PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY: 
BODIES, BUBBLES, & BUNKERS

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to show how the idea of presidential security is a construct that has taken on several different meanings and rationalities in the American context due to shifting power relations, new practices of presidential security, and the constant re-formulation of the friend/enemy distinction. The United States Service has had to continually think and re-think the concept of presidential security in order to provide suitable protection for the President of the United States. In creating these spaces of protection, the practices of the Secret Service have slowly contributed to re-constituting the sovereign to fit the agency’s particular logics and rationalities. The capturing of the Chief Executive Officer does not only rest on disciplinary techniques that restrict, but are also founded on the truth production of the Secret Service: presidents begin to accept and internalize the *modus operandi* of the Secret Service. They begin to self-monitor their own desires and actions related to security concerns. The walls of protection are coupled with a conscious capitulation to accept the barriers of protection. The cage is no longer only imposed from without, but also emerges internally.

By problematizing how this evolving security bubble encapsulates the president, this dissertation is able to examine how the Secret Service begins to reshape and reformulate key democratic governance values by protecting the public and private body of the president through a disciplinary apparatus that seeks to control and contain as well as display and deliberate. Democratic norms that privilege openness have to be challenged, if not curtailed, to adequately protect the Chief Executive Officer. Everyone and everything is a risk that must be inspected, catalogued, and watched, even the president cannot be trusted with his own safety.

With its mission to protect, the Secret Service has constructed an organizational operation to ostracize the other, permanently put the president behind protective procedures, and present a pleasing public persona fitting to the status of the POTUS. These overt actions have allowed an administrative agency to redefine key democratic governance values. The agency has been able to delineate who is a suspicious other, justify the placement of barricades that separate the president from the people, instill a preventive/security ethos in the Office of the President, and display the president as the apex of a constitutional order. Because of its successes and failures, presidential protection has become normal, acceptable, legitimate, and absolutely necessary, which has provided the Service the ability to give shape to a particular rationality concerning what the president can and cannot do. This constitutive role of a public agency has had a dramatic impact on how the people come to experience and interact with the POTUS.

The development of the Secret Service and its protective procedures, however, has been sporadic and tenuous. For the past 100 years, this emerging rationality was produced by a multitude of sources that have helped construct the idea and practice of presidential
security. The subjects of insecurity and security mutually created the idea of POTUS endangerment and safety. Enemies of the state have helped mold state action while friends of the president have sought to project an image of presidential grandeur. In this context, the Service has had to secure territorial spaces in order to conceal and confuse threats while simultaneously having to display and disclose the presidential body to the public. The capacity to control threats and to coordinate the presidential spectacle has enabled the Service to direct the body and mind of the POTUS. With this disciplinary apparatus in place, the Secret Service is able to construct bubbles and bunkers that are designed to protect and trap the president’s two bodies.
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CHAPTER ONE
ADMINISTERING BODIES, BUBBLES, & BUNKERS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO CLOSE PROTECTION

The nature of policing in modern day America has reached a point where the government often has to ignore democratic and constitutional principles to preserve normality and order. To ensure safety and order, policing has expanded in the post-9/11 context to encompass critical individuals and events where such protection had been deemed unnecessary before, especially regarding presidential security. As a result, the Secret Service, like many other police agencies, is seeking to expand, modernize, and update the concept of security. The most effective method to secure potentially dangerous zones is to quarantine high risk-areas by creating a sterile and risk-free environment or at least an isolated pocket of quiet, safety, and stillness. To ensure that the President of the United States is protected in these zones, the Secret Service creates an extensive disciplinary apparatus that monitors every action and movement. Presidential protection evolves into a siege mentality; the Service has built an extensive, but also an adaptive, mobile, and complex fortress that surrounds the president.

These situations, in particular, emerge when the Secret Service classifies an event as a National Special Security Event such as the U.S. Presidential Inaugurations in 2005 and 2009. The Service had to protect and monitor a series of events from the prayer service at St. John’s Church to the procession from the White House to the Capitol to the swearing in ceremony to the myriads inaugural balls in the evening. In and during these events, the Service reshaped the built environment: it sealed off streets, covered manholes, restricted airspace, watched the underground Metro, and implemented security measures to process and filter people, installed advanced listening devices and hidden cameras, and placed undercover operatives among the people. Bridges and streets leading into Washington were closed and the downtown area is in a
quasi state of exception. To accomplish this, the Service coordinated FBI agents, SWAT teams, military personnel, snipers, bomb-sniffing dogs, the regional air defense, undercover agents, and other law enforcement officials to protect the president (Horwitz & Hsu, 2005, January 10; Johnston, 2009, January 15). In 2009, the Service coordinated more than 25,000 security officials, including 12,000 law enforcement officials, 10,000 National Guard troops, and 1,000 park police, and a host of Secret Service agents.

The mobilization of these security officials was meant to create a ring of concentric circles that are designed to build a sterile area (Bajc, 2007). By producing an enclosed space with disciplinary measures, the Service sought to conduct and control behavior at every level. In scenarios like the inauguration of the president, the bubble must be dense, thick, visible, and designed to create clean spaces. Given the presumed threat of an attack, the Service mobilizes its resources of people and things to ensure that spaces are enclosed and free from any potential danger. This is best accomplished by forming a security bubble that separates the president from the people, while also showing the POTUS to the world.

The distance between the president and the people is so great that it is hard to determine how the president actually lives his life. Despite the desire of presidents to have direct access with the public, this is precluded by the bubble that includes and excludes people. Presidents with a direct and personal touch with the people have perhaps faded from the American landscape. As early as the beginning of the 20th century, Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt were learning how to construct consent and connection through isolating media technologies. Although this connection between the president and the people can be achieved at some level by contracting the containment zone, the bubble always filters most interactions with the president. This allows for the president to project a normal image of the public body, but to behave in a
private manner that is concealed from the people. The ability to display and deliberate and contain and control allows the modern presidency to use the media to construct a carefully crafted image that is divorced from authentic interaction based on Jeffersonian ideals.

This mentality stands in stark contrast to the nature of the president and presidential policing in the 19th century which was virtually non-existent, as the security of the Commander-in-Chief was not deemed a priority. Commentators deemed security measures related to the president suspicious, monarchial, and foreign. In 1831, Gustave de Beaumont, companion of Alexis de Tocqueville, was amused by what he perceived as a lack of presidential gravitas. He wrote that President Jackson was “not a man of genius” and “occupies a palace that in Paris would be called a fine private residence” (Pierson, 1996, p. 663). Instead of being richly ornamented, the White House was simply decorated. This lack of a presidential spectacle was only compounded by the fact that the president had no security detail. There were no royal guards, body guards, or military personnel who ensured the safety of the president. Beaumont and Tocqueville thought it odd to see a chief magistrate of a nation in such a homely and unprotected condition. This attitude of the two Frenchmen reflected an image of sovereigns as isolated, protected, and distant from the people they serve. The sovereign should not live, feel, think, or act as the people do. In contrast, representation in the American context (the anti-Federalist and Jeffersonian vision) consisted of rulers who were of the people. Representatives were expected to “mix with the people, think as they think, feel as they feel” (Mason, 1970).

The traditions and habits that existed in 19th century America prevented this formation of extensive presidential protection resulting from the fear of a “Praetorian guard” surrounding and controlling the movements of elected representatives. No president had a moving security detail that would filter unwanted people. All presidents were, in a sense, ‘open’ to the public. This
modest manner of presidential living and casual attitude toward protection reflected the spirit of the age. It was an approach approved by Thomas Jefferson, who was “concerned about what his manner of living and entertaining would say about his political principles” (Seale, 1986, p. 90). Jefferson’s political principles sought to deflect aristocratic, elitist attitudes of the Federalists and reflect an openness and liberty that were associated with the common American. In particular, Jefferson fought against Washington’s predilections of building an executive mansion that sought to create an aura of superiority and distance from the American people.¹ As Washington’s first secretary of state, he was able to thwart such a design and convince the first president to build a mansion that was smaller in scale. Jefferson disagreed with the plan that was accepted as still being too grandiose. As the third person to hold the position, he sought to create a symbol of the presidency as an office that was accessible to the people. This symbol was the White House, or, as it came to be known, the “People’s House.” In Jefferson’s time and for generations afterward, people used the White House grounds for daily walks, picnics, fairs, and even public markets. This openness reflected this type of president.

Jefferson was keenly aware that his manner of living said volumes about his political principles (Seale, 1986). Many early 19th century presidents believed unquestionably that security should not encage the only nationally elected official in the Union. In particular, Lincoln believed that any filter, especially a guard to protect his public person, would interfere with his access to the people (O’Reilly, 1866). This is why Beaumont and Tocqueville saw a president unprotected. It was not that security did not matter; it did. Presidents chose, however, to embrace different logics, practices, and values. Placing barricades between the president and

¹ The original design of the executive mansion was close to five times as large as the White House and sought to illuminate the “kingly ideal of the Presidency current in high Federalist circles” (Seale, 1986, p. 4).
the people was an act that many were unwilling to take as it would inhibit their liberty to mingle with the people; it would compromise their position.

This approach was odd as other countries stoutly protected the body of the sovereign. However, these practices reeked of monarchy and Bonapartism in the American context. The personal bodyguard implied that the sovereign body could call forth subjects as its armor.

Charles II in England ensured that he was protected by the Royal Horse Guard, Napoleon relied on his Old Guard as both protectors and an elite military unit (Elting, 1997), and Peter the Great created the Preobrazhensky and Semenovosky units to serve as palace guards. The practice of close protection extends back from the “Companions” who protected Alexander the Great to the Janissaries who protected the sultans in the Ottoman Empire. The most famous specialized force in the ancient world was the Praetorian Guards. However, it was the Germani corporis custodes who directly protected the Julio-Claudian caesars (Ferrill, 1996). They were the elite custodians who were in charge of the emperor’s body. The Praetoriers merely served as guards to the imperial palace.² The practice of close protection or the use of bodyguards was a common practice in the West and East. Despite the acceptance of sovereign security, the norm of protection was an illegitimate enterprise in the United States, which began to falter after three successful assassinations. It took 117 years for Congress to finally grant proper legal authority in 1906 to the United States Secret Service to protect the President of the United States.

² In protective practices, there is often a distinction between the household guard who secures spaces and buildings and the royal guards and chamberlains who protect the body of an anointed figure like the king. Dynastic families hold a host of properties that are gifted from the social order, which then must be protected from the people. Within these spaces, guardians of sites and persons develop. In Rome, the senate and the people equaled what Rome was. Its buildings were SPQR (The Senate and People of Rome). The Caesarian coup shifted this to an imperial order needing the corporis custodes. In the American context, both sets of guards were rejected. However, there was a greater willingness to employ doormen to secure the building of the White House in the 18th and 19th centuries. The word guard in any form was not used to avoid the tinge of royalism (Seale, 1986). The United States often had White House or Capitol guards, not presidential or congressional guards.
To understand this development in securing the president, it is critical to look at how rationalities emerged, which have allowed the Service to gradually develop far greater methods of control, and in the process reconstitute American conceptions of the democratic character of the presidency. The formation of presidential security emerged at the same time as the rise of unitary state (Skowronek, 1982) and the modern presidency (Klinghard, 2005; Lafeber, 1986). The dispersed public order which operated in contested spaces between Federalist and Anti-Federalist, North and South, large and small states, national and state power began to fade with the emergence of a unitary state that called for a new center of sovereignty that is shared between the states and the people. Jeffersonian ideals of the presidency were eclipsed by Hamiltonian ones. The president was no longer an elevated citizen of a union of states, but a sovereign figure that dispersed authority and power. In this reconstructed republic, this new entity acquired land and resources by a new figure called the Idol of Ohio or the Trust Buster or the Prince of Peace. This figure was dynamic, charismatic, and above all else energetic. Hamilton’s full vision of a president molded after the British monarch materialized while the president who was led by Congress started to disappear. Schlesinger (2004) aptly referred to this formation as the Imperial Presidency.

3 The Office of the President of the United States was embedded with energy, passion, and force through the design of the Constitution. This energy enables the executive to produce good government through results. However, this type of office with its accompanying energy potentially violates the principles of popular government by granting too much power/influence to the president. To address this peculiar problem in the American system, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison writing as Publius formulated a new type of executive that was energetic, but tied to republican principles. Although Publius was united in theory during the ratification of the Constitution, they were later separated in practice. The writings of Pacificus and Helvidius, in particular, reveal a significant split between the Hamiltonian and the Madisonian/ Jeffersonian tradition (Hamilton & Madison, 2007). Writing as Pacificus, Hamilton argued for an independent executive that did not have to rely on the legislature in terms of maintaining the peace. The president can be an independent force. Writing as Helvidius with the urging of Thomas Jefferson, Madison advocated for a tempered executive which is more closely tied to the legislative branch. Presidents in the 19th century mostly followed the tempered executive while presidents in the 20th century, beginning with William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, have reverted back to the Hamiltonian tradition. Freeing themselves from Congress, presidents have used action and energy to dominate.
The advent of a new sovereign who was increasingly secured and isolated from the people was only reinforced by the emergence of the mass media. The newspaper, radio, and television would be mastered and used as screens of power (Luke, 1989). Presidents starting from McKinley, refined by TR, expanded by Wilson, transformed by FDR, revolutionized by Kennedy, and mastered by Reagan were able to constitute a particular reality. The careful manipulation of information and images enabled this new figure to directly influence the masses (Hilderbrand, 1981). Edward Bernays proclamation that public relations was engineering consent was quite accurate concerning presidential use of the media. The fixation on information management allowed the sovereign to maintain and build its stature while being able to remove himself from the people.

With a new unitary state apparatus with a new executive at its helm the United States set down the road toward becoming more than just a collection of states, but a new world power with new enemies. This newly centralizing nation-state became more heavily concerned with the social, economic, political, and the dangerous. The anarchist, the socialist, and the communist posed a fundamental threat to an organized and unitary governance structure. This new enemy of the state often manifested as the mad, partisan, and unorganized anarchist began to define the new centralized and unitary state. The assassinations of President Garfield in 1881, Tsar Alexander II in 1881, President Carnot of France in 1894, Prime Minister Antonio Canovas of Spain in 1897, Empress Elizabeth of Austria in 1898, King Umberto of Italy in 1900, President McKinley in 1901, King Alexander and Queen Draga of Serbia in 1903, King Carlos of Portugal 1908, Crown Prince Louis-Philippe of Portugal in 1908, King George of Greece in 1913, and Archduke Ferdinand and the Duchess of Austria in 1914 created a new, more threatening context for how, in the U.S., to safeguard its sovereign and the body politic. An unguarded and
unprotected sovereign was no longer tenable in a context where the chaotic and confused and murder and mayhem may threaten the public order. In this environment, the new entity called POTUS must be secured from partisans who seek to terminate his life.\textsuperscript{4} With these drastic changes, enemies of the state began to discipline state action and formation.

Despite the increased sophistication of how the Secret Service has been used to protect, the idea and implementation of a presidential bubble was a slow and arduous process. It has not developed in a rational process that can be reduced to a set of laws that prescribe how security should be operationalized. Even though presidential security has developed in a more of an episodic and unpredictable manner, its development is often overlooked. Given the frequency of political assassinations and the common practice of protecting political leaders, Cox notes that “it is somewhat surprising that there are few theories” about protecting leaders (Cox, 2001, p. 7). Because the idea of close protection is underdeveloped, this dissertation seeks to explain how the concept of close protection for a Constitutional Republic became institutionalized in early 20\textsuperscript{th} century America and how it has evolved into the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century.

In examining the genealogy of presidential protection, there were several limitations to this study that must be noted. First, the enigmatic nature of the Secret Service precluded my ability to gather the amount of material I would have preferred. Because of the highly sensitive and classified information related to protecting the president, there is no way to determine fully and precisely how the Secret Service protects the president or how these practices have changed over time. The documents related to the procedures of protective procedures are classified and not accessible. This was a particular problem for examining internal changes in the Secret

\textsuperscript{4} Walter P. Phillips developed the acronym POTUS for the United Press Association in 1879 to serve as a shorthand for the President of the United States. William Safire (2008) notes that the acronym emerged in popular usage in the 1950s to refer to the President Eisenhower, especially among the people who immediately surrounded him. However, the Secret Service occasionally used the acronym to refer to the presence of the president in early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. In particular, the Service labeled the presidential train with the term POTUS.
Service structure. The Service, for example, does not provide a complete organizational chart. There is no way to know positions, titles, and how many divisions exist within the Service or how they have changed. On a similar note, it was rare to find exact personnel numbers or budgetary figures for the White House Detail or the Presidential Protection Detail. Even with these difficulties, there was plenty of information that established how the Secret Service has created meaning related to presidential protection. Although I was not able to find all of the necessary information, there was enough to draw approximate conclusions concerning presidential security.

Second, theories, concepts, and analytics tend to explain any type of phenomenon by simplifying it. As a result, conceptual categories both capture and miss important details about the complexity of real life. This project focuses on the power, politics, problematic events, and processes of presidential protection. The reliance on key theorists, like those of Foucault and Schmitt, help illuminate key aspects about close protection, but they hide other parts of the Secret Service. Although the mundane and normal stories are included, the majority bits of information are connected to significant events in Secret Service history. Related to these potential blind spots is that of selection bias of sources, which can lead to predetermined conclusions. This bias is handled by relying on an inductive approach and explicitly using sources that show some aspect of the relation between the president and the protective detail. The accounts overwhelming show a gradual sophistication of protective practices over the past 100 years. Finally, this project does not try to create an all encompassing history of the Service. It does not capture all or even the majority of important details about the history of the Secret Service, and this is not an account that seeks to provide the definitive history of how the Secret Service evolved. In particular, it neglects candidate protection, dignitary protection,
counterfeiting missions, etc. The focus is on power, control, and the political vis-à-vis the president.

Despite these limitations, the purpose of this research is to show how the idea of presidential security is a construct that has taken on several different meanings and rationalities in the American context because of shifting power relations, new practices of presidential security, and the constant re-formulation of the friend/enemy distinction. The Service has had to continually think and re-think the concept of presidential security in order to provide suitable protection for the POTUS. In creating these spaces of protection, the Service has slowly reimagined its own officers’ duties as it has re-constituted the sovereign to fit its particular logics and rationalities. It has primarily done this by constructing a bubble around the body of POTUS, which is an enclosed space that is open but separate, transparent but also a screen (in both sensees), and a membrane of men, women, and things around a body.

By examining how this evolving security bubble encapsulates the president, this dissertation is able to examine how the Service protects the public and private body of the POTUS through a disciplinary apparatus that seeks to control and contain. It does this by protecting his nationalized, institutionalized, and politicized body and his private image from public and private enemies of the state, carefully controlling information about public and private affairs: the Service must employ total information and organism management. In dealing with the president, the Service devises new meaning and subjectivities related to presidential protection. Over the past 100 years, there has been an emerging rationality that describes the basic functions and principles of presidential protection. Without these discursive formations that rest on authoritative statements, the president could not be confined, disciplined, or
surrounded by a phalanx of armed guards like a dictator or king. The creation and administration of the bubble is shaped by these governing rationalities.

**The Two Bodies of the President**

The history of presidential protection is a history of how the presidential bubble slowly re-constructs the conception of the sovereign beginning in the late 19th and early 20th century America. A new administrative agency is not only able to police this newly created sovereign in the early 20th century, but is able to begin to control his public and private movements by the possible sacrifice of life to the Office of the President. The political master, in one sense, becomes constrained, if not subjected, to an administrative agency that can control and conduct his movement and action. However, the capturing of the Chief Executive Officer does not only rest on disciplinary techniques that restrict, but are also founded on the truth production of the Secret Service: the discipline of self emerges as the president begins to accept and internalize the *modus operandi* of the Secret Service. He begins to self-monitor his own desires and actions related to security concerns. The walls of protection are coupled with a conscious capitulation to accept the barriers of protection. The cage is no longer only imposed from without, but also emerges internally.⁵

This dissertation is about the process of how administrative practices of protection begin to create new subjectivities and rationalities related to presidential practices of openness and accessibility.⁶ With the advent and institutionalized form of protection that emerges during

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⁵ It is at this disciplinary moment that an administrative agency is able to reshape and reformulate a political institution like the Office of the President. In using Foucault’s concepts of productive and disciplinary power (1995), the Service is able to restrain and regulate the body of POTUS.

⁶ In working in a similar vein as Cook (1996) and Carpenter (2001), an administrative agency like the Secret Service is able to reconstitute democratic governance values. In particular, it begins to create, infuse, and project an image of fortification and inaccessibility. The agency has been able to define who is a normal American via police thought and who is a suspicious other, build barricades that separate the president from the people, and instill a preventive/security ethos in the Office of the President. Hence, the role of administrators goes beyond the
Theodore Roosevelt’s administration during the mature post-reconstructed republic, the Service had to deal with the two bodies of the president: his public body that is ordained by the people through the Electoral College and his private body that is prone to weakness and folly. In dealing with these two separate spheres, the Service must handle both the President of the United States (POTUS) and the man of brute fact and human nature. This requires building an extensive security apparatus that protects his public and private life, carefully controlling information about public and private secrets. The concept of the two bodies of the president can be traced back to the two bodies of the king, in which he simultaneously had a body politic that was divine and eternal and a body natural that was weak and temporal (Kantorowicz, 1957). The King’s mystical two bodies problem can be clearly seen in the figure of POTUS. In particular, this tension between these bodies is reflected in how the Service came to handle the public and private body of the president since 1901.

instrumental function of service to a political entity, exercising in addition a constitutive function through political and administrative practices that revise and reform fundamental regime values and purposes.

7 The king as a divine agent who was simultaneously consecrated by God and a person of the earth who dwelt in the earthly city was a tension that English jurists, parliament, and the King’s court constantly had to manage (Kantorowicz, 1957). The body natural and the body politic was a mystical doctrine of the church that was transferred to English law during the Tudor and early Stuart lines. The King had a divine body that was embodied in a corporation and the King’s earthly body that was trapped in flesh and blood. The tension between these bodies allowed for conspirators and revolutionists to fight the king in order to defend the King. Bolingbroke to the Puritans based their moves to dethrone the natural body, not the body politic.

8 Carl Schmitt (1985) argues that some Western political concepts are secularized versions of Christian doctrine. He notes that the liberal bourgeoisie “wanted a god, its god could not become active; it wanted a monarch, but he had to be powerless.” In effect, Schmitt observes that they “declared the person of the king to be inviolable but had him take an oath on the constitution” (1985, p. 60). They created a liberal king, who was tied to a Constitution. Like Schmitt, Mansfield also points out the tension between having a strong and weak executive, especially in the American context. Beginning with Machiavelli and ending with Publius, Mansfield (1989) takes a journey of how the executive was created, ossified, tempered, constitutionalized, moderated, and finally republicanized. In this process of taming the prince, modern executive power became ambivalent in the American context, but was embedded with manliness. The executive is both strong and weak; the executive is confined to form, but required to produce results; the executive must carryout the law at the bidding of his Congressional masters, but possess powers to deal with the necessity. In creating this figure with potentially enormous power, the Founders, especially Hamilton, wanted to create an energetic president molded after the king. The desire to maintain the essence and feel of the king was a critique the Anti-Federalist made against the Federalist idea of the presidency. Cato argued that the president and king “are substantially the same” (1981). George Mason “raised a fundamental challenge to the possibility of reconciling a single executive with republic principles” (Rohr, 1986, p. 48). Access to energy and secrecy, according to Mason, posed a fundamental threat to republican principles (Farrand, 1937). This energetic figurehead closely resembled the English monarch and Roman dictators.
The Public Body of the President

For the Service, the POTUS has been anointed by the people and set apart for a special calling. As protectors, agents are the legal custodians of the body politic as they have the right to watch, observe, and be in the presence of the Chief Executive.⁹ They are to live with the president in order possibly die for the POTUS. Special Agent Edmund Starling in the first part of the 20th century referred to himself as a “white knight in armor” whose responsibility it was to secure the safety of the body of POTUS (1946, p. 30). These special agents, according to former Chief Baughman, are “human shields” who “must be prepared, as part of their duty, to intercept a bullet, the cold steel of a knife or any other weapon with their own flesh” for the shielded POTUS (1963, p. 63).

The obligation to sacrifice life to preserve life is the code of the Service. Its motto reflects this implicit oath: “Worthy of Trust and Confidence.” There is no greater degree of trust or confidence than to serve as the president’s bodily armor. By choosing death to secure life, agents “preserve the code of a medieval palace guard” (Rush, 1988, p. 19). Although Special Agent Petro in the beginning of the 21st century rightly points out that agents never make this oath explicit, he is wrong to conclude that it is a myth. The training, practice, and culture of the Service revolve around this simple tenant. As Petro himself observes:

Most people duck when they hear gunshots. It’s the predictable response of policemen and soldiers. They get down low to protect themselves before returning fire. But Secret Service agents need to do just the opposite, which is an unnatural reaction. When shots are fired, we’re trained to pull our weapon, stand up straight, and return fire. Instead of protecting ourselves, we turn ourselves into a larger target (2005, p. 14)

When Reagan was shot, Petro notes that the military aide next to Reagan took cover while the agent next to the president became a shield: he would give his body to preserve another. This

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⁹ This constant watching is royal in many ways. Princes and princesses to kings and queens have been watched their whole lives. There is never a time when the gaze has been lifted from their presence.
oath of death or dismemberment in violence to shield the president empowers the United States Secret Service to direct the president. Agent will die so the POTUS must listen to agents on how to live. The oath to secure grants the Service not only a deep conviction to protect, but a fair degree of power over the mind and body of the president.

According to Rohr (1986, 1998), this dual nature of oaths is the moral foundation of public service as they are made for only purposes of the highest order. He points out that oaths serve two purposes for civil servants: they bind, but grant autonomy. Secret Service agents, like all federal employees, swear to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States.” In making this pledge, agents also make a different oath: the Service ties itself to the person who embodies the powers of Article II. In the unfolding of the constitutional history of the United States, the preservation of the president’s body becomes an issue of high concern. The sovereign who protects the constitutional order must himself be protected. His body becomes an exception in a constitutional order. Ensuring safety from enemies of the state, the sovereign’s body must be separated and treated in a distinct manner that violates a liberal and egalitarian ethos. To protect this public body, agents must revere the president’s body and be willing to sacrifice and discard their own for his. In a democratic society where all people are created equal, an agent “puts the life of its elected emperor above the lives of all others” (Rush, 1988, p. 18).

In making this sacrifice, agents are bound to the president, but also are set free. With the professional obligation to die and protect, agents are granted the power to conduct the conduct of the president. The president also makes a similar pledge to the Secret Service as he must listen

10 Rohr distinguishes between an oath and a promise. An oath is a “profound commitment because its object is always something that is or should be of great significant to the juror” while promises “can be serious or somewhat trivial” (1998, pp. 70-71). Both are morally binding on the subject, but an oath is not “easily reappraised” while a promise “can always be reconsidered” (1998, p. 72).

11 In addition to his friend/enemy distinction, Carl Schmitt’s other crucial variable is the exception. He argues that the sovereign can declare a state of exception or suspend the constitutional order in order to save it. Similar to Lincoln’s limb-body metaphor, the state of exception allows the sovereign to identify and eliminate enemies of the state. In extending this construct, the exception comes to cover the president’s body.
how to live. The POTUS accepts the custodial responsibilities of the agency, which grants it a
great deal of latitude.\textsuperscript{12} As the chief executive, the president has lost his ability to act in ways
that would endanger his security or the freedom of being out of the bubble. He should not have
the flexibility or freedom to take a walk by himself, drive a car without a host of bodyguards, or
ride unsafe horses. This attitude of making the president different and more special than an
ordinary citizen is seen from the origins of presidential security. Franklin D. Roosevelt violated
this norm early in his presidency when he decided to take a side trip up Mount Charleston in
Nevada without Secret Service approval. The road was made of gravel and as they progressed
up the mountain it became more and more dangerous until the motorcade had to turn around on a
narrow passage. Special Agent Edmund Starling thought Roosevelt was reckless and
endangered his life. He told the president,

\begin{quote}
I don’t think you were fair to me or to the Secret Service or the country to go
up that mountain last night. You took an unnecessary chance. I know it is
hard to realize that you have no right to endanger yourself, but you haven’t.
Your life isn’t your own to give or to take now. It belongs to the people of the
United States (1946, p. 315).
\end{quote}

FDR agreed with Starling’s assessment, apologized, and wrote a letter to Chief Moran assuming
full responsibility for the act. Even Eleanor Roosevelt intervened and told her husband that he
should “adhere rigidly in the future to the itineraries he [Starling] approves” (Starling & Sugrue,
1946, p. 316).

This attitude of the POTUS belonging to the United States allows the Service the logic it
needs to direct presidential behavior. The implicit oath to the president and explicit oath to the

\textsuperscript{12} The reliance on a large contingent of bodyguards to secure the life of the king was heavily used by Richard in
1397. English historian G.L. Harris points out that “Richard formed a Cheshire bodyguard composed of seven
squadrons of forty-six men with two reserves, in all some 750 men who guarded him wherever he went--their motto
being ‘Dycun slep sicury quile we wake’” (Harris, 2005, p. 483). The king was never to be left unguarded. The
motto only reinforced the notion that the King’s life was to be protected above their own: their bodies (living dead)
serve as a protective barrier of/for sovereign (living god). They are ready for sacrifice to the sovereign.
Constitution creates a power dynamic that links the protector and the protectee. Power produces both bodies. Presidents from Taft to Truman to Clinton have all been forced to adhere to protective measures regarding menial and serious activities. President Harding was told he could not have a campaign event on a particular ferry, President Carter was informed that he could not travel to Canada because of security threats, and President Reagan was not allowed to throw out the first pitch at a baseball game from the pitcher’s mound. The president’s public body has to be watched and enveloped. Agent Marty Venker of the Secret Service described it “like the eye of God, you know, always watching all day long, looking down through the trees with zoom-lens and night vision, like the Holy See” (Rush, 1988, p. 15). Because of this distinctive calling, the president has no right over his own body: it is owned by the people and the Service has been granted the authority to protect it.

This implicit oath of the Secret Service firmly justifies the logic that the president’s public body must be governed and protected. As sacrificial lambs appointed to die for the POTUS if the occasion arises, the Service is a unit that has been delegated the authority to preserve the public body of the president for the sake of the Union, which in a democracy is a powerful contract. Death for life allows the POTUS to live and govern. This oath was sealed when Secret Service agent Leslie Coffelt spilled his blood for the life of President Harry S Truman. This oath was further entrenched by the blood of President John F. Kennedy. Their deaths affirmed the mutual vow and responsibilities that the POTUS and Secret Service share.

In protecting his public body and upholding its oath, the Service has primarily sought to protect the president from freak attacks by unstable individuals and organized attacks that stem from either terrorist organizations or foreign states. These constant and recurring threats require the Service to make a fundamental and very political distinction: the categorization between
friend and enemy. Carl Schmitt originally articulated this concept of the political, which seeks to establish criteria to distinguish between friend and enemy. This concept of the political rests on a very real threat of existential annihilation. Reminiscent of Hobbes’s concern for life, security, and order, it is the responsibility of the state to ensure that this threat is handled. In developing his theory of the partisan, Schmitt devises a basic understanding of three types of enmity: conventional, real, and absolute (Schmitt, 2007; Slomp, 2005). What concerns Schmitt is not the conventional enemy; they are recognized enemies who are bound by the rules of war. It is the real and absolute partisan who uses irregular means to wreak terror. While the real partisan is the internal threat that the social order has given birth to, it is still tied to its homeland, which tends to make them less dangerous. The absolute enemy is the most problematic threat. This partisan is not tied to land or place, but solely to an ideological cause. They fight for fundamental values that bind them to nothing but their cause. This type of enemy is the late 19th century anarchist and the modern-day terrorist. Because their actions are absolute and total, the state seeks to conduct total war itself.

By relying on Schmitt’s central insight about the basic nature of the political, the partisan, and the exception, the Service must continuously establish who is a public enemy of the state. Although the president comes from the people, he must be protected from them, especially the partisan who is willing to commit terror for ideological considerations. His body must be treated as an exception to the rule because of his status as POTUS and his status as a possible target of ideology; no other political entity is treated with such care or concern in the law or in practice. Furthermore, the public nature of the enemy requires the Service to marshal its resources to identify and track these threats who rely on irregular methods to accomplish its purposes. For the most part, the Service is not usually concerned with the conventional enemy, but the real and
absolute partisan who seek to destabilize the public order. The internal crank and crazy and the
global external terrorist becomes issues of high concern. The question for the Secret Service is
how far agents should go in its protection function. Do they anticipate the crime instead of react
to the commission of a crime? Who is most likely to attack the president? What profiles need to
be created? What classes of people need to be categorized? In asking and answering these
questions, Schmitt’s idea of the exception is flexibilized. It is here where the state may choose to
suspend or maintain the constitutional order to deal with enemies of the state. This order at times
may be suspended and at other times be permitted to operate in gray segments. This becomes a
necessity as the Service seeks to eliminate real and absolute partisans that would seriously harm
the social order.

In classifying public enemies of the state, the Service has created extensive watch lists
with foes that it considers to be dangerous to the body the POTUS. After the JFK assassination,
the Warren Commission recommended that the Secret Service refine its methods of determining
who enemies of the state were after its discovery that the Service did not have adequate
intelligence, especially regarding to the communication and intelligence flow between the
Service and the FBI. The Warren Commission Report stated that “it will require every available
resource of our Government to devise a practical system which has any reasonable possibility of
revealing such malcontents” (Warren Commission, 1964, p. 463). The development of the
concept of dangerousness13 coupled with the government’s insistence that enemies of the state
were everywhere allowed the Service to devise broad criteria of who was a potential risk. By

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13 Dangerousness is a term that is grounded in scientific discourse to develop profiles and characteristics of potential
assassins. The terms arises in the 1960s and 1970s as the Secret Service begins to take formal measures to
investigate in a methodologically more sound way what class of individuals is more likely to attack the POTUS. A
threat is transformed to a discourse on dangerousness, which is based on classifications, predicting political
violence, and generalizations.
1974, the Service had 84,000 files on potential assassins, mostly classes of people it considered to be real partisans. Agent Venker said that the index file of who was a threat probably contained an estimated 100,000 to 180,000 names (Rush, 1988). Senator Sam Ervin effectively labeled this practice as a “mass surveillance system unprecedented in American history” (Congressional Record, 92nd Congress, 1st session, vol. 117, p. 31874).

In more serious situation and a shift toward a focus on absolute enemies, this massive surveillance system was expanded immediately following the 9/11 attacks. The Bush administration enacted a surveillance policy that exceeded previous use of police power by using extensive measures to identify and monitor perceived enemies of the state. Among the consequences of such action was that “surveillance has become algorithmic, technological, preemptive, and classificatory, in every way broadening and tightening the net of social control” (Lyon, 2003, p. 143). In effect, the “pendulum has swung … widely from ‘care’ to ‘control’” (Lyon, 2003, p. 143). What the state cannot see must be made clear and visible in order to regulate and restrain. To actively watch over suspected groups, new internal borders were constructed on the ethos of fear to monitor citizens and non-citizens alike (Pickering & Weber, 2006). Techniques ranging from closed-circuit television, biometric technologies, and radio frequency identification tags gave the state power to track suspected individuals and populations. The use of over 200 data-mining programs by more than 50 federal agencies to track terrorist and citizen was just one example of the extensive powers used by the government (Brasch, 2005). Not only does government extensively use these programs, it also had access to private data programs from corporations through the PATRIOT Act (Brasch, 2005). The promotion of these high-tech instruments not only secured more people, but some contend it provided “an important
myth giving greater legitimacy to and confidence in the government’s ability to provide security” (Haque, 2005, p. 480).

To increase its effectiveness at protection, the Service has been given a great deal of flexibility in its attempts to investigate terrorism and related criminal behavior, especially since the Warren Commission’s recommendations in 1965 on how to secure the POTUS. The nation cannot afford to lose a key political leader or be seriously attacked through its financial institutions. The prevention doctrine became solidified, expanded, and transformed through various forms of government labeling and enactment in the post-9/11 world. Prevention could only be fortified if the Service was given greater latitude to identify, watch, and monitor perceived threats. The formulation and passage of the USA PATRIOT Act just a mere six weeks after 9/11 expanded the existing financial investigatory powers of the Secret Service. Sec. 506 of the PATRIOT Act extended the jurisdiction of the Secret Service by granting it additional offenses that it can investigate. Although the FBI was the lead agency and primary authority in these offenses, the Service now had the power to investigate “cases involving espionage, foreign counterintelligence, [and] information protected against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001a). These new powers reinforced and expanded the ability of the Service to discover and classify between conventional, real, and absolute enemies.

Private Body of the President

The securitization and normalization of protection, however, goes beyond the protection of the president’s public body. The Secret Service and its administrative practices have also served as a barrier of bodies and buildings that serve as a bubble that protects the hidden and private life of the president.14 Privacy is a construct that has powerfully emerged from a type of

14 The use of bodyguards to provide some degree of security and spectacle developed as early as Henry VII’s reign in England. The King created the Privy Chamber so “he could retreat in search of peace, relative solitude, and,
protection that requires presidents to be always in a secured and controlled location. This notion of presidential protection extends beyond just securing the body of the president in closed spaces; it also allows the Service to keep some of the life of presidents secrets and some more public. With the desire to keep some aspects public and some private, the Service works in tandem with others aspects of the White House bubble like the White House Press Office to carefully manage image perception. The protective detail must be concerned with information management.

Because the gaze of the Secret Service penetrates the private life of the president, a relationship emerges between protectee and protector. This relationship is often plagued with difficulties, ambiguities, and tensions, but it may develop into a relationship grounded in cooperation, trust, and openness. The direct and quasi-unfiltered access requires this relationship to be built on promises of trust and privacy. The agency has demanded, from the very beginning, that agents do not discuss or talk about the private lives of presidents. In 1910, the Secretary of the Treasury wrote a memo titled “Protecting the President,” which emphatically states the appropriate conduct of Secret Service agents. They are “instructed not to talk of anything they may see or hear.” In fact, “so far as the action of the president and his family, and social or official callers are concerned, the men are deaf, dumb, and blind” (Holden, 2006, p. 112). Agents are bound by a promise not to reveal or disclose information that would harm either the private or public persona of the POTUS.

This promise of secrecy and confidentiality concerning presidential conduct has been deeply woven into the fabric of the agency. Agents Bowen and Neal in the 1960s remarked that perhaps, greater safety from assassination” (Bucholz & Key, 2004, p. 47) However, court life followed him into these chambers as well. To filter and protect the king from the throngs intruding into the Privy Chamber, English historians Bucholz and Key note, “to provide additional security, as well as to increase the magnificent of his court, Henry also created a royal bodyguard” (2004, p. 47).
the presidential protective detail has seen and heard things that would make the nightly news because of its close proximity and distance to the life of POTUS. However, “each agent keeps a closed mouth and a memory which is conveniently forgetful where significant events are concerned” (Bowen & Neal, 1961, p. 157). Agent Petro, who served in the 1980s and 1990s, has said that in no way would he “betray the trust and unique personal access that agents have with people we protect” (2005, p. 279). This zone of privacy enables the president to hide parts of his humanity that would infringe on his carefully managed and constructed public persona. The image of the POTUS must not be threatened by the reality of the private body of the president.

In promising to protect the body and image of the president, the Service becomes enmeshed in information control. Secret Service scholar Melanson argued that it is no secret that the Secret Service offers “protection of a different kind—protection of the president’s political career, of his image with friends and family, of the safety and anonymity of his female companions” (2002, p. 216). This concern with information management develops in the late 19th century and early 20th century. With the establishment of press offices in the White House, the media gaze would report on presidential activities on a continual basis and create the media presidency (Ponder, 1999). This hub of information requires presidents from TR to Obama to construe messages that directly impact media and audience perception (Kumar, 2007). With the formation of the media presidency as the same time as the development of presidential security, the bubble becomes a screen. Its role is to hide and reveal. This new dynamic puts the Service in a context where it has to filter and mold information journalists see and hear, just like a press

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15 The implicit responsibility to act for the president’s sake is also reflected by the chamberlain conflict in the royal household. Is the chamberlain the King’s man or just a courier? Is the Secret Service an extension of the president himself or just a protective unit designed merely for security?
office. The Service has to be tuned into which stories to release, which stories to leak, and which stories to hide.

Furthermore, this type of protection and information control is critical because life in the bubble causes the president and his staffers to lose touch with the realties of economic hardships, religious fervor, and national mood. Agent McCarthy (1985) saw firsthand how presidents fail to understand this outside world because of layers of protection, handlers, and reporters. But beyond the failure to make a connection with real problems that affect real people, agents must mask the personality quirks that each president has. These abnormalities, however, must be kept secret in order to protect the institutional majesty of presidential power. Presidents ranging from Woodrow Wilson to Franklin Roosevelt to John F. Kennedy to Jimmy Carter have wanted certain secrets to be kept. Agents have noticed presidential personalities as being petty, cold, dismissive, hypocritical, awkward, difficult, and weak. No president wants it leaked to the press how he acts behind the dense and impenetrable security bubble, especially if his public image is radically different from his private actions. Stories about presidential behavior ranging from gambling, to flirting with women, to sneaking in women through the backdoor, to lying, to throwing a temper tantrum, to fighting with the First Lady all need to be kept within the confines of the White House. This confidentiality the Secret Service has about presidential conduct enables the president to project a more dignified and distinguished personality to the public at large.

President Jimmy Carter sought to create an image of Southern peach farmer who was deeply moral and religious. He was the outsider coming to rescue a town that was imprisoned by its lax morals. This nice guy image was reinforced through various stunts that Carter employed during his term in office. Most notably, he sought to create a different attitude about the
president by replacing all the limos with sedans and walking down Pennsylvania Avenue during his inauguration parade. According to agents, however, Jimmy Carter was partially a hypocrite. These stunts were just stunts. Carter portrayed the image of a hospitable Southerner who was grounded in reality, but he failed to live up to his image in private. To say the least, this Southern Peach farmer was not popular with the Secret Service. He never spoke, looked at, or bothered to recognize any of his protective detail (McCarthy & Smith, 1985). For one agent, “Carter was a jerk despite his carefully crafted image of being a Washington outsider; he was petty, a sore loser, and competitive; he was brutally cold and dismissive” (Rush, 1988, pp. 125-126).

Relations between the Secret Service (and the Washington Metro Police and Park Police) and President Carter had deteriorated to such an extent that agents finally started to show their disdain for the private body of the president during his last months in office (Rush, 1988). One time, President Carter ordered the Service to ensure that no one in the motorcade ever use its sirens around Washington. To get back at Jimmy Carter, the Park Police and Washington Metro cops blasted their sirens in a tunnel “creating an ear-spilling noise” (McCarthy & Smith, 1985, p. 172). When they returned to the White House, “all the motorcycles officers had smiles on their faces” (McCarthy & Smith, 1985, p. 172). Although the Secret Service had a deep disdain for the person of Carter, they kept his White House life secret; agents protected Carter’s carefully crafted image because of their implicit promise of secrecy, which required them to be quiet regarding private and public affairs. The disconnect the between public and private personality of the president was only ensured because of the bubble. It selected what to show and what to hide.
On the other hand, the Service has also used the press to re-establish presidential credibility by re-building the private life of the president. Mike Reilly, head of the presidential protective detail during FDR’s administration, often talked to the press. One time he secretly asked three members of the press corps to verify that Roosevelt did not have a heart attack. This was motivated by constant attacks in the press related to how FDR was no longer fit to be POTUS because of health concerns. Reilly said that he knew “how the Boss felt about these stories and realizing that these were three honest reporters who really believe he was in a hospital somewhere, I decided to forestall any newspaper junk that would upset FDR” (1947, p. 196).

Because of the close connection that may develop between the president and his protective detail, agents often feel a personal obligation to protect his image, sanity, and well-being.

And because of the security bubble, presidents feel connected to their protective units. President Coolidge befriended Agent Edmund Starling to the point where they became almost best friends in the White House. Starling taught him how to fish, hunt, and ride. The two even discussed Starling leaving his White House post to work for Coolidge after he left the White House. Franklin D. Roosevelt and his agent also developed a close relationship; the president was able to disclose some of his thoughts to his agents. Presidential historian Jim Bishop noted that agents are “as close to the President as his skin” and “he often confided his innermost thoughts on diverse subjects because he knew, by their calling, that he could ‘sound off’ without fear of being quoted” (J. Bishop, 1974, pp. xi-xii). President George H.W. Bush also extensively trusted his agents to maintain a code of secrecy about public and private affairs. In a letter, he wrote, “I allowed the agents to have proximity first because they had my full confidence and secondly because I knew them to be totally discreet and honorable. Never once did I hear an agent on any detail of mine, Vice Presidential or Presidential, repeat any gossip about anyone
they had ever covered” (George Bush, 1998, April 24). This type of control and management over information enables the Service to build and maintain a close relationship to POTUS.

In protecting the private body of the president, the Service must also identify and deal with private enemies of the president or with what Schmitt called an *adversarii*. The adversary exists within a political community and is no danger to the political order as they only seek to secure power through legal means. The reliance on the Service for political purposes emerged during Theodore Roosevelt’s administration. He, like many future presidents, would order the Service to investigate certain crimes, people, and issues. The Service went all over the nation looking at land fraud cases for Roosevelt and happened to uncover fraud by two Washington politicians. In fact, this investigation discredited “most of the Republican leaders in Congress” (Gatewood, 1970, p. 245). Senator John H. Mitchell and Congressman John Williamson were nabbed during these investigations (Messing, 1966). The arrest of these two politicians caused an uproar in both halls of Congress as many felt that they were being tailed by Secret Service agents. The battle over how to use the Secret Service culminated in 1908-1909 when Congress prohibited the loaning of agents to other departments, which ended its escapades in tracking down gamblers, land fraud cases, dealing with the mob, and a host of other crimes. Congress wanted to restrict the ability of the Service to become the president’s own private police force.

Although Congress kept a watcheye on the Service, it still, at times, became an overt political tool for the White House. Richard Nixon, Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, and the White House staff were acutely aware of the importance of the Service in identifying these types of enemies. By actively relying on the Service, Nixon was able to use agents to accomplish political ends that were separate from protection. He often used the Secret Service to create barriers between the press corps and his office, label protestors as private enemies, and use the
Service to spy on political rivals, journalists, potential troublemakers, and even his own family. Agent Mary Venker nicely encapsulated how the Service was politicized during Nixon’s term in office. He said, “There were times when Nixon called upon the Secret Service to do his personal bidding and the agency had hopped to it” (Rush, 1988, p. 58).

**The Presidential Bubble**

In securing the two bodies of the president, the Service devises a spatial zone around the POTUS and ensures that no unauthorized person can infiltrate the perimeters that surround the president. The security bubble is designed as an enclosed space to keep the president entrapped while preventing unknown threats from penetrating its perimeter. Presidents are often thought to live in the so-called fishbowl, which inhibits if not destroys the private lives of presidents (Rockman, 1984). Presidential movements, habits, family relations, personality, speech, and actions are constantly “monitored by a burgeoning and often hostile press and by demanding and critical citizens” (Walcott & Hult, 1987, p. 115). This transparent space gives the people and the press full access to how the president governs in public settings and how he acts in private settings. The public and private distinction that most citizens enjoy collapses on 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. The White House ensures that there is no distinction between office and bedroom. In the end, the fishbowl creates an environment where the president “might end up doing what goldfish do — which is not much of anything” (Song, 2003, p. 14). Hence, the lack of privacy afforded by a transparent bowl deters the president from acting in any way that could be labeled different or abnormal.

However, the fishbowl metaphor does not adequately describe presidential living because it does not consider how presidential security constructs a bubble that provides not only security,
but also a space that grants a great deal of private freedom.\textsuperscript{16} Although it is a different kind of privacy, the POTUS is allowed a fair amount of personal independence. In this zone, the Secret Service acts as a screen to control and contain information. In effect, the Service becomes embedded within the structure of White House information management. It is concerned with presidential image and safety. Agents must release, hide, and gather intelligence to secure both of these concepts. The agency becomes involved in the information war that surrounds the White House. It must deal with and compete against a host of entities that seek to shape and mold the POTUS. Its function, however, is to manage information in a certain way, which secures the body of POTUS and enhances the Office of the POTUS. Without an open and unfiltered gaze, the POTUS through the help of his protective detail can project a presidential persona while hiding some presidential quirks and abnormalities.

In contrast to a static fishbowl, the bubble that encapsulates the POTUS is an entity that changes based on the situation. The connotations of the bubble are numerous. It can be referred to as an isolated dome that can move and mutate subject to external variables. It is also a pocket of gas formed by a liquid that is fragile and unstable. And, it is another word for an unreliable scheme. The bubble the Service constructs has elements of each of these meanings. The protective bubble is an enclosed space that serves to isolate and separate the POTUS with layers of security; it is an amorphous matter of enclosed space where agency membrane of bodies shields the body membrane of the POTUS. The size and strength of the bubble that surrounds the POTUS is also contingent on the physical location, the political context, presidential personality, threat level assessments, and other factors. However, this isolated chamber built by

\textsuperscript{16} Although the fishbowl does imply that presidential movement and action is curbed, it relies on a model of openness and transparency for these conditions to emerge. His model emphasizes public constraints. There is no doubt that the fishbowl metaphor works to a limited degree because of this public focus, but it fails to take account of how the president can escape this transparent environment through layers of presidential protection afforded by the Secret Service.
bodies and buildings is unstable and can be deflated as seen in the attacks of FDR, Truman, Kennedy, Ford, and Reagan. Furthermore, the bubble is an artificial scheme that is built as a screen in order to disclose and display. Agents carefully manage what is retained and what is released about POTUS body movement, gestures, comments, and actions.

This conceptual tool allows the Secret Service a great deal of flexibility in determining how the bubble should be built. It can be designed as an isolated dome of protection or a screen that filters for image management purposes. The president may require the Secret Service at times to take a step back for political considerations while at other times the president may need extensive protection for security considerations. Hence, the bubble can be dense or transparent, visible or invisible, impenetrable or penetrable, and it can be expanded or contracted. Chief Wilson of the Secret Service aptly described how the bubble would change in the 1940s and 1950s. He remarked that presidents “like to be on the move, at parties and in public places, and their protection varies according to the occasion and number of the people present” (1965, p. 232). This range allows the president to be open and accessible to the people or completely sealed off.

Under the former category, barriers that are often erected to prevent any contact with the president can be relaxed, which enables people to have direct access to the Commander-in-Chief. A bubble that is invisible, penetrable, and contracted often emerges during election season, which allows the president to “press the flesh” and have direct contact with citizens. This environment allows the president to project an image of a normal American, who has the same common problems, feelings, fears, and concerns that the American public has. These conditions breed familiarly and trust between the president and citizens. By masking and altering the bubble to fit these contingent situations, the Service helps create this presidential persona. To
reinforce the image, the Service also creates an enclosed space around crowds. The people are
epected to comport themselves to certain level of behavior. The presence of the president
requires the Service to ensure that the crowd is also bubbled, disciplined, and produced to behave
by some design. Everyone must get the “drill.” The party loyalist, the staunch protestor, the
good citizen is expected to be submissive. The discipline and behavior of the crowd helps
amplify the image of the president.

Under the latter category, the bubble can be dense, visible, impenetrable, and expanded.
In these situations, the Service creates an extensive disciplinary apparatus that monitors every
action and movement. Presidential protection evolves into a siege mentality, but it still displays
and deliberates as if it is democratic; the Service must build an extensive and moving fortress
that surrounds the president with the guise of openness and accessibility. Although this close
protection might be suffocating, it ironically enables measures that may create a zone of privacy
for the president, especially in the White House. In addition to building this containment zone
around the president, the Service also constructs a stronger and more visible bubble around
crowds. The anarchists, the crank, the crazy, the commie, or the criminal cannot be permitted to
freely move in these zones. The actions of the crowd must be carefully watched and managed to

17 When President George W. Bush visited Virginia Tech after the deadliest school shooting in the United States,
security was lax and the bubble was thin. Upon entering Cassel Coliseum for the convocation service, the Secret
Service did not run people through metal detectors or check bags. The crowd knew the bubble: it was its own Secret
Service agency. People knew the drill and how to act around POTUS. The only exception to this was those who sat
behind the president when he spoke. However, individuals were still able to sneak in cameras and take pictures of
the president from behind. While the president visited the memorial site on the drill field, individuals were able to
approach and watch the president from a close distance, but they disciplined themselves and did not get too close.
These conditions probably emerged because the threat assessment level was low. The assumption might have been
that this was a sudden trip in a rural region with the likelihood of a potential attack being very low. The Service did
not need to establish layers of security to protect the president from a threat that it believed did not exist. In creating
these zones with limited protection, the president has greater ability to show more empathy and have increased
access to the people. These thin bubbles help presidents create an atmosphere of familiarity and trust.

17 Agent Petro (2005) comments that the Service always implements its three perimeter philosophy regardless of
whether the bubble is compact for when president is golfing or whether it is imposing for when the president is
giving a major policy speech. There is always the underlying governing rationality fortified by professionalization
and bureaucratization of the Secret Service that restricts presidential movement.
ensure the safety of the people and the president. Security sweeps to site control begin to discipline, direct, and isolate crowd behavior. In general, guarding both the POTUS and the public enables these entities to act collectively to secure and show the body of the POTUS.

The bubble metaphor reinforces a containment/screen image that is rooted in a disciplinary apparatus. Whether the bubble is small or large, the Secret Service is always concerned about how to regulate and steer presidential movement and action. He is not free to escape the gaze of the Secret Service or leave the containment zone. Although the president can push against and resist security measures implemented by the Service, he still must operate and live under this disciplinary mechanism that seeks to secure his safety.

With its capture and control mentality, the security bubble that encapsulates the president serves two functions. First, the Secret Service must devise a bubble that is strong enough to protect the president from unknown outside forces that seek to terminate his life. This type of protection must be extensive and intimidating. The Service must define enemies of the state and plan for contingencies that involve random acts by disturbed individuals and highly advanced and coordinated attacks by organizations that have substantial resources. Because of these threats, the body of the president must be secured by bodies and buildings in his home, car, plane, train, retreat, etc. Second, this security bubble also creates a space that protects the private lives of presidents. Information regarding illness, marital problems, affairs, and personality quirks is partially controlled through these zones of security. Information management becomes a function of the protective detail. Presidents from Jefferson, Lincoln, Cleveland, Wilson, Harding, FDR, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Clinton, to Bush have had to project an image while

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18 Agent Petro (2005) comments that the Service always implements its three perimeter philosophy regardless of whether the bubble is compact for when president is golfing or whether it is imposing for when the president is giving a major policy speech. There is always the underlying governing rationality fortified by professionalization and bureaucratization of the Secret Service that restricts presidential movement.
hiding certain conditions or behaviors that would infringe on this persona. These zones of protection create the possibility of a myth that the president is a normal individual who conducts himself in a manner that is deemed presidential. Therefore, the service the agency gives is one that deals with secrets of security and privacy.

However, it took time for these functions to fully form and mature. The Service had to be professionalized and bureaucratized. Presidential protection in the early 20th century was poorly designed and implemented. Security consisted merely of bodies, not bubbles or bunkers. There was no serious attempt to actually protect the president from an organized and coordinated attack. The most common and recurrent strategy was to use a small professional force of federal agents backed up by massive support from local police departments. It was merely a poorly designed body-defense strategy that pivoted around a large number of threatening bodyguards. The central principles in establishing a protective sphere around the POTUS were access and proximity to his body, but these principles were rarely implemented in a routine manner. The body of the POTUS was erratic and unpredictable to an extent. To establish these secure zones in a more routine manner, the agency created a rudimentary protective bubble, which surrounded the president with bodies. Agents accompanied the president everywhere and anywhere in order to adequately protect the president.

Despite these principles, guarding the president was still negligible in terms of its effectiveness. In guarding the president at the White House, security was not much better. When Starling reported for work the first time in 1914, he encountered virtually no security at the White House grounds, gates, or entryways to the executive offices. The first guard or agent he encountered was in the office lobby. There was little to no bubbles or barricades, only muscle. When he accompanied President Wilson on his walks around Washington, only three
agents were required to keep guard. This rule was designed to ensure that Wilson had adequate protection, for these were “considered dangerous days when anything is apt to happen at any moment” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 58). However, the application of the rule was flimsy at best; Wilson found himself occasionally with just one agent accompanying him on his walks. There was a clear lack of bureaucratic rules that were stringently followed.

However, White House security was soon to take on a more formal stance as the security principle of distance surfaced as the Service started to protect a disabled Franklin D. Roosevelt and the United States entered World War II. In particular, a defense strategy of protection centered on space and sterile environments started to emerge alongside the body defense techniques of access and proximity. The bubble began to supplement body-based protection: it took shape and grew. The previous informality of protection would start to cede under the pressures of formal rules and security that would provide the framework for continuous and expansive protection. This was a partial result of trying to hide FDR’s invalid body. Newsreel talkies and radio required the Service to create a suitable distance between the people and the president. Furthermore, under the guise of resisting presidential security, Roosevelt allowed the Service to construct the foundation of Fortress White House. He closed down the West and East Executive Avenues, allowed the military police to stand guard around the White House, built a series of sentry boxes inside and outside the White House fence, closed the White House grounds that had been open to the public for over a century, and implemented a host of other security measures. The War-Time White House was cloaked in secrecy and inaccessibility.

After the war many of these measures were immediately abandoned as political civil space returned. But some elements of Fortress White House remained. In particular, the grounds to the White House were never opened to the public again. The first significant barrier
between the president and people was institutionalized. The next set of barriers that were institutionalized was the 1947 National Security Acts, which created a National Command Authority and the permanent closure of West Executive Avenue after the attempted assassination on President Truman in 1950. Presidents with nuclear power had to be enclosed in a tighter security bubble that was regimented. The parts of a presidential compound started to gradually emerge. However, the reliance on security measures such as distance and sterile environments was not consistently implemented. Protection was still executed in an ambiguous manner.

Despite the favoring of access and proximity, the Service gradually implemented new measures to protect the president. In fact over the next 30 years, the White House and the president became increasingly isolated from direct contact with the people as the study and experience of presidential security demanded that the president be shielded from unknown threats. The danger of exposure was marked by a series of crisis situations for the Service. The assassination of John F. Kennedy, the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, and the attempted assassinations of Gerald Ford and George Wallace, respectively shaped, exposed, and changed the Secret Service. Each of these attempts on the life of the POTUS and a presidential candidate unveiled failures in agency culture, personnel, tactics, and even the law.

As an object of study, the Service failed to examine all of the possible threats and avenues for protection. In response to these threats, the Secret Service examined its failures by conducting a series of studies to find out how to secure the president in a more effective way and how to identify threats in a more scientific manner. With new ways to secure the POTUS, Secret Service details and the White House Guard increased in size, training started to mirror reality, and White House security was fortified with new perimeter and identification systems. One of the few measures that the Secret Service did not press was the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue.
It realized that closure of this symbol would represent something that even it was not willing to do. After a man was able to crash his car through a gate leading directly to the White House, a Secret Service spokesperson mentioned the closing of Pennsylvania Avenue, but immediately said that, “I guess we could close down Pennsylvania Avenue, but that would be like a police state.” He continued. “We could put a bubble over the White House, but our society wouldn’t tolerate such a thing” (M. Hunter, 1974, December 27). Even at these late stages of constructing a fortress that surrounds the White House, the closure of America’s Main Street was still a mere utterance.

The Secret Service had achieved a high-degree of institutionalization concerning the strength and scope of the presidential bubble. This protective apparatus had been growing and hardening for over a century now. With these changes, the Service became more structured and formal. The looseness of protection was replaced with concrete measures. The result of this hardening of its security conception allowed the Service to make and act on political decisions concerning public and private enemies and had permitted the Service to put the president behind bars and barriers. The fortification of the security perimeters enabled the Service to create an expansive space around the president that was clean and sterile.

**The Presidential Bunker**

In responding to enemies of the state, the presidential bubble had been gradually transforming into a presidential bunker. It started to emerge in the early 1940s during World War II and became more of an expectation in the early 1950s with the threat of mutual assured destruction. Nuclear proliferation and warfare required the Service to begin thinking of protection from a bunker-based perspective. A president in charge of the national command authority had to be placed in secured spaces. The inflated bubble would have to be fortified and
reinforced with a protective embankment. The bubble did not disappear, but was transformed with armored cars and resistant bodies. However, it was not until the early 1980s, resulting from the increase probability of a terrorist attack, that the Secret Service seriously considered and rebuilt how the body of the president should be enveloped within a fortified compartment. The Secret Service studied plans of presidential protection and concluded that East Executive Avenue should be closed, massive concrete barriers should be built, and antiaircraft missiles should be placed on top of the White House. Despite these new measures, the most controversial and untenable position was to create a college “campus-like” environment around the White House by closing Pennsylvania Avenue. For many outside the Secret Service this idea was reckless; it carried too great a stigma. The public would not and could not endorse such an idea and this power play by the Service failed.

However, terrorist attacks continued into the 1990s from the bombing at the World Trade Center to the Oklahoma City bombing. For the Secret Service, this meant that it had to securitize by challenging tradition, customs, and public symbols. This was mainly done by justifying the closing of Pennsylvania Avenue after the Oklahoma City bombing. The principles of distance and sterile environments finally became authoritative. The primary presidential threat had evolved from a lone gunman who sought close distance to eliminate his target to massive truck bombs that could be stationed on the side of the road and detonated. This new context allowed the administrative practices of protection to trump the administrative practices of openness. The People’s House (or the very last vesture of this myth) was transformed into Fortress White House. The reverberations of continued terrorist attacks forced the Service to examine past practices and introduce unorthodox solutions such as creating huge zones of protection around the body of the POTUS to mitigate the probabilities of an unorthodox attack like a truck
bombing. This value of protection based on distance gradually spread from Pennsylvania Avenue to the gates at the Super Bowl as presidential security is now expanded to critical events where none were deemed necessary before. The 9/11 crisis would only accelerate and strengthen this meaning through new, more expansive methods of control.

Although the initial security strategy was ineffective in dealing with public threats, the apparatuses of discipline based on distance and clean spaces began to become a more permanent feature of society (Lyon, 2003). This evolution from a presidential protection detail that solely relied on a body-based strategy based on proximity and access to a presidential protection detail that centered on a bunker-defense strategy based on space and sterile environments is a key marker in the change of logics related to the Service. Although the bunker is built on contingent factors, there is an ever increasing likelihood that protection is modeled after a well-ordered fortress that confines and control. To manage its subjects, the Service has used a variety of practices to monitor and regulate both subjects of insecurity (anarchists, home-bred terrorists, Islamic fundamentalists) and subjects of security (the POTUS, the people, the media, etc.). In fulfilling its mission, the Secret Service must construct a bunker to keep the president inside and enemies outside. These moves have allowed an administrative agency to shape and even change certain democratic governance values. The president is no longer free to mingle with the people. The values of openness and accessibility have been reformulated and repackaged by an organization that values secrecy, privacy, prevention, and close protection. The Service has embedded these values into presidential bodies, bubbles, and bunkers.

**Preview of Study**

The security, territory, and population of POTUS protection rest on the capacity of the United States Secret Service to safely quarantine an artificial space from enemies of the state.
The security of the president relies on agents to build an institutional dense environment that provides a fair amount of certainty when it comes to protection. Security must be stable, adequate, and certain. This is best accomplished by locating spatial areas that can be watched, cleansed, and fortified in a regular and routine manner. In these zones, everyone and everything is watched and regulated. To further enhance security at these territorial locations, the Service must identity populations that pose a risk to the POTUS. Demographic information, psychological profiles, family history, known associates, and other variables are used to make known likely threats. The art and science of threat assessment permits the Service to monitor levels of dangerousness. By considering these factors, the Service is able to devise measures to safely secure presidential movement and action.

In proceeding with this account of presidential security, Chapter 2 outlines the methods that were used in this dissertation. In particular, it relied on Foucault’s genealogical approach coupled with a focus on problematic events. In dealing with the descent and emergence of objects of study, Foucault is able to illuminate how concepts are unstable and prone to change through the historical process. What is normal and accepted today is different than what was normal and accepted a generation ago. This discontinuity exposes the fragility of stable constructs that are taken for granted today. This change-based process is a perfect fit to examine the history and origin of presidential protection. How and why the president is protected in today’s Fortress White House stands in stark contrast to an unprotected president in the early 20th century. The examination of changing logics, power relations, and new modes of protection over the past 100 years fits nicely with Foucault’s emphasis on the history of the present.

In Chapter 3, the focus of the dissertation switches to the role of productive power, surveillance, self-discipline, and the categorization of friend and enemy. In restricting and
regulating presidential behavior, the concepts of power and politics come to the forefront. In particular, the idea that an administrative agency comes to guide the conduct of the chief executive in the United States in terms of movement and action pivots on two central ideas: power and politics. Through its power relations, the Service constructs a rationality of protection that the president accepts and is governed by. The reliance on the connection of power and knowledge is a critical construct that enables the Service to police the public and private body of the POTUS. This is why Foucault’s insistence that power is connected to meaning is decisive in understanding domination and control. In handling these power relations, the role of politics emerges as constant and critical element in protecting the body of the POTUS. In relying on Schmitt’s novel, but underused concept of the political, this section describes how the Service is able to identify public enemies of the state and private enemies of the president. Schmitt was able to show how this raw idea of politics is deeply engrained in political organizations. Finally, this section shows the compatibility between Foucault’s and Schmitt’s thinking in relation to power and politics and reveals how each of their models is different, but fills in important details that are missing when their theories are looked at in isolation.

Proceeding from the theoretical dimensions of the dissertation, Chapter 4 delves into the origin of presidential security in the early 20th century after the assassination of President McKinley. It is at this moment when a host of forces such as the Secret Service, Congress, the President, the media, and other powerful entities begin to create a rudimentary governing rationality that facilitates the building of the bubble that surrounds the president. In dealing with this new state of affairs, President Theodore Roosevelt immediately rejected the intrusive nature of this restrictive entity by stating that the Service has the right to protect his public body, but not his private body. The freedom of movement for the POTUS was to be considered and accepted
on official duties of state, but should have no hold on the private life of the president. These issues of discipline, surveillance, and controlling movement were challenged, but gradually accepted by successive presidents from Roosevelt to Wilson to Hoover. In Chapter 5, the focus moves to the administrations Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman’s. During these two presidents, the security bubble begins to take on a modern twist as the principles of access and proximity to the president have been affirmed and reinforced, but new principles of distance and inaccessibility begin to become more prominent. In Chapter 5, this account begins to address the modern Secret Service begins to use its productive powers to entrap the president. After FDR’s initial creation of the Fortress White House and its reaffirmation during the end of Truman’s term of office, these concepts continue to grow. However, it is not until the Kennedy assassination that security takes on a harsher and more serious edge. Protection exponentially grows under Johnson and Nixon because of the Service’s focus on treating presidential security as an object study. In Chapter 7, the discussion moves ahead to address how presidential protection transforms into a bunker mentality under Clinton and Bush. By end of George W. Bush’s presidency, the Service had built logics and rationalities that justify an expansion of its power over the president and the marginalized other.

In Chapter 8, the dissertation concludes with an outline of the modern presidential bubble that excludes anyone and everyone from the presence of the POTUS. The apparatuses of discipline, security, and the articulation of the friend/enemy distinction has become a permanent feature of modern-day society as the police gaze seeks to supervise and normalize deviant, abnormal, and illicit behavior and produce normal, healthy, and productive behavior through normalizing discourse.
CHAPTER TWO

GENEALOGY & CASES

To examine how the once suspect practice of presidential security becomes a normal, acceptable, and legitimate, this chapter describes the methodological approach used for this dissertation. In particular, the methodology in this study used a genealogical approach developed by Foucault with special focus on problematic events that disrupt the practice of presidential security. This research considers how the Secret Service emerged from historically suspect origins and developed into a time-honored institution that protects the Commander-in-Chief. In this process, the Service is able to establish truth claims, knowledge, and meaning related to presidential protection. It helps create the parameters of presidential protection through its discursive statements. The concept of protection is neither natural nor scientific, but it is a creation that fits into a broader discursive formation. To examine these methodological approaches, this chapter outlines the genealogical approach used to examine the research questions, and describes the case selection and analysis.

Methodology

Genealogy

In the opening of *Discipline and Punish* (1995), Foucault juxtaposes two modes of rationalities in order to produce some level of discomfort and estrangement for the reader. He begins by describing in excruciating details the torture of Damiens in 1757 and then immediately illustrates a different penal system based on a series of time-tables that was constructed only eighty years after this public torture. One is marked by brutal and unforgettable scenes of a man being drawn and quartered, while the other is striking because of its extensive and sanitary rules and time-tables. By contrasting a public execution to the methodical procedures of controlling a
Foucault seeks to problematize the traditional notions of history. Rather than looking at history from a linear or progressive model, he looks at genealogies. This Darwinian/Nietzschian approach to history is based on the notion that events do not have a natural or transcendental telos. In effect, there is no ultimate purpose that history is striving towards. Hegel and Marx were wrong to conclude that there was an end to history. History is not embedded with a telos or ultimate end, nor does it have an origin that it can restore. The pure, the natural, and the original are categories that Foucault wishes to de-stabilize through his model of analysis. History is the result of highly contingent permutations that randomly form. Rationalities, subjects, and institutions develop in a certain time or space in reaction to various forces and the bubble is a perfect case in point. The supposed natural or given category is challenged and shown to be a construct of a multitude of forces and power relations.

By examining certain permanently unstable constructs, Foucault is conducting a history of the present. His primary purpose is to take what is natural or reified and challenge these taken-for-granted concepts. This is accomplished by starting from a present problem and working backwards. By diagnosing a modern problem like sexuality, rehabilitation, madness, or even government, Foucault is able to trace the development of these ideas and show how they have been changed and codified in different ways. In one example, Foucault is able to describe how the modern state emerged from a sovereign model to one that captures “new liberal approaches to management” (Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006). Foucault describes how Western governments evolved from a sovereign model of government based on law, to a police state that is founded on discipline, to the emergence of modern government or governmentality that relies on security. In this analysis of governmentality, Foucault traces the development of government in the West not to better understand how the sovereign used laws, contracts, and its
divine stature to rule, but to grasp how governmentality has come to shape all aspects of modern life.

Foucault uses the past to better understand the present. This process allows him to use history as an illustrative tool of how society or government has developed certain problems. A history of the present is not a story of progress or decline but a story of differences: how society comes to organize itself is different than how society organized itself in the past. This discontinuity reveals several important insights. The unmasking of difference allows a critical dimension to be added to Foucault’s analysis. By using the past to understand the present, Foucault wants to show how these codified subjects are tangible and changeable. Foucault is “fascinated by the past for the sake of the present” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 44).

Foucault lays out the basic premises of his analytics of genealogy in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1977). Genealogy is characterized by two key terms: descent and emergence. By rejecting the pursuit of origin (Upsrpung), Foucault wishes to show how history develops alongside descent (Herkunft) and emergence (Entstehung). In the analysis of descent, genealogy is able to look at inheritance and heritage from a non-traditional perspective that does not expect to find continuity or stable traits. It expects to find differences among similar variables. Foucault argues that an analysis of descent enables the genealogist to discover “accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals-the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us” (1977, p. 146). The discovery of difference seeks to undermine and to challenge stable structures that appear natural. Not only is descent marked by differences among similarities, but it also examines how descent has impacted and embedded itself in the body. This type of examination shows how the subject “does not recognize itself as emergent but takes
itself as prior to the effects of discourse” (Prado, 1995, p. 36). By focusing on descent, the reveals how this supposed prior self is constructed through multiple differences.

While descent focuses on subtle and often undetectable change, emergence is focused on the “moment of arising” (Foucault, 1977, p. 148). In this analysis, the genealogist seeks to understand how struggles between various forces create new forms of knowledge. This productive mode of operation, however, does not have a teleological foundation to it. Rather than reaching a pre-determined endpoint, “emergence is always produced through a particular stage of forces” (Foucault, 1977, pp. 148-149). These local and new rationalities arise due to the merger of multiple and contingent permutations.

This struggle is often the tension between subjugated knowledges. For Foucault, there are two types of subjugated knowledges (2003). First, subjugated knowledge is a type of discourse that is grounded in erudite and historical claims that are masked. These bodies of knowledge are often excluded, not talked about, and often hidden in functional systems. The modern prison was based on the hidden and buried work of Bentham’s Panopticon. To examine how these knowledges establish truth claims, it is essential to unearth these specialized and authoritative claims. Second, knowledge is often local and on the margins. In contrast to the other type of subjugated knowledge, these beliefs have not been deemed scientific or authoritative; these knowledge claims are non-commonsensical, particular, and left on the margins. Although these subjugated knowledges are separate, they are interrelated. In fact, genealogy is the “coupling together of scholarly erudition and local memories, which allows us to constitute a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in contemporary tactics” (Foucault, 2003, p. 8).
This notion of subjugated knowledge is closely aligned with other key concepts in Foucault’s earlier archeological works: statement, utterance, discursive formation, and rules of formation. In particular, a statement is a type of discourse that is considered legitimate, authoritative, or scientific in a given context. This speech is distinct and different because of its credibility and persuasive ability. Statements consist of a “general set of rules that govern their objects” (Foucault, 1972, p. 152). In clarifying this, Dreyfus and Rabinow show how statements are serious speech acts.19 These “special speech acts” can only be serious “if one sets up the necessary validation procedures, community of experts, and so on” (Foucault, 1983, p. 48). In clarifying a serious speech act, Dreyfus and Rabinow provide a pragmatic example to show the difference between an utterance and a statement. An example of a serious speech act is when the National Weather Service makes an authoritative declaration about whether it will rain or not. This stands in stark contrast to when a friend says that it looks like it will rain (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). This is an example of an utterance, or a simple claim that it is not grounded or backed by authority, credibility, or a medium of truth. These everyday speech acts are ignored.20

Statements are found in local discursive formations, which are a subset of a governing episteme. These subsets of an episteme range from biology to economics and from psychology to public administration. It is a discourse set that each particular area privileges and empowers. In effect, they are a “group of statements with an internal dynamic” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 55). In Security, Territory, and Population, Foucault (2007) shows how certain truth is selected and

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19 Foucauldian scholars Dreyfus and Rabinow use serious speech acts to avoid Foucault’s occasionally “misleading tendency” to refer to statements as ahistorical (1983, p. 48). Statements are always context-dependent. Furthermore, they remark that the internal rules that make statements serious are “analogous to Searle’s speech act” (1983, p. 93). In fact, Foucault and Searle talked to each other about the similarity between a statement and a serious speech act, with Foucault writing, “I was wrong in saying that statements were not speech acts, but in doing so I wanted to underline the fact that I saw them under a different angle than yours” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 46). The different angle, according to Dreyfus and Rabinow, rested on the fact that statements had to pass an institutional test to be valid while speech acts are based on ordinary conversations between individuals.

20 In a genealogical mode of analysis, the utterance emerges and becomes more critical because of the dynamic tension between everyday and serious speech acts.
bracketed based in a particular context. For example, the plague in the 16th and 17th century is treated like a disciplinary problem and knowledge is based around how to divide and separate people from each other, while smallpox in the 18th century is treated in a distinct and different manner. The overall goal is not to create a disciplinary space that quarantines people, but the “problem of knowing” relates to how to halt epidemics (Foucault, 2007, p. 10). In a different context, statements made in public administration differ based on time and context. Protective administration has been marked by a series of changing statements and practices that range from allowing the POTUS to go on walks virtually unprotected to requiring a small army to accompany him as he jogs around Washington. Some statements like requiring agents to touch the president as he mingles with the crowd to direct his movements was unheard of in the beginning of the 20th century; the practice is now commonplace. In each discursive period, certain statements are credible while others are excluded.

Because of the centrality of these serious speech acts, Foucault argues that “one can define the general set of rules that govern the status of these statements, the way in which they are institutionalized, received, used, re-used, combined together” (1972, p. 115). These “rules of formation” clarify how an utterance is declared or deemed an authoritative statement. Foss, Foss, and Trapp argue that a number of rules “govern various aspects of the discursive formation” (1985, p. 196). The first category revolves around what can and cannot be said. Reminiscent of the second face of power, there are underlying rules that determine acceptable discourse. In History of Sexuality, Foucault (1990) explains how childhood sexuality was a topic that was not addressed during the Victorian Age. It was “driven out, denied, reduced to silence” because “everyone knew, for example, that children had no sex, which was why they were forbidden to talk about it, why one closed one’s eyes and stopped one’s ears whenever they came
to show evidence to the contrary” (1990, p. 4). In contrast to being reduced to silence, there are rules that establish objects of study. In *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault (1988) is able to show which objects of study emerge throughout history. In the Middle Ages, madmen were an accepted part of society and not hidden away in asylums to be studied, but during the 17th and 18th century this changed. Madness, in particular hysteria, “joined the domain of mental diseases” (1988, p. 137). As an object of fascination, hysteria and hypochondria were closely linked with women and were extensively studied to determine their sources.

For the Secret Service, the object of study related to presidential security arose when it was granted the power to protect the president in the early 20th century. However, the scientific study of presidential attackers did not emerge until a series of assassination attempts in the 1960s. After the JFK assassination, the Warren Commission recommended that the Secret Service establish a profile of political assassins grounded in “objective” data. The attempt to develop scientific criteria of dangerousness, the ability to predict political violence, and the use of psychological models to help the decision-making process became one area of study for the Secret Service that was neglected in the preceding decades. This lack of studying the source and cause of political assassinations was primarily a result of the “action-oriented” framework of the Service, which focused on identifying and tracking down enemies of the states (Institute of Medicine, 1981). The Institute of Medicine reported that the Service “has little opportunity to reflect on, analyze, or evaluate some of its practices regarding the identification, assessment, and management of potential threatens” (Institute of Medicine, 1981, p. 2). The development of the concept of dangerousness allowed the Service to devise broad and often crude ways to identify who is a potential threat.
In close relation to what objects are studied, the second category centers on who is allowed to make authoritative statements. In a contemporary context, these figures range from scientists to lawyers to doctors to generals. Through professional degrees, scientific objectivity, accrediting exams, experience, these groups or institutions have the ability to proclaim certain statements as valid and others as invalid. In examining who is allowed to speak, Foucault (1990) offers an interesting example of Pierre Riviere, who was arrested and examined for sexual delinquency. During his trial, it was the scientific experts who were heard from and allowed to testify about his condition, not the local pastor who heard his confessions. By the court privileging their status to speak and “getting to know Riviere, a group of experts were reinforcing a regime of truth production which legitimated their own existence” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 86). This stands in stark contrast to those who are silenced. In one example, Foucault shows how “Mendel spoke the truth,” but “science could not properly speak of him” because his models and categories did not fit their pre-conceived conceptions (1972, p. 224). In a more drastic example, Foucault shows how “the madman’s speech did not strictly exist.” In fact, “whatever a madman said, it was taken for mere noise” (1972, p. 217).

In a similar position, the Service had a small voice that was often neglected, if not unheard in the beginning of the 20th century, especially with Congressional resistance in establishing a protective detail and Theodore Roosevelt’s independent streak. The voice of the Service was not strong enough to convince Roosevelt to feel comfortable about close protection by allowing no more than one or two agents with him. This resistance was partially a result of Roosevelt being an armed citizen and a media darling. He continued to resist the Service by trying constantly to lose his detail, or sneaking away in the middle of the night to hike with his son, or his determination to carry a firearm while he was president (Wilkie, 1934). In effect,
Roosevelt was “no admirer of the Secret Service” (Seale, 1986, p. 1121) and “was the most difficult president to guard” (Reilly & Slocum, 1947, p. 14). To protect the president, Mrs. Roosevelt requested that additional agents secure the president because he would not listen to them. In general, he “had no idea of the extent to which he was guarded” (Seale, 1986). This stands in stark contrast to the voice that agents developed as early as the 1930s when one agent noted that presidents “follow Secret Service advice with little or no question” (Reilly & Slocum, 1947, p. 14).

The final category of rule formation centers on the form of discourse. Legal opinions are often dry and colorless; quantitative studies are filled with charts, numbers, and graphs; financial reports rely on simple equations to tell the story behind a company’s profit margins. Behind the numbers and words lies the form or structure of discourse that establishes what is to be accepted. Foss et al. provide an example that “non-linear perspectives and ways of writing or speaking are generally not recognized as valid or appropriate; truth does not reside in statements produced from such approaches” (1985, p. 197). Despite what is studied or who has said it, the structure of things is a necessary condition in establishing the rules of formation. This form was exhibited in 1950 when the Chief of the Secret Service stated, “I could veto a decision of the President himself if I decided it would be dangerous not to. The President of course knew this fact” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963, p. 70). It was the form or structure of things that dictated presidential obedience.

In summary, Foucault outlines three different rules of formation in establishing the merits of a statement: the object of study, who may speak, and the form of knowledge (Foss, et al., 1985). In his genealogical mode of analysis, Foucault does not abandon these concepts but transposes these ideas into his framework of struggle, conflict, and war. Rather than just
showing what is an object of study or who says it, Foucault is able to explain how a casual utterance becomes an authoritative statement. These ideas are supplemented with the introduction of Foucault’s ideas of power. The emergence of ideas is based on the inversion of Clausewitz’s proposition: “politics is the continuation of war by other means” (Foucault, 2003, p. 15). These types of knowledge clash and produce random but highly rationalized forms of knowledge. Emergence of knowledge is based on struggle within a realm of peace. In this condition of stability, ideas are discussed and truth is created within a regime of truth. Haugaard nicely summarizes this connection:

By truth production Foucault means the common rules which determine the seriousness of statements- what qualifies as a statement and what does not. This is as in archaeology. In genealogy this represents peace, but what is added to this is the hypothesis that the machinery of truth production is constituted out of conflict. In short, the shared regime of truth is actually the conflict of war transposed into a regime of truth (1997, p. 68).

In particular, utterances can become statements through a process of conflict.

For Harry Truman, the Secret Service was a nuisance when it came to his freedom of movement. He thought it was asinine as president that he had to be accompanied on his morning walks or that he just could not leave the White House unaccompanied. Truman’s frequent visits to the barbershop, the bank, or just stopping people on the street for a chat became routine for the Service. Two agents noted that “without warning, he would grab his hat, stride out of his office, and say, ‘I’m going to the Capitol for lunch’” (Bowen & Neal, 1961, p. 168). This abrupt, sudden, and unpredictable behavior was in clear violation of the Service’s standards and expectations of presidential conduct. The lingo of danger and the commands of precaution were more of an utterance than a statement; Truman, according to the Chief of the Secret Service, noted that “as with so many physically fearless men, anxiety about what might happen in the future seemed childish to him, perhaps even womanish” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963, p. 66).
It was not until the attack at the Blair House that President Truman started to realize that these utterances by the Service were authoritative (S. Hunter & Bainbridge, 2005). In fact, “he seemed to realize just how necessary his permanent companions were” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963, p. 66). After the attempt on his life by two Puerto Rican nationalists, Truman was not only more subdued, but he listened and considered what the Service had to say as a statement, not as meaningless utterances that could be dismissed. The immediate changes to security were apparent and Truman did nothing to stop them. Hunter and Bainbridge list the changes Truman now accepted as part of his security detail: “The presidential limo was armored and supplied with running boards where agents could ride; the president no longer walked from Blair House to the White House; public access was limited to Blair House. The president’s walks were rearranged: now his armored limo drove him to random places in the city so that his movements could not be anticipated” (S. Hunter & Bainbridge, 2005, p. 317). Truman was now in a position to accept the authoritative declarations made by his security detail; he no longer considered protective measures as “womanish.”

The process of change is a degree of controlled chaos with a degree of stability that allows for new ideas to emerge. With the introduction of power, Foucault is able to explain dynamic stability and change. This is critical for examining the Secret Service, because struggle over meaning allows it the capacity to produce new statements. The Service is able to float ideas and generate new knowledge in this nexus of chaos and stability.

Cases

By examining emerging rationalities and differences in a variety of cases that point to key events in presidential security, this research project is well-suited to examine the shifting power relations between the president and his forms of protection. This can be accomplished by
looking at multiple cases, which are tied together with a genealogical mode of analysis. Cases that focus on events provide the researcher with the ability to bracket, but also look at them as part of a process-based perspective, which are grounded in inductive approaches (Langley, 1999). This type of grounded research provides “vividness and detail” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 159). This is because an inductive approach “begins in idiography and is rooted in the traditional conception of clinical study” (Eckstein, 1975, p. 132). By examining cases with an orientation toward detail, the researcher is able to capture rich and nuanced phenomenon. The inductive nature of this research privileges the concrete and observable in order to examine surface and deeper levels of meanings. It also is more equipped, according to Yin, to deal with how questions “because such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence” (Yin, 2003, p. 6). The linking of events over time is a critical aspect to the examination of the Secret Service and how it has evolved from a fledging bureaucracy that was merely concerned with surviving to a robust agency that protects the Chief Executive Officer.

In describing inductive-based research, Yin (1981) uses the metaphor of a detective to describe how research should be conducted. A researcher must be able to ascertain the context and find clues to build a plausible interpretation of what happened. In order to do this, the detective must rely on little clues leading to big indicators to develop a picture. Hence, research consists of gathering relevant information to the case, an examination of alternatives leads, and a conclusion that reflects both the findings and consideration of alternative explanations. This method of analysis is similar to Foucault’s genealogical project of considering statements, utterances, and alternative voices that may have been excluded in the construction of a narrative.

**Case Selection**
For this research, case selection will range from the successful assassination of President McKinley and the following decade of debates involving presidential protection, the beginnings and growth of presidential security from Roosevelt to Hoover, the temporary security measures established by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt during the World Wars, the assassination of John F. Kennedy and its aftermath, the increased security and intelligence apparatus that emerged in the 1970s, the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan that marks the modern era of threat and publicity, the events of Oklahoma City, and the security bubble that surrounds George W. Bush. These cases provide detailed information regarding how the Secret Service handles “problematic events” in presidential security. In particular, this study maps out a somewhat discontinuous process of employing protective procedures that unfolds over time, interrupted by events that problematize presidential security. In these moments, the Service either failed to or successfully rethought its past practices and reformulated new modes of protection. These responses ranged from doing very little after the attempted assassination on FDR to installing new protective barricades after the attack on Truman to closing down Pennsylvania Avenue after the Oklahoma City Bombing.

The primary justification for choosing the cases used was based on the need to focus on key events in which presidential security has been problematized. This notion of problematization “is a technical term that suggests a particular way of analyzing an event or situation” (S. J. Collier, Lakoff, & Rabinow, 2004, p. 3). For Foucault, an area becomes problematic when something “must have happened to introduce uncertainty, a loss of familiarity; that loss, that uncertainty is the result of difficulties in our previous way of understanding, acting, relating” (Foucault, 1994a, p. 598). In and during these moments of problematization, the status quo is questioned and challenged. This allows for bracketing and labeling of new and dramatic
experiences, which may create a space of new meaning. These problematizations are an “ensemble of discursive and non-discursive practices that make something enter into the play of true and false” (Foucault, 1994a, p. 670).

By interjecting uncertainty into stable conditions, presidential security is able to unfold in a discontinuous manner. The process of presidential security is marked by a series of random events that problematize how the president should be secured in a democratic context. In linking a series of events into a process view perspective, Vayda, McCay, and Eghenter point out, “It is by explaining events and connecting them to other events that we may discern the kind of intelligible sequence” (1991, p. 319). New ideas and techniques related to presidential security can be traced in order to link events with process. However, Vayda et al. warn, “If we are interested in long-term changes, we must do what we can to observe them over the long run” (Vayda, et al., 1991, p. 326). These interruptions, therefore, must examine how actors, groups, and organizations participate in the creation of new discursive and non-discursive practices over an extended period of time.

To examine the drivers of this process, Foucault argues that the direction and velocity of “problematic events” often result in making something an “object of thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.)” (Foucault, 1994a, p. 670). In the *Order of Things*, Foucault (1994b) examines a series of emerging “objects of thought” ranging from resemblance in the Renaissance period to representation in the Classical period to man in the modern period. For more contemporary examples, Collier, Lakoff, and Rabinow (S. J. Collier & Lakoff, 2008a, 2008b; S. J. Collier, et al., 2004) have shown how biosecurity, critical infrastructure, and distributed preparedness have become objects of study. Due to modern challenges of terrorist attacks, energy crises, technological accidents, and major
natural disasters, the state experienced uncertainty and a loss of familiarity in how to handle these security problems. In addressing these new configurations, the state has had to identify new threats, focus on vital targets, and create new strategies to alleviate this loss of certainty. It did so by focusing on contingency planning, conducting vulnerability mapping and analysis, and developing emergency responses. In a similar way as Foucault, Clegg (1989a) employs power dynamics encapsulated in his circuit-based metaphor to examine change. Process-based change is driven by a complex mix of exogenous and endogenous variables. The concrete to the abstract give shape to a process perspective.

For this particular study, the main object of thought centers on and around presidential security over an extended period of time. In selecting the cases, the primary determinant was whether something happened related to presidential security that introduced uncertainty or a loss of familiarity. The cases that were selected revolve around moments of uncertainty created by a “problematic event.” Situations ranging from the McKinley assassination to World War II protection to the aftermath of the JFK assassination to the attempted assassination of Reagan to the closing down of Pennsylvania Avenue were selected to study in an in-depth manner because they all represent moments of uncertainty. During these events, the loss of familiarity is critical because it allows the Secret Service, Congress, the President, the media, and others the opportunity to reformulate the structure of presidential security. It is here where the circuits of power emerge and power is most productive: new constructs emerge to handle new problems.

Data Collection

In conducting this research, this project relied on historical documentation. Although the Secret Service has been an enigmatic agency, there is abundant material that revolves around the
concept of presidential protection.\textsuperscript{21} These sources range from archival material, the Congressional Record, Congressional reports, oral histories of presidential biographies, newspaper accounts, editorials, White House staff memoirs, and various Secret Service documents. These historical sources are “particularly useful in qualitative studies for establishing a baseline or background” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 123). These documents provide the information needed to help in understanding how attitudes and beliefs related to presidential security have changed over time. Most notably, these documents provide an in-depth analysis of what presidents, legislators, the press, and citizens said about how and why the president should be secured. In particular, abundant amount of information on the Secret Service appears after an attack on the president. With each dramatic shift in presidential security, there are intense debates in the halls of government and the media about the meaning of presidential protection. After President John Tyler experienced threatening encounters with a mob and an intoxicated painter, he immediately asked Congress for a security detail that would protect the Executive Mansion. As a result of this petition and resulting law, there exist historical records from newspaper accounts to archival material that describe this historical moment. This type of data is crucial for a genealogical mode of analysis. Historical shifts can be understood by analyzing primary and secondary sources that recount the practices and reasoning behind presidential security.

Data Analysis

In analyzing data, I followed some insights from Marshall and Rossman (1999), which are similar to Yin’s detective-based metaphor or Eckstein’s clinical approach. Marshall and

Rossman suggest that researchers focus on generating concrete categories and themes. In this part of the research process, researchers must be able to identify recurrent themes, changes in concepts, and a broad outline of the material. They describe these categories as “buckets or baskets into which segments of text are placed” (1999, p. 154). This stage in the research process is perhaps the most difficult because of the importance of establishing categories. In reading Secret Service material, I focused on what Secret Service agents had to say, coupled with scholarly and historical information.

However, in selecting historical sources to construct a narrative, there is always a concern of selection bias. Because it is impossible to identify and examine a universe of sources or find the correct history regarding the Secret Service, the issue of bias emerges. Lustick observes that “selection bias exists whenever historical sociologists or historically minded political scientists draw upon available monographic material to produce background narratives” (1996, p. 606). The most serious issue regarding selection bias, according to Geddes, is it “may bias the conclusions one reaches” (1990, p. 149). Despite these problems, Collier and Mahoney argue that sampling is a concern, but it “is not the central issue in evaluating such designs and that this perspective provides an inappropriate basis for completely dismissing them” (1996, p. 90). What is more critical is “avoiding selection bias through informed choices about research design” (D. Collier & Mahoney, 1996, p. 89). Lustick makes a similar point. He argues that researches need to “demonstrate self-consciousness in the selection of source material” (1996, p. 614). This allows the researcher to be more aware how they select and analyze findings.

