Writing that W/rights Politics? —
An Examination of the Re-viewing Practices of Telos, The Public Interest, and
the Journal as an Institution of Criticism

BY

ELISABETH K. CHAVES

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Timothy W. Luke (Chair)
Wolfgang G. Natter
Scott G. Nelson
R. Janell Watson

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Elisabeth K. Chaves

ABSTRACT

My dissertation explores the relationship between journals and the political. Using the modern examples of The Public Interest and Telos, I analyze how critical journals write politics. As a scholar, I am interested in writing practices and how they shape epistemologies, ontologies, and Weltanschauungen; in essence, how they act as narratives of power. The practice I have undertaken to study in this dissertation is the practice of reviewing. The etymology of the word “review” is “to see again.” Tracing the review form to its institutionalization in the early 19th century in Great Britain and bringing it forward to the late 20th century in the United States, I analyze how critical journals “see again,” whether they challenge how the state “sees,” or whether they conform to the state’s view. I argue that by writing about politics and re-viewing the state’s writing of politics, critical journals also contribute to the wrighting (or making) of political realities.
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INTRODUCTION: WRITING THAT RE-VIEWS

In the second half of the 1960s, two new journals began publication. *The Public Interest* was founded in New York City in 1965 by Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, two men described as “New York Intellectuals” who had already contributed to and edited other important journals of opinion. They promised to make the journal a forum for the study of public policy aided by the expertise of social scientists that could help people better know what they were talking about. Upstate, in Buffalo, New York, on a SUNY campus, a group of graduate philosophy students started a journal called *Telos* in the spring of 1968. That it appeared at the same time as the radical political events of that year was purely coincidental, the journal later averred. The purpose of this new journal as set forth in its second issue\(^1\) was a commitment “to investigating new philosophical horizons that seek to rescue philosophy from the triviality and meaninglessness in which it presently finds itself.” *The Public Interest* continued publishing until 2005 when its final issue appeared. *Telos* publishes to this day.

To announce the arrival of these two new journals into a rather crowded intellectual field of other intellectual publications and endeavors can only be the starting point of an investigation into the more important questions: “Why there? Whey then? Why thus?”

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\(^1\) The journal’s editorial team experienced a split between the first and second issues between a more pluralist, professional oriented aim, as evidenced in the editorial introduction to the first issue, and a more radical aim. The latter won as explained in Issue 6 and discussed further here in Chapter 3.1.
(Mulhern, 1979, p. 3). At its core, the common answer to these questions is that the groups associated with each journal believed something was missing from the intellectual discourse surrounding public policy and philosophy, respectively. The founders of each new journal had surveyed their respective fields of public policy and philosophical understandings and found them lacking. Their objective then was to provide a new or alternate view, a re-view. They chose the medium of a journal to exercise this reviewing practice because historical evidence suggested that a journal is that forum or venue\(^3\) where people concerned with ideas come together to fight for their ideas and perhaps persuade others to accept their ideas and, even more hopefully perhaps, put their ideas into action. By the 1970s, the argument was being made that journals could become, or actually were, the new “party,” or form of political organization.\(^4\) Some new journals considered themselves to have or did, in fact, take on a movement character.

This dissertation examines their efforts, and it advances an answer to “Why there? Why then? Why thus?” Further, it explores the larger implications for an even deeper question: why write? Why do people concerned with ideas undertake such a practice of

\(^2\) Francis Mulhern wrote a study of the British literary magazine *Scrutiny* in 1979. In the introduction to his book, he writes that few precedents existed for such a study and that his aim was to understand the journal in “its material specificity” (pg. ix). He continued: “It is insufficient, then, simply to record that *Scrutiny* came into being in Cambridge, in the spring of 1932. This curt statement of facts does no more than pose the essential questions. Why there? Why then? Why thus?” (1979, p. 3).

\(^3\) However, journals should not be considered to be only containers for thought or places for discussion (Williams, 2009). In other words, they are not only receptacles or passive sites where activity occurs. The form (or forum) also influences what it contains. One should not separate the form from the content.