In analyzing and choosing Secret Service material, I identified “problematic events” that served as interruptions in a longer term process. In organizing the material, I used selected categories that illuminated ruptures of thought, changing power-relations, and new formulations
of the friend-enemy distinction. Concepts created by Foucault and Schmitt played a key role in understanding and interpreting primary and secondary source material.

These Foucauldian and Schmittian categories shaped how I looked at various events, practices, and concepts. By labeling events that are related to normalization, discipline, truth production, resistance, and friend/enemy distinction allowed me to sort and analyze critical information. In reading and choosing sources, I focused on similar events and moments when the Service disciplined presidential movement, how agents categorized threats, how members of the media, the courts, or politicians talked about protection, moments of presidential resistance to Secret Service commands, and how the Service sought to produce new meaning related to president protection. Selection of sources was primarily based on the categories and the availability of documents to the public. For example, journalists repeatedly commented about Theodore Roosevelt’s attitude toward protection, agents told President Harding that he could not have a party on a ferry because the ship was too unsafe, agents informed President Eisenhower that he could not sit on a White House balcony because he was a stationary target, members of Congress helped frame the basic concept of presidential security after the assassination of President McKinley, President Kennedy refused to allow the agents to stand on the running boards of the presidential limo, and how the Service created new security measures after the attempted assassination of President Reagan. All of these situations deal with discipline, resistance, and truth production.

Labeling events related to discipline, resistance, truth production, and normalization allowed me to sort and categorize information. In using these “buckets” and tracing the process of events allowed me to determine whether the categories were able to provide insights into a genealogy of the Secret Service. Foucault states that genealogy “is gray, meticulous, and
patiently documentary” (Foucault, 1977, p. 139). It “requires patience and a knowledge of
details and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material” (Foucault, 1977, p. 140). By
looking at a multitude of sources and analyzing the material in this way, it provides a solid
foundation for beginning to understand how the Secret Service has implemented and changed the
practices of presidential security.
CHAPTER THREE

POWER & POLITICS: THE CRAFT OF IMPRISONMENT

The United States Secret Service has to control presidential movement and action. To fulfill its primary purpose of protecting the body of the president, the Secret Service must employ a range of disciplinary techniques that ensure that no unauthorized individual can get within range of the president and the authorized protectees must be watched. In order to establish a containment zone around the president, the Service must rely on the president to listen to its advice and even adhere to its commands. This relationship between protector and protectee must be marked by trust and confidence that is grounded in discipline via training, routine, information management, and the extensive security apparatus. In establishing the parameters of presidential security, the Service relies on a concept of power that is embedded with meaning, knowledge, discipline, and self-surveillance of the POTUS.

However, the Secret Service employs other power-based techniques that are not confined to discipline and enclosed spaces in its mission to protect the president. To adequately ensure that enemies or potential threats are known, the Service must rely on a different conception of power that is rooted in the concrete and existential. Although the coordinates of the president’s location are constantly known, the Service must also watch over potential threats that may damage his body. Here the populace equals the threat, and the president the threatened. This form of power ensures that targeted populations are ideally controlled, watched, and managed in open, free, and circulatory spaces. Like POTUS, the crowd is shaped, steered, and screened: it too is a body under control. Without walls, bubbles, or enclosed spaces, the Service cannot rely on the power to discipline or create docile enemies.
The Secret Service is not confined to one overarching view of power. In examining the works of Foucault and Schmitt, this chapter serves three main objectives. First, it provides a brief account of various models of power. By examining conflictual and consensual based models of it, it reveals how Foucault has been able to add important insights into how power functions. Second, it outlines Foucauldian and Schmittian models of power. In particular, it will examine how Foucault revolutionized the power debate by introducing the idea of power as positive by linking power with meaning and abandoning Lukes’ three dimensional approach. It then examines how Schmitt’s ideas of the power and politics have tended to be neglected and not considered in organizational theory. Instead of hiding the role of politics, it will be unearthed and given a prominent role in how organizations respond to conditions. Third, it shows how the theories of Foucault and Schmitt are mutually reinforcing. By relying on Clegg’s circuits of power, this section will examine how episodic-based power situations interact with the facilitative and dispositional circuits. These circuits constitute a field of force relations, which empowers and disempowers institutions, groups, and individuals. In constructing a tight cocoon with little room to move, the Secret Service is able to keep the president inside and the enemies outside.

**Frameworks of Power**

To understand how the Secret Service shields the president from danger, concepts of power must be examined to determine how agents guard the president and watch for danger.

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22 There is no one theory of power. Power is experienced differently based on the scope of analysis and context. A Paronsion view of power that is rooted in structures is as plausible as Dahl’s framework that relies on concrete observations. This is why Haugaard and Clegg describe power as a multifarious concept.

23 Charles Perrow is another scholar who has focused on the role of power in organizations. In his most recent work on the development of organizations in the 19th century (2002), he has focused on how power is derived from a multitude of sources: public opinion, values, social movements, and organizations. In particular, organizations can amplify and reinforce social mores and also bring about new conditions.
understood from an event based approach (Dahl) or one that deals with masking options by mobilizing bias (Bachrach & Baratz) or one that starts to understand how power is productive (Parsons) or one to one that links power, knowledge, and rationalization (Foucault). Each perspective understands only a segment of the myriad ways that power manifests itself (Clegg, 1989a; Haugaard, 1997).

Some theoretical approaches, especially the three dimensional debate tend to view power as merely conflictual. They privilege an agency based perspective that is grounded in force, hierarchy, and causality. In establishing a narrative of potential oppression because of the concentration of power, there is tendency to view power as simply negative or coercive. Although in many cases these models are appropriate and even preferable, they do not cover or explain all situations, especially when new conditions have emerged. This is why a Parsonian framework that looks at how power is productive reveals another important aspect to the power debate. Rather than seeing power as relational or only discovered through its effects, Parsons looks at power from a structural perspective. Hence, power and organizations can be understood from a very conservative and radical orientation (the three dimensional debate) to one that starts to understand how power is located in structures (Parsons, Barnes, and Giddens) to one that deals with struggle, knowledge, and meaning (Foucault). Each of these models will be examined in how they deal with the emergence of new ideas and power relations.

Like previous models of power (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970; Dahl, 1959), Foucault is seeking to understand how compliance is secured. However, his model of power deviates from the three dimensional power debate as presented by Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes. These theorists centered their ideas on an agency-based perspective that saw power as solely conflictual and at least in principle observable. In this paradigm, individuals have the capacity to
control and dominate events by shaping preferences, mobilizing bias, or forcing people to do things they normally would not do. These models rest on a negative framework that prohibits and bans what can and cannot be done. Power over displaces any notion of power to: there is little to no room for consensus or how power builds. The main focus is whether power is distributed in a fair and equitable manner. From Dahl’s event based approach to Lukes’ radical view, power is a critical construct for understanding the nature of democratic society.

Although this normative perspective is able to explain a great deal and examine democratic claims and ideals (Haugaard, 1997), it fails to account for how power is productive, the strategic nature of power relations, the constitutive role of discourse, and relation between power and knowledge. By neglecting the view that social spaces are formed by a power/knowledge nexus, the three dimensional power debate misses important details. In particular, Dahl and Lukes are too tied to the Hobbesian framework of causality and agency (Clegg, 1989a). They are unable to understand effects of power that are not caused by calculating agents who use their agency to get what they want. Resulting from their belief that people rely on appropriating power for their own ends, they also do not pick up on the consensual nature of power; not all agents or structures use power to bind people to their will. Power can and is used in ways to build and enable action, not just constrain it.

In challenging this view, Parsons (1963) takes the concept of power in a different direction by focusing on how power is located in structures, not just agents. Rather than viewing it as a zero-sum concept, he argues that power is positive: it builds and grows. In particular, Parsons helped move the power debate away from the power over approach. He did this by showing how power is like money, which is rooted in sovereign fiat.24 Trade is hampered when

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24 Habermas (1990) also uses the medium of money to discuss how power operates. In his analysis of power, money, and discourse, he privileges a consensus-based model while neglecting coercion and conflictual approaches.
the medium of exchange is unreliable and inconsistent. Without a legitimate source of exchange, economic growth is inhibited. By introducing a stable medium of exchange like money, buying and selling is not only facilitated, but the economy as a whole becomes stronger. For Parsons, this is how power functions. It works by creating consensus and legitimacy in society and its structures. With an established framework, power enables political transactions like money enables economic exchange. To explain how power is created, he uses another monetary metaphor: banking. Money can be invested or loaned and used to create additional wealth. In fact, banks use money in multiple ways to generate new wealth. Like banking, power can also be invested to generate returns and new ways of doing things.

Despite Parsons’s innovative conception of power, his model is problematic. While Dahl and Lukes failed to address a consensual view of power, Parsons did not adequately formulate a conflictual understanding of power. Because of his reliance on legitimacy, consensus, and the structural functional approach, Parsons does not understand the other facet of power. Not only is conflict missing, but his analogy of linking power and money is problematic, especially his reliance on money as power, which rests on the dictate of sovereign authority. Under this premise, power is centralized and consolidated; there is little room to see power as dispersed and decentralized. Although at face value the analogy works, others have shown how “money itself is a profoundly puzzling set of phenomena, and everything that is puzzling with regard to money would be puzzling with regard to power” (Barnes, 1988, p. 19). Money is not the best explanatory tool to explain how power operates. Despite these shortcomings, his insight of how power is productive has influenced a host of individuals.25

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25 In particular, Barnes (1988) and Giddens (1984) have both built on to Parsons’ initial understanding of how power is circulatory and productive. Barnes (1988) reformulates Parsons’ theory by abandoning his structural functional theory and showing how social power is the capacity for action. He does this through a close examination of consensus, the distribution of knowledge in a society, and how meaning is established and secured. Without
Foucault’s Power Relations

In remedying the defects of models based primarily on conflict or consensus, Haugaard notes that Foucault’s model has the “virtue of highlighting the fact that meaning and frameworks of knowledge are constituted through conflict” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 114). Consensus and conflict are not mutually exclusive categories for Foucault, but should work together to understand how power can be linked to truth production. By inverting Clausewitz’s formula, Foucault (1980, 2003) privileges the metaphor of war to describe power, but in the process of struggle explains how meaning is produced within stable regimes of truth. In these ordered stability, order, and reliable extrinsic observation, power cannot flourish. As such, power is closely connected to the distribution of knowledge within a particular society. This allows individuals to use their rationality to understand and predict outcomes. As rational egoists, people can identify power through knowledge and use it in proper context. By relying on people to recognize power, his model follows Hunter’s reputational approach. Although consensus is a key theme in his project, he does not overlook conflict. Sanctions are powerful tools in shaping and guiding behavior. With an understanding of adverse consequences, people are willing to alter their decisions based on that knowledge. Although his assumptions are different than Foucault, he extensively relies, but does not cite critical insights from him. In particular, there is a failure to recognize how Foucault has expanded on power/knowledge and how “man” is both the subject and object of study. Like Barnes, Giddens (1984) views structure and order as facilitating stability, which allows for agency and power. In particular, he views structures, environments, and agency as dynamic entities that change and power is a critical concept in that duality. In his theory of structuration (1984), he argues that structures serve a dual function. They are both the medium and outcome of social practices. Structures constitute individuals while simultaneously individuals create and re-create structures. Due to this duality, structure and agency are deeply inter-connected and cannot be separated from each other. They both serve a function in creating and maintaining meaning. Despite Giddens’ theory of duality, he falls into the same trap as Parsons: he privileges consensus over conflict. Routine, habits, and recursive knowledge reinforce the structure rather than challenging it. In remedying this defect, Foucault shows how conflict and consensus work together to enable and constrain action.

26 This is the same problem that Allison’s bureaucratic politics model encounters. His model (Allison & Halperin, 1972; Allison & Zelikow, 1999) is based on a conflictual view of politics and power that sees the random emergence of policy through the pulling and hauling of self-interested actors. Decisions are achieved in a game-like system where actors differ on what should be done based on their institutional positions. The battle that ensues between these competitive actors is resolved by politics, not pure reason or organizational routines or tendencies. Although this model recognizes how politics is embedded in the fabric of political systems, it fails to account for several important insights. First, the model fails to notice how the rules of the game are constituted. The failure to stand back “from the immediate battles with a long-term rather than a short-term perspective” prevents the examination of “those things that the participants take for granted” (Freedman, 1976, p. 449). For Welds, “the ‘value added’ of a constructivist intervention would be in answering questions logically prior to the application of a bureaucratic politics model” (1988, p. 224). Using Foucault’s model of power, the analyst is able to stand back and analyze the formation of rules and discourse. The focus on the strategic and immediate battles is coupled with a historical vantage point that identifies governing logics. Second, the bureaucratic politics model also does not recognize consensus-based aspects of power relations. By accepting a logic/politics dichotomy, the model implicitly does not pick up on shared values. In particular, conflict overrides and overwhelms any sense of consensus. In contrast, Foucault shows how conflict and consensus work together to enable and constrain action. Finally, the bureaucratic politics model’s concept of power does not adequately explain the process of normalization, discipline, self-surveillance, and power as productive.
battles, actors use tactics and strategies to prevail. This notion of victory because of right strategy, which results in privileging one idea over another, is closely aligned with Sun Tzu’s orientation (2002). Agents or characters in battle must have the clarity of thought to understand the reasons, purpose, and objectives of war. They must have an envisioned outcome or face total destruction. No detail should be overlooked in preparing and strategizing. Underestimating the enemy, not being familiar with the land on which the battle will be fought, over-hyping particular strengths, or not having a clear vision for Sun Tzu would result in defeat. The supremacy of tactics and strategies coupled with knowledge was critical in victory. Transferring these pre-modern methods of strategic battlefield thinking to civil society was a key project for Foucault.

In developing this genealogy of control and Weber’s analysis of modern life (1978), Foucault examines how institutions have developed more intricate and multifaceted techniques of discipline. In advancing the Weberian project, Foucault identifies and explains the increased rationalization in modern society and organizations. In fact, “he has isolated and identified the mechanisms of the power of rationalization with a finer grained analysis than Weber” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 113). In refining his analysis, Foucault’s model falls more in line with

27 The relation that exists between the Secret Service and the POTUS cannot be adequately understood using most traditional organizational lenses. Principal agent theory (Moe, 1984) does not provide the tools to understand the pulling and hauling between two political actors seeking to impose their will. Shirking, opportunism, moral hazards, and asymmetrical information would help explain some aspects of presidential protection, but would ultimately fail to account for complex, historical, and nuanced relationship between these two entities. In particular, it would be hard to identify who is the principal and agent, and it would miss how an organization like the Secret Service is able to mold presidential protection through the production of knowledge and meaning. Even crisis management/communication models do not address sufficiently the interactions between the president and his protective detail. Most theoretical approaches, especially apologia (Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1995) and sensemaking (Weick, 1988, 1995), tend to view organizational history and crises as linear and rational. They privilege a “return to the normal” as the customary response to a crisis episode. In re-establishing the narrative by returning to traditionally accepted values, organizations can continue to grow. Although in many cases these models are appropriate and even preferable, they do not cover or explain all crisis situations, especially when conditions emerge in which a return to the normal is no longer effective or desirable. By relying on past discourse to frame how an organization should respond, these frameworks also have failed to notice the role of power in facilitating minor and even radical change. In particular, the Weickian view of crisis response often relies too much on past action to create
Lukes’ notion that power is able to limit, control and even shape the body and mind (he would reject Lukes’ stance on real interests, false consciousness, and his reliance of objective criteria) and Parson’s notion of power as productive, but he pushes the envelope by examining how the mechanisms of power (e.g. Panoptic, confessional, examination) are able to partially constitute individuals and create meaning and knowledge. This project is at the core of what Hacking calls “making up people” (1986). In these localized settings, power in its “capillary form” is able to reach “into the very grain of individuals, touch their bodies, and inserts itself into their very actions and attitudes” (Foucault, 1980, p. 39). Power is linked to the creation of meaning and knowledge, which then has the capacity to discipline and shape body and mind.

Securing the president through the use of bodyguards, surveillance, investigations, and policing can be understood through Foucault’s constructs on productive power, disciplinary power, and governmentality (1990, 1995, 2003, 2007). Foucault applies his analytics to the study of how power is exercised in a historically contingent context. In these local and micro-settings, power relations produce practices, rationalities, modes of action, and forms of control.

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current and future sense. It does not consider that sense can be created apart from retrospective analysis. Weick seems to be imposing a linearity on the way people and organizations make sense. Selecting, bracketing, and interpreting the situation can emerge from sources other than past experience and events. In particular, sensemaking does not consider how ideas, norms, and rules emerge apart from rational creation and intention. Retrospective analysis tends to privilege the past while neglecting how individuals and organizations use power to create sense. Weick also fails to realize how power is deeply embedded in the notion of sensemaking at individual, organizational, and social level. By not considering these power relations, his model is prevented from understanding the facilitative role of power in creating new nodes (Clegg, 1989a). Due to Weick’s stance on power (or lack of it), his analysis is not able to understand power relations that are embedded in organizations. March and Olsen’s institutional perspective (1984, 1996) complements a historical view of the Secret Service. History is not an efficient process because institutions often follow a “less automatic, less continuous, and less precise” path (March & Olsen, 1996, p. 255). An exogenously-induced course of organizational development fails to consider that political and organizational outcomes often do not reflect broader social and political currents. The environment does not trigger the development of institutional routines and outcomes in an efficient and timely manner. This nuanced view of organizational change allows for a “world of historical possibilities that includes multiple stable equilibria” and “pressures of survival as sporadic rather than constant, crude rather than precise” (March & Olsen, 1996, p. 255). However, March and Olsen at times underplay exogenous factors, which is problematic because the Service is heavily impacted by episodic events that problematize the construct of protection within and outside the agency. Although March and Olsen underplay the impact of the external environment, they wisely point out that institutions are political actors. In this sphere, Foucault and Schmitt emerge to examine the dimensions of power and politics. By constructing protective screens and barricades, the Secret Service is able to shield the president from outside threats while managing presidential movement and action inside the bubble.
Among these different facets of power, productive power focuses on the internal regulations and rules which people impose on themselves due to the reifications of knowledge. Rather than trying to control people through temporal, spatial, or hierarchical relations, this aspect of power is productive as it creates subjects and objects. In his study of discipline and sexuality (1990, 1995), Foucault finds that it is not repression, but productivity that defines how an individual sees him or herself. This innovative aspect of power is neither negative nor coercive as it seeks to create conditions where people regulate their own thoughts and actions. Power is not something that restrains subjects; it is something that produces knowledge, practices, and subjects through the practices of normalizations. Instead of being destructive, power is able to generate new modes of thought and action that people tie themselves to. Not only do people discipline themselves, this form of power “categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity” (Foucault, 1983, p. 212). This is an easy recognition for the ordinary individual, but the truth production in the Secret Service generates the same subjectivity for the POTUS. The first presidents to be exposed to this type of surveillance were Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson. With each successive president, the gaze accompanied by the same subjectivity grew stronger and stronger. This gaze was only reinforced by the press function of the White House in the early 20th century. The president had to be presented in particular way.

In applying a Foucauldian framework, Flyvbjerg (1998) demonstrates how local battles in the city of Aalborg between the Chamber of Commerce, the Technical Department, the bus company, and city officials over urban renewal resulted in a case study of how power fits a strategic and productive framework. In this setting of real rationality, knowledge, information, and objective analysis were an object of power to be used for the tactical advantage of one entity
over another. In this contest, Bacon was turned on his head: knowledge is not power, but power is knowledge. This rationality-as-rationalization pivots on the central point for Foucault. Power produces meaning and knowledge: it selects what counts and does not count, it determines what is viable and is not worthwhile, and it establishes what is normal and abnormal. How is shaped by governing rationalities, which establish boundaries of thought and action. From this insight, Foucault is able to proceed and examine how power operates based on these governing rationalities, which people themselves are tied into. Self-surveillance and discipline rest on these governing rationalities which emerge from conflict and struggle.

In particular, the presidential security apparatus that the president becomes tied to is linked to these governing rationalities. This is why Foucault’s idea of linking power to meaning is critical. There is a governing rationality that facilitates the building of the security bubble that surrounds the president. Whether the bubble is small or large, the Secret Service is always concerned about how to regulate and conduct presidential behavior and manage presidential image. The president is not free to escape the gaze of the Secret Service or leave the containment zone. In this sense, the institution of protection has created a certain rationality that dictates how the Service must interact with the president and how the president interacts with the Service. It also determines how the crowd is expected to react in these settings. There is a certain dequorum that must be followed for those in the presence of POTUS. The Service normalizes the unruly masses to an orderly crowd. The “how” of protection is shaped by a rationality, which establishes what is knowledge, who can speak with authority, what the factors are in determining dangerousness, what information to release and control, how to provide for physical safety, and what protective measures are legitimate. This is the essence of productive power.
In proceeding from productive power, disciplinary methods of control regulate and restrain individuals through a variety of techniques. The deviant and abnormal behavior becomes normalized through these external power relations in organizations. In particular, surveillance is able to operate through institutions as an instrument of control by using disciplinary techniques that focus on the individual. The gaze is able to regulate behavior and normalize individuals through Jeremy Bentham’s innovative method of control (Bentham, 1843). The Panopticon or Inspection House is an architectural design that controls prisoners (or subjects) through the use of watching and non-watching (Foucault, 1995). This disciplinary apparatus creates “a new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example” (Bentham, 1843, p. 39). This set of power relations for Bentham rests on the simple idea of the inspection principle, in which the object of interest is constantly watched and monitored from a central location. The constant vigilance (or even the perceived vigilance of watching) transforms the watched into a potential docile subject. This form of power is not just rooted in prisons, but is to be found in factories, schools, armies, hospitals, and the media. In these enclosed sites, centralized authority is able to instill a sense of normalization resulting from the control over temporal and spatial relations. Although subjects are still resistant to complete ideological incorporation and do not become docile subjects, they are still impacted from the context they are confined to. In these situations, discipline is the primary form of power that creates an identity that subjects are confined to.

The end product of these disciplinary spaces is self-surveillance. These subjects, president and crowds, not only become confined to an identity imposed from without, but they willingly choose to reinforce and reify that identity. This constant and anonymous form of discipline eventually transforms the watched into “his own guardian” (Dreyfus & Rabinow,
1983, p. 189) because he is aware that his actions are being monitored. From the school child to the assembly worker to the patient to the president, the gaze is constant. There are few spaces, if any, that these individuals can escape the continual gaze. From total institutions to enclosed sites, disciplinary power backed by governing rationalities begins to shape and constitute how people think, feel, and act.

In fact, this gaze has been directed towards the Office of the President for more than 100 years. He, like the military private, the student, or the prisoner, is subject to the effects of this peculiar power relation. The Service is able to construct an artificial and confined space that limits and manages the movement of the president. The closed space of the White House eventually spreads itself to encompass the President himself. Wherever the president stands or moves, the Secret Service must construct an artificial space that is controllable. The quality of White House security has been gradually extended to cover presidential retreats, cars, planes, yachts, and even presidential speeches, dinners, dances, and meet and greets (although the later half of these spaces have to appear open and accessible). Surveillance naturally becomes a permanent feature of political events that should celebrate the benefits of an open society. In effect, Abraham’s Lincoln’s cage has been partially built by the Secret Service, but then fortified and locked by the presidents themselves. They finally become their “own guardian,” as Harry S Truman’s “womanish” comments about protection indicate.

In the production of POTUS safety, the Service also disciplines and normalizes crowds in the vicinity of the body of the Chief Executive. The crowd is also trained to be docile and obedient. There are certain movements, actions, and words that are not said or done in the presence of the president. Movements must be orderly, contained, and civilized. Disruptions are silenced and removed. This separate and distinct bubble is created not only for presidential
protection and crowd safety, but it enables the media spectacle of image. The Service is able to display and disclose a particular type of presidential persona by carefully constructing the bubble.

Through this analysis of power relations, Foucault recognized how these two forms of power merged in the government (2007). Disciplinary power as external and negative and productive power as internal and positive enabled the government to manage both individuals and populations. In essence, governmentality constitutes “a space in which the negative and positive dimensions of power come together” (Bevir, 1994, p. 350). Although the dominant subject in this form of governmentality is the population, the government still seeks to designate “the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed” (Foucault, 1983, p. 221). The police state is able to use its productive and disciplinary tactics to direct the conduct and behavior of others in closed and open spaces. The disciplining of closed spaces works “in an empty, artificial space that is to be completely constructed” while the disciplining of open spaces relies “on a number of material givens” (Foucault, 2007, p. 54). Rather than seeking to control individual bodies by relying on the inspection principle, security in open spaces seeks to manage an open, free, and “not exactly controllable” space and population (Foucault, 2007, p. 54). This space is not constructed, but a given that cannot be controlled like a prison, hospital, school, or even the White House. The fundamental issue with open spaces is the problem of the series or of calculating probabilities. It must compute, estimate probability, and ascertain predictability among unpredictability. It seeks to control a population based on numbers and figures.

In order to govern these spaces, the police have to have an intimate knowledge of those they watch and be careful observers who seek to guide conduct.29 The state is deeply concerned

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29 In Foucault’s view, the police do not just focus on law and order. The term covers organizations that shape and direct behavior. Policing deals with public health, crime, education, security, sex, etc.
with the creation of a healthy mind and body for the individual and the collective; it is constantly working on the conscience. In particular, “Foucault shows that the chief role of the police, which took more and more precedence over time, was the control of certain individuals and of the general population” (Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1983, p. 139). The role and function of the police is to acculturate, manage, control, and regulate society in a productive manner.

The Political

In securing these open spaces and protecting the president in enclosed spaces, the Secret Service must make the fundamental political decision: the distinction between friend and enemy. This classification between potential safety and catastrophic danger emerges as a constant theme in the history of the Secret Service and is closely tied to power relations that the Secret Service must establish. However, most organizational theory does not consider the role of politics in organizations (Hult & Walcott, 1990). This is strange because political philosophers from Machiavelli to Hegel to Marx to Clausewitz to modern thinkers like Allison, Pfeffer, and Perrow have emphasized how politics is deeply embedded in the fabric of political systems and organizations. Rather than understanding the role of the political and how its shapes everyday interactions, politics is deemed to be self-serving, dangerous, and unproductive in organizational life; it should be eliminated or controlled to avoid conflict and controversy (Drory & Romm, 1990; Randall, Cropanzano, Bormann, & Birjulin, 1999). Although this view of politics is embedded in most organizations, it does not accurately represent the importance of the political in organizational settings. In public organizations, this view tends to reinforce the belief that politics and administration should be separate (Goodnow, 2003). Under this framework, administration is plagued by politics and politics is plagued by administration. By separating these two spheres, administration can be effective and efficient. However, administration is
political (Waldo, 1984). By looking at the political from a different dimension (not just the limited, self-interested view of politics), organizations become entities that constantly must deal with politics. For the public sector, administrators must actively have a political strategy to accomplish their objectives and goals. Hult and Walcott (1990) point out that public organizations can be conceived as political systems. As polities, organizations are immersed and embedded with the political. In these settings, politics serve to “allocate values and to generate purposes and commitment” (Hult & Walcott, 1990, p. 24). Viewed this way, organizations are governing and ruling systems that steer toward particular ends.

The resource dependency approach (Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978) also focuses on the vital role of power and politics to stabilize an uncertain environment created by interdependence. This dependency is the result of organizations needing resources from their environment to prosper. These range from tangible resources like customers, employees, suppliers, investors, capital to symbolic resources like reputation, goodwill, and credibility. Due to this reliance on key resources, external forces have the capacity to shape organizations. In fact, these factors have a tremendous amount of influence on the structural, behavioral, and cultural aspects of organizations. To avoid being too dependent on critical resources, organizations cope by obtaining resources through a host of strategies ranging from cooption to the law to mergers to collusion.

The critical challenge for any organization is to obtain a stable supply of key resources, which are the source of organizational power. However, an organization is merely “a coalition of groups and interest” with each “attempting to obtain something” (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978, p. 36). In this setting of struggle and opposition over needs and wants, obtaining resources is problematic. To gain access to these resources, actors in organizations must be political. They
must be willing to overcome opposition by seeking to acquire, mobilize, and use these resources for their own interest (Pfeffer, 1981). In obtaining these power resources and the political will to act, these power-brokers have continued access to resources, stabilize outcomes, and avert environment control. For Pfeffer and Salancik, power and politics are necessary components in organizational life to achieve a degree of certainty and effectiveness. But beyond this, they recognize that organizations are not orderly processes with fixed goals, static needs, and established meaning. Rather, organizations are coalitions with competing factions that must fight to maintain position, power, and the capacity to be political (Cyert & March, 1963).30

The process of who gets what or how these resources are secured is critical in organizational analysis, but it neglects that this distribution is based on the categorization of who is my friend and who is my enemy and places too much emphasis on conflict. Public organizations like the Secret Service must allocate values and generate who gets what and how by making a fundamental political decision: the distinction between friend and enemy (Schmitt, 1996). For Schmitt, there is a clear distinction for Schmitt between a private and a public enemy (Schwab, 1970). In particular, private enemies should not be treated with viable threats that terrorize the public order. The real enemy is public in nature. However, not all public threats are considered or classified as enemies either. Schmitt was careful to point out that the enemy does not have to be “morally evil or aesthetically ugly,” but “is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 27). The difference and the potential merger between the established order and un-established chaos create the threshold for Schmitt’s sovereign to declare

30 Although this approach explains how organizations are conflictual systems, its concept of power does not adequately explain how resources can be equated to power. Dahl (1961) refers to resources as potential power, not power per se and Morriss (2002) argues that equating resources with power is committing the vehicle fallacy. Despite these limitations, the resource dependency approach illuminates how power is dispersed in organizational systems and how politics is the art of achieving and attaining critical resources.
a state of exception. There is a potential tendency for democratic societies to suspend certain
democratic norms to preserve normality (Agamben, 1998, 2005).

Despite this tendency to ignore constitutional rules to preserve order, Schmitt advocates
that the type of enemy should determine the treatment the enemy receives. This nuanced view of
the enemy allows Schmitt to use Richard Zouch’s typology to distinguish an adversary, a hostes,
and an inimici (Schmitt, 2006). An adversarii is an opponent that usually exists within a legal
community. Rules, tradition, and law often prescribe appropriate action and bound the sovereign
to an extent. States may actively pursue the other within prescribed norms; there are limits that
prevent the sovereign from annihilating this type of enemy. In contrast to the adversarii, a
hostes or enemy of the state “may injure and kill” (Schmitt, 2006, p. 164). Because of the radical
nature of this threat to the public order, this enemy may be annihilated. However, most times
states operate under just war theory with just causes. The sovereign is bound by international
law built by the Jus Publicum Europaeum. The final threat is the inimici who “is an opponent
with whom there is friendship, no amicitia or legal community, no hospitium (hospitality), and
no foedus (covenant) (2006, p. 163). Schmitt argues that war can be total when the enemy is a
hostes.

In developing a more refined theory of the enemy, Schmitt devised a basic understanding
of three types of enmity: conventional, real, and absolute (Schmitt, 2007; Slomp, 2005). The
conventional enemy or the hostis is closely connected to the state and its recognized enemies.
Schmitt sees here a critical distinction between an enemy and a criminal. The enemy has a
particular status that grants them certain rights. They fight for a cause, wear a uniform, and are
directly tied to a state’s apparatus. This defined definition of the external enemy establishes a
“clear distinction between war and peace, between internal and external, between combatant and
non-combatant, between neutrality and engagement, between enemy and criminal” (Slomp, 2005, p. 509). The real enemy, however, moves towards Schmitt’s theory of the partisan (Schmitt, 2007). The partisan is an irregular combatant that is directly tied to an ideological cause that uses “means of terror and counter terror” (Schmitt, 2007, p. 13). This type of enemy is the “particular enemy (inimicus)” who “wishes us the worst, who takes pleasure in it” as “he nurtures in his heart animosity and hatred” (de la Grange, 2004). These partisans are far more deadly because they exist on the outskirts of the state, but yet exist within the state. They are the internal threats that the social order has given birth to. Schmitt labels partisans as irregular entities who rely on agility and mobility to cause havoc within their homeland. Yet, the real enemy and its actions are bound to an extent because they are tied to the land. They are not foreign creatures with no disregard for the people, which tends to put them in a defensive position. The final type of enmity, however, is the absolute enemy. This partisan is not tied to land or place, but solely to an ideological cause. They fight for fundamental values that bind them to nothing but their cause. This type of enemy is the late 19th century anarchist and the modern-day terrorist. Because their actions are absolute and total, the state seeks to conduct total war itself. What is distributing for Schmitt is the gradual replacement of the conventional enemy with the real and absolute enemy. The terrorist has become the new norm, order, and enemy. With this historical trend, Schmitt sees the gradual criminalization of the enemy, which allows states to intensify their means of destruction (Schmitt, 2006). Wars become police action and terrorist become enemy combatants.

In using his central construct of the political, it is important to soften Schmitt’s idea of the enemy. For the Secret Service, the agency is often required to make a clear delineation between adversarii and hostes/inimici or between private enemies of the president and public
enemies of the state, but it does not seek to utterly destroy either of these enemies. An adversary for the Service might be a bothersome family member, pesky protestors who seek to challenge and embarrass the president, political rivals, or other entities that seek to harm the president in a non-violent manner. These are private enemies that the Service categorizes and watches to protect the image of the president. In dealing with these enemies, the Service watches, hides, and regulates its behavior through a host of mechanisms. *A hoste* and *an inimici*, in contrast, are a public enemy of the state that seeks to challenge and disrupt the public order. They are the real and absolute partisan who seek to conduct terror. These types of enemies are a viable and legitimate threat that may harm the body of the president. Under these conditions, the full weight of the Secret Service is utilized to neutralize these types of threats. These enemies have ranged from home-grown anarchists, to Islamic terrorists, to German spies, to suspected KGB agents, to the lone gunman.

Because it is difficult to ascertain who is a public or private enemy, the sovereign who embodies executive power must ultimately decide who is a threat. This distinction between friend and enemy is based on Schmitt’s decisionism. This concept rests on two points (Schwab, 1970). First, the sovereign must have the capacity to establish order and harmony from chaos and discord. A strong authority with substantial resources must have the power to overcome crisis situations. With this power, the sovereign acts for the people by suspending the previous order to provide protection from the necessity. Fear is replaced by a strong executive that is able restore order. Second, the sovereign not only stands on the watch tower, but must act as the safeguard to ensure that order remains. To provide this protection, the sovereign must interpret and decide what is normal and abnormal. This power is based on *auctoritas* and *potestas directa* (Schwab, 1970). Working from Hobbes’s central claim, the sovereign can only demand
obedience as long as it protects. Without authority and the direct power to command, the sovereign has no power to decide. The sovereign can only demand obedience if he has the power to protect.

To provide protection of the president’s body and soul, the Service must interpret and decide what is normal and abnormal. Although Schmitt is clear about making this fundamental distinction, he is unclear about how to make the political determination of who is a friend and an enemy. The distinction of “what constitutes enmity and friendship at a given moment in our epoch can be derived only from the concrete situation” (Schwab, 1970, pp. 27-28). The criteria for this distinction are often the result of concrete, contextual, and existential conditions. The decision “is based upon a political judgment able to comprehend the conceptual basis of the political as friend-enemy groupings” (Lefebvre, 2005, p. 92). The friend-enemy distinction is not stable or predictable. The decision-maker must constantly re-evaluate these policies in order to act.

Although Schmitt’s ideas are centered on the sovereign and the state, his ideas can be directly tied to organizations. In particular, organizational analysis can use Schmitt’s idea of the friend/enemy distinction and his decisionism. In systems of coordinated action, some organizations exist in a battlefield in which they employ a host of strategies that seek to control and eliminate public and private enemies. Although most organizational analysis recognizes struggle, it often fails to recognize a key component: the distinction between friend and enemy. Organizations have the capacity to establish order from chaos and then protect those conditions, especially security-based entities whose primary mission is to make these key decisions and implement procedures to eliminate the enemy. To survive, politicos and organizations like the Service make this fundamental decision that determines this distinction.
Circuits of Power

In securing the president against enemies from within and without, the Service has used Foucauldian and Schmittian inspired versions of power. Although these theorists hold potentially incommensurable assumptions, the two can be linked.\(^{31}\) While Foucault’s research was more abstract and focused on a top-down perspective Schmitt looked at how power operates in a visible manner that was grounded in context. What is missing in Foucault’s approach is “an understanding of how the forms of discourse become part of the lives of ordinary people, or even how they become institutionalized” (Hacking, 2004, p. 278). For Hacking, Foucault needs to be filled out by adding a bottom-up approach.\(^{32}\) There needs to be additional consideration of how power operates in everyday interactions. What is missing in Schmitt’s approach is an understanding of how the sovereign makes the very political decision regarding the friend-enemy distinction. Without a consideration of both the abstract and the real, Hacking is right to point out that something is missing.

In dealing with what is missing, Haugaard notes that “what we need is a plurality of models and theories which we can build bridges or fuse together” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 40). Rather than simplifying events with one theory, it is necessary to use a multitude of theories to better grasp the complexity of how power operates. Without building bridges between diverse concepts, power-based theories simply show that people are either oppressed, made free, are cultural dupes to the elites, or constituted by power relations. Because power is a conceptual

\(^{31}\) Clausewitz (1968) idea of power is concrete, but considers the broader political, social, and environmental conditions in how power is able to operate. Furthermore, the work of Agamben has sought to combine Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty and the state of exception with Foucault’s notion of biopower.

\(^{32}\) Although Hacking is mostly correct, he tends to overemphasize that Foucault is not a bottom-up theorist. He overlooks that Foucault does deal with details. His studies are filled with intricate stories and facts that show the connection between the abstract and the real. For example, his work *Discipline and Punishment* illustrates this. Foucault shows the abstract development of a disciplinary society by relying on a host of concrete and tangible events, including detailed accounts of ordering of prisoners through timetables and tortures and the methods used to quarantine towns.
swamp, there is a necessity to “fuse together” comparable and opposing views of power in order to illuminate organizational and political phenomena. In particular, Clegg (1989b) and Haugaard (1997) have developed their own models by linking Dahl with Wong and Foucault or Parsons with Giddens and Foucault. These models provide frameworks to understand how two individuals with seemingly different metaphysical beliefs can be linked to create more dynamic and interesting interpretations of social life. This section will demonstrate how Clegg’s circuits of power can be utilized to show how Foucault’s notion of disciplinary/productive power is compatible with Schmitt’s decisionism and friend/enemy distinction. By partially merging aspects of Foucault and Schmitt, their notions of power become mutually reinforcing.33

Clegg (1989a) argues that different concepts of power can be integrated in a framework of circuits with each shaping the other. Despite differences in theory and assumption, Clegg shows how different facets of power come together and relate to each other. This relation allows power to be circulated and changed based on the situation and context. Power has different properties and manifestations depending on its state; power is not an all-encompassing single entity that has the capacity to divorce people from their true interests. Clegg identified three primary types of power that are interconnected: causal, dispositional, and facilitative.

The first circuit is grounded in a modified Dahlian framework of power. By relinquishing some of the more overt claims of agency and causality, Clegg is able to retain and

33 Although there are key differences between Schmitt and Foucault, they can be connected because of their intellectual heritage. Although Foucault relies more on a tradition based on Machiavelli and Schmitt on Hobbes, both were influenced by Thucydides. Foucault and Schmitt both saw life as one marked by struggle and conflict as advocated by Machiavelli and Hobbes. War is always beneath the social order. Hobbes was fearful of this condition and sought to temper it with a strong Leviathan, while Machiavelli sought to use tactics and strategies to control these forces. Hence, Clegg (1989a) is wrong to say that the gap between them is almost insurmountable. Although they had different solutions to the basic question of how people come together in civil ways, both relied on the ideas of Thucydides to understand the nature of humanity and how they interact. Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War reflects the notion that individual and collective actions revolve around the principle that people, groups, and nations act in accordance with their interests. According to him, his work is a “possession of all time” because it accurately portrays the human condition. This Realpolitik version of politics is deeply embedded in both the works of Schmitt and Foucault. By keeping Foucault and Schmitt’s realism in mind, their notions of power can start to merge.
show how power is an avenue for control and contest. This episodic view of power is the “most accessible and most visible circuit of power” (Clegg, 1989a, p. 211). In this sphere, power effects are obvious and observable. It is here where power is manifested in the everyday lives of people. But it is also here where Scott is able show that people are not cultural dopes to the system or structure (J. C. Scott, 1992). In particular, individuals born in a particular context do not incorporate or passively accept values imposed upon them by the elites. People both accept values through the public transcript and resist them by creating different modes of thinking through the hidden transcript.

This is the sphere in which Schmitt mainly resides. His concrete and pragmatic theory is based on real events with real people. It is here where the sovereign decides who is a threat and who is benign. The existence of everyday life informs the sovereign of what must be done to channel struggles and maintain order. Schmitt relies on a particular notion of the agent that has the capacity or efficacy to bring about intended effects, which is another form of productive power. The role of the sovereign is to create order from a complex and messy world. However, Foucault also plays a significant role in this sphere of action. Despite his earlier focus on meaning holism and the death of the author, his notion of power is still relational and strategic. People must effectively use tactics and knowledge in particular events to obtain what they need. In fact, the Foucauldian inspired works of Flyvbjerg and Scott at times operate at this level of analysis. In general, the power over truth production is still bounded up in struggle, conflict, and contest (Haugaard, 1997). What is most important is the ability to link Schmitt and Foucault at this level of analysis. It is here where the sovereign is productive power. His or her mandates create new subjectivities.
The second and third circuits operate at a deeper and more influential level. Although the dispositional and facilitative circuits do not determine the episodic conception of power, they do shape it and impose constraints on how people behave and think. In particular, the dispositional circuit shapes the context of episodic power. It does this by fixing and re-fixing rules of the game. This circuit of social integration is therefore concerned with codifying “relations of meaning and of membership” (Clegg, 1989a, p. 244). The rules of practice are determined and solidified. In this circuit, Foucault’s ideas of power/knowledge, truth production, and discipline are tied to dispositional power because it “works through the creation of specific meaning and modes of subjectification which are internalized” in different settings (Haugaard, 1999, p. 247). Although Clegg does not point this out, this circuit mirrors Foucault’s discursive formations. In these epistemic subsets, rules are continually being formed and reformed. By examining innovations in discipline and truth production, Foucault examines the mentality of the prison system, factories, schools, hospitals, madness, sexuality, and the state. In these discursive formations, some use timetables, others use examinations, while still others rely on surveillance. Although these discursive formations share important details, they are also distinct and have different rules, which then shape episodic power.

While the dispositional circuit mirrors discursive formations, the facilitative circuit reflects epistemes or systemic rationalities. The structuring and shaping of an agent’s capacity to act is reaffirmed and reinforced by the facilitative circuit, which creates the context for dispositional power. In this circuit, Clegg is able to examine systemic rationalities that provide a broad orientation of society. Concepts ranging from capitalism to democracy to science mark the deepest and most penetrating aspects of power. Because of this constitutive element, Foucault’s ideas also come to the forefront in this circuit. By focusing on emerging and reified
governing rationalities, it becomes clear how systems of thought are able to partially constitute and create new individuals and peoples. Although Foucault tended to exaggerate the overwhelming effects of these formations, they still are able to empower and disempower the actions of people at a macro and micro level. This circuit includes certain ways of being while it excludes other ways of being.

Employing Clegg’s framework of power shows how Foucault and Schmitt can work together in an organizational setting. Although Foucault wants to cut off the head of the sovereign and Schmitt wants to stitch it back on, their ideas are complementary to an extent. In fact, what is missing in Foucault is filled in by Schmitt and what is missing in Schmitt is filled out by Foucault. In particular, Foucault is able to examine the emergence of governing rationalities and how these discursive relations are embedded in institutions, while Schmitt is able to show direct and visible power in the body of the sovereign. Even though Schmitt’s sovereign is constrained by these seemingly fixed nodal points, Foucault’s ideas show how and why this is the case. Freedom is always constrained and enabled. While Foucault examines these overarching mentalities, Schmitt is able to examine how interactions between normal and abnormality play out in everyday life. Instead of focusing on the intended and unintended effects of institutional control mechanisms, Schmitt is able to elucidate how these governing logics materialize and change based on context. This continuity between the two proceeds in their models of power which rely on pouvoir: the act, not the disposition is what brings meaning and order to the surface. Both knowledge and order are established through concrete actions that stabilize social relations. The act of the sovereign is one facet of productive power. The premise behind the moment of a decision and the declaration of who is an enemy is shaped by governing
rationalities, but these rationalities are shaped by the productive power of the decision, itself backed up by sovereign fiat.

While Foucault examines the surfacing of new rationalities and how stabilized power relations constitute reality Schmitt is able to show how political decisions are made in real time. As decisions are made and conflict arises, these governing rationalities are prone to change over time and often in unexpected ways. This dynamic tension between the abstract and concrete allows for permanent change and permanent domination. These feedback loops between the ideal type and practice is what allows for consistent change and domination to occur, and enables new classifications and subjects to emerge. Hence, “naming has real effects on people, and changes in people have real effects on subsequent classifications” (Hacking, 2004, p. 280).

One example of this process was White House security during World War II. Before the start of the war, the Secret Service was in a process of modernization as it was trying to transition from 19th century conditions of travel and communication to a 20th century model that was built on technology and access. Despite these internal changes to Service personnel and practices, the president was fairly accessible to the people. Despite the attempt on Roosevelt’s life in Miami, the Service had not fully developed the art of creating distance between the president and the people. Concrete conditions on the ground would not allow a significant change in how protection was operationalized. However, the dangers on the ground because of the start of World War II changed the idea and practice of presidential security. In this state of war, anyone could be a foe.

The dispositional and even the facilitative circuit were altered; a new system of rules and logic began to emerge during this period. With this opening, the Secret Service created the foundational elements of a Fortress White House, which rested on the premise that the enemy is
lurking around and maybe within the gates of the White House. The Service convinced Roosevelt to close down the West and East Executive Avenues, allowed the military police to stand guard around the White House, increased the White House Police guard, permitted the building of sentry boxes inside and outside the White House fence, closed the White House grounds, and canceled any access to the north door. With creating an imposing blockade on the White House grounds, the Service took that logic inside the White House. Agents installed blackout curtains, windows and skylights were painted black, the White House detail was increased, and sentries with machine guns were placed on top of the White House and surrounding buildings. The War Time White House was cloaked in secrecy and inaccessibility.

The feedback loop between the concrete and abstract in the early 1940s created a new system of protection. Foucault’s notion of power as developing knowledge and meaning was directly connected to Schmitt’s concrete existence.

In this rough and tumble relation between agency and classifications or between episodic power and dispositional/facilitative power, new modes of discipline gradually emerge and impose new restrictions, which then in turn are re-shaped by resistance and agency-based action. These feedback loops grounded in a web of power relations create a dynamic environment, in which meaning and power are produced through conflict. It is here where decisions have intended and unintended results in the articulation of knowledge and creation of subjectivities. The dependence on tangible decisions and concrete events has real consequences that bring about change. Rather than being completely restrained by governing logics, people and institutions are able to shape meaning and break constraints. They are not overly determined by society, but action is limited and constrained by embedded subjectivities. As Foucault notes, there is no escape or emancipation from power relations. Order is always imposed via norms,
traditions, and regimes of truth. In this circular medium of exchange, power evolves, adapts, and changes. In fact, Foucault and Schmitt both saw life as marked by struggle as advocated by Machiavelli. Politics is a form of war and war is always beneath the social order. The existence of organizations like the Secret Service is an institutional confirmation that the state must tame this war underneath the social order. The production and re-production of its space, power, and behavior allows the agency to order this environment.
CHAPTER FOUR

ALIEN PRACTICES:
THE FORMATION OF PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION

Congressman Dudley Wooten (D-TX) vehemently proclaimed on June 2, 1902 that the newly minted proposal from the House to protect the POTUS was a “doctrine of sovereignty as known in the monarchial system of the Old World” and it was “unnecessary, unconstitutional, [and] un-American” (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st session, vol. 35, 6342, 6344). The bill that had been devised by Representative George W. Ray (R-NY) after the assassination of President William McKinley sought to create a framework of protection by establishing an attack or assassination against the president as a federal crime, creating an expansive immigration policy that targeted anarchists as enemies of the state, and authorizing the Secret Service division of the Treasury Department to shield the president from perceived threats. For Wooten, the bill was revolutionary. It sought to introduce a “new note in our national life, an alien principle in our system of institutions” (p. 6344). The subtext of this resistance to presidential protection by Wooten and others might have flowed from the constitutional structure of presidential succession. The political order had a succession plan that was rooted in democratic discourse and elections. It made little sense to try to weaken or replace this process with an institution that was grounded in monarchy and imperialism.

Despite the opposition of introducing a quasi-imperial guard in the republic, this new note reflected the broader social and political changes that were occurring in the early 20th century, which saw the emergence of a centralizing power in the form of the state and in the body of the president. This development occurred simultaneously with the rise of mass media. William Randolph Hearst and the Joseph Pulitzer became media tycoons who influenced domestic and foreign policy through sensational news coverage. In response to these erratic
times, McKinley assumed the role of warrior president and became a Commander-in-Chief that directed the affairs of a nation. He became a president of the people as he assumed a stature that would permanently overshadow congressional authority. Presidential biographer Charles Sumner Olcott remarked that new problems required the president to deal with “questions, not of party of politics, but of national policy” for the nation had “become a world power” (1916, p. 296). With these new conditions, McKinley himself proclaimed, “I can no longer be called the President of a party; I am now the President of the whole people” (Olcott, 1916, p. 296).

Dealing with the tragic death of this new figure, the House bill created a new classification of crime that separated the POTUS as different from ordinary citizens by granting the national government jurisdiction over physical violence targeted at the president. The creation of this new class of crime based on the president’s special status in the American republic created a fundamental inequity between him and regular citizens. The president’s public body was cloaked with Constitutional power that made him distinct. The body of the POTUS would be regarded as a living entity in a state of exception. The House bill explicitly distinguished between the president’s public body that deserved extra care and protection and his private body that was deemed ordinary and should receive the same protection as a regular citizen. In separating the two bodies, Wooten saw clearly that “this bill erects the President into a peculiar potentate who rights as an individual are merged in his majesty as an official, and it includes in the awful circle of its solemn protection all who stand in the shadow of the throne and expect the glory of the crown” (p. 6342). The establishment of a dignified and different body recognized by law represented for Wooten the “beginning of a movement that needs to be checked rather than encouraged” (p. 6344). However, Wooten’s advice in the end was dismissed
as the alien idea of presidential protection was introduced and institutionalized in the beginning of the 20th century.

The purpose of this chapter is to show the beginnings of this movement in the first half of the 20th century. It will first do this first by examining the aftermath of the assassination of President McKinley. The recognition that an unprotected president can no longer be tolerated in a democratic society finally sinks into the American consciousness. In handling this new ethos, Congress, the president, and the Secret Service, and others begin to develop a governing rationality that acknowledges that the POTUS has to be treated in a distinct way to ensure his distinct status. In particular, the emerging of the public and private body of the president forcefully emerges from these entities. Congress devises several bills related to presidential protection that hinge on the idea of a public and private body, President Roosevelt recognizes the need to protect his formal body, but not his informal one, and the Secret Service begins to develops it own logic related to this public and private distinction. After this initial creation of the idea of presidential security, this chapter will then look at how the beginnings of this movement grew substantially from Taft to Hoover, with a particular emphasis on the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. The uncertainty caused by World War I established the need to track down enemies of the state to shield the president from danger. During this span, the practice of disciplining and issuing commands by the Service to the POTUS becomes a regular part of White House life. Despite some presidential resistance to a protective guard, the Secret Service starts to slowly refashion the sovereign in its new image.

A New Body Emerges
With the publication of his 15th edition of *Congressional Government*, Woodrow Wilson wrote in the preface that he was concerned that the action of the current administration reformed the structure of government to such an extent that it made his earlier work obsolete. He noted that McKinley’s new leadership “may put this whole volume hopelessly out of date” (1901, p. xiii). Wilson recognized that the new brand of politics that McKinley employed could “have a very far-reaching effect upon our method of government” (1901, p. xiii) Congress could be overwhelmed as the president assumed a higher position in a constitutional order designed to separate and divide power. The state was transitioning to a “government by mass meeting” headed by POTUS (1901, p. xiii).

William McKinley assumed this role as a new sovereign entity with a style of politics that superseded state and local interests. McKinley represented a new world order for Americans. With relative ease, he used the brute force of American power to expand beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States and led a nation out of economic depression. Pushing back the ethos of isolationism allowed the POTUS to emerge on a world scene filled with threats and enemies. This type of figure is exactly what the Anti-Federalist feared would emerge. Hebert Storing pointed out that most of the early critics of the new order feared an executive they called the “President-General” who “could find justification for almost anything he wished to do” (1981, p. 49) Patrick Henry warned of dictatorial power, questioning whether the American President will “come and lay prostrate at the feet of Congress his laurels” (Storing, 1985, p. 316) He doubted that such a breed would exist. Brutus counseled that a system built on ambition will result in state that is “administered with a view to arms, and war” instead of virtue and happiness (Storing, 1985, p. 146). They feared that security and conquest would precede liberty and well-ordered government. Publius mistakenly rejected the “nation of soldiers” argument in *Federalist*
8, but knew that the most powerful motivator of national conduct was security (Cooke, 1961, p. 47). He bluntly stated, “Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates” (Cooke, 1961, p. 45). The most effective way to ensure both security and liberty was through a strong centralized government with an energetic president. However, Hamilton’s vision of executive authority failed to consistently emerge in the 19th century. The president was just one player in a system of separated powers. It was not until McKinley and his entrance to the world scene that the POTUS became unbound.

In this new setting, the president had a whole new set of tools to manage his domestic and international policy agenda. In particular, a government directed by mass meeting could easily be moved by rhetoric and the press. McKinley accomplished his vision by shaping public opinion through the manipulation of the media. He learned quickly after the attack on the U.S.S. Maine that the media could sensationalize issues to such an extent that it could dictate national policy. McKinley used John Addison Porter and George B. Cortelyou to begin directly shaping news through the use of information management. Historian Robert C. Hildebrand noted that McKinley was so successful in “directing public opinion” that Midwestern states like Iowa who favored isolationism were heavily impacted and influenced (1981, p. 22). The president’s strategy for the engineering of consent relied on “taking his message directly to the people” and creating an “executive department that wielded, through its daily contact with the press, a more unobtrusive influence on public views” (Hilderbrand, 1981, p. 51). In this new media reality, the press reported continuously and extensively on the president and his policies. The emergence of a presidential spectacle was on the verge of exploding.

Yet, this figure was totally vulnerable to the upheavals of the late 19th century and early 20th century. It was an age of anarchist terrorism, bitter labor strife, massive inequalities
between proletarians and capitalists, political turmoil, and real and absolute partisans filled urban centers. Leaders all across Europe had been targeted and assassinated by global anarchists, Washington had been “invaded” by Coxey’s Army, the Pullman Strike of 1894 and the Lattimer Mines Massacre in 1897 resulted in the deaths of a host of strikers, William Brian Jennings campaign for ordinary folk was dead, the business tycoons of Morgan, Rockefeller, and Carnegie dominated society and politics, and the urban and rural poor were in a helpless state unable to fulfill the American dream. With no economic or political support, despair and desolation were widespread ailments for many. In this America, the POTUS remained unguarded.

The Assassination of William McKinley

The creation of a formal organized unit to protect the president began with the shooting of McKinley on September 6, 1901. Before this date, the president was protected in a loose, unorganized, and uncoordinated manner by entities like the Secret Service, the military, local law enforcement officials, the Washington Metropolitan police, private detective agencies, and sometimes the president’s own bodyguard. There was no oath, implicit or explicit, that demanded citizens/bodyguards die for the president. They were there as a precautionary measure to stop potential attacks on his life. This rudimentary protective apparatus began when the Secret Service unilaterally decided to start protecting the body of the president in the spring of 1894 despite not having Congressional approval. Through its various investigations, Operative Walker and his informer uncovered a plot in Colorado to assassinate the president. To secure the president, the Secret Service sent these two agents to Washington, commissioned them as special policemen, and assigned them to guard President Cleveland. They were “instructed to stay in the vicinity of the White House during the daytime and watch for suspicious persons who might be
Western gamblers, Anarchists, or cranks; and in the evening they were to attend meetings of Coxey’s Army, which was then in town”("Commission Exhibit 2549," 1964, p. 777).  

Because of the increased fear of a possible attempt on the president’s life, protection was expanded outside the White House during that summer as the Secret Service accompanied the Clevelands to their summer home at Gray Gables. The Chicago Daily reported that a security detail of three operatives was stationed at the president’s summer home to protect his wife and children, especially from the threat of being kidnapped ("Keep Men on Watch," 1894, August 6). This trend continued and was extended as the president was now guarded during trips, and social functions at the White House, and protection continued every summer thereafter at his home outside of Washington ("Commission Exhibit 2549," 1964). In fact, Cleveland’s concern with security continued as he expanded the White House Police Force, which was under the auspices of the city of Washington, from three to twenty-seven members during his second administration.

It was not until 1898 that an audit discovered that the Service was diverting funds and agents to protect the president. Congressional wrath fell upon Chief William P. Hazen for exceeding his primary mission, and he was quickly demoted to field operative. Despite this rebuke from Congress, McKinley was soon protected by operatives in the Secret Service and a contingency from the military during the Spanish-American War. The New York Times reported

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34 See Kaiser’s, “Origins of Secret Service Protection of the President: Personal, Interagency, and Institutional Conflict” (1988) as an excellent source of how the Secret Service operated at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. He argues that Cleveland’s security situation coupled with the reaction to McKinley’s assassination created several precedents which the Secret Service still continues to operate under today. In particular, he notes that “protection encompassed precautionary arraignments (with local authorities and other Federal agencies), surveillance (of suspected groups, such as Coxey’s Army), gathering intelligence (on “archaists,” and members of the “criminal class”), and investigation (of individuals who had threatened President Cleveland and who were thought to be involved in plotting or carrying out the assassination of President McKinley)” (1988, p. 119).

34 The New York Times reported that the security detail “was received with some surprise here, for the matter had been kept a secret for nearly two weeks” ("Secret Service Men at Gray Gables," 1894, August 7).
that a “force around the grounds will be largely increased and many detectives in citizens’
clothes will be placed on duty” accompanied by a military guard to “protect the President from
any possible danger” ("To Guard the President," 1898, April 22). Although McKinley was
surrounded by operatives and military personnel during the war, he did not have a proclivity for
security precautions like his former predecessor. In fact, “President Cleveland used to have quite
a bodyguard of detectives, but this custom was done away with when Mr. McKinley came into
power, and one man has been regarded as sufficient by the Secret Service” ("News to Chief
Wilkie," 1900, July 12).

McKinley did not fear the people or felt that he needed to have a host of bodyguards
surround him. Secret Service Detective Ireland said that since the Spanish War, the president
traveled across the country without any threat of being harmed. In Washington, Ireland noted
that he “walks about the White House grounds, drives out freely, and has enjoy much freedom
from the presence of detectives” ("Story of the Assault on the President," 1901, December 22).
Despite this limited protection for President McKinley at the White House, he could be heavily
guarded on trips outside of Washington, during which the Service was a constant in helping
manage his security and the presidential image. On the day of his assassination in Buffalo at the
Temple of Music, he was surrounded by a “conglomerate force of security men,” which created a
very large spectacle (Dorman, 1967, p. 21). There were 18 exposition policeman, 11 soldiers,
four Buffalo law enforcement officials, and three Secret Service detectives (Dorman, 1967).
Kaiser puts the number of security officials at more than 100 (1988). The number of security
agents, however, did not prevent Leon Czolgosz from firing two point-blank shots at McKinley even though two Secret Service agents were standing right next to him.35

To the spin the story in a certain way, Secret Service operatives started to manage and release selective details about the attack on the body of the POTUS. The Service noted in its manual of Principles of Protection that “three agents were present at the time of the assassination but they merely acted as guards and were not allowed control of the crowd in such a manner that the attack could not have been prevented” ("Commission Exhibit 2549," 1964, p. 777). There was no expectation for the Service to create a bubble to envelope the POTUS or the crowd.

Detective Ireland of the Secret Service recounted two unfortunate events that allowed Czolgosz to gain easy access to the president. First, the Secret Service detectives always stood behind the president and to his left so they could see the right hand of every person who came in contact with the president ("Story of the Assault on the President," 1901, December 22). However, Mr. Milburn, a member of the greeting committee, wanted to stand in that position so he could introduce people to the president, which prevented the detectives from being able to make a precise scan of potential threats. Second, Ireland was observing Czolgosz, but was interrupted by a short Italian man with a black mustache who “was persistent, and it was necessary for me push him along so that others could reach the President.” ("Story of the Assault on the President," 1901, December 22). As he pushed the man along, Czolgosz had free and easy access to shoot the president without any interference. Although the president was surrounded by a multitude of guards, there was no systematic system to screen the crowd, keep the people a certain distance away from the president, or even search those individuals who were

35 The Secret Service noted in its manual of Principles of Protection that “three agents were present at the time of the assassination but they merely acted as guards and were not allowed control of the crowd in such a manner that the attack could not have been prevented” ("Commission Exhibit 2549," 1964, p. 777)
greeting the president. Without some organizational routine, discipline, and process, the president was absolutely unprotected.36

Secretary James Wilson and presidential secretary George B. Cortelyou immediately announced that they feared an attack, “took special precaution” and that “nothing that foresight could imagine was omitted and yet the dastardly crime was committed” ("Every Precaution Taken," 1901, September 8). In fact, John F. Francis, a member of the reception committee, insisted that some measure of precaution be taken to protect the president. He noted that, “I know some people thought it was un-American to surround the President with a bodyguard in a peaceful community like this, but it must be borne in mind that the cranks we have always with us” ("One Ray of Consolation," 1901, September 7, p. 14). It is clear that threats to the public order were known and identified, but there was no clear and authoritative governing logic related to how or why the president should be protected. The belief of Wilson and Cortelyou that every precaution was undertaken to shield the president from danger was accurate based on how they viewed the practice of protection.

However, the Metropolitan Police of Washington had already started to devise a particular system of practices and knowledge related to presidential security that was not yet authoritative or carried out in a uniform manner. Colonel Sylvester, chief of the Metropolitan police, outlined the basic process to show how the president was protected in Washington and how he should have been protected in Buffalo ("Methods of Protecting the President's Person," 1901, September 7). First, “showy protection” was worse than having any protection at all. The

36 The military was also concerned with information management. The Boston Globe reported that the description of officers of Company C, First Heavy Artillery “differs from those already published” ("Who Captured Czolgosz?," 1901, September 10). The officers recounted that it was the fault of the Secret Service that Czolgosz was able to get so close the president and it was not the negro Parker who had seized the weapon from the assassin’s hand, but it was two Army privates who should have the credit for disarming him. The Secret Service operatives were in shock after the shooting, which forced the military privates to take action to secure the situation.
“glimmer and glamour” of the presidential spectacle that was created by armed guards in uniform only attracts attention to the possible target. This increased attraction to the principal “invites reckless irresponsibles to try to defeat our purpose” of protection. Security details must be keenly aware of how they dress and present themselves for it affects how the president is presented and protected. They too must be concerned with a particular type of image control.

Second, protection required bodyguards to be in plain clothes so that they can appear to be crowd-like, blend into the environment, and observe any “unnatural” details. Third, distance between the president and the crowd was the best technique to prevent a successful attack. Colonel Sylvester recommended a safe distance of about 15 to 20 feet from the president. He noted that a shot taken from this distance has a about chance of one in a hundred of fatally wounding the president. The protection in Buffalo clearly violated this rule as people were able to stand in a waiting line and greet the president. Finally, bodyguards must be constantly moving and rotating in order to check critical spaces, and they must check in every 10 minutes to ensure no security breaches. Finally, the Metropolitan Police kept track of visitors to the White House or those that had contact with the president. With this type of protection, Sylvester noted that “danger is reduced to a minimum” ("Methods of Protecting the President's Person," 1901, September 7). When the president left Washington, the other chiefs of police were informed of the Metro’s methods in how to establish a safe zone around the president, but what was conveyed most strongly was that the crowds be kept at a safe distance, around 20 feet.

Despite these initial practices of trying to create sterile zones, the president “has always objected strongly to being surrounded by detectives, and so the Secret Service people have a hard time protecting him against possible cranks” ("Methods of Protecting the President's Person," 1901, September 7). The president would not consider protective procedures to be important or
taken seriously. He in no way bound himself to the logic or practice of protection when he interacted with citizens. Former Attorney General Griggs recalled the day after the shooting:

I warned him against this very thing time and time again. I asked him for the country’s sake, if not for his own, to have a bodyguard when he went out. He refused. He laughed at me. He insisted on going about almost as freely as if he was not liable to attack. He insisted the American people were too intelligent and too loyal to their country to do any harm to their Chief Executive ("Mr. Griggs Warned Mr. M'Kiniely," 1901, September 7).

The inability to seriously consider that the POTUS was a viable target somehow seemed to escape McKinley’s thought processes despite the numerous assassinations across the globe and the social and economic conditions of his own country. In the preceding twenty years, President Garfield had been killed from behind at a train station, as had Tsar Alexander II in 1881, President Carnot of France in 1894, the Prime Minister Antonio Canovas of Spain in 1897, Empress Elizabeth of Austria in 1898, and King Umberto of Italy in 1900. The danger of a possible attack was evident, but there was no compelling reason in the context of American exceptionalism to do anything about these potential threats.

After the attack on McKinley, the attitude about protecting the president’s public body changed to a considerable degree and eliminating enemies of the state became a singular priority. Mr. Pendel, the oldest doorman at the White House who had experienced the assassinations of Lincoln and Garfield, said, “It looks at though we would have to keep the President in a fort and search all visitors before letting them in to talk to him. Assassination is too easy here” ("More Care in the Future," 1901, September 7). Senator Samuel McEnery (D-LA) also argued that the president “should more closely and carefully be guarded” ("Sympathy is Universal," 1901, September 7), while Henry C. Payne, National Republican Committeeman member and personal friend of McKinley, pointed out that “it is almost a crime that our Government does not take
precautions to protect our Chief Magistrate from assassination” ("Part of the Anarchist Scheme," 1901, September 7).

Although there was a partial realization that the president should be protected, the overwhelming sentiment was how to identify, sort, and eliminate anarchists entering the country and how to remove those that were already here. Secretary Gage sent a letter to the Treasury Department demanding that all anarchists in the United be identified and located as soon as possible; acting Attorney General Beck noted that Congress had the power to exclude antiracists from the state; and the Commissar of Immigration Powderly noted that the laws should change to exclude anarchists by requiring immigrants to produce some certificate that verifies their good character and law-abiding status ("Means for Suppressing Anarchy," 1901, September 8). Assistant Secretary Alies of the Treasury Department immediately pushed for a measure that would enlarge the Secret Service; “it should be given supervision over groups or bodies of men who plot against the form of government and against the officers of the Government” ("Would Bar Anarchists," 1901, September 8).

Rhetoric was transformed into reality just a few days after the attack when detectives in Chicago arrested six men that were implicated in a plot to assassinate President McKinley ("Chicago Anarchists Raided," 1901, September 8), and a few days later Emma Goldman was also put behind bars in Chicago and charged with the same crime because she allegedly “fired the brain” of Leon Czolgosz ("Emma Goldman Arrested in Chicago," 1901, September 11). Arrests continued across the nation as Antonio Maggio was charged in Silver City, New Mexico, two men in Pittsburgh were also were put behind bars ("Nation’s War on Anarchy Begins," 1901, September 11), and Ethelebert Stone was arrested in Camden, New Jersey for aiding and abetting in the attempted assassination of McKinley ("Stone not an anarchist," 1901, September 11).
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12). New York City Police also placed the 200 known anarchists in the city under close surveillance ("The Anarchists Here Under Close Watch," 1901, September 8). The Chicago Daily Tribune noted after these series of events and statements by government officials that the "Nation’s War on Anarchy Begins" ("Nation’s War on Anarchy Begins," 1901, September 11). In this security panic, the state fervently began to find additional foes to contain and control.

**Ideas of Presidential Protection**

In focusing on ridding the country of anarchists and providing a secure means the Chief Executive Officer, the idea of presidential protection forcefully emerged on the scene. The assassination of President McKinley problematized the protective procedures surrounding the president. This loss of certainty about whether the POTUS was ever safe in a democratic society allowed for new ideas and knowledge to emerge. In articulating a new vision that introduced a quasi-Praetorian guard in the American system, the Honorable LeBaron Colt, presiding judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, presented a lengthy and well-developed argument concerning the need for a host of bodyguards around the president (Colt, 1902, April). In justifying this alien principle of protection, he established the undemocratic principle that such crimes as attacking the POTUS “rise infinitely higher than crimes against the individual” (1902, April, p. 148). An attack on the president was an attack against “humanity, civilization, and the country’s life; against society, law, and liberty” (1902, April, p. 148). In losing the public body of the president, free institutions that were grounded in liberty were challenged and threatened.

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37 It should be noted that New York City showed restraint and did not arrest any of the known anarchists in the city ("The Anarchists Here Under Close Watch," 1901, September 8), the Secret Service did not charge any anarchists in Paterson, New Jersey (the hotbed of anarchist activity) due to a lack of evidence linking them to Czolgoz ("After Paterson Anarchists," 1901, September 11).

38 See Aldrich’s article “The Powers and Duty of the Federal Government to Protect Its Agents” as another source where a circuit court judge makes the argument for presidential protection (Aldrich, 1901, December).
For Colt, it was abhorrent and appalling that in 37 years three presidents have been assassinated, while England has not had an assassination in more than four hundred years, and France has only lost one ruler in three centuries. The reason for this difference between attacks in the United States and Europe were “accounted for only upon the theory of the absence of safeguards surrounding the president” (1902, April, p. 150). In particular, Colt argued that a host of bodyguards can act as a deterrent and serve as protective barriers. In his view, Lincoln, Garfield, and McKinley probably would have not have been assassinated if there were some reasonable efforts to secure the president from unknown threats.

To protect the president by utilizing European methods of protection, Colt recognized that this posed a problem for democracy. However, this “savor of royalty must not stand in the way where the life of the President is at stake” (Colt, 1902, April, pp. 150-151). The people’s access to the president, although it was a custom that has developed in the American context, must be restricted. He based his logic on simple Darwinian ideas that the republic must adopt to the new environment. The country was no longer the idealized rural community that Jefferson envisioned; it was a sprawling urban commercial republic that was inhabited by millions of people with different backgrounds and loyalties. And, these social conditions that produced the deranged mind of Czolgosz could not be eradicated by legislative mandate, and therefore the republic must rely on a protective guard to combat these threats. In doing so, protecting the POTUS could be done without pomp and frivolity, but it must have some element of “showy protection” to act as a deterrent against possible assassins.

Alongside creating a special class for the POTUS in the law and establishing a military guard to protect the president, other judicial figures also recognized the need to eliminate the deranged mind. There was a fair amount of propaganda to identify and expose enemies of the
state. This information war centered on the anarchist. Magistrate Mayo confirmed Colt’s sentiment that “it is certainly a more serious crime to attempt to take the life of the President than that of an ordinary citizen,” but adds that he “would like to see all Anarchists excluded from the country, but I know of no way in which we can discriminate against a class of men” ("Judges’ View of Act of Anarchists," 1901, September 8). Judge Schuchman recommended that that “our lawmakers should do something toward putting an end to these Anarchists bloody work” ("Judges’ View of Act of Anarchists," 1901, September 8). Judge John Henry McCarthy echoed these thoughts in advocating that Anarchists have been allowed to operate too freely without consequence and apathy must end. He notably said, ‘Let the ‘Reds’ be swept out of the country” ("Judges’ View of Act of Anarchists," 1901, September 8).

The House and Senate Bills of Presidential Protection

These calls for reform were immediately heard by Congress. The House and Senate both devised different ideas in how to protect the president. Senator George Hoar (R-MA) constructed the Senate response while Congressman George Ray (R-NY) developed the House’s solution to securing the POTUS. Both bills revolved around three key ideas: an attack on the president is fundamentally different than attacking an ordinary citizen, anarchists must be identified and swept from the country, and some unit must be allowed to protect the president. Schmittian ideas of the executive as an exception and friend/foe are perfectly encapsulated in this new move to secure POTUS. In the House Bill, Ray wanted to create a fundamental distinction between the public body of the president and the private body of the man. Without this critical

distinction, a law that enshrines that the president is fundamentally different than a regular citizen is unconstitutional. It was only recognizing that the president embodies the state and therefore should be protected by the state that it is permissible to make such a distinction. The right of self-preservation was an inherent right of any government. Under this framework, the federal government had jurisdiction over crimes against the body of the president, but not against crimes against his private body. The federal government had the right and responsibility to protect federal officials in the performance of their official duties. In sum, “an attack on or an injury to an officer of the Government, when he is engaged in the performance of an official duty, or because of his official character, or because of an official act or omission, is an attack on and resistance to the Government and its authority” (U.S. Congress, Protection of the President and the Suppression of Crime against Government, 1902, p. 6). The logic of this argument rested on a U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1890, which established that federal officials are protected if they are in the process of discharging their public responsibilities. In In re Neagle, the Court determined that a judge who was attacked while he was eating breakfast on his way to perform his official duties in San Francisco was still a public figure. The decision was based on the fact that the judge was assaulted because of his public office, not his private character. According to the Court, he was engaged in his official duties and therefore the federal government had jurisdiction over the case, despite there being no statute to grant federal jurisdiction.

In appropriating this judicial logic to protect the president, Ray divided the president in two, recognizing an attack on public body of the president is a federal crime while an attack on his private body is a state crime. To illustrate the difference, he offered a fictional story of the president on a fishing trip. The president gets into a fight with his guide who does not know that
he is the POTUS. During the melee, the president is killed. The question now arises whether the guide killed the public or private body of the president. For Ray, the question was a matter of fact and a jury should decide on this issue. Although he left it to the jury to make the distinction, he expressed his opinion that the president was “clothed with Federal power, and constructively engaged in the discharge of his duties of his office when killed” (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st session, vol. 35, p. 6240). The presumption must be that the president was a public entity first and it must be proven to the contrary. The burden of proof rested on the defendant to prove that he killed the private body of the president, not his publicly ordained body. In fact, section 13 of the bill stated, “Nothing in this act contained shall be constructed as an admission or declaration that there is a time when either of such officers, during the tenure of his office, is not engaged in the performance of his official duties” (p. 6251). Congressman Samuel Lanham (D-TX) vehemently argued that section 13 must be eliminated from the bill because it denied that the POTUS has a private body. The bill should more aptly consider that an attack on the president was to be directed at his personal and private life. He noted, “I do not believe that because a man is President, or an officer of any rank, it makes him exempt from common frailties of men. I believe he is liable to sin, and will be as long as he ‘is of the earth, earthy’” (p. 6251). Because of this, the burden of proof must be shifted to the prosecution to prove that an attack was targeted at the Office of the President.

40 Congressman Ray’s logic here gets dicey. He wants to make the distinction between the public and private body of the president, but is unwilling to admit that the president ever inhabitants his private body. Wooten points out the “absolute inconsistency and absurdity of the positions taken by the chairman of the Judiciary Committee” (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st session, vol. 35, p. 6338). Due to the president’s constitutional power of executing the laws, he is clothed with public authority and is “always constructively engaged in the performance of his official duties” regardless of what is he is doing, even if it is playing golf, eating breakfast, or playing with kids (p. 6241). Hence, the private body is there, but subsumed by the public nature of the president. Ray could have helped his cause by taking Congressman Lanham’s advice in giving the private body more consideration.

41 The language of this section eliminates the question of fact of whether the attack was targeted at his public or private body. It not only assumes, but establishes that the president is always public. Despite this strong language in favor of the public body, the House Bill did recognize that there are circumstances which allow for someone to kill the president. The exception to this rule is that a person may the kill the president in self-defense.
Without the distinction of the two bodies of the president, a bill that privileged the status of the president is unconstitutional, which the Senate bill exactly does. Ray accused the Senate of relying “on the theory that the President is the king, and that the king can do no wrong” (6243). The Senate’s idea of protection resembled how Roman Emperors and European Kings were secured. Ray argues,

This is in exact line with what was done in France. It is an exact line with establishment of the old Swiss Guard. It is an exact line, and indeed is copied after the laws of Rome, when she established a Pretorian guard, which after some three hundred years she was compelled to disband, such was the indignation of the people against it [Loud and long-continued applause] (p. 6243)

In joining the critique against the Senate bill that considered any attack against the president as a federal crime, Senator August O. Bacon (D-GA) loudly proclaimed that this bill “lays a foundation for an aristocracy” (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 2nd session, vol. 36, 2962).

In fact, the logic of creating a special class for the president could be applied to other federal officials. Bacon argued that it “would extend to every official in the United States down to the lowest” Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st session, vol. 35, 2957). In trying to refute this heated line of argument, Hoar (R-MA), the author of the Senate bill, took the position of Hamilton’s sovereign: guarding the president is equivalent to guarding the American people. The law did not make a special classification for the person of Grover Cleveland, William McKinley, or Theodore Roosevelt, but for the Office the Presidency. Hoar argued, “Is not one piece of cloth just as good as another? Is not a piece of silk better than a bit of bunting? But when that piece of cloth becomes the American flag it is the one most sacred thing in this world with us” (2959)? This was why the aristocracy argument does not hold weight or even the distinction between a public and private body that his fellow Republicans in the House were advocating has problems; these arguments make no reasonable sense to Senator Hoar or other
Republicans in the Senate. The assassination of a president was “worse than murder” because “everyone is wounded,” according to Senator William Mason (R-IL) (p. 2959). It was an unspeakable crime that violates the sovereignty of the people. Any attack on the president, whether it is for personal or public reasons, was a crime against the federal government. Motive did not matter when the target was the Chief Executive Officer. An attack on the president transcends the public/private distinction because of the severity of the crime was targeted at the republic itself. The Americanization of the 1870s to the 1890s came to Americanize the republic in the persona of POTUS.

However, Bacon insisted that the bill would be more viable if Hoar grasped the importance of the public/private distinction. In particular, this distinction was critical because it considers what Hoar does not want to fathom: motive. Bacon argued, “If the crime was committed without reference to any purpose to interfere with the functions of government—it was a crime against the person and not a crime against the Government of the United States (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 2nd session, vol. 36, p. 2959). The ability to parse out motive was important because of the consequences attached for harming or killing the president in the Senate and House bills are severe. The death penalty was mandated for anyone who successfully kills the president, the death penalty was mandated for anyone who attempts to kill the president, a 20 year jail sentence was imposed for anyone who instigates, advises, or counsels anyone else to kill the president, and a 10 year term was set for anyone who threatens the life of the president. With such grave consequences attached to speaking about or acting against the president, Bacon argued that there must be some type of affirmation that distinguishes between a crime against the public and against the private body of the president. However, Mason said that this distinction is outrageous. He ridiculed Bacon’s argument in a simple example of what
someone might say after an attack, “‘I did not wish to kill him as President. I was shooting at him as an individual.’ It is a distinction and a difference absurd in law and worse than nonsense when it comes to be weighed by men of affairs” (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st session, vol. 35, p. 2963).42

Although the House and Senate were bitterly divided over the issue of the president’s public and private body, both grounded their logic for the need to penalize those who harm the sovereign on precedent. Under statute 25 Edward III (1351), English law affirmed the principle that to “compass or imagine the death of our lord the King, or our lady his Queen, or of their eldest son and heir” is treasonous and punishable by death. In creating the basic idea of treason, English law created a fundamental distinction between who is superior and inferior. In his commentaries, Blackstone made it clear that treason entails when an “inferior abuses that confidence,” which has been granted to him by a superior (Blackstone, 1962, pp. Book VI, Chapter IV). The law fundamentally assumed different classes with different rights; opponents of the House and Senate bills were quick to point out the inequality that is inherent in this type of reasoning. High treason, however, occurred “when disloyalty rears its crest, as to attack even majesty itself, it is called by way of eminent distinction high treason.” Under these two bills, the protection against high treason was being transferred to the POTUS. Congressman Ray argued that these statutes were adopted by the colonies and by the courts of the United States in recognizing common law (p. 6241), while Senator Bacon conceded that this English statute of protection never goes beyond the king and his heir and therefore the protection that Congress

42 In the end, the Senate and House both won and lost on this issue. In the conference bill, the House conceded the public/private distinctions as related to the president, but the Senate gave in that it could be applied to other federal officials. One possible explanation of why the House decided to forgo the distinction is that Congressman Ray resigned in September, 1902 and the conference bill was not settled on until the New Year. However, the public and private distinction was resurrected in 1917 and codified in the threat statute.
was about to grant should only be limited to the POTUS and the vice president (p. 2956).\textsuperscript{43} In general, Congress sought to create a bill that declared aggression against the POTUS as a distinct crime and worthy of additional punishment.\textsuperscript{44}

In establishing that an attack on the president resembles an attack on the king, the House and Senate then had to decide which entity in the federal government should protect the POTUS. Despite not spending an abundant time on this issue, the divisive argument between the House and the Senate continued as Ray and his supporters advocated for the Secretary of Treasury to supervise protection, while Senator Hoar and his supporters pushed for the War Department.

House Republicans argued that having a contingent of soldiers around the president, as advocated by the Hoar bill, is equivalent to having the Praetorian Guard surround the president. The House Committee Report on presidential protection noted: “when such laws begin to operate in this Republic the liberties of the people will take wings and fly away” (U.S. Congress, House, Protection of the President and the Suppression of Crime against Government, 1422, 1902, p. 13). Under the Senate bill, some members of the House feared that the Secretary of War would expand presidential protection to dangerous proportions. They believed that there would little to no limitations on how the Secretary chose to protect the president. The Secretary of War determined how many soldiers are sufficient to shield the president from danger, prescribes their

\textsuperscript{43} Despite this quasi-acceptance in limiting protection only to the president and vice-president, Senator Bacon still rejected the larger point of assuming the president should receive special protection under the law (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st session, vol. 35, p. 2432). He argues that the Founders explicitly rejected section 1 of 25 Edward III statute that defined high treason as an attack on the sovereign by ignoring it. The Founders extracted section 4 of this statute to define treason, which focused on giving aid and comfort to the king’s enemies. However, Senator Culberson effectively challenged Bacon on this point by noting that the Founders did not prevent Congress from punishing other acts as treason (p. 2432). This opens the door for Congress in establishing new law related to protecting the president.

\textsuperscript{44} Aside from this basic agreement between supporters of the presidential protection bill in the House and Senate, Congressman Ray deducted from this statute that the king has two bodies, which should then be applied to the POTUS. Relying on Blackstone’s commentary, the House Committee notes that “under this statute it was held no treason to kill the King when he was not in possession of the Government or acting as King” (U.S. Congress, House Report 1422, 1902, p. 11). Blackstone comments that treason against the king cannot be enforced if the he is not in control of the government (162). The King de facto, not the king de jure demands obedience.
duty, dictates how they dress, and can hide information from Congress. And, he could control all information related to these activities. Ray suspected that the Secretary of War may use this power to detail and prescribe duties under the subtext of protecting the president. These soldiers may begin to operate under “secret orders” that are not held accountable to Congress.

He took this argument to its logical extreme, relating a paranoid scheme that the Secretary of War may send out 25,000 to 50,000 soldiers dressed in black masks to infiltrate homes and arrest people across America on secret orders that are unknown even to the president (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st session, vol. 35, p. 6243). In fact, these same soldiers may wait outside the Capitol building and take members of Congress into custody on the basis that they have threatened or endangered the life of the president. Congressman Charles Littlefield (R-ME) seconded this fear, noting that “the bill allows him to make any kind of regulations that he pleases and to keep them locked in his own breast” (p. 6243). Under these conditions of legitimizing a secret police in the military with such close connections to the POTUS, Ray argued that “when such laws begin to operate in this Republic liberty dies” (p. 6243). Furthermore, a military secret police would establish a fortress around the president, which would sever his relation with the people. Congressman Samuel Powers (R-MA) cautioned that “we might to the extent of saying that the President during his term of office should live in a fortress surrounded by soldiers; that on one should have access to the President but trusted subordinates and that they should be searched before they entered therein” (p. 6286).

To avoid this doomsday scenario, members of the House advocated, but did not flesh out the idea of who should protect the president. The proposal was that the Secretary of the Treasury should be able to organize and train agents to protect the president. The House Judiciary Committee and its second report on presidential protection simply made the point that “such a
force will be much more efficient and effective in protecting the President” (U.S. Congress, House, *Protection of the President and the Suppression of Crime against Government*, 1902, p. 13). There was no further mention or explanation of why a force organized under the Treasury Department would be more effective than another entity such as the military, marshals, or even the Secret Service. In particular, the military had the means to secure to the president. However, the House simply glossed over this idea of who should protect the POTUS.

Meanwhile, senators who supported the Hoar Bill made a strong argument for the Secretary of War to be used for protective purposes. Senators Edmund Pettus (D-AL) and Hoar argued that soldiers, not detectives should be given the right and responsibility to shield the president (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st session, vol. 35, p. 2275-2276, 3050). First and foremost, the president should be not be guarded by a class of detectives such as the Secret Service. They were, according to Hoar, “not competent, in my judgment, to that duty” (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st session, vol. 35, p. 2961). Pettus proclaimed that “it is beneath the dignity of the Presidential office, in the first place, to have the President guarded in that way by that class of men” (p. 3050). His attack deepened, “Men in that employment do not, as a general rule, belong to the class of citizens to whom ought to be instructed the duty to guard the life of the President of the United States” (p. 2276). There was no pledge or code of self-sacrifice. The decorum of the president required protection of a higher ilk, which the military embedded in its soldiers. The warrior code of fealty and unit blood created contracts of comradeship. Secret Service operatives had no such class or oath. He noted that soldiers were of a different class; they were honorable men who are esteemed very highly. These “cultivated officers” were sharply contrasted to the lowly detective whose main task to uncover and track thieves. The world of the soldier fit with the glory of the POTUS.
Second, the duty of the solider was to fight and die, while the duty of the detective was to find and arrest. The training of disciplined and well-ordered fighting “machines” were more equipped to protect the POTUS. In granting this jurisdiction to the military, Hoar wanted to somehow make clear that this proposition did not encourage the president to be surrounded by military pomp and glory. What it does was provide immediate protection of the president’s body. With a military guard, Hoar said that Booth would never have been able to gain access to Lincoln and Jackson would have never been attacked on a steamboat; Pettus argued that none of the three presidents would have been assassinated if the military had jurisdiction. Soldiers alone were equipped to fight, prevent, and attack a potential assassin, as according to Hoar, they would be “a much more efficient force for that purpose” (p. 2276).

Finally, uniformed soldiers would be disgraced if anything happened to the president while they were on duty. The reputation of what it meant to wear the uniform required a demanding ethos that privileges honor and fears disgrace. Pettus flatly stated if a solder fails in his duty, “then he would have been tabooed forever as a man unworthy to be trusted in the command of soldiers” (p. 2276). This fear created an “eternal vigilance” on the behalf of protecting the president (p. 2276) as the consequence were too high of being “forever disgraced in the eye of all mankind if they suffer any neglect or stop at any exposure of their person in the defense of the life of the President” (p. 3050). It was this type of protection and this type of man that was rooted in the ethos of discipline and reputation that should protect the president. The protective class should reflect and amplify the glory of the POTUS. And, Pettus understood the importance and power of an oath to guard the POTUS. The covenant to die in order to secure

45 Hoar believes the only reason Jackson survived this attack was because he “was a great soldier, accustomed to exactly such things, and he defended himself against that assassin” (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st session, vol. 35, p 2961).
46 Pettus fails to point out that soldiers and the Secret Service were with McKinley when he was shot; neither organization had absolute jurisdiction to protect to the president.
life granted protectees the adequate authority and leverage to protect. Soldiers who know and understand death are the entities that could make this promise and live up to it. The military oath made them distinct and different, just like the body of the President.

However, the raising of the Chief Executive Officer in this manner was problematic for many. The ramifications of coupling military pomp and presidential aura led to a custom that is in direct contradiction to deep-seated traditions, according to Senator Stephen R. Mallory (D-FL). He argued, “I would object on general principles that it is antagonistic to our traditions, to our habits of thought, and to our customs that the President should surround himself with a body of janizaries or a sort of Pretorian guard, and never go anywhere unless he is accompanied by men in uniform” (p. 3049). The president was not the King of Great Britain or a monarch of Europe that yielded to a protective force. For Mallory, military pomp and ceremony were too easily connected to that of an autocrat, and the president, who was primarily a civil official, should be surrounded by civilian officials. Protecting the president was vital, but it must be done in a way that conformed to political values, and the Secret Service division of the Treasury Department was the prime candidate for securing the body of president. In introducing this proposal of protection, he argued that these detectives have protected the president for years, dedicated themselves to the mission at hand, and legitimizing this authority “will insure a great deal more to the protection of the President” (p. 3049).

Mallory articulated a far ranging and radical proposal that combined protecting the body of the president with investigating enemies of the state. He understood the central problem of protection: how to secure the president from real enemies of the state, but to do it in a manner that corresponded to existing attitudes about the presidency and democracy. Solutions to this problem relied on assigning the president some sort of protective details, whether it be the
military or the Secret Service. However, bodyguard protection was inadequate. It was only one part of the protective process to keep distance between the president and the people. The other half required detectives to investigate suspicious movements, conspiracies, and viable threats. Therefore, the mission of the Secret Service, according to Mallory, was preventative.

This required the Service to physically control its environment with the use of information. It had to gather intelligence to discover threats to the body of the POTUS and hide information that would harm his physical body and image. The logic of granting one agency the power to secure and investigate in order to prevent an attack on the POTUS was what lied at the core of the modern-day Secret Service. By capturing the problem of and solution to presidential protection, Mallory argued that presidential protection could be legitimized through a reliance on a civilian agency that can both shield the president from attacks, but prevent them through their investigatory powers. This avoided the hint of royalism that was attached to a military guard, and amplified the strength of the Secret Service in relying on its detective methods to find and eliminate enemies of the state.

In searching and finding deranged minds that seek to undermine the public order, the diametric opposition between the House and Senate on previous issues ended. They came together in their opposition to anarchy and those who professed it. It was an illness that plagued the industrial West. Senator John Morgan (D-AL) puts forward the statement that “we will show a purpose on the part of the Congress of the United States to stop its business of cultivating anarchy in the secret meetings and in public meetings” (p. 3126). This movement not only pervades American life as it has infiltrated neighborhoods across the nation, but it has brought the country under suspicion from foreign countries. The attack on King Humbert of Italy originated in Paterson, New Jersey where anarchy was not suppressed, but allowed to operate in
the open. Senator Joseph Bailey (D-TX) took this logic and pushed it to the extreme. He promoted the eradication of anarchists by using the “heavy hand [of Congress] upon the anarchists” (p. 3006). The threat of a disorganized entity required swift and strong reaction from a newly centralized state. Bailey said he would go to the very limit and “hunt him from end of this country to the other, until he should find no resting place” (p. 3006). With the growing administrative apparatus, the ability of the state to be political and hunt the other became a viable tactic to filter the unwanted. Despite this strong rhetoric from the Senate, the Hoar bill did not seek to exclude anarchists from the country; it was silent on what to do with these public enemies of the state.

In contrast to the Senate, the Ray bill not only declared the danger of a deranged class of citizen, but sought to deny them entry to the country or deport them if they exhibited threatening signs. In order to this, the House wanted to create a different type of criminal under the law, which happened to define this newly emerging sovereign entity. The underlying enemy to a state that was built on order is those who preach disunity and disorganization. While the proposal before the House was to set apart the president in a higher class, the anarchist was desecrated to a lower class. These foes would not be fully integrated or accepted as fellow citizens. The other had to be watched, if not discarded from the body politic. The Report on How to Protect the President laid out its logic in a clear manner, “We must prevent the entrance into this country of those who are not desired as citizens and who would offend against our laws, either the letter or spirit, or whose presence and teachings would endanger or impair our government” (U.S. Congress, Protection of the President and the Suppression of Crime against Government, 1902, p. 8). This logic of exclusion at the border was reinforced by exclusion during the naturalization process. Immigrants could not become citizens if they either preached against organized
government or belonged to such an organization that taught opposition to government. A political litmus test to enter the country or become a citizen was advocated as a means to eliminate the dangers against the POTUS. The violation of either the spirit or letter of the law would allow federal officials to selectively identity and eliminate potential threats by never permitting them to enter the country legally or granting them full legal/citizenship status.