\(^4\) Discussing the origins of *Social Text*, editors Brent Hayes Edwards and Anna McCarthy, describe a series of meeting between founding editors, Fred Jameson, Stanley Aronowitz and others. “At the center of these spirited dialogues...was a curiosity with the argument then circulating on the intellectual Left that politics was no longer organized around political parties, but instead around journals. ‘So we thought,’ as Jameson explains, ‘if we’re trying to build up a Marxist intellectual movement in this country, we would have to have a journal’” (2009, p. 4). This echoes Antonio Gramsci’s view that a party needs a press. However, here the press is the party.
reviewing through the medium of a journal? What goals do they hope to attain? As two journals concerned with political questions, what effect, if any, on politics do they hope to make? If ultimately their aim is to make people think better about the questions they raise, what hope do they hold for a more critical thinking public? Do they envision their reviewing practice through critical prose as a political activity? And is it? Can writing about politics either wright (in the sense of working up something new) or right (in the sense of providing some common corrective intervention) politics? Ironwrights work up iron into new forms, and journal writers are ideawrights working with comparable goals. Heroic righters of wrong hope to correct error, and so too do writers labor to lessen errors or evil in the name of right.

This dissertation itself also engages in a practice of reviewing politics, and prose about politics, albeit through a different scholarly lens. It aims to re-view the practice of journals. Its goal is to add more substance to our understanding of the nexus of intellectuals and political theory made by writing, and the importance of journals in making this connection. As an academic in training, I wonder why I write. I wonder what forty plus years of journal issues—all carefully archived with many others stored off-campus in the remote archival facilities of my university library\(^5\)—means for the writers and readers of critical prose as well as the politics that this prose is meant to correct. What does it mean to participate in a reviewing practice? What does it mean to intervene critically in politics

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\(^5\) The fact that I recalled them from their “mothballed” storage is evidence (albeit limited) that these journals may transmit to future generations looking for some intellectual guidance thought to be contained therein. Horkheimer, in an exchange with Adorno, said that without a party, they must rethink the meaning of theory and practice and that perhaps it is most useful to view their writing practice as a means of keeping theory in stock in the hopes that “the time will come again when theory can be of use” (T. Adorno & Horkheimer, 2010, p. 58).
from the pages of a journal with a circulation of three or six thousand, a number that would doom almost any other medium in this hypermediated age?

When I first began this project, my idea was to study journals as a generic form, or the journal as a writing genre. However, this agenda gave impetus to what was a much more ambiguous and vague desire to join and perhaps inhabit the community of letters. I was curious about journals and the worlds they create for their writers and readers. Barbara Epstein, one of the co-founders and co-editors of the New York Review of Books, passed away during the first semester of my doctoral program. A number of obituaries and retrospectives appeared, and they left me with a sense of an intellectual community where ideas and writing are paramount and perhaps even glamorous. As a Master’s student, I co-authored an article that was eventually published in a respected academic journal. Flipping through the pages of the issue in which my article appeared, I felt no allure and certainly no glamour. While ideas were discussed, they were not paramount and mostly lay heavy on the page. There was a divide. The academic journal was the home of the scholar, and the journal of opinion was the home of the intellectual.⁶

As I proceeded with my studies, I became more acquainted with another species of journal that seemed to lie somewhere between the academic journal and the journal of opinion. I am not sure what to call it, but some (Cusset, 2008; Williams, 2009) have referred to it as the “theory journal.” This genre includes journals such as Telos, Thesis Eleven, New German Critique, and Social Text. They are not strictly speaking academic, because many began (and some remain) outside academia. Furthermore, having

⁶ I define “academic journals” as journals produced and funded either by disciplinary organizations or institutions of higher education. In essence, they are professional journals. I refer to journals outside these institutions of academia as “independent journals,” which includes “journals of opinion,” among others.
publications in these journals often neither merits the same considerations for tenure review nor carries as much academic legitimacy. However, they also should not be lumped in with the journals of opinion, because they mostly have drawn far smaller audiences than journals and magazines like The Nation, Dissent, and The New Republic. Moreover, they tend to print much longer articles with more depth and usually with the scholarly appurtenances of footnotes and extensive references. Many of these “theory journals” clearly appear to have started with explicit political intentions.7 By this I mean, their foundational purpose was not only to advance knowledge or theory but also to make some political intervention in the world, whether within the confines of certain scholarly disciplines or in the greater bounds of society, politics, and culture. In other words, they definitely intended that their criticism articulate a specific politics.

I included The Public Interest in my study, because it strove to create a politics without “ideology,” as the journal’s editors referred to it. In some ways, Telos and The Public Interest, which existed at similar times, were the antitheses of each other. Telos began as a philosophy journal that sought to revisit certain traditions of neglected European political philosophy to disclose its possible contributions to the political and cultural situation of the late 1960s. The Public Interest began as a policy journal that putatively eschewed ideology in favor of more positivistic sociological and economic analyses of current American policy problems. For someone who prefers things simplified, you could say Telos was a journal of theory, and The Public Interest was a journal of practice.

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7 At this point, I am not attempting to pass normative judgment on which type of journal is better, which is more serious, which carries more political clout and so on. Nor do I mean to imply that because “theory journals” may articulate an explicit political vision, academic journals have no politics. However, I am trying to describe the material differences between these journal “genres.”
I think this is the question at the heart of journals that concern themselves with politics in any shape or form: can political writing wright politics? Or put more bluntly, does a journal actually make a difference politically or is just a place for people to idly navel gaze, ideologically rant, or ineffectively watch from the sidelines as politics happens elsewhere? This question seems to haunt journals and those intellectuals, theorists or scholars who are associated with them. The question pushes them forward and arguably holds them back. It frames criticism as always being in crisis, because there is always the possibility that it carries little political force. At some moments, this potential ineffectuality is greater than at others, because there usually is a true asymmetry between the work of political writing and the activity of politics.

I am not yet sure how to capture this asymmetry without also oversimplifying, because I think it is too simplistic to say that political writing occurs many places, and then gets printed on the page, while politics occurs in arenas like parliaments and congresses and then settles in policy. Perhaps the asymmetry is a matter of power—those that write in political journals often do not hold any office and lack the type of power that is most common in the political field, while those who hold office and wield power in the political field most likely find their power doubted, criticized, and attacked in the intellectual field of the journals. Additionally, here in the United States, do they touch, care about, or affect each other? I believe this asymmetry also underlies the question of theory and practice as understood by those most concerned with the question—thinkers.

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8 Perhaps this self-doubt is what prompted the *New York Review of Books* to feature a diagram for how to construct a Molotov cocktail on the cover of one of its 1967 issues.
9 As Paul Piccone, the editor of *Telos*, wrote “the figure of the politically marginalized intellectual[s]...social function has been in crisis at least as long as Leninism or socialism” (1983, p. 3).
This is what I find fascinating about studying journals—that their practices directly allow one to take up the question of theory and practice. As different as Telos and The Public Interest are/were, they are also very similar. They are both forums where alternate political views were put forth with the aim of reshaping politics. As Brent Hayes Edwards, one of the current editors of Social Text, says: “‘Theory’ is not only a matter of conceptual precision and rhetorical force, in other words, but also inherently a matter of writerly practice” (2009, p. 181). Theory is a writing practice, and as I discuss below, the practice of writing can have considerable political consequences.

However, the study of journals does not provide any easy generalizations or necessary proofs. It is a complex field for analysis full of contradictions and difference, because journals provide insight into how theory shapes politics and how journals shape theory. So, from the start, I had two provisional points of analysis for conducting this study. First, I wanted to explore the journal form in order to construct its genealogy and thereby come to know its parameters. Second, I wanted to understand better the journal as a medium for political intervention. Important to this second consideration is the notion that a journal is not merely a repository for political writing but also a form that acts upon political writing. In other words, we cannot think of journals as passive only.11

10 The notion of “writerly practice” contrasted with “conceptual precision” and “rhetorical force” calls to mind an artistic, as opposed to an intellectual, practice. I take up this theme further below in my discussions of Bourdieu, who argued that the intellectual field achieves its greatest autonomy with the practice of “art for art’s sake.” I return again to this question of theory or writerly practice as art in the conclusion via Theodor Adorno.
11 Jeffrey Williams sums up this thought well when he writes that “journals are usually seen as a kind of cargo truck, tangential to their intellectual freight. Spatially, they are containers, like a box or the frame on a painting. Temporally, they are seen as secondary to the thought of theory, gathering it afterwards. If one were a deconstructive critic, one might reverse these poles: what if we thought of the journal as primary rather than secondary, as central rather than peripheral, as the content rather than the wrapping? It strikes me as an odd habit of mind that contemporary
Political Writing that Wrights Politics?