Congressman Joseph Sibley (D-PA) brought this language down to the pragmatics of the situation by saying that the “PATRIOTism of our nation” required the “first act of the American Congress would be so to legislate that in the future neither a Johann Most nor an Emma Goldman, the more responsible authors of such crime, should escape punishment” (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st session, vol. 35, p. 6332). Anarchists were coming to the United States and were “here unmolested” as they “hold their meetings and teach their dangerous and pernicious doctrines,” Ray argues. “It is time to put a stop to their coming” (p. 6244). The prohibition of entrance to the United States as well as naturalization was based on a fear of a class of individuals who taught a doctrine that is “alien” to American soil. These immigrants, according to Representative Hamilton, had never been visited by the “angel of liberty,” and “it would be strange if they knew how to entertain her” (p. 6349). The institutions of free speech, free press, personal liberty, and private property “are at first incomprehensible to them” as “generations of oppression have corroded and distorted them” (p. 6349).

It was not the American experience that breed these conditions, but it was “transplanted from abroad” (p. 6349). To effectively contain this doctrine, the Ray Bill created a political classification that deemed immigrants as suspicious and anarchists as public enemies of the state. It was here where the state started to treat the other as a barbarian who was a foreign enemy who sought to pillage and destroy order. Instead of examining how conditions in the body politic
created these internal enemies, Congress put the blame on Europe. Labeling the other as foreign and foe allowed Congress to remove them from the territorial boundaries of the United States. Judge Colt, in this sense, was more intellectually honest in describing how social conditions produced the “deranged mind” because of vast discrepancies between economic and political power. The social milieu in the United States gave birth to these enemies. However, this argument did not lead to the exclusionary practices and therefore could not be applied to in this particular instance.

The lengthy and heated debate in the House and Senate between supporters and critics of the Presidential Protection Bill engulfed the 57th Congress, as supporters deemed it necessary to create a higher classification for the POTUS and a lower classification for the anarchist while detractors thought it necessary to stop the alien principle of aristocracy from being introduced into the American republic. In considering the two bills in the House and Senate, Ray and Hoar came to an agreement in conference.

The reconciliation of differences produced a mixture of both the Senate and House bills. The conference committee bill included the Senate provision that any attack against the public or private body of the POTUS was a crime against the state and deserved the death penalty, and the House provision that restricted the immigration and naturalization of suspected anarchists who taught or belonged to suspect organizations. Neither the House nor Senate provision of who should protect the POTUS was included in the bill. The concessions by the House and Senate were significant, especially for Ray who had to forgo the public/private distinction of the president. Despite these compromises, the House passed the conference bill while it stagnated in the Senate. Senator Bacon refused to lend his support to the bill and precluded any vote from being taken on it. In the end, the Senate failed to act on the conference bill in the final remaining
days of the 57th Congress and the Presidential Protection Bill died and it would not be resurrected for some time. Although there were attempts in the next couple of years to bring bill the back, it never gained the same traction it did in the 57th Congress.

Although no presidential protection bill was passed, the debates between Hoar, Bacon, Ray, and others in the House and Senate helped articulate a fundamental logic of how and why the POTUS should be protected. As Foucault points out, codified law does not have to be the source of power in establishing what is. The debates in Congress produced a particular type of knowledge that centered on three ideas: the president was of a different status in the American republic; public enemies of the state were foreign and dangerous and should also be classified under a different status as they should be identified, watched, and eliminated to avoid an attack on the public body of the president; and some type of force whether it be the Secret Service or the military should protect the public and private body of the POTUS. The clash of opinions and the pulling and hauling between these different forces established the necessity of presidential protection. The landscape of American life had changed to such an extent that the alien principle of treating the POTUS and his enemies as distinct emerged. The POTUS was no longer a mere citizen, but represented the leader of this centralized system of governance. In the 58th Congress, the anti-anarchists/immigration section in the Ray Bill was moved to the 1903 Immigration Act, which established the refusal to naturalize or admit those who profess anarchy based on the concern to protect the POTUS. Sherman noted that “Congress wrote into American immigration law the first test of political opinion” (Sherman, 1983, p. 12). However, Congress did not give jurisdiction to the Secret Service to police and monitor these immigrants; it was given to the Immigrant Bureau.
In terms of who should provide close protection to the POTUS, Congress did not reach a conclusion of what should be done for another four years. The Service continued, with Congressional knowledge, to protect the POTUS. The assassination of McKinley coupled with the fear of anarchy produced a climate in which presidential protection became accepted without congressional statutory authorization. Sherman noted that Chief John Wilkie of the Secret Service finally demanded that Congress do something to avoid him the “necessity of committing perjury every month when he signed the payroll” (1983, p. 16). Without much discussion or floor debate, the Service was given authority on an annual basis in the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act of 1907 to protect the POTUS. This was the first time that Congress officially recognized the right of the Service to protect the Chief Magistrate. And finally, the Senate idea of treating the body of the president as a distinct legal category and the House idea of distinguishing between the public and private body of the POTUS became formalized 15 years later when the 65th Congress passed a threat statute, which established federal jurisdiction over anyone who threatened the POTUS.

In the end, these debates on the idea of presidential protection created a peculiar logic in the American framework. It is here where the groundwork of presidential protection were fully investigated and debated. The contradictions and tensions with previous held values, the pragmatic reality of threats materializing against the president, and the fear of the unknown in the early 20th century no longer prohibited the creation of an American Praetorian Guard. In this new context, the 57th Congress laid the foundation for meaning behind an expansive presidential barrier that would separate the president from the people. These political officials saw how the United States would change with the introduction of a political aristocracy, but also realized the absolute necessity of protecting the public order by protecting the POTUS. They started to
realize that securing the president revolved around close protection and identifying enemies of the state who threatened the newly ordered Americanized state. These ideas would come to full bloom based on the seeds that were planted in these debates.

**Practices of Presidential Protection**

Before these ideas would fully materialize, the Secret Service and President Theodore Roosevelt would further flesh out the details of what it meant to protect the POTUS. The ideas that originated in the press and law reviews, among state and federal officials, and in the halls of Congress were tested as the Service began to construct a bubble that encapsulated and surrounded the POTUS while the POTUS actively resisted, resented, but ultimately accepted the establishment of a protective force. The dynamic relationship that exists between the president and his protective force becomes evident during Roosevelt’s presidency. He was the first president that has to accept by law a protective force that follows him on a continual basis. Without absolute freedom, the president began to become shackled to an administrative agency that has the power to produce new meaning and knowledge related to presidential protection.47

However, Roosevelt was notoriously difficult to protect. Agent Joseph Murphy, the first head of the White House Detail, observed that the he was the toughest to secure (Reilly & Slocum, 1947, p. 14). Agent Don Wilkie attributed this to Roosevelt’s “fearlessness, coupled with his lifelong habit of moving about freely and being his natural self, also tended to make him indifferent to attack and added to the worries of his bodyguard” (Wilkie, 1934, p. 143). He would often escape to the Rock Creek Park for his 15 mile hike or go to the deep swamps south of the White House, forcing his bodyguards to follow (Reilly & Slocum, 1947).

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47 See Sherman’s article “Presidential Protection during the Progressive Era” for a nice overview of the ideas and practice of presidential protection during the Roosevelt presidency as he explains the debates in Congress over the first set of presidential protection bills and various Secret Service practices (1983).
He would even try to occasionally lose his Secret Service detail. A few weeks after the assassination of President McKinley, Roosevelt just walked out of the White House without informing anybody where he was going. He decided to visit his friend Captain Cowles; his Secret Service detail and the White House police who protect the grounds did not notice that he was gone for quite some time ("Roosevelt Goes Without Guard," 1901, September 21). The next day he pulled the same stunt. Roosevelt and his friend Governor-General Wood of Cuba started off taking a walk around Washington, but then decided to hire two horses and take a ride through Rock Creek Park. His bodyguards, relying on street cars and carriages to follow them, soon lost track of them. In hopelessness, they returned to the White House to wait for his arrival ("President escapes from bodyguards," 1901, September 22). The trend of trying to escape the Service did not end there. Later in his presidency, Roosevelt and his son snuck out of the White House during the night and went to Rock Creek Park, but unbeknownst to them a contingent of agents followed them at a discreet distance (Wilkie, 1934). Even if he was not trying to purposely lose them, Roosevelt would still take great joy of trying to shake his detail, especially on horseback. He recounted in a letter, “No less than four secret service men started to follow us and to my great amusement I found that when we struck a trot one was left behind; but Jimmie Sloan and Mike Connell can of course keep up” (2005, p. 180). The easiness of his escapes also reflected the poor training of Service operatives. They could not on a consistent basis deal with Roosevelt’s rural retreats.

Roosevelt’s practice of walking and riding around Washington without protection was immediately criticized. One reporter commented that these actions, especially after the McKinley assassination reflected an attitude of “bravado and recklessness” due to his general disposition of “restlessness and aggressiveness” ("Urge President To Have Guard," 1901,
September 25). These attacks reinforced his gumption “during the last few days” to have “walked, ridden, and driven about the streets of the capital, sometimes alone, sometimes accompanied by friends and with no guard in sight” ("Urge President To Have Guard," 1901, September 25). For Roosevelt, this was perfectly acceptable.

In fact, this media coverage built his image as the Rough Rider who was independent and tough, but also reinforced the emerging idea that the president was special and distinct. To deal with these two competing interpretations, he argued that guards should accompany him on public occasions or where there might be large crowds. While he performed and exercised his official duties of state, the Secret Service had every right to protect him. Not only does the Service have the right to protect him, but he owed it to the country not to take unnecessary risks or expose himself in an imprudent manner. However, in Roosevelt’s view, this should be the extent of protection. The use of “secret service agents to watch his every movement when going about ordinary social and business duties of the day” was not acceptable nor will it be tolerated by Roosevelt ("Urge President To Have Guard," 1901, September 25). In a few quick rhetorical moves, Roosevelt was able to maintain the idea of the presidency has something special, but also keep his rugged Western image.

He maintained this image by trying to establish a certain demeanor about how the POTUS should be protected on an everyday basis. Roosevelt believed that protection had limited value and he could do a decent job himself of fending off any cranks. Historian Arthur Dunn reported that Roosevelt carried a gun and said to him in a blunt manner that if an attack occurred that “such a man must be quicker than I am in the use of a gun” (Dunn, 1922, p. 361). One minor incident did occur during the first year of his presidency when he was taking a walk along Massachusetts Avenue at dusk and reportedly knocked out a drunk who had tried to grab
his arm ("Bumped the President," 1901, December 22). The Secret Service immediately took
the drunk down to the police station, and he was soon released. This bravado was reinforced by
the press who reported, “President Roosevelt would be a formidable antagonist for anybody at
close range. He swings along with all the activity of an athlete, and his powerful shoulders, with
the sturdy poise of his neck show the effect of his long training among the cowboys of the West”
("Roosevelt Goes Without Guard," 1901, September 21). This was a news story that fit and
reinforced the image of a president who did not need a body of royal guards to secure him.

Roosevelt also tried to establish the distinction between the public body of the President
and the private body of Theodore. This dichotomy was premised on the idea that the Service
must protect his public body that was ordained by the people, but his private body does not and
would not need protection. These outbursts of independence so soon after he became president
reflected the tremendous fear Roosevelt had about being trapped by his protective detail, which
was a total of five agents; he was usually protected by only one or two agents at a time. He
wanted to make sure that the ability to constrain his private actions would not be tolerated; as
one pundit noted, “He will not have his person so guarded and put his foot down at the start”
("Urge President To Have Guard," 1901, September 25).

Although Roosevelt was reluctant to accept presidential protection, he “seemed to realize
his personal and political dangers for the first time” according to Edmund Morris, when he
visited Yale’s campus on October 23, 1901 to dine with Booker T. Washington (E. Morris, 2001,
p. 58). This dinner/event was only about six weeks after the McKinley attack. With this on

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48 The White House denied the story, saying that the drunk brushed up against the president and the Secret Service
arrested him. The New York Times reported that the other story that was floated was that it was a Secret Service
agent who threw the punch. However, this was unlikely because Roosevelt always keeps his distance from agents
during his walks ("Story of the Assault on the President," 1901, December 22).
49 In addition to preventing Roosevelt from engaging with the crowd, a new security plan was devised to separate
Washington from Roosevelt during dinner. Roosevelt sat on the stage while Washington sat with the crowd (E.
Morris, 2001).
their minds, agents prohibited Roosevelt from accepting any public handshakes or coming too close to the crowd. The New York Times reported that “the unique and original feature of the reception was the fact there was no handshaking” ("The President Entertained," 1901, October 24). This was one of the first attempts in the age of presidential protection to place a bubble around the crowd. The Service expected a level of proper behavior from the crowd.

Despite these new security measures, which reflected the Metropolitan Police logic of how to protect the president by making sure there was distance between the crowds and the president, the Secret Service was still unable to control who was admitted to the dinner. The bubble around the crowd failed. Security officials were only to admit those who had badges, but a “great number of the general uninvited public had managed to gain entrance” ("The President Entertained," 1901, October 24). The problem of managing unruly crowds also plagued the president earlier in the day when the Secret Service and police could not control the masses from swarming their cars. There was no mechanism to push back or keep the president’s escort at a distance. The Service was limited in its ability to control the crowd as it did not have the power to discipline proper crowd behavior around the POTUS.

This early security that surrounded President Roosevelt was mostly a body-based defense strategy. Protection mostly relied on the bodies and muscles of operatives that casually surrounded the president. It was a basic security operation that observed and watched POTUS on a continuous basis. It did not have the power to inflate a bubble around the president or the masses. What they could do was rely on the bodies of agents that served as a weak membrane to protect an emerging isolated chamber. However, the bubble was fragile and unstable; it could not discipline or appropriate spaces in a secure way. Although agents were able to create some distance between the people and POTUS, there was still a lack of bodies and means that
prevented the Service from controlling unruly crowds, limiting direct access to the president was a problem, and being able to control the president’s movements was erratic.

This undeveloped bubble was exposed in a car accident on September 4, 1902, in which a trolley car hit the President’s carriage. Roosevelt was thrown from the car, but suffered no injuries while a Secret Service agent was killed ("President’s Landau Struck by Car," 1902, September 4). Frederic Morlok wrote that it is “strange to say” that no guard was “alert for dangers of just such a kind, as well as the possible appearance of an anarchistic fanatic ("The President’s Guard of Soldiers," 1902, September 9). Jacob Riis commented that the President was not adequately protected, noting that there are only two men on duty during the day and three during the night. And, he used to be only protected by one agent during the day and two at night ("The President’s Guard," 1903, September 4). Armed crazies still continued to come to the White House. In June 1902, an officer discovered an armed young man in the White House who was reportedly insane (Sherman, 1983, p. 14) and in October of the following year, another armed crazy was able to gain access to the White House ("Cranks at the Capital," 1903, October 7). In a trip to New York City in 1905, one reporter observed the masses overwhelmed the president’s carriage and commented that “the policeman and the Secret Service men might as well have been asleep at home in so far as the safety of the President is concerned” ("Roosevelt Triumph Through East Side," 1905, February 15). In the face of these dangers, Roosevelt was still accompanied to church by only one agent ("To Ethel Carow Roosevelt," 1952, p. 313). During this initial stage of presidential protection, the Service had little disciplining power over the president or the people.

Despite the problems of body-based protection, Roosevelt began to accept presidential protection. In a letter on August 7, 1906, to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge, Roosevelt laid out his
thoughts on the idea and practice of presidential security. He noted that the “secret-service men are a very small but very necessary thorn in the flesh” ("To Henry Cabot Lodge," 1952, p. 347). The necessary aspect of security, however, did not include his safety, but was related to making life manageable. He noted, “It is only the secret-service men who render life endurable, as you would realize if you saw the procession of carriages that pass through the place, the procession of people on foot who try to get into the place, not to speak of the multitude of cranks and others who are stopped in the village” ("To Henry Cabot Lodge," 1952, p. 347). Roosevelt’s previous logic about not wanting the Service to interfere with his private life collapsed. It was only through the security bubble acting as an isolating chamber that he could enjoy his private time without being disturbed by intruding crowds.

Protection now seemed to be more important to protect his personal life than it was for his publicly ordained body. For him, security was not what the Service did very well. It was just dumb muscle. He adopted the same fatalist attitude that Lincoln did concerning his safety. He said, “I do not believe there is any danger of such an assault, and if there is it would be simple nonsense to try to prevent it, for as Lincoln said, though it would be safer for a President to live in cage, it would interfere with his business” ("To Henry Cabot Lodge," 1952, p. 347). It seemed that Roosevelt was trying to have it both ways: he accepted protection only for the narrow purpose of having a peaceful private life, but believed its primary function of protection was useless and therefore he could hide, dodge, and oppose the Secret Service. But what was important was that the POTUS at this early stage of presidential protection began to accept and embrace certain aspects of the practices of security, especially in the form of a bubble that included and excluded. Furthermore, the exclusionary practice of the Service yielded public relations benefits for a Chief Executive who was obsessed with reputation management. He
could appear in a security spectacle that heightened his image as president, but also be able to hide and enjoy his private life.

This conflictual attitude of accepting the Secret Service for benefits other than protection, but rejecting the premise behind security was what marked the relationship between the first protected president and his protective detail. He continued to state that the Secret Service was of limited value. In a conversation with Speaker Joseph Cannon (R-IL), Roosevelt said that the “the principal purpose of the Secret Service men in traveling with the President was to pose for their pictures as his protectors” (Busbey, Cannon, & Busbey, 1927, pp. 230-242). Again, Roosevelt saw the importance of the unintended consequences of protection; in this case, it is the image management of the Service that was critical in fostering and building a presidential spectacle.

**A Web of Construction: Entangling the President**

The struggle with the Service continued when the First Family visited famed naturalist John Burroughs at Pine Knot. Roosevelt was accompanied without protection. The lack of protection even bothered Burroughs as he confronted the president about the wisdom of having no protection in such an isolated place; he could be kidnapped. Roosevelt responded with assurance about his ability to protect his own body. He said, “Oh, I go armed, and they would have to be a might quick draw to get the drop on me” (Burroughs, 1921, p. 106).

Yet, the acceptance of presidential security did not solely reside within the POTUS. Other characters in and outside of Roosevelt’s personal circle accepted it as authoritative. First and foremost, Edith Roosevelt was a firm defender and advocate of the Secret Service. During the Pine Knot trip, she was terrified for Roosevelt’s safety and arranged for two agents to secretly guard the cabin at night; they would arrive at 9 p.m. at night and guard the houses during
the night (Burroughs, 1921). Roosevelt did not know the agents were there. Edith did this without informing him “because it would irritate him” (Burroughs, 1921, p. 106). While the president was unwilling to recognize concrete dangers against him, Edith was constantly worried about him. She wrote, “I am never without fear for Theodore. The secret service men follow him everywhere” (S. J. Morris, 1980, p. 221).

In order to protect the president, Edith did request that additional agents secure her husband. Due to her active role, Theodore “had no idea of the extent to which he was guarded” (Seale, 1986, p. 696). Second, his friends like Frederick Remington and Burroughs were generally supportive of the Secret Service. Remington wrote a letter after Roosevelt’s public antics of trying to escape his protective detail. He wrote, “He is more than a man now; he is an idea, and he doesn’t exactly belong to himself” ("Urge President To Have Guard," 1901, September 25). Everybody knew he is personally brave, but “the new President should be personally protected against attempts on his life” ("Urge President To Have Guard," 1901, September 25). This pithy statement by Remington revealed that the POTUS was no longer the custodian over his own body, but belonged to the people of the United States. This distinct entity needed to be disciplined and protected.

Third, Congressional officials, especially Congressman Ray and Senator Hoar, established the prevailing logic that there was a dire need to secure the body of the POTUS. The precedent of foregoing a protective unit around the Chief Magistrate had to be overturned; it was a custom whose day had gone. Fourth, society at large ranging from the press to professionals to the people voiced their opinion that the president deserved protection. Finally, the Secret Service was in position to begin laying the foundation of what it meant to secure the POTUS. The support for presidential protection created in a time of uncertainty resulting from McKinley’s
assassination established a new area of knowledge, which permitted the Secret Service, the First Lady, Congress, and others to create new meaning and knowledge. As a result of this combination of forces, the POTUS was going to be protected whether he accepted it or not.

**The Membrane of Protection: The Role of the Secret Service Agent**

Despite Roosevelt’s seemingly arrogant resistance to his protective guard, he still accepted the Secret Service. The acquiescence to the idea and practice of protection became entrenched during Roosevelt’s administration. In particular, the Secret Service would become a powerful force in making truth claims when it came to what the president could and could not do. This small agency with a checkered past, especially with Congress, was going to have the power to help shape a regime of truth that would start to discipline the POTUS. Roosevelt would both publicly and privately denounce the Service as a hassle and unnecessary, but in the end he accepted its protection, even without congressional authority between 1901 and 1906. The president would begin to learn how to adjust in this new, confining atmosphere.

Agent Don Wilkie, son of Chief Wilkie of the Secret Service, aptly described the origins of presidential security under Roosevelt. He noted that Roosevelt was watched over day and night by the White House Detail. This original five man unit consisted of two different shifts: the morning shift which was called “getting the President up” and the night shift which was called “putting the president to bed” (Wilkie, 1934, p. 145). Because of the constant and close protection, agents on the White House Detail become very close and familiar with the First Family. Wilkie suggested that not only are the agents “intimately a part of his official family,” but “he becomes their friend” (1934, p. 145). The bond that was created between protector and protectee became fully ingrained during Roosevelt’s White House years. In a letter to

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50 See Johnson’s *Illegal Tender* (1995) as a great source for the early history of Secret Service concerning counterfeiting and its contentious relationship with Congress.
Archiekins, Roosevelt wrote that his youngest child “is reduced to the secret service men for steady companionship” (J. B. Bishop, 1919, p. 198). Although the Service has not been explicitly told to protect the First Family, it assumed this responsibility and in doing so became something more than just a protective unit. It became tied to the personal affairs and needs of the First Family; a role it would never relinquish.

In developing this relationship, Chief Wilkie made it clear to Roosevelt soon after he became president that his shenanigans had to stop. Roosevelt now belonged to the nation, not to himself. He bluntly told Roosevelt that “he owed it to the nation to cooperate with the Secret Service in its efforts to protect him” (Wilkie, 1934, p. 143). The prime responsibility of the Service was “to see that no authorized person gained access to him” (Dunn, 1922, p. 360). The underlying assumption behind these statements is that Roosevelt must help build the wall that would simultaneously protect and imprison him from potential friends and enemies. The Inspection House was to be built from the outside, but it was expected that the president would embrace it. Dunn put this conversation between Wilkie and Roosevelt in harsher terms by noting that the president must “submit to what seemed annoyance in the interest of the country” (Dunn, 1922, p. 360). The observer of his public and private life must be given respect. The question of the POTUS submitting to the governance structure of the Secret Service was tough for Roosevelt. However, Wilkie believed that “when one becomes President he forfeits the right to expose himself to danger of any sort” (Sherman, 1983, p. 14). This logic affirmed the notion that the Service may intervene, stop, control, and guide presidential movement and action for the nation’s sake. However, the ability to ensure that he did not expose himself to potential enemies of the state rested on the president’s capitulation to how the Secret Service understands protection.
This understanding was best exemplified in perhaps the most dangerous public event of the year for the POTUS: the New Year’s Day Reception. The tradition of having a public reception at the White House was firmly established by the time Roosevelt got into office. President Roosevelt was expected to meet and greet any American who decided to come to the White House on New Year’s day. This open invitation presented a host of problems for the Secret Service. Agents could not and did not screen individuals in advance nor did they frisk them upon entering the White House. People were allowed to carry gifts, bundles, purses, and bags into the White House. Although agents knew that these items could be potential screens for a bomb or a gun, they did not search individuals or prevent them from bringing them into the White House. Under these conditions, Agent Wilkie noted that “danger lurks in any crowd” (Wilkie, 1934, p. 148). Even with this understanding, the Service did little to discipline crowd behavior.

At most, it created a minimalist apparatus to control and discipline the people. Any person, no matter their rank or wealth, was considered a threat. Being paranoid about potential attacks was the first criteria in handling crowds around the president. It must become the norm for the Service. No one can be trusted and so everyone was carefully scanned. To protect the president, agents relied on their observation skills to determine a potential crank, anarchists, or deranged mind. Scanning the crowd requires agents to detect anything that was strange. If something did not fit, agents searched, confiscated, and roughed up people who were suspected of having a weapon (Wilkie, 1934).51

This small, enclosed bubble was not elaborate or intrusive. It was more of a simple body defense strategy that required some agents to form a loose circle around the president and

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51 Wilkie (1934) recounts one story of a man who was sweating profusely while he was waiting in line to greet Roosevelt. This sign of overt nervousness and sweat caught the attention of agents, who then frisked him. As they conducted their search, they thought his whiskey bottle was a gun and the man was roughed up a bit.
considered distance between the president and crowds to be a primary factor. Any time the president left the confines of the White House the Secret Service sent an advance agent to plan his trip. This rudimentary bubble had to morph subject to the external variables of spaces and territories that existed outside the White House. The *Los Angeles Times* reported that the agent would arrive a few days before the president and make all of the arrangements with the local police department and the reception committee ("Preparing the Way," 1903, March 22). The agent would identify the track on which the presidential train would arrive and figure out the best route between the president’s train and his carriage. The exact location of the president’s train was known and how many steps it took for the president to arrive to his carriage was counted. Rope lines were secured that prohibited the crowd from having immediate access to the president and local officers were assigned to secure those lines. The details that occur at the railroad depot were replicated everywhere the president went. The agent looked over exact details of where the president will sleep, eat, and speak. With these territorial spaces identified, the agent formulated a strategy for where police officers were to be stationed and where the rope lines were to be stretched.

Security also considered the public relations aspect to the president’s public appearance. The bubble had to be designed to project a particular image of the president. Theodore Roosevelt was meticulous about his publicity. He had to control it. His friend Rudyard Kipling observed his prowess in twisting and turning stories to his liking. He sat and “listened and wondered, until the universe seemed to be spinning round and Theodore was the spinner” (Thayer, 1916, p. 333). The editor of *New York World* Willis J. Abbot said Roosevelt “was shrewd enough to see the advantage of giving out important utterances” (1933, p. 244). He also reported that Roosevelt’s slogan was “Publicity! publicity! publicity!” (1933, p. 244). With the
help of George Cortelyou and William Loeb, Roosevelt managed and manipulated newspapers. The president and his secretaries arranged presidential press conferences, personal meetings, issued press releases and presidential statements in order to be constantly in the news. Roosevelt created a spectacle around his image by flooding the market with information about presidential duties and activities. In dealing with the press and the people, Roosevelt also relied on the Service and its protective practices. Agents were to build, not interfere with this image. A *Los Angeles Times* article observed that the “President dislikes to be hemmed in by policemen to an extent that will interfere with his movement or prevent an assembled multitude from getting a good look at him” ("Preparing the Way," 1903, March 22). The management of information served two purposes. First, agents considered how its protective practices facilitated or interfered with how the public could interact with the president. Rope lines cannot separate the president too much from the people and the police cannot be that noticeable that they distract from the presidential spectacle. By giving the president some space to move while establishing a strong police force on the perimeter that conducted the movement of the crowd, presidential publicity in form of presidential protection was established.

Second, information management had to be carefully administered by agents to silence particular news items that could harm the body of the president. Agents stopped pamphlets from being published that would incite violence against a protectee,52 (R. D. Evans, 1910, p. 29). The practices of stopping or encouraging newspapers from either publishing threats or actual attempts on the president were common-place. Agent Wilkie called this agreement as the “league of silence,” in which newspapers would not publish anything related to presidential protection

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52 In managing information to secure protectees, Chief Wilkie was able to get in his possession 25,000 copies of a pamphlet that attacked Prince Henry. He had all the copies burned before they were distributed (R. D. Evans, 1910). The move to contain information resulted from a desire to protect, but also to ensure that the Prince was viewed favorable as he visited the United States.
(Wilkie, 1934). With each publication, the Service believed that it would incite those of a
deranged mind to try to attack the president. *The Washington* reported that “the secret service
has a way of minimizing or completely denying stories of attacks or attempts upon the lives of
those whom it had to guard on the theory that publication of the story of one attempt upon the
life of a public man usually induces more” ("Shot Excited City," 1912, October 15). If anything
was published, the White House Detail would be doubled and public appearances were canceled.
The pretext for these cancellations was usually the “pressure of official business” or that the
“President is suffering from a cold” (Wilkie, 1934, p. 146). Behind this veil of secrecy, there
was no way to see into a bubble that projected a blank screen. For example, *The Washington*
reported that there have been recent stories about an infernal machine that was sent to President
Taft, but was intercepted by one his of secretaries ("Shot Excited City," 1912, October 15).
However, there was no way to confirm the attack because of the denial by anyone associated
with the POTUS. Although this bubble was far from effective,53 it was the first steps of
publicizing and protecting the POTUS.

**Enemies and Motives: The Impact of Reasoned Madness**

The next step in presidential protection was the identification and surveillance of public
enemies of the state. After the McKinley’s assassination, the enemy was clear: the crank who
existed outside the mainstream and the anarchist who advocated the destruction of government.
The crank in early 19th and 20th century America was irrational, unpredictable, and did not fit the

53 In particular, the Service’s loose circle around the president violated the principle of proximity. Without being
able to have direct contact with the president, an attack at close range cannot be stopped. Roosevelt’s desire not to
be hemmed in by the Service prevented a strong bubble from forming. Security was sacrificed for the sake of
politics and Roosevelt’s personal tastes. The Service still had not established effective routines for how to protect
the president on the road. Although the Service ensured that there was not much congestion by ensuring that local
party officials had their carriages parked across the street from the president’s party, they did not direct or control
traffic, which resulted in an accident that caused the death of an agent. Furthermore, agents did not travel with the
president on his carriage/car, but always in the follow-up vehicle. Again, this prevented the Service from taking
decisive action during an attack on the president.
political norms of society. In one of its short stories, the *Atlantic Monthly* defined crank as “a man who does his own thinking” (“Over the Teacups,” 1890, June). In another piece of literature, Barbara Yechton described the key character in her novel as a crank. She described him as “irritable and disagreeable, and sarcastic” and has “his little peculiarities and sharpnesses and sarcastic speeches” (1898, pp. 10-11). She continued, “He does get the queerest notions into his head sometimes, and you can’t budge’em” (1898, p. 10). Anarchist John Post used a sliding scale to describe whether Leon Czolgosz was a crank or a crazy. He noted, “He is likely a crank or perhaps downright crazy” ("Anarchists Don’t Know Him," 1901, September 7). This continuum made an ever so slight distinction between the deranged and the rational. In fact, the popular press and politicians “had a habit of referring to anarchism as itself a form lunacy” (Rauchway, 2003, p. 20). Because of this seemingly close connection between irrational thought and a particular political ideology, the crazy and the crank merged in the form of the anarchist. He would come to represent reasoned madness.

This is what made Czolgosz’s act so threatening. He resembled Schmitt’s emerging class of partisan: the absolute enemy. The anarchist was not bound to his or her homeland, but to an ideology that transcended PATRIOTism of one’s country. These enemies and their mission were global in nature as they relied on irregular combatants who used mobility and agility to track their prey. This enemy had killed across the West: sovereign entities in France, Italy, Spain, and the United States had all been brutally attacked by abnormal means. Historian Eric Rauchway (2003) argued that the reasons behind McKinley’s death were fair more dangerous than the assassinations of Lincoln, Garfield or even Kennedy. John Wilkes Booth sought to kill a tyrant

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54 What is interesting is both of these authors framed a crank from a positive perceptive, even though they are different. The title of Yechton’s book is *Lovable Crank*. Although the main character has these crank-like attributes, Felix is adorably and loved. With the *Atlantic Monthly* piece, the author points out that cranks are different, but they are the driving forces of society and culture.
and extend the Confederate cause, Charles Guiteau killed for a personal slight and divine
revelation, and Lee Harvey Oswald’s motives were unknown. Czolgosz made his reasoning
clear: “I killed President McKinley because I done my duty. I didn't believe one man should have
so much service and another man should have none (Czolgosz, 1901, September 6). As an
anarchist, he symbolized the plight of the hopeless and the destructive forces of a corrupt,
capitalist society. He struck out against that system and killed its sovereign.

The district attorney made a similar case to the jury that would convict and sentence him
to die. Czolgosz killed with reason and intent. Even he admitted what he had done and accepted
the consequences of his action. The defense attorney, however, argued that Czolgosz was the
product of an unforgiving environment that turned him mad. Judge Colt echoed these same
thoughts. He stated that “this form of assassination is the result of the environment” (1902,
April, p. 151). This “disease” of modern life that created extreme imbalances between wealth
and poverty, power and hopelessness, and luxury and misery produced estranged minds. These
stories of reason and madness were only enhanced by a new media environment that distorted
and sensationalized.

As a master manipulator and controller of spin, Rauchway (2003) pointed out that
Roosevelt relied on both sets of reasons to justify the tracking down of enemies of the public
order and remaking social conditions to be more civilized. With the focus on both motives, the
story of the assassination developed into reasoned madness: the delusional class of anarchist

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55 Rauchway (2003) also makes a clever argument about the significance of the assassination of McKinley. He
argues that “William McKinley had two killers: the man who shot him and destroyed his body, and the man who
succeeded him and erased his legacy” (2003, p. xii). The first point is obvious, but the second claim is more
debatable. It views McKinley as a relic of the 19th century with no 20th century inclinations. It is Roosevelt who
transforms the presidency and becomes the new sovereign with his stewardship claim. Arthur Schlesinger also make
this same claim, arguing that the “imperial Presidency began with the first Roosevelt” (p. 492). Although there is
merit to this argument, it totally neglects the previous four years of imperial conquest had been headed by a new
national figure. Although Roosevelt changes the presidency with his personality, it is McKinley who helps create
these 20th century foundations. Stephen Ponder makes this point quite clear. He noted that Roosevelt “accelerated
the transformation of presidential leadership that McKinley had begun” (1999, p. 17).
partisans acted on reason. By the end of his presidency, Roosevelt still viewed the primary enemy of the republic as the rational anarchist. Roosevelt bluntly said in 1908, “When compared with the suppression of anarchy, every other question sinks into insignificance” (U.S. Congress, Senate, *Message From the President*, 1908). This deep-seated fear from this supposed criminal class had become embedded into the American way of thinking as according to Roosevelt “the anarchist is the enemy of humanity, the enemy of all mankind; and his is a deeper degree of criminality than any other” (1908).

However, this deep rooted hatred for humanity evoked feelings of irrationality. Because of the significance of these reasoned threats from delusional creatures, the Treasury Department in 1902 warned Congress of the potential dangers of a deranged class of citizens; they reminded congressional officials that there was no law to deal with these “marginal elements” of society. The report stated, “There is a large field for effective work among the disaffected classes—that is to say, those who advocate the use of force in the destruction of governments, and who preach assassination and anarchy” (U.S. Congress, House, *The Annual Report of the Treasury of Secretary*, 1902, p. 52). The report continued, noting that there exists no law to deal with this element of society. These sub-groups, according to this report, were too “be found in almost all industrial cities and whose existence is a constant threat to the highest official of the government” (1902, p. 52). To handle these enemies, the Treasury Department urged Congress to use the Secret Service to identify, track and eliminate these classes of people. Although Congress bestowed jurisdiction on the Immigration Bureau in the 1903 Immigration Act to track these individuals, the Service nevertheless would separately identify and investigate anarchist threats to the president.56

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56 Despite this legislation that sought to exclude suspected immigrants from being citizens, the government deported only 38 people between 1903 and 1921 for being anarchist (Preston, 1966, p. 33). However, this does not negate the
The Secret Service and the Washington Metropolitan Police already had files on potential threats, especially anarchists (Kaiser, 1981; Sherman, 1983). Even before the attack on McKinley, Chief Wilkie targeted the most dangerous anarchists and made sure they were followed (Wilkie, 1934). In particular, there were two different reports from Philadelphia and Paterson, New Jersey, about possible plans to kill the president right before McKinley left to Buffalo.\textsuperscript{57} The intense observation and surveillance of anarchists was only increased after the Czolgosz’s successful attack. Admiral Robley Evans, in his memoirs, recounted how Chief Wilkie’s system of protection and surveillance of anarchists worked (1910).\textsuperscript{58} He noted that “Chief Willkie worked with energy and [a] perfect system” (1910, p. 28). His organizational scheme consisted of every important anarchist being put under observation days before the potential target arrived. They were sometimes observed at distance and other times agents dined with the “objectionable people” and accompanied them “to the theater or some other place of amusement” (R. D. Evans, 1910, p. 28). This method of operation allowed the Chief to be confident “that he knew in advance if any mischief was contemplated” (R. D. Evans, 1910, p. 28).

It also allowed the Chief to treat the absolute enemy in exceptional ways. The Chief would arrest someone without cause and keep them detained until the president left a particular city. Knowing full well that it would days for a judge to issue a writ, the Service violated legal and constitutional norms to detain and discourage its enemy. Evans observed that anarchists

\textsuperscript{57} Chief Wilkie recommended to President McKinney that he not go to Buffalo due to these reports. Due to his failures to convince the president not to leave, he “doubled the White detail,” but implementing "precautions as are common in Europe were out of the question" (Wilkie, 1934, p. 10).

\textsuperscript{58} Admiral Evans (1910) observed the Secret Service in action when he accompanied Prince Henry of Prussia as he traveled across America. The President ordered the Secret Service to accompany and protect the Prince to ensure his safety.
were “locked up, and found **habeas corpus** proceedings so slow that they only regained their liberty when it was too late for them to do any harm” (1910, p. 29). Despite the lack of statutory and constitutional authority to identify and treat enemies in such a manner, the Service was not reprimanded by Congress. No one complained that the Service was violating **habeas corpus** or rights of speech. Congress was more interested in how the Secret Service was becoming a private police force of the president.

**The Congressional Foe**

Targeting public enemies of the state was justified, but using the Secret Service to investigate private enemies of the president was beyond the pale. Hints of using the Service for his own private use was occasionally reported in the papers. Agents served as information managers that disclosed and concealed information. Agent James B. Sloan was charged with assault and fined $10 by the Village Square of Oyster Bay for attacking a photographer who attempted to take a picture of Theodore and Edith Roosevelt in their carriage ("President's Guard Fined," 1906, July 10). The President did not like it when the press invaded his privacy, especially when it concerned the First Lady ("President's Guard Fined," 1906, July 10).

The President’s use of the Service, however, extended beyond establishing a zone of privacy for him and his wife. He actively told who and where the Secret Service should investigate. He asked the Service to look into the Oklahoma land, the Louisiana Plaquemine Locks, and the Savannah River frauds (Wilkie, 1934). The broad use of the Secret Service came under heavy attack. One reporter said that Chief Wilkie was trying to become the Fouche of the United States, copying France’s methods of control and regulation. The Service was “considered absolutely contradictory to the democratic principles of government” ("Wilkie Would be the Fouche of the United States," 1904, January 3).
The idea of a dangerous secret service governed by a powerful Fouche and a POTUS did not come to the attention of Congress until the Service started to investigate powerful politicians. The indictment of a Congressman and Senator during the Western Land Frauds investigation is what began the accusations that the POTUS was using the Service as a tool to go after his political enemies. Congressional officials accused Roosevelt of using the Secret Service to investigate them, especially his political opponents (Lowry, 1909). To eliminate this threat, Congress prohibited the transfer of Secret Service agents to other departments to conduct criminal investigations. The Service was merely confined to protecting the president and investigating counterfeit cases because as Congressman Smith noted the Secret Service “had been abused” (Congressional Record, 60th Congress, 2nd session, vol. 43, p.674).

Congressman Swanger Sherley (KY-D) went a bit further and accused Roosevelt and the Secret Service of creating a massive spy operation that could be directed toward citizens or politicians alike. The Congressman was primarily concerned with the information management system that the Service had its disposal. He argued that there are many countries that have “perished as a result of the spy system” and that “if the Anglo-Saxon civilization stands for anything, it is for a government where the humblest citizen is safeguarded against the secret activities of the executive of the government” (p. 671). The Congress of the United States allegedly had been a target of that spy system. Lowry (1909) reported that “nobody except Chief Wilkie knows to what extent secret service agents have been employed to ‘shadow’ Congressmen and others for political reasons.” Senators and Congressman believed that the president directed operatives to spy “upon Congressman who did not approve the Roosevelt polices” and monitor senators “who opposed the President’s action in discharging the negro soldiers in the Brownsville raid” (Lowry, 1909).
Presidential scholar Gatewood recounted that James A. Tawney (R-MN) accused Chief Wilkie of sending an agent to his district to shadow him and ensure his defeat; other senators also claimed that they were being shadowed, a federal judge was supposedly harassed by the Service for issuing a ruling that Roosevelt did not like, and an anonymous Democratic congressman reported that he was being shadowed on his “visits to a particular gambling house as well as other questionable places in Washington” (1970, p. 259). Morris also noted that this suspicion of the president’s protective guard “was due to rumors that he had been using the Secret Service for his own purposes over the years, harassing Senators Foraker and Tillman and other political opponents, gathering espionage for political campaigns, even getting his bodyguards to fetch and carry for him” (E. Morris, 2001, p. 547). Several years later, Senator Miles Pointdexter (R-WA) affirmed this sentiment when he claimed, “No doubt the Secret Service has been guilty of doing things that it ought not have to done” (Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 1st session, vol. 50, p.5394).

This belief that the Service was used as a political tool was reinforced by Roosevelt when he lumped Congress with the criminal class: “It is not too much to say that this amendment has been of benefit only, and could be of benefit only, to the criminal classes” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Message from the President, 1908). This war of words continued to the next year when Roosevelt again noted that the Congress did not want “to be investigated by Secret Service men” and that he does not “believe that it is in the public interest to protect criminals in any branch of the public service” (U.S. Congress, House, Special Message of the President of the United States, 1909). Without concrete evidence that Congress was a corrupt, criminal class, it made it easy for Tawney and others to depict the Service as a tool of the POTUS. However, Congress
also did not have “evidence of abuse” either (E. Morris, 2001, p. 549), but that did not matter as the Service was already politicized.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding these attacks at the end of Roosevelt’s presidency, the Secret Service did establish itself as the custodial body to protect the POTUS. Congress prevented the Service from becoming an awkward hybrid of a domestic and foreign intelligence agency by limiting its ability to transfer agents.\footnote{In response to Congress prohibiting the Secret Service from loaning operatives to other agencies, President Roosevelt transferred nine agents from the Secret Service to the Department of Justice, which formed the nucleus of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, the Service’s focus on espionage and foreign intelligence during wartime was gradually shifted to other agencies like the Office of Strategic Service, the CIA, and NSA.} However, they did not challenge its authority to treat the body of the president as an exception or forbid or censure exclusionary practices to ascertain and arrest public enemies of the body politic. The logic that was introduced after the assassination of McKinley was on solid ground. It was not one entity that produced these state of affairs, but a multitude of sources that constructed the idea and practice of presidential security. Foucault aptly noted that power must be studied “as relations of force that intersect, refer to one another, converge, or, on the contrary, come into conflict and strive to negate one another” (2003, p. 266). In this particular case, power converged to negate and produce. In this process, the president was no longer an equal partner in a structure of divided and separated powers, but a sovereign entity at the helm of a fully reconstructed state. His new body required security, not liberty. In understanding how power produced the body membrane of the president and the body membrane of the Service, past logics had to be erased and new logics had to be written. Hobbes was partially wrong to conclude how this happens in a political and historical context. He argued that people “are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by Public Authority shall be imprinted in them” (1968, p. 379). Yet, the public sovereign did not exclusively hold the pen that inscribed on
the paper what is. Hobbes more accurate assessment of these changing power relations was that paper was “scribbled over with the opinions of their Doctors” (1968, p. 379). It is these opinions, according to Foucault, that bind the people, even Hobbes “potent” and “learned men” are tied to these truths. The doctors of society like congressional officials, judges, reporters, the president, and federal law enforcements like Secret Service operatives wrote the new scribbling of how the president should be secured and who should do it. The establishment of these truths was based on a complex historical process that produced a series of special speech acts.

These new authoritative declarations established what it meant to protect a sovereign entity in the American context. Although the public/private distinction was not codified in law during Roosevelt’s administration, the idea and practice of thinking and treating the public and private body of the president emerged anyway, mostly because of the slaying of McKinley. The POTUS had a distinct and distinguished body. His status as president bestowed upon him a higher status that made him fundamentally different than a judge, a congressman, or a citizen. And, this status fit with the emerging administrative state that centralized and consolidated power. The figure of a newly anointed POTUS stood it as its apex. The powers of Article II resided in one body, and this required society to protect him. By going back to the 25 Edward III statute, Congressman Ray resurrected and secured the King’s two bodies. The state had an obligation to penalize those who violate the body that represents the people.

In creating this distinction, the public body of the president needed to be protected from internal threats created by a growing administrative state. Society had to be defended from cranks and crazies. However, this posed a conundrum for protective practices. Although the POTUS came from the people, they were the source of his dangers. These partisans forced the president to retreat inwards and remain partially separate from the masses. In observing internal
threats in a European context, Foucault noted two interesting trends in state formation that can be tied to presidential protection. First, he observed that the state begins to be concerned with “the idea of an internal war that defends society against threats born of and in its own body” (2003, p. 216). In the American context, a new particular kind of threat emerged with the formation of a unitary state. The absolute enemy was formed in the belly of American industrialism and adopted a global ideology that sought to undermine this capitalist creation. The body of the American state as represented by the body of president produced internal enemies that existed at the margins of society. They embodied reasoned madness as they sought to destabilize this centralized system through assassinations. As the president began to represent the body politic, these threats started to target his body, which forced the government to consider protective practices.

Second, Foucault argued that the state becomes “endowed with military institutions” to effectively handle war-like conditions posed by these external and internal dangers (2003, p. 267). However, the United States chose at this time not to endow federal agencies with military-like resources or follow Senator Hoar’s advice and bestow the Secretary of War with the responsibility to secure the POTUS and eliminate internal disorders. Instead the government relied on a civil institution to protect a civil office. The head of government and state would be secured by a professional band of bodyguards/administrators by tracking and detaining public enemies of the state. In doing so, Schmitt’s idea of the exception was flexibilized. Operatives took measures to discourage and detain public enemies of the state through unconstitutional and constitutional means. These flexible standards of treating absolute partisans as exceptions to the rule allowed the Service to provide some semblance of security. Cranks and crazies may have their rights of habeas corpus violated or they may be treated in a fair manner. Because of its
mission of defending society, the Service was able to exclude, spy on, imprison, and deny fundamental civil rights and liberties.

By classifying the president and the enemy as distinct, the Service was provided with the justification to begin its imprisonment of the president by controlling his movements and actions. The idea of an Inspection House that would soon record and monitor everything the POTUS does or says became firmly entrenched. Senator Mallory’s insight about the dual nature of the Service was spot on: the dual pronged strategy of providing a detail that followed both the POTUS and his enemies allowed the Service to begin creating a bubble with a fortified membrane that isolated.

This was reinforced by also considering that the president had a private body that needed protecting. President Roosevelt’s initial resistance to the idea of protection centered on this concern; it was fine to guard the president when he was performing his official duties of state, but it was impermissible to violate his privacy. However, Roosevelt learned that the way to have a private life was to ensure that the Service protected it and shielded it from the people. In this regard, the bubble started to become a screen that would later develop into a full media spectacle and a filter that would later provide a chamber of privacy for the president. In these territorial spaces, it was the Service that made life more manageable for the president. Agents could be trusted to manage information that was private in nature. With this establishment, the Service became a tempting vehicle to be used to advance political purposes by monitoring private enemies of the president. Although there was no concrete evidence that Roosevelt ever used the Service to track or expose his political enemies, the perception existed, especially among his political rivals. And, his political opponents sought to amplify the dangers of a secret service that was hidden from the public and was at the command of the president. Roosevelt was close
to his protective detail, he was good friends with Chief Wilkie, and he told the Service in certain situations who it should investigate. This led to suspicions of an improper relation between protectee and protector.

Despite the wild conjecture that surrounded the two at the end of his presidency, the Service established itself as the means to protect the public and private body of the president. Although President Roosevelt did not always have a deep love for the Service, he accepted it and fought for it, especially when Congress attacked for it supposedly being a tool for Roosevelt. The Service and the POTUS became intertwined with a logic that demanded proximity and access to the public and private life of the Chief Magistrate.

**Bodies of Service: The Growth of Protection between Taft and Hoover**

Despite the unevenness of protection during Roosevelt’s tenure, the Secret Service would begin to solidify its hold on the POTUS between the presidencies of Taft and Hoover. Agents became an ever-present force in the lives of the presidents. There were few to no spaces the POTUS could escape the gaze of agents. Bentham’s inspection principle was in full force as it began to “exercise power of mind over mind” (1843, p. 109). Taft remarked that it felt that he was under overbearing surveillance, Wilson experienced bouts of loneliness in a confined White House, and Harding complained that he could no longer act in certain ways. The gaze of the Service had penetrated beneath the surface and started to work on the habits and thoughts of presidential behavior. Even though presidents speculated that these security devices were useless if an assassin did choose to attack, presidents still embraced an isolated state marked by an ever present stare. Bentham’s suggestion of applying the inspection view and exterior fortifications to “all such public establishments” became rooted in the Office of the President (1843, p. 109). The conditions of prison life were transferred to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue:
there was an explicit and implicit recognition that a look-out had to exist around the body of the POTUS.

To ensure the president was protected at all times, the Service received additional authority to protect the President-elect and the president’s immediate family, and to arrest those who made threats against the president; it also gained control over the White House Police Force. With these new measures, the public body of the president was ordained the moment he was granted the title president-elect, and threats against his public body were deemed illegal and punishable. The creation of the first legal distinction between the public and private body of the president was codified in these expansions of authority during the span of five presidents, which allowed the Service to entrench itself in White House life as operatives were no longer considered to be novel creatures. However, presidential resistance still occurred as the POUTS sought to maintain some degree of separation from bodyguards. Yet, this separation was limited as enemies of the state were still supposedly lurking to assassinate the POTUS.

In fact, the dubious and the destitute became an ever larger problem during the Great War and the Great Depression for the United States government and the Secret Service. For Foucault, this type of public enemy can best be referred to as a “barbarian” who lurks around the edges of society looking to target and undermine the body politic. This barbarian “is someone who can be understood, characterized, and defined only in relation to a civilization, and by the fact that he exists outside of it.” He “does not make his entrance into history by founding a society, but by penetrating a civilization, setting it ablaze and destroying it.” In the American context, this was best accomplished by Schmitt’s absolute partisan: the combatant who used irregular means possible to carry out its devotion to a very personal, but global ideology. Yet, the Service would also have to begin focusing on the conventional and real partisans, not just barbarians who
sought to destroy. The Germans, the Russians, and desperate Americans began to threaten the public order. Resulting from the range of these threats, the Service began to take measures to strengthen the membrane that surrounded the body of the president. Although it mostly relied on bodies to do this, the Service created a rudimentary bubble that was still plagued by its fragility, despite the enemies that surrounded and lived in the body politic.

**Guarding William Taft**

Life with Secret Service bodyguards was both “amusing” and “trying” for the Tafts (H. Taft, 1914, p. 370). The president did not see himself as the apex of authority in this grand new imperial state. He favored the idea of federalism, state rights, and reverting power back to local communities. He was just a mere custodian with minor powers who implemented the will of Congress. This idea of the presidency stood in stark contrast to his predecessor who saw the need to expand the power of the presidency with a stewardship doctrine. Even with this limited view of the presidency, Taft accepted the Service because of past assassinations and understood that he was the “personal embodiment and representative of their [people] dignity and majesty” (1916, p. 54).

Even with this casual acceptance of protection, he felt that “these guards are a great burden to the president” (1916, p. 51) He was no longer able to freely visit with friends or leave the White House on a whim. He was confined and watched. He noted that it is a “little difficult for him to avoid the feeling after a while the he is under surveillance rather than under protection” (1916, p. 51). The design of the Inspection House and the utilization of the inspection principle were in full operation as the president and his family were in an enclosed setting with corporeal custodians everywhere. The feeling of utter surveillance seeped into body and mind. However, Taft had mixed feelings about protection. He believed that “if a person is
determined to kill a President and is willing to give up his life to do it, no such protection will save him” (1916, p. 51). In this sense, he was a fatalist, like Lincoln, McKinley, and Roosevelt. He believed that no amount of professionalism or preparation could ward off the strike of an assassination. Yet, he also stated the new measures of protection employed by the Service would have prevented the assassination of McKinley. For Taft, agents were “level-headed, experienced and of good manners, and they are wise in their methods” (1916, p. 51)

Despite this ambiguity concerning protection, Helen “Nellie” Taft felt that their presence was justified “as long as there are cranks and unbalanced persons such precautions will be necessary for the protection of Presidents” (1914, p. 370). Two events during the Taft presidency reaffirmed the belief that the POTUS was susceptible to an assassin’s bullet. First, the Department of Justice discovered that there was a plot to kill President Taft and President Diaz of Mexico in their historic meeting in the territory between El Paso and Ciudad Juarez. It was alleged that a wealthy gardener in Mexico City was planning to kill both presidents on October 16th, 1909. However, Chief Wilkie questioned the proof that had been gathered and believed that the evidence that pointed to an attack was on “flimsy foundations” (Wilkie, 1934). However, the Department of Justice and the Service continued its investigation to discover if a plot truly did exist. It did not. The Department of Justice agents were quick to propose a threat without the necessary evidence or confirmation. They even arrested a man named Ramon Sanchez who did fit their own description of the supposed assassin. In the end, Agent Wilkie commented that the investigation was “so absurd that it should never have been given serious attention” (Wilkie, 1934, p. 174).

The second event that confirmed the potential dangers against the president was the attempted assassination against former President Roosevelt. On October 15, 1912, John Schrank
shot Roosevelt directly in the chest while he was campaigning for president in Milwaukee. He followed Roosevelt across eight states waiting for his opportunity. He had chances to kill him in Chattanooga and Chicago, but lacked the courage and decency to kill him (and the death penalty existed in those states). Less than a month after he bought a .38 caliber Colt revolver in New York, he developed the courage and conviction to kill Roosevelt for seeking a third term in office. He waited for Roosevelt to get in his car. Trapped by bodies and steel, Roosevelt stood and waived to the crowd. From just a few feet away, Schrank fired one shot directly into the former president’s chest.\(^{60}\) At such close range, Dr. Alexander Lambert noted that Roosevelt was lucky to have survived as “the folded manuscript and heavy steel spectacle case checked and deflected the bullet so that it passed at such an angle that it went outside the ribs and in the muscles” ("Roosevelt Gains, Bullet Located, Lodged in Rib," 1912, October 17).

Schrank’s motives were both political and odd. His intent was to kill Roosevelt because he was dangerous to the republic for seeking a third term in office, which violated the roots of American democracy. His statement was simple. He said, “So long as Japan could rise to the greatest power of the world despite her surviving a tradition more than 2,000 years old, as General Nogi so nobly demonstrated, it is the duty of the United States to uphold the third term tradition. Let every third termer be regarded as a traitor to the American cause” ("Crank’s Reasons for the Shooting in Two Documents," 1912, October 15). In his confession to the *New York Times*, he argued further that Roosevelt was a third-termer, created his own third party, and nominated himself to the presidency, which “was absolutely out of the way” ("Full Text of Assassin’s Confession," 1912, October 16). His political reasoning was clear and to the point.

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\(^{60}\) *The Washington* reported that Roosevelt was protected for a brief period during the Republican National convention by a former Secret Service operative Frank Tyree who worked in the White House. Apart from this, he had no protective unit.
He was no absolute enemy of the republic, but a real partisan who fought and tried to kill for the republic.

His social relations and political statements appeared to indicate that he was both a normal person and a reasoned partisan. His neighbors, friends, and associates said he appeared to be sane. The *New York Times* also reported that Roosevelt’s camp was “unanimous that Schrank is not crazy” ("Schrank Brooded, but seemed sane," 1912, October 16). A physician in Roosevelt’s inner group argued that his claim “is a perfectly clear and reasonable argument against a third term, and shows no mark of insanity” ("Schrank Brooded, but seemed sane," 1912, October 16). Roosevelt’s camp understood how clever Schrank was. He did not attempt to kill Roosevelt in a state with the death penalty and had a clear and distinct set of political ideals. His actions and reasons for the attack showed no signs of delusion.

However, Schrank was declared insane and his political message was drowned out by claims of madness. His assertion that McKinley’s ghost informed him that it was Roosevelt who killed the former president prevailed. He was immediately labeled as a crazy and it was declared official by a sanity commission appointed by the court a month later.61 Admiral Hugh Osterhaus confirmed the madness speculation many felt, “We do not wonder at anarchy and assassination—the bomb and the revolver—when we find them used against hereditary tyrants, but it is incredible to think that in a government of and by the people resource should be taken to such measures. The would-be murderer must be insane. There is no other possible explanation” ("President Shocked by News of Attack," 1912, October 15).62 This same argument was leveled

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61 The Secret Service did not have John Schnark on their list as a possible threat. He was a complete unknown to them ("Guard for Roosevelt," 1912, October 16).
62 The Admiral’s understanding that only a crazy disposed of all rational faculties could assassinate the president or ex-president was very common place. President Taft also stated this reasoning, “I am firmly convinced that the unfortunate wretch who has been guilty of this attack is mentally irresponsible” ("President Shocked by News of Attack," 1912, October 15). This same logic was used after the attack on McKinley. President Cleveland argued
against Czolgosh. The insanity of a person was confirmed by the insanity of an act. The idea of American exceptionalism for many would not and could not allow an American assassin who killed a democratically elected leader to be equated to a European assassin who killed tyrants. There was a clear reluctance to admit that the president could not remain free and open to the public anymore.

To capitalize on this attack like he did with Czolgosh, Roosevelt sought to use Schrank as a symbol of American problems. However, Rauchway argued that his political ploy never gained traction (2003). In fact, the attack actually hurt Roosevelt politically. The failure to persuade the public that he was sane amplified the worst traits of Roosevelt and masked his desire to reform the social ills that caused people like Czolgosh and Schrank to attack leaders of the highest order. He argued that the “failure of Schrank’s assault to provide a similarly meaningful set of moral lessons robbed Roosevelt of a chance to restate his progressivism persuasively” while the attack “cast the old reformer in the role of an ambitious office-seeker,” which “highlighted his personal determination to occupy the presidency without giving him a political creed to oppose or a social disorder to cure” (2003, p. 201).

The second attack on a presidential figure in little over a decade cemented in the minds of many Americans that an attack on the president must originate from a crazy or a crank. And, most likely it would originate from a crazy with crank tendencies. While Czolgosh was considered to be both, Schrank was mostly insane, but was still reasonable enough to devise an attack and justify it with rational arguments. However, the Service did not make any attempt to make a systematic attempt to study the profile of those who commit such attacks. Even though a noted criminologist Arthur MacDonald argued that Congress should establish a “Government
laboratory or bureau for the scientific study of the abnormal classes, especially of cranks who are potential assassins” ("Wants a Crank Laboratory," 1912, October 17). This class of individuals were a “dangerous species of abnormal persons who are popular labeled ‘cranks’ ("Wants a Crank Laboratory," 1912, October 17). The refusal for Congress to intervene and the unwillingness of Secret Service to consider a systematic study behind these attacks prevented them from better understanding their so-called enemies. The Service would have to wait another half century before taking this suggestion seriously. The development of the truth production of the Secret Service failed to materialize at this point as agents relied on bodies and muscles to secure the POTUS, not scientific studies and profiles. Immediately after the attack, the Service’s solution to this problem was predictable. It doubled his guard while he was in New York and he was accompanied by a host of local police officers to ensure his safety ("Taft’s Guard Doubled," 1912, October 16).

In relation to these alleged conspiracies against the POTUS, Taft received a great deal more letters from those with deranged minds than Roosevelt did. Wilkie wrote that threats to the POTUS “far exceeded that of Roosevelt’s time” (Wilkie, 1934). He accounted for this difference to the fact that Taft had a different temperament than Roosevelt. With a judicial mindset, the deranged did not dread him while “undoubtedly the cranks feared Roosevelt” (Wilkie, 1934, p. 154). Despite the increased threat level, Taft, like Roosevelt, eluded his protective detail in order to get some space. Taft fled to Baltimore without notifying his guards and on another occasion he snuck out of the White House with an aide to go shopping (Wilkie, 1934). These bouts of resistance, however, were infrequent.

Helen Taft begrudgingly noted that the “secret service men, like the poor, we had with us always” (H. Taft, 1914, p. 369). There was no escape from them: the gaze was seemingly
constant, but unseen. The Service had blown up the bubble to such an extent that it encapsulated the White House. The First Lady of the United States (FLOTUS) remarked that they would appear from secluded and hidden places inside and outside the White House. They had chairs strategically placed inside the White House to avoid being seen by visitors and would often appear from the bushes. The watchers observed the watched in a manner that was not too intrusive. For the First Lady, it seemed that these operatives did not live anywhere because they “were merely around all the time” (1914, p. 369). The monitoring was constant; the POTUS or the FLOTUS could not escape from the gaze of the Service. Because of this close access to the President, the Service sent a memo in 1910 to the Secretary of the Treasury Department informing him of the Service ethos relating to the public and private life of the POTUS. The memo said,

I wish to say that the men of this service detailed at the presidential home in Washington, or elsewhere, are instructed not to talk of anything they may see or hear. So far as the actions of the president and his family, and social or official callers are concerned, the men are deaf, dumb, and blind. In all the years of this service has been maintained at the White House and the freedom with which many important public matters have been discussed in their presence, there has never been a leak or betrayal of trust (Holden, 2006, p. 112).

The central idea of remaining “deaf, dumb, and blind” to affairs of the state and the private life of the president is the foundation of establishing a cohesive and reliable relation between the protector and protectee. Without this established meaning, protection that centered on access and proximity does not work. The duty of the operative on the White Detail must be silence regarding the life of the POTUS as the public and private body were to be observed and monitored, but in the end forgotten. The presence and invisibility of agents was critical in establishing a certain knowledge of presidential protection.
To protect the president in the White House, the Service filtered access to the POTUS, especially during the New Year reception. This required a bubble to capture the Chief Executive and a separate bubble to discipline the masses. With around 6,000 to 8,000 people greeting the president, the Service devised broad orders to eliminate any person that may pose a threat. In designing and implementing these standards, the Service created a separate bubble around the throngs of masses who wanted to see the POTUS. They were expected to dress, talk, and behave in a manner that fit the presence of a head of state. The presidential receiving line, which extended to the White House Lawns, had to be orderly and clean. The First Lady listed some of the orders, “No person under the influence of liquor, disorderly in his behavior bearing any advertisement will be allowed in line. Conspicuously dirty persons will not be admitted” (H. Taft, 1914, pp. 374-375). The Service acted as the means to protect the space around the POTUS and the space in the direct vicinity of the president. Agents could only do this by also disciplining crowd behavior. The people had to appear and behave in a certain fashion in order to be admitted to the Chief Executive’s presence. From special events like the New Year Reception to every day situations, the Secret Service operatives were always on guard, looking for the suspicious character.

In training crowds, the Service also tried to teach the president how to behave in public. Early 20th century historian Robert Hilderbrand noted that not only did Taft fail to capitalize on the symbolic importance of being president, but the press “found themselves rebuffed at the door of the presidential offices” (1981, p. 73). In public, Taft was not interested in crowds or appealing to their baser natures like Roosevelt did. When he went to the ballgame, he went to watch, not mingle. Because of his social awkwardness at most public events, Secret Service agent Jimmie Sloan intervened and told the military aide to Taft that he “will be a dead card if he
don’t change” (Butt, 1930). In making these attempts to enhance the presidential image, agents in the White House Detail tried to create a rudimentary screen to show the president in a positive light. However, Taft would not help build the presidential spectacle. He refused to interact with journalists and failed to employ the power of the spectacle to create public support.

Even though Taft struggled with some of the finer points of the presidency, especially with media relations, he accepted the idea and practice of presidential security. Like Roosevelt before him, the gaze of the Secret Service began to normalize his movements and actions. The constant inspection forced Taft to rethink what he could and could not do. This was only reinforced by his overwhelming feeling that he embodied the people of the United States. This made him distinct, despite his yearning to have a smaller role in government. His stature as POTUS made him a threat, which forced the Service to take an active role in public and private affairs.

**Isolating Woodrow Wilson**

The trend of presidential protection established by Roosevelt and continued with Taft would grow substantially over the next eight years. Woodrow Wilson needed the strong presence and the unnoticeable invisibility of the Secret Service during his two-terms in the White House as he had to deal with the dangers of a World War, the courtship of Edith Galt, a debilitating stroke, and the every-day activities of presidential life. His romance required the delicate touch of agents to screen information, the Great War demanded that the Service search for internal and external spies and build the first artifacts of a fortified White House, and his stroke put the Service in a role of caretaker. With each of these conditions, Wilson had to rely on the Service to shield his public and private body from physical and political danger. The POTUS became increasingly bound to the functions and duties of the White House Detail.
Protecting the Public Body

To ensure protection, the Service started to guard Wilson immediately after the election results in 1912 with a bubble that was still barely inflated.\(^{63}\) As president-elect, he originally was guarded by two operatives, but his detail grew to four without any explanation ("Wilson’s Guard Doubled," 1913, February 15). Yet, a detail of four agents was discontinued when he officially became the POTUS. As president, the Service articulated a rule that Wilson was to have at least three agents guard him (Starling & Sugrue, 1946). The exception to this small security bubble was during moments of uncertainty where the Service could not contain crowds or a potential assassin was loose. In one case, Wilson’s detail increased by two-fold after the bombing at the U.S. Capitol Building and the attempted assassination of J.P. Morgan by Frank Holt who opposed the United States policies concerning Germany. The Service immediately began to over-protect the president by assigning eight bodyguards to where he was staying in New Hampshire. To guarantee there were no threats in Cornish, New Hampshire, the New York Times reported that “United States Secret Service has been set in motion to protect the president” by increasing its guard and scrutinizing strangers ("President’s Guards in Cornish Increased," 1915, July 5).

The inaugurations also were times of great uncertainty, which allowed the Service to expand its protective measures and build a stronger bubble that could exclude with greater efficiency. During Wilson’s first inauguration, New York City sent detectives to identify thieves, Baltimore sent 50 uniformed police, and the primary police force ballooned to be over 1,000 detectives. The problem of protection was filtering “desirable visitors and weeding out undesirables” ("Wilson Takes Office To-day as 28th President," 1913, March 4). The bubble and

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\(^{63}\) The Service also protected President-elect Taft without legal authorization. However, it did ask for Congressional permission to protect both president-elects by asking for appropriations money. Congress approved the protection of the president-elect in 1913.
all of its regulations and restraints were gradually moving outside the White House. The membrane around the president was expanded and forfeited and the chamber that encompassed the president became more secure. Agents were on watch for “dips,” “crooks,” and “female undesirables,” which forced the Service to use about 100 female detectives to help them identify this criminal class ("Wilson Takes Office To-day as 28th President," 1913, March 4). The second inauguration was even more tense according to Starling, because “threat letters were reaching a new high” as the country was about to go to war (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 83). To maximize coverage, the Service was assisted by the Metropolitan Police, Capitol Police, soldiers, and marines. The New York Times reported that “there never has been an inauguration anything like it” because Wilson took his oath of office and allowed his “detachment of Secret Service men all around and ahead of them” to clear the way so he could avoid “any formalities or congratulations ("President Takes the Oath," 1917, March 5). The Service was used to create an informal and sterile-like environment around the president.

Apart from these rare events that required a different level of security, protection had settled into a routine. Joseph E. Murphy, head of the White House Detail under Wilson, and Richard Jervis, head of the advance detail, informed newly minted agent Edmund Starling about the intricacies of protecting the president. Murphy said the overall goal was to “give him the maximum amount of protection with the minimum amount of inconvenience to his private life” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 31). The second floor of the White House was off-limits to agents; this was the president’s private living space, and no member of the president’s detail was allowed to monitor it. This policy would not change for another 65 years.

As part of the White House Detail, agents did not work for the president and were not answerable to him. The Service was accountable to the Treasury Department and Congress,
which had given it the responsibility and jurisdiction to protect the president. Because of this, Murphy noted that the president “can’t order you to go away and leave him alone” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 31). The POTUS must be under constant surveillance, despite his resistance to it. To provide the optimal level of protection, agents must be able to identify places, people, the abnormal, and anything that does not fit. Jervis pointed out that identification is the key principle to protection. On trips outside of Washington, everything and everyone must be checked on a presidential detail, from railroad switches to old ties to the selection of the train crew to the identification of the members of the official presidential party to hotel guests and hotel employees. The elevator could stop at the presidential floor, and to gain access members of the presidential party had to be screened by an agent. The president usually stayed on the second floor in the middle room and agents were stationed to his right and to his left. Furthermore, adequate protection on the road and in Washington required that agents know the president’s personal routine and way of life. Murphy noted that “part of your job is to learn as much about his personal habits as you can,” but remember that “no matter what we see or hear never goes beyond our group” as “the ‘Secret’ part of the Service is very important” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 34). The promise to be confidential allowed the Service greater proximity to the president.

**Protecting the Private Body**

With this access, the service the agency provided was one of secrecy, especially regarding the president’s personal life. Information and image management became important facets to the protective detail under Wilson. Like the Service, Wilson understood the importance of managing media relations in order to yield favorable impressions. Building off of McKinley and Roosevelt’s media techniques, Wilson consolidated and centralized the information
apparatus in the White House (Ponder, 1999). He relied on scheduled presidential press conferences that were open to all journalists, regardless of their political affiliation, and used the State of the Union addresses to connect with the people on an annual basis. To maximize his propaganda efforts, he used agencies like Food Administration to shape public opinion and created the Committee on Public Information, which was the state’s first attempt to engineer support for the war.

Wilson had a keen knack for understanding how framing and disseminating selected information was critical to generating the power of the presidency. The ability of the president to garner support for his domestic and foreign policy initiatives also rested on his public and private image. The president was aware of the power of information to mold and distort. He would have to rely on the Service to help him project a healthy image, which also allowed agents to begin erecting a disciplinary apparatus that confined the president for public relations purposes. Wilson did not hesitate to use the Service to hide his personal life from the public and escape from the public pressures of the job. Under this new administration, agents became an integral part of helping Wilson navigate the tides of the information war that surrounded White House life.

The management of private concern was necessary as Wilson would experience the loss of his first wife, the courtship of Edith Galt, and a debilitating stroke. The death of his wife early in his presidency complicated matters, but made it easier for the Service to contain information about his private well-being. During this troubling time for the president, he was lonely. His brother-in-law Stockton Axson wrote, “I know that it is not exaggerated use of words to say that he was the loneliest man in all the world” and Dr. Axson mentioned the president’s “awful loneliness” (R. S. Baker, 1968c, p. 51). Wilson scholar Ray Baker noted that “friends avoided
instruction upon his sorrow” and “he cut down to the last degree upon visitors and personal conferences” (R. S. Baker, 1968c, p. 51). This was only compounded by a feeling of isolation in the Executive Mansion. The confines and constrains of White House life made the solitude more acute.

However, this self-imposed isolation changed dramatically with his introduction to Edith Galt. Baker noted that “everything began to change” (1968b, p. 46). His security detail would now have to deal with a energetic president who left the confines of the White House to date Galt. Privacy and protection became a serious concern for both the Service and the POTUS. While Wilson courted Galt, the Service became a primary vehicle in maintaining presidential privacy by helping reinvigorate and protect the private body of the president. Agents would accompany Wilson to Galt’s house on a daily basis and had to patiently wait outside for the president to leave, which was never later than midnight. To avoid any embarrassing moments for the president, agents told reporters that no pictures were to be taken of Wilson entering or leaving Galt’s house. However, this order, according to Starling, was “like waving a red flag in front of a bull” as “the newspapermen were openly on our trail now, and we gave them all the help we could, at the same time doing our best to protect the privacy of the president” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 56).

Agents warned, physically removed, and threatened reporters with violence in order to prevent them from taking pictures. One time, Starling warned a reporter that “you’re going to force me to spoil the barrel of my brand-new pistol by bending it over your head” (1946, p. 57). The Service was conscious of knowing when to allow the media access and when to close them down. The privacy question became such an issue that agents started to refer to Galt as “Grandma” to avoid the press from gleaning any information from their conversations about her
Because of the sensitivity of the issue, Jervis had a talk with Wilson in trying to seek out a suitable arrangement between his privacy concerns and the Service’s responsibilities of protecting him. Jervis recounted that Wilson understood the duties of the Service, but told him that “you must perform them as best you can—remembering, however, to let your conscience be your guide” (Bowen & Neal, 1961, p. 158).64

In relation to protecting the privacy of the president, agents remained silent about private affairs. His earlier romance with Mary Allen Hulbert, while at Princeton came to the forefront when he was dating Galt. Hulbert informed her of the affair, and Wilson “offered to release her from her promise to marry him” (Weinstein, 1981, p. 291). Despite this past event, Wilson continued to see and be enchanted by women other than his wife. In particular, Wilson loved going to the theater and visiting with the performers after the show, particularly “the good-looking ladies” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 105). Starling observed that Wilson loved the play because “he wanted to laugh at the clowns, admire the pretty legs of the chorus girls—like any normal man he had a deep and sincere appreciation of the female form” (1946, p. 105). Going to the theater had a dramatic effect on Wilson; the effect was to such an extent that Starling mused that “it was a genuine tonic for him, better by far than eight hours of sleep or a point of cod liver oil” (1946, p. 105). Wilson could not stop talking about the “performers or the beauty of the ladies in the cast” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 105).

The promise to ignore and forget presidential misdeeds extended beyond potential inappropriate relations with another woman, but also entailed presidential personality and temperament. Although Starling observed that Wilson was “not a petty man” in the beginning of

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64 His relationship with Galt was not the only time that Wilson desired privacy. The Service tried to prevent the press from taking pictures of Wilson arriving at Penn Station in Washington D.C. ("Flashlights Annoy Wilson on Arrival," 1913, November 29).
his White House tenure, he showed early signs of potential future problems. In one instance, Wilson had a temper tantrum while he was riding around Washington because he failed to comply with traffic standards and a watchman yelled out, “What’s the matter? Can’t you read a sign” (1946, p. 98)? The President ordered the car stopped and demanded that he see the watchman. Wilson promptly told him that he would be fired because he stopped the POTUS. He had no right to issue a command to the president. Starling, however, tried to alleviate the fears of the watchman and told him that he did not have to worry about losing his job.

Toward the end of his presidency, Wilson became difficult to handle. After his second stroke, the Service had to take extensive measures to hide his condition from the public. Starling reported that he could no longer walk and his left side was badly impaired. Because of Wilson’s status, agents had to take conscious measures to build a multitude of screens that hid his condition from the public at large and also project a favorable image of the POTUS to himself. For agents, he was not to be seen by reporters, people, and or politicians. The Service would often put him in a corner by the East Wing that provided him a fair amount of privacy so he could feel the sunshine and look out on the South lawn. Agents also constructed a platform at the South entrance to allow wheelchair access to the presidential car. Starling recounted that they would “place him in the right hand corner [of the car], arranging his cape and adjusting his cap, so that when he appeared on the streets there was no indication that anything was wrong with him” (1946, p. 156)

During this secret government phase, Starling proclaimed that there was no nothing wrong with Wilson’s mental faculties. He maintained that his mind was sound, but conceded that his temper was out of control. Starling recounted that “he was irascible, and we had trouble evading his unreasonable orders without embarrassment” (1946, p. 157). One order was that
agents could not allow any car to pass them while they were driving. If a car passed them, he sent up the order to chase the car and question the driver. Things got so bad that he asked the Service if “he could arrest these drivers and try their cases” (1946, p. 157). His protective detail convinced him that would be beneath his dignity as POTUS. Again, the Service was cognizant of guarding the presidential image and ensuring that these stories were kept from muckrakers.

Because of his melancholy attitude that had developed after his stroke and his defeats in Congress, the Service felt that it needed to intervene and help mitigate his private suffering. As Wilson would return from his automobile trips, agents would organize groups and stand in at the front of the gate and cheer him. Starling reported that the first time this happened, Wilson responded by saying, “You see, they still love me!” (1946, p. 157). Organizing and implementing pep rallies for the president’s mental well-being was enhanced because agents cleverly constructed a screen to amplify images of devotion and loyalty. No crowd was there, but the Service made it appear so.

Information control also extended to other areas of White House life. In a letter to his mother, Starling reported that he made secret arrangements for the president to meet with officers at the Army and Navy Club and that Edith Galt Wilson had asked him to do charity work on her behalf. He had to track down and deliver some money to a needy person who had written the First Lady. From these personal encounters with the POTUS and FLOTUS, it is clear that the Service was becoming an essential part of the White House. Both Woodrow and Edith relied on their protective detail for more than just physical protection. Securing the body of the president expanded to include helping manage his personal life and well-being, but also hiding personal stories that could harm his reputation. As part of these protective functions, agents were expected to take a bullet, stall reporters, and smash cameras. The taking care of the
president’s private body started to become a common practice under Wilson, which would be expanded greatly under Harding, FDR, and JFK. While Roosevelt perhaps used the Service for political purposes in identifying and harassing private enemies of the president, Wilson, as Roosevelt did, relied on them to make life as president more bearable. The bubble’s buoyancy was maintained by the ability of agents to uplift the private body and secure the public one through the careful placement of screens and barricades.

Deflated Bodies and Bubbles: Poor Protection in Washington

Even the acceptance of the White House Detail as part of the extended family of the president, physical protection still remained poor. It was clear that the Service did not appropriate the perspective of Justice Holmes’s “bad man” when it came to protecting the POTUS. There was no foresight in how the president needed to be protected around Washington. The Service had a strict rule that three agents must accompany the president anywhere he went, even on a walk around Washington. This three-guard protective unit was critical, according to Starling, because “these are considered dangerous days when anything is apt to happen at any moment” (1946, p. 58). However, agents routinely violated this rule of three. One night, Murphy, head of the White House Detail, Jervis, head of the advance team, and Starling were guarding Wilson at his future mother-in-law’s house. Murphy and Jervis phoned into the White House to determine where the president was going to eat dinner. They were informed that he was going to stay where he was and have dinner with Edith and her mother. Since they did not have dinner themselves, they returned to the White House to have a bite to eat, leaving Starling as the only agent to protect the president. However, Wilson and Galt returned to her house for supper, leaving Starling as the lone agent to accompany them. Although this was strange and perhaps dangerous, Starling did not counsel the president to stay...
or seek to control his movements by preventing him from taking the walk to Galt’s house. It was not until 11:30 p.m. that Murphy and Jervis found them and Starling was given permission to leave in order to have dinner. Yet again, the rule of three was not followed. Another minor incident occurred after Wilson had finished golfing. Instead of returning with the president to Galt’s house, Starling and another agent hurried back to the White House to drop off Wilson’s golf clubs.

This lax security detail also allowed Wilson to make attempts to escape from the White House. Although Wilson was no Roosevelt, he occasionally tried to lose his detail. One summer morning, Wilson walked outside and made his way toward the east front gate without his detail. He simply wanted to go shopping by himself. However, the protective detail noticed and two agents caught him before he was off the White House grounds. The President remarked to the agents, “I came very near getting away that time” ("President is Captured," 1914, July 11).

Security around the grounds of the White House was clearly lax at best. During Wilson’s tenure, the grounds were open to the public and often a host of people would gather at the front porch of the White House and Wilson would have to walk past them to enter his own house (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 73). With no screening device except for three agents following him around, the president was completely vulnerable to crowds.

Although the logic had been developing of keeping the president distant from the unknown, it still had not developed to a large extent, especially in Washington. The president was perceived to be safe in Washington because it was home. This carefree attitude of

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65 Starling recounted another story that illustrated Wilson’s propensity for being petty. One Sunday morning, Wilson and Galt were returning from a walk and a crippled girl who happened to be sitting by the front entrance to the White House waved at them. Galt noticed the wave and left her husband to talk to a crippled girl. When the president noticed that his wife left him to talk to the girl, he “turned with a look of annoyance on his face,” but regained his composure and went over and talked to the girl (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 73).
protecting the POTUS around Washington would stay with the agency until an attack occurred that nearly cost the president his life. Like White House protection, security was also fairly elementary when the security bubble moved outside of the nation’s capital. Edith Helm, the presidential secretary, recounted a quick story that showed how little coordination existed between the POTUS and his protective detail. Agents did not know when Wilson would leave his hotel room to start the day’s activities. In order to be fully prepared, they “always watched for the President's shoes to be taken in from outside his door so they would know just when to prepare to get ready to leave” (Helm, 1954, p. 62).

**World War I Protection, Isolation, & Enemies of the State**

However, Wilson’s days of being a quasi-free man would abruptly end with the beginning of World War I for the United States in 1917. The Service would begin to take a more modern approach to protecting the president by controlling and confining his movements. He would no longer be able to take a walk around Washington with just one agent following him. The Service would turn the White House into a fortified bubble. The Panoptic began to emerge and become more material. The bubble not only included bodies of agents, but started to include fences, guard houses, streets, and buildings. Starling noted that the “task of guarding him grew constantly more complex” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 97). With extra layers of protection, security evolved from a one to three man operation to a host of soldiers, detectives, and agents.

In early February of 1917, the *Washington Post* was reporting that the Secret Service and the Washington Police were now implementing plans that they had devised almost a year before ("Police Are on Alert," 1917, February 5). Although they would not disclose the information, the 30 policemen who make up the White House Guard and the Secret Service detail would be increased to ensure that no unauthorized visitor could gain access to the White House. It was the
first time that the Service had closed the grounds to the public. Guards were stationed at all entry ways and prevented anyone from entering without authorization; the only gate that remained open was West Executive Avenue, which happened to be right next to the State and War Department.

A few months later, the *Literary Digest* revealed that the White House was now guarded by “soldiers with loaded guns and bayonets [who] took their places about fifty paces apart on the sidewalks surrounding the White House grounds” at night and policemen stand at every gate ensuring that no unauthorized person can enter the grounds during the day ("War-Time Day with the President," 1917, September 8). The military was under strict orders to ensure that anyone and everyone was constantly moving and prohibited loitering after sundown. Entry to the White House was also restricted. The Service banned “visiting delegations” whose “only business is to shake the hand of the Executive,” and the “special-card” hours that allowed congressional and government officials to give passes to constituents and friends so they could visit the first floor of the White House was ended ("War-Time Day with the President," 1917, September 8, p. 38). With this increased security, Wilson and Galt moved to the first floor of the White House, allowing the Service to guard them day and night. Mrs. Brown, a personal friend of the Wilson’s, wrote in a letter noting that even White House access to visitors was banned under the pretext that the house was being renovated. She commented that the “real reason…is the danger to the President” and “the Secret Service men and watchmen are on duty day and night” (R. S. Baker, 1968a, p. 305). She observed in this situation have little to no personal or private space, which began to put a considerable load on the POTUS and the FLOTUS.

These security measures from the external measures that included the military marching on the White House lawns to policemen at every access point and internal measures that denied
the president any contact with the people reflected the growing isolation of the POTUS from the people. However, this separation from the people was justified as “necessary isolation” ("War-Time Day with the President," 1917, September 8). The *Literary Digest* argued that “the growing cares and problems of war have caused the President to withdraw from the gaze of the public, and to deny himself the idly curious” ("War-Time Day with the President," 1917, September 8, p. 38). The interesting language employed here is based on the fundamental assumption that the POTUS chose willingly to adopt the security measures advocated by the Service. Wilson always felt that White House life was confining. He experienced it early in his presidency, after the death of his first wife, and now with the restrictions imposed by a nation at war. He willingly accepted an isolated state in a time of war. The president was willing to lock himself into his own cage, despite the mental anguish.

In dealing with this isolated state, Mrs. Brown picked up on a false impression about how Wilson was dealing with these new security precautions. She observed that he “proceeds about his daily business with the calm cheeriness of a man who never had heard of war—politics—or assassinations in his life” (R. S. Baker, 1968a, p. 305). The isolation of the president imposed upon him by the Secret Service because of the possibility of an assassination had the exact opposite effect on him; he was lonely and miserable. The constant attention and gaze of the Service bothered him, but Wilson chose to accept this. In a letter to J.K.M. Norton in June 1917, Wilson lamented the remoteness, but realized its effectiveness. He said, “We are so safely (almost annoyingly) guarded here nowadays that we, as a matter of fact, have a great deal of seclusion and privacy,” and “I feel that real effectiveness demands that I should stay where I am” (R. S. Baker, 1968a, p. 71). A few months later the strain of isolation made Wilson more
desperate to be a free man with no external constraints confining him to the White House. By October 1917, the yearning for personal and private privacy had only grown. He writes, “It is literally impossible for me to give myself such pleasures and the attempt never works out right because I have to be accompanied by a whole retinue of Secret Service men and ‘sich,’ and the attempt to be quiet and secluded always ridiculously breaks down” (R. S. Baker, 1968a, p. 324).

This isolation caused him to dream and “be a free man and then I can enjoy my friends as my heart longs to do” (R. S. Baker, 1968a, p. 324). Presidential historian Seale picked up on this theme of Wilson’s self-imposed loneliness by noting that he “allowed this to happen,” but still yearned for personal freedom (Seale, 1986, p. 814). Seale recounted that Wilson was not a public person who liked to engage with the public, but the constant isolation forced him and Edith to daydream about taking a bike tour in Europe. In order for her learn to ride, Edith could not practice on the grounds, but was confined to the narrow and long basement corridor in the White House (Seale, 1986, p. 814).

Due to the pressures of an ever strengthening pocket of isolation, Wilson had to escape from Washington. He wrote to his daughter with a certain sense of relief and desperation, “Edith and I are on the MAYFLOWER to-day to get away from the madness (it is scarcely less) of Washington for a day or two” in order to “escape people and their intolerable excitements and demands” (R. S. Baker, 1968a, pp. 181-182). This feeling of being imprisoned and seeking escape was repeated to his close friend Colonel House. He wrote, “I am seeing a day or two of relief from the madness of Washington. A point is reached now again when I must escape it for a little” (R. S. Baker, 1968a, p. 181). The tone of Wilson’s messages during the formation of a

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66 Taft also felt the same pressures of an isolated White House during his administration. He complained to the Literary Digest that “nobody drops in” and if they do it is only by appointment ("War-Time Day with the President," 1917, September 8). Furthermore, “he missed neighborly visits, chats” ("War-Time Day with the President," 1917, September 8, p. 38).
tight and strong security bubble was suffocating. The Service had created an isolated chamber that felt like a prison, which the president voluntary submitted to, but occasionally needed to flee. A year later, Wilson was feeling imprisoned inside and outside of Washington. While in New York, he pleaded with Starling to allow him to “to take a walk like an ordinary citizen” because he was “tired of policemen and preparations” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 110). This justification was enough for Starling, and he permitted Wilson to take the walk around New York as long as he could accompany him. Starling noted that Wilson was like a kid walking around New York. He was so careless that he was almost hit by a car. Although another agent eventually caught up to them, Starling violated the rule of three, which stated that the POTUS must be accompanied by multiple agents at any one time. However, Starling felt he could “take care” of the POTUS by himself and Wilson needed a break from the confines of the bubble.

**Linking the Two Bodies of the President and Crimes Against the State**

This security apparatus that imprisoned Wilson during the war years of his presidency was reinforced by congressional acts in 1917 that made it a federal crime to threaten the POTUS, which solidified the public/private distinction of the president, expanded Secret Service protection to include the president’s immediate family, and gave the president power to use the Secret Service as he saw fit. The first of these acts affirmed Congressman Ray’s argument that the president is two distinct persons: he has a public body that is protected by the federal government and a private body that receives no special protection. Under 39 STAT. 919, c. 64, a threat to take the life of the POTUS or inflict bodily harm can be punished up to five years of prison and/or a fine of no more than $1,000. With little Congressional debate on the subject, it

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67 The Act prescribes: “That any person who knowingly and willfully deposits or causes to be deposited for conveyance in the mail or for delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of or inflict bodily harm upon the President of the
was deemed acceptable to treat the POTUS as distinct from classes of individuals because of his office. Senator Jacob Gallinger (R-NH) was surprised that there was no law on the books that prevented anyone from making a threat against the president and bluntly stated “that is most extraordinary” (Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 1st session, vol. 54, p. 2667).

The Harvard Law Review ("Threats to Take the Life of the President," 1919) outlined the basic components of the statute, showed its historical foundations, and argued that its constitutional status rested on the public/private distinction of the president’s body. The law is rooted in precedent: England’s statute of 25 Edward III prevented anyone from compassing or imagining the death of the king. Walter Walker was convicted under this statute for merely saying to his son in jest, “Tom, if thou behavest thyself well, I will make thee heir to the Crown” ("Threats to Take the Life of the President," 1919, p. 725). Because he offended his oath to the King, Walker was hanged, drawn, and quartered. Sir Thomas Burdet experienced the same fate for being accused of merely imagining the king’s death. The King entered Burdet’s land and killed a white buck; when Burdert found out what happened he said, “I wish that the buck, horns, and all, were in the belly of the man who advised the King to kill it” ("Threats to Take the Life of the President," 1919, p. 725). Although he argued that the threat was targeted at the King’s advisors, a jury found him to be guilty of contemplating the King’s death.

This new presidential threat statute rested on the same logic of threatening or imagining the death of a King as a crime against the Kingdom. No one could willingly or knowingly make a written or verbal threat against the public body of the state. The mere expression of a conditional or imagining threat against the president was to be punished. Words like the president ought to be shot or he should be killed for doing such a thing fell under the jurisdiction

United States, or who knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the President, shall upon conviction be fined not exceeding $1,000 or imprisoned not exceeding fives years or both.”
of the federal government to punish. In effect, a threat against the POTUS was a threat against
the United States of America. His body was public and set apart to be protected under the law.

A year later a federal district court upheld the constitutionality of this act by parsing out
the difference between the president’s official character and his private life; the threat must be
directed toward his publicly sanctified body, not to his private body. In United States v.
Metzdorf (1918), the court found that the government’s indictment against Metzdorf was faulty
because it did not establish that the threat was directed at the public nature of the president’s
office. Without the ability to link a threat to the president’s public body, the government could not
charge people as harming the polis. Congress did not have or cannot give jurisdiction to federal
agencies to arrest people for attacking federal officers in a private capacity. The constitutionality
of the act rested on the distinction between the public and private body of the president.
Although there was still no law against hurting or killing the POTUS, this threat statute
legitimized and officially recognized the two bodies of the president.

With this new power, the federal government immediately started to arrest people who
made threatening statements against the POTUS. The first person prosecuted was a Chinese
actor who allegedly said that someone should shoot the president and if he had a gun he would
do it himself ("Arrest Chinese Actor Hostile to President," 1917, March 4). Wah Wing claimed
that he was complaining over the cost of high food prices and in a fit of temper made some
remarks “he did not mean” ("Arrest Chinese Actor Hostile to President," 1917, March 4). A
week later the Service arrested Amos H. Paul for claiming that he was chosen by a secret society
to kill Wilson ("Chosen to Kill Wilson," 1917, March 9). He had a railroad ticket to
Washington, but got drunk the night before which prevented him from making the trip. He was
tried, found guilty, and sentenced three weeks later to 18 months in prison ("Gets 18 months for
Threat," 1917, April 4). It took the jury seven minutes to convict. The *Washington Post* argued that “this is the right way of considering the offense and handling the offender” ("How to Handle Them," 1917, April 5). The judge issued a ruling in which he declared that anyone who makes a threat against the POTUS did not deserve to be on the street.