In 2007, I met with the editors of *Thesis Eleven*, a journal begun in Australia in 1980. I was in New Zealand attending a conference, the annual meeting of the New Zealand and Australian Sociology Associations. The *Thesis Eleven* editors, Peter Beilharz and Trevor Hogan, agreed to give a talk about the journal to the School for Social and Cultural Studies at the University of Victoria, Wellington. They sat down with a (very) small group of students and faculty to discuss the journal, how it began, its history, and current projects.

As its title suggests, the journal had Marxist origins. The eleventh thesis from Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” reads: “The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it” (Marx, 1978c, p. 145). The editorial statement of the first issue of *Thesis Eleven* in 1980 stated that

Marxism as a theory and as a movement is in crisis. Radical theory has become completely undiscriminating. In the movements and parties there are blockages, perhaps decay, but little advance. In the turn of Anglo-American Marxism away from the project of importing Continental theory there is a danger that theory will be allowed to lapse altogether. There is a need for a new “theoretical” journal attaching a specifically political understanding to “theory” (“Editorial,” 1980, p. 2).

The journal argued that theory was losing its political potency. Their aim was to be a new kind of “theoretical” journal. Arguably, they were criticizing other journals devoted to theory that failed to connect theory with praxis.

The fundamental tenet of the original Marxian project and its echoes and refractions through the principal representatives of western Marxism is that theory and politics must find their necessary articulation in each other. The struggle for socialism depends on the politicization of theory and the theorization of politics. Neither of the dominant tendencies within Marxist theory—those which propagate more theory or more history in isolation from each other—can be adequate to this task. Within the left this division is maintained between activists who carry out the everyday organizing and theorists who stand back and survey the general theory, despite its critique of humanism and categories like individual genius, still conceives its own history largely in terms of individuals and singular statements” (2009, p. 684).
tendencies. Marxist politics can only have meaning if it can begin to bridge this gap ("Editorial," p. 2).

The editors of this journal then saw what they regarded as a severe divide between those who practice politics and those who theorize politics. One can argue whether or not this was an accurate perception. What is important is that the individuals behind Thesis Eleven responded to this crisis of Marxism by beginning a journal. Like Social Text, they also created a press as party, rather than a party press, and in lieu of a party—that no longer functioned or could no longer exist—they intended that their press enter service in the cause of both working towright and right politics. “The intention of Thesis Eleven is to provide the framework in which these themes, problematics and struggles might be unified as politics” ("Editorial," p. 2).

The editorial continued with a discussion of the relationship between Marxists and the workers’ movement. It then discussed the fragmentation of Marxism into many knowledges, “knowledge is not only separated from practice, but also internally compartmentalized” ("Editorial," p. 2). The journal argued that a central theme accompanying its emphasis on politics would be “everyday life” and its necessary corollary, “the cultural specificity of marxisms” (p. 3).

Thesis Eleven seeks to promote open honest and principled debate which considers everything to be the object of critique. We seek a broad diversity. The unity of the materials carried in Thesis Eleven will be reflected in their shared commitment to understanding the world with a view to changing it. Thesis Eleven is not alone in these aims; it finds certain affinities with other projects aimed at a radical rethinking of marxist orthodoxies (p.3).

The editorial then named projects like the British Hegemony group, the then new journal Social Text in the United States—with the caveat that its manifesto, if less its content, expresses positions close to Thesis Eleven, the new openness within New Left Review, as
well as Perry Anderson’s *Arguments Within English Marxism*, and the “radical rethinking evident in the three volume *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*” (p.3). It stressed that what was valued in these projects was their openness to debate and not assertion. The journal wanted to investigate the contradictions and differences within theory, not simply formulate a politics based upon a dogmatic understanding of Marxism.

While much of the editorial seemed to counterpoise theory to politics, the editors did not understand them as part of a dichotomy, as passive versus active, or thinking versus the absence of thought, or whatever other simplified conventional understanding is often brought conceptually to these terms. Still, they recognized a distance between them. Even if ideas might have a force within themselves, that force was not being sufficiently articulated in politics.

If Marx was aware of the material force of ideas then we, today – confronted with ideas in the practices of reproduction, consent, consumption, acceptance and incorporation in the circumscription of possibilities, theories of ‘human nature’, technological necessity – should need even less to confirm their real and coercive power. The point is not that theory needs to be obliterated, only that it needs to be constituted politically. We invite you to participate as writers and as readers in the spirit of the eleventh thesis” (p.4).