The Service used this threat statute in and during World War I as an effective and easy way to contain perceived threats. The public enemies of the state, according to Hagedorn, consisted of socialists, anarchists, pacifists, labor activists, African-Americans, Germans, Russians, and immigrants in general (2007, p. 30). The diversity of enemies ranged from conventional to absolute enemies. Internal threats who were disgruntled Americans were often grouped with conventional and absolute enemies of the state. To effectively quell the multiplicity of others, the government relied on the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Division, the Secret Service, the Food Administration, U.S. Railroad Administration, the Marshals, and the Justice Department ("Seek Co-ordination of Secret Services," 1918, January 4). In addition these public organizations, a host of private groups ranging from the Liberty League, All-Allied Anti-German League, Boy Spies of America, the American Anti-Anarchy Association, Knight of Liberty, the Anti-Yellow Dog league, American Protective League and many others formed to spy on ordinary Americans (Hagedorn, 2007). In continuing their search for public enemies, police agencies, public and private, expanded their tools to detain, deport, and discriminate. This creation of a domestic intelligence apparatus during the war “was, in fact, revolutionary” (Hagedorn, 2007, p. 25).

Preston (1966) examined during and after the World War I years how the military was used in internal affairs, how Attorney General Palmer was given full rein to track and hunt down suspected threats, and how Congress passed new legislation to discriminate against immigrants.
In particular, the military was used to ensure domestic tranquility by stabilizing “any local disorder—be it in mine, lumber camp, or city” (1966, p. 116). The military did not arrest these disturbers, but merely detained them, which allowed it to skirt issues like warrants and writs of habeas corpus. The Justice Department and Immigration Bureau were just as active, if not more aggressive than the military in squashing radical dissent. By the end of 1919, Preston reported that “they had a near-perfect procedure” in neutralizing the other. These measures included “sudden and simultaneous dragnet raids, secret testimony of undercover informants, seizure of organization correspondence and lists as well as membership cards, cross-examination of aliens without the interference of defense lawyers, and detention of radicals in isolation under high bail or none at all” (Preston, 1966, pp. 219-220).

In developing these methods, the Justice Department started to initiate raids in earnest in 1917 as they focused on Germans who had violated the neutrality proclamation. The Department arrested five in New Jersey, three in Manhattan, and five more in Chicago ("Eight Taken here as German Spies," 1917, April 7). A day later a “small army of Secret Service men and other Federal employees” rounded up 50 more Germans who were suspected to be planning to poison meat and burn buildings ("Fifty Arrests in Chicago," 1917, April 8). And, it did not take long for the Justice Department to arrest Emma Goldman for aiding the enemy ("Emma Goldman and A. Berkman Behind Bars," 1917, June 16). These raids and arrests continued throughout the war, especially in Chicago. In early 1919, the Justice Department and Chicago Police had rounded up 162 International Workers of the World members in just two weeks ("More Raids in Chicago," 1919, February 14). These raids were taken to a different level after the bombing that almost killed Attorney General Palmer on June 2, 1919. Between 1921 and 1923, the Palmer Raids had a significant impact on deporting aliens and arresting terrorists.
The executive and his departments, however, were not the only agents in government seeking to eliminate radicals. Congress passed the most comprehensive immigration reform since 1903. Under the Immigration Bill of 1918, the government was able to go after leaders and members alike of groups it deemed radical. The broad language employed allowed the government to use guilt by association to deport people. Mere membership in a radical organization like the International Workers of the World was a deportable offense. This law permitted immigrants to be treated “like a pig in a Chicago packing plant” as “the immigrant would be caught in a moving disassembly line, stripped of all his rights, and packaged for shipment overseas—all in one efficient and uninterrupted operation” (Preston, 1966, p. 220).

Enemies of the state became an exception to the rule of law. The executive for all intensive purposes could suspend the constitutional legal order and use its executive departments to hunt down these barbarians and eliminate them. The Germans as conventional enemies, the disgruntled American as a real partisan, and the communists and archaists as absolute enemies were often grouped into one whole, whether they had done anything or not. The mere appearance of being an enemy was enough justification to act, which would be replicated on a more massive scale in the next two decades. None of these groups could rely on rights because they appeared to pose a fundamental threat to the body politic.

However, Congress began to suspicious of employing the Secret Service in tracking down these enemies. The Secretary of War and the Attorney General were to be held in high regard, but the members of Congress sill feared the Service on this point. It was the on agency that that could use its autonomous powers to go after them. This fear only increased when Congress granted the president the power “to use the officials of the secret service without reference to the existing limitations when, in his judgment, an emergency exists, which requires
such action” (Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 1st session, vol. 54, p.4034). Representative Franklin Mondell (R-WY) reminded his fellow representatives that this was dangerous “because there is always a temptation, in the presence of unlimited power to do so, to spy upon those with whom one in official position does not agree” (p. 4034). And, Mondell pointed out that at one time Congress felt that the “secret-service men were used for the purpose of shadowing Members of Congress” and if these systems went unchecked “it might develop in a system of terrorism such as existed in time past under monarchial governments” (p. 4034). With over 100,000 spies on the loose and granting the president near monarchical power over the Secret Service and other police agencies, power could easily be misused and be directed back toward the halls of Congress.

Despite these suspicions, the Secret Service was used once again for espionage, intelligence, and the investigation of perceived threats. The Secret Service was unbound during the war. With its new freedom, Wilson directed Chief William J. Flynn to investigated Germans who might be violating the neutrality proclamation of the United States Government. The Service immediately established a counterespionage unit in New York City consisting of 10 agents and placed the German Embassy in Washington under surveillance with orders to shadow German officials (Bowen & Neal, 1961). In New York, the Service placed George Sylvester Viereck under watch without any plausible cause or evidence because it believed that people “active in espionage and propaganda might visit or associate with him” (Bowen & Neal, 1961, p. 103). On July 24, 1915, the Service followed Viereck to an encounter on a train with Dr. Heinrich Friedrich Albert, whom the Service did not know existed. After Viereck left, Albert remained until he arrived at his stop. Unknowingly, he left behind his briefcase, which contained German propaganda and sabotage efforts. It was a treasure trove of information as Albert was
the financial agent for the Germans. The briefcase contained information including Albert’s
distribution of as much as $2 million a week to German agents, a plan to attack New York and
New Jersey by overwhelming force, a code that revealed the petitioning of Mexico to invade the
United States, attempts to incite strikes at ports and munitions firms, and attempts to acquire
liquid chlorine to be used for poison gas (Dorman, 1967).

With its counter-espionage work, the Service’s main concern was discovering plots to
attack the POTUS. The first reported plot to target President Wilson was hatched in Kansas.
Pietro Pierra, an anarchist who was arrested for opposing the selective draft, was allegedly
behind a plot to kill Wilson and former Secretary of Treasury William G. McAdoo. Reports
indicated that 20 men knew, helped fund, and planned the attack while they were in Leavenworth
Penitentiary. These 20 members of a “band of nihilists” drew lots to determine who would carry
out the attacks; it fell to Pierra who was warned that he would be killed if did not make an
attempt to kill Wilson and McAdoo. All 20 were to be released on same day ("I.W.W. in Plot To
Kill Wilson," 1919, February 13). However, Pierra confided his secret to his two Italian
cellmates who then told the Warden after he had been released from jail.

The second reported attempt to kill Wilson occurred in Boston ("Bomb Planned for
Wilson," 1919, February 24). Two Spanish anarchists, with supposed close ties to the IWW, had
made a compact with each other to assassinate the POTUS. The plan was simple. They were to
throw a bomb at Wilson while he walked with his party through the streets of Boston. However,
officials could not find the bomb. In the course of its investigations, the government arrested 14
more Spaniards who were supposedly part of the plan. Two days later, Federal Judge John Knox
issued a writ of *habeas corpus* demanding that the police produce evidence of a plot to kill the
POTUS. The writ accused the police of merely making up an “excuse to arrest so-called
radicals, and the said United States Secret Service has admitted that they have no proof of a bomb conspiracy against the President” ("Deny Plot to Kill Wilson," 1919, February 26).

Despite these threats and extra-precautions, the security bubble that surrounded the POTUS was still minimalist in nature. The Service’s annual appropriation merely consisted of $325,000 and a force of approximately 109 administrators (U.S. Congress, House, Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill, 1920). The pay was so poor for these operatives that Chief William Moran warned Congress that the Service “was in danger of disintegrating” (U.S. Congress, House, Sundry Civil Appropriation Bill, p. 271). To help alleviate some of these protective and investigative concerns, Moran asked for a 20% budgetary increase and 21 additional agents. In the meantime, low pay coupled with limited manpower created an agency that was overstretched and ineffective. Moran pointed out that the Service had a total of 35 districts nationwide to investigate crimes and 10 of those field offices only had one agent. Sometimes it took a year before agents were informed of forgery and counterfeiting. The lack of resources also inhibited the ability of the Service to provide a proper presidential guard that could shield the president from real dangers. Security was erratic at best. In one instance during the war, the Service was stuck in the middle of the road with the president because they could not get his car out of a ditch filled with mud ("Truck Rescues Wilson Auto," 1917, Aug 24). They sat on the side of the road and waited until a Baltimorean with his five ton truck was able to pull them out.

A month later Wilson was in Nantucket and the Service did not bring its automobiles to the island because they were not allowed. Without putting up any resistance based on security issues, agents relied on carriages to follow the POTUS (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 95). On Wilson’s trip to Europe, he was accompanied by a small contingent force consisting of 10 agents. Agents did search the ship, investigate members of the crew, and ensured that the boat
was secured. However, this type of protection was irregular. While in Italy, Starling noted that
the crowds loved Wilson and this “lessened our anxiety about the President’s safety” (Starling &
Sugrue, 1946, p. 124). There was no attempt to “keep the crowds from pressing close to the
automobiles and carriages, but we felt reasonable sure that no one meant harm to our precious
charge” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 124). It seemed at times that the Service was more
concerned with the presidential image and spectacle during his trip to Europe than they were
placing a bubble around him or crowds. This lack of security continued as Wilson returned
home. The same methods were not employed in searching and investigating the crew,
passengers, or the cargo they carried with them.

Although security was underfunded and still inconsistent at the end of Wilson’s two
terms in office, the logic of protecting the POTUS had been reaffirmed as a nation at war caused
the presidential protective detail to treat the president more carefully. The use of the military, the
closing of the White House Lawns, and the increased security detail forced the POTUS into
isolation. It was necessary to create an expansive space between the people and the president;
the safety of the president relied on this separation. Wilson chose to readily accept and even
embrace an exclusive presence rather than accessibility. The disciplinary apparatus was starting
to change presidential movement and reformulate certain democratic values that privileged an
open and accessible president. By capturing the president in this enclosed space, the Service was
able to more aptly protect his private and public body, which had been fully ordained by
Congress. Agents hid his flaws and desires while searching for Germans, Russians, anarchists,
socialists, immigrants, and communist. The rationale of what it meant to secure the POTUS
became more prevalent and mainstream as the Service protected his public body from enemies of
the state and shielded his private body from snooping politicians and journalists.
Harding to Hoover

The Fortress White House that been erected during Wilson’s tenure was partly dismantled. A new era of openness and accessibility began with Harding’s presidency. Traditions were brought back, the White House Police force was cut, and the White House grounds were reopened. Despite these changes, the Service still continued to protect the president’s public and private bodies. Being regular fixtures in and around the White House, agents began to be used in creative ways, especially with Harding. However, by the end of Hoover’s administration, protection became problematic. The Roaring Twenties evolved into an ugly, depressed nation that posed significant threats for guarding the president’s safety. During the years between Harding and Hoover, the Service developed by gaining control over the White House Police force, reinforcing its logic by continuing to discipline presidential action, and creating barriers between the public and the president.

Warren G. Harding

Warren G. Harding brought the Office of the President out from the isolation that Woodrow Wilson has been subjected to during his two terms. Presidential historian Seale noted that “social life under Harding helped symbolize the return to ‘normalcy’” as “every abandoned White House tradition was revived, from the New Year’s receptions to the Easter-egg rolling to garden parties” (Seale, 1986, p. 842). The White House grounds were reopened, callers were able to leave their cards at the White House, and cars were able to drive through the open gates at the White House callers. During the first New Year’s celebration in nine years at the White House, Harding greeted 30 people a minute; 6,500 people were admitted to the White House to meet the POTUS ("White House Doors Admit Line of 6,500 New Year’s callers," 1922, January 3).
In addition to restoring the White House grounds back to the people, Harding “instituted or restored publicity practices” that brought the White House out of darkness” (Ponder, 1999, p. 110). These press features marked the emergence of the media presidency. According to media scholar Stephen Ponder, they included “frequent, regularly scheduled presidential press conferences with established rules of attendance and conduct; expansion of the resident’s personal and professional relationships with the correspondents, their clubs, and industry trade associations; and the encouragement of parallel publicity activity in Cabinet agencies to support the administration’s policies” (1999, p. 110). With this new attitude of openness and accessibility among the people and the press, Harding insisted “on being treated without respect for his office” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 169).

The roaring twenties brought a new ethos to White House life. Harding loved to gamble, played poker and golf, liked to party and enjoyed an occasional drink, like Wilson he had a propensity for women other than his wife. However, the Service contained and controlled information about Harding’s “frat house” ways. The president could appear bringing back an aura of openness to the White House, but could not afford an image of a Speakeasy. Although Starling compared most of Harding’s activities with as innocent and fun-loving, information of drinking and partying would distort an image of openness to excess and licentiousness. Starling observed that “they played with great zest and good humor, drank moderately and sociably, and smoked—all in the best tradition of the Elks Club” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, pp. 169-170).

However, this fun-loving attitude of Harding also consisted of more private matters that the Service soon became involved in. Soon after the inauguration, Starling was presented with an opportunity to act as a go-between for Harding and an unnamed woman in New York. He declined saying that this was purely a private matter between the president and the woman.
Although Starling repeatedly noted that Harding was weak, he says that no affair could have occurred in the White House because he was under constant surveillance. The form and function of the Inspection House would have made it easy for the Service to spot such illicit actions by the president. For Starling, it must have ended before he entered the White House. However, Starling might have over exaggerated how fortified and watched the White House had become. He admitted that “one of the other members of the Detail accepted the assignment, and on one occasion brought the young lady to the White House” without the notice of other agents (1946, p. 170).

Nan Britton supposedly used an agent she referred to as Tim Slade as a liaison during the first few months of Harding’s presidency (1927). The first arranged meeting occurred at Eagle Bay while Harding was still president-elect. When Harding went to Washington, Britton continued to use Slade to send private letters to him, but sometimes just sent the letters directly to the White House, which Harding told her not to do again. Agent Slade was again used as the go-between. The next meeting occurred at the White House in June 1921. In her memoirs, she revealed that the president and her snuck into a closet in the ante-room of the White House for some privacy. However, the affair could not have lasted long in the White House; as Starling was quick to point out, it would not have escaped the attention of agents. Despite these clever maneuvers to hide his personal activities, Starling noted that Harding “did not resent our constant attention; he was sorry it had to be that way” (1946, p. 191). He remarked once to Starling about life inside the bubble. He expressed, “Damn it, Colonel, that’s the trouble with being President. You can’t do the things you want to do, and what you can do you can’t do your own way” (1946, p. 191). The purpose behind Bentham’s Panopticon was in clear operation. The power of mind
over mind was in full force with Harding. He knew that his behavior was limited in living under
the closer inspection of his protective detail.

The use of the Service as a means to facilitate and hide his personal life’s adventures was
not the only change Harding made to the Secret Service and White House protection. He
petitioned Congress to remove the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police to guard the White
House; he demanded that he be given direct control over this household guard. Unlike the
presidential guard, the White House Police Force was greatly expanded during the war. Its
budgetary figures a year after the war hovered around $53,000 and it consisted of a 33 man force
(U.S. Congress, Senate, White House Police Force, 1922).

Congress justified the creation of the White House Police Force under the direct
jurisdiction of the POTUS primarily for administrative efficiency concerns. Congressman John
Langley (R-KY) argued that “it is a matter of economy and involves good business principles”
Force had grown during the war, but was now too large, and it needed to be cut back down to
size. Senator Lawrence Phipps (R-CO) said that the primary purpose of the bill “is to reduce the
number of the police force which has been guarding the Executive Mansion and grounds since
the beginning of the war” (p.8406). The debates surrounding the bill centered on matters of good
business that ranged from pension issues to pay to why not use the Park Police to the reduction
of the White House Police Force to cost savings of up to $30,000. In the new few years,
Congress would slash its budgets and reduce the personnel power of the White House Force
dramatically. By 1925, there were a total of 6 officers in the guard with a budget of $14,100
(U.S. Congress, Senate, Salaries and Equipment, White House Police Force, 1924). These
changes, in general, reflected an inability to secure either the White House grounds or the body of the POTUS with any degree of potency.

Even with these planned changes, Congressman Meyer London (S-NY) briefly raised the question of the “necessity for establishing this praetorian guard” (p.12133). Congressman Carl Chindblom (R-IL), in response, commented that the president would have limited control over his own protective guard. He said that the “President cannot do anything with regard to the conduct, the behavior, the assignments, or the routine duties of any of them” (p. 12133). The discussion on the ramifications of granting the POTUS jurisdiction over the household guard was not discussed any further. Debate ended and the bill was passed. In the Senate, the discussion revolved around what the uniforms would look like, not on substantive questions. It was reported later that the new uniforms were military in design, but “not gaudy, distinctive but not too pompous” ("Harding New White House Police Head," 1922, December 20). They resembled “the fatigue headgear of the Grenadier Guards and other household troops” and the crown of the hat was “embroidered blue frogs similar to those on the caps of officers of the Marine Corps” ("Harding New White House Police Head," 1922, December 20).

**Calvin Coolidge**

In contrast to Harding’s vibrant and open personality that matched the new atmosphere of the 1920s, Calvin Coolidge was the antithesis of this age. He was silent, calm, and stayed to himself. However, he was the more effective communicator than Harding or almost any previous president. Silent Cal used the media to move the people. Charles Thompson of the New York Times proclaimed, “Coolidge is the best known President in the history of the United States. Roosevelt does not compare with him, and no other President ever compared with
Roosevelt” (C. W. Thompson, 1927, August 7) Like his predecessors, Coolidge learned and employed the art of publicity by carefully managing newspapers and radio.

Even with this increased fame and exposure, which often needs to be backed with additional force, the Service continued to rely on the rule of three to protect the president. As Coolidge walked around Washington on a rainy April day, three agents were in tow ("Coolidge Walks in Rain," 1926, April 7). Coolidge loved his walks as he was a habitual morning walker. However, the Service did not see anything wrong with this routine or allowing a popular president to be completely open to the public. Starling made no mention of the dangers of establishing and sticking to a particular routine. There was no conception of how hazardous this was for a potential assailant to know the exact time and place the president would be every morning.

Even though Coolidge had a reputation for being stubborn, he often complied with orders given to him by the Secret Service. Starling once told him that he could not ride a particular horse; it was too dangerous. Coolidge did not like this, but accepted a safer horse that he could ride. Starling also recounted a different story in which “his stubbornness suffered another defeat” (1946, p. 231). On a trip to Chicago, Coolidge resisted the idea of using either a special train or a special car. He did not believe the extra costs were justified. Although the Service relented on this issue, the experience was so bad for Coolidge that “he never tried it again” (1946, p. 231). In another instance, Starling had to persuade the president to stay at his vacation home in Wisconsin. Doctor Coupal had convinced the president that his wife needed a drier climate and that they should go to Yellowstone for the summer. Starling’s response was couched in political and personal terms. He told the president, “These people up here in Wisconsin are mostly poor, yet out of their love for you two they have raised money to make this place livable
for you and your servants. If you left now you would give their country a black eye” (1946, p. 267). Needless to say, the president listened to Starling and stayed put. The disciplining of the president extending beyond mere security concerns as the president’s behavior was altered for political purposes.

Starling played this role in protecting John Coolidge as he attended Amherst College.68 The cover story was fairly simple. John had received numerous threatening letters and the president wanted someone to protect him. However, Coolidge wanted Starling to act as John’s custodian for a couple of reasons. First, the president was worried about his son. His grades were low and he was acting up. The New York Times reported that Starling “advises John as to his friends, his hours, at the same time guards closely the boy’s health” (“Secret Service Man Guards Young Coolidge at Amherst since Return There This Fall,” 1926, October 26). And Starling was to ensure that “no incident of a sensational nature occurs” (“Secret Service Man Guards Young Coolidge at Amherst since Return There This Fall,” 1926, October 26). John was in a fight earlier that with another student from Brooklyn and he needed a trusted confidant to manage any situation that might arise. Second, Coolidge was worried about whether the twenties “would have a lasting effect on the members of John’s generation.” The president told Starling, “These boys are not Communists. They are Americans. But I want to know what kind of Americans they are. People are like apples. They can spoil” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 243). At the age of 50, Starling only lasted a semester before he asked to be returned to the White House. He was replaced by another agent who was much younger ("New Guard for John Coolidge," 1926, December 21).

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68 John was the first of many teenagers/young adults who had to be secured by the Secret Service. Although there is no record of him complaining about the impact of the bubble on his personal life, other teenagers from Margaret Truman to Ron Reagan would voice their displeasure on how the Secret Service infringed on their personal lives.
Starling would continue to act as crucial figure for Coolidge. After Coolidge selected John Garibaldi Sargent as Attorney General, he asked his favorite agent to locate him and hide him from the press. Coolidge gave him explicit instructions in how to deal with the situation. He said, “You’d better take him up to 2400 Sixteenth Street and get him a room. Dress him up and take him to the Department of justice and have him sworn in. Be sure that he has on black shoes. Don’t let him talk to the newspapermen. You talk for him” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 230).

When Starling did arrive at the train station, a host of reporters were already there. They wanted to know who he was and what the president wanted with him. He informed the press that he was a “good guy” and the president would explain to them the situation at the White House, not here. Starling effectively repelled any questions and managed this sensitive information in a deft manner.

**Herbert Hoover**

Presidential security would stay relatively the same with President Herbert Hoover. Starling recollected that “there would be changes at the White House,” but “things would go along pretty much as before” (1946, p. 282). Hoover would take his strolls around Washington with little to no protection. The *Los Angeles Times* observed that on a fall day Hoover was out and about Washington with only one agent instead of his usual four; it seemed that the Service did increase protection by one guard (“Hoover Take Stroll in Streets of Capital," 1929, October 14).

The most pressing issue for the Service during the first two years of Hoover’s presidency was the lack of coordination that existed between the White House Police Force and the White House Detail. With little communication and coordination between the household guard and the presidential guard, there were gaping security holes, which allowed strangers to walk directly
into the White House. To resolve this issue, the president issued an order for Richard Jervis, head of the White House Detail, to be put in charge of both entities ("Promoted at the White House," 1929, March 16). Even though Jervis was put in command, the two organizations were still distinct and the coordination between the two was not seamless. Agent George C. Drescher recounted a story of a man who walked directly through the front door and proceeded to the State dining room where Hoover was chatting with someone. Drescher blamed the incident on the “laxity of the policemen and the Negro doorkeeper” (1967, June 1, p. 10). The man had to walk past one policeman who was stationed outside, another policeman inside the front door, and then the doorkeeper. For Drescher, “it was just laxity, that’s all” (1967, June 1, p. 10). After this event, Hoover called upon Congress to transfer the White House Police to the Secret Service (USSS, 1990). With no resistance, Congress agreed to this merger on May 14, 1930; Congressman David O’Connell (D- NY) said that “We cannot throw too many safeguards around the person of the President” (Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 2nd session, vol. 72, p.4734).

With the change in jurisdiction, Chief Moran found that the White House Police Force was too small to properly secure the grounds of the White House (U.S. Congress, House, Increase in White House Police Force, 1930). Even though the force had been rebuilt after it was disseminated in 1925, Moran was able to expand the White House Police Force from 38 to 43 privates (U.S. Congress, House, Increase in White House Police Force, 1930). The conditions of the depression also required the Service to increase its expenditures in order to combat threats against the president and fight against the spread of counterfeiting. Between 1928 and 1932, the Secret Service Division increased its spending from $496,113 to $711,982 (Department of the
An increase of almost 30% in its resources allowed the Service to increase its personnel numbers and ability to more aptly fulfill its two missions.

Despite these new measures and resources, Drescher still believed that securing the president from danger was an impossible task. He said, “Anybody in God’s world could take a maximum silencer and put it on a rifle and knock off any President…They can knock off people anywhere” (Drescher, 1967, June 1, p. 11). Resulting from the impossible task of controlling the unknown, it was important to put the president in secure places. In Philadelphia, for example, Jervis told Drescher that the president should never be allowed to walk or ride down Walnut or Chestnut Street; the streets are too narrow with buildings around; the president’s party would be “like canyons,” easy to pick off (Drescher, 1967, June 1, p. 11). The president can only go down Broad Street or Market Street. Simple observational details could keep the president alive during an attack.

The dangers of guarding the president increased as the Great Depression spread. Starling noted that the “effect of the depression on the Detail was acute” as “our vigilance had to be doubled” (1946, p. 289). Threat letters rose and visits from crazies increased dramatically, which forced agents to track down people all across the nation. The White House Police had to ditch its uniforms, blend into the environment, and ensure that policemen were not visible to the public (Starling & Sugrue, 1946). As he campaigned for reelection, the Service had a variety of problems. At one train stop, people were so upset that they hit Hoover with tomatoes. Exasperated by this quasi-attack on him, he said, “No, I’m ready to quit” (Drescher, 1967, June 1, p. 13). In Detroit, danger was at such a high level that the Service had to start “handpicking our audiences” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 299). Tickets to presidential events were being counterfeited, which forced the Service to monitor printing presses and prevent a demonstration
against the president. These initial attempts to filter the unwanted and include the wanted prefigured what the Service would become. It also was the beginnings of a systematic attempt to create a docile public who could behave properly in the presence of the president. Crowds had to be bubbled and be managed just like the president. The best way to ensure discipline is to pick the audience.

At home, the Service had to deal with large organized groups that could pose a substantial threat to securing the POTUS. Communist demonstrators were reported to be planning to gather outside of the White House. To ensure that no protest could take place, a special detail “composed of city policemen, park policemen, plain clothes men, and secret services” were posted on the grounds to break up any attempt to organize ("Guard White House When Communists Talk Demonstration," 1931, November 25). However, this planned demonstration was dwarfed by the potential dangers of the Bonus Army. The Service devised a plan to infiltrate the Bonus Army, give them a place to live, keep them well fed, and separate them in small groups so that no large group could form and begin a riot (Starling & Sugrue, 1946). However, the Service’s plan was not implemented except for placing agents in strategic locations inside “Hooverville.” Reports from undercover agents recounted that there were no attempts or plans to overthrow the government; they were just disgruntled Americans, not real partisans who would use irregular means to hurt the body politic.69 However, there were a few Communists and radicals that needed to be watched. In July, a small contingent of approximately 150 veterans rioted at the White House. In rapid response, the tall iron gates were locked and every policeman in Washington was called to secure the grounds around the White

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69 Agent Drescher (1967, June 1) overheard Secretary of War Patrick Hurley inform General Douglas MacArthur that he had to tell the president that the police could no longer handle the protestors; the Army had to dispel them. Drescher went directly to the president’s secretary Larry Richey and tried to convince him that MacArthur’s plan would be a disaster for Hoover, pointing out the fact that the government had enough supplies to treat the veterans decently. Drescher did not know if the Richey passed the information to Hoover.
House. Hoover canceled his plans and Washington virtually became “an armed camp all night and several hundred police reserves and secret service operatives were under orders to remain on guard at the White House” ("Veterans Riot; White House Gates Locked," 1932, July 17).

Even with these dangers, Hoover still opened the doors of the White House for the annual New Year Celebration. He shook 6,429 hands in 1931 and 1,906 in 1932 ("Hoover Shakes 6,429 Hands to Start New Year," 1931, January 2; Hoover Shakes Fewer Hands in New Year’s Line," 1932, January 2).70 In late December 1931, Hoover was able to lose his Secret Service escort in Maryland on an impromptu trip. The Service searched for him and then returned to the White House empty handed ("Hoover and Body Guard Play at Hide and Seek," 1931, December 21). With these bits of resistance, it was clear that Hoover “resented the supervision of the Secret Service” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 287). Agents would routinely refuse his requests, which made him more bitter. Notwithstanding the cold relationship that Starling reported existed between Hoover and the Secret Service, the president accepted protection “as a necessary evil” (1946, p. 287).71

By the end of Hoover’s presidency, the county was in a dangerous place, especially for the POTUS. The spirit of liberation of the twenties that allowed Harding to bring back the People’s House was tested under conditions of a depression and despair. In order to secure Hoover, the Service had to take great steps in watching crowds, monitoring enemies of the state, and ensuring the president was closely watched at all times. Even though the Service had its lapses, it continued to discipline and tell the president what he could and could not do. The

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70 The number in 1932 was smaller in part because of rainy conditions.
71 It was clear that Starling did not think to highly of Hoover. He was cold and ignored his protective detail. Agent Drescher had a different picture of both Starling and Hoover. For one, he called Starling “the biggest phony in the world” (1967, June 1, p. 7)). He could not stand the way “he used to parade” (Drescher, 1967, June 1, p. 7). In contrast to Starling’s depiction of Hoover, Drescher felt that Hoover was too honest to be a politician; he was just too good.
sophistication of the Service was still simple, but it was gradually developing its own idea of what security entailed.

Conclusion

Bentham pushed the idea that the basic principles of the Panopticon should be applied to public institutions. He argued that certain establishments “on account of their destination, of their importance, their magnitude, and their destructibility, are particularly exposed to the clandestine enterprises” (1843, p. 109). To avoid a frontal or covert attack on these institutions, they had to have a strong “mode of exterior fortification” and inspection must be the norm. Concerning the White House, there was no place of greater magnitude, and its destination and potential for destruction were very high. Due to the likelihood of an attack, the enemy or barbarian must be placed in what Foucault called a “vector of domination” (2003, p. 195). Because the barbarian is “the man of history, the man of pillage and fires, he is the man of domination” (2003, p. 196). This type of enemy must himself be dominated. In this vector, the state took extensive measures during the Great War and the Great Depression to mitigate the power of the outsider who sought to challenge the condition of things.

Internal threats born from the body politic and external threats born from the state of nature must be resisted and neutralized. The state used the military apparatus of the Secretary of War and domestic operations of the FBI and the Secret Service to expose and eliminate these dangers. In dealing with the criminal class, the Service had to identify the deranged mind. The identification, classification, and tracking of these individuals through the use of lists provided the Service with a sense of security. By relying on lists and later developing the protective research section, the agency became more sophisticated in monitoring perceived enemies of the state.
The management of threat classification and assessment was also coupled with the desire to project a particular presidential image. The bubble of protection evolved into a screen which displayed and disclosed particular images and concealed and confused other bits of information. Wilson was able to safely court Edith Galt, flirt with women at the theater, and hide the severity of his stroke while Harding concealed his partying ways and his affairs. At this time, the bubble was thick enough for the Service to adequately hide the private habits of the president. In doing so, the Service also provided the president the ability to manage and monitor a presidential spectacle that surrounded his body. The ability to create protective practices that reinforced the image of the POTUS allowed the Service to help build the image of the Prince of Peace and allow Hoover to travel across the United States with minimal harassment. The ploys to distract and demonstrate allowed the Service to fulfill its unique responsibilities to secure the public and private body of the POTUS.

Despite the gradual acceptance of the Secret Service and its security ethos in restricting presidential liberty, its logics and practices of presidential protection were still rudimentary to provide adequate protection from a rational assassin. For the most part, the implementation of security had remained the same since Chief Wilkie established the White House Detail during Theodore Roosevelt’s administration. Although World War I was a significant departure from the normal routine of security, it did not have a significant impact in how the president was protected; presidents following Wilson opened the White House grounds, restored its traditions, and made the White House grounds accessible to the people. And, protection still revolved around a strict body defense strategy, in which the Service relied on a host of agents to prevent a close-range attack. The Metropolitan Police’s logic of distance had been casually accepted by the Service, but never fully developed or implemented. The Service was more concerned about a
stabbing, a shooting with a pistol, or the threat of a bomb. The bubble did not provide a strong enough vector of domination to control barbarians or partisans. An attack on the president still required little planning and minimal skills.
CHAPTER FIVE

A CITADEL OF SECURITY:
THE LEGITIMIZATION OF PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION

The idea and practice of presidential security was about to change once again with a new immobilized president, the conditions of World War II, an attempted assassination on Truman, and the presence of a new Chief who sought to modernize Secret Service practices. With the uncertainties that resulted from these problematic situations between the FDR and Truman years, the Service was able to develop its own meaning and knowledge related to how the POTUS should be protected. It was able to expand its information management system to help FDR maintain a particular image and build a stronger bubble during the war and after the attack on Truman’s body.

But what was most pressing during these years was how the Service could better regulate and restrain the president. Presidents had been fickle entities that could not be entirely tamed. The bouts of presidential resistance had to be reduced in order to secure the president in a safe environment. The gaze was working, but its power was limited; surveillance never reduced presidents to a docile state. Although presidents listened and complied to agency direction, there needed to be additional ties that bound presidential movement and action. To accomplish this, Machiavelli had a compelling observation about the nature of dependency and power. He observed that the “nature of men is, to oblige oneself because of the benefits one gives, as well as because of those one receives” (1997, p. 41). This obligation was necessary because people are fickle. He understood the unreliability and untrustworthiness of people in dangerous, doubtful, or even in quiet times. Without establishing some type of due dependence, no one could be relied upon. In order to create this link, Machiavelli advocated for a state of security based on mutual obligations. This sense of obligation implicitly rested on having adequate means.
This chapter shows that during the FDR and Truman years the Service was able to strengthen its ties to the president’s body and mind through additional resources and by sealing its oath in blood. By pushing for more resources, the Service was able to continue to strengthen the scope of the bubble by expanding the isolated chamber of the bubble and strengthening its outer core. This was mostly done by the newly appointed Chief of the Secret Service Frank J. Wilson in 1937. He modernized the Secret Service by increasing its manpower, changing personnel rules, updating equipment, and creating a more sophisticated branch of the Service to find and arrest enemies of the state. By inflating the bubble, the Service also expanded its role to screen and show a particular image of the president. The Service disclosed and displayed, but also concealed and confused. FDR was able to have his affairs and be portrayed as a healthy and normal president who could walk and mingle with the people. This bubble was further modernized due to the advent of World War II. For the second time in the 20th century, the White House had to be made over to fit the highest standards of presidential protection. With these resources, the White House Detail offered a host of benefits for the president that allowed him to maintain his public persona and satisfy his private needs.

This mutual obligation was only reinforced during the Truman years. However, it took on more serious considerations with the death and wounding of members of the White House Detail. Although Truman heavily resisted presidential protection early in his presidency, he learned the cost and benefits of presidential protection. With the death of Les Coffelt and the wounding of Joseph Down and Donald Birdzell during the attack at the Blair House, Truman understood the full meaning of presidential security. It was his obligation to adhere to the dictates of the White House Detail. The oath of protection was a matter of life and death. This was solidified in the “Coffelt Effect.” Agents swore on their lives to serve as the president’s
armor and presidents swore to conform. This effect as encapsulated by the death of Coffelt empowered the Secret Service. It created a new subjectivity concerning presidential security. The Service was able to capture the mind of the president through obligation and fear and secure the body of the president through bodies and bubbles. The consequences of the attempted assassination on Truman created the impetus for the Secret Service to be permanently authorized in statute to protect the POTUS. It was at this moment the alien element Wooten warned against was fully normalized as Congress approved the establishment of a secret service to surround the POTUS. The liberty of the president, which grounded in Jeffersonian ideas, to be open with the public ended. This type of president had to adhere to the dictates of security. Because agents bleed, the president was now legally expected to conform to their dictates. He must listen how to live: that was his obligation. With the transformations in resources and the fulfillment of its oath, the Service and the POTUS became intertwined. Agents knew his secrets and presidents knew agents would die. These events created a state of mutual obligation for the POTUS and his armor.

Even with these changes in resources and the fulfillment of the oath, the Service still relied on the logic of a simple body defense strategy. The bubble was merely composed of bodies with a hint of armor. Protection still revolved around the administrative principles of access and proximity, which were entirely inadequate in an age of modern weaponry. The successful avoidance of two assassinations attempts only reinforced this strategy. Protection was made vulnerable because of an institutional process that failed to produce new meaning. Neither the Service nor the Treasury Department thought to thoroughly examine its practices of protection after two near misses. The failure to examine and produce new meaning related to
Assassins, War, and Enemies: The Securitization of Protection

The refusal to challenge the basic idea of how the president was protected should have occurred after the attempted assassination of President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in Miami. This event exposed the flaws of a crude body defense system. On the night February 15, 1933 at Bay Front Park in Miami, Guiseppe (Joseph) Zangara was approximately 10 yards away from the president-elect when he unloaded 5 bullets directed toward at an immobilized Roosevelt who was stuck in his car. Roosevelt was lucky to have survived as the assassin had a 100% hit rate. Zanagra just made a critical error in planning his attack. He decided to arrive early at the amphitheatre in order to gain a first row seat so that he would only be a few feet away from his target. However, he “misjudged the time when seats would be available” (Donovan, 1964, p. 146).

By the time he did arrive, the seats and aisles were already full of people. He waded through the crowd to get within about 35 feet of the president according to FDR’s economic advisor Raymond Moley (”Zangara Educated, Moley Discovers,” 1933, February 17). However, Zanagra was too short to actually see the president-elect. After Roosevelt delivered a very short address in the back of his presidential limo, the crowd started to leave and Zangara was able to stand on top of a chair and fire at the president at will. Each bullet hit a human target, resulting in the death of Chicago Mayor Anton Cermak. There was no security detail around the president to cover him or near the crowd to get in the way of Zangara’s line of sight. The Service failed to establish an adequate bubble around the president’s body and the crowd. With utterly no bodies or barriers, the president-elect was in a helpless state. The White House Detail was in the back-
up car with no way to shield the president from danger. Vincent Astor, the host of Roosevelt’s
time in Miami, commented repeatedly to Moley before the attack that “it would be easy for a
crank to shoot Mr. Roosevelt” ("Astor had Premonition of Roosevelt’s Danger," 1933, February
17). Riding in an open car among thousands of people was no security at all. In fact, the
security that did exist was unintended. The crowd of 10,000 people who came to see Roosevelt
prevented Zangara from gaining immediate access to the president. He was hemmed in to such
an extent that he could not carry out his plan until people started to disperse. According to
Zangara, standing on a wobbly chair was the reason that he missed. In fact, this was not
Zangara’s first attempt at assassinating a Chief Magistrate. He declared that he almost made one
attempt against King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy, but decided against it

His motive and his loathing for the president stemmed from his hatred for capitalism. He
blindly attacked the system, which happened to be the body of the president-elect. Like
Czolgosz and Schrank before him, he attacked the symbol of his hatred, which happened to be
the POTUS. Zangara said he had no bitterness towards the person of the president-elect, but
despised what he represented. He coldly said, “As a man I like Meester Roosevelt. As a
president I want to kell him. I want kell all presidents” [sic] ("Assassin, in Jail, Tells of His
Motives," 1933, February 16) This dislike for the POTUS grew out of his attitude towards
capitalism. Zangara repeatedly commented that “capitilaism kill me” and “I got it in my mind
capitalist hurt people” [sic] ("Zangara Receives 80-Year Sentence," 1933, February 21) He
ultimately blamed his father and capitalism for the stomach pains he experienced, which drove
him to act out.

The reaction of the press was immediate. Outlets from the Los Angeles Times to the
Chicago Tribune to the Washington Post automatically referred to him as an anarchist, even
though he had no ties with any of those organizations. Furthermore, he was an isolated loner with no friends and few family members. He espoused no political ideology other than pure and unadulterated hatred. In one sense, Zangara fit Schmitt’s idea of an absolute enemy and Foucault’s barbarian. His hatred was global, he had little ties to the land, even though he became a U.S. citizen, he used irregular means to carry out his attack, and he glorified in his actions. Zangara wanted to pillage and burn. His actions were reasoned and outweighed any sense of guilt. This was how the press viewed him. The *Los Angeles Times* was perhaps the most vocal in its reactions of how the state should handle these enemies. It proclaimed that the attack was a “call to action.” The column expressed “the immediate necessity of ridding this country of alien enemies, whether they are anarchists, Communists, revolutionaries of another stripe, or merely racketeers and criminals” ("A Call to Action," 1933, February 17). The other had no place in the United States, which would soon be public policy. This was best represented with how quickly the court dealt with his attempted assassination. The court found him to be sane and sentenced him to 80 years in prison, even with overt signs of a troubled mind. After the Mayor of Chicago died, Zangara was sentenced and executed by the electrical chair on March 20, 1933.

Even though Zangara was able to carry out an attempt on the president’s life and evade Secret Service protection with little planning, no training, and no money, there was little clamor to revise presidential security. There was mostly praise. Schuyler Patterson of the *New York Times* argued that “whatever loopholes may have become evident as a result of Zangara’s attempt will be closed at once” (1933, February 19, p. 21). He continued, arguing that Zangara “penetrated what is regarded as the most efficient protective system in the world” and “The President of the United States is the most thoroughly guarded executive in the world” (1933, February 19, p. 21). In a brief 30 years, the attitude of protection had shifted from disdain of
close protection to glorifying its supposed effectiveness. It was believed by many, especially Starling that the Secret Service had established effective security screens and protocols that surpassed the French and Italians.

Vylla Poe Wilson from the Washington Post also mythologized the Service after the attack (1933, February 23). She pointed out that “the special corps of silent men took their places at the elbow of President Roosevelt and have kept these watchful places ever since” as their “deeds of heroism, the long hours of service in the face of danger, their constant alertness and quick judgment must go unsung” (1933, February 23, p. 14). Agents were absolutely devoted and faithful. In protecting the president, Patterson proclaimed that agents were strategically stationed at various points to prevent people from taking advantage of the situation, they spot every high building, cover newsstands, stand on the running boards of the president’s car, and “Secret Service surveillance does not stop with physical guardianship” as every threat letter sent to the president is investigated (1933, February 19). Perceived administrative success, however, hid the fundamental truth concerning presidential protection: it was not adequate. This was a trend that would continue to haunt the Service. Its failures were never corrected because there was supposedly nothing amiss with the protective process. The spectacle of success masked poor administration. This caused an institutional paradox for the Secret Service, which it would encounter later in the middle and late 20th century. The Service had to truly fail in order to change its protective practices.

One of the few exceptions to praising or recognizing the need for the Secret Service was the Los Angeles Times and Eleanor Roosevelt. The Times bluntly stated the obvious, “The country waits the explanation is why all the secret service guards of the President-elect at Miami were in an automobile behind him, and none stationed in the crowd near him” (“A Call to
This critique encapsulated the failure of the Service to bubble the president and the crowd. There was no disciplining force to be found in Miami. This type of administration was useless. The *Times* furthered its attack on the Service. It said, “There may be a good reason for what seems a peculiar distribution of forces, but it does look as though the secret service may have been caught sleeping” ("A Call to Action," 1933, February 17). What the column alluded to, but failed to realize was that protective practices were routinely and poorly administered. The most egregious error committed by the Service, however, was the failure to realize how dangerous carriages and cars were for leaders of nation-states. The space most vulnerable to these leaders in the early 20th century was being trapped by bodies and steel. It was here most leaders were either stabbed or shot to death. They provided the perfect scenarios to pull off an assassination. Even with the attack on TR, the Service still had not developed the meaning or skills to protect the POTUS in these highly vulnerable situations.

The First Lady-elect’s attack was a bit different. She immediately announced after the attempt that she would not ask for protection from the Service. The recent attack on her husband’s life had not bothered him so it would not bother her either. For the FLOTUS, the Service represented death and she did want that presence near her. And, she was right to an extent. Agents represented the living dead. They implicitly swore to give their lives to an elected office. She said, “As far as I am concerned, I cannot imagine the living in fear of possible death” ("Mrs. Roosevelt keeps to routine," 1933, February 17). Even though the Service had been given power over the First Family, it chose not to push the issue. She told Chief Wilson that no agents were to follow her on any of her trips. To provide her some security, the Service gave her a revolver for some protection (E. Roosevelt & Brough, 1975, p. 72)

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72 Eleanor never liked Secret Service protection. Unlike most presidents who tend to play tricks with the Service and then wholly embrace protection, she actively resisted it.
70). However, she did not know how to handle it. For slightly better protection, agents gave her a little gas gun, which was the size of a pen. It would momentarily disable an attacker. Despite her unwillingness to be followed, Wilson occasionally assigned a detail of agents to protect Eleanor without her knowledge (Starling & Sugrue, 1946). Even with these covert protective details, protecting FLOTUS was not as important as securing POTUS. There were no grandiose statements from any agents that they could command her like they could command her husband.

Notwithstanding this nonchalant attitude toward protection, not only does the mythical corps of bodyguards protect the president, but an agent like Starling was “the only man in the world who can order the President of the United States around” ("Roosevelt’s Guard," 1937, January 2). He was the Chief Body of Body Protectors. Agent Michael Reilly, head of the White House Detail during the second half of FDR’s presidency, reinforced this myth, but gave it a practical and realistic spin by noting that “every schoolboy knows that the White House Secret Service boss can order the President of the United States not to go here or there if he chooses,” but if “he orders a president to do anything the agent will shortly be giving the bank teller at No People, South Dakota, a lecture on how to tell the counterfeit two-dollar bill from the true one” (1947, p. 14). Even though agents might not issue direct commands, Reilly noted that presidents “usually accept” the advice of the Secret Service with little hesitation or questioning. If the POTUS ever flatly vetoed or overruled a decision Reilly made, he said he would resign his post. Securing the president’s safety rests on the fundamental assumption of discipline. Agents had to embrace the ethos of command and obedience. The Inspection House does not work if there is no legitimate constraint to control. Without the ability to direct presidential behavior, the Service cannot do its job.

**Modernizing the Secret Service**
However, the ability to get the POTUS to listen to Secret Service commands was not enough to establish an adequate protective barrier around the president. When Frank J. Wilson, who earned his fame for capturing Al Capone and investigating Kingfish Huey Long, replaced Chief Moran in 1936 as head of the Secret Service, he found out the “shocking fact that in certain respects the Secret Service was still back in the horse-and-buggy era” (1965, p. 96). The agency was understaffed and underfunded and its administrative routines were ineffective and too informal. The bubble was inadequate. Although appropriations had increased since Moran said the Service was disintegrating, it still lacked the necessary budget to provide suitable protection. It appropriations in 1936 just consisted of $776,830 (U.S. Congress, House, Treasury Department Appropriation Bill, 1935). In the next decade, the Service would be spending more than $2 million a year on its protective and investigative functions. Wilson also observed that there was a lack of professionalization and expertise among the ranks of the Secret Service. The agency still relied on a pocket commission book to identify themselves, a book of rules and regulations that had been issued in 1906, a seniority system that promoted older and slower agents, a system of informal training that relied on a mentoring system, and a crude White House identification system; it did not use any electronic equipment. Agents delegated the responsibility to protect the POTUS were wholly insufficient. They had no training in hand-to-hand combat, were not trained marksmen, and had no medical training.

To fix this, Wilson remarked that his office “became a conference room for developing improved procedures” (1965, p. 123). He quickly remedied these gaps in personnel, administration, communication, and technology. He would build a better and more refined bubble with the power to include and exclude with greater efficiency. Administrative rules and routines would ensure that agents were ready and qualified to protect the POTUS. He installed a
radio system which allowed FDR and his White House Detail to be in constant communication with the central office, equipped field offices with polygraphs and cameras, required agents to attend the Treasury Department School where they were taught a crime prevention program, made the Service more public, scrapped the seniority system and replaced old agents with young athletes, and required that they be trained in marksmanship, judo, boxing, jujitsu, swimming, firefighting, first aid and in psychiatry, observation, and communications.

Personnel numbers also increased as the White House Detail doubled from five to nine and the White House Police expanded from 43 to 60 officers by 1940 (Reilly & Slocum, 1947; Wilson, 1933, February 23; U.S. Congress, Senate, Authorizing an Increase in the White House Police Force, 1940). Wilson also installed a new security pass system in which the president’s regular staff, maintenance crews, and reporters received permanent passes. No one was allowed in certain areas in the White House without a pass. He filtered visitors as well by requiring those with appointments to come to the Pennsylvania Avenue entrance and tourists through the East Gate. To ensure that standards were followed at the entry points in the White House, Wilson had supervisors conduct surprise inspections. Most of these measures created a more expansive information system. Agents could better control access to key locations in the White House by tagging and filtering people, which enhanced measures to divide the POTUS from unwanted contact from the people.

To further enhance protective measures, the Service processed, checked, and filtered food and packages. Wilson continued the practice of inspecting all the food that passed through the White House by sending it to a special lab run by the Department of Agriculture and only agents could buy groceries for the president. Reilly recounted that only once did the lab discover a piece of food that was poisoned. Because FDR did not like this practice of sending gifts to a lab
to be checked, the agents either destroyed these gifts or ate them. The Service also set up another lab in the White House garage equipped with an x-ray machine, a time-bomb detector, and a bomb carrier. Any packages sent to the White House were checked, opened, inspected, and cataloged before they could be sent to the president (Reilly & Slocum, 1947; Tully, 1949; F. J. Wilson & Day, 1965). A few days after the attempted assassination of Roosevelt a letter bomb was discovered at the White House (F. J. Wilson & Day, 1965). Even though it was a poorly designed bomb made of shotgun shells, it was a prime example and perhaps cause of inspecting all letters and packages.

**Crazies and Cranks: Hunting Reasoned Madness**

Perhaps the most important change Wilson authorized before the World War II years was the creation of the Protective Research Section (PRS) in 1941. These intelligence-based agents were assigned to create a central filing system that included a complete list and description of suspects and criminals who had been arrested for being a potential danger to the president, a catalog of anonymous threat letters, and a file “showing the periodic checkups of potentially dangerous cranks” (F. J. Wilson & Day, 1965, p. 125). This information/intelligence system allowed the Service to identify and keep track of potential enemies of the state, which would reinforce the size and strength of the security bubble. Before this system, Wilson noted that the Service had located only a few of these threats. He rejected “the theory that past Secret Service methods were above reproach and, like the laws of the Medes and Persians, unalterable simply because for thirty-five years no President has been assassinated” (1965, p. 123). Reilly reported that approximately 5,000 suspicious and threatening letters were sent to the White House monthly (1947, p. 19). If a letter was classified as threatening, agents would give it careful consideration and the author would be tracked down and checked on every six months.
Wilson viewed these letters as a serious danger to the president and the Service had to start investigating them. This mentality reinforced and entrenched a few key assumptions that the Service held for years. First, those make threats also pose a threat. Although the Service in the later part of 20th century would decouple those assumptions, it became engrained in how the Service searched for and identified potential threats. Second, the focus on letters led to a fixation on crazies and half crazy cranks as the primary threat to the POTUS. The previous known assassins had been partially reinterpreted by the Service as merely a bunch of mentally deranged entities. Czolgosz, Schrank, and Zangara were primarily delusional individuals that could make reasoned decisions.

By creating a central intelligence apparatus, the Service was able to identify known threats nationwide. This system of surveillance allowed the Service’s tentacles grew to reach beyond the White House and into the living room of Americans. Each time a president left the White House agents would be equipped with addresses to visit suspected crazies/cranks and photographs to identify potential suspects in crowds. These visits were meant to ensure that families could keep them off the streets or have them temporarily institutionalized; a detail of agents was to monitor the mentally unstable if the family was incapable of doing it. Under this intelligence apparatus, the principles of the Inspection House were being transferred to watch and monitor suspected foes. The crazy and the crank had to be controlled to secure the body of the POTUS. Even with this extension, the Service failed to develop any systematic method to access threats. It would take a seriously ill-informed judgment call before this practice would change.

For Wilson, these crazies were dangerous because they were “irrational” and were “guided by dangerously disordered minds,” but “such persons often make uncannily logical,
vicious, and at the same time intelligent plans, and always try to execute them suddenly at an unexpected moment” (1965, p. 123). This was the hallmark of reasoned madness. He recounted story after story of crazies visiting the White House, from Coffin who wanted the president to change people’s names, to Doris who came to the White House to complain about her missing lover, to I.C. Peace who galloped to the White House on a white horse wrapped in a white sheet. All of these people were referred to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, which evaluated whether they should be committed or not. Although most of these mentally unstable individuals were harmless, some were not. The most prominent of these dangerously disordered minds was an Army deserter who was found to be equipped with two bottles of nitroglycerine, a bottle of nitric-acid, and a loaded rifle; his plan was to blow up the president.

Despite these threats against the POTUS, there was no organized attempt to kill the president. Wilson pointed out that most public enemies of the president have not been connected to any larger conspiracy or organized group. The attempt to link crazies and cranks with groups is “groundless” (1965, p. 111). Wilson believed most were publicity seeking loners. Due to the heavy interaction among the Service and the mentally unstable during FDR’s administration (and throughout the history of the Secret Service), agents placed a heavy focus on identifying this class of criminal and labeling them as enemies of the president’s public body. Presidential protection seemed to rest on the fundamental assumption that an assassin will be a loner who is likely to be crazy. Attempts, therefore, were mostly likely to be simple and to occur at close range. Security measures pivoted around this premise, which required the Service to implement a body defense strategy. There was no real comprehension that an organization or a nation-state could send a highly trained death-squad to kill the president.

The Strengthening of Shields and Staging of Screens
Because of the constant reminder that the Service represented the very real possibility of death, Wilson said that FDR was “assassination conscious” (1965, p. 111). This acceptance of the Service partly had to do with Zangara’a attack on him in 1933, living across the street when Palmer’s house was bombed in 1919, and seeing TR almost assassinated in 1912. These near-death experiences were coupled with the fact he “was realistically aware of the ‘sitting duck’ target he presented, immobilized in his wheelchair” (1965, p. 110). According to Wilson, FDR “was never resentful of either the necessity or the methods used by the Secret Service” (1965, p. 110). Starling also made the same observation saying that “the President had no objection to our surveillance, and he cooperated with us completely” (1946, p. 311). Roosevelt accepted these massive changes to the security detail from the establishment of a protective research wing of the Service to the technical upgrades to changes in a larger and more confined security bubble. He willingly embraced the disciplinary function of the Secret Service. He recognized the importance of listening to commands from his security detail.

Roosevelt also understood the importance of the Secret Service in setting a stage for his public performances. As POTUS, he relied on his media savvy skills to set the stage in the internal confines of the White House. For Roosevelt, “managing the press to achieve that public support was one of his highest priorities” (Ponder, 1999, p. 162). FDR used an arsenal of media strategies to influence the masses. His range of propaganda techniques included using the nation’s first White House Press Secretary to disseminate the president’s message in a prepackaged way, the creation of National Emergency Council to directly shape the masses, the authorization to create government documentaries to be shown in theaters, his use of twice-weekly press conferences where he bullied reporters, and his clever use of fireside chats to connect directly to the people. The continued modernization of the White House press
operations enabled FDR to push a carefully crafted image in relative isolation from the rest of the public.

As the White House media operation became more sophisticated so did the Secret Service screens and stages. In public, Roosevelt depended on the Service to build a stage that disclosed, but concealed a particular image of the POTUS. Without his own White House advance team, Roosevelt relied on the Service to make arrangements with local political officials for maximizing his exposure to the public in the proper way. Reilly commented that “a Secret Service man’s job, by legal definition, includes working the interests of the President” and the “vast majority in our Detail were staunch Roosevelt rooters” (1947, p. 96). While he was on the road, Roosevelt’s physical condition posed political problems for the Service. It had to carefully manage his image by controlling the information of what the people experienced. The Service could not just focus on security concerns when escorting the president as information management had to work alongside protective management. As Reilly often repeated in his memoirs, the Service had a responsibility to consider the president’s interest when he is out in public.

Starling recounted that the Service had to “devise a routine for his movements from place to place, particularly when they involved public appearances” (1946, p. 305). This involved building portable and permanent ramps, which allowed Roosevelt to walk very short distances wherever he went. At his four inaugurations, Starling had devised a strategy of building a wall of boards to help Roosevelt make a 35 yard walk to the Inaugural stand. The use of stands, rails, and ramps were installed on the president’s train, car, and any place of public exposure. Agents also installed a jump seat in the president’s cars to help him maneuver getting out and of the car. The Service was so effective with its strategies that Reilly commented that “literally thousands
who had seen him at ball games, rallies, and inaugurations never suspected his condition” (1946, p. 227). However, the use of portable and permanent ramps to transport FDR was just one aspect of staging public appearances. The Service also had to discipline the space between the POTUS and the crowds. Maintaining the illusion of a healthy FDR required the Service to maintain a distance between the masses and the president. This required agents to place a disciplinary apparatus around crowds. The people had to abide by a certain subjectivity. They could not get close enough to detect the staging of the president’s body.

Despite this political support from the agency, the Service, at times, had to forsake political ends for protective means. In Boston, Reilly told local campaign officials that Roosevelt would not go down any of the streets they selected because they were too narrow. These politicos, according to Reilly, would first yell at them, accuse them of being Republicans, and then call the White House to convince FDR of their plans. Other changes the Service usually made to local plans included preventing the president from being on bridges, at parks, or having huge crowds gather around the president’s car. Due to these security conditions, the locals always complained that the Service ruined political events. In one instance, the Mayor of New York City was supposed to present a bouquet of flowers to the POTUS near the garment district, but the crowd started to break through police lines and Reilly gave the command to get the president out. The president’s motorcade sped right by the Mayor in the middle of the street. Needless to say, the Mayor was infuriated and complained to the president about the Secret Service.

Agents still had to consider effective security precautions to shield a helpless president with their bodies. The Secret Service as the living dead was continually reinforced resulting from the inability of FDR to defend himself or move. One of the central security issues that
FDR’s agents had to address was moving “swiftly, particular in crowded areas” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963, p. 64). During the ’36 campaign, FDR proceeded to give a series of speeches on the back of his train. In Erie, Pennsylvania, someone threw a dagger and FDR could not move one inch to avoid it. Reilly noted that, “He could not jump back like any well person, nor could he crouch or duck. He’d just have to stand there and be a target while we hoped our human shield was effective” (1947, p. 103). Although the dagger was rubber, the Service devised a strategy to collapse the president and have two agents cover him if he was ever in danger again. Another incident occurred in Los Angles when FDR and William McAdoo were campaigning together. Someone in the crowd threw a package that hit ex-Treasury Secretary McAdoo’s head; it happened to be a bag of peanuts, but it could have easily been a bomb. These events coupled with FDR’s disability forced the Service to consciously sacrifice their bodies for that of the POTUS.

These moments of confining presidential movement did not stop FDR from resisting his detail. Roosevelt was notorious for playing jokes on the Service. Like his cousin, he would routinely try to escape from his detail or play pranks on them. Starling recounted a story while FDR was in Hyde Park taking a car trip with secretaries Missy LeHand and Grace Tully. With some quick maneuvering and turning around on a narrow street, Roosevelt lost the Secret Service follow-up car and a contingent of state troopers. Yet Roosevelt returned to the house, had Starling call and inform the follow-up car where he was, and waited for them to return before he continued on his automobile trip with LeHand. For this president, the art of escape was bound within the confines of discipline. He escaped, but returned willingly to the Panopticon. The president had succumbed to the logic of protection, even though he occasionally toyed with his agents.
This was reinforced on his summer vacation trip at Campobello Island where he used a yawl to sail the New England coast without his protective detail. There were only five spaces and FDR wanted his three sons and another mystery visitor to accompany him. According to Starling, “we could like it or lump it, but that was the way it was going to be” (1946, p. 308). With his speedy little craft, FDR was to be protected by a large fleet of destroyers, a speed boat with Secret Service agents, and another boat full of reporters. FDR was able to outmaneuver the larger boats and go places that “maintain the privacy he desired” (Starling & Sugrue, 1946, p. 309). Even with this space FDR created, the Service had a speed boat and Starling was on land with a fast car to track his movements and provide him with supplies during the night.

On another occasion, FDR secretly met with Churchill at sea without informing his detail. In fact, Starling unbeknownst to him was used as an unintended decoy. To reporters from afar, Starling dressed and looked like Roosevelt while he was on the Potomac. However, the head of the White House Detail had no clue where FDR was. Tully noted with amusement that “the President howled with laughter at the thought that he had fooled the Secret Service Chief” (Tully, 1949, p. 247).

“Looking after the President’s personal comfort”

Even though FDR resisted his detail on occasion, Wilson, Starling, and Reilly all noted that he accepted and needed the Secret Service. He needed its screens to create proper public exposure and hide private, improper behavior. He relied on his detail to facilitate private interactions with women other than Eleanor Roosevelt. Reilly bluntly remarked that an agent “is also charged with looking after the President’s personal comfort” (1947, p. 76). In the first few months of his presidency, FDR received 16 phone calls from a Mrs. Paul Johnson of Augusta, Georgia. It was later reported by Secret Service agents that Johnson was Lucy Mercer
Although phone calls could be quite harmless, the Service would become much more active in its role in arranging meetings between the Roosevelt and Lucy Mercer Rutherford. At first, FDR ordered his drivers to the back roads of Northern Virginia and asked them to pull over and pick up a certain lady who happened to be waiting on the side of the road. After these random pick-ups happened a few times, the Service quickly caught on and used a White House usher to find out who the woman was (J. B. West & Kotz, 1973). Reilly observed that the “President would return to the White House much relaxed and happy” after these trips (Persico, 2008, p. 250).

Because of the presidential bubble screen and shield function, FDR’s liaisons with other women could remain a secret. Persico notes, “Secretaries had to carve out time in his schedule to see her. Government drivers had to pick her up. Valets led her to the president’s private quarters,” not to mention that the Service shadows the president inside and outside the White House (2008, p. 262). FDR was often so eager to see Lucy that appointments would be made immediately after Eleanor left the White House. In one situation, “Eleanor was leaving the White House for New York at 4:30 in the afternoon while Lucy arrived at 5:30” (Persico, 2008, p. 263).

However, this was not the only woman that FDR saw while he was in the White House. Missy LeHand was, according to FDR’s son Elliot, a “confidante, companion, and counselor” (E. Roosevelt & Brough, 1975, p. 94). She was the “mother of the White House” when Eleanor was not around. The White House staff responded as if she were FLOTUS. Although the relationship “underwent a marked change” later in Roosevelt’s presidency because “he deliberately chose to discipline himself in order to concentrate on the task for which he had been elected” (1975, p. 94). This marked change in their relation was only exacerbated because of her
illness in 1942, which caused Roosevelt to be further detached from her (Persico, 2008). It was quite clear that the Secret Service and the White House staff not only knew and kept silent about FDR’s relationships with these women from Eleanor, Congress, and the American people, but also helped him in facilitating these interactions.

The one agent who could always be relied on was the head of the White House Detail Mike Reilly. Presidential historian Bishop noted that “when something delicate had to be done, whether it was to locate a secret health report on Senator Alben Barkley or to arrange a secret rendezvous with Lucy Rutherford, the President called Mike” (J. Bishop, 1974, p. 235). FDR relied on him as a confidant and protector. There was no one more reliable or trustworthy to accomplish political and personal tasks for the POTUS. One of the things he did for FDR was sneaking people in the backdoor to the White House. Reilly commented that the Secret Service had a system that allowed “off-the-record” callers to see the POTUS without the press or anyone else knowing. Although these callers were mostly people involved with state issues, there was no reason not to suspect that this system was not used to bring in people for social reasons. The Service would simply send an agent to “meet the ‘off-the-record’ visitor and have them spirited through the South Grounds and into the President’s office via the back door” (Reilly & Slocum, 1947, p. 73). The press never grew the wiser as the Service continued to use this method to traffic private guests in and out of the Executive Mansion. In another situation outside of the context of presidential liaisons, the Secret Service banned reporters from the Associated Press and Acme Newspictures from the White House for taking unauthorized pictures of the president while he was on Jefferson Island ("Pictures Scoop’s Brings Reprisal by White House," 1937, June 30). The White House was upset that these reporters violated the ban of reporters on the island. For this “scoop,” the White House retaliated by using the force of the Service.
The Service remained quiet about these presidential liaisons; it was part of its expanded protective function to control and contain information that would harm the president. There was no mention in the memoirs of Starling, Reilly, or Wilson of FDR having affairs with multiple women. The code of silence that was pronounced in that 1910 memo by the Secretary of Treasury had been fully engrained in how the Service believed it should protect the president. His public body was nearly as important as his private body and it became a task for the Service to help maintain the president’s personal comfort level and help create the president’s public persona. The shielding and screening of the POTUS allowed agents to fulfill both functions simultaneously.

**World War II Security: The Advent of Fortress White House**

FDR allowed the Service to grow and develop to historical proportions before the advent of World War II. By 1940, the Service had 146 agents, 60 White House guards, and was spending more than a $1 million on its protective and investigative functions (Department of the Treasury, 1941; U.S. Congress, House, Treasury Department Appropriation Bill, 1939). By the end of the war, the Service had more than 400 agents and clerks, the White House Police Force had more than 100 guards, and its expenditures exceeded $2.6 million (U.S. Congress, House, Treasury Department Appropriation Bill, 1945; Department of the Treasury, 1946). With these resources, the Service took the steps to build a stronger and bigger presidential bubble that fit the dangers that existed outside and inside the Oval Office. FDR saw enemies everywhere. He had reasons to be suspicious. Germans, Japanese, Italians, and Soviets were found in every corner of the United States. The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), the precursor to the KGB, had infiltrated all levels of the American government without the ability of any federal or military entity to expose this intelligence crisis. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin
reported that the NKVD had succeeded “in penetrating all the most sensitive sections of the Roosevelt administration” (2000, p. 110). In fact, they noted that if Roosevelt would have died during his third term in office then Vice President Henry Wallace would have inadvertently appointed two NKVD agents to become Secretary of State and Secretary of Treasury.

The fear of enemies of the state had engulfed the government. Direct, immediate, and far-reaching action had to take place to mitigate the danger. With this rationale in place, FDR took extensive measures to round up and treat threats as absolute partisans: they were to be stripped of rights and de-humanized. To prepare for the eventual war, FDR and Congress authorized the FBI to create alphabetical and geographical lists of those they perceived to be enemies of the state (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001). They divided these threats into three categories: the leaders of organization who had the greatest loyalty to their ancestral homes, members of such organizations, and those who supported those organizations. The lists highlighted those who would have to be arrested, interned, deported, or put under surveillance once the war started. The authorization to detain citizens, aliens, and suspects domestically was granted to the Office of the Provost Marshal General. Like World War I, the military would be used in a domestic setting to hunt down enemies of the state.

During the war, the state went into action. FDR immediately issued proclamations 2525, 2526, and 2527 on December 7th and 8th, 1942, which declared Japanese, Italians, and Germans who had not completed the naturalization process as “enemy aliens.” The Attorney General and the Secretary of War had jurisdiction to detain and deport these threats (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001). They were not allowed to own guns, short wave radios, cameras, or any instrument that could be construed as an instrument of espionage. They also had to carry identification papers with them and could not go near airports, camps, forts, storage facilities,
etc. Being classified as an enemy alien was probable cause to justify searches of persons and property.

Japanese Americans, whether they were citizens, naturalized, or enemy aliens, were targeted across California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona and shipped to concentration camps all across the United States. Italian Americans were treated in a similar manner. Although the government “kept these measures from the public during the war,” the Department of Justice has recently revealed that thousands were shipped to camps, 10,000 were evacuated from their homes and told not to return or enter coastal zones, and more than 50,000 had to abide by curfew laws (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001, p. 6). In addition to these methods, FDR declared six Germans and two German Americans as “unlawful combatants” after they landed on United States soil to commit acts of sabotage, which stripped them of any rights to a civilian trial. Even though they arrived in the United States wearing uniforms, they were not granted the status of a conventional enemy. They were to be treated as barbarians. In a secret military tribunal, six of the eight were executed, including an American citizen.

The resulting paranoia of seeing enemies and partisans dispersed throughout the body politic allowed the Secret Service to transform presidential protection into a living and breathing Panopticon. With increases in personnel and resources, the Service constructed a territorial zone that monitored and regulated every aspect of White House life. The observers would contain and control the observed. For Reilly, presidential security in an environment plagued by enemies of the state rested on three tasks: guarding the president at the White House, protecting him while he was in transit, and securing him in territorial spaces outside the White House.

White House Protection
During the war, each of these components of presidential protection was enhanced, if not transformed. The day after Pearl Harbor the soon-to-be head of the White House Detail Michael Reilly increased the White House detail from 11 to 70 agents; he met no resistance in this massive buildup of manpower (1947, p. 26). Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau\(^73\) wanted to issue machine guns for White House employees, even for the secretaries. Outside of the mansion, the White House Police Force increased from 80 to 135. The tripling of White House security officials was just the beginning. Chief Wilson (1965) confiscated White House passes of German, Italian, and Japanese correspondents, prohibited cabs from entering the White House grounds, hired a crew of chemical warfare experts, recruited bomb experts, stationed an officer at the White House switch board, and reinforced exterior security by calling up the military to help protect the grounds of the executive mansion.

In short order, all White House identification cards were revoked and new ones issued based on a list devised and managed by the Secret Service. Resulting from the gravity of the situation, the Secret Service also discontinued the British monarchical practice of raising the flag when the president was at the White House and lowering it when he was gone. During the war, the flag was always raised (F. J. Wilson & Day, 1965, p. 168). In addition to this, Starling was relieved as head of the White House Detail and Reilly was promoted as Wilson could not tolerate the presence of slower and older agents. Grace Tully observed that the Monday after the attack on Pearl Harbor “there was already a new ‘normality’ of routine” (1949, p. 258).

Wilson devised a three front strategy to protect the president at the White House. The military soldiers from Fort Bragg were the first line of defense as they stood outside the White

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\(^73\) Matthew Connelly reported that Morgenthau was very active in supervising the White House protection of President Roosevelt and Truman. In fact, he would “make personally take trips around at night to find out if the Secret Service were on their posts” (1968, August 21, p. 332). This was quite obnoxious to the Secret Service and even to President Truman.
House gates, the second line of defense was the White House Police who guarded the immediate grounds, and the last line of defense was the White House Detail (F. J. Wilson & Day, 1965). This endeavor to build a “defense in depth” strategy by placing three perimeters around the president marked the first stages of the modern security bubble. The Army installed anti-aircraft guns on top of the Treasury building and four additional anti-aircraft batteries were put on the East and West porticoes of the White House. The Service built a stronger, heavier, and higher iron fence around the White House, and the military erected a host of lookout booths for soldiers and the White House Police. The Service attempted to use a new electronic signal system to detect movements around the White House Grounds and a rudimentary electric device that detected guns, knives, and other metal weapons. Both of these systems proved to be impractical, especially the electronic signal system as birds would set off the alarm.

Reilly (1947) also petitioned the District of Columbia Commissioners to close East and West Executive Avenues to traffic. According to Reilly, the bombing outside the Morgan building in the 1920s that killed 30 people provided enough justification for closing down the streets. An attack like this could easily be replicated. Because of his fear of bombs, Reilly also moved the mail and packing room from the White House garage to a location several blocks away. Agents relied on a bomb carrier to dismantle and check suspicious packages, often driving out to the woods in Virginia to pull packages apart. A detail of fire fighters also was stationed between the Treasury building and White House to extinguish any fires that might be caused by bombs.

To further protect the White House from bombs, the Service started to think in terms of bunkers. A hardened shelter that could eliminate visibility from the inside and outside allowed the Service close to absolute protection. The first rudimentary bunker used by the Service was in
one of the vaults in the Treasury Department. It served as a temporary bomb shelter while a new one was built in the basement of the White House. In the meantime, a tunnel between the White House and the Treasury was constructed to ensure safe passage. FDR initially was immediately against the idea of building a bomb shelter at the White House, but according to Tully “Morgenthau and the Secret Service were insistent” and the president conceded (1949, p. 259). Wilson also ordered a complete blackout of the White House. All windows were to be draped with heavy black cloth and all lights and flashlights were to be equipped with blue bulbs. Skylights and bathroom windows were painted black

In devising White House security, Wilson drew up a 50 page report outlining security measures that he felt needed to be included (Seale, 1986). However, FDR became hesitant about the extensive security measures that were already in the works. Wilson recommended machine gun nests to be posted around the White House, the erecting of a 15 foot sandbag wall around the White House, the call for guards to patrol the top of the White House, the construction of steel curtains in the Oval Office, the installation of bullet-proof glass, and the painting of the White House to camouflage it. The report did yield that the White House was structurally unsound and it was vulnerable to a fire. Most, if not all of these measures, were rejected by FDR as being extravagant, except for the installation of some bullet proof windows. Eleanor mentioned that her husband did not like the security precautions, especially the prohibition of visitors from seeing the White House. It sent the wrong message in a democratic society to be converting the White House into a quasi-fortress. Despite FDR’s hesitancy, Seale noted that “wartime security was strict” (Seale, 1986, p. 977). Although the Service was not able to implement all of its security measures, it was able to overcome FDR’s resistance and establish a cloak of darkness around the White House. In furthering the myth of the power of the Service, the New York Times
reported that the Wartime White House security was operated by the Service that could “give orders even to the President” ("America’s Effort," 1941, December 21).

**Presidential Protection Outside of Washington**

As the White House turned into a fortress, the Service also had to devise a moving fortress. The quality of White House protection was needed to protect the president when he traveled. This moving security bubble marked by the panoptic philosophy encompassed cars, trains, boats, planes, retreats, and temporary living quarters. Although agents extensively increased the protective apparatus outside the White House before the war, the Service escalated it to a different level during the war as FDR had to travel to dangerous locations. To rectify this gap in security, the Service needed to cloak the president’s vehicles in armor. Before the war, Roosevelt and previous presidents often rode in an unarmored car with the top down. This was the exact situation that Roosevelt faced when he was attacked in Miami. And for Reilly, the slow motorcade ride is the most dangerous aspect of protection as the president is exposed and completely vulnerable. Agents would reduce this danger by standing on running boards equipped to the president’s car or running alongside him, having a back-up car loaded with agents, and relying on local police to manage the crowds. The Service had learned from previous assassination attempts.

Even with these security conditions, the Service also had to be aware of creating a proper presidential image. It was one of the functions of the bubble to be concerned with image management. This function became more pounced because of FDR’s disability, which required agents to constantly think of ways to display and present the POTUS as a normal and healthy individual. In the case of FDR, the Service built handrails everywhere he went in order to project an image of being presidential. There was never a case where the Service would put the
image of the POTUS in a wheelchair; he would walk off the train and get out of the car on his feet. Reilly pointed out that these measures were so effective that the people never picked up on his handicap (1947, p. 227).

In protecting the president on wheels, the Service had major problems with FDR’s fleet of cars. The cars had no protective features during most of the 1930s. In response to this, the Service used Al Capone’s confiscated armor car once the war started. It was enclosed, large, and had bullet-proof windows (F. J. Wilson & Day, 1965). Because the body of the car was still susceptible to gunfire, the Service asked Ford Motor Company to renovate a car for the POTUS that would be able to repel a legitimate attack. The new “Sunshine Special” was reassembled to include armor that could stop a 50-caliber machine gun fire, a two-way radio system, a gun rack, and a siren (Siuru & Stewart, 1995).

In protecting the president on the road, the Service relied on a few plays to coordinate protection around the president. According to Reilly, the call of Position One was for agents to jog alongside the president, while Position Two was a command for agents to use the running boards and for the president’s car to speed up. If one player was out of rotation or needed to handle a threat, another agent would fill his position to prevent any gaps from forming. In guarding the president on wheels, there “were two inviolate rules” (Reilly & Slocum, 1947, p. 24). First, the agent running alongside the president should never leave the president’s side regardless of what happens. Second, the response of all agents during an attack was to sacrifice their bodies for the body of the POTUS. They were expected to get as many bodies between the president and the crowd as “flesh stops bullets—if there is enough of it” (Reilly & Slocum, 1947, p. 24).
Another primary rule for protection on the street was never to stop and maintain a healthy level of speed. Chief Wilson ordered that the motorcade sustain a minimum speed of 10 m.p.h. regardless of the conditions on the road as “a slow, parade-paced car is an easy target” (1965, p. 168). Robert Nixon, a White House correspondent, observed that agents always placed people “in such a position around and near the President that if there was any attempt made on his life, that we probably would absorb the bullets rather than the President being struck” (R. G. Nixon, 1970, November 5). FDR’s open car required agents to put people who were not agents in front of the president to act as shields. Another interesting note is that the agents did not drive FDR around town, even during the war years. The Army had someone assigned to chauffeur the president around. However, this practice stopped when Sergeant Schnider, Roosevelt’s driver, got intoxicated. After this incident, Agent Boring reported that “they decided that they were going to have an agent drive,” which happened to be him (1988, September 21, p. 6).74 However, the Secret Service agents were not trained in evasive maneuvering or how to control the car in case of an attack, which would prove to be deadly.

The next presidential vehicle that had to be equipped with armor was the presidential train. Reilly asked the Pullman Company to build a new car that would have bullet proof windows and armored steel. According to Reilly, the president’s new train was “impervious to projectiles short of cannon fire, and to dynamite charges placed on the roadbed” (1947, p. 33). The Service also had the Pullman Company erase any markers that identified the president. Before the war, the president’s train usually had the title of POTUS on his cars (Roberts, 1991). The president’s train was quite the spectacle as it was the most dominant form of transportation for presidents until Roosevelt and Truman. The Service decided that it would no longer use

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74 The agent who sits next to the driver is called the front-seater. This agent’s primary responsibility is to carry “the speeches and stuff like that” (Boring, 1988, September 21, p. 7).
Union Station to transport the president to the train or rely on police escorts in order to avoid the
fanfare of presidential travel. Secrecy of movement was of the highest concern. Agents snuck
the president out of the White House by taking him to a loading zone at the basement of the
Bureau of Engraving and Printing. To enhance security even further, the presidential train was
preceded by a pilot train that would set off any bombs that were planted. On top of that, Agent
Youngblood noted that “the entire route was carefully checked by railroad inspectors and Secret
Service agents, with special attention to switches, underpasses, bridges, and tunnels” (1973, p.
32). Because of the demand of protecting the president on the road, especially by train,
Youngblood reported that “all this resulted in a great drain on the White House detail” (1973, p.
32).

The spectacle of presidential travel had to be significantly reduced as security measures
took over the need to present the president in an open and accessible manner. However, the
reliance on such extensive security measures actually increased presidential presence. The
spectacle was reinforced by a massive security detail that symbolized the presidential presence.
Wilson noted that thousands of soldiers accompanied the White House Detail in securing the
president (1965). They guarded the routes, checked the railroad track, and were used as crowd
control. The presence of soldiers in uniform and agents in suits would create a certain feeling of
presidential attendance. Reilly reported that a usual presidential trip included the ordinary
Pullman berth car, the president’s private car, the Secret Service car, a compartment car for
reporters, and a club car for drinks and poker; the train also had to carry the Secret Service
automobiles and the communications car. However, the movements of the POTUS during the
war were cloaked by the press. The media agreed not to report on the president’s domestic
movements (Reilly & Slocum, 1947). With this shroud of secrecy, Reilly commented that
reporters “made the job of protecting the President in wartime much easier” (1947, p. 29).

However, this secrecy only pertained to advance notice of where the president was going and his departures and arrival times (F. J. Wilson & Day, 1965). The press freely reported on what the POTUS did on a daily basis.

The most important aspect of secrecy and presidential movement had to deal with FDR’s overseas trips to Casablanca, Cairo, Malta, and Yalta. The advent of plane travel was just another dimension in presidential security. After Roosevelt’s famous trip to Casablanca, Project 51 was established to build the president a new airplane. Again, security measures came to the forefront. Douglas Aircraft Company was going to rely on airports to use their wheelchair ramps, but “this would be a dead giveaway that FDR would be using a particular airfield (Siuru & Stewart, 1995, p. 140). They installed a battery-operated elevator for FDR and one large bullet proof window in the front of plane. This new plane was dubbed the “Sacred Cow” and FDR was given the codename “Sawbuck” to conceal his identity. Although the reliance on plane travel was dangerous, the Service did everything it could to shield the president’s travel plans.

To remove himself from the pressures of the war, Roosevelt created a presidential retreat outside of Washington in 1942, which he called Shangri-la. This Naval institution was concealed in the Catoctin Mountains and provided the perfect distance from Washington. Reilly commented that Shangri-La met the Service’s requirement of providing FDR a “secure home” away from the White House (1947). With the Marines and the Service, security was established. In fact, this presidential resort in many ways was based on White House security. It was isolated, distant from the people, and sought to give the president privacy. The quality of presidential security and its attributes was transported to this small base that no one could see or visit.
The act of creating a secluded place outside of Washington reflected in so many ways how security had evolved during FDR’s administration. Before and during the war, the Service created an extensive machine that expanded the protective detail around the POTUS and created new techniques to identify and track enemies of the state. The development of the security bubble added to the esteem of the president’s public body and the ability to hide his private body. The inclusion of the military, the reliance on additional agents, and use of modern technology created a more comprehensive and impressive spectacle. As the president left the confines of the White House, he was still surrounded with a horde of agents that planned every movement and place the POTUS would attend. The Service would watch him and replicate zones of protection. Within these secured locations, the president was free to live his life without some interference from the press or the American public. He was isolated to such an extent that the Service was able to facilitate and hide his personal adventures with Lucy Rutherford and Missy. LeHand. The protective relationship between protector and protectee only deepened.

Conclusion

With these new administrative practices implemented by Chief Wilson, the Service illuminated and defined a certain knowledge of what it meant to protect the POTUS. The logic of treating the White House as a prison became the norm. Principles of inspection, surveillance, access, and proximity became entrenched. The Service left the horse-and-buggy era behind and embraced new, modern, and invasive techniques to protect the president. This transformation of security was evident as Winston Churchill had a hard time dealing with the Service and its commands. Chief Wilson and Agent Reilly both commented that the English did not have rigorous methods of protection and were not used to the constant presence and power of agents to direct and command (Reilly & Slocum, 1947; F. J. Wilson & Day, 1965). Even though FDR
partially resisted what the Service did, the meaning of how to protect the president in terms of identifying potential threats, separating the president from the people, using modern technology, and relying on more agents became solidified. The creation of what it meant to protect the president involved a complex process of haggling, arguing, and a clash of wills.

After the war, however, protection would change and the bubble would slightly be deflated. Wilson admitted that protective procedures had to be modified due to the changes in context and a new president (F. J. Wilson & Day, 1965). Enemies of the state no longer posed the same threat and the next president would not be so easily confined. Even with these adjustments, the Service had still not created a milieu of danger where it could control the president’s every step in public. In fact, protection was still fairly basic despite Wilson’s dramatic changes to administrative practices. FDR continued to ride in his car with the top down, did not want the White House to become too secluded, and would not capitulate to an isolated state. The president still had to appear as being of the people.

The Rebellion of Harry S Truman

The next president would perhaps be the most difficult to protect since Theodore Roosevelt. Harry S Truman was his own person in so many ways. During his term of office, Truman would deny, resist, and then embrace and legitimize presidential protection. This journey of Truman’s refusal to adhere to Secret Service protocol in the beginning of his presidency to his reluctant acceptance of protection at the end mirrors perfectly the development of security as a nascent principle where it could be resisted to a fully mature and robust one where protection commands attention. The entity known as the United States Secret Service would no longer be a foreign principle to the American regime as its logic and practice would be accepted. Under this new administration, the Service would face a huge force of resistance
embodied in Truman and another assassination attempt that nearly succeeded. Once again, the security bubble seemed to adequately defend the POTUS against threats to his public body.

**Resisting the Bubble**

With the wartime Secret Service still at relative full power, it was still not ready for the energetic new president. The first day in the White House Truman woke up at dawn and walked right outside without his protective detail. It took the White House Police to make an urgent call to the Secret Service office to inform them that the president had the left the premises and that he was accompanied by only one agent. He was down 15th street before agents at full sprint were able to catch up to him. For Secret Service Chief U.E. Baughman, this situation was “without precedent in recent Secret Service history, for we always saw to it that a minimum of four men accompanied the President whenever he was outside the White House” (1963, p. 65). These routine and habitual morning walks posed a significant security dilemma for the Service. The agency did not have the power or the wherewithal to prevent Truman from taking these walks. However, they were extremely dangerous because of the routine and route of these walks. Any deranged person or organized group could plan an attack based on Truman’s walking schedule or just wait outside the White House for Truman to appear. Furthermore, Baughman noted that Truman presented a slow-moving target for an assassin with a high-powered rifle or a possible drive-by shooting.

The ineptitude of the Service during the first few days of Truman’s stay at the White House might have been a result of political turmoil within the Secret Service. Eben A. Ayers, White House press officer, divulged in his diaries about the successful attempt to remove Michael Reilly as head of the White House detail and replace him with George Drescher (1991). The plot was supposedly orchestrated by Chief Wilson who had a deep distaste for FDR and
wanted to remove people who were loyal to him, which meant the majority of the White House Detail. Agent Floyd M. Boring also mentioned the movement of Chief Wilson to “remove all the agents from the White House Detail” (Boring, 1988, September 21, p. 5). Reilly told Ayers that Drescher and his people were not “suitable for the important and responsible job of guarding the life of the president” as “they are, in many cases, obviously inexperienced and know little of what to do” (1991, p. 35). Drescher was not the type of agent who should be positioned next to the president as he was a “big, somewhat rough, individual, far from the gentlemanly type of Reilly” (Ayers, 1991, p. 35).

Despite the turmoil within the Service of who should protect the POTUS, the Service never developed a contingency plan to handle these predictable situations when Truman decided to leave without informing anybody. Truman was notorious for leaving the White House at any given moment to deliver a letter, to go to the bank, or to run an errand. Philleo Nash, administrative assistant to the president, recounted one story about Truman’s desire to get outside and deliver a letter (1966, August 19). Without giving any advance notice to his detail, he just walked downstairs, opened the front door at the Blair House, and told the agents that he was leaving and needed a stamp. Agents rushed around the Blair House until they found one and then had to immediately follow Truman wherever he was going. Resulting from the suddenness of his escape, agents left the Blair House completely unprotected.

In another instance, Wilson noted that one time Truman needed to do some personal banking and left the White House without any of his agents (1965). This slip was soon discovered and agents found him before he had finished his business with the bank. This probably had to do with the fact that “an immense crowd swarmed around him” as he caused “a monumental traffic jam, plus a mob in which women and children might have easily have been
trampled” (M. Truman, 1973, p. 228). The Service called in the Metropolitan Police to help manage the situation. This was the last time Truman went to the bank solo.

When Truman did leave the White House with agents, his security detail was minimalist in nature. He would have one agent to his right, usually the head of the White House Detail James Rowley, and two agents about 10 feet behind the president (Tames, 1980, June 11). George Tames, White House reporter, observed that “nobody thought anything” of having such a small security bubble encapsulate the president (1980, June 11, p. 62). It was absolutely normal to see the president accessible to the people with a few agents to ensure his safety. The *New York Times* reported that he took an eight block walk to church with only two other agents accompanying him ("Truman attends church," 1946, August 12). However, the Service did not like Truman’s flippant attitude toward protection. White House correspondent Carleton Kent said that the “Secret Service was always a bit unhappy about the carefree way that he liked to walk around” (1970, December 21, p. 10); he was difficult to confine to one space. The panoptic philosophy established by the Service during the war years with FDR was being effectively challenged and resisted. The observed would not yield to the commands of the observers.

The inability to confine its principal was only enhanced by the drastic cut of Secret Service resources and a president who was diffident about the idea of protection. Agents Bowen and Neal reported that appropriations were reduced and more than 150 agents were let go (1961). By 1949, the Service had an appropriation budget of $1.7 million and it only had 342 agents and clerks (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury and Post Office Departments Appropriation Bill, 1949). The only remaining piece of White House Fortress that remained enact was the White House Police. It was able to maintain its numbers around 110 guards (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury and Post Office Departments Appropriation Bill, 1949). This drop in resources precluded the
ability of the Service to maintain the same level of presidential protection it had obtained during
the war.

This was only compounded by the fact that Truman did believe in or really accept the idea of protection. The moment he became president he realized that things had changed for him and Bess. The bubble created a level of discomfort that he was not used to handling. By its very nature, the bubble confined and controlled his movement. It put him in an isolated dome of protection secured by layers of protection. The constant watching and filtering by agents were overwhelming for him and his family. He confessed that agents were considerate and helpful, but he “couldn’t help feeling uncomfortable” (1955, p. 27). He was trapped by an overarching structure that confined his movements. He noted, “There was no escaping the fact that my privacy and personal freedom were to be greatly restricted” (1955, p. 27). He complained that his friends could no longer just drop in. They had to be identified, checked, and ensured that they posed no threat to the president; most needed a pass to see him. And, he could no longer go anywhere without 10 agents and 20 policemen accompanying him (McCullough, 1992, p. 361). This spectacle of security led Truman to describe the production of leaving the White House as a circus and living in the White House as finest jail in the world ("Truman Calls the White House ‘The Finest Jail in the World," 1947, September 26; Truman’s Guards ‘Improvise,'" 1946, April 14). Truman’s Secretary of Treasury John W. Snyder said that most presidents, especially Truman, felt that “they are caged animals” living under the constant surveillance of the Secret Service (1969, April 2, p. 1336). The atmosphere of a circus and the restraints of a prison was a significant burden for Truman, but it was one that he accepted. The Service was becoming more successful and effective in confining POTUS.
To alleviate the pressure, personal friend Bud Porter retold a story about how “he would joke about how the Secret Service was watching closely, and how they would go in and check the toilets before he could use them and this sort of thing” (1975, December 29, p. 36). For Truman, security seemed excessive. This is one of the reasons why he refused to allow the Service to drive him from his temporary residence in the Blair House to his office in the White House. It was silly to create a huge circus when he just needed to walk across the street. Grover Ensley, an economic advisor to Truman, recalled that he “said he didn't see any point in having a great big entourage and a bunch of limousines to take him across the street to lunch” (1977, October 7). He was insistent and refused to allow the Service to provide him extensive security when he routinely and predictably left the White House on a daily basis. The Service tried to increase security on these walks between Blair and the White House by fixing the lights to turn red so the president could make his way across the street. Truman was not happy with this and waited his turn like everyone else. The Service was told not to do this again. However, every time he had to stop and wait for the light a huge crowd would gather around him and he would cause a traffic jam. He reluctantly allowed the Service to fix the lights so he could make an uninterrupted walk to the White House without causing any trouble (M. Truman, 1973).

Truman believed “the whole thing was a little ridiculous” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963, p. 66). His daughter Margaret shared the same sentiments. For a young woman in New York City who was trying to build a music career and date, she had a tough time with the confining aspects of the bubble. Chief Baughman noted that “she said we’d interfered with her personal life and probably prevented her from getting married while her father was President” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963, p. 78). This was one of the occupational hazards of having an armed guard constantly with the First Daughter, even outside her bedroom door. The chief concurred that it
must have been hard on her. Although agents respected her privacy, they had to comport to professional standards and not let her out of their sight. Just like her father, she had to be disciplined and watched on a constant basis. The impact of the bubble on a young adult was clear and immediate. It was too much for her to handle as it was a crushing force on her personal life.

However, this relation between the First Family and the Secret Service did not carry over to how the president treated agents. Treasury Secretary Snyder noted that “Mr. Truman was very considerate of the Secret Service” (1969, April 2, p. 1337). He constantly talked to agents, asked about their lives, and was genuinely interested in them. Agent Boring recalled that Truman knew all the agents by name and often talked to them (1988, September 21). When Boring started to drive Truman around, the president immediately asked who he was and asked him if he could call him by his first name. When Boring’s wife had a baby, Truman had the Secret Service drive him to the hospital to see how the new family was doing (McCullough, 1992, p. 808).