The editors believed that within the pages of a journal they could make gains in politically constituting theory. At the same time, they appeared to at least implicitly, or subconsciously, recognize the contradictions or limits of their project as they invited readers and writers to participate with them in “the spirit of the eleventh thesis.” Why not instead ask readers and writers to participate in carrying out the eleventh thesis and change the world? If they recognized that the theoretical and political investigations of a journal, and hopefully the reconciliation of those often-divergent practices, could be part of the Marxist project to change the world, they also seemed to recognize that a journal could
not be politics *tout court*. Maybe I am reading too much into what they meant by joining them in “the spirit of the eleventh thesis.” However, what the journal’s editors said in that New Zealand meeting almost thirty years after this editorial was written gives weight to my approach to politics, journals and intellectuals here.

During the discussion, one person asked the editors, Peter Beilharz and Trevor Hogan,\(^\text{12}\) what the political purpose of the journal was. In essence, the question was, what is the political power of your journal? Beilharz and Hogan gave the person who had posed the question a funny look and answered that that was of no real concern to them (Peter and Trevor) or something to that effect. In other words, their aim was not to carry out any political program. They were operating a journal and a center for cultural sociology. They organized international conferences, focusing on Southeast Asia. SAGE, a large academic publisher, now publishes their journal. When you look up the journal on SAGE’s website (http://www.sagepub.com/journalsProdDesc.nav?prodId=Journal200952), the journal’s description reads

*Thesis Eleven* encourages the development of social theory across the social sciences and liberal arts. The journal is international and interdisciplinary with a central focus on theories of society, culture, and politics and the understanding of modernity.

There is no mention of Marxism or a desire to reconcile theory with politics, much less any stated intention to change the world. Farther down the page, the description continues with an analysis of the journal’s contents.

*Thesis Eleven* publishes theories and theorists, surveys, critiques, debates and interpretations. The journal also brings together articles on place, region, or problems in the world today, encouraging civilizational analysis and work on alternative modernities from fascism and communism to Japan and Southeast Asia.

\(^\text{12}\) Peter Beilharz is one of the founding editors of the journal. Trevor Hogan joined the editorial time sometime later and now serves as a co-ordinating editor with Beilharz and Peter Murphy.
Marxist in origin, postmarxist by necessity, the journal is vitally concerned with change as well as with tradition (emphasis added).

Here, the journal acknowledges its Marxist roots, which are quickly identified as historical only. What made the journal necessarily postmarxist is not acknowledged. This implies that if you are reading the journal then you already know. In other words, the transition from Marxism to postmarxism can be regarded common knowledge, or a store of “common sense,” among social or critical theorists. That transition no longer requires investigation; it is a moot point.\textsuperscript{13}

Even more interesting is the suggestion that while the journal still remains “vitally” committed to change, it also values tradition. The word, “tradition,” is most commonly associated with a conservative outlook. Associated with tradition are the ideas of conserving or preserving. Its dictionary definition is “the transmission of customs or beliefs from generation to generation, or the fact of being passed on in this way.” Tradition is derived from the Latin \textit{tradere} meaning “deliver, betray,” from \textit{trans} meaning “across” and \textit{dare} meaning “give.” Traditions then are preserved because they are carried forward or given across time.\textsuperscript{14}

In its conservative understanding, tradition implies a holding onto, or a keeping back. It is the antithesis of moving forward or progress. Yet, as its etymology suggests, for tradition to be maintained, there must also be a forward movement, something must be

\textsuperscript{13} These statements may also get you past gatekeepers, such as university deans and librarians, which may then allow you to publish more critical or Marxist/ Marxian material. Earlier examples of such self-censoring include Max Horkheimer’s substitution of “critical theory” as code for Marxism while in the United States and Antonio Gramsci’s elimination of words like Marx and “class” from his prison writings (T. Adorno & Horkheimer, 2010; Gramsci, 1971).

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Telos} published a special issue on the subject of “traditions” (Issue 94, Winter 1992-93), which included a symposium on David Gross’s \textit{The Past in Ruins}. As Gross explained in his contribution, traditions might serve as a basis for viable, or organic, communities. Whether old traditions could be restored or rescued, critically appropriated, or newly formed was a question the symposium, made up of divergent viewpoints, sought to explore.
passed on to the next generation. As Marxism became postmarxism, for *Thesis Eleven* and many others, the old theoretical framework was left in the past as a new framework or multiple frameworks took its place. The desired change in the world could no longer be based on this old reading of a multivocal theoretical framework. Instead of being a change maker, Marxism, once radical, became a dusty tradition, one no longer worth passing forward. To return to Marxism now for many becomes a conservative position, a rehabilitation of tradition.

*Thesis Eleven’s* title may have become a relic of its past. At the meeting, the editors said the title had been, at least in part, homage to a deceased friend. He had suggested the title, and when he passed away, they decided to use it. On its face, the journal’s history reads like a narrative of de-radicalization, a once Marxist journal intent on changing the world turned a commercially published critical theory journal that values both change and tradition.15 However, like the story of how the journal got its title, appearances can be

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15 Paul Piccone, *Telos’s* founding editor, found this to be a common trajectory for such publications: “Most new journals generally come into being in order to confront what are perceived to be urgent cultural, political, and social needs not being met by existing intellectual organs. As such, they tend to follow peculiar trajectories. Initially, they seek to introduce alternative perspectives into a cultural environment generally seen as mired in conformism and unable to deal with the ‘new,’ other than by reducing it to mere extensions of the ‘old.’ These periodic injections of allegedly fresh ideas, however, either end up recycling even older and forgotten notions or become rapidly integrated into the very orthodoxy they were meant to explode from without. Thus, after a phase of preliminary self-definition, most professedly radical outlooks gradually degenerate into commonplaces. Institutional conformism subsequently reabsorbs them, and intellectual rigor mortis inexorably follows—irrespective of whether the no-longer-so-new journals actually cease publication altogether or stubbornly continue an inauthentic institutional existence rather different from their original intentions” (1988, p. 3). Perry Anderson, the editor of *New Left Review*, recognizes a similar phenomenon but believes it can be rectified. “[P]olitical journals have a different reason for being, that makes renewal beyond their first impetus a test specific to them. They stand both for certain objective principles, and the capacity of these to decipher the course of the world. Here, editorial fade-out is intellectual defeat. Material or institutional pressures may, of course, cut off any periodical in its prime. But short of such circumstance, political journals have no choice: to be true to themselves, they must aim to extend their real life beyond the conditions or generations that gave rise to them” (2000, pp. 4-5).
deceiving. Journals are not just compilations of bound essays. They are complex institutions comprised of the labor of many individuals, groups, and institutions in a particular context.

Journals then should be understood as practices of writing that unfold in time. Francis Mulhern in his study of the British literary journal, Scrutiny, emphasized that

[the constant attempt in research and composition was to understand the journal in its material specificity: not as a serially published ‘big book’ but as a practice that unfolded in time, constituting a history that was specific to itself and at the same time bound to the other histories that made up mid-century English history as a whole; not as the ‘expression’ of a master-subject (Leavis) but as a play of many voices, within the ideological formation of which Scrutiny was the organizer and bearer (1979, p. ix).]

As a scholar, I am interested in writing practices and how they shape epistemologies, ontologies, and Weltanschauungen of both writers and readers and even non-readers that are affected by some outward ripples. In essence, I am interested in how writing practices act as narratives of power. Examples of writing practices include keeping a diary, writing poetry, blogging, investigative journalism, social scientific writing, publishing a journal, and so forth. I ask here how the practice of publishing a journal acts as a narrative of power and, hence, of evaluation, appraisal, critique, and judgement. From where does its power, if any, derive?

Political theory or political philosophy depends upon vision. The word “theory” comes from the Late Latin theoria and the Greek theoria meaning “contemplation, speculation, a looking at, things looked at,” from theorin “to consider, speculate, look at,” from theoros “spectator,” and from thea “a view” plus horan “to see.” Sheldon Wolin argues that “political philosophy constitutes a form of ‘seeing’ political phenomena” (2004, p. 17). However, his definition of “seeing” more closely adheres to the definition of vision of
“something seen in the imagination or in the supernatural” rather than the descriptive “act of seeing, sight, things seen.”\(^\text{16}\) He argues that

most political thinkers have believed imagination to be a necessary element in theorizing because they have recognized that, in order to render political phenomena intellectually manageable, they must be presented in what we can call ‘a corrected fullness’ (Wolin, 2004, pp. 18-19).\(^\text{17}\)

Max Horkheimer argued that the social function of philosophy is the “criticism of what is prevalent” (1972, p. 264). The prevailing thought or opinion, belonging to the ruling class, is known as *doxa*. It is harmful because it often loses itself in a single idea or presents itself as self-evident without questioning the assumptions upon which it is based. Thinkers from Plato to Bourdieu referred to its proponents as *doxosophers* or “technicians of opinion who think themselves wise” (Bourdieu, 1998a, p. 7).\(^\text{18}\) The role of the philosopher or theorist is to challenge the *doxosophers*.