Agent Rex Scouten who accompanied Truman on his daily walks said that Truman “talked nearly the whole time as we walked” about the Army, the Civil War, and being raised in Missouri. He had an affinity with his agents; Scouten said, “He would treat us almost like sons” (McCullough, 1992, p. 808). He once told his daughter that “I like them more than all the top-notchers” (McCullough, 1992, p. 808). The feeling for Truman was reciprocal, even though the Service was often frustrated with him for not taking security more seriously. The Chief Baughman once said that “one would have to go back to Lincoln to find Truman’s equal as a person” (1963, p. 68).

Screens and Image of POTUS
The substance behind Truman as a person, however, did not stop the Secret Service from constructing screens of power to shield and show a particular image of the POTUS. Like previous chief executives, Truman relied on his protective detail to hide embarrassing details about personal matters, which might impact his image in a negative manner, and show positive attributes of his public image. In particular, the protective detail was concerned with how the media reported and interacted with the First Family. Its job was to control and manage information. Margaret Truman went to Paris and caused an uproar. She went to a “typical French girlie show” and was photographed by a member of the press. The agents “guarding Margaret felt that the better part of wisdom was to ask the photographer for the film” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963, p. 80). The agents were able to get the film, which then caused a huge ruckus in France over violating basic freedoms and liberties. The Service was utterly shocked with the response of the European press.

The same thing happened in Stockholm with Margaret. Agents prevented members of the press from taking pictures of her at the Town Hall, which caused even a bigger firestorm than the Paris disaster (Baughman & Robinson, 1963). In these European accounts, “Secret Service men had shoved the photographer, threatened to knock him unconscious, blocked the doorway of the town hall and decided who could or could not enter the building” (Dorman, 1967, p. 159). The protective detail was just accustomed to providing a greater degree of privacy for the president and his family than was the norm in Europe.

This was clearly the case when the White House decided to use the Service to seize pictures of Truman swimming on the beach during his vacation in Key West. White House press secretary Charles Ross justified the seizure because he said, “I was afraid taking pictures of the President on the beach might make the secret service job of protecting the President more
difficult by publicly locating the beach. Also, it seemed to me to be a totally unauthorized invasion of the President’s privacy ("White House Seizes Films of President," 1949, March 15). Reporters handed over the film and the negatives to the head of the White House Detail, James Rowley. After this situation, the White House imposed total censorship on the media while he was on vacation at the beach (Leviero, 1949, March 15). Keeping stuff out of the news was a normal part of protecting the POTUS and reporters had to comply with the dictates of security.

The Service also sought to build the image of the POTUS, especially on the road. Truman often referred to his moving security bubble as a circus. There needed to be flare, spectacular views, extraordinary movements, and an overwhelming feeling of being in the presence of something great. And, this is what the Service did. It built a circus. Presidential motorcades to presidential trains to presidential greeting parties to presidential crowds were all designed to show the magnificence of the public body of the president. To add luster to the presidential entrance, the Service ensured that the president’s train had the label of POTUS outside the president’s car. Although this practice was temporarily discontinued during World War II, the Service quickly resumed the practice. With Truman’s reliance on train travel to campaign, the Service sought to maximize the presence of the POTUS by cleverly linking the Office of the President with the person of the president. This strategy would be carried over into other aspects of presidential publicity with the help of the White House Detail. Leonard Reinsch, radio advisor to the president, came with a similar technique. He said, “When he

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75 This is not to say that Truman liked the circus atmosphere that was created for his presence. He would rather have avoided it and he often did. Dennison recalled a story about Truman wanting to avoid the spectacle while General Marshall gravitated toward it. On his way back from the Capitol after paying respect for General Pershing’s body, a motorcycle cop from General Marshall’s motorcade pulled in front of the president’s limo because it failed to yield. After realizing who he had pulled over, the police officer “turned around and got on his motorcycle and got the hell out of there” (Dennison, 1971, November 2, p. 166). Marshall apologized to Truman about the incident at the White House. Truman responded by saying, “Well, George, this will teach you a lesson, something I’ve been trying to get across to you, never have a motorcycle escort if you can help it” (Dennison, 1971, November 2, p. 166).
became President I had the Secret Service develop what is now a common practice -- the Presidential seal to be placed in front of him -- because I wanted the identity of Truman as President of the United States to catch the eye as well as the ear” (1967, March 13, pp. 38-39). It was a simple media strategy to persuade by using sight and sound, something the Service had been doing for quite some time. With these functions, the two primary missions for the Service on the road were to protect and present.

The Three Perimeter Philosophy

These functions would be transferred to how the POTUS was secured in his home and on the road. The ability to protect Truman at the beach, on the road, in a banquet hall, or in the White House consisted of strategy Chief Baughman called “defense in depth” (1963, p. 86). This security logic consisted of forming three concentric circles around the POTUS with the outer layer being the thinnest and the inner layer the thickest. A potential attacker would have to infiltrate and defeat each layer of security before he or she could attack the president. The outer ring consisted of the White House Police who guarded the White House grounds or Secret Service agents who were stationed at exits or vulnerable points of access when the president was at a speaking engagement. These security officials usually were just equipped with a sidearm. The middle ring of security was concerned with watching stairwells, hallways, or other places close to the president. These bodyguards were also equipped with just a sidearm, but had easy access to Tommy guns and other high-powered weapons in order to stop an assault. The final and inner layer of security was agents who were assigned the responsibility of staying in close proximity to the president. They served as mobile armor to the president’s body. Again, these agents only carried sidearms. The point of devising a security plan around three layers of
defense allowed the Service to keep “every means of approach to the President under surveillance” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963, p. 87).

These perimeters not only just provided walls of protection, but also confined the president to move only within these circles. It was the Service that decided where the president should go, where he should stay, and what routes he had to follow. Truman noted, “The President of the United can never escape being a public figure, and when he travels, Secret Service agents travel ahead of him to inspect the route that he will follow, the vehicles he is to use, and the buildings he intends to enter” (1955, p. 333). In particular, Truman found that the Service had much more power over his movements away from the White House.

The moving security fortress confined Truman to certain limited actions that he was not under while he lived in Washington. The finest prison in the world traveled with Truman whether he liked it or not. When Truman went swimming at Key West, the Service “had carefully marked off the spot where Mr. Truman and the White House party were going to swim” (1970, December 21, p. 78). Agents created an outer perimeter and reinforced it by stationing agents to guard it and rowboats to further enhance it. Truman was not allowed to breach the perimeters. When he was campaigning in Newark, New Jersey, the Service informed local political figures that the overhead fireworks had to be set-off before the President would arrive in his car. They broke their promises and set off the overhead fireworks as Truman rode down in the street in an open car. Baughman reported, “Sparks showered down upon the President. Mrs. Truman’s touring car was directly behind the President’s. The sparks fell on her too, singeing her fur jacket and falling upon her hat” (1963, p. 71) Chief Baughman ordered the motorcade stopped until all overhead fireworks stationed along the motorcade route be set off. Baughman noted that Truman “was for continuing but this time I put my foot down” (1963, p.
In another situation, Truman was supposed to stand in a receiving line at House Speaker Sam Rayburn’s house. However, the Service would not allow the president to stand in any receiving line until they had received the name of every guest that would be at the party (McCullough, 1992, p. 678).

At home, the Service had additional complications in protecting the POTUS, especially because Truman stayed at the Blair House while the White House was being renovated. The Blair House was not as secure as the Executive Mansion, which was afforded a certain degree of natural protection because of its distance from the street. The Blair House had no such advantages; it was a mere 10 feet to the sidewalk, and it had only a picket-fence to stop intruders from entering the grounds. David H. Stowe, administrative assistant to the president, noted that the Service became apprehensive about the security flaws at the Blair House (1989, June 24). Agents were concerned that someone could throw a Molotov cocktail, a grenade, or a bomb through a window. With ten feet of distance between the house and the sidewalk, anyone could shoot or throw something into the Blair House with relative accuracy. There was also a potential security problem concerning a long-range shooter. Angles from atop an office building and the Old State building provided easy access for a sniper.

These security problems were amplified because of the increased number of threatening letters being sent to Truman and the visible increase in the number of armed crazies attempting to penetrate security at the White House and the Blair House. Chief Baughman said the “present force is inadequate” and called the situation an “emergency” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury and Post Office Departments Appropriation Bill, 1950, p. 845). To prove his point of the dire necessity of revamped protection, he pointed out that PRS had a total 50,000 names in its files and 99% of them had some type of mental disorder (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury and Post
Office Departments Appropriation Bill, 1950). In order to keep up with protection and the investigations of these cases, the Chief asked for at least 20 additional agents and 3 clerks. These additional agents would be employed with the White House Detail and the PRS.

The Service also started to enhance security by fortifying the Blair House. Agents really began to experiment with how to beef up protection, especially on the first floor. There was talk of installing bullet-proof glass, but it was too heavy for the house. Agents agreed that they would install an iron curtain or a heavy screen that was used in psychiatric ward that repel bullets. Stowe vetoed this security precaution because the press would have a field day talking about how the Service has the POTUS behind psychiatric screens. Even with this danger and Service’s consideration of how the Blair House might be attacked, protection was still lax. Nixon observed that security was porous when it came to loading and unloading the president in his car outside of the Blair House. Agents would park the car in the front driveway, stop foot traffic, and have Truman walked to the car in view of the public. Nixon said, “There were always a couple of Secret Service men on guard there, but that was the only precaution” (1970, November 5). He was completely vulnerable as he left and entered the Blair House.

The Blair House Shoot-Out

The negligence of security in and around Blair House would be exposed by two Puerto Ricans partisans, who would use a clever plan by irregular means to try to eliminate the president. On November 1, 1950, Griselio Torresola and Oscar Collazo would not only expose the flaws of the Blair House security arrangements, but also show the inadequacy of the protective measures around the POTUS. Despite the poor strategic layout of presidential security, the agents involved were disciplined, responded in a timely fashion, and were willing to use their flesh as body armor; their quick response and one major mistake by Collazo saved
Truman’s life that afternoon. Torresola and Collazo setup a basic plan to infiltrate and kill the president by relying on a “stunning blast of firepower, disorient and dis-coordinate the response, then hunt the president down in Blair” (S. Hunter & Bainbridge, 2005, p. 91). Walking in opposite directions down Pennsylvania Avenue Collazo was to come from the east and Torresola from the west. Torresola would neutralize the Western guardhouse by killing any guards stationed there, and Collazo would simultaneously eliminate the guard positioned at the front door of the Blair House. With this initial outburst of fire, Torresola would then kill the remaining guards coming from the east. In eliminating the outer ring, the plan was for Collazo to enter the Blair House and kill the remaining agents stationed inside, providing easy access to the president.

However, the plan failed to materialize. In the first second of the shootout, Collazo pulled his gun, fired, and there was a loud click. But nothing happened. It could have been a misfire, the gun perhaps jammed, or Collazo accidentally hit the safety. In trying to fix the gun, he accidentally fired and hit Agent Donald Birdzell in the knee. In quick response, Birdzell was able to limp away, pulled his gun, and started firing back. Two agents proceeded from the Eastern Guardhouse and started firing at Collazo, who was now vulnerable because of his failure to neutralize his first target. In the back and forth gun fire with no one hitting anyone, Collazo was finally dropped by a bullet.

Meanwhile, Torresola shot Private Leslie Coffelt three times in the chest and dropped him with this automatic handgun. With an open pathway, Torresola began his shooting spree, firing seven times and hitting his targets seven times ("Commission Exhibit 2549," 1964). After mortally wounding Coffelt, he turned and hit an unsuspecting Agent Joseph Down three times who was returning from the grocery store. He then ran to the Blair House lawn and fired and hit
Agent Birdzell’s other knee. As he reloaded, Coffelt with his remaining energy raised his revolver and ended “Torresola’s orgy of marksmanship” ("Commission Exhibit 2549," 1964, p. 776). During the shootout, two agents were stationed in the middle ring of security. In quick response, Agent Stewart Stout rushed to the locked cabinet, unlocked it, and pulled out the Tommy gun, loaded it, and then proceeded to the top of the stairs to wait for the assailants. He responded to the situation perfectly, but as Hunter and Bainbridge point out it took much time to unlock the cabinet, load the gun, and arrive at his position. White House aides yelled at him to go outside and help his partners, but he remained in his position. His duty was to protect and give his life to POTUS, not his fellow agents. Agent Vince Mroz, in contrast, left for the outer ring to help his partners in the on-going fight to save Truman’s life.

With six agents at the Blair House, Chief Baughman praised the response and heroic actions of the Secret Service, pointing out the “defense in depth” strategy worked. It saved Truman’s life. The outer ring was able to resist the initial attack. If it failed, Chief Baughman said that the middle ring was secured by Agent Stout with his Tommy machine gun waiting for the attackers to burst through the screen door. They would have “been faced with a hail of bullets from this representative of our second line of defense” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963, p. 91). Stout would be immortalized as the agent who stayed at his position to guard the president. His responsibility was not to the agents outside, but to the POTUS. He fulfilled his oath. Chief Baughman proudly proclaimed, “Stout would not be bullied or tempted. He would not yield to the invitation either to achieve glory or save his reputation for courage. To him his duty was clear. That was all there was to it. Stout’s refusal to move form his post was equaled that day only by Coffelt’s act of dying heroism” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963, pp. 91-92).
The media did not challenge this basic narrative after the shootout, assuming the Service’s defenses were impenetrable. Columnist Bill Henry for the *Los Angeles Times* claimed that “the would-be assassins never had a chance” (1950, November 3). Arthur Krock for the *New York Times* fell back on typical stereotypes and argued that “the plan they followed was framed in such ignorance as to suggest insanity” (Krock, 1950, November 2, p. 30). Although assassins armed with modern weapons do have a legitimate chance to kill the POTUS, Krock says that the “Secret Service is vigilant, and is in sufficient numbers to give the President all possible protection” (Krock, 1950, November 2, p. 30). *U.S. New World & Report* assumed that “it takes planning, cunning and a lot of luck to the shoot at President” as “chances of hitting him are almost nil” ("Presidents Better Guarded Now," 1950, November 10). In fact, the POTUS “is one of the best-protected men in history” ("Presidents Better Guarded Now," 1950, November 10).

With the heroic actions by its agents, the praise from the POTUS himself, and the media’s positive spin, the Service choose not to examine its protective apparatus. There was no questioning, examining of practices, or re-thinking how the president should be protected. Even as Nixon consciously recognized the security flaws at the Blair House. He pointed out that if “these Puerto Ricans waited another fifteen or twenty minutes, the President would have been coming down the front steps of Blair House to get into his car, a perfect target. They probably would have killed him” (1970, November 5). In fact, there were a number of ways that the president could have easily been dispatched. An assassin, with such a short distance between the pedestrian sidewalk and the Blair House, could have easily by-passed the three rings of security and thrown a few grenades inside the Blair House, or they could have waited for Truman in the morning and attacked him during his routine walk, or waited for him to leave the Blair House.
Hunter and Bainbridge (2005) also noted that the vaunted three rings of security devised by the Service was flawed. The outer perimeter was sturdy, but easily could have been defeated by Collazo and Torresola. With automatic weapons, the rate and volume of fire could have easily overwhelmed an outer security ring built on less supplicated weaponry. The middle ring of security was also negligible at best. By the time Stout arrived at his position with the Tommy gun, the gunfight was over. If the assailants had gotten through the front door in a timely-fasion, there would have been no security detail to prevent them from going up-stairs. In effect, there was no middle ring of security during the first minute of the fight. And finally, there was no inner security ring that protected the POTUS. No agent was posted to guard Truman outside his door while he slept. Security was non-existent at this level. According to Chief Baughman, the inner circle was supposed to be the thickest and most difficult to overcome. However, the Service failed to deploy agents in the inner circle in a routine fashion. In this situation, the outer ring of security was the only means of defense and it was manned by only four agents, two of whom were supposed to be dispatched in the first few seconds of the gun fight. They were serendipitously lucky that Joseph Down returned from the grocery store at the right moment to distract Torresola for a few brief seconds. Although he was shot three times, he provided the extra vital seconds that prevented Torresola, a crack-shot, from eliminating the other remaining guards. The middle ring had two agents, which was cut in half when Vroz left his station to enter the fray.

The structure of presidential security was not the only problem that surfaced during this attack. Although the agents performed with valor, their training was inadequate. They were trapped in Chief Wilson’s vision of how to fire a weapon. With the Service’s zealotry of having one of the best competitive pistol teams in the nation, it did not teach agents how to fire a gun
during a gunfight. According to Hunter and Bainbridge, it was amazing that the Service or anyone did not study “the 38.5 seconds of November 1 for their tactical revelations” (S. Hunter & Bainbridge, 2005, p. 317). They point out several lessons the Service could have extracted. The first lesson that should have been drawn from this experience was that training to shoot stationary targets is wholly inadequate in a gunfight. Agents need to learn how to move and fire in a chaotic and unpredictable environment. The second lesson that agents would have learned was to shoot two-handed according to Hunter and Bainbridge. The only person known to have used two hands to fire was the crack-shot Torresola. He connected seven out of seven times meanwhile Birdzell missed all five of his shots and Davidson probably was one for six. Although this point has merit, shooting with two hands is more of a necessity for semi-automatics; shooting with one hand works for revolvers. And, the final lesson was to equip agents with semi-automatic weapons. It was clear that overwhelmed agents with two automatic pistols; they were easier to load and handle on average. This is critical in a gunfight that lasts mere seconds. The bubble needed to be mechanized, fortified, and armed.

The Imprisonment of Harry S Truman

Even though the Service did not study its own protective procedures to produce new practices, it was able to introduce new meaning that confined Truman to a great extent because of the guilt he felt about the death of Coffelt. He was now obligated to conform to Secret Service dictates. The “Coffelt Effect” transformed the relation between protector and protectee. The Service assumed the highest order of protection by giving its life over to the president. The president would now be expected to reciprocate with the pledge to be obedient. This oath tied the two entities together and served as a major source of Secret Service power. Agents had the power to confine the POTUS because they had captured both his body and mind. Foucault noted
that this was the hallmark of power. The power to ensure compliance rested on controlling both bodily movements and mental thoughts. Agents had successfully controlled presidential movement by constructing artificial spaces that confined, but they also had simultaneously built mental bonds that captured.

With the sudden revelation that protection was a life and death game, Truman would now adhere to what the Secret Service wanted. He commented that he was “really a prisoner now” (McCullough, 1992, p. 813). He relented and embraced the practices of protection. He wrote in his diary a few days after the attack, in which he expressed his new predicament, “Because two crackpots or crazy men tried to shoot me a few days ago my good and efficient guards are nervous. So I’m trying to be as helpful as I can. Would like very much to take a walk this morning but the S.S. say that there are more crackpots around and the ‘Boss’ and Margie are worried about me—so I won’t take my usual walk. It’s hell to be President of the Great Most Power Nation on Earth—I’d rather be ‘first in the Iberian Village’” (Ferrell, 1980, p. 198). The confining of the POTUS as a prisoner to his office was reluctantly accepted by Truman, with the support of his guards, his wife, and his daughter. This conglomeration of forces now expected Truman to behave. The success and cost of protection was marked by the living body of the POTUS and the dead body of Agent Coffelt. During the dedicatory speech honoring Coffelt, Truman expressed his new outlook and acceptance of protection.

It brought home to me the fact that it is not the President who is in danger on occasions of this kind, but it is the men guard him. And I want to say to you that I have extremely cooperative with the guards since this event took place, and I shall continue to be just that way until I am through with this office. Not because I am afraid of being shot at--I have been shot at by experts-but I do not want to endanger the lives of the men who spend their lives guarding the President of the United States (1952).
The mutual contract of bodies for bodies was firmly entrenched. This oath of death empowered the Service to direct the living president.

With this oath sealed in blood, Truman changed. He would no longer walk the few hundred yards to the White House from the Blair House; he would have to take the limo to get to any place he wanted. In his farewell remarks to the nation, he commented,

The Secret Service wouldn't let me walk across the street, so I had to get in a car every morning to cross the street to the White House office, again at noon to go to the Blair House for lunch, again to go back to the office after lunch, and finally take an automobile at night to return to the Blair House. Fantastic, isn't it? But necessary, so my guards thought--and they are the bosses on such matters as that (1953).

As the bosses of the POTUS, the Service roped off the sidewalk between the Blair and Lee House and dismantled a street car stop directly across the street. Pedestrians were completely cut off from any access to the presidential residence. His interaction with the people would be severely restricted. The Service also sealed off West Executive Avenue to allow the President safer passage between the White House and the Executive Offices. And Truman’s infamous morning walks became less predictable as the Service would transport him somewhere in the city to walk. There was too much danger for the president to be taking habitual morning walks in routine areas. Agents took greater command in its ability to confine Truman’s movements.

Even more important was that Truman finally capitulated to the idea and practice of presidential security. Yet, he still had his moments of bravado as he felt that he could have handled the assailants if they made it to his bedroom. Presidential historian McCullough says that Truman “always imagined he might take care of any would-be assassin, as had Andrew Jackson” (1992, p. 813). After the attack, Truman remarked he “would have taken his gun away from him and shoved it in his gullet” (R. G. Nixon, 1970, November 5). Although he wanted to display his manliness to the broader public, the death of Coffelt had a dramatic impact on him.
Throughout the rest of his life he would often remark how bad he felt that someone gave his life for his. Truman would say, “Just think, a man gave his life for me” (Peters, 1963, August 8, p. 70). On top of that, Truman wrote that “the one who was killed was just cold bloodedly murdered before he could do anything” (McCullough, 1992, p. 813). Mize Peters, boyhood friend of Truman, observed that Coffelt’s sacrifice “affected him a great deal” (1963, August 8, p. 70).

With the recognition that a body of guards was the armor of the president, Congress permanently authorized the Secret Service to protect the POTUS and increased its resources so it could more aptly protect the president. The yearly appropriation bill that was rooted in the 1907 Sundry Civil Bill was no longer adequate. The Service needed to have permanent authorization to protect the POTUS; its mission was too important to be drawing its authority from an annual appropriation bill. On July 5, 1951, Truman signed Public Law 81-79 into law, which authorized the Secret Service to protect the POTUS. He remarked, “The work of protecting me has at last become legal.” In addition to this authority, the Service was also granted new powers to make it an official police organization. Agents could now legally carry firearms, execute warrants, and protect the Vice President of the Untied States at his request.

These changes in law were also reflected in the adjustments of the organizational operation of the Service. The Service requested a budget of $2.3 million for 1951 and $2.6 million for 1952 (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury and Post Office Departments Appropriation Bill, 1951). It also moved to expand the White House Police Force, not the White House detail after the attack on Truman. It requested an additional 36 guards to patrol the White House grounds and the Blair House, making the White House Police Force a formidable unit of 174 officers (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury and Post Office Departments Appropriation Bill,
1951). It did ask for more agents, but not for purposes to dramatically expand presidential protection; it needed to alleviate a backlog of counterfeiting cases partially caused by more agents being reassigned to the White House Detail. The Service sought to slightly increase presidential protection. The chief concern after the attack was to more effectively secure the president at home with White House guards and not increase protection on the road with additional agents. The outer perimeter of the defense in depth strategy needed to be reinforced.

Alongside these changes, Baughman had been also making management modifications. He implemented a system of inspection that was designed to ensure that agents were following the manual, sticking to the rules of the organization, and be given a chance to offer advice (Bowen & Neal, 1961). However, the most progressive idea that he instituted was the creation of a Management Committee to review Secret Service measures. Agents Bowen and Neal commented that the committee was designed to “make a continuing review of Secret Service activities, to evaluate suggestions from the field, and to act as his advisers in administering the affairs of the organization” (1961, p. 210). Even though this body would not analyze the Blair House attack with any depth or treat it like an object of study, it was a precursor to an organization that would begin to obsessively review all of its protective measures on a continual basis.

Even with these changes, the threat spectrum for the Secret Service still remained very narrow. Truman had been attacked because he represented the imperial order of the United States. Torresola and Collazo sought to kill the POTUS for Puerto Rico independence. However, the list of public enemies to the president still just focused on crazies and cranks. This was how Truman saw them. The crazy did not have control of his mental faculties and the crank still existed outside the mainstream. The head of the White House Detail James Rowley flatly
stated that the biggest threat to the president are “people that were mentally deranged,” for “you never knew what they were going to do” (1988, September 20). There was little consideration given to conventional enemies and partisans who had the support and resources from a well-funded organization. It was not official enemies like the Nazis or the Communists, but the crazies who roamed the streets and occasionally made their way to the White House steps. Nixon reaffirmed these sentiments, arguing that foreign powers do not assassinate each other’s leaders. World War I put a stop to that. He noted, “These Puerto Ricans were cranks. They were, of course, partisans of their cause. They wanted to obtain autonomy for Puerto Rico. But they weren't put up to that by any foreign power” (1970, November 5). Frank J. Wilson, Chief of the Secret Service 1937 to 1946, pointed out that “our assassin and would-be assassins have, in the main, been loners, not identified with any organized group” (1965, p. 213). In fact, the only organized attempt that terrorized the White House, he noted, was Theodore Roosevelt’s little boy Quentin and his Black Hand gang.

The primary threat to the POTUS was the crazy and crank who had no institutional support. Even though Collazo and Torresola were not mentally deranged, Chief Wilson put them under the rubric that the Service had already established. An attack on the president was the result of a distrusted mind that could not think entirely rationally; an attack could not and would not come from an organized group or an assassin with his or her mental faculties. The belief in a weak enemy with little rational faculties permitted the Service to build a bubble that was fragile and weak. The Service would endanger its mission to serve and protect with such proclamations about the nature of enemies and partisans.

On the final day of Truman’s presidency, he was happy to leave his guard behind and return to Missouri. Being an encaged animal in the finest prison of the world was not an easy
task for the 33rd president. But, he chose to accept the basic ethos of the Secret Service: security was more important than freedom. This trend started with Theodore Roosevelt and came to fruition under Truman. A president that ruled over a Constitutional republic had to be partially isolated from the people. Although it took a grievous situation for Truman to accept this, his final years in the White House consisted of him obeying commands by the White House detail. The hatred of a protective detail never ceased, but he learned to accept it for the safety of his agents and his own self-preservation.

Conclusion

The idea of presidential protection had evolved from an alien principle that was deemed un-American and un-Constitutional to a fully legitimized practice in the American polity. After the attempted assassination of President Truman, he willingly signed his own jail sentence. The “Coffelt Effect” pushed Truman to take protection serious. The oath of protection was affirmed with the death and wounding of agents at the steps of the Blair House. Truman was saved because members of the White House detail upheld their part of the oath. For them, the highest order of concern in the republic was to secure the president’s body, even with their own blood and bodies. With this act of service, the POTUS became increasingly tied to the *modus operandi* of the Service. The Service was bound to the president in a subordinate role, but was also granted a fair amount of latitude to command. Administrative subordination complemented administration discretion.

Furthermore, it was given full legal responsibility to protect his public and private body. With this congressional act, Congressman Wooten lost the battle to keep the idea of presidential protection subjugated; he had been losing it for over 50 years. Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Truman eventually accepted that protection was a necessary part of a democratic
regime. The president could no longer place an absolute trust in the people as they were the source of danger. Although the stigma of presidential protection was softened, it was never eliminated, even with the passage of Public Law 81-79. Wooten’s belief that a bodyguard represented the very epitome of tyranny could not be vanquished. Chief Wilson fully admitted that protection is difficult because of the “democratic dislike” for it (1965, p. 243). Truman was still accused of living like a king. Lawrence Burd of the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, a few weeks after the protection to guard the POTUS became official, wrote that Truman’s lifestyle far exceeded that of the monarchs in Europe (1951, July 20). His fleet of 10 luxurious Lincolns coupled with a host of bodyguards that kept watch over his family at all times seemed more kingly than presidential.

The POTUS was now a distinct entity who could stand alongside the monarchs of Europe. With pomp, prestige, and a certain type of protection, the Service was able to secure the public body of the president and hide his private body. The creation of barriers between the people and president allowed the Service to help in crafting a particular image of the president. Most notably, they did this by hiding and keeping secret who he is. The affairs, the awkward personality, the temper tantrums, the drinking, and the gambling were hidden from public purview. Some of these acts were facilitated by the Service itself. They would often go to great lengths in hiding abnormal behavior from the press, sneaking people through the backdoor, or arranging meetings. With the ability to protect the public and private body of the president, the Service was able to tie the president through the use of obligations and oaths. Machivalli was correct. The fickle nature of people could be partially overcome with oaths and obligations that stabilize and bring order. The exchange of benefits and costs during the presidencies of FDR
and Truman allowed the Service to gain further access to the president’s body and mind. At least at this time, the Service believed it had the means to protect the POTUS at all costs.

In developing this sense of security, the Service also created a new person to protect this new sovereign that emerged. The agent had been constituted to think and act in certain ways. As Foucault noted, people are constituted through a series of complex historical processes (1995). In Hacking’s terminology, the agent was “made up” to defend (1986). Starling described this life as “cold, suspicious, and secretive” (1946, p. 108). He questioned how it is possible for him “to write a letter full of feeling and love after living” this life (1946, p. 108). This type of life required one to make judgments of character; those snap decisions determine life or death. For an agent, it was almost always easier to fall on the side of danger. Chief Baughman called himself a “hand-wrinking prophet of doom” (1963, p. 67). Danger was all around for the agent. For Starling, it became a part of his nature to read “character by countenance, feature, and expression” (1946, p. 327). From these small details in life, he ascertained threats and then acted, regardless of the consequences for his own self-preservation. He did not ponder “whether the man himself deserved it I did not question; it was what he represented that was important” (1946, p. 38). And this symbol or this life was considered more valuable and important than another life; to accept and act upon that assumption was what made the Secret Service different.

Hunter and Bainbridge argue that society needs this type of person. Although there has been a “tendency of modern culture to devalue them—to find them crude and boorish and insensitive and political incorrect,” it requires them (2005, p. 319). People like Wilson, Boring, Starling, or Coffelt are needed in times when the would-be assassin tries to eliminate the POTUS. The Service scarifies their bodies as guards to a higher order of republican values.
To ensure that this does not happen often, this type of agent commanded the attention of the POTUS and this type of agency built a peculiar logic that demanded elected officials listen to the advice of their security detail. These administrators were able to build a security zone that Truman liked to call the finest prison in the world. The belief that the Service would command the POTUS was firmly entrenched in the Secret Service lore. Agents from Starling to Reilly to Wilson to Baughman all emphatically declared that a president would yield to their commands. Chief Baughman went so far to say that everybody must obey. He said, “Now the Chief of the Secret Service is legally empowered to countermand a decision made by anybody in this country if it might endanger the life or limb of the Chief Executive. This means I could veto a decision of the President himself if I decided it would be dangerous not to. The President of course knew this fact” (1963, p. 70). In approximately 50 years, the Service was able to develop its logic of presidential protection and gradually convince presidents to adhere to their advice. Although the system was far from perfect, the bars of the cage were solidly entrenched.
CHAPTER SIX

BUBBLE BUILDING:
MOVING THE SECRET SERVICE INTO THE MODERN AGE

The Secret Service had created a particular type of person to protect a particular type of
president. The fear-mongering and detailed oriented agent who swore to sacrifice a life for a life
had successfully stopped two assassinations attempts. The body of the nation had been secured
for more than 50 years without serious incident. It appeared that the Service’s protective
practices that had been built over an extensive amount of time were impenetrable. Enemies
ranging from cranks to crazies had been effectively rebuffed. Yet, these successes were built on
the illusion of a 19th century enemy who relied on knives and revolvers to kill. The Service was
fixated on securing close-quartered spaces to prevent a close-ranged attack. And, it did not even
do this very well as both FDR and Truman were totally alone and vulnerable during their
respective attacks. Although it vaguely understood the importance of a 20th century enemy who
could use bombs and rifles, it never institutionalized this meaning into practice. Organizational
routines rested on a particular type of knowledge that impeded the ability of the Service to
understand a new threat. This inertia was reinforced by an agency that never sought to study
close protection.

The Service had merely relied on the process of time to build protective practices. Yet,
Hobbes clearly recognized that the “art of well-building” rested on both time and industry (1968,
p. 378). The Service had perfected the first part to its determinant, but failed miserably to
consider the concept of industry in constructing the idea and practice of security. Machiavelli
warned that a wise prince must “never in peaceful times remain lazy, but capitalize on it with
industry, in order to be able to use it in adversity, so that, when fortune changes, it might find
him prepared to resist her” (1997, p. 56). The beginning of the second half of the 20th century
exposed that the Service had not capitalized on times of peace as presidential security was lax and loose. With the failure to protect, the myth of an agent as a commander of presidential movement collapsed. The Service would have to industriously rebuild the concept of protection after the winds of fortune dramatically changed. The agency was exposed as being dangerously incompetent. It had neither the knowledge nor the resources to secure the POTUS.

This chapter describes how the Service addressed the complexities of a new world order built on the premise of mutual assured destruction, the challenges of losing a president, and confronting massive internal turmoil that threatened the body of the POTUS anywhere in the United States. In the next thirty years between Eisenhower and Ford, the Service had to rethink and rebuild its method of protection. To make matters worse, the Service pivoted on an unstable foundation resulting from a lack of resources and legitimacy, which allowed presidents like Johnson and Ford to effectively resist protective measures by either ignoring protective advice or putting themselves in dangerous situations. As presidents made one attempt after another to unshackle themselves, the Service began to understand how to construct newer and tighter restraints that would set the stage of the president being permanently placed behind protective shields and screens. The Service started to become productive and industrious. It tied Foucault’s productive power with the industry and the art of well-building. What the Service realized was how new modes of truth emerge during pockets of uncertainty. It could help create a discourse of domination in a field of forces during uncertain times. It was at these moments that the Service understood that power is knowledge.

**Warriors & Mobility: The Cold War Problem**

President Dwight D. Eisenhower came to represent what the Anti-Federalist feared during the dawn of the republic: a “President-General” who had assumed control over the
National Command Authority. The president/general had assumed a unique position in a national order that had been rebuilding to address the threats of mutual assured destruction. Eisenhower’s predecessor had created the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defense in order to address new international threats. In this new nuclear order, the president would have his finger on the button to officially and ultimately decide who America’s enemies were. With the presidential emergency satchel at his side (or the nuclear football), the president was equipped with the power to destroy in order secure. He also needed the nuclear football as the president would no longer be confined to the Executive Mansion. The airplane like the Cold War would begin to transform the presidency.

With the nuclearization of the state and the emergence of rapid presidential travel, the Secret Service had to start reconsidering how to secure a mobile president in an age of mass destruction. The first step to fortify protection was to use mobilization as a source of security. The president received two helicopters in order to have a safe avenue for departing the White House with little complications. The Service and the White House Military Office would run evacuation drills that simulated enemy attacks. These choppers would also be used for the president’s personal comforts. These vehicles would transport the president to Camp David and the golf course. In addition to using helicopters as a form of security and pleasure, the White House Military Office continually upgraded the president’s plane from different iterations of the Lockheed Constellation to a Boeing 707 because they were larger, more secure, and had larger fuel tanks.

The second step to fortify protection was to occur at the White House. To secure the Executive Mansion, it had to be rebuilt. Even though the newly reconstructed White House was
finished during Truman’s last year, Secret Service Chief U.E. Baughman remarked that “the story of the elaborate security measures which were set up, gradually, for the New White House concerns the Eisenhowers” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963). The new Executive Mansion had been rebuilt with “a very deep foundation,” which made it “virtually indestructible” according to the Chief. The structure of the White House had become a bunker to protect the president from a nuclear strike. The bomb shelter that had been first built during World War II was fortified and reinforced. Outside the mansion, the Chief proclaimed that the president was protected by “a small army of hand-picked men” (1963, p. 128). This “standing guard” consisted of 154 White House Guards who patrolled the grounds of the White House. The strategic placement of these guards followed the same pattern as the White House Detail. They established a 3 shift rotation with a series of concentric series to force the enemy to penetrate each life of defense before it could reach the White House. Inside the White House, the Service had an elite force of 40 agents who comprised the mobile White House Detail. These agents followed and accompanied the POTUS anywhere he went.

The final step to rebuilding security was to reorganize the Service and develop and train more refined agents. Baughman redesigned the organizational apparatus of the Service to make it fit with his previous changes and to make the organization more streamlined. He created a deputy chief to help manage the organization, an assistant chief who was given jurisdiction over the White House Detail, the White House Police, and PRS, and a Chief Inspector who was given responsibility over investigations (Bowen & Neal, 1961). Although the Service was still fairly small, the Chief sought to follow former Chief Wilson’s actions by continually updating the Service.
And, one aspect that was in desperate need of change was its personnel. The Service needed an updated and modern agent to fit its image as being an elite body of corporal custodians. Although Chief Wilson took steps to modernize Secret Service personnel in the late 1930s, he still relied on recruiting “unsophisticated” athletes from the state police to fill out the White House Detail. These agents received no formal training and were required to have little educational experience. For Baughman, these types of personnel choices were too informal and immature for an agency with an elite status. When Starling appeared at the White House, he was provided with no formal training and was immediately asked to secure the president. During World War II, Floyd Boring, who had no formal training, was assigned to protect FDR’s children (S. Hunter & Bainbridge, 2005). The training that did exist merely consisted of a tour of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing and maybe a two-week stint at the Treasury training program. This type of agent and this type of training was no longer permissible.

The change in personnel, according to Hunter and Bainbridge, reflected two different realities. First, the Service had to fight off Hoover’s attempt to gain control over presidential protection. Hoover’s agents were not only college educated, but many of them had advance degrees. In order to compete, the Chief decided to replace his private dicks with college educated students. Second, Baughman also understood the importance of screens and image. The kind of agent the Service recruited from the ranks of state police did not adequately reflect the power of the POTUS. It needed agents who could help build that image. This was how Vincent Mroz was promoted to the White House Detail after being in the Chicago field office for a mere 8 months. Hunter and Bainbridge noted, “When the president visited Chicago and Vince stood next to him, people noticed Vince, his size, his bearing, his good looks. He was ‘discovered’ you might say, like a movie star” (p. 78). These trained, sophisticated, and
educated agents began to reflect and even capture the iconic status of the presidency. The public
dick was replaced with the image of a refined super agent: dark glasses, crisp suits, and a tough,
but refined façade.

This shift from drawing “its men, fully formed and well trained, from the ranks of
America’s state police” to the “would be slicker, college-educated, more presentable” agents
coincided with the establishment of the Service’s first training school in 1953 (S. Hunter &
Bainbridge, 2005, pp. 77-78). In supplementing the 6-week Treasury school that agents had to
attend, this school was a five week training program designed to teach agents about presidential
protection and counterfeiting (U.S. Congress, House, Treasury-Post Office Departments
Appropriation Bill, 1961). The Service also used more specialized classes they referred to as the
ABC schools. These one week courses were created to help agents learn about equipment that
could help them detect atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. Because of its short time span
and lack of resources, the Service also had to rely on-the-job-training. Chief Baughman pointed
out that they would often assign agents to the White House Detail for 30 days to determine “if
they are suitable for that type of work later, to see if they are diplomatic and have tact, and so
444). Overall, the Chief noted that agents spent more than 20 weeks in school during their first 2
to 3 years in the Service. Even though this training was still rudimentary, this new school would
become critical in institutionalizing knowledge and creating new meaning related to presidential
security.

In trying to secure the White House, the Service also had a huge problem in dealing with
a mobile president who could travel domestically and internationally. Although Truman
occasional used the presidential plane to travel, Eisenhower transformed the office by using
Columbine II, Columbine III, and a Boeing 707 to directly connect with the people. Presidential pilot Ralph Albertazzie noted that “Eisenhower logged an average of 30,000 miles and one hundred hours a year aboard Columbine III” (Horst & Albertazzie). Baughman reported to Congress that the Service had accompanied the president on his trips to Italy, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Iran, Greece, Tunisia, France, Spain, and Morocco and were soon to provide for protection in France and Japan. This change in travel also changed the Secret Service as it taxed its budgets and personnel. With a budget of $3.7 million and 427 agents and clerks in 1959, the Service was still overwhelmed and underfunded (U.S. Congress, House, Treasury-Post Office Departments Appropriation Bill, 1960). Agents were exhausted. Baughman pointed out that it was easy to protect the president with train travel as they usually stopped in “small towns that provided smaller crowds” ("President Taxes Guard," 1956, October 1). Now presidential travel consisted of large urban areas with large audiences. And during election seasons, “the high-speed political campaigning of these days had made it more difficult to guard the life of the President” ("President Taxes Guard," 1956, October 1). This move toward extensive travel and frequent visits to large cities allowed more people to feel the presence of the president. The New York Times observed the power of these moments when the public came into contact with the president. It noted, “For the American citizenry each Presidential visit leaves behind exciting memories, treasured snapshots, perhaps some new insight into problems their country faces, but most of all, a sense of communication and intimacy with the foremost office holder in the land” ("The President Goes to the People," 1953, June 21).

However, the speed of travel compounded the complications of the Service to address security and political issues in an adequate manner. Presidential trips had become a circus, which required an extensive amount of preparation. In trying to plan for a court of 60 people, the
Service had a week to survey spaces, track down cranks or crazies, plan routes, and ensure that political events were adequate and could be secured ("The President Goes to the People," 1953, June 21). Because of this burden on the White House Detail, the Eisenhower Administration alleviated this strain by sending White House Advance people with agents to help prep an area for a presidential visit (Rowley, 1998, August 17). This shift away from relying on agents was supposed to help with the burden of presidential travel and eliminate politics from security. Head of the White House Detail James Rowley noted that it was Thomas Stephens who told agents that “we can’t afford to get involved in politics, so we therefore are going to establish select men to go with you” (1998, August 17, p. 11). The policy of using White House Advance personnel would start to erode security precautions as political considerations would begin to trump Secret Service measures. This created a huge problem for the Service in terms of its ability to adequately discipline the president. There was a new entity on the scene that actively resisted and refuted the protective detail. The “roadrunners” of the White House and the Secret Service over the next half century would have to begin to reconcile exposure and security.

Although this move mostly separated the Service from mingling directly with political partisans at the local level, it definitely did not remove the Service from political concerns. In fact, the Russians often used the Secret Service as a political weapon against the president. During a trip to Geneva, Switzerland to meet with world leaders, Eisenhower was always secured by a closed car with an accompaniment of guards. Meanwhile, Khrushchev frequently traveled in an open car with no guards. This ploy by the Soviets was a clever strategy, which tired to show that the openness of the United States was a mere façade. Its elected leader could not trust the people to be among them. Even the Swiss and Italian press attacked the president for being too heavily fortified. Chief Baughman was clearly irritated with this tactic. He said,
“The only conclusion I can come to about his two sallies outdoors with relatively few guards is that he’s willing to risk his life for a little propaganda” (1963, p. 174).

This bunker-based mentality of presidential security was also criticized in Paris and London. Although the Service, according to Boring, never ran into trouble with foreign security, the press and the people were often critical of the amount of security (Boring, 1990, November 26). The presidential motorcade in Paris drew an outcry from its citizens. One Frenchman decried, “Oh, you know the Americans, they always do everything the grand manner” while another noted, “Why does he have to have such a great escort; the rest of them don’t” ("Big Eisenhower Escort Irks Paris Pedestrians," 1957, December 17). The one exception was with the British. He said that that the British “were a little stiff and were very stubborn in their ways, but we had no basic problem with them” (1990, November 26, p. 10). When the POTUS visited London, the British government reacted in fairly harsh terms with the advance teams. Press Secretary James Hagerty and the Service had requested an escort of 100 police officers and 30 cars to accompany the presidential motorcade with a news truck to shoot the presidential procession.76 The British only permitted 15 officers, 10 cars, and no news trucks to film the event. Journalist Walter Waggoners reported that “while there is pomp aplenty in this seat of constitutional monarchy, not even reigning sovereigns or Prime Ministers are given so heavy a security guard on their travels through London (Waggoners, 1959, August 27). What Hagerty and the Service understood and the British failed to consider was the emergence and importance of the television spectacle. By creating a media circus around the body of the president allowed the people at home to feel the grander and awe of the POTUS. This new format required

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76 Grossman and Kumar noted that “if there was a golden age of partnership between the White House and the news media, it existed during the eight years of the Eisenhower administration” (1981, p. 305). This was of particular importance to how the U.S. media reacted to the presidents’ security bubble overseas. The media here at home defended, explained away, and justified these security measures in response to attacks by the French, Italians, and the Russians.
presidential security to evolve alongside the White House press office in adopting new strategies
to present the president.

This change in the media also allowed the Service to design new protective measures that
specifically targeted the press. Like the president and crowds, the Service started to bubble the
media. For the first time, the Service consciously used the press as a buffer zone between the
president and the people. It was an intermediary space that only included the media. Before the
Eisenhower administration, Rowley commented that the press “would group around the
President, when he came off a plan, or [when] he came off the train” (1988, September 20).
And, they did serve as a means of separation. However, he noted that it was with Eisenhower
that this type of protection was employed as a layer of security to filter people’s access to the
president. The Service had photographers and reporters on each side of the president, which
created a wall of separation. Agents also relied on reporters and photographers for help in
identifying people who did not belong in these zones; they would often report suspicious
individuals to agents on the ground. This new form of security would soon allow agents to have
better control over both the president and the people. The establishment of a press zone served
as a boundary that would be tough to cross.

With this level of security, the pomp of protection had indeed reached a high level. But
this type and amount of security did not bother too many Americans. The body of the POTUS
had been granted a different status. With the election in hand, the New York Times overtly
discussed how Eisenhower will assume a new body. It noted that the president “has been
projected out of the role of an ordinary citizen, however well known or successful, into that of a
superman” ("Man and Superman," 1952, November 8). This transformed body would
experience the full powers of the state encircle and surround him. The article continued, “Never
again as long as he is President, will this eminent person be left unguarded. Never will he be allowed to go to church or the theater alone. He is, in a way, a prisoner of his great office. He has become our Number One citizen and all the majesty of all our police power is summoned to protect him” ("Man and Superman," 1952, November 8). Presidential supremacy had assumed Superman status.

With this iconic status, Eisenhower built a White House that fit his brand. The president used the military for White House chauffeurs, waiters, staffers, mess crews, and cooks. Representative Frank Kowalski (D-CT) thought this was clearly an abuse of power, but the general thought it was a cost effective measure ("President Defends G.I.’s As Servants," 1959, May 14). Eisenhower continued to rely on military insignia with his Boeing 707. He never thought to change the military markings and appearance. The people were accustomed to Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief and the “President-General” was naturally quite comfortable with the trimmings and frills of military symbols. Boring even commented that Eisenhower treated agents with a military-type ethos. He knew no names and never saw agents as people. He observed that Eisenhower’s attitude was “you do your job and I’ll do mine” (1988, September 21, p. 63). And for the Service, Eisenhower was fairly easy to contain because of his military background, which were compatible with the Service’s ideas and practices of discipline and isolation.

Even with this apparatus of privilege and protection, the Service still relied on simple methods of protection designed to stop an old-fashioned enemy. The bubble was extremely fragile as it was still easy to bypass security and resist Secret Service commands. One reason why it was manageable to breach protective measures was the size of the Secret Service. It did not have the resources to adequately sterilize spaces for presidential visits. Although advance
work was tedious and thorough, agents did not have the power, means, or knowledge to create a safe zone for the POTUS. At the end of Eisenhower’s administration, the Service had approximately 456 employees and a budget of $4.1 million to enforce counterfeiting laws and to protect the president (U.S. Congress, House, Treasury-Post Office Departments Appropriation Bill, 1960, 1961). The White House Police had an additional 162 positions to guard the grounds of the White House (U.S. Congress, House, Treasury-Post Office Departments Appropriation Bill, 1960). With 57 field offices (Ansley, 1956), there was not a sizable contingent to guard the president from a 20th century enemy. Baughman revealed that protection just required six agents to accompany the president, 40 agents to be on active call, and 36 White House police officers to be on duty (1963). The bubble was small and exposed, despite the dangerous changes to the world order. The Service was more consumed with logistical issues than devising new techniques to secure. The inability to construct a fortified bubble would soon be exposed during the JFK years. Rowley believed that personnel and resource levels were too insufficient to provide suitable protection for the POTUS. The money, equipment, and numbers of agents were so minimal that he said “at the time we weren’t self-sustaining” (1998, August 17, p. 10). With few resources, Rowley commented that “we had to beg and borrow from the Armed Services for a lot of our equipment and so forth” (Rowley, 1998, August 17, p. 10). The failure to strengthen the bubble with resources and personnel would have dramatic and deadly consequences.

**The Two Bodies of JFK**

On November 22, 1963 the Secret Service lost the first president under its direct control. John F. Kennedy was silenced as his motorcade crept at a snails pace down Elm Street in Dallas, Texas with a sniper attack. A president entrapped inside a car along narrow streets with tall buildings were known as a security threat, but the Secret Service advance team headed by Agent
Winston Lawson failed to take this into consideration. No agents were sitting next to the president despite the numerous attempts on leaders inside their vehicles; nor were they on the running boards next to him; nor were they standing on the rear steps behind the president. The bubbletop was not used and agents did not screen buildings. Countless Secret Service measures were either not implemented or not thought of. Then there was the question of whether the Service had measures in place, but the POTUS issued a command to remove any and all protective barricades to ensure maximum exposure to the Texas crowd. Extensive debate had ensured about what the Service did do, what it did not do, and what role the president had in security measures (J. Bishop, 1968; Manchester, 1967; Melanson & Stevens, 2002; Palamara, 2006; P. D. Scott, 1996).

The assignment of praise and blame rested on the fact of who was responsible for the easiness of the kill. The Service immediately blamed the fallen president. Past and current agents came out and expressed that Kennedy was a fatalist and therefore was reckless with his own life. Assistant Chief Harry Neal argued that the “Secret Service performed its protective duty as efficiently as it could” (Neal, 1971, p. 14) The Service did not have the power to command or tell the POTUS what he could and could not do. It was the president who gave orders, not his protective detail. This type of rhetoric was oddly new. It was the agency that had so proudly expressed its ability to command the POTUS in the past. Former Chief Frank Wilson blatantly stated that Kennedy “didn’t seem to take death very seriously” or “at least not seriously enough to listen to the advice of his security men over that of his political advisors” (1965, p. 244). His “charmed life” led him to embrace a “young man’s illusions of immortality” (F. J. Wilson & Day, 1965, p. 244).
With the failure to protect the POTUS, the assassination exposed two fundamental truths about the Secret Service. First, it did not have the power to issue direct commands to the POTUS. The myth of the Service as espoused by Starling, Reilly, Baughman, and Wilson of being able to directly control the president collapsed. The Inspection House marked by command and obedience was not as firmly entrenched as many had thought. Second, the security bubble was inadequate. The direct cause of a weak security plan probably rested on two key trends. The defense in depth strategy as developed by the Service was ineffective as it extended to a very small area around the president. Distance-based attacks were not taken serious. And, there was no true inner circle of agents stationed to protect the president in case of an attack. Both of these issues resulted from an inability to discipline JFK, a lack of knowledge of how to provide sufficient protection, and a shortage of resources. Even though the Service saw its budgets and personnel grow quite substantially under the first couple of years of Kennedy’s presidency, it was primarily a result of increased presidential travel and a shortage of agents to deal with counterfeiting investigations (U.S. Congress, House, Treasury-Post Office Departments and Executive Office Appropriations, 1962). From 1961 to 1963, the Service budgets increased from $4.6 to $6.3 million and its personnel figures from 470 to 577 (Commission Exhibit 1053-F, 1964; U.S. Congress, House, Treasury-Post Office Departments and Executive Office Appropriations, 1962).

Security was made more complicated because it was often viewed through the prism of the two bodies of the president. Billy Henry of the Los Angles Times argued that “Kennedy always considered himself two separate persons—the public person as President of the United States, and the private person who had his own friends and insisted on keeping his private life entirely secret” (Henry, 1964, December 3). With his private body, he was irresponsible and
took too many chances; he loved crowds, women, and notorious, but concealed behavior. To make things more complicated, he used his public body to satisfy his private needs. With this conflation, Seymour Hersh (1997) argued that the Service became too lackadaisical when it came to protection because it was influenced by his carefree attitude; this ethos spread to everyone in the White House, including his protective detail. This negligence was clearly seen leading up to his assassination as the Service acquiesced too easily to presidential demands.

However, Kennedy believed that his public body should be protected within limits. The so-called relaxed atmosphere was tempered by the desire to be secured. He was more ambivalent than neglectful when it came to security. In the end, the failure to provide satisfactory protection in Dallas (and other places) was a mixture of the inability of the Secret Service to actively re-think what protection means in a Cold War context and Kennedy’s ambivalence toward it. The supposed mystery behind the JFK assassination centered on a simple fact that neither the POTUS nor the Service were adequately prepared to deal with a relatively coherent, rational, and strategic assassin.

The Weakening of the Public Bubble

The breakdown of the Secret Service on that November day reflected the agency’s inability to do two things: construct an updated security bubble that excluded both long and short range attacks and properly discipline presidential movement in light of those probable attacks. One possible explanation for why the Service failed to adequately address a long-range attack is that it was rooted in administrative inertia. The most visible and noteworthy attacks directed at the POTUS were from close range. This was only reinforced by Richard P. Pavlick’s attempt to blowup the president-elect at his West Palm Beach residence. Like Collazo and Torresola, Pavlick had a strategic and well-thought out plan to assassinate the president. He did
reconnaissance work at the Kennedy’s home and his church in West Palm Beach. He visited both sites, knew the layout of the locations, and took pictures to study them. He even visited the church one time while JFK was inside to more fully understand the best way to kill him. He devised a simple, but ingenious plan. He filled his car with sticks of dynamite and rigged up a detonation system so that he could manually explode the bombs once JFK entered his car.

His first plan was to attack the president on Sunday morning outside his home while he was getting into his car to go to Sunday mass. This habitual activity provided Pavlick the perfect opportunity to know the exact location and time of when the president would leave his house; it also allowed him to observe how agents transferred the president from his house to his car. Due to the limited number of security precautions, Pavlick was going to simply ram his car into the president’s car and detonate the bomb. According to Chief Baughman, it would have been an easy kill (1963). However, the day of the attack Pavlick changed his mind after seeing Jacqueline and the children wave good-bye to him. These were not his victims. He decided to wait and do it at the church.

In the meantime, the Service picked up his trail and caught him before he could make a second attempt. The Service succeeded because of its administrative structure in finding potential enemies of the state. Agents were able to obtain his name from a post office in New Hampshire and track him down. Yet, the Service did not think to address the problems with the security bubble. It would have clearly failed if Pavlick had made his attempt. Protection as an object of study was not fully developed. No lessons were learned from it. Just like the Truman situation, the Service refused to consider presidential protection as an object of study. With its refusal to look at its own protective measures, the Service had limited capacity to create new meaning. In this case, the Service still had not adequately addressed how to transfer the
president from a building into his car; this was the same issue that agents had with Truman and the Blair House.

Over the next two years, the Service continued to fail to adequately protect the president at close range, especially on the road. For the Service, routine had set in. There were no new problems or new solutions or no new enemies to solve. Gerald Behn, the Head of the White House Detail during JFK’s tenure, noted that traveling with the president away from the White House “involved practically the same problems as far as we were concerned, probably a little more of it” (1976, February 24, p. 5). There was no mention of continual improvements or constantly examining procedures to refine them. Chief James Rowley declared, “The biggest threat to a President’s life is from the self-deluded who become the dupes of terroristic or subversive organizations” ("Self-Made Investigator," 1961, August 2). The only real difference in terms of travel and security between Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy was the amount of it.

With each succeeding president, travel became more of the norm. However, this did not change how the Service viewed protection. For Behn, it involved just in different locations. Agent Floyd Boring, the lead advance agent for Kennedy, went as far as to say that all nations “basically do police work alike” as “their only interest is to get their principal person they’re protecting through a line and into and out of areas in which they’re protected” (1990, November 26). The bubble expanded or contracted depending on the threats in the area. In one trip to Chicago, the Service expanded the number of agents needed, removed most of the decisions usually made by the Chicago Police Department, and did not reveal the motorcade route that would be used. This security response was insurance against potential Caribbean demonstrators ("Extra Guards Planned for Kennedy Visit," 1961, April 26). Even with these precautions, the
*Chicago Daily Tribune* still reported on the likely route that the president would take and speculated on whether the bubble top would be used, noting that it was up to the president to employ it or not ("Extra Guards Planned for Kennedy Visit," 1961, April 26).

In contrast to the Chicago trip, the Service did not set up any barriers between the president and crowds at the beach in Santa Monica. Peter Lawford and Kennedy walked right off the beachfront property and mingled with people. The president then went in the water with a host of people in tow. According to reports, “at this point, secret service agents started running across the beach en masse” ("Woman, Fully Dressed, Joins Kennedy in Surf;" 1962, August 20). Agents were able to get a patrol boat out to sea and watch the president’s movements. After 15 minutes of swimming, he went right back into the crowd to greet the people.

In a similar situation at the White House, agents were overrun by a group of international students on the South Lawn who wanted to touch the president. After finishing his remarks, the president went to the rope fence designed to give him space so that they could comfortably shake hands. However, the students soon overwhelmed the rope barricade and swarmed the president. Billy Henry called the event a “stampede” as hundreds of students broke loose and “swarmed around him” (Henry, 1963, July 28). One agent lost his shoe, others had their clothes ripped, and one White House officer collapsed in trying to create space between the crowd and the POTUS. Agents had to “use elbows and shoulders in a not-too-gentle struggle to keep the youthful crowd from knocking the President down” ("Kennedy Mobbed by Foreign Students at the White House," 1963, July 28). In one final example, three teenagers in Minneapolis were able to deceive a host of agents and gain close access to the president by posing as students from Germany ("Youths Crash Kennedy Reception," 1962, October 10). At the Leamington Hotel, these teenagers took an elevator to the 12th floor, then walked upstairs to the 14th floor, and
immediately asked agents in a German accent where Senator Humphrey’s suite was. They told
them and then convinced Humphrey to introduce them to the POTUS, which he did.

These security breaches and inability to design adequate bubbles around the president and
the people came about at the same time as threats to the president reached a new level. In his
first year of office, the Service saw a 52% increase in threatening letters ("White House Threats
Up 52%," 1962, February 28 ). In total, there were 870 cases compared to 573 during
Eisenhower’s last year in office. And, a total of about 643 people tried to force their way into
the White House. With the number of mentally unstable individuals trying to gain access to the
President, the press still believed in the Service’s power to command the POTUS. The Chicago
Daily Tribune reported that “technically James J. Rowley, secret service chief, is the most
powerful man in the United States. He can forbid the President to take a walk or a trip to
Mexico: he can tell him where to go fishing or forbid him to go at all” ("Threats to the President
on the Increase," 1962, July 22). Despite this assumed power of command, the Service was
unable to devise security shields that could encapsulate the president and the crowds. Neither
entity was disciplined or docile.

The Flowering of the Private Bubble

The inability of the Service to command the POTUS was obscured because of the
distance between the people, the press, and the president. The layers of security around the
White House and the handlers to the president hid what actually occurred behind closed doors.
In this setting, it was the president that issued the orders and the Service who concealed what
occurred. Agents Larry Newman, William McIntyre, Tony Sherman, and Joseph Paolella
revealed to Seymour Hersh the party lifestyle of the president inside and outside the White
House (1997). Although the Service did not play the same role it did with Harding and FDR, it knew and kept silent about what occurred.

Hersh argued that JFK’s penchant for other women than his wife and his party lifestyle endangered not only himself, but the nation as a whole (1997). Newman recollected that Dave Powers, a presidential aide, prevented agents from searching these women or their belongings. This was particularly disturbing because the threat level against the POTUS was extremely high as a result of the Russian and Cuban situations. The most active the agents were in helping Kennedy hide this aspect of his life was keeping it secret from Jackie. Sherman reported that one time while he was on duty the special agent in charge had to burst into the swimming area, which was off-limits, to warn the president that his wife was en route from the airport. Everyone scattered. Another well-cited incident in Secret Service lore is Agent Brooks Keller’s wild parties. He became so famous for his care-free attitude and the parties he threw that Kennedy supposedly approached him and asked for an invitation (McCarthy & Smith, 1985).

Even with the documented affairs, most Secret Service agents deny what occurred in the White House. Agents were expected to adhere to a strict code of silence about the president’s public and private affairs. Although there is some suspicion about the accuracy of the four agents’ description of the extent of the partying, there is no question that Kennedy was excessive in his relations with the opposite sex. The hierarchy of the Secret Service, including Chief James Rowley, Head of White House Detail Gerald Behn, and Head of Advance Trips Floyd Boring, denied that any strange women were ever found in the White House. Boring went as far as to say that “the entire time during the president’s administration and prior to the president’s administration and I know I can never recall at any time the president meeting with any girl” (1990, November 26, p. 24). Behn, as head agent in the White House, was in closest proximity
to the president and his denial was more cloaked. He stated that he had never heard of or saw
Mary Pinchot Meyers or Judith Exner around the president. Chief Rowley argued that “too
many people would be involved” for the president to do such a thing (1998, August 17, p. 11).
These women would have to get through the White House Police, then encounter the Secret
Service, have their names included on a roster, and would have to be checked-in. Ushers to
secretaries would have easily found out. This creative story-telling by agents close to the
POTUS mark the power that bubble has over agents. Sixty years later, there is still an outright
denial by the top officials in the Secret Service who served under JFK. The oath to protect the
body and the promise to protect the image of the president is still ingrained within these former
agents.

Despite these denials, Hersh added that the culture of the White House influenced how
agents responded and reacted to security measures (1997). Things became lax. The “party
atmosphere” of the White House influenced how agents handled their own jobs. Something was
seriously wrong. Newman commented, “You get the tone of the way the detail works from the
top. It was loose” (Hersh, 1997, p. 244) He noted that some agents on the presidential detail
started to party and stay out late, especially at bars. The problem of drinking, bars, and staying
out late emerged in Dallas.

This attitude was reinforced by the close relationship between the Service and Kennedy.
Newman commented that he made a conscious effort to know their names and something
personal about them. This made it difficult for the agents to blame the president for lapses in
security. John Dempsey, a personal friend of Kennedy, said this about their relationship,

Oh, I don’t think they’ve ever had one like him. Absolutely. I’d put that right in
the record. They never had one like him. They liked him. He was good to them.
He saw to it that they had… He never forgot them (1964, June 10, p. 14).
And, they never forgot him, even in death. Robert Bouck, the agent who installed and managed Kennedy’s secret recording system, pulled the entire system out the day of the assassination (1976, June 25). Kennedy asked him about a year into his presidency if he could install a tape recording system in the Oval Office, the Cabinet Room, and his library.

Unlike Nixon’s automatic recording system that turned on with sound, Kennedy manually controlled it by pressing a button that was concealed under his desk. According to Bouck, he did not record most of the time; he mainly wanted it as a record to document understandings between the Soviets and the Americans. However, Bouck claimed that he did not know the content of the tapes. He merely managed the recordings. He replaced the tapes and hand delivered them to Kennedy’s secretary Evelyn Lincoln.77 There was never a moment he heard or saw what the tapes contained. Yet, the day of the shooting he immediately dismantled all three recording devices and never told the incoming president about them. Bouck, like so many other agents, had to manage and hide information, even from the incoming president. Information and image management was of paramount concern.

The trust between protectee and protector was too personal to violate. This was why the president asked the Secret Service, not the Signal Corps to install and manage the recording system. Bourk noted that the “Secret Service could keep the activity more confidential” (1976, June 25, p. 7) In fact, Bourk bluntly said “certain types of confidential things he had us do” (1976, June 25, p. 7) The institutional relation between the Signal Corps and president was not strong enough for the president to adequately rely on them with state or personal secrets; it was not personal enough for Kennedy. The Signal Corps would have different crews to install the system, to manage them, and to deliver the tapes. There would never be one person Kennedy

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77 He believed that Ms. Lincoln used a Navy corpsman to transcribe them.
could directly deal with about the system. With the Service, Kennedy knew intimately what agent would do what. He could trust them.

**Protection and Publicity**

With this bond between the Service and the POTUS, the Service became lackadaisical when it came to protection. However, this so-called relaxed atmosphere created by Kennedy does not completely represent how he viewed protection or why he was killed. He was ambivalent toward protection, not neglectful. There was no direct questioning of the role or usefulness of the Secret Service. He knew his public body needed to be protected to a degree. The POTUS was security conscious; he sometimes took it serious and other times was reckless.

Four months after the reported assassination attempt by Pavlick, the Service picked up on a new threat that was directed at then three year old Caroline Kennedy. It was rumored that a pro-Castro Cuban group had hatched a plan to abduct the president’s daughter at their Palm Beach residence. The following day the Kennedys elected to have their children stay at home while they attended Easter Services with a sizable and increased security force attending to their safety ("Tighten Guard on Kennedy," 1961, April 3). Although the Service later discovered the plot to be overblown, Kennedy reacted and allowed increased security measures around his family.

On another occasion, a personal friend of Kennedy’s Charles Bartlett, recounted a story that rattled the president outside his home in Middleburg, Virginia. They were driving on one of the back roads and a car just sped right by the president’s motorcade. Kennedy immediately cried out that the Secret Service should have stopped the car. Bartlett noted that “he disliked the fact that he was showing concern and he said, ‘Charlie, that man might have shot you’” (Bartlett, 1965, February 20, p. 152). Kennedy made no mention of the intrusive measures the Service took to guard him on the road.
On any advance trip, the Service thoroughly checked and re-checked his rooms, elevators, and elevator cables, fire extinguishers, and did a background check of all the hotel employees (Baughman & Robinson, 1963). The Service used its audio-visual security and often relied on the Signal Army Corps to sweep all rooms to detect bugs. At the White House, the Service revamped security by installing new x-ray machines to check bags of visitors. The Chicago Daily Tribune reported that White House sources claimed that these “were the strongest security precautions taken in connection with the public visitors since the outbreak of the Korean war” ("Tighten Check at Tourists at White House," 1962, October 24). This was tried during World War II, but it was thought to be too intrusive. Times had changed. Kennedy went even further with protection by getting Congress to pass Public Law 87-829 that extended protection to the vice-president elect, former presidents for a reasonable period of time after leaving office, and officers in line of succession to the presidency if there were no vice-president; it also required the vice-president to accept protection. With each of these moves, the bubble became larger, tougher, and more impenetrable. The principles of inspection and observation became more and more generalizable. It was not just the president who was to be watched, but everyone in his radius.

Some Secret Service agents close to Kennedy noted that he was cooperative. In remarking about Kennedy and about all the administrations he served under, Agent Boring said, “The president and the people surrounding the president were very gracious and were very cooperative” (1990, November 26, p. 27). Even with Boring’s tempered statement about Kennedy and other presidents being cooperative, social secretary Letitia Baldrige Hollensteiner had a different view of Kennedy’s reaction to protection. She commented that “he used to upset the Secret Service because of his security violations” (1964, April 24, p. 56) The Service would
set up “elaborate security measures” and then he would “transgress against them” (1964, April 24, p. 59). This lack of concern for his safety deeply troubled the White House Detail.

What made it especially difficult for the Service was that Kennedy desired and craved publicity. Like the Roosevelts before him, Kennedy deeply understood the power of perception. Presidential scholar Bruce Miroff noted that “Kennedy reached the White House as a celebrity, with a heroic image more manufactured than earned” (2002, p. 274). As president, he would rely on his personality and the White House information apparatus to continue to manufacture these celebrity and heroic images by creating massive spectacles that blinded. He relied on press conferences, staged public appearances, and the television to produce a heroic-like image and to connect with the people in an intimate way. Miroff noted Kennedy directly fit the mold of the Hamiltonian presidency as he sought to sustain and reflect the “aristocratic sense of superiority, the preoccupation with masculinity, the longing for a heroic destiny.” These moves to manufacture the body of the POTUS in such a manner were carefully managed. Kennedy even understood the importance of the presidential plane in reflecting a particular image. He transformed Eisenhower’s military-looking Boeing 707 into a sleek metallic blue Air Force One with the presidential symbol included on the plane (Burton, 2006). With this majestic plane, Kennedy used airport arrivals and departures as “a dramatic scenario for television to record” (Berry, 1987).

In establishing its protective shields, the Service also had to be cognizant in how the president appeared in person and on television. These added dimensions to publicity only complicated matters for Service. But what made them worse was that no previous president, according to Boring, sought attention from mobs of people like Kennedy did. Images on the screen had to be reinforced in person. Isolation did not fit with president’s persona. The
president was the first to “go into crowds and shake hands and so forth” (1990, November 26, p. 22) Boring tried to reason with the president, saying that he would be an easy target for an assassin. Kennedy responded that he could not get “elected dog catcher” if he did not mingle with the people. Columnist Bill Henry observed that Kennedy in contrast to Truman and Eisenhower would not succumb to security precautions. He “is not sort of individual to submit to anything that interferes with his personal freedom or action” (1963, July 28) For him, a crowd “is an attraction that he can’t resist” (1963, July 28). If he saw one, he humped right in the middle, regardless of its size or danger. This was exactly what occurred during his trip to Ireland. He neglected the dangers, got to close to the crowd, and was almost pulled out of the car. Henry saw it a dozen times and agents had a difficult time in protecting the president in these circumstances.

The week before his assassination Kennedy continued to push the limits of caution for publicity purposes. He decided to drop his police escort from La Gaurdia to his hotel in Manhattan. With no escort and no sirens, the president’s limo had to stop at all stoplights, which caused significant dangers for the president and others. One photographer was able to directly approach the president’s window and take a picture of him on 72nd street and Madison Avenue (Hunt, 1963, November 15). The limo was further slowed down by a nurse running after a patient and a group of teenagers who surrounded the limo. Once Kennedy got to the hotel, an Irish woman snuck into the ballroom and was able to shake the president’s hand. Reporter Martin Arnold noted that “no one was able to explain how she had gotten into the ballroom in the first place, since the only credential she had was a bright blue badge on which the words ‘Senior Citizen’ were printed” (1963, November 16). On another trip, the president
exposed himself in countless ways and the Service failed to provide an adequate screen at the hotel.

There was something wrong about how the president viewed protection and how the White House Detail was implementing it. The formidable moving Fortress now was easily breached. Disciplinary measures seemed to evaporate as the president directed his own conduct with little apparent concern for security. Politics and publicity had trumped the need to be secured.

**The Assassination**

Special Agent in Charge Roy Kellerman and Head Advance agent Winston G. Lawson arranged the details of the Dallas trip. In particular, Lawson drew up the motorcade route, did reconnaissance work on several building sites where Kennedy could speak, assigned agents to guard certain locations, and coordinated plans with the local Dallas Police Department. The aim of the trip was clear enough: Kennedy wanted maximum exposure to boost his chances of winning Texas in the next presidential election. Kenneth O’Donnell made this point clear and how security was to be arranged. He said,

> So it would be automatic, and we would not even proceed with instructions, that the advance man and the Secret Service would, within the time allotted to them--would bring the President into Dallas, through an area which exposes him to the greatest number of people ("Testimony of Kenneth O’Donnell," 1964, p. 433).

It was a political trip designed to allow the people to see the president. With that meaning in mind, the Service went ahead and designed its security bubble to ensure that the president would be protected on the road and at his final destination to the extent that it did not hurt his accessibility to the people.

In determining the size of the bubble, the Service considered mostly presidential personality alongside context and viable threats in the area. In establishing threat assessment
levels, the Service must always look at presidential temperament. Chief Baughman believed that presidential personality was the important aspect to presidential protection. Setting and assailant had clearly not emerged as the primary factors in protecting the president. He wrote that the “one simple but all-important aspect of Presidential protection” is that “the main protective problem of every President seems to stem from some important trait he has, physical or psychological” (1963, p. 63). Each president creates “unique security problems” because of “their temperaments, their personalities, their good or bad health” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963, p. 188).

For Lawson, he understood the political habits and needs of Kennedy. The president wanted a security bubble designed that would allow open access to his body along the motorcade route. The Service also considered known threats to be in the area. This factor could dramatically increase or reduce the size of the bubble. In Dallas, the Service had no actionable intelligence that an attack was likely. With that information, the bubble did not have to be impenetrable. And finally, the Service was aware of context, especially the dangers of sitting in an open car in a downtown area with tall buildings and narrow streets. However, there was no policy or routine to impose tighter restrictions around the president in these situations. Downtown Dallas was a dangerous location. What was more dangerous was a president entrapped inside a car with no access to any of his agents. An assassin could sit on almost any perch and have an open shot at the president.

In considering these variables on the day of the attack, the Service constructed a very loose and open protective bubble. The critical decisions, in particular, were the refusal to place agents around the president’s car and the choice to remove the bubble top from the president’s car. The Service blamed the White House staff and the president himself for telling agents not to
interfere with the crowd’s view of him, which meant that no agent could stand on the running boards to the side or rear of the car, and wanting the bubble top removed. Kennedy told Behn that “he did not want agents riding on the back of his car” ("Commission Exhibit 1025," 1964, p. 805).

In Berlin, the president repeatedly told agents to not push away individuals who broke free from the police lines and allow them to greet him. In a slightly different interpretation, Boring reported that driving Kennedy’s last trip before Dallas he informed agents in Tampa, Florida to step off the rear steps and return to the follow-up car if the crowds were thinning out. This had also occurred that summer in Rome. But Boring made it clear that this was only the case in situations “when the crowds along the route were sparse” ("Commission Exhibit 1025," 1964, p. 806). This request was translated by the Service as meaning that the president did not want agents on the rear steps at all. Agent Clint Hill said that he received “information passed verbally from the administrative offices of the White House Detail of the Secret Service to Agents assigned to the Detail that President Kennedy had made such requests” ("Commission Exhibit 1025," 1964, p. 809). Despite these reports, there was still no evidence that Kennedy asked agents not to stand on the running boards on that day in Dallas (Palamara, 2006) or whether they misinterpreted his direction about not standing on the rear steps. This potential miscommunication might have cost Kennedy his life because agents standing on the rear of the president’s car would have shielded Oswald’s line of sight.

The next major point of contention revolved around who ordered the removal of the presidential bubble top. To this day, there is no fixed conclusion on who made the final decision to remove it. Resulting from this uncertainty, a host of people were blamed. Palamara referred to this confusion as a “multiplicity of responsibility,” noting that no one seemed to be in charge
of the day’s events (2006). There was no clear channel of direction. The basic use of the bubble was merely to allow the president to travel under poor weather conditions; the bubble top was not bullet proof nor did it provide the president any real security. Despite this basic understanding, the Service still argued that it could have deflected the bullet (Youngblood, 1973). In any case, the bubble top, which was not designed for security purposes, might have or might not have saved the president’s life. For the Service, the bubbletop was better than no bubble.

The most disconcerting aspects of how security was planned and implemented was how the motorcade route was selected, the total lack of building security along the route, the partying and drinking the night before by agents, how the two most strategically placed agents failed to respond to the shooting in a timely manner, and the inability of the Service to adequately identify enemies of the state. O’Donnell made it clear that the motorcade route was political in nature. With little concern for security, the route was designed to proceed slowly through the downtown area despite the multiple sniper vantage points on Elm Street. Chief Rowley in his testimony to the Warren Commission explained the reasons for when the Service surveys and does not survey buildings along the motorcade route. He stated:

Except for inauguration or other parades involving foreign dignitaries accompanied by the President in Washington, it has not been the practice of the Secret Service to make surveys or checks of buildings along the route of a Presidential motorcade. For the inauguration and certain other parades in Washington where the traditional route is known to the public long in advance of the event, buildings along the route can be checked by teams of law enforcement officers, and armed guards are posted along the route as appropriate. But on out-of-town trips where the route is decided on and made public only a few days in advance, buildings are not checked either by Secret Service agents or by any other law enforcement officers at the request of the Secret Service. With the number of men available to the Secret Service and the time available, surveys of hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows is not practical ("Testimony of James J. Rowley," 1964, p. 467).
The lack of manpower coupled with the lack of protective knowledge for how to conduct a search in a short amount of time were clear deficiencies in how the Service protected the president. A distance-based protective strategy was never thought of or fully articulated in normal conditions of presidential travel. Special events like inaugurations forced the Service to think of distance as a security issue, but under normal circumstances the agency did not have the personnel or the resources to actively implement an expansive bubble.

Furthermore, politics trumped protection in planning a president visit; there were plenty of reasons to suspect that the president could be assassinated on a narrow street surrounded by tall buildings or even the wisdom of ever releasing the president’s schedule in advance. These details were known to the Service, but were never fully implemented or engrained in protective practices. To top it off, nine agents were out the night before drinking, five of whom happened to be in the follow-up car directly behind the president’s vehicle. According to Secret Service rules and regulations, no alcohol was to be consumed while on protective assignments. The apparently loose nature of protection extended to all corners of the Secret Service.

Despite these previous mistakes made by the Service, it was two agents in particular who failed. Agent William Greer drove the president’s vehicle and Special Agent in Charge Roy Kellerman sat next to him in order to be his eyes and ears. While on Elm Street, Greer reported that he heard a loud noise that he took for a backfire of one of the motorcycle cops ("Testimony of William Greer," 1964). Assuming it was no big deal, he maintained his same trajectory. It was not until he heard the noise again, saw Texas Governor John Connally fall out of the corner of his eye, and heard Kellerman yell to get out of there that he hit the gas pedal. Between the first and last shot, there was a seven second window. In this span, Kellerman said or did nothing
and Greer took no evasive measures to break the sniper’s line of sight. The final shot proved to be fatal.

The attack also might have been avoided if the Service had a more advanced system to detect potential threats. At this time, the Service’s Protective Research Section (PRS) relied on a very broad criterion to establish who was a threat to the POTUS ("Commission Exhibit 1021," 1964). It rested on a simple category of whether someone had actually threatened the public body of the president. Under this scenario, any threat, no matter how small or serious, was indexed in PRS general files. The Service was also concerned with membership and activity levels of people who belonged to suspicious groups. To make the list more manageable, the general index file was condensed to a “trip file” that agents took with them during presidential visits. This file had about 100 names in it on the day of the assassination and consisted of two main categories: people with unstable mental conditions and individuals who are active in dangerous organizations. This list was condensed once again into a file called the “album,” which had about 15 names. This portfolio consisted of those individuals who were deemed to be “unusually dangerous” and “mobile” ("Commission Exhibit 1021," 1964, p. 705). The file contained a description of the subjects and photographs; agents were expected to be intimately familiar with the album and recognize the names in the trip file.

With this filtering system in place, the Service failed to pick up on the name of Lee Harvey Oswald. Although he was a dissident, lived in Soviet Russia, and was staying in the Dallas area, the FBI and the Dallas Police Department did not pass on any information to the Secret Service about him. This was because he had made no threat against the POTUS. This was the main criterion for filtering names; the Service was only interested in information related to threats. From there, agents would assign these suspicious individuals to the mentally unstable
or the suspicious organizational category. By creating a very focused, but extremely “broad and flexible” system to classify names, the Service was unable to interpret critical data ("Commission Exhibit 1021," 1964, p. 704). And, the Service had no memos of agreements with the FBI, CIA, or State Department to inform those agencies about the intelligence it required. Although the FBI did have a liaison that worked with the Service, Hoover’s agents had no exact standards of who should be considered a public enemy of the state. The looseness of this intelligence apparatus proved to be fatal.

In particular, the Service was unable to discover the estranged American who would become the primary assassin for most of the second half of the 20th century. Assassination scholar James W. Clarke argued that most of them suffered from what Laswell labeled as a “political personality,” in which they “project personal motives on public objects and rationalize them in terms of some larger public interest” (1982, p. 15) Lee Harvey Oswald, Samuel Byck, Lynette Alice Fromme, and Sara Jane Moore were all figures who fit this mold. They were primarily alienated from their spouses, families, and friends. They chose political targets to avenge a personal loss. Although Clarke is partly right to consider this as their primary motive, their political reasoning, however, cannot be totally reduced to a dysfunctional family environment. This is one problem with his attempt to find a casual variable. These assassins had been either “betrayed” or wanted acceptance from their support groups and sought to justify their political beliefs.

This was clearly the case with Oswald. Even though his ultimate motives were masked for why he killed JFK, he felt betrayed by his wife and his political principles. The trigger that moved Oswald to act, according to Clarke, resulted in his wife’s refusal to reconcile and move back in with him. However, his decision to kill the president was also couched in his hatred of
the American system, which Kennedy represented. In fact, his cynicism toward both the American and Soviet system was acute. He felt that American capitalism hollowed out the individual, but also was fully aware that Soviet Marxism was corrupt; his experience living in Russia left him deeply alienated from the Soviet government. He had hoped that Cuba would be a viable alternative, but he was also rejected by them. Even with this discontentment toward the American and Soviet systems and his hope for a viable third alternative, he said he had no interest in “violently opposing the U.S. Government” ("Commission Exhibit 97," 1964).

Yet, he also appeared to be very similar to Czolgosz. He was a bitter absolute partisan who claimed he had no ties to the United States and declared he would kill for his ideological devotion. At times, he sounded like Schmitt’s absolute partisan. Oswald proclaimed that he had “no attachments of any kind in the U.S” and said that he “would kill any American who put a uniform on in defense of the American government--any American” ("Commission Exhibit 295," 1964). He qualified these statements by noting, “I do not say [this] lightly, or unknowingly, since I have been in the military as you know, and I know what war is like” ("Commission Exhibit 295," 1964). Despite his seemingly ambivalent statements concerning violence, this was exactly what he did. He assassinated the POTUS. Although the president did not wear a uniform, Kennedy symbolized the American system that Oswald detested. In end, he was deeply estranged from what he loved most: family and politics. This would be the case for a series of assassins over the next 20 years.

Conclusion

In general, a host of problems existed that led up to the successful attack on the president’s body. There were the inadequacies in the PRS general index files, the inability of Greer to immediately and instinctively know what a gun shot sounded like, and Kellerman’s
inability to do anything reflected the status of the Secret Service at this point in time. The Service was utterly incapable of living up to its oath of protecting the president against a serious threat to his body. The Service did not train its agents to react in a decisive manner and was incapable of detecting possible attacks. The lack of personnel, irresponsible agents, a poorly planned and executed security plan, the inability to foresee threats beyond close-ranged attacks, the failure to discipline the president, and many other shortfalls would lead to a quiet desperation in the Secret Service: it had lost the president because of its administrative failures. The ability to protect was weakened because the Service no longer had the means to securely protect the president; its protective measures might help, but could really do nothing to prevent a determined and rational assassin who was willing to trade his or her life for the life of the POTUS. Boring admitted,

We could probably protect maybe an injury. However, we all came to the conclusion (and I don’t think anybody in the security field would differ with me) that if the principal or the president or whoever your might be guarding or protecting has to meet people, has to be with people, the possibilities of him being shot or killed are very great in that they have the first action (1990, November 26, pp. 19-20).

No security bubble could counter an enemy with resources as the Service could not screen people who wished to smuggle knives, poison, or guns to a presidential event. But what made it impossible to protect the POTUS according to Boring was that the assassin has first strike capability; agents merely respond to the attack.

For Boring and other agents, the Service could not come up with measures to actually deter an attack. Although the idea of prevention was there, it was considered to be an impossible value to achieve. Agents had no conception of how to filter a massive amount of people, identify threats, and create sterile environments. These security measures were required to deal with a 20th century mobile president who attracted large crowds and a 20th century enemy who used
unconventional means to attack. There was no knowledge in the American context for them to
draw on. The only reference point for Behn in providing total security was a dictatorial regime.
He had a limited idea of how to secure the POTUS in a democratic context, merely following the
practices of what had come before. Politics and protection did not mix and therefore one must be
sacrificed to the other. He accepted the fatalist fact that any assassin could eliminate the
POTUS.

**Copy Cat: LBJ’s Crowds and Carelessness**

In contrast to Bohr and Behn’s pessimistic analysis of the situation, the Service as a
whole did not become fatalistic. The lessons that should have been grasped with the attempted
assassination attempts against FDR and Truman would now be implemented. Above all else, the
myth of a docile president who yielded to Secret Service commands would never be fully
recovered, but it would become more of a reality. It was clear that the ability of the Service to
tell the POTUS what to do was now an illusion. This had been jointly fabricated, according to
reporter Felix Belair of the *New York Times*, by an agency that preached command and
obedience and presidents who constantly griped about limitations of what they could and could
not do (1963, November 23).

With the attack in Dallas, Belair argued that it would “likely turn this myth into reality”
(1963, November 23). The Panopticon would be rebuilt. The Service would make this radical
transformation in the next six years, despite dealing with a belligerent, independent, and
rebellious chief executive in Lyndon B. Johnson; the POTUS would be tamed as the Service
rebuilt its shattered myth on stronger ontological grounds that were rooted not in image, but in
concrete security measures. The Service and others would begin producing knowledge related to
presidential security. Johnson would continue to jump into crowds as JFK had done, but he did
so with about 1,500 guards protecting him. This new security protective apparatus rested on the recommendations of the Warren Commission, studies conducted by the Service, and an erratic president who needed to be disciplined for his own safety. But in the end, it was President Johnson who accepted and embraced the Service’s logic of an isolationist state.

**The Weakening of the Coffelt Effect**

The taming of Johnson, however, was quite difficult. The newly anointed POTUS wanted to exert and maintain his independence. Johnson immediately and publicly spurned the advice of his protective detail against walking in Kennedy’s funeral procession. He aptly said, “I’d rather give my life than afraid to give it” ("Johnson Spurns Advice, Walks in Procession," 1963, November 26). With this logic, he resisted the request made by the Service and walked to St. Mathew’s Cathedral. The *New York Times* referred to this decision as “steel determination” on Johnson’s part and noted that the Secret Service “has usually bowed to President’s wishes,” despite having the authority to veto a presidential decision ("Johnson Spurns Advice, Walks in Procession," 1963, November 26). Rufus Youngblood, the heroic agent who jumped over the front seat to cover Johnson in Dallas and who would become head of the White House Detail under LBJ, remarked that the president had the same “peculiar fatalistic attitude about his own safety” (1973, p. 152). The Service could devise a full proof mechanism to ensure the safety of the president’s body, but “there would remain the even more difficult task of getting the President to use it” (Youngblood, 1973, p. 152).

With the death of JFK, the bond between the protector and protectee collapsed. Johnson no longer trusted agents to ensure his protection. He viewed them with suspicion, believed that they were incompetent, and that they were not to be trusted with his security. The Coffelt Effect that had bound previous presidents with their protective details was greatly diminished during
Johnson’s tenure. The situation was porous enough for Johnson to constantly request help from the FBI to buffer Secret Service protection. In fact, Youngblood reported that if Hoover wanted to take over presidential protection he could have had it with relative ease. However, Hoover understood that the benefits of protection were outweighed by its costs. This distrust was compounded by the fact that Johnson did not trust or like the Secret Service. Marie Chiarodo, personal secretary to President Johnson, admitted that “at first [he] resented the Secret Service greatly” (1972, August 16, p. 5). Because the tie between the POTUS and the Service was weakened, Johnson felt that he could not get to know them on a personal level and therefore he could not trust them with his privacy or with public affairs. Chiarodo remarked that there “were all these strangers who were observing what he was doing, and how could he trust them” (1972, August 16, p. 5). This distrust was compounded by the fact that the Service was greatly expanding its personnel. Johnson would see the agency grow from a mere few hundred employees to one that had over 1,000 by the time he left the White House. Agent Youngblood, however, was the rare exception. Once the bullets started to fly in Dallas, he covered the Johnson with his life; he had fulfilled his oath and obligations to the vice-president and Johnson knew it. Because of his service, Youngblood was elevated to head of the White House Detail and rarely left his side.

For Johnson, the panoptic principles of observation yielded distrust. Bill Gulley, who worked in the White House Military Office as director and presidential liaison, believed Johnson “never fully trusted [the] Secret Service” (1980, p. 73). The Service could not protect his body or his secrets. White House Correspondent Frank Cormier recorded that Johnson exploded about the incompetence of the Service, saying, “If I ever get killed, it won’t be because of an assassin. It’ll be some Secret Service agent who trips himself up and his gun goes off. They’re worse than
trigger-happy Texas sheriffs” (1977, p. 21). The lack of trust in the Service to protect his physical body led him to go to the FBI for added security. Assistant Director of the FBI Cartha DeLoach had close ties to the White House and said Johnson “was very fearful of his own life” (1991, January 11). He did not want to take the chance of being the next JFK and therefore “he wanted that added protection” (1991, January 11, p. 11). And, the FBI had the personnel, intelligence, and trust factor to buffer the inadequacies of the Secret Service. The POTUS even demanded that the FBI station an agent outside his ranch in Texas to provide him extra security. Throughout his presidency, Johnson would repeatedly use the “FBI dart” to threaten the Secret Service. According to Youngblood, this dart “was going to be thrown at us more than once, and there was a lot that went unsaid when we would hear about the twenty-one-year-old accountants who were going to be sent over to replace the Secret Service” (1973, p. 149). Then, there was always the nagging question of whether the Service could be trusted at a personal level to guard his image, his secrets, and his behavior. Johnson would repeatedly say, “Don’t you tell Secret Service. Don’t you tell them anything” (Gulley & Reese, 1980, p. 73).

However, the feeling was mutual; the Service hated Johnson as much as he hated them, which weakened the bond between the president and his protective detail even further. He was not only a difficult president, but “wanted the same kind of treatment in the White House” as Kennedy had had (McCarthy & Smith, 1985, p. 164). Not only did Johnson have a Texas-sized ego, but he treated everyone around him as hired help, particularly his protective detail. He constantly yelled, berated, and humiliated the agents who protected him (Youngblood, 1973). Agent Marty Venker noted that he never referred to any of the agents by name; he would merely yell, “Secret Service” (Rush, 1988). To mock the president, agents referred to LBJ’s ranch as

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78 Due to this distrust, he turned to the White House Communication Agency to install an elaborate recording system. His conversation were recorded “at the ranch, in the Oval Office, in the family quarters, at Camp David, even on the road” (Gulley & Reese, 1980, p. 77).
“Volcano.” They continued to ridicule him after he ordered one agent to arrest another agent for supposedly causing his daughter to fall while she was waterskiing; agents started to arrest each other all across the ranch. And then Johnson decided to hit an agent with a newspaper a multitude of times while they were driving him around; the agent “got out of the car, opened up the back door and punched Johnson in the eye” (Rush, 1988, p. 65). He had a black eye for a few days.

Conditions grew so bad that agents not only sought to show their disdain for Johnson, but started to allegedly leak stories about him to the press. The Service in this moment no longer sought to shield Johnson from himself. It violated its own promise of silence related to presidential activities. Information management was temporarily no longer a concern for an agency that hated its chief executive officer. One day at the ranch, Johnson threatened the follow-up car that he would shoot out their tires if they got too close to him. Although Youngblood reported that “it was a simple example of LBJ being himself,” what was important was “that a magazine found out about it” (1973, pp. 147-148). The bubble that existed to protect his privacy was burst. Agents were supposedly talking to the press about the conduct of the Chief Executive. The POTUS was infuriated, threatened the institutional integrity of the Service, and then immediately reestablished the bubble, but made it clear that he “can’t have disloyalty” or he would have Hoover’s FBI take over the protective detail (Youngblood, 1973, p. 148).

This act of disloyalty was furthered compounded by the fact that that Johnson got hold of a memo that detailed the low morale in the Secret Service. In fact, it was at an all time low. Agents in the White House Detail were asking for transfers because they felt that they could not do their jobs in a proper manner. McCarthy flatly said that “Johnson had not been very well liked by any of the agents on the detail” (1985, p. 25). Johnson wanted to be treated like a king,
which meant absolute discretion, loyalty, and obedience. He took this discretionary attitude seriously, even urinating on a member of his protective detail. Johnson remarked that “it’s my prerogative” after he was informed by the agent that he was going to bathroom on his leg (Dallek, 1998, p. 186). Agent Jerry Kivett had to dress Johnson in a Los Angeles hotel room because they were running late. On another occasion, Johnson put all the agents under house arrest. With these outbursts and demands, the White House Detail did not feel embraced.

According to a memo, agents “just want to be accepted” (Youngblood, 1973, p. 147). The memo had been written by one of Kennedy’s old allies. This was another touchy spot for Johnson. He questioned whether the Service was loyal to him or Kennedy. In particular, Gulley believed that Johnson questioned whether Agent Clinton Hill was a mole for the Kennedys. Chiarodo confirmed that “he was very afraid of” Hill (1972, August 16, p. 6). Johnson noticed that he did not receive the same treatment from the Secret Service as his predecessor enjoyed. The “Irish Mafia” as Hersh referred to the Secret Service could not and did not connect very well to Johnson.