The chief aim of such criticism is to prevent mankind from losing itself in those ideas and activities which the existing organization of society instills into its members. Man must be made to see the relationship between his activities and what is achieved thereby, between his particular existence and the general life of society, between his everyday projects and the great ideas which he acknowledges. Philosophy exposes the contradiction in which man is entangled in so far as he must attach himself to isolated ideas and concepts in everyday life (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 265).

\(^\text{16}\) “Vision is commonly used to mean an act of perception. Thus we say that we see the speaker addressing a political rally. In this sense, ‘vision’ is a descriptive report about an object or an event. But ‘vision’ is also used in another sense, as when one talks about an aesthetic vision or a religious vision. In this second meaning, it is the imaginative, not the descriptive, element that is uppermost” (Wolin, 2004, p. 18).

\(^\text{17}\) Wendy Brown writes: “As a meaning-making enterprise, theory depicts a world that does not quite exist, that is not quite the world we inhabit. But this is theory’s incomparable value, not its failure” (Brown, 2002, p. 573).

\(^\text{18}\) Brian Nelson contrasts Plato’s view of the state with that belonging to the Sophists, writing: “The essence of Plato’s argument is that the state is natural and, as such, constitutes an ethical community premised upon the maintenance of justice. Justice, therefore, is itself natural, an inherent quality of humanness and what is absolutely crucial to the Platonic theory of the state, knowable. It is not simply the opinion (*doxa*) of the politically dominant class, as the Sophists maintained, but an intellectually comprehensible and universally applicable transcendent standard or *form* of rightness” (2006, p. 20).
Such criticism assumes a negative function. It challenges the dominant vision. The chief aim, then, of the critical attitude is to confront all shallow thinking. As Marx said, it requires a “ruthless criticism of everything existing” (1978a, p. 13). Marx called for this ruthless criticism in a letter to Arnold Ruge while discussing the aims of the journal they were founding. It would provide a forum for such criticism. If doxa is the prevailing opinion, an orthodoxy, which represents the point of view of the dominant thinkers as well as the powers of domination, then any criticism that undermines this view by offering an alternative view becomes a re-view of those theories and authorities.\(^\text{19}\)

If journals act as writing practices where theory is articulated (as a writing practice itself), then we can also say that journals act as re-viewing practices. The noun “review” itself dates back to 1441 and derives from the Middle French reveue meaning “a reviewing, review.” The verb “review” derives from the French verb reevier, which means, “to see again, go to see again.” This is from the Latin revidere, “re-” meaning again and “videre” to see. As a verb, “review” dates back to 1576. It was first used to describe an inspection of military or naval forces.

The etymology of the noun, “review,” would be enough if we considered a review (or journal) to be an object, a passive assemblage of essays or articles. However, if we consider the more active construction of a review—who writes for a review, where and how did the review originate, what role does it play in society, how is it institutionalized—any and all of

\(^{19}\) Frank Lettrichia argues that literary critics, the inheritors of the early reviews, discussed further below, should make such a re-viewing practice a part of their criticism. “If one thing in the world of value, as Emerson once said, is the active soul, then the kind of activity that a Marxist literary intellectual preeminent engages in – should engage in – is the activity of interpretation, an activity which does not passively ’see,’ as Burke puts it, but constructs a point of view in its engagement with textual events, and in so constructing produces an image of history as social struggle, of, say, class struggle, an image that is not ‘there’ in a simple sense but is the discovery of the active intellectual soul” (1983, p. 11).
these questions speak to a practice of “reviewing.” Therefore, more appropriately, the etymology of the verb “review” should be investigated. How then are the writers and their reviews “re-viewing”? What do they “see again”? Are they outlining visions with Wolin’s “corrected fullness”?