Another issue was that Johnson “had to bend everyone to his will” (Dallek, 1998, p. 186). Chiarodo admitted that Johnson felt that “they all worked for him” (1972, August 16, p. 5). His stature as president required the White House staff and his protective details to bend to this attitude. He could scream, scold, and shriek because it was his prerogative as POTUS. He acted like a monarch. Agents must be willing to accept it and be loyal to him despite their own personal discomfort. And, this is what the Service did to an extent. Agents were forced to allow the POTUS to follow in Kennedy’s footsteps and take reckless risks. In one instance, he disregarded security protocol by refusing to drive in the bullet-proof limousine to attend morning services at St. Mark’s Episcopal Church ("Johnsons Disregard Security, Protocol," 1964, April
6). Instead, he took the large sedan used by White House staffers with no agents inside the vehicle. He further violated protocol by not sitting on the right in the rear seat. According to Service rules, no one was supposed to sit or walk to the right of the POTUS.

In another instance, he followed the example of Harry Truman and decided to walk from the Blair House to the White House. Columnist Bill Henry commented that “nobody is quite as disturbed as the Secret Service over President Johnson’s carefree defiance of security measures” (Henry, 1964, April 17). He stopped for autographs and pictures and was almost hit by a motorcycle cop. He would also randomly take walks in the South Grounds of the White House, sign autographs of tourists, and even occasionally invite unchecked strangers with large packages into the White House Grounds ("Lyndon Shuns Guards’ Advice," 1964, September 28). He continued to rush into crowds every chance he could get, relied on an open-car to see the people, and adamantly stated that he did not worry about mingling with crowds (A. Lewis, 1964, October 1). The Warren Commission both advised Johnson to be more prudent in how he interacted with the public, but as POTUS he seemingly ignored their advice too. Treasury Secretary Dillon, who was named to head a new committee to follow up on the Warren Commission, commented that Johnson “thinks he has a perfect right to meet the people, and so he intends to go on doing so” (A. Lewis, 1964, October 1). In Mexico City, the Service did nothing to shield the president from the masses of people. Youngblood reported that “it would have been a perfect example of what the Warren Report said not to do” (1973, p. 192). And finally, Johnson broke the ultimate rule of never riding with the vice-president in the same car (Youngblood, 1973). In this case, he did admit that he was wrong and would not do it again.

The mutual dislike the POTUS and the Secret Service had for each other made protection problematic. The tie that had been created between presidents and agents was severely
weakened because of Kennedy’s death. The blood of a president was a direct result of the failure of an agency sworn to protect him. The Service neither had the personnel or the resources to secure the president from a well-organized attack. The power of the Coffelt Effect, which had secured presidents body and mind for more than a decade, was severely strained. Johnson pushed against his detail and his detail resisted Johnson. Both sets of reactions only increased the problem of how to protect the president.

**Reorganizing Security**

Despite this apparent indifference to security, Johnson’s protective detail was massive. His public image reported in the papers was that of an open and accessible president who was glad to mingle with the people, but this was also juxtaposed against the waves of security agents that surrounded the president at any given moment ("1,500 Guard President on St. Louis Visit," 1964, February 15; Young, 1963, December 9). This fundamental tension of trying to keep close to the people while being accompanied by 2,000 armed guards is hard to sustain for an extended period of time. Security and discipline would eventually win out. When the president went to Herbert Lehman’s funeral in New York shortly after the JFK assassination, Lawrence O’Brien noticed the immediate difference in security. He observed,

> We came into New York and the motorcade to the service went through completely empty streets. Pedestrians were not allowed outside. Everywhere you looked, you saw the military or police with guns showing, machine guns, out of windows and on edges of roofs. It was eerie (1986, February 12, p. 6).

Although Johnson retained Kennedy’s style of movement for a time, he did so under a new framework of security devised by the Warren Commission that sought to enclose and isolate the POTUS from meaningful dangers that emerge from the people—like closing down New York City with massive police and military presence. The ideas and practices of presidential security would be transformed as the Service finally took on the semblance of a modern security
organization that was equipped with the necessary personnel, resources, and knowledge to perform its duties in an effective and efficient manner. The bubble became less of an unreliable scheme as the Service strengthened its knowledge base.

The Warren Commission laid out five major problems related to presidential protection that zeroed in on the inability of the Service to adequately protect the POTUS in public spaces (1964). Even though the Service had to work under the limitations of presidential personalities and prerogative, it failed to devise a sufficient bubble to secure. The administrative structures, routines, and operations needed to be modified in order to build an isolating chamber that could resist an attack from a highly trained assassin. First, the Service lacked adequate personnel and resources. The combination of a lack of personnel and technology prevented the Service from building an expansive bubble. Second, the Service’s procedures to classify and filter potential enemies were not adequate. Again, there were not enough agents and resources to fully equip the Protective Research Section; with a lack of training and technical assistance, agents were unable to fully think through an intelligence apparatus system. In particular, the Service “did not develop adequate and specific criteria defining those persons or groups who might present a danger to the President” (Warren Commission, 1964, p. 24). The concern with looking at only direct threats to the POTUS was problematic.

Third, there was insufficient liaison between the Service and other federal agencies. The reliance on other federal agencies for information without explicit intelligence guidelines needed to be remedied. Fourth, advance work to prepare for a presidential visit had to be revamped. The Service did not have any written instructions to give to the Dallas Police Department or any police department when the president visited. Even though the Service relied on local police departments to buffer the bubble and identify threats, it failed to pass on “well-defined
instructions” (Warren Commission, 1964, p. 24). The details of what to do, when to do it, or how to do it were never given to local police departments. Furthermore, the Service failed utterly to check and detect threats in buildings along the motorcade route. The official practice of the Service during this time was not to secure buildings, but merely to have its agents and local police officers look at windows in large buildings. Finally, the configuration of the seating arrangement around the president prevented agents from coming to immediate help. Chief Baughman’s inner bubble still did not exist. There was no system of security that could manage presidential movement; access to the POTUS was too limited.

The Warren Commission recommended a host of solutions to fix the issues surrounding the inability of the Service to build a fortified bubble around the POTUS and to identify enemies to the public body of the president. The bubble needed to be mobilized, accelerated, and expanded. The more prominent recommendations involved building stronger and closer relations with federal agencies like the FBI, developing more formal and well-defined relations with local police departments, increasing security along motorcade routes, requesting additional personnel and resources from Congress, and establishing an attack on the president as a federal crime. Perhaps the most far reaching recommendation was to overhaul the Protective Research Section. The Commission strongly noted that the Service needs to have a “more useful and precise criteria defining those potential threats” (1964, p. 26). To accomplish this, it needed to have the most advanced data-processing system to house, classify, and filter threats and new liaison criteria to delineate necessary information.

With these recommendations, the Service partially deconstructed its protective apparatus and rebuilt it with a greater emphasis on armor, science, technology, and personnel. The first step in revising protection was to secure the president in his vehicle. For more than a century
now, leaders all across the globe had been easy targets to stabbings, shootings, and bombings because they were entrapped in a closed location. The Service knew this, but still made no attempts to mechanize and fortify presidential travel. Al Capone understood this principle in the 1930s and J. Edgar Hoover also implemented this practice in the 1960s as he had a fleet of armored cars for his personal use. The Service had to immediately borrow one of Hoover’s bullet-proof vehicles immediately after the assassination while it waited for Ford Motor Company to construct an armored vehicle. Youngblood commented that it was “more than slightly ironic that the President of the United States should have to borrow an armored car from one of his subordinates” (1973, p. 151). The rebuilt X100 nearly weighed 9,500 pounds and had inch thick bullet-proof class, fabric armor, titanium steel plates, and a custom 430 cid engine (Siuru & Stewart, 1995). The new armored car began to reflect the new Secret Service. The use of resources and knowledge to build a fortified containment zone in the form of a car was just the first step in isolating the president.

The Service also would soon transform its audio-visual security unit into the Technical Security Division (TSD). Before the attack on JFK, the Service was severely restricted in its ability to use state of the art equipment to contain security spaces. Robert Bouch, the agent who was in charge of the Protective Research and audio-visual concerns under JFK, admitted that they often had to borrow equipment from the Signal Corp to do its job (Bouck, 1976, June 25). Site control, however, would be revolutionized with the revamping of this one particular division in the Service. With the resources to do its job, TSD would be able to sterilize sites with a range of technologies designed to act as counter-measures. Bugs and bombs would be effectively neutralized. Holden commented that that TSD would begin to focus on “installation and maintenance of intrusion-detection, video-assessment, and access-control systems, and
installation and operation of technical surveillance equipment in support of protected venues” (2006, p. 108). This move to build TSD not only modernized protective measures, but established an entity within the Service that could start dealing with a 20th century enemy.

The Service would continue to rely on using new technology and building new knowledge to tie the president to its protective practices. An institution grounded in the practice of close protection needed to build intuitional knowledge. With this expertise, it could restore the myth of being able to command the POTUS. To achieve this, it asked for help from the Rand Corporation, the Research Analysis Corporation, and the Institute for Defense Analysis to build a bigger and bolder security screen with a heavy reliance on technology and science (Kirkham, Levy, & Crotty, 1970). These suggestions came to be called the STAR Reports. First, the Service set up a panel with the Presidential Scientific Advisor and the Rand Corporation to develop a range of new protective measures, which included devising a sound methodological procedure to identify possible assassins. However, the Service faced the real dilemma of keeping the threat index to manageable portions ("Commission Exhibit 1027," 1964). It would be easy to construct criteria that could include everybody, but difficult to devise a system that would exclude harmless threats and still not eliminate people like Oswald. Furthermore, the Rand Corporation looked into building stronger networks between the Service, the White House, and federal and local law enforcement agencies; the feasibility of detecting weapons; the use of screening devices, reliance on body armor, and new shielding and threat reaction measures for agents.

The Research Analysis Corporation took the Rand suggestions a step further by delving deeper into scientific protection to ward off an attack. Beyond its threat analysis research, the primary focus was on how to secure the president in open spaces with advance technology. It
examined the practicality of relying on armor-plated objects, including armored cars, chairs, speaker platforms, helicopters, and a blast-containment chamber. However, this was just the beginning. The Research Analysis Corporation also looked into using cold liquid weapons, liquid stream projectors, a distraction and confuse defense system, gas-propelled projectiles, an acoustic detection system, and other bizarre scientific suggestions.

The Institution for Defense Analysis was also requested to produce a report that revolved around buffering presidential security. Like the previous two research organizations, it examined how to classify threats and new security measures to shield the president. It raised the question of using doubles, looked into building better and more transparent armor, and a detection system for when bullets were fired. Other far reaching suggestions included employing light to blind potential assassins and a system that could silently use a massive amount of energy to deflect moving ballistic objects.

Most of these suggestions were discarded (Kirkham, et al., 1970). The Service would not install a smoke screen device on the presidential car to hide it during an attack or deflection devices that use energy to sidetrack objects or screens that made the president appear to be standing when he was in fact sitting or a lighting device to blind people or a high-pitched noise machine to disable people. Despite the failure to adopt advance weapon and defense systems around the president, the STAR Reports showed the importance of developing new meaning related to protective practices and illuminated two key aspects of protection. First, the Service needed to rely on armor and weapon detection systems to shield the president from danger. The agency asked the Materials and Mechanics Research Agency to deal with weight problem that plagued armored cars. The Service needed a new car that did not just place armor on top of a
predesigned vehicle; it needed a new mode of armored transportation that was built for security purposes.

In addition to this, the Service continued to look into flexible shields, armored blankets, body armor, and armored lecterns. The Office of Science and Technology helped with the weapon detection systems. Despite this move toward research, Congress was still hesitant to fund the Secret Service’s move toward greater technical specialization in advanced weaponry and detection. The agency complained to the Warren Commission that it “has no funds for research and very limited funds for the acquisition of protective devices” ("Commission Exhibit 1027," 1964, p. 820). In fact, Congress rejected the request for two technical specialist positions. Even though Congress was not fully supportive, the Service continued to contract out and ask for help from public and private entities to assist with presidential protection.

The second aspect pivoted around the automation of threat detection and classification. Before the attack on JFK, the PRS was staffed with agents with no specific expertise related to threat assessment. They were regular agents who served in the area for a few years and then left. Rowley commented that “we have been utilizing the service of agents who naturally have not been specifically trained in this area, nor have they made a career of it, and realizing the sophisticated nature of certain electronic devices, we feel at this time it is incumbent upon us to provide our own specialists” (U.S. Congress, House, Treasury-Post Office Departments and Executive Office Appropriations, 1964, p. 442). The Warren Commission explicitly stated that the PRS “should be automated and expanded so that it may more effectively identity” threats ("Commission Exhibit 1053-A," 1964, p. 900). This shift in focus toward specialists would allow the Service to begin refining its simple binary distinction between possible assassins and potential assassins. The problem was not detecting potential, but possible threats. And then
there was the problem with how to filter the massive amount of data being sent to the agency from a range of security based agencies. The Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President would help the Service in devising criteria to identify possible assassins and how to manage the overwhelming flood of information. The Service signed agreements with the FBI, NSA, Department of Defense, and other federal agencies. The memo of agreement between the Service and the Pentagon was signed in 1966, about 15 months after the release of the Warren Commission and studies had already been conducted by Rand and The Research Analysis Corporation.

The Department of Defense agreed to exchange information based on well-defined, but broad categories, which included any individual who had happened to threaten, imagine, or seek redress against the federal government, any individual who had advocated harming the public body of the president, any military or civilian personnel who had been discharged because of mental illness, any defectors who had reflected hostility toward the POTUS, former personnel that may have collaborated with the enemy, any former employees who have been discharged based on security issues, and any groups that have trained their members in the art of assassination ("Pact on Guarding Johnson Reached," 1966, April 7). Although the Service signed agreements with other agencies about what intelligence it should send and formed relations with major think tanks to identify concrete enemies of the state, McCarthy noted that these attempts failed to create viable profiles to help agents determine the difference between foe and friend. In the end, McCarthy pointed out what rested “almost entirely on the judgment of individual Secret Service agents” (1985, p. 109).

To further enhance the operations of protection, the Service reorganized itself. It created four divisions within the Secret Service headed by four assistant directors. The responsibilities
were divided by function; they included protective forces, protective research, investigations, and administration. The most notable change centered on separating the duties of presidential protection and threat assessment, which were before handled merely by the Head of the White House Detail Rufus Youngblood. To also make the organization more formal, the title of the head of the Secret Service was switched from Chief to Director and the White House Detail was transformed into the President Protection Detail (PPD). The previous title of chief was seen as too antiquated and did not represent the new Secret Service; the White House Detail was too rooted in the idea of royal guard stationed to protect the POTUS only in his residence. These name changes reflected the new ideas floating around what it meant to shield the Chief Executive in a modern age.

With the reorganization and new tools to protect the POTUS, the most significant changes, according to Director Rowley, were the “additional manpower and up-to-date equipment that would be conclusive for our type of work” (1998, August 17, p. 10). Presidential protection had become a “much more sophisticated operation” with a budget that increased between 1963 and 1965 from approximately $6.3 million to $7.6 million and an increase of agents from 400 to 600 between 1963 and 1965 ("Commission Exhibit 1053-F," 1964; Secret Service is Reorganized," 1965 November 11). The White House Police Force’s number also increased from 170 to 212 between 1963 and 1965. These increases continued to grow at an alarming rate between 1965 and 1967, especially for the Service (U.S. Congress, House, Treasury-Post Office Departments and Executive Office Appropriations, 1962; U.S. Congress, Departments of Treasury and Post Office and Executive Office Appropriations, 1966). In a short two years, the Service had a budget around $14.6 million and a personnel force that was
expected to grow from 884 to 1,161 (U.S. Congress, House, Departments of Treasury and Post Office and Executive Office Appropriations, 1966).\(^7\)

This massive influx of resources allowed the Service to take training and education more seriously. Roy Reed for the *New York Times* reported that “special training for agents was a sporadic, part-time duty before the assassination” (1967, June 25). Agent Dennis McCarthy was one of the last agents hired in 1964 before the Warren Commission recommendations went into effect. He called it the “old system” where agents were expected to wear hats and learn their jobs on the street (1985, p. 141). The training facilities the Service did have were too small and wholly inadequate for its purposes. In replacing the old method of training, the Service identified a site owned by the Department of Agriculture in Beltsville, Maryland to build a new training facility ("Commission Exhibit 1053-A," 1964). The Service equipped its new training division with nine agents; newly minted agents were required to do training on a full-time basis; irregular and informal physical and mental check-ups were replaced with regular and formal check-ups; the lack of records and documentation of performance was also revamped (Reed, 1967, June 25). Agent Harry Neal recounted that this “special security training” included teaching agents how to advance an area, how to drive the presidential limo, and how to secure the presidential limo on foot; agents had to learn how to use the running boards, jump off of the car, relieve agents, and know the security formations (Neal, 1971, p. 73). The Service even sent its agents to teach select members of local police departments about close protection and required anyone who worked on the presidential detail to go through the Service’s training

\(^7\) In 1966, the budgets and personnel figures of the Secret Service, White House Police Force, and the Treasury Guard were consolidated, which helps explain the dramatic increase in both the budgetary and personnel figures of the Service. Even with these changes, the Service’s budget in 1966 was $12 million, the White House Police Force’s budget was $1.9 million, and the Treasury Guard’s budget was $500,000. The Service projected by 1967 that it would be able to have around 644 agents on its payroll (U.S. Congress, House, 1966).
school. Overall, the new training and education focus would now be a vehicle to socialize, train, and pass on information to the new generation.

**The Disgruntled American: The Emergence of a New Enemy**

The reorganization and reemployment of resources also provided opportunities for the Service to expand protection around the president’s public and private body by classifying malcontents as serious threats to the body politic. The Service would expand its search parameters to consider disgruntled Americans who supported Civil Rights, opposed the Vietnam War, and who wanted to humiliate the president. Allen and Scott from the *Los Angeles Times* reported that the Service “is gathering information on all individuals, organizations, and groups posing a potential physical threat or ‘embarrassment’ to the President Johnson” (Allen & Scott, 1964, December 15). The Service sent memos to various federal agencies requesting any information from individuals or groups that pose any threat or embarrassment to the POTUS. The George C. Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama was told to report anyone who posed a physical or political danger to the president (Allen & Scott, 1964, December 15).

The Service expanded its measures in detecting public and private enemies of the state by relying the NSA’s MINARET program, which intercepted mail and private communication from Americans across the country. The Service submitted names “not considered a direct threat to protectees on the theory that they might participate in demonstrations against United States policy that would endanger the physical well-being of government officials” (Donner, 1980, p. 277). Most of the names were of civil rights and Vietnam protestors. Alongside electronic surveillance, the Service relied on agents to infiltrate suspected groups. Dennis McCarthy

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80 The FBI also played a key role in this image management process. After Walter Jenkins, Johnson’s chief of staff, was arrested for having sex with another man in a bathroom at the YMCA, Johnson asked the FBI to run background checks on all federal employees who work in the White House. Hoover agreed and setup an extensive system to examine the past lives of all White House employees. These background checks were supposed to identify prospective problems before they could embarrass the POTUS.
(1985) as a member of the Intelligence Division went to Berkeley to pose as a student and gather information on protestors. The intelligence gathered from such encounters allowed the White House Detail to manage Johnson’s movements in the midst of protestors.

The Johnson Administration took the surveillance of public and private enemies of the president a step further when the president requested that the FBI send a 30 man team to the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City to do intelligence work (Dallek, 1998). DeLoach contacted Director Rowley and informed him of their presence (1991, January 11). They spent the next seven days helping protect the POTUS\textsuperscript{81} and informing the White House of the activities of Bobby Kennedy, Martin Luther King, organizations on the floor that might disrupt the proceedings, or any other political maneuverings that might harm Johnson. FBI agent William Sullivan recommended and implanted wiretaps and bugs to pick up information that was immediately forwarded to the White House. DeLoach admitted that “it did give us an insight particularly as to how those organizations at the time artificially used acts of provocation in order to gain publicity themselves” (1991, January 11, p. 16). With the success at the Democratic National Convention, the White House then asked the FBI to monitor Goldwater’s campaign; DeLoach did not tell them that he would not do it, but only that “this was fraught with danger and I didn’t think we should go through with it” (1991, January 11, p. 17). The White House did not pursue this course of action any further.

**Protecting the Privacy of the POTUS**

The Service continued to be concerned with the political and private image of the POTUS. When George McGovern and Sargent Shriver visited Johnson at his ranch near the end

\textsuperscript{81} Lyndon Johnson distrusted the Service on a number of levels, which might explain why he did not actively use agents to spy on the Democrats. Even with this inter-agency squabble, Jack Albright (1980, December 11) recorded that the Service was always in command of a situation, regardless of whether there were FBI agents or military troops on the ground. There was never a question of who was in charge of presidential security.
of presidency, Venker had to make a top secret call to the Army in Washington to ensure that the helicopters were wiped of any military insignia, and the pilots had to dress in civilian clothes. Johnson did not want this political spectacle to remind anybody that the “Democrats got us into the war” (Rush, 1988, p. 66). Venker had to carefully manage the situation, ensuring that no symbols or images would harm Johnson. Information had to be carefully monitored and controlled.

Beyond the role of managing the presidential image, the Service was also concerned with managing information about his personal life. Presidential Historian Robert Dallek notes that “almost all of Johnson’s outrageous personal behavior was hidden from the public (1998, p. 188). This was partially a result of agents on his detail hiding and keeping quiet about his temper tantrums and his affairs.” As Vice President, Johnson used Secret Service agents to create spaces of privacy. Youngblood reported in vague, but clear terms that “Johnson quite often cast us in a dual role and our job at times included… assuring him privacy when he wished for it” (1973, p. 83). Venker, who also served in Johnson’s protective detail, recalled that presidents ranging from Wilson to Nixon “had griped about the way the agents cramped their style whenever they tried to get away for poker, golf, sex, whatever” (Rush, 1988, p. 125). In particular, Johnson griped a lot. According to Gulley, “Johnson’s sex appetite was legendary” (1980, p. 57). It was well-known, especially among his secretaries of his cravings.

Dallek (1998) reported on a host of affairs that Johnson allegedly committed at the White House and at his ranch. As Vice President, he had women ready for him at his office and at his ranch, who were unceremoniously dubbed the “chili queen” and the “dairy queen” (Dallek, 1998, p. 186) As president, he complained to the director of White House personnel about the

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82 Dallek also argues the press knew, but hid his personal indiscretions for political reasons. Although Johnson was “sometimes a Neanderthal,” the media “were reluctant to undermine someone as progressive as LBJ” (1998, p. 188).
secretaries. He demanded that they all be 25 to 40 years old and be willing to work long hours. He even tried to get the wife of David Brinkley into bed while she was at his ranch. Despite the apparent openness of Johnson’s openness around women, there was no mention of it among any Secret Service agent except for vague remarks by Youngblood and Venker. Even though the bubble had grown, there was not a loss of privacy for the POTUS.

However, the immediate impression for Johnson was that his privacy was gone. Lyndon Johnson’s brother shared this sentiment. He aptly described life in the White House as a prison. There was no equivocation to what it meant to live in the Executive Mansion. He lived in a jail and so did his brother. In fact, “his whole family shares that cell without walls” (S. H. Johnson, 1970, p. 12). His brother observed, “Anyone who’s elected President is serving a stiff sentence in my opinion. His whole life is circumscribed, with not freedom or privacy whatsoever” (1970, p. 12) This ranges from the “Secret Service men who continually surround you wherever you go, hardly ever letting you go off on a sudden whim” and “to a kind of public imprisonment to which the President is subjected, his every word and gesture coming under the most severe scrutiny” (1970, p. 12) What Johnson and his brother failed to consciously understand was that the massive barriers between the POTUS and the people also created a zone of privacy. Johnson was able to have his temper tantrums, affairs, and other indiscretions without public disclosure. This same zone of secrecy also applied to political affairs. His brother commented that nobody

83 The other privacy issue was how to secure two teenage girls. Unlike Margaret Truman, the girls actually accepted and liked their protective detail (Dorman, 1967; Youngblood, 1973). Luci became so close to Agent Bob Kollar that she asked him to be one of her sponsors when she converted to Catholicism. However, this did not mean that she totally embraced security measures either. She escaped from the White House on a couple of occasions. Agents solved this by taking away her car keys. When she was dating Pat Nugent, they decided to sneak out the back door during a White House party. When they returned from their night on the town, an agent grabbed Pat “by the front of his coat, lifted him against the wall and explained the facts of security life to him” (McCarthy & Smith, 1985, p. 223). They did not attempt a repeat performance. Lynda also posed no problems for the Service. Agents protected her while she at the University of Texas and later at McCall’s magazine. Like her younger sister, she was able to have a social life and develop romantic relations. She also married Charles Robb while under Secret Service protection.
could have guests on the second floor of the White House because Johnson would have secret guests visiting with him all the time; no guests meant the press could not find out about these visits. Although Johnson believed that his privacy was violated by the presence of agents, it simply was an unfounded claim.

**Expanding the Public Authority of the Service**

While the Service was protecting the image of Johnson, there was also the question of additional changes like making it a federal crime to attack the POTUS and candidate protection. Both of these questions were raised in 1964 and both of proposed bills failed to pass. The following year, however, Congress passed a bill that made it a federal crime to assassinate the president. Congressman Hoar’s initial vision in 1901 of securing the president in federal space was finally declared legal. With the threat protection statute passed in 1917, this bill only reaffirmed the public body of the president as distinct. The states no longer had any authority over the president’s body, which Dallas Police officers tried to assert over Kennedy’s body. The body of the POTUS was now solely national, and it stood above the people. With this new change, the Service also was given the power to make arrests without warrants. Agents would no longer be tied to existing law that prevented them from charging and arresting people. This power in particular is critical as it allows the Service to impose strict security procedures in the presence of the POTUS and arrest anyone who violates or harasses the president.

The next step in expanding presidential protective power was protecting candidates to the Office of the President. A bill sponsored by Congressman Charles Goodell (R-NY) sought to extend protection to the nominees of president, but the statute failed to pass. Youngblood reported that “it was going to take another assassination to get it through” (1973, p. 166). Goodell reasoned that his bill failed because “there was some inference that anyone desiring
Secret Service protection was exhibiting cowardice” (R. E. Thompson, 1964, September 30).
This was why neither Goldwater nor Miller ever appeared before Congress to ask for it. Johnson also dismissed the idea of protecting Goldwater, noting that the Senator had never said anything to him about concern for his bodily safety (1964, August 15).

The final assassination of the decade proved to be the key stimulus for changes in legislation. The shooting of Robert Kennedy in the basement of the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles revealed the defects of legislation and the lack of foresight to protect major candidates in a time of turbulence. Eight hours after the attack, the president sent agents to guard the remaining candidates for president: Richard Nixon, Eugene McCarthy, George C. Wallace, Nelson A. Rockefeller, and Harold Stassen (as vice president, Humphrey already had protection). Johnson had already asked Congress three weeks before the RFK incident about funds to help the Service with this increased responsibility. Subcommittee Chairman Senator Mike Monroney (D-OK) revealed this request remained confidential “to prevent suggestion of danger and potential threats to all candidates through publicity” (Jackson, 1968, June 6). Within days, Congress had passed a law authorizing the Service to provide protection for presidential candidates. To help the Service in this emergency situation, federal agencies like the FBI supplied personnel and resources. Candidates immediately started to use the agents for political purposes. Reporter Stuart Loory recounted that Wallace used an agent as the de facto press secretary, agents advised McCarthy on how to manage his campaign staff, and even Vice President Humphrey used agents to remove rowdy hecklers, “perhaps treading on the thin line that separates protection of the candidates from political crowd control”(1968, October 11).84

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84 Candidate protection is another great source of the formative effects of the security bubble. It can be given by the president himself, but the decision is usually made by a Congressional Committee made up of the Speaker of the House, House Majority and Minority Leader, and Senate Majority and Minority Leader. This recommendation is then passed on to the Secretary of Treasury who then appoints the Service to guard a particular candidate. Over the
The Caging of a Political Animal

The changes to presidential security created a massive bubble around the POTUS with thousands of law enforcement officials paving the way for the president to move outside the White House. Johnson was accompanied by 1,500 security officials in St. Louis, 1,600 in Chicago, and 3,000 in New York—perhaps the largest protective force ever assembled for the years, candidate protection has shown the difficulty of living life inside the bubble, even for a short period of time. Jesse Jackson experienced the full force of the bubble early in his bid for the presidency. Agents had a hard time with how Jackson chose to conduct his campaign. Jackson biographer Roger Bruns said that “the patience of the agents, as they tried to keep track of Jackson and those surround him, was sorely tested” (2005, pp. 75-76) The climate at times got so tense that fist fights broke out between Jackson’s handlers and agents. This happened on a number of occasions. Despite these moments, Bruns points out that Jackson accepted life inside the bubble. Jackson “knew the high-risk stakes of the game he was in and knew that the work of the agents was critical” (2005, p. 76). Vice presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro noted that “it was hard at first to get used” to protection (1985, p. 185). However, she remarked that she only got impatient with them one time. It was after her husband had a hernia operation and needed to get home quickly. Agents decided that they would take the long route for safety measures. She recounted, “I was angry because we always seemed to take the most time-consuming ways to get home. Outside of New York I didn’t feel it, but this was my city, and I wanted to get to my own house. So I crabbed and fumed in the backseat en route. They did it my way, but of course, they were right. And I felt terrible about it afterward” (1985, p. 185). Despite this one case, she said that the “Secret Service agents were one of the best things about the campaign” (1985, p. 184). She felt completely safe with them, noting that she never had to worry about locking her front door. Michael Dukakis felt a bit differently about the Secret Service. His wife Kitty wrote that the Secret Service hurt his campaign by shielding him from the public. He relied on “personal contact.” However, she noted that when “the Secret Service took over, he lost that precious touch” (1990) In fact, she decried that “he couldn’t move around freely” (1990). Reporter Hunter S. Thompson also observed in 1972 how the Secret Service dramatically alters the interaction between the candidate and the people. He casually observed, “The arrival of the Secret Service personnel has changed the campaign drastically. Each candidate has ten or twelve SS men surrounding him at all times” (1973, p. 139). This mini-bubble and its effects was one reason why John McCain also delayed protection. He felt that the Secret Service would interfere with his ability to connect with the people. He said in 2008, the Secret Service “inhibits, obviously, my ability to have close contact with people” (C. Wallace, 2008, April 6) However, the stance of maintaining a connection to the people has limits. The would-be president accepted protection because “as we get more and more visibility that we recognize the inevitable” (C. Wallace, 2008, April 6). Security expert Jack McGeorge called McCain selfish for not taking a detail earlier. In parroting the Secret Service line, he argued, “He is a public figure. And it is not about him.” (Meserve, 2008, April 8). His protection is needed for the safety of people around him and for the nation as a whole. In contrast to McCain’s desire to be close to the people, Ross Perot did not like the Service because of the spectacle that a security detail created around his body. He said, “I don't want to be driven around in a motorcade, and I don't want to be led around by the Secret Service. I don't need the ego stroke for a title” (1992, p. 65). He went on to say that they closed the highways, sent limos by air, and trained agents to learn how to ski. These measures are unnecessary and to an extent undemocratic. This is how Hunter S Thompson saw protection in the beginning phases of candidate protection in 1972. He observed, “I was not accustomed to working in a situation where any sudden move around a candidate could mean a broken arm. Their orders are to protect the candidate, period, and they are trained like high-strung guard dogs to react with Total Force at the first sign of danger. Never hesitate. First crack the wrist, then go for the floating rib…and if the ‘assassin’ turns out to be just an oddly dressed journalist—well, that’s what the SS boys call ‘tough titty’” (1973, p. 148). He goes on to say that “everybody is a suspect, including journalists” (1973, p. 148). The formation of security units around the bodies of candidates allowed the Service to train potential presidents to understand what life is like the inside the bubble. Furthermore, it changed how candidates interacted with citizens because anyone and everyone is a threat.
president ("1,500 Guard President on St. Louis Visit," 1964, February 15; Act to Guard President on Chicago Visit," 1964, April 22; Johnson Guarded Heavily at Fair," 1964, May 10). These security forces were necessary to handle a new emerging security threat for the Service and the POTUS. Crowds had become unruly and uncontrollable. With JFK, they were often large and frenzied, but they were still controllable; there was no overt animosity and hatred. With LBJ, crowds had transformed into an enemy. Agents had to start taking extensive and controversial measures to contain and control the masses. In dealing with this new problem, the Service also devised new motorcade rules, which included never stopping for any red lights and always having a follow-up car directly behind the president filled with six agents (R. E. Thompson, 1963, November 28). Agents were stationed outside doors, inside buildings, and on roof tops to secure the outer perimeter of presidential protection.

Despite this massive show and acceptance of force to secure the president, the New York Times argued that Johnson “has missed the point of the Warren Commission” ("Presidential Security," 1964, October 2). His appetite for greeting and mingling with crowds was dangerous and irresponsible. He had failed to realize that he is “presidential property” that belongs to the public. Yes, the people had right to see the POTUS, but not in a manner that resembled a mob scene. The answer to presidential protection was the internalization of the ethos and logic of presidential protection. The New York Times points out, “The President himself, and not the Secret Service, is his own best security agent” ("Presidential Security," 1964, October 2) The act of self-discipline based on the modus operandi of the Secret Service was perhaps the only method to adequately secure the president from threats to his public body. The creation of Truman’s mobile prison to accompany the POTUS was not sufficient to shield Johnson from
dangers of an unruly mob; the man himself would have to begin to accept, learn, and obey the principles of security.

The Service sought to tie Johnson to security measures by scaring him, relying on new techniques and meaning to construct a stronger bubble, and rebuilding its personal relationship with the president. The first and easiest method was to employ fear. Despite his bravado, the president was scared for his life, and agents used this to force Johnson to adhere to security guidelines. Bill Gulley described how agents used fear to remind the president about his own bodily safety,

The Secret Service kept Johnson scared to death. They were still in shock from the Kennedy assassination and never missed an opportunity to frighten the President. Before he went anywhere they’d tell him all about the possible assailants that were last known to be in the area or that could be coming to the area, or that they had lost sight of but might possibly turn up in the area (1980, p. 71).

Even using fear to control the POTUS, Johnson was tough to manage during his first couple of years in office. He was belligerent and wanted to be in control, plus he did not entirely trust his protective detail. Youngblood reported that the “activities and nature of Lyndon Johnson resulted” in limited security arrangements with the president willing to ride in open cars across the United States. For Youngblood, “all that was missing was another Lee Harvey Oswald” (1973, p. 173).

However, Johnson’s willingness to dismiss security was short-lived. The mingling stopped and the barricades emerged shortly after the election in 1964. The second half of the 1960s proved to be a defining moment for the enclosure and capture of the Chief Executive. The Service was able to convince the POTUS that the people were no longer to be trusted. The masses were unpredictable and dangerous to the president. From 1965 to 1973, the sentiment was reinforced as the capitol was often under siege from rioters and war protestors who often
targeted Johnson and Nixon. In one situation, 14 civil rights demonstrators took a tour of the
White House and sat in a hallway on the first floor; they were there seven hours until Johnson
commanded Youngblood to have them removed without creating a media frenzy; he did so by
discreetly placing police vehicles in the rear driveway and forcibly escorting the protestors to the
back of the White House, avoiding the press in the process.

Daily White House protestors expanded to include massive rioting and demonstrations
that caused significant problems for guarding the president in a city under siege. The city had to
be occupied by the military on a number of occasions to prevent various groups from burning the
city, attacking the Pentagon, raiding the White House, or overrunning the Capitol. The first of
these events started when a group of Vietnam protestors marched on the Pentagon in 1967. The
military called up 1,200 troops and 500 military police from Fort Brag to prevent protestors from
overrunning the Pentagon. During this time, Johnson realized that the city was vulnerable and
started to devise plans to secure it (Gilbert, 1968). Although Washington was under threat, it
was clear that “everybody knew that there were plenty of hand-picked troops, with special
training in riot control, nearby” (Gilbert, 1968, p. 2). In particular, there were the elite 3d
Infantry at Fort Myer, the 91st Engineers at Fort Belvoir, the Marines at Quantico, and the 6th
Cavalry at Fort Meade to protect the city. Despite these potential forces, the city still
experienced riots for three days in April 1968 after the assassination of Martin Luther King. It
took more than 11,500 troops to contain the rioters. The Service put everybody on call, helmets
and gas masks were passed out, a command post was established in the Executive Office
Building, and the helicopter was on constant ready to evacuate the president to Andrews Air
Force Base for a direct flight to Hawaii (Youngblood, 1973). The occupations of Washington
lasted 12 days. Two months later the city had to use extensive police and military force to control the uprising at Resurrection City on the Mall.

With the massive uprisings across the nation, Johnson began to discipline his own movements and actions with the help of the Secret Service. As early as 1966, Johnson was using the military to ban the public from runways ("Security Measures for Visit by Lyndon to Be Tightest Yet," 1966, November 3); the usual presidential spectacle of arriving to a large party delegation was being eliminated. The POTUS could no longer trust an unscreened public from entering his presence. Harry McPherson, special counselor to the president, noted that Johnson finally broke. He resisted for a long time by taking walks around the White House grounds and freely mingling with the people, but “I think it got to him--the reports of threats that were made against his life of dangerous people who were at large” (1969, April 9, p. 37). In the last year of his presidency alone, 12 to 14 people had jumped the White House fence, two to three thousand threatening anonymous letters were sent, and constant phone calls to the White House threatened his life.

McPherson believed that Johnson finally told himself, “I'm going to get out of here one day, and I'd like to live at the Ranch above ground” (p. 37). With this attitude, “he was a prisoner in the White House--he could not go anywhere” (1969, April 9, p. 37). The only place he did go was to military bases; the Service demanded that it was too dangerous to go anywhere else; the masses were too wild. With this mentality, the Service was able to convince Johnson not to attend Martin Luther King’s funeral.85 Youngblood reported that the “President reluctantly heeded our advice” due to the dangers “of thousands of sympathizers, black and white, [who] were already moving toward Atlanta from all over the country” (1973, p. 224). The

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85 Youngblood noted that Johnson attended Robert Kennedy’s funeral a few months later because there “were no intelligence reports of the sort that had stopped the President from going to Atlanta” (1973, p. 227)
same decision was made a few months later concerning the Democratic National Convention. Decisions like this to remain inside the White House Bubble on a continuous basis, according to McPherson, were disastrous for him politically, but on the “basis of the fact that he is alive and might well be dead if he had followed my advice, I think they were right” (1969, April 9, p. 37).

While the Service confined the POTUS to sterile locations with no real public contact in the last year of his presidency, LBJ made an attempt to break free from the hold of the Secret Service. Johnson admitted that he wanted to “be a people's President, and in order to do so, you have to see the people and talk to them and know something about them and not be too secluded” (1964, August 15). He routinely ordered the police officers that stood between him and the crowd to be moved from their stations. Even with these attempts, he realized that he was a prisoner in the White House. In 1964, Johnson described his previous year in the White House as an inmate. He said, “I came back to the White House and got behind that lonely, black, iron fence, and the Secret Service turned the gate lock on me, and there I have been most of the time for 11 months and 3 days” (1964, October 27). This partial isolation would become all-consuming in the next five years. The 1960s were a scary time for the Secret Service and for the POTUS; Johnson did not want to lose his life and the Service did not want to lose another president. With Washington being swarmed by protestors, angst in the nation’s capitol was at an all-time high. With the assassinations of three high profile public figures the Service was scared into modernizing protective measures and the POTUS was scared into isolation. Both entities become prisoners to the fear of security: they were mutually reinforcing.

The second method of securing the president was relying on the new meaning that had been created after the assassination. The findings from the Warren Commission, studies conducted by think tanks and major research entities, the emergence of TSD, and the Service’s
shift toward viewing close protection as an object of student transformed the ability of agents to rebuild zones of protection. Standard operating procedures had changed to fit the realities of an enemy that could strike from a crowd or a building. With these changes, the Service used new techniques to find and isolate enemies of the state, relied on massive manpower to secure the president, imposed new regulations on his movement, relied on advance technologies to secure sites, and started to use armor to better protect the president.

Finally, the strained relationship between the president and his protective detail was moderately healed. The Coffelt Effect was partially rebuilt. Even though the Service had experienced a massive influx of new agents, Johnson was able to get to know intimately the inner circle of agents known as the Protective Protection Detail. For Johnson and future presidents, the size of the Service would not impact the relation between the protector and protectee because there was always an established set of agents who protected the POTUS. The change of how Johnson viewed the Service was best encapsulated in his relationship with Clint Hill. The president heavily distrusted and disliked Hill, who was made famous for saving Jacqueline’s life after she crawled onto the trunk of the presidential limo in Dallas. With this move, Hill was often assigned to protect her, which made Johnson believe that he was a mole for the Kennedy family. Despite the initial distrust, Chiarodo remarked that the president “became very fond of Clint Hill, who he was very afraid of” (1972, August 16, p. 6). This transition from doubt to trust allowed the Service to do its job. In fact, Johnson became close to a host of agents that he came to personally know. Stu Knight, Bob Taylor, Jerry Kivett, Lem Johns, and his most beloved Rufus Youngblood were members of the detail that Johnson trusted and liked. At the end of presidency, LBJ had a remarkable moment with his Secret Service. He said,

President Harry Truman once said that the Secret Service is the only boss the President really has…I think all the Presidents that have worked with the Secret
Service have shared that same feeling…For more than 8 years now my life and the life of my family have been entrusted to you. I have never made a secret of my admiration for you. But the means by which you protect the President and his family, and the Nation's highest officials, are something I think that the country doesn't fully recognize or appreciate. As long as I live I am going to have a very special memory of this extraordinary group of men and a sentimental, affectionate feeling for each of them. This may be a surprise to most of you because I don't express that sentiment through the days. I know that sometimes you are surprised at the way I react to your orders and sometimes I am surprised at the way you react to mine… If I could rewrite them, I would change a lot of them because I have abused you, I have criticized you, I have been inconsiderate of you, and all of those things that you know better than I do. I have spent more of my time telling you what you did wrong than what you have done right. But Luci, Lynda, and Mrs. Johnson remind me every day of how blessed you have been to them…You hear a lot about the FBI. I admire them and I applaud them. But I don't yield to them a bit in integrity and competency when you talk about the Secret Service (1968, November 23).

But the most important statement was made to Rufus Youngblood about that dark day in Dallas. Johnson simply remarked, “His life was being offered to protect mine” (1968, November 23).

This sentiment captured the meaning of the Coffelt Effect: agents will die for the POTUS, even those in line to assume the presidency. With this oath, presidents must be expected to obey.

The containing of the president was a complex affair with LBJ. It is with every president. The Service had to begin dealing with an enemy who could strike from close or afar, crowds that were uncontrollable, and an independent president would had a hard time listening. With this president, the Service relied on fear, knowledge, and Coffelt Effect to begin trapping the president’s body and mind once again. Although it was tedious and torrid affair, the POTUS succumbed to presidential protection. Just like Truman before him, LBJ began to understand that the shackles of the presidency were necessary.

**Politics**: The Special Case of Richard Nixon’s Secret Service

The protective measures initiated with the succeeding president were a predictable outcome of what LBJ’s Secret Service had created. The apparatus of protection was now
fortified and imposing. Upon entering office, Nixon was surrounded by a phalanx of republican guards who were supposed to both capture and do the bidding of the president. These changes in presidential security were succinctly reflected at Nixon’s inauguration ceremony. Youngblood observed that security looked like a war zone. The president was enclosed in a “bombproof and bulletproof” car, helicopters roamed the sky, and 15,000 soldiers and officers were on the ground to do combat with upset Americans (1973, p. 232). Youngblood commented that “the times had changed in America…and along with the times, Secret Service security had changed.” Protection began to reflect a world on the verge of war and a nation tearing itself apart.

McCarthy recounted that these conditions resulted in the Service having “to be ready to do battle with hundreds, sometimes thousands, of our fellow citizen every time the President left the White House” (1985, p. 64). For the Service, enemies were to be found everywhere from upset Americans to Soviet ideologues.

In the next six years, the Service would have to further isolate the president inside a fortified bubble, make attempts to discipline unruly crowds, categorize between friends and enemies, and handle becoming a private police force for the POTUS. With these changes, the Secret Service became politicized. Security measures were impaired because of political considerations and the Service had to work on a level that mostly excluded marginal elements of society. Operating on the margins of establishing what was normal and abnormal behavior, the Secret Service had the potential to include the marginal, but tended to work and move around democratic norms to protect the body and life of the president. This political pattern of labeling private and public enemies of the president had grown with the development of the Secret Service.

Taking Control of the Service
The liberal and promiscuous use of the Service was on the immediate mind of Nixon. The protestors and hecklers proved to a major thorn to his ego during the 1968 campaign, believing that the tactics of his political adversaries had gone too far. Crowds needed to disciplined and controlled. He ordered John Ehrlichman to “have the Secret Service rough up the hecklers” to rectify the situation (1982, p. 50). The agents assigned to protect Nixon refused to be employed as bouncers to squash and filter dissent; the special agent in charge did not want to risk the accusation of violating free speech. The alternative solution was to solicit and accept offers from local police departments to remove protestors and have Nixon’s own advance team act as a “flying goon squad” to rough up the opposition. Although the Service resisted this initial offer to help Nixon resolve his political problems with crowds, it would not last. As POTUS, Nixon and his inner circle would use the Service for personal and political ends.

Nixon Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and others in the White House staff were acutely aware of the importance of the Service in accomplishing political objects, whether it was befriending or removing uncooperative agents, handling disrespectful crowds, making them add to the presidential aura, or using them in discreet private matters. Nixon knew that they could not use the FBI in partisan contests, apart from using “them against demonstrations” (Nixon Watergate Tapes, 1973, Mar 17). While the POTUS noted that the “Bureau is never used” for partisan issues, he mentioned that the “the Secret Service was used, but that’s their job” (Nixon Watergate Tapes, 1973, Mar 17). The implicit belief that the Service was political and was designed to carry out political objectives was the driving force for how the White House staff treated the protective detail.

To build and solidify this relation between agents and the president, Nixon’s White House staff used strong-arm tactics to remove agents who were perceived to be “Johnson” or
“Kennedy” men and held social events like receptions where the president could build relationships of trust. First, agents like Rufus Youngblood were labeled as a “LBJ loyalist” and “fell out of favor of the White House” (Cheshire, 1971, October 19). He was no longer permitted to eat in the White House mess and was force to move across the street to work at a desk. Another agent was shipped off to Birmingham, Alabama and demoted from a Grade 17 to a Grade 15. Maxine Cheshire of the Washington Post reported that agents are being “banished to less prestigious, lower-paying posts outside of Washington” if they were considered loyal to Kennedy or Johnson (1971, October 19).

Another means to add to the presence of the POTUS was to beef up White House security in a symbolic manner. In this case, Nixon converted the White House Police Force into the Executive Protection Service (EPS), which changed its name to the Uniformed Division (UD) seven years later. The 250 White House police officers were transformed in 1970 to a newly designed unit that reflected the royal household guards of European monarchs. They were equipped with specially designed uniforms to be worn in the presence of the POTUS during special ceremonial events (Robertson, 1970, January 28). Inspired by Nixon’s visit to Europe, the White House police officers were now to be dressed in a manner that fit the presidential persona. They had to wear shakos inspired by West German traffic officers, glossy black-holsters, and white tunics with a black belt. In the next five years, this force of 250 would expand to 850 members to more adequately protect the Executive Mansion with the added responsibility of providing security for foreign diplomats (Lamb, 1975, April 4).86

86 With its name change in 1970, Nixon also delegated additional jurisdiction to the Executive Protective Services. Its mission also included protecting foreign diplomats in Washington D.C. This Household Guard would now be assigned to protect the mansions of diplomats. To accomplish this added security function, its personnel numbers jumped from 250 to 850 officers with a new 12 week training program (Roberts, 1991). In 1977, the name would be changed again to the Uniform Division (UD). Although it is a police agency, its four main responsibilities still revolve around protecting buildings. They include: The White House, the Naval Observatory, and Foreign
House Police Force took a step forward by reverting to the traditions of what it meant to protect a sovereign; security was not only about protection, but securing the image of the person who sits on a throne or in an Oval Office.

Apart from using uniforms to instill a sense of pride among the EPS, the president used social events to build relationships of trust between him and Secret Service agents. He partly had to do this because of the size of the Service had dramatically changed since the Kennedy and Johnson years. It was no longer a small agency with a few hundred employees. Three years into his presidency, the Service had more than 1,000 agents and more than 2,500 total employees (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury, U.S. Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, 1972). These gatherings gave Nixon the opportunity to meet, chat, and create a bond with his protective detail and agents stationed outside the White House, which then could be used for extra-protective functions. In one meeting with Haldeman, Nixon requested and commented, “Get 100 men then and it’s 200 and I shake their hands and thank them and you look (unintelligible) too (intelligible)” (Nixon Watergate Tapes, 1972, June 23). Nixon devised this clever strategy partially because “they know a hell of a lot about us” (Nixon Watergate Tapes, 1972, June 23). Haldeman confirmed this sentiment, pointing out that because “they are friends, and they have such overriding respect for you and your family” (Nixon Watergate Tapes, 1972, June 23). In another conversation, Nixon calmed down Haldeman over a situation by noting that he has “a top flight fellow that’s from the White House detail” (Nixon Watergate Tapes, 1973, Apr 20).

Protecting the Public and Private Image of the President: The Explosion of Enemies
By actively relying on the Service, Nixon was able to use agents to accomplish political ends that were separate from protection. Nixon’s strategy worked so well that Venker commented that “there were times when Nixon called upon the Secret Service to do his personal bidding and the agency had hopped to it” (Rush, 1988, p. 58). With this relation established, the POTUS used agents to create barriers, labeled protestors as private enemies to shield him from embarrassment, relied on the Service to spy on political rivals and potential troublemakers, and even used them to hide some of his personal indiscretions.

The most notable use of the Service for political purposes was the spying on rival Democratic candidates. Agents who were Nixon loyalists passed on sensitive information to the White House. The worst of these incidents occurred with an agent assigned to guard George McGovern. This unknown agent was disturbed that McGovern willingly associated and stayed with a “subversive” at his home in Massachusetts (U.S. Congress, Senate, The Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, 1973, p. 148). The agent passed on this information to an assistant in the White House Steve Karalekas, who then disclosed it to Charles Colson. The agent promised to keep channels open and divulge more information as it became available. The disclosing of confidential information not only plagued the lower levels of the Service, but was found within the upper echelons of the organization.

A top official in the Secret Service, according to the Final Report on Presidential Campaign Activities, passed on to an intelligence file on McGovern (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1973). The report alleged that McGovern had attended a fund-raising event in Philadelphia with known former Communist sympathizers. It was suspected that this information was delivered to Colson who planned to publish it. Agent Venker also reported that agents used their close access to report on and deliver critical information to the White House (Rush, 1988). In response to
these allegations, the White House conceded that some staffers “had circulated memos in 1972 urging the use of the government agencies like the Secret Service to gather information on President Nixon’s political opponents” (Toth, 1973, August 11). The *Final Report on Presidential Campaign Activities* concluded that these activities were not confined to the 1972 election, but had also occurred during his first term in office. It said, “This political utilization by the White House of information obtained from the Secret Service during the 1972 campaign was very similar to earlier events by the White House to obtain information on individuals from investigative agencies” (U.S. Congress, Senate, *The Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities*, 1973, p. 148).

One of these prior acts of using the Service as an instrument for political gain revolved around Congress. Nixon employed the Service to spy on and follow Speaker of the House Carl Albert (D-OK). Ehrlichman reported that both the “Metropolitan Police and the Secret Service kept the White House fully aware of Albert’s social troubles” (1982, p. 196). He drank heavily, tried to drive home drunk on occasion, and would have to be continually driven home by the police. Nixon thought he was a drunk and an ineffective Congressional leader. With this intelligence, the POTUS wanted to use this information to blackmail Albert, but Nixon’s Congressional Liaison director Bryce Harlow refused. Nixon even got Colson to try to plant a story in the news about Albert’s activities; he never succeeded in placing a story.

This perception of the Service becoming lackeys for the White House was only reinforced by a memo written by Nixon aide Pat Buchanan to Attorney General John Mitchell and from media reports that revealed how the Service treated protestors (U.S. Congress, Senate, *The Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities*, 1973). Buchanan asked for permission from the Attorney General to authorize “covert operations” for the White
House Advance Team (1973, p. 201). Ron Walker, head of the advance team, had set up plans to subvert political distractions. Through the use of logistics and harassing protestors, the White House team could help sterilize an area. Although Buchanan said his memo was rejected, it was clear that the White House Advance team along with the Secret Service used questionable tactics to discipline crowds and quash opposition. Walker admitted that they would strategically place groups with pro-Nixon signs in front and moved protestors to the back. Walker also sought to “insure that ‘undesirables’ did not show up at Presidential rallies (1973, p. 201). The White House Advance Team did this by using the “fake ticket routine” (1973, p. 201), which consisted of them asking “for the ticket of an individual and then declare it a ‘fake’ and escort the individual from the rally” (p. 201). Another tactic that was discussed, but not implemented was gathering some “cowboys” together and if any trouble materialized that “they would release the cowboys and ‘let things happen’” (1973, p. 202).

Even though the White House Advance Team was the prime mover behind these events, the Service was involved in helping these political advance agents implement their plans. Nixon’s protective detail was all too willing. According to Special Agent Joseph Petro, the Presidential Protective Detail (PPD) who surrounded Nixon were “disturbingly arrogant” (2005, p. 94). The first incident of this smugness that Petro saw firsthand was a case in Akron, Ohio. The Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) ordered another agent to strip protestors of a North Vietnamese flag that they were waving outside of Nixon’s hotel room. The reason the SAIC gave the order was “because it’s an embarrassment to the president” (Petro & Robinson, 2005, p. 94). The attitude of arrogance and above-the-law mentality by the PPD was a reflection of the president himself. Petro argued that the “PPD reflects the president” and the more the president is out of line so is his protective detail (2005, p. 167).
The Service continued to run political interference for the president, especially at political rallies. Since Johnson, disorderly crowds had become a serious problem for the Service. It had a difficult time in bubbling and disciplining them in a suitable manner. Working with White House staffers to represent the president in the most favorable light, the Service began to manage crowd behavior through a simple process of exclusion. This was the most effective way to create a safe and docile crowd who favored the president. The most notable of these events occurred in Pekin, Illinois, Nashua, New Hampshire, and Charlotte, North Carolina. During these events, agents “tore up anti-Nixon signs and physically removed peaceful citizens from the scene because they were thought to be politically opposed to the president” (A. Lewis, 1974, February 18). In North Carolina, 11 people sued the Secret Service for barring them from protesting against the president. Bill Henkel ordered the Service to profile protestors and keep them out of the event. Agents “profiled people coming through, allowing well-dressed men and women and turning away anyone who looked like a possible problem” (Petro & Robinson, 2005, p. 30). In Illinois, the Service once again mishandled protestors. However this time a “list of 25 witnesses to the incidents has been sent to the Senate Watergate Committee” for investigation of the activities by the Secret Service ("Claim harassment during Nixon Visit," 1973, July 6). These witnesses testified about agents removing people from the presidential parade route and removing antiwar signs.87

The Service also started to keep dossiers on celebrities who made disparaging comments against the president, the war, or the government. Celebrities including Jackie Robinson, Dr. Benjamin Spock, Muhammad Ali, Joe Louis, Jane Fonda, Tom Hayden, and Groucho Marx were

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87 The Service argued that Peter C. Murphy, a White House advance person, was responsible for the events in Illinois, not Secret Service agents.
labeled and watched by the Service. Venker noted that in addition to the Service’s long list of potential assassins there was another list that included Nixon’s potential adversaries, which included demonstrators, celebrities, and politicians (Rush, 1988).

**Schmittian Crisis: The Conflation of Friends and Enemies**

Not only were political enemies watched, but Nixon started to use the Service to watch friends. He conflated the two, seeing almost no distinction between ally and foe. In one sense, this was a Schmittian crisis. The delineation of who is an enemy is defined by its opposite. With few to now friends, paranoia set in as anyone and everyone is a threat. For Nixon, this is exactly what happened: he began to see enemies in his own family, his own cabinet, and his own party.

To find these foes, POTUS ordered the Service to place his brother under surveillance out of fear that Donald would embarrass him; his initial request to the CIA failed, and he did not trust Hoover enough to ask. Ehrlichman called in Pat Boggs from Secret Service headquarters to make the request and he immediately agreed, showing no signs of hesitation (1982). The Service did it for Johnson, so why not for Nixon. Agents followed Donald Nixon to New York, New Orleans, Las Vegas, and Southern California; Ehrlichman received reports every three to four days on Don’s whereabouts and activities.

However, the Service felt that physical surveillance was inadequate; if the POTUS wanted real observation, then agents would have to begin electronic surveillance. Woodward and Bernstein reported that because Donald had close ties to Howard Hughes, Nixon felt that “wiretapping apparently was the only means by which the President felt confident of monitoring what his brother was doing” (B. Woodward & Bernstein, 1973, September 6). By bugging Donald’s phone at work and at home and placing him under physical surveillance, the Service

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88 The Service started to watch Eartha Kitt after she asked tough questions of Lady Bird Johnson about the Vietnam War at a White House luncheon. The embarrassment of the First Lady was cause to put her on the Watch List (Rush, 1988).
argued that this had been “related to the protective function” (Naughton, 1973, September 7). It had gleaned a lot of information that could possibly hurt the presidential image. Donald was involved in supposedly big business deals with John Meier, asked for a multimillion dollar finder fee from Howard Hughes for helping him buy American West, and was going to try to influence his brother to appoint a personal friend and district court judge to the Supreme Court. Things only got worse when a Las Vegas hotel hired Don to bring powerful politicians to its grand-opening.

During these six weeks of surveillance in 1969, what Nixon and Ehrlichman learned most was that the “project had worked perfectly” (Ehrlichman, 1982, p. 178). Information/intelligence gathering by the Service could be trusted and therefore expanded to other areas. Information management was soon to take on political implications. This event coupled with “the FBI taps and surveillance that Kissinger and Nixon had placed on journalists and staff people had been effected without discovery” (Ehrlichman, 1982, p. 178). The White House could use these measures without fear of being exposed; this only emboldened Nixon’s White House to expand and rely on physical surveillance as a tool to expose leakers and informers, not to mention gathering valuable political information. Woodward and Bernstein reported that Nixon authorized the use of 17 wiretaps on administration officials and news reporters (1973, September 6). These wiretaps as administered by the Service’s Technical Security Division were designed to eliminate national security leaks; they were all done without court orders on the justification that national security concerns trump judicial review.

With the reliance on secret bugs and monitoring devices, Nixon had reached a point where he could no longer trust his own people; the distinction between friend and enemy was too hard to make. The presence of foes provided Nixon the justification to put countless people on
surveillance. What was also surprising to some was how and why the Service was so easily manipulated by the president. Anthony Lewis of the *New York Times* wrote in 1974 that “it is surprising and worrisome, that the Secret Service evidently caved in so easily” (1974, February 18). It was a disconcerting trend of the White House’s complete “manipulation—the perversion—of the Secret Service.” Youngblood issued similar warning years earlier about how Haldeman and Erlichman were “trying to run the Secret Service now ‘like a Los Angeles advertising agency or Disneyland’” (Anderson, 1971, October 19; Cheshire, 1971, October 19). They had brought in their own people and expected obedience to the person of the president, not to Office of the President. The focus on shielding the private body from danger whether it be real or symbolic allowed the Nixon presidency to gain a great degree of control over the protective apparatus.

*The Personal and Secret Needs of the President*

This faith in his PPD also allowed Nixon to appropriate the Service for personal needs, whether it was using the Service to build nicer compounds at San Clemente and Key Biscayne, or installing a private recording system in the Oval Office, or if it was hiding private secrets within the Nixon household. In stark contrast to Johnson, Nixon trusted his protective detail. And with that influence, he convinced the Secret Service to renovate his private homes in San Clemente, Key Biscayne, and Grand Bahama. The White House staff persuaded the Service to justify the expenditures on security grounds and get the GSA to pay for them. With no centralized oversight, the Service and the GSA added a host of features to the president’s two homes. They included a $66,000 fence, a $412,000 helipad, $50,000 a year for landscaping, 200 government employees who were permanently stationed at these houses, a pier for his boat, a fireplace, an exhaust fan, and even lanterns (Presidential Protection Assistance Act, 1975).
Overall, they spent approximately $17 million from the public treasury to maintain and improve his homes in California and Florida. They spent $9.4 million in capital improvements and $7.6 million to station personnel (Secret Service agents, house cleaning crews, cooks, etc) at these locations.

Congress soon discovered the Service’s indiscretions in allowing the POTUS to build two vacation homes in the likeness of the White House. Congress retaliated by holding a series of hearings to investigate how and why this happened, but only after Nixon resigned.89 Representative Jack Brooks (D-TX) disappointedly noted that “if Presidents were content to live in a lifestyle expected of them by the America people” then they would not have to intervene (Presidential Protection Assistance Act, 1975, p. 3). He noted that they have a splendid White House with a swimming pool, a movie theater, tennis courts, and a putting green as well as a 180 acre resort at Camp David to escape the pressures of Washington. Even with these public houses, the POTUS felt the need to have a wait staff at his homes, a permanently stationed palace guard to protect the residence, and amenities to fit his lifestyle. In his defense, Nixon noted that he was not alone in using the Service in this manner (1978). He reported that Johnson spent at least $5 million of the taxpayers’ money on his homes at the LBJ Ranch, the Haywood Ranch, and the boathouse in Llano County. Kennedy was perhaps the worst with his homes in Hyannisport, Middleburg, Palm Beach, Squaw Island, and Atoka.90


90 According to Nixon, the expenditures on JFK’s homes were lost when his naval aide who was in charge of the records accidently dropped the papers overboard while he was in Europe or the Philippines. Johnson’s records could not be assessed because they were classified by the Pentagon.
What was more critical was that the Service had to rebuild these homes because they became a site of command for the Commander-in-Chief. Nixon admitted that these homes were used “for the kind of privacy that is impossible in the capital” (1978, p. 954). However, he also argued that these homes need the same resources and equipment as the White House and Camp David. In an age of nuclear strike capability, these multiple sites of command must be armored, updated, and secured in a manner to allow the president to use the nuclear football. No expense could be sacrificed if it endangered national security. Fences to helicopter pads to the wiring needed to be reliable enough to protect the POTUS and the body politic.

Like his predecessors, Nixon also installed a security recording system in the White House. Both Kennedy and Nixon relied on the Service to carry out these duties while Johnson used the White House Communication Agency under the auspices of the Pentagon to install and monitor the system because of his fundamental distrust of the Service. Because Johnson relied on the military, Nixon had it immediately pulled out; Hoover warned Nixon that the military recorded everything and could not be trusted (Gulley & Reese, 1980). When Nixon finally wanted a system to record events, he went to the Service; it was the one agency he could trust not to use it for personal reasons. The problem with the system, however, was that it was turned on merely by sound, while Kennedy and Johnson’s systems were manually operated by the presidents themselves. Nixon was hardly aware how much he was being recorded, but he did rely on the Service to maintain his secrecy.

This level of secrecy also extended to private moments within the Nixon household. Both Richard and Pat had a problem with alcohol.91 According to one anonymous agent, Pat’s

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91 Betty Ford also had problems with alcohol and pain medication while in the White House. One agent reported, “She was in a stupor all the time. We took her off Air Force One rigid as a board, carrying her down the steps. I blame Ford. He always seemed to be in another world. He never saw what was right behind him” (Kessler, 1996, p.
problems manifested themselves during the first term in the White House. He said “I think at one moment she was almost an alcoholic” (Kessler, 1996, pp. 41-42). She would have three to four martinis a day and would often be so drunk that she did not recognize people. The problem persisted throughout the White House years with things getting worse as the Watergate scandal dragged on. Woodward and Bernstein reported that “she was becoming more reclusive and drinking heavily” (1976, p. 166). The White House staff would catch her in the pantry during the early afternoon hours. This is the same time that the president also started to drink. The same agent observed that Nixon could handle no more than two drinks before he got tipsy. Although he never consumed alcohol in public, he started to drink every other night at the White House. The agent said, “He would loosen up, start talking more, and smile. It was completely out of character” (Kessler, 1996, p. 41).

There were other incidents that the Service kept quiet about the Nixon family. Pat Nixon smoked heavily and denied it. She also had a very hard time with the security bubble. She needed her personal space and privacy, but agents would not afford her that luxury. One time she wanted to visit a friend without any protective detail (McCarthy & Smith, 1985). In order to appease her, agents let her go, but followed her in a discreet manner. An agent also revealed that the Nixons church-going habits were mostly for show (Kessler, 1996). Once they left the White House, the former president stopped going immediately. Another agent Marty Venker noted that the POTUS “liked to swear and sometimes he’d try to get into locker room talk” (Rush, 1988, p. 195). However, he was quite inept about trying to be dirty. His arrested adolescence manifested itself when he got “friendly with one woman on St. Martin” (Rush, 1988, p. 195). These minor acts of keeping quiet about the temper tantrums, the drinking, the smoking, and the “dirty” talk

68) Although her husband was oblivious to the situation, the Service was not. Agents had to hide and contain her problem, even from her husband.
under wraps is just another manifestation of the function of the bubble. Agent McCarthy
admitted that security “entails protecting the privacy of the First Family” (1985, p. 229).

Public Enemies of the State

In watching the private adversaries of the POTUS, the security bubble also expanded to
better protect the public body of the president. However, McCarthy believed that protection was
seriously compromised under Nixon and his lackeys. Even though the Service had the resources
and the personnel, security was always triumphed by political concerns. He bluntly stated, “In
reality, where a president or presidential candidate goes rarely has a thing to do with security.
The decisions are nearly always based on political rather than security considerations” (1985, p.
207). It was the White House who makes the decisions, not the Secret Service. McCarthy
pointed out that agents merely provided the routes and determined how many agents were
needed. Eisenhower’s intent of using a political advance team to help agents with the prep work
had debilitating security to an extent; publicity concerns had superseded the Service’s desire to
maintain a healthy level of security.

With his focus on publicity, Nixon was able to create presidential stages on the campaign
trail and at the White House (Kumar, 2007). Journalist Brit Hume commented that Nixon
“created the contemporary model for the event” (Kumar, 2007, p. 121). Camera angles, media
access, crowd location, placement of security barricades, lighting, sound, and other variables
were employed to build the stature of the president through the careful manipulation of
contextual variables. Photographer David Hume Kennerly said that the Nixon figured out how
to have “this incredibly well-staged event” (Kumar, 2007, p. 121). The ability to stage screens in
such an effective manner partially diminished the power of the Service to implement its security
measures. However, it did enable them to more effectively setup press zones, which created a
fair amount of separation by excluding the masses from having direct access to the president. Although the White House Advance Team seemed to be winning most of its battles with the Service at this point, it would be short lived. McCarthy’s pessimistic analysis of the Service’s inability to control the POTUS was temporary as succeeding presidents would begin to side with the Service. He also failed to see Youngblood’s point: security was often so extensive around the body of the POTUS that it did bind him.

What was clear to both Youngblood and McCarthy was how the Service transformed its capacity to track down cranks and crazies and real and absolute partisans. During Nixon’s tenure, the Service created an extensive watch list with individuals that it considered to be dangerous to the United States. After the JFK assassination, the Warren Commission recommended that the Secret Service refine its methods of determining who enemies of the state were after its discovery that the Service did not have adequate intelligence, especially in regards to the communication and intelligence flow between the Service and the FBI. The Warren Commission report stated that “it will require every available resource of our Government to devise a practical system which has any reasonable possibility of revealing such malcontents” (1964, p. 463).

In developing criteria to find and filter malcontents, the Service developed the concept of dangerousness. It was a term that was based on formal and scientific reasoning to create a reliable profile of a presidential assassin. The term was used in an attempt to develop predictable criteria of who was and was not dangerous. This would allow the Service to try to develop predictive frameworks and use psychological models to help inform the decision-making process. Although the initial articulation of the concept was based on simple generalizations and profiles, the Service began to look at threats through a scientific lens. By injecting the perceived
authority of science, the idea of a threat was transformed into a concrete concept that could be measured. With the development of the concept of dangerousness and the government’s insistence that enemies of the state are everywhere, the Service devised broad criteria of who was a potential threat.

By 1974, the Service had 84,000 files on potential assassins according to one report. Agent Venker said that the guidelines probably contained an estimated 100,000 to 180,000 names (Rush, 1988). Senator Sam Ervin effectively labeled this practice as a “mass surveillance system unprecedented in American history” (Congressional Record, 92nd Congress, 1st session, vol. 117, p. 31874). Ervin said that “no one is interested in denying the Government the right to collect information it needs for legitimate purposes, including the enforcement of the laws,” but the state should not have an “indiscreet and indiscriminate gathering and use of such information” (Congressional Record, 92nd Congress, 1st session, vol. 117, p. 6648). The Secret Service data bank, in particular, was “one of the most sophisticated information gathering systems in government” (Woo, 1970, November 19). The agency devised simple and broad categories to determine possible enemies of the state. In 1969, the Service issued liaison guidelines about information to be shared for the FBI, NSA, CIA, and local police (Rush, 1988).

These liaison guidelines ranged from threatening statements, to irrational statements, to abusive statements directed toward the United States government or one of its officials, to efforts to embarrass high officials, to anti-American demonstrations. Un-American comments to anti-American comments could be classified as a possible sign of dangerousness, which allowed the Service and other agencies to track, monitor, and bother anyone it perceived to an enemy. Its classifications were so broad to be meaningless. The internal enemy had evolved from anarchists cranks to hippies and demonstrators and the external enemy from Germans to
Russians. However, one enemy remained the same: the crazy. Overall, there were 11 guidelines (U.S. Congress, Senate, Review of Secret Service Protective Measures, 1975). The most questionable consisted of information regarding civil disturbances, information about anti-U.S. demonstrations, and individuals seeking to embarrass a ranking government official.

The more reasonable guidelines were based on terrorist affiliations, attempts to harm or threaten government officials, and people who have been trained to assassinate and kidnap. And perhaps the most important guideline for the Service was information about people who seek redress from the government for imaginary grievances. The Service was still solidly fixated on the mentally deranged as the primary enemy of state. Ervin noted that these “guidelines seek a wide variety of information of any tangential significance for discovering possible assassins” that range from “people taking part in demonstrations, be they anti-American, civil disturbances, or just plain demonstrations” (Woo, 1970, November 19). In effect, this opens “the possibility at least of having every one of hundreds of thousands who peacefully marched in recent months entered into Government security files” (Woo, 1970, November 19).

Representative Scheuer reaffirmed these fears and brought out that these new techniques have “led to a clear abuse of power by those who would guard our national security by the widespread use of wiretaps, electronic bugs, and extensive surveillance techniques on own citizens” (Congressional Record, 92nd Congress, 1st session, vol. 117, p. 13978). However, Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist maintained that these measures were appropriate and that the Justice Department would “vigorously oppose” legislation that would limit the ability of national police agencies to gather intelligence on suspected enemies. Rehnquist argued that judicial review of such cases would equate to “opening the door to unnecessary and unmanageable judicial supervision” (Congressional Record, 92nd Congress, 1st
session, vol. 117, p. 6648). To control dangerous subjects, state security/police agencies must use a range of practices to monitor and regulate deviant individuals and populations (communists, civil rights protestors, Vietnam protestors, and home-breed terrorists).

The Nixon White House, like Johnson’s staff before, was still actively trying to maintain peace in Washington. The streets were so dangerous when Nixon entered the White House in 1969 that the Service advised him that it would be unsafe for him to take a walk. Things were so bad that Nixon ordered the White House lights to be turned on at night to reduce crime around Pennsylvania Avenue. In the fall of 1969, the situation became worse. The federal government called up 9,000 troops, which would be augmented by 1,200 National Guard soldiers, and 3,700 police officers (Delaney, 1969, November 13). In 1971, national and city officials had to activate nearly all the 5,000 members of the Metropolitan Police, 1,400 members of the National Guard, and 4,000 soldiers with 6,000 on call to respond to the Mayday Protests (Barber, 2002). This spring offensive sought to shut down the federal government. During this siege, more than 12,000 people were arrested in two days.

In response to these turbulent and unpredictable conditions in Washington, the number of White House protestors was capped, Secret Service personnel and resources spiked, and agents were employed to monitor and spy on suspect organizations. To deal with nuisances outside the gates of the White House, Departments of Justice and Interior jointly announced that it would limit the number of protesters outside its gates to 100 people and allow 500 people to protest in Lafayette Park ("Rally Rule Asked for White House," 1970, July 14). The restriction was justified in terms of protecting the POTUS. The new permit system would require protestors to submit an application 48 hours in advance and seven days ahead for larger demonstrations. The
ACLU countered by pointing out that Lafayette Park could hold 9,000 people, which would pose no threat to the president. A crowd that size was, however, deemed as a security threat.

The Service also buffered protection through increases in personnel. By the end of 1972, the Service had 1,242 special agents on its payroll (U.S. Congress, Senate, Review of Secret Service Protective Measures, 1975) and asked for a $56.3 million budget (U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S. Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, 1972). These numbers stood in contrast to 400 special agents and a budget of $5.7 million a decade earlier. The Service relied more on paid informers to extract critical intelligence in order to better manage these protestors. Expenditures for informers more than tripled between 1970 and 1976 from $62,000 to $193,000 (U.S. Congress, Senate, Review of Secret Service Protective Measures, 1975). By 1974, the number was as high as $148,000. These measures were coupled with agents infiltrating groups like the Black Panthers, the Weather Underground, and Students for a Democratic Society. Petro justified these excursions in order to investigate whether individuals might be planning to use the organization “as a front for violent actions against the president of the United States” (2005, p. 95). In the course of these probes, the Service arrested the national chief of staff David Hillard of the Black Panther party for making threatening statements against the president, and it made several inroads into the S.D.S. and the Weather Underground.

As the Service was a viable resource in watching over radical organizations on both the left and the right, Haldeman continued to “do everything in his power to turn the Secret Service into his own private police force” (McCarthy & Smith, 1985, p. 29). In these cases, the agency with direction from the White House decided which disgruntled American should be treated in

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92 These numbers also reflect the changing mission of the Secret Service. Its protective mission had expanded over the past decade, which required additional personnel and resources. The Service was given jurisdiction to protect former presidents, the vice-president, presidential candidates, and visiting dignitaries. In 1975, it would also be given the responsibility to protective foreign diplomatic missions and the vice-president’s family.

93 In the course of this undercover work, agents investigated John Kerry.
an imperious manner. The maltreatment began with the Watch List: it had become political. According to Venker, agents watched right-wing groups like the John Birch Society and the National Youth Alliance, but “spied most on would-be trouble-makers on the left” (Rush, 1988, p. 59). Venker noted that “if you opposed the Vietnam war, or happened to be black, you stood excellent chances of making the Secret Service’s list” (Rush, 1988, p. 59). Groups like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, NAACP, Gay Liberation Front, Chinese Hand Laundry Alliance, and Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) were included on the list and watched. Agent Joseph Petro (2005) was one of the agents assigned to monitor protestors and infiltrate the VVAW since it was deemed as an organization that could be plotting a coup d'état and potential members might be planning to harm the president. Although the FBI invested more resources into watching the VVAW along with its spokesperson John Kerry, the Service monitored and even talked to Kerry a few times to determine how dangerous of a threat the group posed to the protection of the president. The Service monitored more than 400 groups that were deemed dangerous (Rush, 1988).

**Secret Service Resistance**

Despite these overtly political acts by agents, the Service resisted some of Nixon’s ploys to control crowd behavior. A few agents believed that citizens had rights to express their opinions at presidential events, even if it interrupted the event. McCarthy argued that, “I doubt if there was a man on Nixon’s detail who agreed with the aims of the antiwar movement, but we frequently went to great lengths to protect the constitutional rights of the demonstrators, occasionally even acting against the wishes of the White House staff, who wanted to use the Secret Service to protect Nixon from political as well as physical harm (McCarthy & Smith, 1985, p. 46). One of those cases was in Cleveland when the White House advance team told the
Service to turn away protestors from a scheduled presidential event. The agents resisted this command on the grounds that it violated basic rights. In response, the White House staffers created two checkpoints that separated dissidents from supporters (Rush, 1988, p. 56).

Another incident of employing the Service for political purposes occurred in Rhode Island. Haldeman devised a scheme in which the rope line was to be dropped when Nixon came off of Air Force One in order to allow his supporters to make a “spontaneous show of affection” by running across the tarmac to meet the president (Rush, 1988, p. 68). This plan was nixed by the head of the PPD Bob Taylor who threatened to arrest Haldeman. However, the rope scheme was put into effect the next day in North Carolina. Soon after, Taylor grabbed Haldeman by the throat and threatened him for taking too many liberties with the president’s safety. For Venker, Taylor represented the best of the Secret Service. Venker argued that the Service at times can and does protect the marginal and excluded. He commented, “I was really proud of the way the Service disdained brute force, and the way it impressed upon agents the idea of freedom of speech, the right of all people to protest their grievances. Particularly after I saw what other law enforcement agencies were like” (Rush, 1988, p. 52). Even with these moments of heroic behavior, it was clear that the Service had become engulfed by Nixonian politics; agents were expected to adhere to White House expectations and take the necessary measures to protect the private image of the president by removing the unruly from the presence of the president. Crowd discipline was best ensured by removal, not protection. Although some agents resisted, others willingly complied to serve the needs of the POTUS.

**Real Threats and Real Assassins**

Despite the interplay between political ploys and Secret Service resistance, there was real danger, which exposed additional flaws to the protective apparatus. One of the biggest threats
was Nixon himself. Even though the POTUS was firmly protected inside and outside the White House, Nixon was still tough to protect. He just did not like protection. At one time, he tried to cut down his detail, but failed. Agent Venker speculated whether “he went out of his way to take his place as a martyr beside Jack Kennedy” (Rush, 1988, p. 186). He often resisted Secret Service suggestions, especially on the road. He made several public appearances that jeopardized his security. Venker recounted that in the Middle East he willingly stood “in an open-sided railroad car as it rolled past hundreds of thousands of Egyptians,” in Saudi Arabia he rode “in a car without a Secret Service driver, and in revolutionary Syria, by ordering that the roof of his limo be opened so he could stand and wave.” He also made attempts on the road to enrage crowds by taunting them. Even in the face of a planned attack, Nixon was sometimes tough to control. It was reported that six black militants had planned to assassinate the president on his motorcade ride through the French Quarter in New Orleans. Venker noted that the only way to get Nixon to justify calling off the motorcade was leaking the story to the press (Rush, 1988). It was a clever information leak that forced the president’s hand. Although Nixon was mad, he accepted the precaution. Yet, he also strangely listened to Secret Service commands. McCarthy noted one time he “obediently” returned to his car after he treated “my comment as though it was an order” (p. 26).

Even with Nixon’s bouts of resistance, the president was entrapped by layers of security. This was fortified by the official creation of “zones of protection.” This statutory change in 1970 declared that the Service could arrest “whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs, resists, or interferes with a Federal law enforcement agent engaged in the performance of the protective functions” (Public Law 90-331). This effectively allowed the Service to permit only authorized personnel in a space designed for protective purposes. For Nixon, it was the tool that enabled the
Service to begin welcoming party loyalists and excluding the opposition. In fact, the presidential stage would soon be coupled with zones of protection to maximize the presence of the president. What was more important, however, was the ability for the Service to design a security apparatus that could effectively deal with the crowd problem. Agents had the power to command the crowd. Hecklers and protestors who interrupted presidential events could now be subject to the visible hand of federal law enforcement officials; people could be made to be docile through a simple process of exclusion. The Service also created a parameter around the president’s body that had to be made sterile. This would allow the Service to start screening and searching anyone gaining access to a zone of protection. The process of filtering was backed with the power to exclude and detain. Subjects who wished to gain admittance to the presence of the president would have to be authorized by the Secret Service. Although this process of creating zones of protection would further develop over the next 10 years, it was at this moment that agents were granted the jurisdiction to create a bubble with the power to include and exclude.

These zones of protection reinforced the Service’s defense in depth strategy. The outer perimeter was now formalized and securitized to such an extent that was hard to get close to the president. One attempt that failed to materialize partly because of these measures was an attack by Arthur Bremer. This mobile transient tracked Nixon across several sites, but was never able to get close enough because of the security and the size of protest crowds. After six times trying to breach presidential security, he gave up; there were too many guards and too many people. He turned to a target with less protection and who was more accessible to the people. George Wallace was the perfect target. He loved crowds and constantly pressed the flesh. And, he was willing to speak in shopping malls, which the Service told him not to do. Bremer was able to get within a foot or two of the Governor in a rope line at a shopping mall in Laurel, Maryland and
unload four bullets into this body. George Wallace, Jr. recounted that Special Agent in Charge Jim Taylor did not object to Wallace’s move to come in contact with the people. Wallace said, “Jim Taylor and I—Jim was in charge of the Secret Service—we looked at each other, and we didn’t object, because there was no reason to object. We didn’t have any threats. Nothing had been thrown. And it looked like a good place” (1975, pp. 207-208). With no visible threat and the appearance of safety, the Service made no moves to confine his movements. Yet, this was not the case with the POTUS. Nixon was prevented by agents from getting too close to mobs of protestors.

However, there were two additional threats that emerged in February 1974, which exposed significant limitations in presidential security. Private Robert Preston stole a helicopter from Ft. Meade in the middle of the night and headed to the White House. He buzzed the White House at 1 a.m., which alerted agents to his presence and possible danger. He came back into White House airspace around 2 a.m. and was able to land on the South grounds without any substantial resistance; agents had no anti-aircraft missiles and had no idea how to combat such a threat. They fired shotguns at the helicopter until it landed. It was clear that the Secret Service had no contingency plan for such an attack. Yet, the Secret Service spokesperson stated that “we feel that officers of the executive protection service did a good job.” The more interesting statement was that the Service viewed this attack as an object of study that needed to be analyzed. The spokesperson continued, “We're certainly going to look into this incident and

94 When Wallace ran for the presidency four years later his whole campaign was shaped by Secret Service protection. Agents had drained any semblance of who George Wallace was. New York Times reporter Drummond Ayres commented, “The campaign is an armed camp with a bulletproof lectern, searches of spectators and newsmen at rallies, and Secret Service agents and bodyguards near at hand” (1976, February 1). He continued, “This is what the Wallace candidacy has come to, the candidacy of the man who professes to represent grass-roots America. No other Presidential candidate, with the possible exception of President Ford, is so isolated from voters” (1976, February 1).
evaluate it” (Austin & Leebaw, 1974, February 24). It was clear from this attack that the vaunted airspace over the White House was easily penetrable.

Samuel Byck would also try to exploit the air space around Washington to attack the president. In a plan he called “Pandora’s Box,” he attempted to hijack Delta Flight 523 in order to crash it into the White House. His attempt was an utter failure. He made his way onto the plane after killing one officer, but was never able to get the plane off the ground. Police snipers disabled Byck after he had already wounded the pilot and killed the co-pilot. After two shots tore through his stomach and chest, he turned his .22 on himself. The attack uncovered more areas of concern for the Service. First, White House airspace was vulnerable. The Service had no anti-aircraft missiles, RPGs, or any other mechanism to defend the White House from an air-based attack. The president was totally vulnerable. Second, agents had interviewed Byck in 1972, but determined he was not a legitimate threat. His psychiatrist confirmed that sentiment to the Service. A month before the attack he once again emerged on law enforcement screens after attending the inauguration. Authorities questioned him and he denied that he had any thoughts of trying to kill Nixon. It was clear that Byck was in the process of thinking about an attack; there were clear signs of attack-related behaviors. With its failure to ascertain how dangerous Byck was, the agency became increasingly aware of its inability to acutely predict violent behavior and determine from interviews the threat levels of individuals. But what was more disconcerting was that the assassinations and attempted assassinations of the 1960s continued to plague the 1970s. With each successive attack, presidential security was treated as an object of study and protective procedures were strengthened.

Conclusion
Richard Nixon’s Secret Service was an interesting entity. During his span as president, the Service was able to take significant strides in securing Nixon in a time of unrest. With a nation at war at home and abroad, the Service saw enemies of the state anywhere and everywhere. The war, the civil rights movement, and general unrest caused the Service to build and rebuild its protective measures to ensure that the people could not infiltrate its zones of protection. It was just too dangerous. No one could be trusted. This was the lesson that Nixon had taught the Service. Because of the magnitude of these threats, the Service constructed secured multiple sites of command, created massive Watch Lists, and fortified the isolated chamber that enveloped the POTUS.

Nixon was not only able to shield his body with the Service, but he was able to transform it into a weapon to be used against both public and private enemies of the state. His family, members of his cabinet, the press, the political opposition, and the perceived other were in danger of being spied upon by the Secret Service. Six years into his presidency, Richard Nixon would resign before being impeached by the House of Representatives with charges that accused him of misusing the United States Secret Service and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The charges alleged that Nixon directed and authorized agencies to “conduct or continue electronic surveillance or other investigations for purposes unrelated to national security, the enforcement of laws, or any other lawful function of his office; he did direct, authorize, or permit the use of information obtained thereby for purposes unrelated to national security” (House of Representatives, 1974). By liberally using these agencies for his own personal and private benefit, Nixon not only disregarded the constitutional rights of countless citizens, but transformed the Secret Service into his own private police force, which was able to gather
information on political enemies, curb the right of citizens to voice their grievances against the government, and spy on suspected groups.

The ability and ease with which the Secret Service transformed into a political arm for the president was a chief reason why Congress was so hesitant in creating this division to protect the president in the late 19th and early 20th century. Senator Stephen Mallory warned of having the POTUS surrounded by “men in uniform with sabers,” and Congressman Wotten cautioned of having a body of guards do the private bidding of the Chief Magistrate. The close relations that exist between protector and protectee make the Service more prone to becoming a highly politicized agency. This role of looking after the POTUS required the Service to make fundamental political distinctions and decisions in regard to protecting his life and image. In the case of the Secret Service, Nixon used that relationship to watch his private political adversaries and public enemies of the state.

**Fending Off Foes: Gerald Ford’s New Enemy**

Like Johnson before him, Nixon was largely confined to the White House. Even though he made occasional shows of public affection by mingling with crowds or overt attempts to show his independence, the POTUS was not a man of the people. The isolated status of the president led George McGovern in 1972 to accuse him of not engaging with the people. He flatly stated that Nixon is “afraid of the people” and “he’s hiding” (Kneeland, 1972, September 15). The same charge could not be made against the newly anointed POTUS. Gerald Ford loved to mingle with the people; he had an affinity toward crowds like JFK. He deeply believed that the president should adhere to the Jeffersonian maxim of being of the people. Ford purposely left behind Nixon’s ethos of secrecy by going out to the people and embracing them. With such openness, the pretension of the office seemed to elude Ford. Aldo Beckman of the *Chicago*
Tribune argued that Ford’s campaign lacked tradition as he did things his own way (1974, October 13). He told the military band not to play Hail to the Chief, but the University of Michigan fight song. And he actually mingled with the people. Rather than just plunging into throngs of people, Beckman noted that people are not pushed around by the Secret Service, but “are allowed to mill around the chief executive as he signs programs, chats and puffs on his pipe” (Beckman, 1974, October 13).

This friendliness even extended to the Presidential Protection Detail. Instead of treating people like tools for political gains, one agent commented that “he made it clear from the beginning that we were to walk with him, and not behind him” (Beckman, 1974, November 10). The POTUS and his aides knew their names and were friendly. However, this accessibility would soon be challenged, and Ford like many of his predecessors would have to yield to the demands of the ethos of the Service. It was not safe to be among the people; there were too many dangers that lurk in an unscreened crowd. The two attempts on Ford’s life in a span of 10 days once again reformed presidential security and tied the president to his protective detail. The Secret Service immediately set up a series of studies to evaluate what happened, what went wrong, and what could be done in the future. The pockets of uncertainty created by attacks once again allowed the Service to intervene and create new implications concerning presidential security.

**Attacking the POTUS**

Agents are trained to be suspicious and treat everyone as a possible attacker. Schmittian politics was deeply embedded within how agents think and operate. In one situation, Ford decided to leave the basketball game he was attending in Portland and suddenly a young man in a red blazer moved swiftly to come into contact with the POTUS. With speed and agility,
Richard Keiser, head of the PPD, intervened and roughly escorted the subject before he could make contact. Keiser noted that this situation was “routine” as it happens about 80 percent of the time at any public appearance made by the POTUS (Beckman, 1974, November 10).

And then there are the more dangerous situations. One of those occurred a few feet from the front doors of the White House on Christmas Day when a young black man wearing Muslim garb crashed his car through the White House gates and drove up the drive-way, screaming that he had explosives. The standoff took four hours to resolve as he stood there with a detonator in hand. In the end, the alleged explosives were highway flares. However, this was the second time in one year that White House defenses were breached. A helicopter and now a car going only 25 to 30 mph were able to easily breach the first-line of defense at the White House.95 Because of the relative ease of breaching the perimeters of White House security, there were immediate calls to treat this incident as another object of study. Chief of the Executive Protective Services Earl Drescher verified this sentiment. He said, “I’m sure there will be studies and evaluation of this incident” (Weil, 1974, December 26).

**The Fromme Attempt**

Despite changes in protection due to its studying of presidential security, the Service still struggled with providing the president with basic body-defense protection. This was most clearly seen when the Service failed to prevent Lynette “Squeaky” Fromme from getting within two feet of the POTUS in Sacramento. Once again, Ford was mingling and talking with the people as he walked the 150 yards from his hotel room to the California State Capitol building. The crowd was unscreened and the only security measure employed was the body defense

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95 White House security did improve after this event. The Service installed a new iron fence that was able to repel another gate-crasher in 1976 (“White House Gate-Crasher,” 1976, December 1). In another incident earlier that year, the Service gunned down an intruder who scaled the White House fence after refusing to stop. When the POTUS is at the White House as he was in this case, the Service shows little restraint in using deadly force (“White House Calls Killing of Intruder Guard’s Duty,” 1976, July 26).
strategy: stick as many agents around the president so if an attack does occur they can deflect it
with their bodies. The inner security that was lacking with Truman and Kennedy was firmly
established. As the president reached Fromme, she raised a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol.
The president flinched. He recounted, “I saw a hand coming up behind several others in the
front row, and obviously there was a gun in that hand.” In contrast to the president’s untrained
reaction to the event, agents went into direct action. Agent Larry Buendorf noticed the
movement and reacted instantaneously by shielding the president and grabbing Fromme’s arm
and subduing her while the other agents forced the POTUS to bend over to reduce his size as a
target. The quick and precise movements by the Service perhaps saved his life as his assailant
was just a mere arms-length away. These instinctive responses were notable and distinctive in
comparison to how some agents reacted during Oswald’s brief shooting spree.

But there were several pressing and disturbing questions about the incident. The Chicago
Tribune asked a series of questions about the event (“Fromme stirs controversy,” 1975,
September 7). First, the Tribune asked “does the government have the right to maintain dossiers
and keep track of persons with a history of violence or those who make violent threats against
the government” (“Fromme stirs controversy,” 1975, September 7). Fromme was a loyal disciple
of Charles Manson, defending him on a continual basis during his trial for the homicides of
seven people. Two months before the attack in Sacramento she had given a press interview
stating that Ford was merely continuing the policies of Nixon, who had condemned Mason to his
fate in jail. With her public appearances and statements, the question remained whether she
should have been on the Service’s trip file of about 300 people or even in the general index file
that contained 47,000 people. She was not on either list for she had never made an explicit threat
against the public body of the POTUS. She was an outspoken critic of Ford and a follower of a mass murderer, but did that deserve her a spot on the Service’s watch list?

One column for the New York Times argued in the affirmative, noting that the “statement and her background of instability and association with extreme violence should have made the Secret Service concerned about her” ("Almost," 1975, September 7). The FBI and California State police both had files on her. She had made threats against the United States government, and she appeared in a documentary saying that people should be intimately familiar with their rifles ("Fromme stirs controversy," 1975, September 7). However, most law enforcement officials noted that there was probably no record due to the increased pressure of preserving civil liberties and a desire to not declare so many political dissidents as adversaries to the state.

According to the Tribune’s article, “it was clear in several interviews after Friday’s near-tragedy that federal lawmen saw Miss Fromme’s attack as justification for maintaining intelligence files” ("Fromme stirs controversy," 1975, September 7).

The second issue that the Chicago Tribune raised was how Fromme got a mere two feet from the POTUS with a loaded gun. Anonymous FBI agents and other law enforcement officials were perplexed over the ease of gaining such close proximity to the president ("Fromme stirs controversy," 1975, September 7). This simple question pivots on the ability of the POTUS to recognize and reconcile the logic of isolation and openness. An editorial in the New York Times noted that the incident reveals the fundamental and “irresolvable conflict between a President’s natural and healthy desire to retain easy contact with the people he leads and, conversely, his obligation to himself and to the nation to keep out of harm’s way” ("Guns and Leaders," 1975, September 6). The Service’s answer to this dilemma happened to be seclusion, while presidents have responded variously with the practice of shielded openness and the idea of complete
openness. Most presidents have sided with the former by the time their presidencies have ended; the Service almost always wins, but it takes an enormous amount of energy to get the president to that point.

At this time, Ford took the latter response, arguing with vehemence that he belonged to the people and therefore the people had the right to see and touch him. He proclaimed that he had no “intention of allowing the government of the people to be held hostage at the point of a gun” (Abramson, 1975, September 13) and declared that “this incident under no circumstance will prevent me from contacting the American people as I travel from one state to another and from one community to another” (Matthews, 1975, September 7). William Safire of the New York Times argued that Ford’s response was typical: “I’m not afraid; no nut is going to keep me from mingling with the people” (Safire, 1975, September 11). It typifies the bravado of many U.S. presidents. Secret Service spokesperson John Warner argued the opposite, noting “it has been a long-time desire of ours that the people we protect do not expose themselves to crowds or a large segment of the population” (Matthews, 1975, September 7). The people cannot be trusted and the only source of security is whether the POTUS decides to embrace the ethos of the Secret Service: isolation from crowds. Safire notes this is also the typical response of the media: “we must recognize, sadly, that with so many nuts in the land, candidates are foolish to expose themselves to the people” (Safire, 1975, September 11).96

Sarah Jane Moore

Ford appeared not to be listening to either the Service or the media. One agent remarked, “It’s a nightmare trying to follow him” (Matthews, 1975, September 7). However, Ford did make slight changes. He agreed to start wearing a bullet-proof vest on a temporary basis and two

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96 Safire reasoned further that presidents only desire to go into the crowd for a psychological boost and to make the six o’clock news. It has nothing to do with having a metaphysical connection to the people. His solution is for the president to make unannounced stops, not planned ones.
and half weeks later he took the advice of his protective detail not to mingle with the crowd outside the St. Francis Hotel in San Francisco. Press Secretary Ron Nessen said that “Ford skipped shaking hands with the throng outside the St. Francis Hotel Monday because the Secret Service at the last minute expressed concern for the President’s safety” ("Agents Asked Ford to Skip Handshakes," 1975, September 24).

He was fortunate that he listened. Ford, who was a mere six feet from his limo, was fired upon again. This time, the assailant was across the street and in the second row of a massive crowd that numbered around 3,000 people. Sarah Jane Moore, a 47 year old middle class woman who was active in the civil rights movement and tried to join several radical organizations, was the second woman in 10 days to try to assassinate the POTUS. Although a disabled Vietnam veteran, Oliver Seeple, was credited for deflecting the 38-caliber handgun, it is still highly doubtful that she had the aim and accuracy to hit the president from a distance of 40 feet. In quick reaction, two agents along with Donald Rumsfeld formed a protective shield around the president and pinned him against the curb (J. Coates, 1975, September 23). They placed the POTUS in the bullet-proof limo and continued their formation as he left the scene. He was not wearing his bullet-proof vest.

It appeared that the Service had once again deflected another attack against the POTUS. This time, however, the agency would come under severe scrutiny. Safire remarked that in a mere two weeks the Service has “gone from heroes to bums” (1975, September 25). The issue revolved around how the Service dealt with Moore after a series of strange events. Two days before Ford arrived in San Francisco, she called the local precinct and told them that she was going to test the presidential security system (R. West, 1975, September 23). The next morning the police confiscated her unloaded .44 handgun with a couple of boxes of ammunition, issued
her a citation, and informed the Secret Service of her behavior. Moore even asked the police officers to arrest her, but they told her that her offense merely deserved a citation. If her gun was loaded, the officers could have detained her (R. West, 1975, September 23).

The Service immediately put a lookout team to monitor her at Stanford University. Two agents visited her later that night to determine whether she was a risk and concluded that she posed no threat to the president and therefore did not detain her for the 72-hour waiting period and pulled the surveillance team. Even though Moore was a known radical, a failed FBI informant, and clearly showing signs of mental fatigue by informing the police that she was going to test the system and then asking to be arrested, the agents still settled on the idea that she was of no danger to herself or to the POTUS. How could agents trained to detect mental instability have failed in such an obvious situation?

Meanwhile, the agency was looking at its trip file of 722 names and figuring out who might pose a problem to the president in the Bay Area. Agents conducted nine other interviews with people across the city. Moore was forgotten, even though she called the Secret Service three times on the day of the shooting and identified herself on one of those calls. Without being able to get hold of the agents who questioned her, she purchased a brand new .38 caliber Smith and Wesson, drove to downtown San Francisco, and waited in the crowd for three hours to see the president. Her hands were in her pockets the entire time, another sign the Service watches for, but failed to spot. She opened fire the moment Ford left the hotel. The attempt was quick and rash.

Ford’s rhetoric was typical to the event, but his response revealed the adjustments to the protective apparatus. He told his son that “we’re not going to let a couple of people stop the American people from seeing the President” (“Ford Won’t Stop Seeing the Public,” 1975,
September 23). Press Secretary Ron Nessen went a bit further by stating that the “president believes it would fundamentally alter the American democratic system if he were to ‘take refuge in the White House’” (Naughton, 1975, September 24).

Despite Ford’s lofty rhetoric of maintaining contact, his subsequent actions screamed protection. Nessen announced five days after the attack that Ford’s October schedule would be revamped and security “will be a larger factor in preparing the President’s schedule” (“Security is Tight as Ford Goes Out," 1975, September 27). His trip to Chicago at the end of the month resulted in sizable security force consisting of 1,200 police officers and 100 Secret Service agents (J. O'Brien, 1975, September 30). Protective measures included the monitoring of at least 20 people, the reliance on electronic devises to screen people, and requirement that all cameras and reporters be set-up two hours in advance; the presidential site had to be prepared in order for agents to makes their final bomb sweeps and make the area sterile (J. O'Brien, 1975, September 30). Although the Service did not have magnetometers to screen people and places, local cities like Chicago started to use them after the attacks on Ford ("Security is Tight as Ford Goes Out," 1975, September 27).

This method of containing and sealing a site hours before the arrival of the president would soon become the norm of protection. As this practice developed, the press would be placed in their bubble and the people were situated in a separate bubble. Reporters would be screened, have their passes checked, and told to remain within the press zone. The crowd would experience the same process. It had to arrive hours before the presidential visit, be checked in, and told to wait inside a concealed environment. In their separate spheres, the Service disciplined press and crowd behavior in order to prepare them for a presidential appearance.
To maintain this level of security on a constant basis, the POTUS asked for 150 new agents (Shaw, 1975, October 1). With these changes, the Service saw the number of agents expand from 1,242 to over 1,500 between 1972 and 1976 and its budgetary figures jump from $82.8 million to $109.7 million just between 1975 and 1976 (U.S. Congress, Senate, Review of Secret Service Protective Measures, 1975; Department of Justice, 2002). The POTUS was no longer the free-wheeling president who was eager to expose himself to unscreened crowds. Like Truman and Johnson before him, he would take into account the protective measures designed to ensure his safety. James Vowell of the Los Angeles Times was spot on when he noted that the POTUS was a “sitting duck” if he chooses to mingle with mobs of people; the only real security was if he chose to accept security precautions and stay “away from crowds when the danger is greatest” (Vowell, 1975, September 25).

**Presidential Protection as Object of Study**

In response to the continued threat of assassination and the ongoing search for public enemies of the state, the Secretary of the Treasury announced an intense review of Secret Service protocol, Congress held hearings on Service security measures, and the POTUS revamped intelligence guidelines to make it more difficult to gather information on ordinary citizens. In particular, the hearing conducted by the Appropriation Committee in the Senate examined the issues surrounding the idea and practice of presidential security (U.S. Congress, Senate, Review of Secret Service Protective Measures, 1975). The most pertinent and pressing need still pivoted on the shaky ground of how to gather, interpret, and filter information. Treasury Secretary William E. Simon noted that the Service screens 200,000 pieces of information annually, interviews 4,000 people, arrests around 60 people, and watches approximately 300 people on a
continual basis. Because there is no exact science to determine dangerousness or threat levels, the Service operates under a great deal of ambiguity about who poses a threat to the POTUS.

Although a profile had not developed, it did not stop the Service from seeking one. Between 1964 and 1970, the Service outsourced 14 separate studies to examine preventive intelligence criteria. The titles of the studies included Information Processing, Criteria and Information Processing, the Psychiatry of Presidential Assassination, A Political Threat File, The Presidential Assassination Syndrome, and others. Each concluded that there is no way to predict violence, dangerousness, or create a valid profile to examine threats.

And, the profile created by the *National Commission on The Causes and Prevention of Violence* in 1969 rested on old stereotypes of who is a likely presidential attacker. The archetypal assassin in the American context, according to the report, came from a broken home, was unable to form lasting relations, can’t hold a job, identified with an ideological movement, used a handgun, and attacked when the POTUS is in public spaces. The factors of being mentally ill or lacking a father figure or being prone to commit violence were not adequate measures to classify someone as a threat. Before the attacks on Ford, women were not included as viable threats to the POTUS. Profiles had a tendency to include commonalties between events, but neglected vital information. Even with these difficulties, the Service reported that its desire had not waned in trying to predict dangerousness or generating a valid profile. In the meantime, Director Stu Knight pointed out that the Service did not use a checklist or any profile to examine the accuracy of who was dangerous. In this sense, the Service was in the dark of trying to ascertain who was a partisan crank. There were no objective measures to find these mobile barbarians who could severely hurt the POTUS.
For the past 20 years, the Service had failed to spot Oswald, Byck, Fromme, and Moore. Even Bremer who followed Nixon for an extended period of time was not discovered. These figures were an enigma to the United States Secret Service. They knew most of them had some political ideology that they believed justified their attacks. Fromme attacked the POTUS because it would bring publicity to Charles Manson while Moore viewed Ford as the representative of a tyrannical order. However, most of these claims were reinterpreted as crazy actions by deeply disturbed people. For the Service, the threat was still the lone-deranged assassin and there was no way to determine in advance that either Fromme or Moore was planning an attack. Even though there were clear signs with Moore, agents had little understanding of how to distinguish between a political radical and a political assassin.

With no valid guide, the Service faced a significant barricade to gathering and filtering information in a rational manner. The attempt to scientize dangerousness had failed to a degree. No presidential attacker had ever been in the Secret Service data base, even in the index file that contains thousands of names. At one time, the file had up to 100,000 names as the Service was bombarded with information from other federal agencies after the Warren Commissions recommendations for building a better intelligence network; to eliminate the wasted time, effort, and information, the Service had to cut its watch list down to 38,000. However, it maintained its top suspects file to about 300 people nationwide. Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) asked how the Service filtered the 38,000 files to 300 individuals. The answer was “judgment,” based on people who are highly mobile and transient.

This inability to define threats was only coupled with the problem of how to protect an elected leader in a democratic society who wanted to directly mingle with the crowds. The Secretary of the Treasury argued that a free society should not be endangered by a few nuts, but
Senator Joseph Montoya (D-NM) wanted to know whether the POTUS “should come to the crowds or to the people when he is traveling” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Review of Secret Service Protective Measures, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, p. 43). Colonel E.C. Dothard, who was shot while protecting Governor Wallace in 1972, remarked that protection was not possible in crowds. Senator Goldwater (R-AZ) argued that the president should stay in the White House and has urged him to do so. According to him, crowd plunging was an unnecessary risk and was mostly used to get copy.

Director Knight pleaded with the president to stay in the White House because of its controlled status. He “would like to see the President spend as much time there as he possibly can” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Review of Secret Service Protective Measures, 1975, p. 83). To secure open spaces, Senator Edmund Muskie (D-ME), a presidential candidate in 1972 who observed the Service in his campaign, remarked that the Service serves several functions on the campaign trail. First, agents provide physical security to the body of the president. Second, the advance activity related to identifying unruly crowds, locating threats in those crowds, and coordinating with local law enforcement officials. The final aspect was intelligence-gathering, which related to figuring out who was a foe. The purpose of the Service for Muskie “is to limit exposure and to identify threats” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Review of Secret Service Protective Measures, 1975, p. 53).

And planned crowds were the most dangerous venue for any president to attend because foe and friend were so intermingled among mobs of people. Over the past 30 years, the masses had been transformed into a hectic, but orderly crowd to an unruly mob that could not be contained. The Service’s bubble around crowds could no longer discipline people to behave in an appropriate manner. It had not been able to tame the masses since the crowds had become
wild with LBJ. Venker commented that “the President always came with a special set of crowd problems” (Rush, 1988, p. 109). Agents not only had to be worried about POTUS protection, but they also had to be concerned with crowd safety. And, the presidential bubble had rough edges and when the two bubbles merged people got hurt. This was especially the case with the presidential limo and its running boards. Venker commented that people would be in such awe of the president that they would often fail to see the running boards “headed straight for their legs” (Rush, 1988, p. 109). The only response was to shove people out of harms way. Agents would also issue commands, telling people to take their hands out of their pickets, to hand over flowers, and to tell them to stop running.

Crowd discipline became complicated and controversial as the Service had to start taking extensive measures to control the people. The only real security on the road for the Service was to close events where admission was by ticket only and detain people for hours while they waited on the president to arrive. With its power to create zones of protection, the Service could exclude and detain people. This solution to this problem would soon usher in the future of presidential movement and action. Crowds discipline would be ensured by allowing in selected party partisans. And, the president’s ability to roam in these crowds would soon cease.

**Overreaction: The Intelligence Conundrum**

Although the Service made great strides toward ending the Kennedy-inspired movements of jumping into crowds, it faced a new barrier to gathering information. President Ford called for the end of “Big Brother Bureaucracy” (Nelson, 1975, September 22). With this sentiment, Attorney General Edward Levi issued Domestic Security Investigation Guidelines in 1976 to reframe how intelligence was to be gathered and distributed (U.S. Congress, Senate, FBI Statutory Charter, Part 1, 1978). He argued the “proposition that Government monitoring of
individuals or groups because they hold unpopular or controversial political views is intolerable in our society” (U.S. Congress, House, FBI Oversight, 1976). The Service, the FBI, the IRS, and the NSA were all culprits in compiling massive watch lists of people they did not like for political and personal reasons. The recommendations were directed at the FBI, but had a deep impact on how other agencies like the Secret Service who primarily relied on the Bureau’s capacity to gather and distribute intelligence.

The shift from treating presidential security as domestic terrorism to a law enforcement problem severely restricted the amount of information the FBI could legally gather (Office of the Inspector General, 2005). According to one former FBI Director, the focus of intelligence gathering would now be based on “conduct rather than ideology” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Domestic Security (Levi) Guidelines, 1982, p. 10). What made these guidelines so difficult for the Service, according to Agent McCarthy, was that intelligence can be separated into two categories: information that is related to the intentions and objectives of a group and information that centers on actions that have already taken place (McCarthy & Smith, 1985). The Service needs the first type of information, but the Levi guidelines forced the FBI to only concern itself with the second type, which all but destroyed the Service’s ability to have access to preventive intelligence. Although this clearly hurt the ability of the Service to have vast amount of intelligence, it may have inadvertently helped the Service in the near future with actually identifying real threats. The Service was often caught in Nixonian pessimism: it seemed everyone who espoused controversial statements was a threat. The focus on conduct instead of ideology may have helped agents delineate the difference between real friends and real foes and between a political radical and a political assassin.
However, the Service was mostly concerned at this time with the drop in intelligence cases because of these new standards. The threshold of evidence was too high either to start a preliminary investigation or to justify the opening of a full case. William Webster, the Director of the FBI, pointed out that its caseload dropped from 21,414 in July 1973 to 4,868 in March 1976 (U.S. Congress, House, Impact of Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic Security Investigations, 1984). He said that the FBI is “practically out of the domestic security field” (U.S. Congress, House, Impact of Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic Security Investigations, 1984). Two GAO reports recounted how this drop in intelligence affected the Service’s ability to define and find new threats (1976, 1977). The new guidelines were further refined so that the FBI could not help the Service without a direct request from the Director of the Secret Service (U.S. Congress, Senate, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, 1981). The building of walls between agencies would prevent direct communication and coordination between them, which would emerge as a problem a few years later with the attempted assassination of Reagan.

The Levi Guidelines, in effect, erected a wall between the two agencies. And the wall only grew thicker with the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. The combination of these legislative and executive actions debilitated domestic surveillance. The Service felt the guidelines were too restrictive as the agency experienced a massive drop in the information it had available. Director Knight reported that it had seen a sharp drop of 40 to 50 percent of information and the intelligence the Service did receive was of poor quality (U.S. Congress, Senate, The Erosion of Law Enforcement Intelligence, 1977). Without adequate information, the preventive function of the Service did not work because it was unable to identify and locate
possible enemies of the state. Because of this lack of information, the Service started to recommend that the POTUS not go to certain cities and increased its personnel to surround the president. Knight went so far as to say that the Service is 75% strapped in comparison to three to four years ago because of this lack of intelligence. This intelligence problem was further compounded by the fact that Attorney General Elliot Richardson in 1973 declared watch lists to be illegal. The NSA and FBI could no longer electronically monitor citizens without a warrant. Knight argued that this reaction is clearly “an overreaction” (U.S. Congress, Senate, The Erosion of Law Enforcement Intelligence, 1977, p. 31).

Even though the Service was weakened from an intelligence standpoint in the late 1970s, its power to control the movement of the Chief Executive was once again reasserted. There were certain places and things that the POTUS must not do: planned public and open exposure was coming close to being a taboo for the president. It just was not safe to proceed from the confines of a controlled environment like the White House. However, Bill Gulley challenged the idea that the president was secure on 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue during the 1970s. The main problem, according to Gulley, was that the Service only “thinks in terms of bodily guarding the President” (1980). Apart from protective formations that relate to access and proximity, Gulley pointed out that neither the Service nor the military had any idea how to counteract a real threat against the POTUS. No one thinks “of mortars in the bushes around Andrews, where Air Force One is parked, or heat-seeking missiles launched from under the cherry blossom when the chopper lifts off the White House lawn, or a helicopter full of armed guerrillas landing on the law” (Gulley & Reese, 1980, p. 174). It would merely take six armed soldiers landing on the White House lawn at 2 a.m. to infiltrate the White House and eliminate the POTUS. The Service had no defenses against a helicopter invasion or adequate personnel to combat six highly trained assassins, which
was seen when Private Kenneth Preston landed twice on the White House Lawn with little resistance. The threat assessment models, in essence, had forced the Service to be ready for the nut (mental or political) who might take a shot at POTUS in the crowd. Beyond that, there were no preparations or strategies to build a truly fortified bubble around the White House.

Even though the Service failed to provide reasonable protection based on military standards, the Service had achieved a fair amount of control over the president. Ford was another belligerent and free-spirited president who was tamed. The Service reinforced and strengthened these shackles with its moves to examine the slightest attack as an object of study. With constant analysis and research, agents began to understand what extreme measures it would take to secure the body of the POTUS. The Service would even start to introduce radical solutions to the problems of security. It began to understand that the ideals of a Jeffersonian presidency rooted in discourse and contact with the people would have to be destroyed. The ideal of the People’s House would have to be dismantled and replaced with Fortress White House.

**Conclusion**

Even though the Service failed to transition to a bunker perspective of security at this time, it still had made significant improvements concerning presidential protection despite challenges from rebellious presidents. The bubble was hardening and becoming more solid. Agent Venker referred to the protection offered to Ford as “exalted defense” (Rush, 1988, p. 109) Because of the unpredictability of presidential movements, the Service attempted to employ a range of techniques that ensured that no unauthorized individual could get within range. This administrative objective often had been hard to achieve, but it required a range of defensive measures to secure the president. These measures were necessary because Kennedy,
Johnson and Ford posed new security problems with their willingness to mingle with unscreened crowds. In these public settings, the president was open to an accessible public with easy access to his body. These accepted conditions resulted in the death of Kennedy and the near death of Ford on two separate occasions. The idea and practice of protection became nearly impossible to administer without designing massive safeguards around a mobile president while he was at home and on the road.

In addressing these conditions, the bubble became an isolated space that moved, morphed, and mutated based on external variables. The Service had to consider how strong and how of weak of a bubble it needed to construct, which was often determined by crowd size, location, and threat assessment levels. In response to these conditions, the Service implemented the practice of removing the president into isolated spaces that were covered by layers of steel and bodies. The White House finished and refined its own bunker, Camp David was an isolating second home secured by the terrains of the Catoctin Mountains, presidential retreats were fortified and equipped as sites of command, and presidential transit began to be armored. On any presidential trip, the Service began to sterilize spaces through careful site planning and site control. The advanced teams accompanied by TSD would lock down an area, sweep for bombs, look for advance listening devices, and search for any possible security hazards. Spaces became zones of protection as agents began to be control, discipline, and regulate these areas. These measures were in direct response to the fear of a conventional enemy who was equipped with advance weaponry or an alienated real or absolute partisan who could use rocket propelled grenades, sniper fire, or a mere handgun to attack the POTUS.

The Service also started to overtly discipline media and crowd behavior. The presidential bubble was supplemented with a separate bubble that covered both the press and the people for
the president’s safety. Journalists and especially crowds were no longer trusted to behave in an adequate manner in the presence of the president, especially during the administrations of Johnson and Nixon. Internal turmoil personified by disgruntled Americans and real partisans who sought to disrupt allowed the Service to take active measures in locating, identifying, and investigating thousands of people. Just like the first half of the 20th century, political ideology was linked to dangerousness. Protestors and hecklers became a security and public relations threat, which allowed the Service to begin shaping crowd behavior. Furthermore, the Service also faced a Schmittian crisis in dealing with enemies. The watch lists of the Service became too bulky and unwieldy because they were unable to devise any real criteria for who was an enemy. Without the ability to distinguish between friends and foes at a concrete level, the Service was limited in its ability to find potential threats. The move away from political ideology and the move toward action may have helped the Service identify enemies of the state.

In constructing screens and finding enemies, the Service became an apparatus of truth production. It had no longer just rested on time and tradition to reinforce past protective procedures. It relied on its emerging industrious research arm to produce new meaning about how the president should be secured. The Service relied on its ability to create authoritative meaning, discipline the president, and make declarative statements about potential enemies of the state and how the president should behave. In its ability to formulate these concepts, the president became increasingly tied to the Secret Service’s apparatus of truth production. The Foucauldian concepts of discipline and power/knowledge informed key aspects of close protection. New logics and modes of discipline gradually emerged and imposed new shackles. The capturing of the body and mind of the president still relied on obligations, oaths, and overt barricades, but these were supplemented with new notions of protection empowered by
institutional knowledge. With these forms of control, the rebellious president was coming to an end. Although most presidents have accepted this ethos of protection, some like Johnson and Ford had to be taught how to behave and listen. The process of succumbing to the wishes of agents was often difficult, but all of them, even LBJ, came to accept the disciplinary status of their protective details. The behavior of presidents like Johnson, Nixon, and Ford were normalized and partially made docile.
CHAPTER SEVEN:  
CAMPUS, COMPOUND, AND CASTLE: THE CREATION OF A WHITE HOUSE FORTRESS

The Secret Service in the next 30 years would become even more sophisticated. New logics and modes of discipline gradually emerged and imposed new restrictions on presidential movement. Power was being increasingly linked to production and discipline. In this circular medium of exchange, power evolved and changed, but also became routinized. The ritual act of protection had achieved a disciplinary level where the Presidential Protection Detail, the White House Advance Team, the crowd, partisan loyalist, and print and broadcast journalists acted collectively in a manner that not only secured the POTUS, but built his stature. The formal process of site selection, security sweeps, and site control began to discipline and direct all the actors involved in the movement and orchestra of presidential movement. The internalization of this particular disciplinary fiction had become embedded in the fabric of the American story and the American Presidency. Stoic Secret Service agents with dark suits and dark glasses would arrive, build, secure, and sterilize territorial spaces to protect the POTUS from the crazy and the crank. Everyone began to get “the drill” as the Service began to dramatically improve on its administrative practices of protection, mainly due to its focus on the subjectivities of security and the subjectivities of insecurity.

This act of disciplining subjects of security (the POTUS, dignitaries, the crowd, the media, the partisan loyalists, etc.) was at the core of the Secret Service in binding the president’s body and mind between Reagan and Bush II. Foucault remarked that the hallmark of discipline is “essentially centripetal” and its primary function “is to prevent everything” (2007, p. 44). The Secret Service’s disciplinary force began to gravitate toward the center of the POTUS and cleaned everything in its radius. Spaces were isolated, enclosed, and disinfected in order to
provide the means to dictate levels of appropriate conduct. Actors within this vector domination were expected to behave in an appropriate and cooperative manner. And for Foucault, this was the essence of disciplinary normalization: the capacity to link people together in a coordinated and productive manner in order to yield optimal benefits. In the case of the Secret Service, its discipline was designed to protect and present the body of the POTUS. This was a ritual of the mutual production of truth.

In the next three decades, the Service also began to dramatically focus on subjects of insecurity (the terrorist, real partisans, and crazies), which would enable the Service to further the process of isolating the president from the people. Terrorist attacks in Beirut, Lebanon, Washington D.C., New York City, and Oklahoma City began to create a general atmosphere of terror. This emerging enemy who relied on crude and unsophisticated weaponry started to redefine the state’s security apparatus, especially in regards to presidential protection. Much like the anarchists in the early 20th century, real and absolute partisans forced the state to consider new realities. The Service started to utter proposals that would fortify the White House and seal the president from the people by closing Pennsylvania Avenue. In this context of terror supplemented with Cold War realities, the Service was able to respond not with “exalted defense,” but with bold offense accompanied by productive and disciplinary power; it would push its own solutions as it would no longer rely on permeable borders around the White House to protect the president from terrorist attacks. The last remaining components of Fortress White House began to forcefully emerge as the Secret Service started to generate new ideas to protect the president. The bubble was gradually transforming into a bunker.

To examine the transformation to a bunker-based mentality, this chapter will mainly deal with presidential security during the Reagan, Clinton, and Bush years. A range of incidents
occurred between these presidencies that caused unthinkable utterances of sealing the president from the people to become an authoritative reality. The attempted assassination of President Reagan, the bizarre and uncoordinated attacks directed at the White House in the mid-1990s, the Oklahoma City Bombing, and the attacks on 9/11 allowed the Service to move presidential security into a state of siege. The administration of protection finally became a serious endeavor as the Service was able to take steps to effectively sterilize almost any space the POTUS touched. But most importantly, the president had internalized the logic of the Service and started to project it an authoritative manner. This chapter will delve into the process of the Service became an authoritative agency with the power to transform the so-called People’s House into Fortress White House. The public body was now fully entrapped behind a host of barricades. This allowed the Service to more effectively hide his private body while shielding his public body from dangerous exposure.

**Stages of Shields and Screens: Protecting and Presenting Reagan**

On March 30, 1981, John W. Hinckley provided a moment in time that problematized the concept of presidential security. In this two second act, security would lose its sense of familiarity, routine would be questioned, and uncertainty would reign. Hinckley fired six shots from his .22 caliber revolver outside the Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C. Two seconds later, police officer Thomas Delahanty, Special Agent Tim McCarthy, Press Secretary James Brady, and President Ronald Reagan were all wounded. For the first time since JFK, the POTUS was successfully targeted and attacked by an unknown assailant. In this fleeting span of time, the public would see a heroic agency in action. With no hesitation and acting purely on instinct, Agent Timothy McCarthy made himself into a shield while Agent Jerry Parr shoved the president into his limousine. The president’s body armor encapsulated his body in mere seconds.
The public witnessed the men and women of the Secret Service successfully protecting and transporting the president away from any further danger.

**The Shields of Security: The Process of Protection**

*The Management Review on the Performance of the U.S. Department of the Treasury* revealed the minute by minute breakdown of the events, successes, and failures on March 30, 1981 (Management Review, 1981). This report, in particular, showed the concrete results of how protection had evolved since the Service started to treat security as an object of study. Protection had become a mobile, fortified bubble with a hardened membrane that mutated based on external variables. The Service was no longer the agency it was in Dallas. The agency properly prepped areas, sterilized them, and secured them. The Service had achieved the means to properly inflate a bubble to protect the figure who headed a constitutional republic. However, protection was far from perfect. The report would expose critical errors and practices of presidential protection that emerged during this attack.

In analyzing the attack, the report noted that Reagan left the White House at 1:50 p.m. to give a 20 minute speech at the Hilton Hotel in Washington D.C. and planned to return by 2:30 p.m. This 40 minute trip exposed the weakness, strength, and limitation of presidential security. Before his arrival, the Service had coordinated the motorcade routes with local police, traffic control, and the U.S. Park Police. It conducted an advance check of the Hilton Hotel earlier that morning to determine places of vulnerability. Agents were assigned to guard hallways, rooms, and corners that posed potential threats. The TSD ran sweeps looking for any explosive devices and a counter-sniper team was positioned outside the hotel. Agents also established two checkpoints to examine identification, bags, and any other suspicious items. Anyone gaining entrance to the main ballroom was carefully searched and monitored. Outside the hotel, the Service set up
a rope line that created a 35-40 feet distance between the limousine and the VIP entrance. This perimeter properly protected those that were included in its zone of protection.

In determining the shape and strength of this bubble at the Hilton Hotel, the Service considered three contingent variables that are in constant flux: the target, the assailant, and the setting (Shah, 1981). There was no one criterion that dictates how the Service constrains presidential movement. Its power relations with the president were always contextual, dynamic, and continuous. In establishing threat assessment levels, the Service always first considered who the target is. Presidents had different characteristics, habits, and needs. Some were more prone to resist layers of protection while others accepted the confines of security. While some presidents were fatalists who do not hesitate in taking risks others were more cautious and not willing to be put in a dangerous situation. Truman liked his walks and Clinton enjoyed his long jogs while Reagan rode his horses in a secluded area and H.W. Bush was rarely seen outside the White House. Each president created “unique security problems” because of “their temperaments, their personalities, their good or bad health” (Baughman & Robinson, 1963, p. 188). For the Secret Service, Reagan’s temperament posed few problems. He was not like Ford or other previous predecessors who mingled with the people at every rope line. The Service did not have to worry about adding extra security at the Hilton Hotel for Reagan.

The second consideration for the Service in establishing the confines of a bubble rested on potential information regarding assailants. This role required the Service to make a very political distinction. The nature of a threat, the capacity for action, and the proximity of a threat helped inform the Service how to operationalize security measures. The ability and potential of a deranged attacker with a concealed handgun was different than a covert cell that has access to rocket propelled grenades, a highly trained sniper or a sophisticated bomb maker. Each threat
required agents to implement different security measures. In Washington, the Service had no actionable intelligence that an attack was likely. Hinckley was not in the general index file and no major threat was in the vicinity of Washington. With that information, the bubble fit standard operating procedures.

Finally, the context of the setting was the final variable in constructing the bubble. Speeches in public spaces, long motorcade routes, the size of the crowd, the distance between the target and the crowd, the height of buildings, private meetings, and foreign trips required the Service to handle each situation in a different manner. The zone of protection expanded or contracted based on the situation. This was the variable that the Service overlooked. First, agents neglected to screen individuals who would be within a 20 foot radius of the president. They knew that the context of the situation forced Reagan to be in close proximity to crowds. However, they chose not to declare the rope line a press area, which would have forced agents to only include journalists. Because no buffer zone was implemented, an assassin could wait in the crowd outside the Hilton Hotel. Seconds, agents were in standard operating mode. The context of the situation had become too normal for agents. Reagan had made this trip on numerous occasions, and the situation did not demand the presence of extensive protection or the establishment of press areas.

With these three variables in consideration, the Service built a relatively small bubble, which allowed the people to be in close proximity to the body of the POTUS when he left the Hilton. Even though the bubble was compact, the Service still implemented its three perimeter philosophy and planed every movement and action of the president. However, the defense in depth strategy was implemented in a poor way. Reagan arrived at the Hilton Hotel around 1:50 p.m. with approximately seven press members and 10 spectators at the rope line. He safely made
his way from the limousine to the VIP Hilton entrance where he briefly met with union leaders in the “holding room.” He was then escorted to the ballroom where he gave a 20 minute speech that lasted until 2:20 p.m.

In the meantime, the president’s motorcade, according to procedure, had to be readjusted so that it was parked at an angle facing T Street. As the president left the Hilton, the agents took up their strategic security positions by surrounding the presidential limousine and surveying the crowd, which had grown to about 200 people. As the limo door was opened for the president, he turned and waved to the crowd. The president was now only 15-20 feet from the crowd because of the changed position of the motorcade. The zone of protection was drastically smaller. As the president responded to the crowd, John W. Hinckley emerged from the rope line and emptied his .22 caliber handgun in a mere two seconds. Agents responded by pushing the president into the limousine, spreading their arms and legs to shield the president, and subdued Hinckley in a matter of seconds.

Despite the apparently instinctive reactions by the Service to save the POTUS, the planning, implementation, and reaction to the Hilton tragedy were flawed from the beginning to the end. There was inattention to detail, sloppiness, and institutional routines that hurt the Service’s ability to protect the president. The Service, according to the Management Report, was in “routine mode” during the Hilton trip (1981, p. 7). Agents had made the trip once every two weeks and “had developed a standard drill for Hilton visits” (Management Review, 1981, p. 7). In the process of planning, the Service devoted less attention to detail and did not comply completely with standard operating procedures. The Service considered the capitol a safe zone. This logic of viewing Washington (and the White House) as a space of relative protection had crept into the Service’s protective procedures. This false sense of security allowed the Service to
guard the president with minimal protection. Even though the Service took steps to make the White House a compound, it still had not achieved that level of security. East Executive Avenue remained open to the public, Pennsylvania Avenue was a vital commuter street in the city, and there were no concrete and visible barriers (except the fence) that separated the White House from the people. Washington was presumed to be a secluded and safe city from terrorist attacks.

Due to this general attitude of not looking at Washington as an object of analysis, there were no procedures specifically designed to protect the president inside Washington. The procedures used the day of the shooting were set-up to protect the president “for environments outside Washington, D.C., and do not take account of the fact that trips in the capital have become routine” (Management Review, 1981, p. 49). Routine was the most dangerous variable in protection: Pavlick used routine to plan his attack, Oswald relied on the basic routine of transporting the president, Moore waited outside a hotel in San Francisco, and Hinckley relied on the rope line routine to plan his attack. The ritual of routine provided the access points to where the president would be. The protocol of security required the Service to act in a predictable manner. The Management Report added that “there is some evidence that the routine nature of advances and heavy protective work load in the Washington area has resulted in agents devoting less attention to detail than is commonly the case in other locations” (1981, p. 49). And, the second most dangerous variable in president protection might be hotels. Since 1968, RFK, MLK, Ford, and now Reagan were attacked at or near a hotel. Alongside the car, the hotel had become one of the easiest spaces to effectively carry out an attack. Yet, the Service had failed to learn that the president must be totally isolated and covered while he is entering, walked through, or leaving a hotel environment. Predictable entry and exit points and a confining atmosphere with lots of people allowed for an assassin to stage a well-crafted attack.
In particular, the most apparent and glaring errors were the failure of the Service to provide for adequate protection outside the Hilton Hotel. The city of Washington was considered a safe zone, which allowed agents to fall back on administrative inertia to protect the POTUS. Inside the confines of a secured Hilton Hotel, the president was fully protected. The zone of protection was thoroughly established. However, the Service failed to provide for identical security measures outside the hotel as it did not consider to bubble the crowd or the press waiting for the president. The rope line, which was open to anyone, was the only protective means that the Service constructed to protect the president. Agents had no idea of who was in this unbubbled state and what they were carrying. If the Service had declared the rope line a “press area” or a security zone, agents would have searched, screened, and identified people entering the area. It would have disciplined them. And within this protective sphere, Hinckley would have never been able to get within 20 feet of the POTUS.

The other notable blunder was the failure of “overmanning” the POTUS at George Washington Hospital. Instating of building a massively inflated bubble around Reagan after the attack, they left a small cadre of agents to protect him while scarce resources were being diverted to the investigation. At the time, the Service had not yet even ascertained or even thought this could be part of a wider conspiracy to eliminate the POTUS. These and other errors were uncovered days and months after this shock to the system. The failings of the Service were noticeable, identifiable, and apparent.

The Aftermath: Utterances and Statements

The heroism by the Service on March 30th partially masked the mistakes of procedure and agent action. Those associated with the Hilton incident were showered with praise. During a subcommittee hearing, senators gave Parr a standing ovation. After the hearing, Senator James
Abdnor (R-SD) remarked “I’ve got to have a picture with him” (Reid, 1981, April 3). The media was an essential vehicle in expressing admiration towards the men and women involved with the assassination attempt. There was no doubt that “agents performed heroically and probably saved Reagan’s life” (L Cannon, 1981, April 12). Reagan even remarked that “I’ve got to apologize to that guy [Jerry Parr]” for accusing him of breaking Reagan’s ribs ("A President’s Apology to Secret Service Agent," 1981, April 2).

Although Parr received a great deal of the attention, the media made sure to highlight that it was McCarthy who “stepped into the line of fire, stopping with his own body a bullet that might have hit Reagan” (Gest, 1981, April 13). The media also focused on Police Officer Thomas Delahanty who was “being treated like a hero while recovering from a wound left by a bullet meant for President Reagan” (A. E. Lewis, 1981, May 11). He was the “first non-New York police officer” to receive “an award for valor from the New York City police department” (A. E. Lewis, 1981, May 11). A *Washington Post* article remarked that these three individuals should serve as a reminder “the next time someone starts in with the predictable blanket indictment of public employees, simply remind him of three names he should recognize: Jerry Parr, Timothy McCarthy and Thomas Delahanty” (Shields, 1981, April 4). Congress passed a joint resolution commending Parr, McCarthy, and Delahanty for “their unselfish courage and PATRIOTism during the recent attempt on the life of the President of the United States” (Resolution to Commend, 1981). This resolution by Congress and the statements by Reagan reinforced the essence of the Coffelt Effect. Agents, once again, willingly gave their lives to protect the POTUS. In similar fashion when Agent Buendorf stepped in front of Fromme’s .45 caliber handgun, the PPD instinctively put their flesh in front of an assassin’s bullet and bled.
The fulfillment of this oath would only reinforce the ability of the Service to bind the presidential to its protective mission.

Although the praise of these individuals moderately masked Secret Service failure on that Monday afternoon, issues were immediately raised by varying political, citizen, and administrative entities, which allowed the Service to create a fair amount of new meaning related to presidential security. Productive power was significantly enabled because of these concerns. Some of these conditions were directly related to how the Secret Service operated while others were tangential in nature. Lou Canon of the *Washington Post* noted that the problems ranged from blaming the Service for allowing Hinckley to get so close to the president, allowing politics to trump security, and permitting the FBI to not disclose all of its information to the Service (1981, April 12). Brad Knickerbocker of the *Christian Science Monitor* laid out other problems involving calls for gun control, increased intelligence capacity for both the Secret Service and FBI, and evaluation of the public’s access to the president (1981, April 10). This nexus of confusion did not yield one dominant story after the assassination attempt except for the heroism of the Secret Service. Although these outlets did criticize the Service, they simultaneously heaped praise on it (Gest, 1981, April 13).

Immediately after the attack, Secret Service Director H. Stuart Knight expressed his concerns about the inability of the FBI to gather intelligence. He “complained that the ‘pendulum has swung too far’ with recent curbs on whom the FBI may watch and what information can be passed along to the Secret Service” (Knickerbocker, 1981, April 10). In a similar argument made after the attempts on Ford’s life, he had targeted the Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts and the Levi Guidelines as barriers for intelligence failures. In response to Knight, FBI Director William Webster cautioned “against overreaction to last week’s
presidential assassination attempt by relaxing controls on the domestic gathering and
dissemination of intelligence on Americans” (Knickerbocker, 1981, April 10). The exchanges
between the two directors centered on whose opinion mattered more and who would be able to
establish changes in intelligence reform. It also brought back into question the relationship
between the Secret Service and the FBI. Once again, the FBI knew about Hinckley, just as it
knew about Lee Harvey Oswald. In both cases, the FBI did not share the information it had with

However, the most troubling rhetoric revolved around hopelessness. Commentator after
commentator cited J. Edgar Hoover’s declarative statement he made after the JFK assassination:
“Absolute security is neither practical nor possible. An approach to complete security would
require the President to operate in some sort of vacuum, isolated from the general public and
behind impregnable barriers” (Lyons, 1981, April 5). Since the Dallas episode, assassinations
were a commonplace event in the American political landscape. From Martin Luther King to
Governor George Wallace, no public person was deemed safe. Enemies of the state had not only
seemingly breached presidential security with relative ease, but did so on a routine basis. Walter
Shapiro of the Washington Post argued that the lesson learned from the Reagan situation was
“nothing” (1981, April 5). In fact, the “ultimate horror of Ronald Reagan being shot” is that
“there’s nothing left to say. We’ve said it all a half a dozen times since 1963” (Shapiro, 1981,
April 5). This lack of anger particularly disturbed columnist Judy Mann. She remarked, “Maybe
this time if enough people stay angry, something can be done while there are still millions of
Americans who remember when this was not the American way” (1981, April 1). With this
sentiment in mind, “what is both reassuring and horrifying about the shootings at the Hilton is
how ordinary it all seems” (Shapiro, 1981, April 5).
Recommendations of Reform: Refashioning the Meaning of Presidential Security

With little resentment, the attempted assassination of Reagan was a news story for three weeks and then vanished. After April 12, the *Washington Post’s* next story on the events of that day appeared on May 11. During his two week stay in the hospital, the president carried out his duties, even signing a bill into law. The assassination attempt was apparently coming to a close for the press and the people. However, the Secret Service and Congress still needed to resolve the issues that this saga brought to the surface. To so do, they had to produce a new set of meanings that would allow agents the means and skills to prevent a similar attack from happening again. The Treasury Department immediately called for an internal investigation to determine how the Service conducted itself during an attack on the POTUS. The Service had to examine how it handled pre-security clearance, the attack, and the protection of the president at George Washington hospital. The Treasury Department would release its management report in August, while Congress held two committee hearings in September. Neither received much press in the Washington or New York papers, but that did not prevent the Service from assuming new methods to contain the POTUS as the Management Report and two committee hearings restructured meaning concerning presidential protection.

The Management Review: Problems and Solutions

*The Management Review* detailed how the Secret Service conducted itself during the events on March 30 and offered recommendations. Some of the suggestions were a drastic deviation from the status quo while others were safe and obvious. The clearest recommendation the Service made was to rectify its lack of policy concerning “overmanning the president” after an attack. Instead of providing minimal or standard protection after an attack on the body of...
POTUS, the Service needed to “establish procedures for substantially and rapidly increasing security around the President in any crisis situation” (Management Review, 1981, p. 25).

The most notable and bold recommendation the Service made was intelligence reform. According to the report, intelligence should be viewed as the “ultimate shield” of protection. In particular, the amount of intelligence information is critical. For the Service, “the FBI is the most importance source of Secret Service intelligence on potential domestic threats to the President, and has a significant impact on the ability of the Service to fulfill its mission” (Management Review, 1981, p. 29). However, the Privacy Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Domestic Security Guidelines of 1976 had prevented the Secret Service and in particular the FBI from gathering information. The Service went back and cited the two GAO reports that showed how the Domestic Security Guidelines caused a dramatic decrease of domestic intelligence investigations from 9,814 to 642 in the years between 1975 and 1977. The ultimate question “is whether the Secret Service can adequately perform its mission without a regular flow of information about the intentions of individuals or groups who may be a threat” (Management Review 1981, p. 34).

With the push for looser security guidelines, Attorney General William Smith relaxed the Levi Guidelines in 1983. After a series of hearings from 1981 to 1983, the Department of Justice decided to make evolutionary, not revolutionary changes to how the FBI gathered domestic intelligence (U.S. Congress, Senate, Undercover Operations Act, 1984). In particular, the guidelines created one new type of investigation that impacted the Service: the domestic security/terrorism investigation permitted the FBI greater flexibility in investigating individuals who were likely to be pursing criminal activities. Furthermore, statements which promote criminal activity were now sufficient cause to start an investigation. In response to these
changes, a *New York Times* editorial decried the new measures, arguing that they “would seem to enable a politically motivated F.B.I. once again to infiltrate and try to destabilize groups no more radical than the Socialist Worker Party” (Editorial, 1983, March 9). For the Service, the new guidelines opened the way for additional intelligence, which would allow it to refine who is a potential threat to the body politic.

To better process the information, the *Management Review* also called for an attempt to “identify indicia of ‘dangerousness’” as the Service failed to “follow advice” that was provided in the Warren Commission to develop a scientific method of investigating enemies of the POTUS (Management Review 1981, p. 36). This accusation was affirmed by the Institute of Medicine three weeks before the attempt on Reagan’s life. The interest in the subject of threat assessment waned in the 1970s as the Service failed to identify dangerousness in scientific terms. It knew that early attempts made to predict violence and establish a viable profile were unsuccessful. The *National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence* admitted, “We are as yet unable to comprehend the individual and social forces at work sufficiently to be able to identify potential assassins in advance of their attacks” (Kirkham, et al., 1970, p. wviii). This conclusion in 1969 halted most of the Service’s attempt to define enemies of the state in scientific terms. The countless studies conducted by outside organizations for the Service on the concepts of profiles, dangerousness, and prediction of violence ceased and were not conducted in the 1970s, even though agents who failed to classify Sarah Jane Moore as an immediate threat to the president revealed that there was much work to be done. This object of study, however, came to the forefront for the Service three weeks before the attempted assassination of Reagan when it held a conference with mental health officials and the Institute of Medicine about developing new methods of assessment (Institute of Medicine, 1981).
With the indictment made by the *Management Report*, the Service would have to increase its efforts to determine dangerousness. It built on the findings of the conference in 1981 and convened another meeting in 1984 to discuss future possibilities of research. Both conferences suggested that within the small community of the Secret Service the role of scientist had been neglected. Because of the practical orientation of the Service, these scientific figures were ignored; research was too slow and abstract and did not fit with an agency culture that privileged a fast pace lifestyle. After the agency decided to develop these relations with the mental health community, it established an in-house research division that would investigate the concept of dangerousness (Institute of Medicine, 1984). The Institute of Medicine recommended that the Service “establish a long-term future direction for research and training,” which it did (Institute of Medicine, 1984, p. vii). This emergence of a new voice allowed the Service to take protection in a different and radical direction in the next 15 years by developing a refined and sophisticated threat assessment model. Instead of reverting back to the 1970s by linking enemies with ideology, the Service would devise a new framework based on a process understanding of targeted violence. The researcher achieved a dominant position within the ranks of the Service.

In addition to the call for “overmanning” the president, developing an “ultimate shield” through intelligence gathering capabilities, and delving into the scientific aspects of protection, the Service also had to focus on how to secure the president in the Washington, D.C. area. The *Management Report* called for the Secret Service to “commit whatever time and resources are required to develop detailed procedures for the conduct of advances in Washington D.C.” (Management Review, 1981, p. 51). This call was a necessary catalyst for the Service to begin taking bolder measures in surrounding the POTUS with increased security. It was clear that the
president was not safe inside the confines of Washington D.C. Security holes had to be identified and filled before another attack on the president.

**Congressional Hearings: More Meaning and More Solutions**

Congress also held two key hearings that would further revamp presidential protection. A month after the release of the Treasury Management report the Judiciary Committee in the House held a hearing concerning a new bill that addressed Zones of Protection, which fit nicely with the Treasury’s focus on access and proximity to the president. Robert McBrien, special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations, pointed out that zones of protection were set-up around the protected “in order to establish a perimeter through which only authorized personnel are permitted to enter” (U.S. Congress, House, Zones of Protection, 1981, p. 16). These protective spheres necessarily exclude and include certain individuals from access to the president, which provides a healthy perimeter between the known and unknown. The Treasury report recommended that the Service and the White House staff “develop a single document, on which both groups can agree, in which they detail the balance that is to be struck among the security, scheduling, and public exposure requirements of the President” (Management Review, 1981, p. 51).

Under these guidelines, the Service needed to restrict presidential access, but still be open to political considerations. In addition to clarifying presidential proximity, the Hinckley situation provided the Secret Service with the opportunity to clarify, expand, and solidify its protective and productive power through the proposal of expanding the zone of protection to all subjects whom the Service protects. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Robert McBrien flatly stated, “The March 30 assassination attempt against President Reagan of course only adds to the impetus and the desirability of improving in any way we can the protective situation” (U.S.
At the time, the law only provided that the president could be protected by these zones. With these presidential perimeters, agents had the power to remove anyone from these zones and charge them with a federal offense. If the protectee is not the president, the Secret Service had no jurisdiction. McBrien pleaded that “we need clarity now” (U.S. Congress, House, Zones of Protection, 1981, p. 8). It was essential for McBrien to convey that the Service needed the power to “carry out its protective mission by excluding people from an area that in the circumstances of that particular case the Service has determined is necessary” (U.S. Congress, House, Zones of Protection, 1981, p. 10). Although this issue did not deal directly with presidential security, this new bill would apply the same protections that the president receives to anyone who is covered by the Service. The quality of presidential security was being dramatically expanded resulting from the Hinckley situation. This would just be the first instance of Secret Service’s methods and principles spreading into other aspects of political and social life.

A week later the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs addressed a host of issues concerning presidential protection. They included establishing a presidential protection commission, reevaluating the protection of past presidents and their families, and reevaluating the standards of protection. Senator William Roth (R-DE) laid out the agenda:

The attack on President Reagan again rekindled many questions that were raised after earlier assaults. Should the President confine public appearances to secure locations? Is this a desirable practice in a democracy? Does the Secret Service have or use adequate manpower in protecting the President? Can the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the Service be enhanced? Is there adequate liaison between the Secret Service, FBI, and other concerned agencies?

Although these questions did not have quick or even solvable solutions, Roth was clearly alarmed of the “record of assassinations and attempted assassinations” in the past 20 years (U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential Protection Commission, 1981, p. 23). However, he expressed
that “in a free society there cannot be 100 percent security for any individual” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential Protection Commission, 1981, p. 1).

In order to provide for better protection, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), who was involved with the Warren Commission, pushed strongly for the creation of a commission after he “observed that very little was in the offering by way of strengthening Presidential protection” (Presidential Protection, 1981, p. 2). To help current presidents understand the importance of presidential protection, this committee would potentially include past presidents, the majority and minority leader of the Senate, speaker of the House, and Secretary of the Treasury. He argued that “there is a tendency to forget the importance of Presidential protection” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential Protection Commission, 1981, p. 3). This commission would help bring this issue to the fore by defining the general nature of domestic and foreign threats to the president, ensure the Service had enough resources to do its primary task, and would ensure that the “White House staff members would take due account of considerations of safety and heed precautionary advice from the Secret Service” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential Protection Commission, 1981, p. 23). The committee would continually look at presidential protection as an object of analysis. However, there was not a great deal of enthusiasm from senators or the Secret Service concerning the commission. Director Knight was clear on this manner before the Senate. He remarked that the Secret Service does not need “another body or commission or committee to do essentially what we are doing” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential Protection Commission, 1981, p. 34).

The committee also addressed the viability of implementing standardized presidential security. Presidential protection was determined, according to the Management Review, by two factors: the “level of manpower that is available to the Secret Service” and “the need to reach a
practical accommodation” between security and politics (Management Review, 1981). These two criteria did not provide for optimal or even effective protection. To rectify these loose standards, the Committee floated the idea of inflating the presidential bubble to an almost unfathomable size. Former Secret Service Agent Charles Vance called for “a ‘fifty foot ‘buffer zone’” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential Protection Commission, 1981, p. 47). Specter asked, “Why was the 50-foot rule not observed on March 30th?” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential Protection Commission, 1981, p. 15). The logic behind this 50 foot rule consisted of “the distance from which a person with a handgun would be unlikely to be able to get to the President” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential Protection Commission, 1981, p. 15). This zone of protection would be large enough to avoid any close-range attack on the president.

Director Knight dismissed the idea of a 50-foot rule by remarking, “Take the situation of the President attending a Super Bowl game or a rally at Madison Square Garden” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential Protection Commission, 1981, p. 37). The president would have to be 50 feet from the public at any of those events. A free society could not tolerate its leader being confined from the people. This is why the Service “procedures do not include such matters as how far from the President crowds should be” (Management Review, 1981, p. 41). In response to this argument over the 50 foot rule, Senator Roth aptly said, “There is no way, it seems to me, in a democracy, you can give complete protection” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential Protection Commission, 1981, p. 37). However, this fatalistic response was unacceptable to the Service. There was an alternative answer to the crowd problem that the Service would soon develop.

**The Process of Readjustment**
The issues raised by the attempt on Reagan’s life were multiple and varied. Very few of these issues gained enough traction for any real or any utterances to become authoritative statements at this time. Productive power was stifled to an extent. The 50 foot zone of protection, the creation of a commission to help administer the presidential protection, increased gun control laws, and massive changes to the Levi guidelines all failed to materialize. Although the press was critical, they were also very positive. The media’s concentration on the positive elements of the Service overwhelmed the negative aspects. The problems that were exposed were often masked by the heroism of the Secret Service and the seemingly permanent condition of political assassinations. These two images actually hurt the Service’s ability to reformulate itself. This organizational paradox could not be resolved. The Service did such a fine job that it was unable to convince anyone of the need for increased intelligence. There was no need to curb civil liberties for a problem that the Service effectively handled, but could not solve through additional intelligence. In order for a real shift to occur, the Service needed to fail. Senator Specter pointed this fact out. He said candidly that “when a president is spared, as, fortunately, President Reagan was on March 30, the event is important but it tends to recede from our minds” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Presidential Protection Commission, 1981, p. 4).

Yet, there were also correctable mistakes such as inadequate communication, no possession of the president’s medical records, failure to increase protection on either the president or vice president after the attack, faulty decision making in a routine situation, the inability to provide for protection outside the Hilton, failure to secure George Washington Hospital for hours after the attack, and slight modifications to the Levi Guidelines. The *Management Report* verified all of these problems and offered recommendations to prevent them from recurring. These solutions were declared authoritative and implemented. Other slight
readjustments were made in response to March 30. The Secret Service was granted additional authority. Congress made changes to the zones of protection through additional statutes by granting the Service new authority to establish zones of protection for people other than the president. It was a federal crime for anyone refusing to leave or enter these moving zones of protection. The Service also placed a higher premium on scientizing presidential security through the use of profiling techniques, statistical tools, and intelligence gathering capabilities. These changes to security and its protective missions were mostly reflected in its appropriation allotment between 1981 and 1985. Its budget grew from $178.3 to $293.2, an increase of approximately 64 percent (Department of Justice, 2002). These changes allowed the Service to take additional steps for strengthening and hardening the bubble around the president.

Another minor, but significant change in presidential protection was the building of the James J. Rowley Training Center in Beltsville, Maryland in 1982. This newly stylized training facility included Hollywood-like sets of the White House, the Blair House, and streets surrounding the 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. The $1.6 million center was to be the first phase of a massive training facility. Overall, it was a 10 year project that cost approximately $10 million to build. The idea of using a mock White House to train agents had been in the works for over 10 years at the Service, but it was never able to get the funding (Tofani, 1982, March 16).

Before this massive training facility, agents used the Beltsville office to train agents by watching assassination films, running drills, and on-the-job training at the actual Blair House and the White House. Director Stu Knight commented that agents simulate situations that “vary from a speech site to entering or leaving buildings, motorcade situations, almost any conceivable

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97 The changes to the Service’s budget also reflected the growth of dignity protection. In 1983, the Service asked for a one time bump of $30 million and 99 new positions to help with the Summer Olympics in Los Angeles (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1983). Even though this $30 million was supposed to be temporary, the Service’s budget absorbed it and continued to grow.
situation in which you can imagine an assault might take place, and the simulation is really quite realistic” (U.S. Congress, Senate, p. 167). The transition to new up-dated facilities would enhance the capacity of the Service to run additional real-like training drills of attacks on the principal (AOP). Although Secret Service spokesperson Jim Boyle said that the Reagan attempt did not instigate the creation of a mock White House, it was the reason that Congress approved the spending (Tofani, 1982, March 16). Staff Adviser to the House Appropriations subcommittee Tex Gunnels said, “We can’t afford to have a president killed. My God, the whole country goes into shock” (Tofani, 1982, March 16). With this facility, the Service had a school that rivaled the FBI’s Quantico base, which allowed it to train, create new meaning, and implement its routines in a systematic manner.

These minor modifications began to challenge the current structure of presidential protection. One change to protective practices after the attack was the magnetometer detail of the Uniformed Division (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1984). Although localities had occasionally used them for a presidential visit after the two attacks on Ford, the Service still had not implemented this practice. Working alongside the Canine Explosive Canine Unit and the counters-sniper teams of UD, this detail accompanied the PPD to presidential sites in order to sweep and sterilize these spaces from any bomb threats. In fact, UD was no longer just confined to being Household guards. Its mission had expanded to such an extent that it worked seamlessly with the PPD, presidential advanced agents, and the Foreign Missions Branch. In 1984 alone, counter-sniper teams provided security for 918 events, the Canine Explosive units conducted 4,405 searches, and the magnetometer details scanned 345 places (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, 1984).
The Service’s also began to solve the crowd problem, which would have the most lasting and important impact. It would not create a 50 foot safe zone around the president, but instead it sought a two-prong strategy to mitigate the dangers from the people interacting with the president. First, the Service began to understand that crowds needed to be disciplined and bubbled on a routine basis. There were no more exceptions for allowing an unscreened public to be in the proximity of the POTUS. The Service correctly bubbled the crowd inside the Hilton Hotel, but failed to build a similar bubble outside the Hilton Hotel, which left Reagan vulnerable. This change in protective measures required agents to secure spaces in advance, screen and sterilize anyone gaining access to these spaces, and hold them in those spaces until the POTUS arrived. Under no circumstance were people allowed to touch and talk to the president without going through the cleansing process. This new routine applied to rope lines, airport arrivals, speeches, meetings, and anywhere the president happened to be. Crowd behavior had to be regulated. This action was just not designed to protect the president, but also individuals within those crowds. The Service had a responsibility to ensure a safe environment for all.

The second answer to the crowd problem was based on a similar principle as the 50 foot rule. The Service needed to create extra distance between the president and the people. It was no longer safe to be in a static environment with enemies of the state that could use homemade bombs to kill. This new terrorist tactic forced the Service to consider the safety of the POTUS outside and inside the White House and on. To deal with dangers on the outside, the Service had to more carefully control the information it released to the public about presidential movement and it had to consider how to create a buffer zone between the president and the people. The Service had to be more prudent in releasing the timetable of where the president will be at an exact time. Hinckley used that information to plan his attack. The Service also started to more
routinely use press areas as buffer zones. Director Knight, in his testimony before Congress, declared that the “press are closer to the President and have preferential position” and it is “important to us that no one other than the press be in that authorized area” (p. 155). These zones created an artificial space that were not only sterilized, but also created an adequate separation from the people. Inside the White House, the Service had to consider how to build a compound around the White House. Streets needed to be sealed and agents needed to be armored. There was no longer any safe zone in the proximity of the White House, which required agents to start taking extensive measures to strengthen and isolate the White House. However, this solution would also be the toughest to implement. The Jeffersonian ideals of an open president would have to be overcome.

**Extending the Fortress: Beirut Bombings and Muslim Hit Squads**

Although not all of these protective measures were declared legitimate, the most pressing issues raised by the attempted assassination would soon receive further consideration. The question of the public’s access to the president and the dangers in Washington would soon no longer be mere utterances. Action would have to be taken to limit direct proximity to the presidential body and the White House grounds needed to be fortified; intelligence laws had to be relaxed in order to detect, monitor, and arrest threats to the president. Although the 50 foot zone was never a practical suggestion, the notion of restricting presidential proximity to crowds was a critical issue, and the dangers of an attack in Washington D.C. only grew exponentially with new and innovative terrorist attacks that were emerging globally. It would take another series of events to produce enough force to make these changes materialize, which would allow the Service to tap into the core of productive power. New subjects of insecurity had arisen that would force the Service to take additional measures to secure.
The reverberations of the terrorist attacks in Beirut, Lebanon, in the 1980s put the Secret Service on alert. On April 18, 1983, a 400-pound suicide truck bomb blew up the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people. Six months later, a truck carrying 12,000 pounds of explosives was blown up outside the Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 242 Americans. Although these attacks did not challenge presidential protection directly, they provided a great deal of clarity about the potential dangers an accessible Pennsylvania Avenue posed to the president. Fear began to grow when threats started to emerge that there could be terrorist attacks on United States soil instead of in a far off place in the Middle East. Less than a month after the barracks attack in Lebanon, a small car bomb exploded outside the U.S. Senate. Intelligence agencies started to report that there could be attacks on major U.S. buildings. In particular, intelligence picked up a viable bomb threat targeted at the State Department. One anonymous State Department official said, “After the bombing of the Marine headquarters in Beirut, and more recently the bomb explosion in the Capitol, we have to take any anonymous threat seriously” (Gailey, 1983). It was later reported that a Thanksgiving attack directed at the White House or a major U.S. installation had been planned by Iranian Shiites that would be similar in scope to the Marine barracks bombing (J. M. J. Coates, 1983, December 18).

In response to these threats, the Service parked seven dump trucks filled with sand outside each entrance to protect the White House. These Park Service trucks were strategically placed to force cars to maneuver slowly around these parked barricades. Other dump trucks were stationed outside the Treasury and State Departments to prevent any car from ramming these buildings with explosives. The viability of an actual terrorist attack in Washington had reached levels that forced the Service to act. White House spokesperson Larry Speakers said that these security precautions “were not a result of a specific threat against the White House,” but
consisted of the Secret Service’s “normal review of security measures” (Gailey, 1983). This normal review of security measures also included tighter screening of vehicles, bomb sniffing dogs, forcing White House employees to leave their keys in the cars as they were searched, and having more armed guards on top of the White House.

Two weeks later, the Service replaced these trucks with Jersey Barriers to protect the White House from truck bombings (Shirbman, 1983, December 4). These highway dividers/barriers were similar to the purpose of the dump truck in that they are meant to ensure that a car has to maneuver slowly around these barricades to reach its destination. Although this safe action by the Service represented a low level of commitment that did not produce much meaning, it was a key step in using dangerous events to expand security measures around the White House. The only comment the Service had about these permanent changes in the White House landscape was that “the barriers are being put there for the same reason the trucks were there—for security reasons” (Shirbman, 1983, December 4). Beyond that, the White House confirmed that the Service now had access to antiaircraft missiles. These shoulder-fired weapons would be placed on top of the White House and the Old Executive Offices building and would be under the direct control of the Secret Service. In response to these increased security measures, the Chicago Tribune noted that “the once fairly open White House is not yet a fortress, but there is no question Reagan’s activities are being curtailed severely by increasing security needs” ("Missiles reported at White House," 1983).

The needs of the Service only grew as it requested the Park Service to close East Executive Avenue permanently; it had been originally constructed “during the administration of Ulysses S. Grant in the 1870s to accommodate the public for visits to the White House” (Bredemeier, 1984, December 7). The closing of a significant artery for DC traffic and a key
street that connected the people and the president was temporarily closed three months after these series of threats. Large iron fences were erected at both ends of the street that connected the downtown area to many Washingtonians. These fences ensured that no vehicle could gain access to this street. With the West Executive Avenue being sealed after the attempted assassination on Truman and East Executive Avenue being closed after bomb threats, the only major connection to the White House was Pennsylvania Avenue.

Finally, the impact of these problematic events allowed the Service to start advocating for a more secure White House by consolidating security around the White House and closing down a segment of Pennsylvania Avenue: the last remnant of the People’s House. First, the Service petitioned to eliminate the dual security system that existed at the White House. It would use another report that generated new meaning to justify the change in protection. The west side of the White House that includes the Old Executive Office building was secured by the Uniformed Division of the Service, while the east side of the White House that includes the Treasury building and the annex was secured by the Treasury Police force. Because “incidents of political terrorism have increased along with demands for a more complete security system” the Report on the Expansion of the White House Security Perimeter recommended that the Secret Service assume protective responsibilities for both the east and west sides of the White House (U.S. Congress, House, Expansion of White House Security Perimeter, 1986, p. 2). The expansion of Secret Service jurisdiction around the White House created “a stronger more efficient, single unit, will aid in fulfilling a strong national need for assuring the safety of the President and the White House” (U.S. Congress, House, Expansion of White House Security Perimeter, 1986, p. 2).
Second, the Service started to ponder closing Pennsylvania Avenue during its major White House revisions in 1983 and 1984. Although Secret Service Director John Simpson said that the plan was in its early stages and would take years to be implemented, the plan was to create a college “campus-like” atmosphere around the White House (Seaberry, 1985, March 7). With the closure of East and West Executive avenues along with Pennsylvania Avenue, the White House would become a compound built around the idea of security. A bunker-based strategy built on principles of access and distance forcefully emerged. For this idea to materialize, the Service had to produce authoritative statements that would be binding.

However, the proposal came under immediate attack from members of Congress, D.C. city officials, and Washingtonians (Engelberg, 1985, April 28). The editorial for the Washington Post commented on the proposal:

WE HAVE ONLY one reservation about the Secret Service's proposal to close off Pennsylvania Avenue to traffic from 15th to 17th streets as a way to increase security for the president and to create a “campus-like” atmosphere around the White House. It doesn't go nearly far enough. Certainly it's appropriate that the White House-as a unique educational institution for expanding the fortress mentality-be in the safest possible setting. But why stop with the closing off of the "Grand Avenue"? If it's safety first here, you need more than just a quick-barricade job around the president's house. To heck with a Band-aid approach-we're talking big security. Better to seal off the entire District of Columbia at the borders, allowing no civilian vehicular traffic at all. Any pedestrians choosing to set foot inside the boundaries should be required to produce official "walking papers" or a student I.D., color-coded to prevent unauthorized ventures into areas off limits. Rivers, of course, would need heavy patrolling (Editorial, 1985, March 28).

Tom Wicker of the New York Times also picked up on this satirical tone and asked “Why not sandbag the President’s house itself? Or build a 20-foot concrete wall around it” (1985, March 29). Even FBI Director William Webster declared his skepticism about the proposal to close down Pennsylvania Avenue. He noted that “sometimes excessive security actually invites trouble” (S. Evans, 1985, April 12). In the end, the proposal was dropped by the Secret Service;
its time had not come. For many, the mere utterance of closing down America’s Main Street was not only foolish but un-democratic and anti-American, as it violated the tradition of the People’s House.

Setting up Stages and Screens

These measures were significant in building a space that could actually secure the president while he worked and slept. However, Agent Venker argued the most impressive feature of protection was severely restricting the movement of the president inside and outside the White House. Inside the White House, the president was never alone, even in his private quarters. Agents were stationed at every key intersection, hallway, and entry point to track the movements of the president in the Executive Avenue. Outside the White House, the president was no longer able to “do the sort of curbside handshaking that used to be the essence of politics” (Rush, 1988, p. 283). The problem JFK had created with his reckless willingness to mingle with crowds had finally been put to an end by a more aggressive Secret Service. Although it took more than 30 years to curtail this security threat, the Service also prohibited the POTUS from using open cars, which all but eliminated the use of a presidential motorcade for political purposes. The presidential convertible had been eliminated from the White House Fleet in the 1970s and the presidential limos with sunroofs were phased out in the 1980s. They were replaced with what Siuru and Stewart called a buttoned up limousine “with protective features that rival those of a military armored car—or perhaps even a light tank” (1995, p. 121). The bubbling was being coated with steel and armor; open spaces had to be replaced with closed and regulated environments. The most effective tool, however, was to discourage the president from leaving the White House on a regular basis. Venker admitted, “Mounting terrorism, horrible as it
is has simplified the Service’s task: it just doesn’t let ‘the Man’ out anymore” (Rush, 1988, p. 281).

And when POTUS was let out, there were more effective ways of reaching the public than Kennedy’s solution of mingling with mobs. White House communication had reached a level that allowed the president to be isolated from the public, but appear to be among them. Reagan did this by building “on the presidential stages discovered by Nixon” (Kumar, 2007, p. xxxi). Through the careful manipulation of events, Reagan’s deputy chief of staff Michael Deaver was able to use images and pictures to tell a story. The framing, the lighting, the location, the angles, the people, and the background allowed Reagan to project an esteemed presidential image. This was done by a careful coordination of subjects of security. The crowd was expected to be reverent, but loud, the media to report on the imagery, the staff of the White House to build the stage, the Service to provide for protection, and the president to perform. In relying on his acting background, Reagan knew how to tell a story and show it to the people. As “keeper of the presidential image,” Kumar noted that Deaver perfectly staged an “event a day” to illicit the proper image of the POTUS (Kumar, 2007, pp. 149, xxx). In terms of managing the presidential image and the news, Helen Thomas flatly stated that “they do it the best” (Kumar, 2007).

Yet, the staging of the POTUS had to be done in cooperation with the Service. Agents had to understand how to protect and present the president. Under Nixon, agents felt that this staging superseded protective concerns. However, McCarthy’s statement that politics always trumped security was no longer true, if it ever was. Under Reagan, stages and screens mostly worked together to help project a proper presidential image; the two were mutually reinforcing and created a productive relationship. The spectacle of the stage was designed to remove the
president from the people’s presence in order to show them the right image of the president. The stage was designed to tell a story, not have meaningful interaction with the masses. This separation actually supported the protective measure of the Service. Reagan did not have to press the flesh like JFK and Ford in order to have a healthy relationship with the public. It could be done by showing screens of images to the public.

The implementation of these screens and shields was often done in cooperation with the Special Agent in Charge and the Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver and White House Political Advance person Bill Henkel. The working out of these two functions, however, was often difficult and required effort to make them compatible. Security and political concerns often clashed, but there was usually a solution that enabled both parties to be satisfied. At first, Henkel had a hard time dealing with security precautions. He publicly yelled at Petro for voicing his displeasure about the suggestion to have hundreds of students sitting behind Reagan at a school. Henkel wanted an image with a crowd behind Reagan while Petro thought it would an unnecessary risk. To resolve the impasse, Petro invited him outside to explain the situation to him. They agreed that the band could sit behind the POTUS because they would be fairly immobile; politics and security could work together with careful negotiation. Petro recounted another incident when he had to negotiate with Deaver and Henkel where Reagan was going to throw out the first pitch at the Baltimore Orioles baseball game. For publicity purposes, Deaver and Henkel wanted the president to throw out the first pitch from the mound, but the Service considered that too dangerous. He would be too accessible to the crowd and help would be to far to reach him if something did happen. Petro suggested the on-deck circle, but they rejected this solution. They came to an agreement that Reagan would throw out the pitch from third-base.
However, sometimes security had to trump politics and sometimes politics had to trump protection. On one occasion, there was an internal debate between Petro and Henkel about whether Reagan should sit with the US delegation after he had given his speech at the United Nations. The Service felt that it was dangerous to sit with US delegation because there was no way agents could screen people, and they would be sitting right in front of the Libya delegation, which Reagan had recently ordered bombed. Henkel thought it would be a nice public relations move. Reagan sided with protection. Former White House staffer Bradley Patterson pointed out that “no team is without conflicts” (2002, p. 246) Bradley noted that the Political Advance teams wanted certain angles, big crowds, bands, high ranking officials, a rope line, and an accessible president. The Secret Service Advance Teams wanted a shielded president to come under the cover of night and darkness. The two groups had competing interests that were grounded in two different frameworks. According to one veteran political advance agent, “they would say, ‘You cannot chose that route,’ and we would counter, ‘No, he will drive that avenue, you go ahead and protect him’” (B. Patterson, 2002, p. 246). Patterson admitted that “since the assassination attempt on Reagan, the Service wins more of these battles” (2002, p. 246). Petro recounted that if the political advance team wanted to create massive political spectacles, then the Service would inform them of the consequences. For example,

If Bill Henkel had wanted the president to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge at high noon, it would be okay with us, as long as everyone understood the implications: we’d shut down the Brooklyn Bridge six hours ahead of time; we’d made sure every window in every building on both sides of the bridge was closed; we’d need hundreds of policemen to help us do this, and he would be the one to take the heat from the predictable outcry, “Why did you close down Brooklyn Bridge and gridlock New York traffic?” As long as he understood what this was going to entail and still wanted to do it, we’d make it happen. Luckily, when faced with anything even remotely close to that, Henkel’s cool head would prevail and he’d say, Forget it, let’s do something else (2005, pp. 31-32).
With this capacity to help shape political events, the Service has considerable weight in shaping the public image of the POTUS through its disciplinary apparatus.

*The Private Matters of Reagan: Children and Health*

In helping mold the public character of the president by employing a series of public screens, the Service also constructed a screen of privacy for Reagan. Because the Service moved into the second and third floors of the White House after the attempted assassination of the POTUS, agents had intimate access to the personal life of the First Family and its secrets. The living quarters of the president had been off-limits to previous security details. This move placed a great deal of trust in the Service. Protecting the secret lives of the first family was always a delicate situation and it required the Service to use private screens to mask the family dynamics of the Reagan household. The relationships between Reagan and his children were extremely strained. Agent John Barletta, a close friend of the Reagan, recounted that family relations “just seemed forced” and Reagan’s children “seemed so emotionally distant” (2005, p. 181).

Although Maureen was extremely close to her parents, Ron was childish and rarely saw his parents, Michael was testy, and Patti was difficult to handle (Barletta & Schweizer, 2005). In one situation, Michael had a temper tantrum and started to berate the Royal Canadian Mounted Police because they would not allow him to have more friends in an unmarked police vehicle.

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98 Susan Ford had similar problems with the Secret Service. She loved to party in Georgetown. One agent recounted, “Susan Ford was young and didn’t know how to handle being daughter of the president. She was gregarious. She wanted to get out. She frequented taverns in Georgetown under age. A couple of places knew her and let her in when she was underage” (Kessler, 1996, p. 69). Agents could not stop her, but neither could they confine her movements. The best they could do was to manage information in a way to prevent the press from hearing about her escapades. Agent McCarthy noted that these situations can be awkward for agents. He writes, “Protecting the older children of a President can also be difficult for the agents involved. If, for example, the young person they’re protecting goes to a party where marijuana is present. It can be an uncomfortable situation for the Secret Service detail. Whatever their own personal views about smoking pot, the agents are, after all, federal law-enforcement officers” (1985, p. 221). Even with this law enforcement ethos, agents make no attempts to expose the children of the POTUS. That would violate a greater responsibility: to protect the private body of the president and its extensions. Beyond this fundamental tension, the bubble is tough for teenagers to live a somewhat normal life. McCarthy notes that “the ever-present security makes it very difficult for these young people to go on dates, to go to parties with their friends, to do any of things that average young people enjoy” (1985, p. 221). Because of this intense gaze, there is a fair amount of commands and resistance between the two entities.
Working for the liaison division, Barletta had to go to the Canadian Embassy in Washington to resolve the situation, which he did before it turned into a diplomatic incident.

Patti and Ron would finally ask for the removal for their protective details. The bubble was too suffocating for them. Like Margaret Truman, the constant surveillance and monitoring was too much as it impinged on their social lives. The two entities were always in conflict, as both children would constantly try to escape their agents; they would often have to race through New York City traffic to find them. One time, Patti was informing her mother how she was able to “outwit those agents” and lose them in New York. Barletta was so upset by her tone and arrogance that he reacted. He said, “Finally I put my arm over the seat, turned my head back, and, looking direct at her, said, ‘Patti, do you think it’s funny that you play games with the United States Secret Service when their only motive, their only reason to be there, is to protect you—with their lives if necessary?!’” (2005, p. 186) He would later apologize to Nancy Reagan about his behavior, but not to Patti.

Another aspect of the bubble is that it hides the outside world from the president and the president from the outside world. One aspect of being the president that drives them away from so-called normal conditions was that presidents did not carry money. Barletta observed that presidents just “naturally forget to keep track of just what things cost” (2005, p. 165). Reagan would constantly have to quiz him about what the price of things. He did not like the fact that he never saw money exchange hands, especially when he got his hair cut. Barletta even suggested to Kay Pieata that they should allow Reagan to tip the barber. However, he said “that wouldn’t have been appropriate for him to do so” (2005, p. 166).

And then the Service had to keep quiet about Reagan’s failing memory. This aspect of screening the private lives of the president’s health had been a recurring theme for the Service.
They had to keep quiet about Wilsons’ strokes, FDR’s disabilities and failing health, Eisenhower’s heart attack, ileitis attack, and stroke, Kennedy’s back troubles, Addison’s disease, and a host of other medical problems, Johnsons’ heart issues, Nixon’s drinking problems, and now Reagan’s memory issues. With each president, the Service knew of these issues and had to keep silent about them. Up until his final day on September 28, 1986 of the PPD, Petro said that he did not see a problem with his memory. Even though there were rumors about his health, he saw no visible signs. Barletta puts the date that he first noticed Reagan’s health issues in late 1993 in Chicago when he could not remember why he was there. However, it was not until early in 1994 that he consciously recognized there was a problem. Even if agents were aware of the problem earlier, it was unlikely that they would have revealed it. Just like the upper echelons in the Secret Service with JFK, they would deny anything, even on their death-beds. Petro was aware “of the fact that the Secret Service was part of a very small clique with incredible access to the president,” which required a code of silence (2005, p. 166). This attitude of secrecy and confidentiality concerning presidential conduct had been deeply embedded into the fabric of the agency. Agents Bowen and Neal in the 1960s remarked that the presidential protective detail has seen and heard things that would make the nightly news. However, they noted that “each agent keeps a closed mouth and a memory which is conveniently forgetful where significant events are concerned” (1961, p. 157). Petro admitted that in no way would he “betray the trust and unique personal access that agents have with people we protect” (2005, p. 279).

Conclusion

The Secret Service had formed and been formed by problematic events during the Reagan presidency. In many ways, the attack on Reagan and the following terrorist attacks were a pivotal moment for the Service. It was here that the Service started to produce meaning that
would enable and justify a bunker mentality. These events allowed the Secret Service, the president, and other figures the opportunity to create and expand meaning through action that began to separate the president from the Jeffersonian myth. This was the essence of productive power. The Service was no longer just providing “exalted defense,” but had moved to a position of offense. It was pushing and advocating for measures that would tie the president to its disciplinary apparatus. After the attempted assassination and as well as the Beirut bombings, the Secret Service was the lead agency in fortifying the White House and advocating for the creation of a campus atmosphere around the White House. This idea, however, was not taken as an authoritative statement. Although the Treasury Secretary James Baker presented the idea to Congress, it still was not given much credibility due to its radical nature. The symbolic representation of placing barricades between the president and the people had too many significant consequences. This particular utterance did not fit the current perceptions of reality in the United States in the 1980s. Despite the continued growth of international terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s, the people were not ready for such a proposal. It had not come to grasp that a new enemy had emerged from the international scene that used rudimentary materials to create massive destruction. For the next decade, the Service would have to struggle and fight for the authority to make the White House a compound. In doing so, it sought to constitute and refashion democratic values by trying to establish that protection trumps openness; discursive action could transform the traditional meaning of what it meant to have a People’s House.

**The Transformation of the White House: The Bubble Becomes a Bunker**

However, this utterance that was barely speakable in the 1980s was granted authoritative status in the mid 1990s. It would take a series of international and domestic terrorist attacks in to create a new discursive and open space which allowed for a possible change in how presidential
security was operationalized at the White House. Each shock to the system gradually changed
the web of power relations that existed between the President, Congress, city officials, and the
Secret Service in relation to the security importance of Pennsylvania Avenue. These power
relations were being slightly altered, which allowed the Service more opportunities in pursuing a
security state around the White House. Agents were able to voice, express, and even act out their
security measures due to these shifts. This underlying change in conditions started to erode and
weaken previous beliefs and traditions about presidential protection and the symbol of the White
House as being the “People’s House.” The importance of the past was withering away with each
successive problematic event as the Service gained increased ability to use productive power.
These series of events finally allowed the Secret Service to close down America’s Main Street:
Pennsylvania Avenue. To demonstrate how a series of events was able to achieve this, this
section will seek to explain how the Secret Service was able to reformulate its power relations
and zones of influence in order to cut ties to previous traditions and modes of legitimizing
behavior. The Secret Service was able to redefine its roles and values in a nexus of confusion
created by a series of terrorist acts between 1994 and 1995. Through these attacks on the White
House, attempted assassination attacks, and a serious domestic terrorist attack, the Service was
able to disconnect with past discourse and build a new framework of presidential protection that
relied on security and fortification. The Service was able to “recodify” how the president should
be protected in the 21st century.

**Resistance & Acceptance: Building Public and Private Trust with Bill Clinton**

The successes in making these changes, however, depended on the ability of the Service
to tame a new independent president who wanted his own space. Even with its mythical code of
silence, Bill Clinton did not trust his protective detail to keep his secrets. This caused quite a few
problems for the Service as the relation between protectee and protector became extremely strained. Clinton immediately challenged the closed nature of the bubble when he entered the White House in 1993. He chaffed against the overbearing nature of his security detail and sought to relax its standards so he could allegedly achieve close distance to the people. For him, the cocoon was too tight and the Secret Service needed to be controlled. Clinton called the White House the “crown jewel of the federal penal system” (Richter, 1998, July 18). Michael Kelly of the New York Times reported that he was “determined to have in the White House some measure of the freedom and privacy he enjoyed in Little Rock” and had “begun a systematic effort to push the edges of ‘the bubble’”(Kelly, 1992, December 2).

His first move was to remove agents that had been stationed in his living quarters. The Service balked at these measures, but the president was able to first remove the agents to a second floor command center and finally to the first floor to guard the residence’s entrances. Some journalists reported that for the Secret Service “this was war” as the “agency doesn’t want to surrender any of its expanded authority” (Clift & Thomas, April 5, 1993). Tension became so high between the presidential detail and the president that stories were leaked to the press corps about fights between the First Couple. It was not the first time that agents had leaked harmful information to the press. Most notably, it occurred with LBJ’s Secret Service after the relations between the two entities had deteriorated a fair amount. The distrust between the two, in the end, hurt the ability of the Service to maintain a close bond to the POTUS. The Clintons, like Nixon, even thought about removing agents they believed were loyal to George H.W. Bush (Richter, 1998, July 18). These rumors, especially about the First Lady, reaffirmed, according to two Newsweek journalists, the prevailing notion that she “is the power in front of the throne, calling the shots and cursing like a man” (Clift & Thomas, April 5, 1993). In particular, agents
allegedly released a story about Hillary Rodham Clinton cussing out Bill Clinton and throwing either a lamp or a Bible at him. Although the details were fuzzy about the so-called lamp-throwing incident, the story leaked by the Secret Service was sexist in nature and confirmed the image, according to Frank Rich, of a couple that had only married out of political expediency and made Hillary look like a “lamp-throwing Delilah, emasculating her weak husband” (1993, June 13).

The White House finally tracked down the leak of the sources to the Secret Service and gave a stern warning: “if the Secret Service doesn’t back off and button up, another federal agency will be found to protect the first family” (Clift & Thomas, April 5, 1993). In response to the measures implemented by Clinton to loosen the bubble around him, Jody Powell, press secretary to Jimmy Carter, said that he “can expand the envelope a little, but the practicalities of the matter make it very difficult to sustain that” (Kelly, 1992, December 2). In fact, any president, at first, resisted the intrusive nature of the security bubble. According to Director Lewis Merletti of the Secret Service, presidents tend “to view Secret Service personnel as an obstacle to their privacy and a barrier between them and the American people” (1998).

However, presidents come to learn through a “natural educational process” how “essential proximity is” and how a certain type of privacy can actually emerge under these conditions (Merletti, 1998).

Despite these initial troubles between the First Family and the Secret Service, agents were able to develop a cordial relationship with Clinton and the First Lady.99 Paul Richter of the Los Angles Times reported that Clinton “has cultivated the friendship of agents, throwing parties

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99 The Secret Service did not have these problems with the First Daughter. Reporter J.F.O. McCallister wrote that it is remarkable how normal Chelsea is and that her “Secret Service detail… deserves a nod” (1997, July 21). He notes that agents have been trained to work with teenagers and reports that inside sources in the White House say that the relationship has worked out great between the two.
for them when they leave the detail and giving gifs to their families” (Richter, 1998, July 18). The First Couple event went to Service’s training facility in Beltsville, MD for nearly four hours. While they were there, they watched demonstrations of how the Service would respond to an RPG attack and Clinton even was able to complete a 180-degree turn in a Camaro. The *Los Angeles Times* reported that they had a blast ("Clintons Have a Blast in Secret Service Tour," 1997, October 5). The relationship reached a level where many speculated that Clinton could not commit adultery even if he wanted to. David Plotz of *Slate magazine* observed that the POTUS “can be intruded upon or observed everywhere” except for certain locations in the White House (Plotz, 1996, July 25). And only if the “president is an exhibitionist or a lunatic, liaisons in the Oval Office, bowling alley, or East Wing are unimaginable” (Plotz, 1996, July 25). However, the president had a bit more privacy than originally thought. Because of Clinton’s extra-circular activities, agents were ordered to testify before a grand jury by the Office of Independent Counsel to reveal what they saw, heard, and knew about the president’s activities.

This request by Kenneth Starr was immediately resisted by the Service and the Department of Justice. In response to this petition by Starr, the Service declared that agents were protected under the protective function privilege, which would shield agents from revealing what they saw and heard while they were in close proximity to the POTUS. This absolute privilege would preclude agents from testifying what they had gleaned in public and private settings regardless of the content of the material. The Service was under no obligation to expose presidential crimes, affairs, secrets of the state, or personality quirks. The logic behind this position rested in a declaration by Secret Service Director Lewis Merletti. He argued that how the Service protects the POTUS requires that agents be protected from federal probes. In contrast to other countries that rely more on a “counter-offensive” approach or a “overwhelm the
attacker” strategy, the Service relied on the “cover and evacuate method” that is based on the principles of access and proximity. The bubble must not only be up 365 days a year and 24 hours a day, but the agents must have direct access to control presidential movement, especially in public places. Merletti argued that close protection relies on the ability of agents to have “complete discretion to initiate physical contact with a President at any time” (1998). This was often useful as agents often put their hands on the hips of the president to control his movement and actions. In addition to this, Secret Service protective formations enabled them to guide the direction of presidential movement. These formations were used often with presidents to prevent him from wandering into crowds, especially with Ford. In private settings, the Service maintained close proximity to the president: they shadow the president whenever he walks the halls, they are often stationed in his living quarters, and they detect his movement at all times.

Merletti continued to argue that access and proximity is a matter of life and death for the president. He remarked that the successful assassination of McKinley in Buffalo the attempted, but failed assassination attempt of Truman in the Blair House, the assassination of Kennedy in Dallas, the various assassination attempts on Gerald Ford, and the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan all revolved around the issues of proximity to the POTUS. Lincoln was assassinated from point-blank range in the Ford Theater and President Garfield also was assassinated from point-blank range in Union Station. McKinley suffered the same fate. He was assassinated as he stood in a receiving line because the agent in charge of protecting him was moved away from his side because of political factors. Because of these reoccurring assassination attempts, the Service had achieved a high-degree of institutionalization concerning access and proximity. However, Merletti pointed out that this protective apparatus requires an “extraordinarily unique relationship” between agents and presidents (1998). It required an
extraordinary amount of trust that what is said and done in the presence of agents will not find its way into the gossip columns of major newspapers across the nation. Presidents must feel at home and comfortable enough for agents to understand their habits, customs, and personality quirks. Signs of normality and abnormality must remain hidden from the public at large. If this relationship is undermined, the quality of presidential security diminishes drastically. According to Director Merletti:

> It is my firm belief, as Director of the United States Secret Service, that using Secret Service protective personnel as witnesses concerning the activities of a President will substantially undermine, if not destroy the relationship of confidence and trust that must exists between the Secret Service and a President for the Secret Service to successfully full its mission. If our Presidents do not have complete trust in the Secret Service personnel who protect them, they may push away the Service’s “protective envelope,” thereby making them more vulnerable to assassination” (1998).

By forcing agents to testify against the person it protects may cause a chilling effect that would endanger the life of the president and his family.

Former President George H.W. Bush confirmed this sentiment in a letter he sent directly to the Director of the Secret Service (1998). He argued that the relationship between Secret Service personnel and the POTUS would be greatly altered if this precedent was allowed to go forward. He remarked that, “What’s at stake here is the confidence of the President in the discretion of the U.S.S.S. If that confidence evaporates the agents, denied proximity, cannot properly protect the President” (1998). In addition to the loss of protection, the president would also be forced to carve out a new notion of privacy. Under the framework of proximity and access, presidents had a notion of seclusion. They were protected by an extensive security bubble that prevented the media and public from gaining full access to presidential actions. Secret Service screens filter and provide a degree of privacy for the president. Bush reaffirmed this bubble privacy in his letter when he said that “never once did I hear an agent on any detail of
mine, Vice Presidential or Presidential, repeat any gossip about anyone they had ever covered” (1998).

However, in the Clinton case the courts ruled against the protective function privilege. The Washington, D.C., Court of Appeals circuit argued that the Service and the Department of Justice failed to carry its burden in convincing the court to create a new type of privilege (In re: Sealed Case). In particular, they were unable to convince the court that the protective relationship between the Service and the POTUS would actually change. The estrangement that may emerge between the Secret Service and the president was a mere hypothetical and based on speculation. The court also argued that former President Bush’s statement about the importance of trust and confidentiality had to be balanced against Presidents Ford and Carter’s statement saying that agents should be forced to testify. Furthermore, the appellate court stated that presidents have a duty to accept protection for their own personal safety despite the threat that agents may release sensitive information to the press or the courts. In fact, agents have testified in court before and have written memoirs exposing presidential personalities and aberrant behavior. These occurrences did not create a separation between presidents and their details.

Although four justices did not grant certiorari, Justice Breyer wrote a stirring dissent against the denial of certiorari (Rubin v. United States). He argued that the president was a special office that needs special consideration on this matter because “The Constitution vests the entire ‘Power’ of one branch of Government in that single human being” (Rubin v. United States). And, he said the court does have the power to create a new privilege as long as there is a transcendent public good. Proximity and access were necessary components in securing the body and life of the president. Without this degree of cooperation between agents and the president, his life would be in danger. This was only reinforced by the need of the president to
rely on a degree of privacy that is created by the security bubble. Justice Breyer noted that without the privilege “a president could not count on privacy” (Rubin v. United States). Presidents like any other politician would not want their politics or personalities divulged to the public through the media or the courts. Without this protective relationship reaffirmed by the protective function privilege, there was a danger that the president will lose trust in his agents and create distance, which may endanger his own safety and the health of the nation.

Although the Secret Service was not granted the protective function privilege, the principles of access, proximity, and privacy were not seriously challenged by Clinton. These events did not threaten the relationship that existed between agents and presidents because Clinton’s protective detail did not inform on him, even under oath. Monica Lewinsky also worried about the “ever-present Secret Service agents were saying” (Morton, 1999, p. 94). To maintain their confidentiality, Andrew Morton recounted that “their use of the curtained inner office, her entrances and exits from his quarters by different doors, the engineered ‘accidental’ meetings, and her avoidance of key White House officials, were all part of the precautions they took to keep the affair secret” (1999, p. 95). For agents trained to detect who visits the POTUS inside and outside the White House, it would be hard not to miss an intern frequently visiting the Oval Office or the supposedly random visits between the two.

Not only did the protective detail fail to expose Clinton in court, but agents also helped provide a positive image of the First Family. During their vacation on the Virgin Islands, the bubble opened up and a photojournalist was allowed to take photographs of the First Couple dancing on the beach, being intimate with each other, and the president hugging his daughter Chelsea. The First Family, who were in their bathing suits, supposedly had no clue the photographer was there, but the Service was absolutely cognizant of the journalist who was
about 100 yards out. The president said this was a violation of his privacy, but also noted that he liked the candid photographs “quite a lot” (Shogren, 1998, January 6). Some said it was a violation of presidential security, but the Service was aware of the possible threats. The Los Angeles Times had hailed the pictures as a hit (Shogren, 1998, January 6). Whether it was intentional or not, the Service provided a particular screen of the president and his family in a very personal moment. These photographs and images they projected would be needed in a time of political crisis for the POTUS.

The security bubble did provide both public and private screens for the POTUS, which allowed Clinton a fair amount of breathing room. He could trust the Service to present him to the public in a positive light, but also hide private information that would harm his image. Although this bond could have potentially been severed by an overzealous agent who spoke to the press or to an overzealous prosecutor, but agents upheld their code of conduct. The promise to remain silent about public and private affairs of the POTUS was maintained under Clinton. The bubble did ensure that the president’s actions and words remained within the White House. Despite the rough conditions that existed under Clinton’s early administration, the Service was able to internally and externally reinforce its image of protecting not just the body of the president, but also his life and image.

The Emergence of a Security State

Beyond securing a private space for the POTUS, the Service took extensive measures to protect Clinton from external threats. The attempts in the 1980s to isolate the POTUS by closing Pennsylvania Avenue would resurface almost immediately into his presidency. A new enemy had clearly emerged that sought to destabilize U.S. institutions through terrorist attacks. The real and absolute enemies of the 60s and 70s had mostly receded while new threats linked to the
militia movement in the United States and religious extremists with a global ideology began to
use a brand of terrorism that employed unconventional weapons to attack unconventional targets.
What made these subjects of insecurity different than the anarchist in the early 20th century, the
communist during the Cold War, and radicals on the left in the 60s and 70s was their
organizational capacity to commit organized destruction. Apart from the attacks on Lincoln and
Truman, presidential assassins were rarely part of a broader conspiracy to undermine the
government. This new enemy, especially a certain brand of Islamic fundamentalism, had the
organizational network and resources to commit such an attack. In understanding these new
threats, the Service also had to continue to manage old threats. Even though they had faded from
the American landscape, the crank and crazy were still people of interest with some means to
carry an attack out on the president. With these dangers, the Service was able to refashion its
protective measures, which effectively enabled it to create a Fortress White House.

However, the Service would have to wait for a problematic event to cause a fair amount
of insecurity concerning presidential security. There would be additional terrorist attacks in the
early 1990s, but nothing approaching a crisis event that would change U.S. policy concerning
how the president should be protected. The closest event that approached this level of crisis was
the attempted assassination of George H.W. Bush in Kuwait by Iraqi nationals in 1993 and the
1993 World Trade Center bombing that killed six people and wounded 1,000. In response to the
plot to kill Bush, the White House declared that it “was a direct attack on the United States” and
responded with a cruise missile targeted at a major intelligence operation in Baghdad (Jehl, 1993,
July 4). While the United States was facing international terrorism across the Atlantic, it also
was encountering a host of terrorism issues in the homeland, especially in New York City.
Alongside the World Trade Center bombing, there were reports about threats targeted at the
Lincoln Tunnel and the United Nations. With these domestic terrorist threats and attacks, reporter Douglas Jehl reported that the United States was slowly awakening to terrorism here and that the “United States still finds it cleaner to contend with trouble outside its borders than within” (Jehl, 1993, July 4). With the perceived and actual threats of truck bombings, bombing plots, and other assassination attempts, the Secret Service did not try to link these events with presidential security. The Service was quiet and did not seek to re-establish its claim about the importance of sealing off Pennsylvania Avenue.

However, in 1994 the Secret Service would change its tactics because its security measures were directly tested and threatened by a series of attacks and assassination attempts at the White House that ranged from a plane attack, a man shooting an SKS semiautomatic rifle at the White House from Pennsylvania Avenue, and another man spraying the White House with gunfire. This series of bizarre incidents started on September 12, 1994 when Frank Corder flew his small plane into the White House in September; the plane crashed under the Clintons bedroom window. Immediately after this incident, the Treasury Department, with coordination from the Secret Service, was to conduct a comprehensive investigation concerning White House security.

This one event served as the catalyst for the Secret Service to reexamine presidential protection as an object of study; this investigation would serve to push the Service to scrutinize its methods and tactics to determine what could be done to prevent a host of attacks that could be aimed at the White House. One of the main objectives, according to Under Secretary Noble of the Treasury Department, was “to see whether the procedures that are currently in place are adequate, and to see whether there needs to be any modification as it relates to the procedures currently in place” (Press Briefing, 1994, October 30). However, the Treasury Review was also
asked to examine how “to keep the White House open and accessible to the American people without jeopardizing valid security concerns” (Public Report of the White House Security Review, 1995). By asking questions of how to increase security and maintain levels of openness, the Service would need to figure out how to mitigate or preserve traditional values about the White House, but yet update security to face a potential terrorist attack.

Six weeks later, White House security was breached once again. Francisco Duran fired 20 to 30 rounds at the White House with a semi-automatic rifle. Before he could unload another clip at the White House, he was subdued by three civilians. In total, 11 rounds hit the White House, and one penetrated the Press Briefing Room in the West Wing. Immediately after this, the Service advocated for the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue for security concerns. Special Agent Griffin adamantly stated that it “would be an enhancement to security at the White House if Pennsylvania Avenue was closed” (Press Briefing, 1994, October 29).

However, Leon Panetta, chief of staff to President Clinton, was more measured in his response concerning presidential security. He said, “You walk a fine balance here; you try to, obviously, provide the greatest security possible for the President of the United States. But at the same time, you also want to provide access for people of this country to the White House. So it's that kind of balance that's involved here” (Press Briefing, 1994, October 29). In trying to determine this line between security and openness, Clinton’s administration was adamant that the president would not be sealed off from the people. Panetta said that they would not close down Pennsylvania Avenue because “they did not want to project the image of the president being inaccessible to the people” (Labaton, 1994, October 30). Robert Pear reported that that “Mr. Clinton clearly chafes at life inside the White House bubble” (1994, October 31). It was clear
that Clinton wanted to preserve, conserve, and enhance the historical precedence of the White House as being open and accessible.

**Initial Reaction to the Proposal**

Even though Clinton’s accepted the security bubble that imprisoned him, he still had to contend with how to deal with actual and potential attacks targeted at his body, especially while he resided in the People’s House. The two attacks targeted at the White House in the autumn of 1994 by Corder and Duran raised the dilemma of how to deal with protection and openness. This tension of how to provide security on 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue was only compounded later that year by four additional incidents. The most significant event occurred on December 17, when an individual fired four shots at the White House with a 9mm handgun. Two shots landed just short of the Executive Residence and one penetrated the State Floor Dining Room. With each incident revolving around presidential safety, the Service’s position of increasing security measures at the White House gained. Relations between the Office of the President and the Secret Service started to shift considerably. A president who allegedly would not allow the Secret Service on the second floor of the White House to guard his privacy would soon would be confronted with an American disaster that indirectly affect his own security.

Resulting from the increased pressure to close down Pennsylvania Avenue after this series of attacks in the later half of 1994, numerous individuals came forward to denounce such a proposal. Harold Gray, the president of the association of the Oldest Inhabitants of the District of Columbia, wrote that “there must be better ways to secure the safety of our chief executive.” He went on to note that the White House “was a symbol of democracy that the people could stroll on the lawn or eat their lunch in the president’s front yard” (1994, November 27). Richard Lewis, professor of architecture, commented that “closing down Pennsylvania Avenue, while
doing little to improve security, would go a long way toward distancing the White House and its occupants from the American People” (1994, November 5).

To complement these concerns, Leon Panetta was very forthright in how he viewed the Executive Mansion. He argued that “you don’t want to turn the White House of the Untied States of America into a fortress” (Malone, 1995, April 11). White House officials were clearly aware of the implications of closing down Pennsylvania Avenue. Months after these attacks, it was leaked that the Treasury Report would recommend that the Secret Service close down America’s Main Street in order to protect the POTUS in an adequate manner. However, the White House responded immediately that Clinton would not favor such a decision. George Stephanopoulos said, “I don’t think he’d like to do that” (Malone, 1995, April 11).

**Oklahoma City Bombing**

When Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols exploded a truck bomb outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, worldviews began to change. The most devastating terrorist attack on U.S. soil had been perpetrated by home-grown terrorists. The deaths of 168 people created a shift in how the United States would respond to terror. Like the truck bombs in Beirut, the Oklahoma City attack altered the relations between the president and the Service. The threat of an actual truck bomb had finally reached the homeland.

In response to the attack, Clinton immediately asked Congress to pass the Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995 and called for more legislation to grant agencies like the FBI “more power to crack these terrorist networks, both domestic and foreign” (Wallace, 1995, April 23). In particular, Clinton wanted to grant federal law enforcement authorities the ability to track, monitor, and infiltrate organizations, examine computer communications and transactions, and be able to deport legal aliens on the basis of secret evidence and information that links them
to terrorism (Editorial, 1995, April 25). Another question reporters raised was whether the Levi guidelines “imposed in 1976 to safeguard civil liberties and eased in 1983 to give the FBI more flexibility, should be relaxed more” (Goshko, 1995, April 27). Although FBI Director Louis Freeh said that the agency did not need these guidelines relaxed, members of Congress and the White House staff argued that this relaxation would allow federal agents to infiltrate terrorist organizations at a very deep level (Editorial, 1995, April 30).

In addition to these measures, “the most dangerous is a plan to revise the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits involvement of military forces in domestic law enforcement” argued The New York Times (Editorial, 1995, April 30). The Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard took these attacks as a way for President Clinton to deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism. Graham Allison argued that there is an “immediate threat to our security at home” and “more deadly acts are surely yet to come” (1995, April 30). In order to “combat this clear and present danger…nuclear terrorism should be topic number one” (1995, April 30).

Although Clinton did not zero in on nuclear terrorism, he did focus on the changing nature of political violence in the United States right after the attack. He argued that “we’ve always had a fair amount of violence,” but “organized, systematic, political violence that leads to large numbers of deaths have not been very much in evidence in American history except for time to time” (Wallace, 1995, April 23). This lack of domestic terrorism that routinely plagued Britain, France, and Spain had finally arrived in the United States. Clinton went on to mention that the United States was “still kind of a frontier nation” (Wallace, 1995, April 23), but the advent of domestic terrorism and the increase of international terrorism eliminated this aspect of
American exceptionalism. Political violence that was coordinated, organized, and well-funded would supersede and destroy America’s frontier ethic.

**Linking Oklahoma City and Presidential Security**

With this stark realization of actual threats on American soil, the Service immediately linked the Oklahoma City bombing with presidential security. By having a main thoroughfare so close to the White House, it posed unfathomable dangers for the president. Any terrorist organization could drive right up to the fence, park a truck, and detonate an explosive device that could either destroy or severely damage the White House. America’s Main Street, under these conditions, was seen as a threat to the president. President Clinton, in responding to this concern, said right after the attacks, “I hope that ways can be found to make the front of the White House secure without doing that, because millions of Americans go by Pennsylvania Avenue every year and see the White House and the overwhelming number of them are law abiding, good American citizens, and I hope they won't have to do that” (Wallace, 1995, April 23). The president was concerned about the perceived trade-off between security and openness, but he was aware of the mounting pressure within the Secret Service to take every measure possible to protect the Executive Mansion. The president in this crisis moment had to choose to conserve and enhance historical precedence or to break with the past and enter this new age of terrorism by declaring the People’s House closed.

The main document that legitimated the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue was the *Public Report of the White House Security Review* (1995). The review was complied and written by a variety of security experts inside and outside of the government. This report would be a major source of productive power as it would legitimate the Service’s claim that new measures had to be taken to protect the president. They consulted foreign governments to find out about their
security precautions and discovered that there was “significantly greater public access to the
White House than to other residences of the chief executives aboard” (*Public Report of the White
House Security Review*, 1995). The United States was the only country that allows public tours
while the chief executive was in residence.

The report would continue to play up this theme of access and proximity. It argued that
the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue actually “significantly enhances the public's access to their
White House.” The report continued. “This concept ensures that pedestrians may enter and
enjoy the White House and its grounds, and feel that distinctively American closeness to those in
high office. At the same time, the proposal significantly reduces the security risk posed to the
White House, its residents, employees, and visitors by vehicles carrying explosives” (*Public
Place and 17th Street, the Secret Service was finally able to shut down Pennsylvania Avenue
with an argument that it advocated almost 10 years earlier. The implementation of a “campus-
like” atmosphere actually enhances the feel of the People’s House by eliminating potential
threats and distractions. By creating a serene space from East to West Executive Avenues and
from Lafayette Park to the North Grounds, the White House had created a safe zone with gardens
and flowers.

This beautification argument was only enhanced by the overwhelming idea that “there
was no viable alterative that ensured the safety of the President and First Family, White House
employees, and visitors from explosive-laden vehicles” (*Public Report of the White House
Security Review*, 1995). This line of thinking was similar to Clinton’s mutually reinforcing ideas
about security, discipline, and liberties. The White House was still free to access, but security
had disciplined these rights to ensure the safety and protection of the people and their
representatives. Under this framework, there was no substitute for disciplining rights and liberties. Although the report responded to the attacks on the White House in 1994, its overall conclusions were dictated by the events surrounding Oklahoma City. The primary justification for the closure was not a plane flying into the White House or rogue crank shooting up the White House, but a bomb-laden truck. With this justification, the Secret Service was able to make an authoritative and credible claim about presidential security.

Despite these claims, there was an outcry not to close down Pennsylvania Avenue for security purposes. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA) adamantly stated, “Keep it open.” (Thomas, 1995). Ken Wringle wrote an editorial questioning whether the Secret Service, the Treasury Department, and others were exploiting fear for increased security measure. He asked the poignant question of “are the times more fearful, or are we?” (1995, May 10). There had been presidential attacks since the founding generation. In fact, conditions concerning assassinations in the 19th century often were more precarious and dangerous than now. In addition to these outcries, Ron Shaffer of the Washington Post accused the Secret Service of using the media frenzy over the Oklahoma City bombing “to create a bigger institutional empire with less accountability and more control over our lives” (1995, May 18). He succinctly described the process of productive power. Shaffer went on to jokingly propose the alternative of “moving the president and the family to Camp David...[where] suicide pilots would have trouble getting through the Catoctin forest, no trucks could get near the place, and a metal detector at the gate could screen out the shooters. Our president should be about as safe there as anywhere. And isn’t safety the point?” (1995, May 18).

Despite these protests, 31 days after the explosion, the “People’s House” was finally sealed from the people’s gaze and replaced with “Fortress White House.” The Secret Service,
with the permission of the POTUS, closed down Pennsylvania Avenue. The Oklahoma City crisis was the final impetus for breaking with history. However, there were many attempts by many individuals to convince the president to reopen America’s Main Street and to reconnect the White House to its origin story. The editorial for the *Washington Post* said, “Our democratic society can give no more. Closing off symbols of our openness must be fully justified and not done, despite the risks, without public notice or discussion” (1995, May 22). Former NSA Brent Scowcroft called it a “great victory for the terrorists” (Weyrich, 1995, June 27). Columnist Carl Rowan said, “So now they have made the White House a splendid bunker, a presidential hideaway more befitting of Saddam Hussein of Iraq or Libya’s Moammar Khadafy—one of those dictators who fear their people and the world” (1995, May 30). The bunker mentality that had partially existed in D.C. since the riots and protests in the 1960s and 1970s finally came to fruition. The past would be sealed off and a new logic of security would prevail. The president had to be, needed to be, and wanted to be sealed off in order to be protected from external threats.

**Reformulation of Presidential Security**

However, the call for not turning the People’s House into Fortress White House fell on deaf ears. In his radio announcement, the POTUS used many of the same points made by *Public Report of the White House Security Review*. In particular, he noted his “reluctance to accept any decisions that might inconvenience the people,” but “the strong supporting voice of the expert panel” concluded that it was no longer safe to the president or the people to have America’s Main Street remain open (Clinton, 1995, May 20a). Although Pennsylvania Avenue was closed, Clinton noted that this did not restrict the freedom of the people to have direct access to the White House. People were free to visit, protest, and take pictures in front of the White House.
However, these new measures would now enable the people to be “more secure in all these activities because it will be less likely that you could become an innocent victim of those who would do violence against symbols of our Democracy.” This is critical because of the “changing nature and scope of the threat of terrorist actions.” The president tied himself to the logic and ethos of the Service. Being disciplined and following these new security measures is the route to safety and order.

To reaffirm and strengthen these arguments, Clinton justified the closure on a number of fronts in a speech he gave following his decision. First, he remarked that in this new age of terrorism that our society is “vulnerable to the forces of organized destruction” (Clinton, 1995, May 20b). Although he could have offered Oklahoma City as an example, he used the terrorist attacks on Japanese subways to show the extent and danger that any community faces from organized threats. Second, he argued that technology only exacerbates the threats and dangers from these possible organized groups. Attacks range from nerve gas to truck bombings to using airplanes as possible weapons. There is no way to be secure in an open and technologically advanced society. In fact, “technology changes the opportunity for organized destruction” and “we have to respond to that” (Clinton, 1995, May 20b).

Third, these security measures enhanced freedom; they did not detract from it. Like metal detectors at airports, he argued, they serve a vital function in preserving freedom and liberty. According to this logic, Clinton argued, “It is a way of preserving our freedom -- by changing to meet the changing realities that technology and time give for the expression of organized destruction. And we should view it in that way” (Clinton, 1995, May 20b). In essence, organized threats coupled with technology forced societies to choose security first and liberty later. Not only was security a precondition for liberty, but it was also privileged over freedom.
In response to these dangerous implications, Clinton warned that we must “minimize the fear that can seep into a society” (Clinton, 1995, May 20b). Although the president alludes to it, fear was a necessity for enhancing security. Past discourse based on openness must be replaced with a new set of knowledge and rules that justifies a bunker mentality existence.

Although Clinton said that he “reluctantly” approved the decision of the Secretary of Treasury to close down Pennsylvania Avenue, he also spoke about “how we would get into the 21st century” (Clinton, 1995, May 20b). What was remarkable about these arguments made by the president was that they are rooted in how the Service thinks and operates. The POTUS internalized the ethos of the Service and projected it to the broader public. This response by the POTUS and the Service in a crisis situation provided the foundation for how elected leaders and citizens would come to view this “new age of terror.” The Hobbesian state of nature that is marked by fear, brutality, war, struggle, and self-preservation had re-emerged. In this age, the threat was everywhere and nowhere. Anyone at anytime was a potential threat to the established order. This emerging enemy of the state had to be effectively challenged and curtailed. The only way to escape this condition was through a strong Leviathan-based state that reminded people of this terror so that it could take it away and replace it with safety. By intervening in almost all aspects of life, the state provided a new type of security through productive power. Terror must be confronted by first accepting this fear and then mitigating it through the disciplining of rights and liberties. In order to channel this apprehension through discipline, the people’s elected representative who symbolized openness and liberty must be sealed off from the people.

The bunker-based strategy built on a fortress mentality was finally affirmed. With these changes, the Service once again saw its personnel and budgetary figures increase to manage
these new threat levels. Although full time employees had stabilized around 4,500 and the Service’s budget had remained around $480 million between 1993 and 1995, these numbers started to drastically change (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, 1993, 1995). The Service saw an influx of about 500 recruits between 1996 and 1998 and another 500 employees between 1999 and 2001 (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, 1995, 2001). The appropriation budget also jumped from $495 million to $555 million between 1995 and 1996 and continued to grow until it reached approximately $859 million in 2001 (Department of Justice, 2002). In a little more than five years, personnel figures had expanded by 11 percent and the budget increased by 73 percent. Although the Service admitted that the Duran and Corder events could not “be directly laid to insufficient numbers of Secret Service personnel,” it still was given a sizable increase to ward off future threats (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, 1995). What additional personnel and resources would enable is “innovations in security procedures and an increase in uniformed police presence decreases the likelihood of attempts to breach security” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, 1995, p. 129). By expanding its resources, the Service was able to further isolate the White House by expanding the number of guards who surround the president and expand its capacity to create newer protective measures that more effectively contain and protect the POTUS.

This set of events and responses provided a new framework for how the United States would deal with terrorist threats: security would trump openness. According to a Rand Report devised to address this issue, the consequences of this action could be “seen as projecting an image of fortification and security that is both undesirable and inappropriate for a nation whose
defining characteristic is its open and democratic society” (B. Hoffman, Chalk, Liston, & Brannan, 2002, p. iv). This clarification manifested through novel action by the Secret Service and the POTUS would have a tremendous impact on how the George W. Bush administration would handle a future episode.

**The Formulation of Threat Assessment**

Clinton furthered the advancement of meaning through two important actions that directly affected the Secret Service (Fein & Vossekuil, 1995, July). First, he issued Presidential Decision Directive 62 on May 22, 1998. The premise behind this directive was that if United States enemies chose to attack, they “will be more likely to resort to terror instead of conventional military assault” (White House Fact Sheet, 1998). To implement this policy, the directive established an Office of the National Coordinator for Security and Protection at National Special Security Events led by the Secret Service. The National Coordinator was to achieve a “new level of integration in the fight against terrorism” (White House Fact Sheet, 1998). The president would designate major events like the Super Bowl, the Olympics, State of the Union addresses, and other events he deemed important as National Special Security Events (NSSE). This action reinforced and expanded the symbolic meaning behind the decision to close the White House. The quality of presidential security was expanded to critical events where none had been deemed necessary before. The intrusive nature of national police powers was gradually expanding as manifested through the arm of the Secret Service.

The second action was signing the President Threat Protection Act into law on January 24, 2000. This statute reinforced and expanded key elements of the Secret Service. The legislation allowed the president to classify NSSE in which the Service would be the lead agency in coordinating protection. This legislation established a new unit within the Secret Service that
would be responsible for months of planning and cooperating with other law enforcement agencies. It would be responsible for coordinating, planning, and working with other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in providing protection for these special security events. In addition to this new division, the Service was ordered to develop a National Threat Assessment Center. Its main purpose was prevention. The Service was given the responsibility to gather research and intelligence to conduct threat assessment and in turn to share this information with other agencies. The doctrine of prevention started to gain more credibility as the Service was to train others in the art and science of threat assessment and prevention.

Secret Service researchers had finally been able to come up with a viable and plausible method to talk about dangerousness/cranks. There was no longer any obsession with mental illness or even the fascination with social misfits or a reliance on profiles. None of these categories adequately described who was a possible threat to the POTUS. After an extensive study conducted by examining all 83 people known to have attacked a public figure in the United States since 1949, Robert E. Fein and Bryan Vossekuil concluded that these past observations and findings were inaccurate (1999). The simple binary classification of either being mentally deranged or being motivated by political concerns was not only out-dated, but wrong. There are a range of motives that drove people to target a public figure, which cannot be simplified. Such motives included the desire to avenge a perceived wrong, to achieve fame, to elevate a topic to national attention, to make money, to change the political landscape, to end personal torment, to establish a relationship with the attacked, and even to save the world. The person who chose to carry out the attack also did not fit the binary distinction of being mentally unstable or being an “unaccomplished loser” (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999, p. 332) Fewer than half the attacks committed since 1949 have not been mentally unstable individuals. These figures led Fein and Vossekuil to
conclude to conclude that a “focus on mental illness may not be useful in preventing assassination” (1999, p. 331). And, the perceived misfit who cannot fit into their social surroundings was not entirely accurate either. Fein and Vossekuil observed that one-third were married, almost half went to college, several completed tours of duty in the military, and two-fifths had been married at some point.

The concept of profiling also failed to generate a key identification category and assessment strategy (Reddy, et al., 2001). Neither crime scene profiling nor prospective identification profiling could yield the benefits that are necessary to narrow down a list of potential suspects. With crime scene profiling as developed by the FBI, the purpose was to make retrospective judgments concerning a crime. The investigator is supposed was gather information at a crime scene and then generate a series of hypotheses about the general characteristics of the culprit, including their age, sex, race. This mode of investigation implied a degree of efficiency for law enforcement by yielding certain classifications of individuals who are more likely to commit certain crimes and provides a list of behaviors that sort and eliminate suspects. The primary problem with this method was that there is no universal or general set of characteristics that indicates a presidential assassin. Potential attackers included a mix of teenagers to semi-retired people, to men and women, to fully employed or out of work, to fully functioning to being mentally unstable.

With prospective profiling, law enforcement officials were able to “identify types of individuals likely to become perpetrators and to assess a given individual who has come to someone’s attention for some troubling communication or behavior” (Reddy, et al., 2001, p. 162). This method of profiling was attractive, especially for the Service, because of its focus on prevention and prediction. The capacity to generate a template that could narrow down suspects
who would be likely to attack the POTUS would be invaluable. However, this process of identification and assessment had also proved to be inconclusive. The primary problem was the low base rate of people who attack political subjects. The key concept in prospective profiling was making a “fit” between the crime and the potential criminal. This fit was nearly impossible to make in scientific terms with the number of people on file who have committed such a crime. Furthermore, researchers at the National Threat Assessment Center noted that the “use of prospective profiling derived from previous assassins would have failed to identify Sarah Jane Moore prior to her assassination attempt on President Ford” (Reddy, et al., 2001, p. 162). The typical profile that was accepted in 1975 was that of a man between the ages of 20 and 40, slight build, foreign born, unemployed, an “unaccomplished loser” with mental challenges. The Service concluded that profiling was not a reliable science that could be relied upon to predict and determine enemies of the state.

To replace poorly constructed profiles that were unreliable, the Service created a new threat assessment model that was more sophisticated and practical in identifying suspects (Fein & Vossekuil, 1995, July, 1999). The idea of dangerousness was to be rooted in concrete facts. The primary object of study for the Service was targeted violence, “a term that refers to situations in which an identifiable perpetrator poses (or may pose) a threat of violence to a particular individual or group” (Fein & Vossekuil, 1995, July, p. 1). In examining targeted violence, the construct of threat assessment emerged as it is a set of tools “used to describe the set of investigative and operational techniques that can be used by law enforcement professionals to identify, assess, and manage the risks of targeted violence and its potential perpetrators” (Fein & Vossekuil, 1995, July, p. 2, 1999). The first set of fundamental assumptions the Service made in creating this model was that “violence is a process” (Fein & Vossekuil, 1995, July, p. 3,
1999). This forced the Service to look at thoughts and behaviors of potential perpetrators of political violence. People who decide to attack did not just snap, but have thought about it, planned it, and prepared for it. These plans left clues for the Service to assess and identify, which they refer to as “attack-related” behaviors. A second set of assumptions were that violence occurs as a result of three factors: an individual who commits the act, a triggering event that leads the subject to choose his or her violent behavior, and a social context that assists or permits the action to take place.

In building off these assumptions, the threat assessment model consisted of three phases. First, agents must identify the potential attacker. This requires agents to define criteria that could operationalize threats to the POTUS, disseminate these categories to other agencies, and filter that information. Second, agents must then assess the risk. There is a key distinction between those who make threats and those who pose threats. Many people who make threats against the POTUS pose no threat because they do not have the capacity to carry out an attack, while many who pose a risk to a political subject often do not make a threat. This distinction is critical as the Service is rarely aware of those who actually carry out an attack because most culprits do not issue a threat against the president. Risk assessment seeks to ascertain whether someone poses a threat and is willing to carry out an attack; this involves an in-depth investigation. Information about the subject is compiled and an investigation takes place to determine, for example, whether there are any attack-related behaviors, who the person has communicated with, what have they bought, have there been any triggering events in their lives, whether their moods have changed, etc. Third, agents must then evaluate the risk to finish their risk assessment. They must first determine whether the suspect’s actions are a fit with “behaviors that would be consistent with an attack” (Fein & Vossekuil, 1995, July, p. 5, 1999) If this is the case, they then must conclude
whether the subject is moving forward with an attack or receding from it. Attacked-related behaviors can wane and wax, and for case management it is important to identify the state of mind of the potential assassin.

Looking at an attack as a process and not a profile, the Service had moved in a direction away from viewing dangerousness in purely abstract and stereotypical forms to a more plausible and realistic method in ascertaining enemies to the POTUS. Although it had not completely moved away from profiles (it still must use categories to identify threats), agents relied on a more sophisticated decision-making process to assess dangerousness. It was no longer based on ideology, distaste for the political opposition, or a distrust of the mentally challenged, but concrete actions that could be construed as planning for an attack.

**Conclusion**

By the end of Clinton’s administration, the Service had been reformed by its new decision-making apparatus and the decisions made after Oklahoma City. These ideas and events allowed the Secret Service, the president, and other figures the opportunity to create and expand meaning through bold action that created a new framework for how to view enemies of the state and how to respond to security and terror. This was the essence of productive power. Prevention became the buzz word at the Service. Although this concept had been a concern for the Service, it now emerged as a structuring concept. Everything from the physical apparatus of protection to threat assessment models had to be couched in the language and practice of prevention. The stopping of an attack before it could materialize became the primary focus for the Service. It changed how the Service talked about and treated potential enemies. After the Oklahoma City bombing and the Beirut bombings, the Service transformed its protective measures by further isolating the POTUS from the people. The continued growth of
international terrorism in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s allowed the idea of the White House compound to materialize. Following a series of attacks in 1994-1995, the Service was given the space and opportunity to initiate radical change and reinforce its basic statement about the importance of closing down Pennsylvania Avenue. In doing so, it sent the message that protection trumps openness, as the People’s House was transformed into Fortress White House. Discourse and action by the Service refashioned basic ideas about what the people should expect of the president and how agencies like the Service would rely on a doctrine of prevention to stop enemies of the states.

**The Ideal and Practice of Prevention: Managing Protective Bunkers**

The transformation or protective measures received another shock six years later, which reinforced and expanded the underlying ethos of the Secret Service: prevention. The events leading up to 9/11 and proceeding from it enabled the Service to expand measures to track enemies of the state and create protective spheres around the president that were close to absolute. These attacks at home and abroad created a substantial disruption in how the United States responded to terror. President George W. Bush reaffirmed the Hobbesian state of nature that is marked by fear, brutality, war, struggle, and self-preservation. Anyone at any time was a potential threat to the established order. By intervening in almost all aspects of life, the state provided a new type of security through productive power. Terror must be confronted and challenged by first accepting this fear and then mitigating it through the disciplining of rights and liberties. The risk of terrorist events had reached such a high probability that the state had to build an extensive security apparatus to prevent such attacks from occurring. To administer this fear, the National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Department for Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency were given full rein to decrease the
odds of a terrorist attack from occurring on United States soil. To control subjects of insecurity, state security/police agencies used a range of practices to monitor and regulate deviant individuals and populations.

For the Secret Service, this meant that it had to securitize by continuing to challenge tradition, customs, and public symbols. This was mainly done by securing the POTUS in an enclosed bunker that was fully and totally regulated by the Secret Service. This bunker-based strategy required the Service to strengthen the outer and inner circles of security that surround the president. There was no space that did not require the Service to fortify and cleanse. The president could no longer mingle with the people without ensuring the space was purified of any potential threats. The presence of protestors, hecklers, or even of the political opposition was unclean and a threat to the public body of the POTUS. To be in the presence of the POTUS in a post-9/11 world, one must be deemed clean and to be declared a political loyalist. The creation of Free Speech Zones enabled the Service full control to manage presidential behavior and action. Under these zones of protection, the POTUS lived, worked, and mingled with people under total and absolute surveillance. The White House Panopticon now moved with the POTUS in a seamless and ordinary way. Contact with the people was filtered and shaped through the medium of security. This protective apparatus enabled the Service to secure the president inside a contained zone while excluding public and private threats to his body.

The 9/11 Crisis

The events that transpired in New York, Washington, D.C. and rural Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001 created the ethos and logic for such a quasi-Hobbesian state to emerge. The shock of 9/11 exposed intelligence gaps and provided the impetus for a shift in meaning as Bush constructed a new logic to deal with a new threat. He said, “History will be the judge, but it
won’t judge well somebody who doesn’t act, somebody who just bides time here” (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003, p. 5). The POTUS was able to bracket and label this experience by expanding executive power through a series of committed and visible actions.

In particular, the growth of executive power had been manifested through the use of Constitutional and statutory powers (N. V. Baker, 2002). The President activated these two sources through his articulation and definition of the post-9/11 era. Daalder and Lindsay argued that presidential action immediately after 9/11 sought to unbind the U.S. from domestic and international constraints (2003). Checks and controls that originated either domestically or internationally prevented the country from defending itself properly. These were replaced with a new philosophy based on unilateralism, preemption, and regime change (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). In a post-9/11 world, agencies such as the Department of Defense, FBI, and CIA needed greater flexibility in investigating terrorist activities. In effect, Bush started a foreign and a domestic policy revolution (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003). In order to accomplish his objectives, Bush clarified an ambiguous situation, provided a reasonable plan, gathered the necessary power, and had the courage to act.

In the domestic policy revolution, the Bush administration acted quickly with committed public actions that created a host of new meanings. The president signed the USA PATRIOT Act into law on October 26, 2001, which greatly expanded the breadth and depth of federal police power; he issued the homeland security presidential directive on October 29, 2001, which used immigration policies to fight enemies of the state; and he issued an executive order on November 13, 2001 in which he established military tribunals to try enemy combatants. In just two months after 9/11, the Bush administration was able to drastically alter the way the federal government operated its intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Its crowning act of
achievement was the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. The bill passed 98-1 in the Senate and 357-66 in the House.

Although political opponents complained that the statute was too intrusive, action had already created a clear meaning for how to achieve safety in the homeland. It was too late, however, for the opposition to reverse the meaning that had been clarified. Despite all of the commotion from selected Republicans and Democrats, a sense of security was now deemed more valuable than possessing rights that might be exploited to threaten the very fabric of society. This line of logic sees “civil liberties as a weakness in the system that can be exploited by terrorists” (N. V. Baker, 2003, p. 547). Although these rights and liberties differentiated the United States from the enemy, they also exposed the greatest security flaw in the system. To ensure that the security system is strong, the national government had created and enacted new powers and responsibilities for federal police agencies.

The Spread of Surveillance

In response to 9/11, the Bush administration enacted a new policy that classified protestors as potential terrorists and citizens as an extension of the state apparatus as they were to monitor any and all suspected activities (Lyon, 2003). James Bovard reported that the Department of Homeland Security’s Terrorist Advisory in May 2003 suggested that anyone who “expressed dislike of attitudes and decisions of the U.S. government” should be watched (Bovard, 2003, December 15). This policy reached a fevered pitch in Oakland, California when its police department and the federally funded California Anti-Terrorism Task Force attacked 500 protestors with rubber bullets and tear gas. The justification for such extensive action against the protestors rested on the simple premise of treating demonstrators as potential terrorists. The link between the two entities was made by Spokesperson Mike van Winkle for
the California Anti-Terrorism Task Force. He argued, “You can make an easy kind of a link that, if you have a protest group protesting a war where the cause that's being fought against is international terrorism, you might have terrorism at that (protest)” (I. Hoffman, Holstege, & Richman, 2003, May 18). He went on to state that, “you can almost argue that a protest against that is a terrorist act” (I. Hoffman, et al., 2003, May 18).

In reverting back to the Nixonian political definition of the enemy, the idea of political dissent as something as dangerous resurfaced. But it did so with a more deadly connotation by loosely linking terrorist threats with political opposition, which justified not only massive electronic surveillance, but new measures to restrict and regulate speech on a massive scale.

With this new classification, the FBI finally scrapped the Levi Guidelines of 1976 that sought to restrict the ability of federal police agencies to identify threats colored by ideology. The new guidelines issued on May 30, 2002 changed how the FBI could handle warrantless monitoring of verbal communication, FBI undercover operations, use of confidential informants, and terrorism investigations. With these new powers, the Department of Justice argued that:

The revisions to the Guidelines issued in May 2002 took into account the FBI's changed priorities by giving it additional authority to conduct more expansive investigations; delegating to field managers significant new authorities with respect to preliminary inquiries, criminal intelligence investigations, and undercover operations; reemphasizing the important constraints on the FBI's use of confidential informants; and authorizing visits to public places without particularized predication to address terrorist threats (Office of the Inspector General, 2005).

With these new measures, FBI investigations were easier to start and could be more expansive in nature. They fostered the ease of gathering, disseminating, and coordinating intelligence. David Lyon pointed out that surveillance has been intensified, automated, integrated, and globalized, which leads to a culture of suspicion (2003). No one was ever above being questioned or monitored by the state or even their neighbors. The reliance on over 200 data-mining programs
allowed state-based entities like the Secret Service and the FBI to track perceived enemies of the state (Brasch, 2005). The state has also created ties with the private sector to further expand its net around the body politic by relying on private firms’ programs and data centers (Brasch, 2005).

Not only did the events of 9/11 shape the American response towards increased police powers, but countries all across the globe reacted in a similar manner. Germany introduced two legislative bills that “enlarged competencies of various law enforcement and military agencies,” France passed an Anti-Terror package that increased the rights of police and judicial authorities, Australia passed legislation that curbed suspects rights to lawyers and to make a statement, Austria increased its eavesdropping power, and the European Union approved a plan that would increase cooperation and exchange of information between different intelligence agencies (Peissl, 2003, p. 20).

Although this form of surveillance existed before 9/11, this situation provided the impetus for the dramatic extension of police powers through dangerous action that was committed and visible. It is clear that the FBI, NSA, and the CIA all were granted a tremendous amount of visible police power through various forms of legislation and executive directives after 9/11. The revelations about the National Security Agency’s domestic surveillance program operating without judicial oversight were just one symptom of this trend. In particular, several measures in the PATRIOT Act expanded the FBI’s disciplinary police power quite drastically. Section 213 authorized “sneak and peek,” which allowed federal investigators the authority to search premises without notification until later (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001a). Delayed notifications were a potent investigatory tool that allows agents to watch, investigate, and track suspected terrorists or criminals from the shadows. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act
established the link between the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) and federal law enforcement agencies (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001b). This section granted FBI new powers to petition the FISA court for warrants, which streamlines the information sharing between foreign intelligence and law enforcement.

Finally, section 505 expanded the use of administrative subpoenas that did not have to be authorized by a court or a grand jury (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001c). This section authorizes searches concerning library, medical, and other private records. In fact, the *Washington Post* uncovered that the FBI has sent out more than 30,000 national security letters (administrative subpoenas) a year to businesses and people demanding personal information (Gellman, 2005, November 6). The overall philosophy that security trumps openness and prevention precedes freedom was clearly manifested in the major security and intelligence agencies. The panoptic philosophy had spread deep into the administrative structure. In particular, protection and stopping counterfeiting methods would rest more on an invasive form of power. Under the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act in 2005, section 215 was placed under greater judicial review, Section 213’s warrants were more narrowly defined, and Section 505’s use of national security letters was renewed, but declared unconstitutional by a federal judge in 2007.

**The Secret Service Post-9/11**

Although these methods of control were more significant in other agencies, the Secret Service also had its police powers grow in order to ascertain threats of its own. Its budget increased by almost 23% in 2002 alone, making it the first time that its appropriations had exceeded $1 billion (Department of Justice, 2002). The staffing figures of the Service followed a similar pattern. Its personnel figures expanded from 5,557 to 6,111 between 2001 and 2003; an increase of about 16 percent (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury, Postal Service, and General
Government Appropriations, 2001; U.S. Senate, Treasury and General Government Appropriations, 2002). Although the Service’s budget and personnel figures stabilized, they continued to grow at a healthy pace. By the end of the Bush presidency, the Service had a budget of almost 1.4 billion and a staff of 6,496 employees, including 3,404 agents, 1,288 UD officers, and 1,804 administrative and technical specialists (Secret Service, 2008). Most of these funds and employees were directly used and employed for protective missions as $694 million went to protective services, $58 million was used for intelligence activities, and $246 million was directed to domestic and international operations (Reese, 2009). Despite these changes in resources, the basic structure of the Secret Service had remained the same since its reorganization after the JFK assassination. It still had a deputy director with four assistant directors who dealt with protective operations, protective research, investigations, and administration. It did include, however, three additional assistant directors to handle public affairs, professional responsibility, and human resources and training (Secret Service, 2008).

These increases allowed the Service to more effectively enact one particular value that fit very well with the Secret Service: prevention. The bedrock principle in which the agency had come to embrace was the value of preemption. Director W. Ralph Basham aptly said, “The Secret Service prides itself on protective and investigative philosophies that emphasize prevention” (U.S. Congress, House, Law Enforcement Efforts, 2004, p. 43). The shift toward prevention as the guiding framework for national intelligence and law enforcement naturally fit with the Service’s ethos, which sought to prevent any future terrorist activities directed toward the nation’s leaders and its financial infrastructure. Although these two missions could be seen as incompatible, they had “become fully interdependent and completely integrated” (U.S. Congress, House, Law Enforcement Efforts, 2004, p. 4).
To increase its effectiveness at protection, the Service had been given a great deal of flexibility in its attempts to investigate terrorism and related criminal behavior. The nation could afford to lose a key political leader or be seriously attacked through its financial institutions. The prevention doctrine became solidified, expanded, and transformed through various forms of government labeling and enactment in the post-9/11 world. The formulation and passage of the USA PATRIOT Act six weeks after 9/11 expanded the existing financial investigatory powers of the Secret Service. Sec. 506 extended the jurisdiction of the Secret Service by granting it additional offenses that it can investigate. Although the FBI was the lead agency and primary authority, the Secret Service now had the power to investigate “cases involving espionage, foreign counterintelligence, [and] information protected against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001d).

The Service also had its financial investigatory powers increased. It was given the responsibility to investigate crimes concerning “access device frauds, false identification documents or devices, and any fraud or other criminal or unlawful activity in or against any federally insured financial institution” (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001e). The ability to investigate any unlawful activity against federally insured financial institutions enabled the Secret Service to track terrorist activity. To better handle financial crimes, the Service had prioritized terrorism-related activity as its primary focus, followed by threats posed against the United States financial infrastructure (Secret Service 2003, p. 12). In the course of its investigations of counterfeiting, cyber crime, credit and debit card fraud, bank fraud, identity theft, false identification, telecommunication fraud, and other financial crimes, the Secret Service had been given broad latitude in its attempts to investigate terrorism and criminal related behavior.
To ensure that it has the capacity to fulfill these new duties, the USA PATRIOT Act authorized the expansion of the Secret Service’s experimental New York Electronics Crime Task Force model. The new National Electronic Crime Task Force had created a national network that is able to coordinate and share information across the country concerning financial crimes. The overall driving force behind the expansion of this model was “for the purpose of preventing, detecting, and investigating various forms of electronic crimes, including potential terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure and financial payment system” (Secret Service, 2003). This system of coordinated action enabled a smooth flow of information to reach field offices all across the nation. But more importantly, the Service had another tool to identify potential threats to the body of the POTUS.

The Service also had been given access to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Joint Terrorism Task Force to help with tracing down unknown assailants. Both of these entities linked federal law enforcement organizations with the intelligence community, which allowed agencies like the Secret Service to petition the FISA Court for warrants. With these powers, the Service planned to “leverage U.S. intelligence assets to improve early warning of threats posed by adversaries and assessment of their capabilities” (Secret Service, 2003, p. 6). The leverage of intelligence was only enhanced by the Service’s participation in the domestic Joint Terrorism Task Force. It planed to help “by lending greater support in tracing terrorists’ financial assets and investigating false identification cases” (Secret Service, 2003, p. 7). Counter measures and risk management strategies were used to their fullest extent to prevent any type of significant terrorist activity.

The Service had also been drawn closer to the body politic by being the lead agency in providing protection at NSSE. In the post-9/11 era, this responsibility had grown dramatically.
The Service’s effort in Salt Lake City during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games represented the “largest coordinated security operations in the history of American law enforcement” (Secret Service, 2003, p. ii). The increasing use of state authority at public events was not common before 9/11. However, the actions by the Service at various Super Bowls, the Salt Lake City Olympics, and other public events demonstrated that the state will be more active in monitoring activities where it had no role before. Surveillance had become a permanent feature of critical events that celebrate the benefits of an open society. Advanced listening devices, hidden cameras, secret operatives, and other devices enabled the Secret Service to survey from a central point without the observer being able to see. In effect, the Secret Service had accelerated its capabilities to detect crimes that fall under its jurisdiction at these events. The quality of presidential-like security being expanded to these events potentially prevented crime because it hindered the ability of terrorists to fulfill their mission. Terrorist activity potentially may shift from hard to soft targets. Although events like the Super Bowl or the Olympics would be considered soft targets, the use of the Secret Service and its massive organizational operation transformed these events into stiffer targets.

Although political opponents complained that these measures were too intrusive, action had already created a clear meaning on how to achieve safety in the homeland. The declaration of a quasi-state of exception allowed the state to take invasive and aggressive measures to identify and track terrorists. It was too late for the opposition to reverse the meaning that had been clarified. Each of these moves has clarified, reinforced, and expanded the doctrine of prevention. The meaning that had been illuminated after the various acts following the 9/11 crisis has arguably had a tremendous impact on how the Service relates to its protective mission. The formation of these new powers has created a new set of meanings. Although it took awhile
for meaning to catch up to action, it was now clear that what occurred immediately following the 9/11 attacks has shaped a new framework for dealing with crimes against the homeland.

In dealing with this new threat, the pieces of bubble had also been fortified. In particular, the presidential limousine was designed and introduced in 2005 to the American public. According to presidential vehicle historian Gregg Merksamer, the presidential car had windows that are at least 5 inches thick, which are about twice the depth of previous presidential cars (2008, November 2). He did not know which type of weapon the car’s armor was supposed to deflect, but noted that it takes a half-inch thick armor to repel a .44 Magnum at close range and 1.5 inches thick armor to stop bullets from an assault rifle. The windows were further fortified by an antispall shied, which prevents glass from exploding into the compartment of the car. The casing of the car consisted of dual-hardness steel, aluminum, titanium, and ceramics. To further enhance security, Merksamer noted that Clinton’s motorcade in 2000 in a pre 9/11 era had at least five decoy cars (2008, November 2). The car was built to be a tank on wheels. The production of this piece of the bubble was naturally classified, which forces the Service to take creative measures in destroying previous models. They sometimes bury them at sea, blow them up, burn them, or crush them. No one is ever allowed inside. The presidential limo located at Clinton’s presidential library cannot be accessed by anyone except for the Secret Service, and even they have to contact the local field office in order to gain entry inside this highly secretive vehicle. In order to maintain contact with the people, the president’s vehicle could not have a sunroof, bubble top, or convertible top, but did have fluorescent interior lighting that allows the people to see the president inside this moving Fortress. Contact with the people had been reduced to a highly advanced lighting system.

Merksamer (2008, November 2) also reported that President Obama received a new presidential limousine after unauthorized pictures of it were taken last year while it was being test driven on the road. This new model is based on a truck-based Cadillac.
Free Crank Zones: Inclusion in Isolation

Not only did the bubble grow more fortified and the Bush Administration take an aggressive stand toward enemies of the state, but the president also used this attitude toward those individuals who would harm his private and political image. In protecting the president away from the campus atmosphere of the White House, the Service had constructed designated protest areas that serve as Free Speech Zones. These demonstration areas served to protect the body of the POTUS by removing any form of dissent to areas that cannot touch or harm the president. The path of a presidential motorcade, the location of a presidential pep rally, or the site of a presidential visit had to be cleansed of any sign of dangerousness. Dissenters were once again classified as cranks and removed from the sight of political events. They were targeted and treated as subjects of insecurity. To maintain the constitutional rights of the disgruntled, the Service had built areas known as Free Speech Zones, which allowed these protestors to voice their opposition. The logic behind these areas, according to the Secret Service, was that these zones allow protestors the opportunity to exercise their constitutional rights without endangering the physical safety of the president. What they do, however, was provide a sterile space for the POTUS to stand on his stage by sorting out the unwelcome and including the welcomed.

101 Although little information exists now about the Service controlling information related to Bush behavior in the White House, there is some concerning his two daughters. Jenna was caught twice drinking underage and Barbara once. When Jenna was arrested in a Texas bar, reporter Josh Tyrangiel raised the question of “why the Secret Service agents hanging out at Chuy’s restaurant in their Hawaiian shirts didn’t do anything to stop her” (2001, June 11). The answer was quite simple. Agents made no attempt to stop the underage drinking or report it to the local law enforcement officers because they had direct orders from the White House to control this information by keeping silent about it. Tyrangiel notes that that according to a Secret Service source “agents have specific instructions from the President and First Lady to turn a blind eye to the collegiate hijinx of the First Daughters” (2001, June 11) The function of an agent is not just to protect, but to ensure that certain information and behaviors remain as a confidential as possible.

102 This policy did not emerge with the Bush administration as it was used as early as 2000 when the Service relied on local law enforcement officials in Los Angeles and Philadelphia to remove protestors to areas outside the main political event (Paul & Scherer, 2004, May 13).
This allowed the president to manage political stages and events in a very methodical way by first excluding subjects of insecurity and including subjects of security. The subjects of insecurity could be rowdy and undisciplined in their pockets of isolation. The subjects of security were expected to be docile and comport to a certain level of behavior. The media had to remain in these secured spaces in order to report, the crowd was full of party loyalists, the White House Advance team set up the event to maximize the presence of the president, and the Service designed security measures to sterilize the presidential stage. Although these actors were distinct, they all acted in a certain way to project the grandeur of the POTUS. The process of setting up and securing these stages rested on the “roadrunners” of the White House: the Presidential Political Advance Office and the Secret Service Advance Office worked together to create a particular atmosphere for the president.

In designing and implementing these events, the political and protective measures remained fairly static; the president must remain in a closed space to ensure his safety. According to the Presidential Advance Manual, the procedures designed around a presidential event were universal (2002). The manual could be applied to speeches, roundtable meetings, rallies, and tours. The first aspect of any advance team was to recruit a crowd of people and develop a proper ticket distribution system. These numbered tickets allowed the political advance people to place certain people and certain groups in strategic locations around the president. Although the Service had an extremely limited role in the process (except for checking names of guests who might be in close proximity to the POTUS), agents had stringent rules regarding who they will admit to a presidential event. People could not bring in handmade signs and must go through the magnetometer checkpoint. A political advance person would be stationed at these checkpoints to remove any potential protestors who were carrying negative
signs or who might be wearing or carrying clothes that voice dissent. The Political Advance had gone as far as to request people sign oaths of support before they were admitted to the presidential presence (Milbank, 2004, September 10).

The Manual also stated that Service would not be expected to filter crowds as its role was “concerned whether the person is a threat physically to the President and not a heckler” (2002, p. 34). Yet the primary way, according to the manual, to “minimize demonstrators” was to rely on the Secret Service. Agents could be employed to establish Free Speech Zones with the help of local police departments through the site selection process. Agents often advised and even located spots for the local law enforcement officials that were miles away from a presidential event. The Manual suggested that these protest areas should be placed “not in view of the event site or motorcade route” (2002, p. 34). Another method, apart from Service protection, was to use “rally squads.” These roaming bands of college Republicans, local athletic teams, and fraternities/sororities could be used to drown out any heckler by chanting something like “USA! USA!” For larger rallies, there could be numerous rally squads strategically placed around the front of the stage, behind the stage area, in front of the main camera platform, and near the cut platform. And there could be an additional roaming squad to identify any points of unrest.

Although the manual tried to make a sharp distinction between the roles of political advance agents and security advance agents, the responsibilities of the two entities in practice merged, especially on the point of eliminating protestors who gained entry to a presidential site. The Service, like the FBI, reverted back to Nixonian political judgments by grouping in protestors with potential enemies. The dissenter became a crank. Conservative author James Bovard had pointed out that there have been a series of instances of protestors being harassed and arrested by Secret Service agents or local police departments for refusing to demonstrate in
designated zones (Bovard, 2003, December 15, 2004). The incidents included arrest in Oregon, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Florida. In Charleston, West Virginia, Nicole and Jeff Rank were able to bypass the political advance agents and gain entry to a presidential site by hiding their protest t-shirts with an outer garment in 2004. Once on site, they removed their jackets and were asked to cover their t-shirts. They refused and were arrested by local law enforcement officials at the request of the Secret Service. Although these charges were dropped and the city of Charleston apologized to the Ranks, Nicole Rank was temporarily suspended from her federal job at FEMA.

In St. Petersburg, Florida, seven people were arrested at the University of South Florida Sun Dome in 2002 for refusing to be herded into the Free Speech Zones. In 2001, three protestors, including two grandmothers, were arrested in Tampa Bay for holding up protest signs outside the designated areas. Peter Buckley, a former Democratic candidate for the U.S. House in Oregon, was quarantined to a Free Speech Zone while he attended a presidential appearance. He wrote a stinging op-ed piece in the Oregonian, claiming that efforts “made to hide political opposition in this country is more than cowardly. It’s un-American” (Blumner, 2002, October 13). Bill Neel, who carried a sign that said, “The Bush Family Must Surely Love the Poor, They’ve Made so Many of Us,” was arrested in Pittsburgh for refusing to move behind a security fence. Police detective John Ianachione told the court in his testimony that the Service informed officers at the scene that “people that were there making a statement pretty much against the president and his views” should be confined (Bovard, 2003, December 15). The charges were dropped by Pennsylvania District Justice Shirley Rowe Trkula on the claim that “I believe this is America” (Hutcheson, 2003, February 20). During her ruling, the judge asked, “Whatever
happened to ‘I don’t agree with you, but I’ll defend to the death your right to say it’?”

(Hutcheson, 2003, February 20).

In South Carolina, Brett Bursey was not as fortunate when the state decided to drop the charges. Once the state dismissed the formal complaint for protesting outside a designated area, the federal government intervened. U.S. Attorney Strom Thurmond, Jr. accused and arrested him for “knowing and willingly” violating Secret Service security perimeters. In response to this situation, Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) with other congressional colleagues including Ron Paul (R-TX) wrote a scathing letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft for his actions. Although Frank said that “it is the primary duty of the Secret Service to protect the President,” there is “no plausible argument that can be made that Mr. Bursey was threatening the President by holding a sign which the President found politically offensive” (2003, May 27). Frank went so far as to say that “this prosecution smacks of the use of the Sedition Acts two hundred years ago to protect the President from political discomfort” (2003, May 27). Despite these appeals, Bursey was convicted and the federal court levied a $500 fine. U.S. Magistrate Judge Bristow Marchant justified his ruling:

In this age of suicide bombers, where people are willing to strap explosives to themselves to literally become walking bombs, the Secret Service’s concerns with allowing unscreened persons to stand in such close proximity of a slow moving vehicle carrying the president of the United States is not just understandable, but manifestly reasonable (United States of America v. Brett A. Bursey).

Dahlia Lithwick of the New York Times construed this logic to be a statement that linked political dissent with terrorism (Lithwick, 2004, August 12b). Bovard suggested that “some observers believe that the feds are seeking to set a precedent in a conservative state such as South Carolina that could then be used against protestors nationwide” (2003, December 15).
Reporter Jonathan Katz also warned, “Bursey’s conviction sharpens the teeth of police threats and gives the discontented one more reason to keep quiet. It’s certainly not the end of protest in America. But it’s a step in that direction” (2004, September 21). He even went so far as to say that the “zones of protection” that were built and backed up by Public law 90-331 were “arcane.” The capacity to arrest people in these zones, he argued, was created after the series of assassinations in the 1960s. It was designed to stop an attack on the body of the POTUS, not to be “used to prevent criticism as well.” The move to use this law in this way not only allowed the Service to shield the president from real threats, but also discouraged disgruntled Americans from voicing their political grievances; there was a strong disincentive to protest. Katz pointed out that one person who was caught up in these GOP sweeps was detained for 25 hours for wanting to buy soup at the wrong time, and an AP photo courier was held for nine hours without charges. The same story unfolded at the Democratic National Convention where the Service set-up Free Speech Zones to filter protestors. Lithwick mocked the absurdity of the argument made by the Service and the Bush administration in justifying their measures to regulate dissent. She said, “It’s tempting to say the difference this time lies in the perils of the post-9/11 world, but that argument assumes some meaningful link between domestic political protest and terrorism. There is no such link, except, in the eyes of the Bush Administration, which conflates the two both as a matter of law and policy” (2004, August 12a).

In seeking to expose this spurious link of treating protestors like enemies of the state, Dana Milbank of the Washington Post pointed out a host of incidents where the Service intervened directly to remove protestors (2004, September 10). Most notably, agents helped facilitate the removal of seven AIDS demonstrators at a Bush rally in Philadelphia where they chanted “Bush lies, people die.” Journalists who followed the removal of protestors were told
that they would not be allowed to return to the presidential event. Millbank reported that “one agent, who did not give his name, told one journalist who was blocked from returning to the speech that this was punishment for approaching the demonstrators and there was a ‘different set of rules’ for reporters who did not seek out the activist” (Milbank, 2004, September 10). In most situations, it was not possible to follow arrested demonstrators as the Service blocks them from media access.

In response to these first amendment claims and concerns of linking dissenters with terrorists, Judge Marchant and the Secret Service argued for the reasonableness of measures to effectively secure the POTUS. Marchant relying on United States v. O’Brien argued that government regulation was justified as long as there was a substantial government interest. For the judge, he adamantly stated that “there is no greater obligation for the federal government than the protection of the president.” It was therefore reasonable manifest for the Service to exclude Barsey from political protest because of his proximity to the president. He was an unscreened danger who was in the 100 yard restricted area. And being in that restricted zone, he was subject to Secret Service commands and the ingress and egress regulations. First, Barsey failed to comply with the orders issued by the Service and he did not have a ticket to attend the event. Second, he provided no evidence of selective prosecution because he never showed that other supporters or protestors were allowed to stay. Because Barsey would have been in the direct vicinity of where the president was exiting his vehicle, the Service had the right to remove him from the scene. The judge did argue, however, that if Barsey would have “had a stronger case” if he removed himself from away from this restricted zone and protested at a further distance. And finally, the tactics employed by enemies of the state had to model Secret Service action. In a context of terror, the Service divided and separated the people from the president.
The Secret Service made a similar argument to that of the judge. Apart from spokesperson Tom Mazur denying the accusation of the Service being actively involved in free speech zones, the Service tried to show how and why the president was secured in such a manner (Milbank, 2004, September 10). These zones permitted the Service to construct secured spaces for the president and the crowds. Within these spatial zones, agents had the power to regulate behavior for the protection and safety of both entities. Secret Service Agent Jean Mitchell admitted that the Free Speech Zones were common at any presidential event and the Service did suggest protest zones, but it was left to the discretion of local law enforcement officials to choose the location (Hutcheson, 2003, February 20). These locations were chosen to provide the people the means to exercise their freedom of speech rights and to safeguard the president in the meantime. Another reason was to protect protestors in these zones. Agent Brian Marr argued, “These individuals may be so involved with trying to shout their support or non-support that inadvertently they may walk out into the motorcade route and be injured. And that is really the reason why we set these places up, so we can make sure that they have the right of free speech, but, two, we want to be sure that they are able to go home at the end of the evening and not be injured in any way” (Block, 2003, July 25). This argument had become patently reasonable for agents who were delegated the responsibility to protect the POTUS using all available means. Obviously, security zones could be dangerous places, which also required the Service to design measures to safeguard protestors. These restricted areas were created as a necessary precaution to shield the POTUS from unknown danger and to secure the people in pockets of protest.

For others, they saw protection being extended to protestors for political, not security concerns. The most frequent argument was that the Service had become a political arm of the POTUS. The caging and incarceration of people within protest zones was a clever ploy to
promote the image of the president. It was simply information management. Stefan Presser, head of the Philadelphia American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) chapter claimed the free speech zones had more to do with politics than physical safety, “It seems these ‘security zones’ for protesters have very little to do with the president's physical security and a whole lot to do with his political security” (Lindorff, 2003, October 26). Although he was correct on the political aspect, he missed one of the underlying facets behind them: creating distance between the president and the people.

In summary, this environment in which the Secret Service now operates was created by a series of actions following problematic events caused by enemies of the state. Once again, tactics employed by these threats modeled Secret Service action. Organizations like the Service were able to treat these concerns as objects of study and create additional knowledge related to security measures. By doing so, they illuminated a path that valued prevention first. In the case of the Service, it reduced confusion and clarified meaning with action that sought to secure the POTUS in a bunker-like state. President Bush neither objected to nor sought to revise these protective standards. He accepted them. In particular, the 9/11 crisis only accelerated and strengthened the ability of the Service to design protective measures that separated the POTUS from the people. This context provided the Secret Service with the ability to grow and solidify its federal police power. In this new framework, security was enabled with a particular focus on deterrence while openness was deemed less essential. Surveillance had become more ontologically real in the public sphere as the Secret Service expanded the scope of its operations at presidential events and also at National Special Security Events (NSSE).

At presidential events, the most difficult feature of protection had been creating enough space between the people and the president to actually establish a safe environment. By
distinguishing between a presidential site and a protest zone, the Service could regulate all conditions of behavior within both locations. Within the quarantined protest zone, the Service eliminated a chunk of people that do not have to be screened and watched. It was one less distraction. Inside a presidential site, everything became sterile as the organizational operation of the Service screens, searches, and seizes anything that is out of the ordinary. This clean space allowed for a limited degree of accessibility to the body of the POTUS. There were very few random meet-and-greets at a rope line or unplanned contact with the people. Anyone who came into contact with the Chief Executive must be declared safe and clean. At NSSE, special occasions that often symbolically represent the benefits of a democratic society were now watched, regulated, and controlled. The quality and mechanisms of presidential protection had extended to public events. People were expected to be screened and watched in public spaces. These increased powers raised the pressing question of whether such bold and novel approaches to law enforcement exacerbated the crisis that was created after the events of Oklahoma City and 9/11, or whether they had been able to mitigate and control the effects of these situations. Although this question is unanswerable, actions by politicians and administrators had created a level of meaning that significantly reduced ambiguity and uncertainty concerning security measures.

**Conclusion**

Over the past 30 years, the Secret Service has transitioned to a bunker-based mentality of presidential protection as it has been able to develop a fully functioning apparatus of discipline over spaces and populations. This method of preventive protection has become a permanent feature of modern-day society. Friends of the state are expected to behave in the presence of the president while enemies of the state are watched and detained. In these vectors of domination,
the Service uses discipline to coordinate and control in order to build and sustain the POTUS. In this case, Secret Service domination does not demean or distort presidential potential, but enables it and fortifies it. Although the Service separates the president from the people, it also creates the conditions for that separation to appear presidential, if not kingly. The figure who stands at the apex of the republic is enhanced by a host of corporal custodians who restrict and regulate his body.

The production of POTUS safety from physical dangers and political hazards has allowed the Service to become an integral part in how the president is protected and presented to the world. This mutual production of truth has come together in how the Service handles these conditions, which has formed the modern ideas and practices of presidential security. In particular, the Service must secure subjects of insecurity and discipline subjects of security. The establishment of a fortified bunker to manage radical threats to the body politic has allowed the Service to revolutionize the practice of close protection. As early as 1985, City Council Chairman David Clarke remarked in harsh tones that the Secret Service was “making a palace out of the place” (Seaberry, 1985, March 7). Representative Michael D. Barnes in his protest against the proposed measure to seal off Pennsylvania Avenue recounted a story of how his father-in-law was able to drive under the portico of the White House to avoid a soaking from the rain. While he was there, he left his business card and was invited to a White House reception a week later. He lamented the fact that citizens like his father had no access to the Executive Mansion or even the ability of presidents like Truman to take a morning walk (Engelberg, 1985, April 28).

However, the Service and presidents realized with overwhelming acknowledgment that international and domestic terrorism no longer permitted a Jeffersonian-like president to roam
the streets of Washington or open the White House doors. The coupling of advanced technology and organized destruction from terrorist organizations require state-based entities like the Secret Service to take unprecedented action to discipline both friends and enemies. Rights, liberties, and the American way of life can continue, but they need to be regulated to fit into the reality of possible terrorist attacks from groups inside and outside the United States. After the closing of Pennsylvania Avenue, Clinton succinctly summarized this point of view. He argued, “We’ll have freedom of movement, but we may have to have some discipline in doing it so we can go after people who want to destroy our very way of life” (Wallace, 1995, April 23). With this logic, the Service built massive barricades that permanently put the president outside the people’s reach and allowed the Service to take radical measures to exclude the unwelcome.

In this process of moving to a bunkered state, the Service also was creating spaces of domination that disciplined subjects of security. The good citizen, crowd, media members, and partisan loyalists were required to behave along a strict code of rules and norms. If any of these figures violated this code of conduct, they were arrested or excluded from a presidential event. To ensure the proper presidential presentation, the Service coordinated these actors through an elaborate stage design and management. Site selection and site control enabled the Service to carefully manage presidential safety and presentation. With the guidance from the White House Advance Office, the Service planned and executed the placement of media officials, visitors, guests, party officials, lighting, and protesting crowds. Everything was carefully designed, implemented, and regulated. The protestors and hecklers of the 1960s and 1970s were replaced with party loyalists and supporters in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The unwelcome were excluded and friends were included in order to maximize the spectacle of a presidential event.
The transition from security that centered on bodies to protection that was grounded in bunkers allows the Service to confine and control the POTUS in order to protect and present. This transformation has evoked a wide range of feelings and beliefs. Most commentators decried the destruction of the People’s House. This single act by a president and his protective unit destroyed the remaining sentiments of a presidency grounded in a Jeffersonian ethos. It had been dying for more than a century. And, the Secret Service, whose roots are to be found in Imperial Rome and the Monarchies of Europe, had been an enduring symbol of this transformation. But the Service was more than an icon; it was an active agent in reconstituting and reforming basic American ideas about the presidency, democracy, and how to handle the other. It used its methods and meanings to help create a state of security by relying on concrete fears and threats. The agency knew that this ordered state of affairs rested on a gruesome and ugly state of war beneath the social order. This reality required agents to serve and secure the POTUS.
CHAPTER EIGHT
A REGIME OF PROTECTION

With its mission to protect, the Secret Service has constructed an organizational operation to ostracize the other, permanently put the president behind protective procedures, and present a pleasing public persona fitting to the status of the POTUS. These overt actions have allowed an administrative agency to redefine key democratic governance values. The agency has been able to delineate who is a suspicious other, justify the placement of barricades that separate the president from the people, instill a preventive/security ethos in the Office of the President, and display the president as the apex of a constitutional order. Because of its successes and failures, presidential protection has become normal, acceptable, legitimate, and absolutely necessary, which has provided the Service the ability to give shape to a particular rationality concerning what the president can and cannot do. This constitutive role of a public agency has had a dramatic impact on how the people come to experience and interact with the POTUS.

The development of the Secret Service and its protective procedures, however, has been sporadic and tenuous. For the past 100 years, this emerging rationality was produced by a multitude of sources that have helped construct the idea and practice of presidential security. The subjects of insecurity and security mutually created the idea of POTUS endangerment and safety. Enemies of the state have helped mold state action while friends of the president have sought to project an image of presidential grandeur. In this context, the Service has had to secure territorial spaces in order to conceal and confuse threats while simultaneously having to display and disclose the presidential body to the public. The capacity to control threats and to coordinate the presidential spectacle has enabled the Service to direct the body and mind of the POTUS.
With this disciplinary apparatus in place, the Secret Service is able to construct bubbles and bunkers that are designed to protect and trap the president’s two bodies.

In tracing this history of entrapment and a service of protection, this concluding chapter will briefly summarize how an agency that assumed protective responsibilities in the early 20th century grew into an administrative force that began to refashion and reinforce values about American democracy. It will do this first by describing the genealogy of presidential security. In developing this apparatus of protection, the security bubble has evolved from being merely a simple body-defense strategy that centered on proximity to an increasingly bunker-based mentality built on absolute enclosure and exclusion. This shift from using rudimentary procedures to secure to advance methods that sterilize has allowed the Service to build a form of protection that reflects both the dangers and splendor of the American Presidency. It will next examine how the Service has come to place the POTUS in a vector of domination. In establishing the parameters of presidential security, the Service relies on a concept of power that produces and normalizes and a concept of the political that distinguishes between friend and foe. The interaction between the two creates an institutionalized form of control, which not only secures the president, but facilitates presidential action. Finally, it will look the future of presidential security. In the past thirty years, the Service has shifted toward a bunker mentality to protect. However, as the enemy grows and fear expands, bunkers are being replaced with districts. It is no longer enough to provide a hardened bubble; the Service must begin to shut down tracks of land to secure one sole person who embodies the powers of Article II.

**The Genealogy of the Bubble**

The day presidential candidate Barack Obama received a Secret Service detail his wife commented that “protection underscored the notion that ‘we are moving to the next level’ of the
presidential campaign” (Zeleny, 2007). In being placed under protection seven months before the first vote was cast for president, Senator Obama was the first presidential candidate to receive this type and this amount of protection so early in the process, which was partially a result of the increased threat level against him because of his historic candidacy as an African American Democrat. In fact, most candidates “resist security protection until the last possible moment, saying it restricts movement and prevents them from campaigning directly with the people” (Zeleny, 2007). However, what is missed in this analysis is the link between the presidential spectacle and the Secret Service. While most candidates fail to recognize this point, Obama’s campaign asked for Secret Service protection so that he could move to the “next level,” which entails a perception of what it is like to be the POTUS. Not only was he the earliest candidate to receive protection from the Secret Service, but his detail grew larger with each victory. After his win in Iowa, the Secret Service increased his details to the extent that it “now rivals that of President Bush, with a dozen Secret Service agents wearing dark suits and earpieces leading bomb-sniffing dogs through event venues, sweeping all equipment brought by journalists and flanking the candidate as he plunges into crowds of supporters” (Curl, 2008).

These measures, initiated by the Secret Service, not only ensure Obama’s safety, they reinforce and strengthen what it means to be presidential. The mantle of authority, trust, familiarity, and, above all, respectability is reinforced by the spectacle of security. Candidates without this type of protection and spectacle are left without the benefit of this manifestation of the presidential persona. Special Agent Venker noted that “protection meted out to Presidential candidates looked like a team of school crossing guards next to the Roman legion that shielded the man himself” (Rush, 1988, p. 109). This protective phalanx of guard adds legitimacy and
credibility to anyone who is surrounded with the power of the state. Protection is not only approved, but also heralded.

A century ago this type of protection was not only deemed suspect, but also stigmatized by much of the citizenry, even though presidents faced threats and hostility. A protective phalanx proceeding from the heart of the republic was too closely linked with the royal stature of monarchs. This violated the customs of a new nation built on republican ideals of representative government that should be able to protect his own body. Warrior presidents from Washington to Jackson to Theodore Roosevelt often represented a rugged individualism of self-help and independence. Protecting the president was frequently framed as unacceptable and un-American. To avoid the hint of royalism and an overprotective and powerful warrior class, the word guard, as it smacked of Bonapartism, rarely appears in the 19th century in relation to the president because the image was antithetical to a democratic society (Seale, 1986). Even after the assassinations of Lincoln, Garfield, and McKinley, resistance to security was still the norm. Senator Stephen Mallory aptly articulated this attitude in 1902, “I would object on general principles that it is antagonistic to our traditions, to our habits of thought, and to our customs that the President should surround himself with a body of janizaries or a sort of Praetorian guard, and never go anywhere unless he is accompanied by men in uniform and men with sabers as is done by the monarchs of the continent of Europe” (Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st session, vol. 35, p. 3049). For Mallory and many others, protection did not grant legitimacy or respectability, but instead signaled fear and weakness.

This type of president and this type of ethos, however, has long since vanished. It started to disappear about 110 years ago when McKinley assumed the role of “President-General.” The Jeffersonian executive that symbolized a federal system of divided and separated powers began
to fade from the American landscape; the Hamiltonian president that represented a new national state took its place. And with the death of this new figure who stood at the apex of a constitutional system, embedded attitudes about presidential security collapsed.

With the birth of the Secret Service’s protective mission in the early 20th century, it created a dynamic state of affairs that required the bodies of citizens to serve as presidential armor. This seminal moment created a catalyst for breaking with the past and creating new modes of rationalities. With this shift, the two bodies of the president emerged. The Service had to protect the president’s publically ordained body and hide his private body. In this new zone of protection, the craft of constructing a confinement zone had to be built mostly out of Secret Service bodies who were willing to die so the president could live and govern. The development of this rudimentary bubble, which was grounded in the bodies of agents did two things. First, it provided an intensive surveillance operation. The president must be placed in an Inspection House for his own safety and security. Even though the gaze produced a high level of discomfort for most presidents, they accepted it as necessary. Second, it became an apparatus of information management. In many ways, the growth of Secret Service protection reflected the advancement of the press function of the White House. With this aspect engrained in the protective apparatus, the Service had to mask and hide his private body in order to maintain the allure of his public body. The Service helped create the idea of president as an exemplary citizen, husband, father, and friend. With these functions, the Secret Service became of body of protection and a body of press relations.

However, this rudimentary form of protection began to evolve and grow more sophisticated with events that exposed the inadequacies of presidential protection. Attacks on TR, FDR, Truman, JFK, and Ford created pockets of uncertainty, which allowed the Service to
refine its protective measures by generating a new normal or a new standard of conduct. The previous fit between structure, mission, and environment had either collapsed or weakened to such an extent that new meaning to form. In these settings, punctuations caused by enemies of the state allowed the Service to re-think many of its basic standard operating procedures. In particular, body-based protection grew into the practices of employing a host of bubbles to secure and show the president. The Service was able to create isolated domes of protection that surrounded the president, the people, and the media. In each zone of protection, the Service disciplined and normalized conduct in order to conceal the president from danger and display him to the masses. In this sense, the bubbles of protection were utilized as a form of protection and as a form of projection.

In the high-risk environment of presidential protection, the range of options during and after a problematic moment allowed the Service to continue to reformulate many of the rules of openness and security. It soon became apparent that bubbles of protection were to unreliable and fragile. Presidential spaces had to be fortified and hardened with a bunker-based mentality. The coupling of advanced technology and organized destruction from terrorist organizations in the 1980s and 1990s required the Service to take unprecedented action concerning presidential security. Foes of the state had become too potent. Although close protection worked to a limited degree in the past, it needed to be updated to include a defense system that isolated the president behind bodies and buildings. A body and bubble-based defense strategy had to be supplemented with a new strategy that addresses this age of terrorism. This required the Service to design and implement a White House Fortress; the power of the Secret Service had become more ontologically real as it has created a “campus-like” feel around the White House.
The development of the Secret Service has been marked by a series of multiple stable equilibria that are interrupted by sporadic and crude events, which have allowed the agency to develop new modes of operation and routines. When presidential security becomes problematic resulting from crisis moments, it has allowed the Service to view protection as an object of study and the capacity to develop new standard operating procedures. In this process, the Service becomes a pivotal actor in a context created by subjects of insecurity and security. With this institutional status, the agency expects presidents to listen to its advice and even adhere to its commands, while presidents rely on agents to maintain a certain code of secrecy about public and private affairs. This state of affairs is not only accepted, but has been gradually institutionalized in the shape of routines, professionalization, and expectations.

The history of the Secret Service and its disciplinary apparatus provides not only an account for how these changes occurred, but illustrates how the nature of security and protection in modern day America has reached a point where administrative agencies have to rely on placing a democratically elected leader in quasi-militarized zones to protect his safety and why they often have to ignore democratic and constitutional principles to preserve normality and order. In reflecting on how the once suspect practice of presidential security has become a time-honored institution that protects the Commander-in-Chief, it reveals how society has come to embrace the idea that protection trumps openness. With this change, the Secret Service has achieved a high degree of institutionalization concerning the strength and scope of the presidential bubble. This bubble has evolved from a simple body defense strategy that centered on proximity to a bunker-based mentality that seals the president from the people.

**The Shielding and Shackling of the POTUS**
The capacity to capture the president in these bubbles and bunkers requires agents to employ a range of disciplinary techniques that ensures that the security, territory, and populations of presidents are protected. The ability to find areas, secure them, and watch for populations who would disrupt or violate these zones requires agents to create vectors of domination. This allows agents to use both fear to control presidential movement and to build concrete barriers that filter and exclude. However, in designing these vectors, the Service is expected not just to fortify spaces to control enemies of the state, but also to create a context to exploit the presence of the president. In managing these two functions of the bubble, the Service brings them together to mutually produce the idea and practice of presidential security. This process of sterilizing spaces to manage populations of insecurity and the ability to help create presidential stages in order to control populations of security collaborate in a coordinated way to structure protective practices. Areas become artificial arrangements that allow agents to both secure and produce the POTUS to the public.

To situate the POTUS in these vectors of domination, the Service must come to control the president, if not dominate him. Securing the president through these practices can best be understood through Foucault’s construct on productive power and Schmitt’s idea of the political. Like previous models of power, Foucault seeks to understand how compliance is secured. His answer to that dilemma rests on the premise of linking power with knowledge. Bentham’s gaze is not enough to create docile subjects that are controllable. Discipline requires that power be embedded within the body and the mind. This requires that the subject of power relations to embrace and accept regulation and restraint because it facilitates actions and ends. In this sense, power is productive because it places limitations on individuals. For Foucault, the end product
of these disciplinary spaces is self-surveillance. Disciplinary power backed by governing rationalities begins to shape and constitute how people think, feel, and act.

In operating in this framework of power, the Service devices institutional routines that teach/discipline: the president, the crowd, the media, and the people conform to a certain expectation of security, even enemies of the state are confined to a degree. But above all, the president becomes tied to the Secret Service’s apparatus of truth production and its ability to formulate these concepts. The rationality which the Service has helped build over the past century to manage threats often emerges during “problematic events” that alter the status quo. These interruptions provide a momentary break in time in which new discursive spaces open. The web of relations that previously defined power, knowledge, and right conduct is altered. Relationships between entities are undone, redefined, and relocated. The web is reconstructed, which shifts who has the ability to make truth and knowledge claims. Certain entities will lose status, while others will gain credibility and the ability to make political, administrative, and knowledge claims. This new arrangement allows for a “recodification of power relations” (Foucault, 1980, p. 123). In these moments of recodification and emergence of new relations, an organization like the Service may be provided with the opportunity to make new knowledge claims.

In this context, the Service has developed a governing logic that states the “POTUS must be defended.” This ethos requires agents to take extensive measures to ensure that the president is safe. Agents often rely on traditional scare tactics to force presidents to behave. The use of information that exposes presidents to credible or even not so credible threats forces them to rethink their choices. The fear of death or dismemberment is a strong motivating factor to listen and conform; even the rebellious LBJ was partially tamed because of fear. However, the use of
dread to bind the president’s mind is not nearly enough to discipline the POTUS on a regular and consistent basis. What is more important and more everlasting is the agent’s oath. With this covenant/contract, agents are willing to sacrifice a life for a life. Even though they live in a democratic society where all people are created equal, agents place a political office above their own life. The obligation and oath to secure the POTUS grants them a special and enduring connection to the person of the president, which was encapsulated in the death Les Coffelt and John F. Kennedy. The effect of these two deaths creates a special relation between the two; it grants the Service the power to discipline so the president may live. Because agents will sacrifice life and limb, president must conform. This service coupled with fear enables the Service to bind the president to its governing rationality.

This governing rationality not only provides the mental shackles to confine the president, but also the physical facilities to entrap the president’s body. To build the mechanisms of control, the Service still relies on its three perimeter philosophy that was developed by Chief Baughman over sixty years ago. Through time and a lot of industry, this philosophy has become routinized, bureaucratized, professionalized, and above all fortified. The Service builds a three perimeter defense strategy whether the event is large or small, which allows agents to consider and counter a long or short range attack. The president is not free to escape the gaze of the Service because agents and machines are everywhere. They have built a space that requires the POTUS to reside in a living and breathing Inspection House. His actions are recorded, seen, and catalogued. Anywhere he goes or anyone he sees is documented and the information is stored. And, this level of security is re-created wherever he goes. The Service must continually re-build and re-establish the Panopticon. Perimeters are established, environments are made sterile, and agents inspect and follow the POTUS. In these spaces of control, the Service physically
micromanages spaces in order to create sterile environments that are clean and safe for the POTUS. Petro points out, “The more effectively we micromanage the environment, the more effectively we can protect the president. We work with his staff to control where he goes, how he gets there, who gets close to him, and how close that person gets” (2005, p. 19).

In the development of this physical and mental forms of control, the practice of protection has created a certain rationality that dictates how the Service must interact with the president and how the president interacts with the Service. The “how” of protection is shaped by a rationality that establishes what knowledge is, who can speak with authority, what factors determine dangerousness, and what protective measures are legitimate. This gaze, which is reinforced by mental and physical bonds, has been directed towards the Office of the President for more than 100 years. The POTUS, like the military private, the student, or the prisoner, is subject to the effects of this peculiar power relation. The Service is able to construct an artificial and confined space that limits and manages the movement of the president. The closed space of the White House eventually spreads itself to encompass the POTUS as he has accepted and embraced the idea and practice of presidential security. Although this protective sphere consists of elite paramilitary and military units, the real strengths of the bubble rest on the fact that the president has internalized, harmonized, and accepted the logic of the Secret Service. However, this form of domination does not demean or belittle his office. In fact, it enables it and fortifies it. Domination is a means to build this kingly figure.

The concrete details and existential threats that inform this rationality can also be directly linked to Schmitt’s idea of the political. In this sphere, the Service is embedded within a political context, which forces it to make the most crude, fundamental, and important decision in a polity: who is my friend and who is my enemy. Although this binary distinction is simple, it is
crucial for the Service to locate friends, to identity dangerousness, and to find enemies of the state. What is distributing for Schmitt is the gradual replacement of the conventional enemy with the real and absolute partisan. The terrorist has become the new norm, order, and enemy in today’s society. With this historical trend, Schmitt sees the gradual criminalization of the enemy, which allows states to intensify their means of destruction (2006). Wars become police action and terrorist become enemy combatants. The state moves closer to a state of exception in dealing with threats that endanger its fundamental values.

The process of protecting the president’s public body in a context plagued by organized destruction from global terrorists, who have no ties except to an ideological or religious cause, places the Service in a precarious, but clear situation. The threat is no longer the disgruntled American who wanted to oppose and disrupt presidential events. This type of enemy put the Service in a Schmittian bind. There was no way to ascertain who was a threat and who was a friend in an environment where ideology dictated whether someone was an enemy to the state. The enemy has now reverted back to the global anarchists in the early 20th century. In contrast to this older enemy, this figure now has the means to carry out organized destruction on a massive scale.

In watching over these suspects, the Service relies less on discipline and more on political decisions to ensure that threats are prevented from planning and carrying out their attacks. By relying on a simple binary distinction between we and they, the Service is able to watch over and control potential enemies. Due to the difficulty in normalizing behavior in open spaces, the Service must rely on a cruder and more apparent form of power that is visible and observable. In doing so, the agency constructs barriers, tracks threats, and creates sterile environments.
Without these visible and invisible manifestations of power, the president could not be confined or disciplined in such an extensive and intrusive manner.

With this type of threat, presidential security has to massively buffer its zones of protection and continue to treat presidential security as an object of study. Director Lewis Merletti in 1999 made this precise point. He said, “By studying assassination attempts worldwide, the Secret Service can assess an assassin’s method of attack, weapons of choice, and motivations. These assessments influence our training, resource allocation, security methods, and equipment needs” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Treasury and General Government Appropriations, 1998, p. 39). He pointed out that a team of agents had just returned from Tbilisi, Georgia after evaluating an assassination attempt on President Shevardnadze of Georgia. They arrived on the scene just three days after the attack, which allowed agents to ascertain new information about how to improve the Service’s armored limousine project. By studying the enemies and assassins, Merletti noted that the Service is able to develop new methods of protection, understand how technology can be used to counteract threats, and learn how to train its agents more effectively. In this sense, the determination of the political reinforces the physical and mental restraints the Service places on the POUTS.

With its ability to make this distinction, the Service has been able to shield the president from the people and define who is a normal citizen that fits within the republic and who is a foe that needs to be tracked and excluded. As enemies of the state gradually have developed more sophisticated techniques to attack the president, the Service has been in a position to generate new meaning to seal the president inside its protective apparatus. Resulting from the dynamic tension between enemies of the state and the president’s safety, it is able to construct disciplinary
sites that control the POTUS. In these settings, agents rely on a certain governing rationality that seeks to create enclosed spaces that steer and direct the president.

In this sphere, Foucault and Schmitt emerge to examine the dimensions of power and politics. By constructing protective screens and barricades, the Secret Service is able to shield the president from outside threats while managing presidential movement action inside the bubble. New logics and modes of discipline gradually emerge, impose new restrictions, and create new movements. The Service begins to constitute, create, and project new ideas, values, and meaning in an administrative and political context. Hence, power is linked to disciplinary production and the categorization of the political. In this circular medium of exchange, power evolves. This is critical for organizations like the Secret Service that operate in highly unpredictable spaces. These concepts fit in nicely with Clegg’s framework of power, which considers exogenous and endogenous variables, and reciprocal interplay. The formative aspect of power and the existential conditions of the political interact, play off each other, and ultimately shape what must be done to protect the president. A Foucauldian approach coupled with a Schmittian analysis looks at what emerges through the process of production.

**The Future of Presidential Protection**

With the advancement of enemies who have access to resources and personnel on a global scale, close protection becomes extremely problematic in the 21st century. The evolution of the other has reached a stage where world leaders rely on armored bunkers to secure them at home and on the road. The fear of a stabbing, close-ranged shooting and a sniper attack is now coupled with realities about roadside bombs, suicide bombers, biological and chemical weapons, and coordinated attacks against high value targets. To manage these threats, the American President as articulated by Clinton and Bush has appropriated, internalized, and projected an
image of America rooted in the ethos of the Secret Service: the values of prevention and security came to the forefront, especially in an open and technologically advanced society. With the overwhelming acceptance of international and domestic terrorism and the likelihood of future threats, the Service was able to taken extensive measures to build and expand on its zones of protection: bubbles became bunkers.

However, this transformation in close protection security is undergoing another shift. Bunkers are beginning to be no longer totally adequate. The Service and other close protection agencies around the world are moving toward districts to secure their leaders. One of the first cases of this development was Bush’s visit to England in 2003. It was here that the Service demanded that the POTUS be enveloped in what protestors called an “exclusion zone” (Sengupta, 2003, November 12). Similar in principle to the concept behind a free speech zone, this zone requires that protestors are placed in isolated pockets, leaders remain behind a forfeited fortress, and major streets and intersections are closed down to secure an area. This exclusion zone was large enough for agents to expect the British to seal off parts of downtown London. London Mayor Ken Livingstone pointed out, “To create a situation in which perhaps 60,000 people remain unseen would require a shutdown of central London which is just not acceptable” (Sengupta, 2003, November 12). In end, it was not only acceptable, but this zone provided the space and security the president needed to enjoy his visit. The isolated state was so absolute that the First Lady remarked, “We actually have not seen that many protests. I don’t think the protests are near as large as everyone was predicting before we got there” (Milbank, 2003, November 22).

This exclusion zone was once again employed in 2007 during the APEC summit in Sydney, Australia. With more than 20 world leaders and 6,000 delegates across the globe, the
Australians closed Bennelong Point, the Opera House, parts of the Botanic Gardens, the Government House, and roads in and around the northern city blocks. These areas were walled off with bomb-proof fences, massive security and military guards roamed the city, a no-fly zone was declared, and military jets patrolled the city. Protestors were classified as PPGs (peaceful protestors) and VPGs (violent protestors) and separated into two zones in order to mitigate protests from being riots. Journalist Ian McPhedran aptly referred to this as “Fortress Sydney” (McPhedran, 2007, September 1). The New York Times reported that President Bush and his protective detail received most of the blame for the security precautions (Stolberg, 2007, September 9). Bush apologized for the inconvenience. He said, “Look, I don’t want to come to a community and say, you know, what a pain it is to have the American president (Stolberg, 2007, September 9).”

The inauguration of Barack Obama was the first time that the Service employed a district-based mentality to presidential protection here in the United States. Days before the official ceremony, agents sealed off downtown D.C. in order to start its sterilization process. No private vehicles were allowed in the city; buses were permitted on the day of the ceremony, but they were also checked and screened. To cover the streets, the Service coordinated more than 25,000 law enforcement officials, including 12,000 police officers, 10,000 national guardsmen, 1,000 park police, and a host of Secret Service personnel (“25,000 deploy for inaugural security,” 2009, January 19). The Service employed its counter-sniper teams, counter-assault teams, TSD personnel, and close protection agents to monitor and track the movement of the city. The agency also relied on other police entities to provide specialized help, like the Maryland Guard who sent 22 highly trained soldiers in biological and chemical detection (Wood, 2009, January

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103 Even with this tight security, an Australian comedy show was able to breach it. They staged a fake Canadian motorcade with a look-alike Osama Bin Laden in the back seat and were able get through two checkpoints before they were stopped. They were supposedly within shouting distance of where Bush was staying.
19). To further enhance protection, the Service’s command center had access to 5,265 surveillance cameras to monitor people, packages, and problems. The main threat to the event, however, was not necessarily a presidential assassin, but a terrorist who would use IED’s or suicide bombs to create havoc. This required agents to provide protection for both the POTUS and the people. Safe zones and escape routes had to be planned and cleared for the potential evacuation of more than 1.5 million people. Because of the size of the crowd, the danger of the threat, and the presence of the president, the Service devised an expansive security operation that covered an entire downtown area to protect not only the POTUS, but the people.

In constructing and controlling ever larger areas, the Service must also be concerned with smaller spaces and smaller actions that may threaten the security of the POTUS. Most notably, there are the attempts made by Obama to breach the bubble. Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton said, “Barrack is determined not to be engulfed in the bubble, because part of his own analysis is that’s what happened to his predecessor. He knows it’s easy to become a prisoner of these things and become totally cut off” (Saslow, 2009, March 12). Journalist Eli Saslow noted that Obama has tried to breach the bubble by making at least one trip outside of Washington a week, leaving the White House to eat or attend a Wizard’s game, and trying to visit Chicago and Camp David on a routine basis (2009, March 12). But, the most interesting form of trying to reach outside the bubble is Obama’s focus on technology. The ruckus over Obama’s Blackberry centered on this theme. The Service and NSA both did not want the new president to use the handheld device to communicate with people. It was perceived as a security risk. There was a host of potential problems associated with this simple device. Questions included who would have access, could the device be secured, could Obama be tracked, and could someone leak highly sensitive and
classified information. Despite the hesitancy by the Service and the NSA, Obama was able to get a highly advanced Blackberry with the necessary security precautions.

Although these attempts to chaff against the bubble are noteworthy, Obama will not be able to escape from the constraints and consequences of being in such an isolated space. It has become embedded within the Office of the President. There are things the president can do to mitigate the effects of the bubble, but it is an illusion to believe that an escape is possible. The whole White House structure from the Secret Service to the Press Secretary to the White House Military Office to the Chief of Staff to the White House Communication Office manage and structure where the president will be and what he will be doing. Even though the Blackberry might give Obama some freedom to email, it is limited to a very small scope of friends and advisors. Like everything the president touches, it is regulated. As Foucault notes, there is no escape or emancipation from power relations. Order is always imposed via norms, traditions, and regimes of truth.

This process of control and containment is the history of the Secret Service. It has sought to protect by putting practices into place that permanently isolate the president in an isolated dome. This bubble has acted simultaneously as a screen that projects the president and a shield that hides him from enemies of the state. The coordination and interaction between these two functions creates the practices of presidential security. Although the routines and meaning of close protection has changed over the 100 years, one thing has remained the same: agents protect so the president may live. As this simple premise has evolved, agents have been able to devise new mechanism that physically control and new meaning that mentally binds. With this disciplinary apparatus in place, the Secret Service is able to construct bubbles and bunkers that are designed to secure the president’s bodies.
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