While Horkheimer recognized that the social function of philosophy was to criticize prevailing thought, he also argued that no longer can the contradictions in thought be resolved by purely theoretical reflection.20 Instead, Horkheimer charges the theorist with the task of ensuring that: “in the future, the capacity for theory and for action which derives from theory will never again disappear, even in some coming period of peace when the daily routine may tend to allow the whole problem to be forgotten once more” (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 272).

In another time and place, namely, near the dawn of Victorian England, issue 25 of the London and Westminster Review, which appeared in 1836, contained a short essay in dialogue form, titled “Theory and Practice.” The dialogue in Socratic form sought to prove through logic that there is no distinction between theory and practice. Rather, one informs the other. Those who seek to divorce them by elevating practice and denigrating theory display their own ignorance, the author argues. Members of Parliament are most guilty of this offense. They shout down anyone who offers theories, but this is a development. Before, what most offended was philosophy. The author writes:

The cry of practice against theory began to be used when the force of the cry against philosophy began to grow feeble, and it grew rife as the cry against philosophy died away. The cry against philosophy was raised as soon as the eyes of the public began to be prying. There is never anything which needs amendment in the state, but there

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20 Horkheimer argued that “[o]nly in exceptional historical periods, such as the French Enlightenment, does philosophy itself become politics” (1972, p. 271). Perhaps the 1960s was such an exceptional period, as The Public Interest and Telos no doubt thought.
are numbers of men who see it is their interest to fight against the amendment; because they make their profit out of the abuse. All this disposition to pry into abuses was imputed to philosophy. If philosophy, that is, the disposition to inquire, could be successfully cried down, men would be quiet; and those good things which good men has so long enjoyed at the expense of others, would rest in peace (Vol. 3, Issue 24, p. 132, author "P.Q").

Perhaps in the early 1800s, there was less distance between theory and practice and some contradictions in thought could still be resolved through theoretical reflection. However, theorizing has always been challenged. The doxosophers or counter-intellectuals, as Peter Steinfels refers to them, profit from the prevailing doxa and would lose that profit were it to be challenged (1979). They would prefer to offer small changes, minor revisions, to appease those out of power as well as to assure those in power. They resist any wholesale re-viewing of orthodox thinking and values.²¹

This points to another understanding of the re-view, or re-vision. "Seeing again" can be both future and past oriented. A re-view can be a theoretical imagining of something that does not yet exist—the holding out of a Platonic ideal and measuring it against the state as it actually exists. A re-visioning, however, can also be an act of revisionism—re-reading the past and revising the perception of what occurred.²² The critics often

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²¹ Antonio Gramsci made the distinction between militant and rear-guard movements. The former are the most interesting, while the latter deal “with established ideas which have become classic or commercial” (1977, p. 149). Many publics and producers of trade and academic journals can be classified as rear guard, more interested in protecting established ideas than offering anything new or revolutionary.

²² Adrienne Rich's groundbreaking article “When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-vision” appeared in the journal College English. There Rich argued, “Re-vision—the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new critical direction—is for us more than a chapter in cultural history: it is an act of survival. Until we can understand the assumptions in which we are drenched we cannot know ourselves. And this drive to self-knowledge, for woman, is more than a search for identity: it is part of her refusal of the self-destructiveness of male-dominated society. A radical critique of literature, feminist in its impulse, would take the work first of all as a clue to how we live, how we have been living, how we have been led to imagine ourselves, how our language has trapped as well as liberated us; and how we can begin to see—and therefore live-afresh. A change in the concept of sexual identity is essential if we are not going to see the old political order
undertake both of these roles. They may attempt to change our understanding of history, and they may offer a vision for the future. Theory does both as well.

The first part of this dissertation focuses on the beginnings of the modern state and the early critics who sought to amend its activities through a practice of re-viewing in writing. The next part examines the institutionalization of the review form with such journals as the *Westminster Review* in the early nineteenth century. Interestingly, while the review or journal has been a home for the intellectual or theorist intent upon making a critique of the state, from its beginnings, its very users have critiqued the form itself, questioning whether the review medium can effectively challenge the prevailing thought. The third and final part of the dissertation analyzes two more contemporary examples of the journal, *The Public Interest* and *Telos*. It examines their views and re-views of the roles played by a political journal, and their relationship of theory and practice.

Throughout, I investigate whether political writing can, in fact, “wright” politics or “right” politics, to the extent that politics more resembles the alternative views the journals present. While no longer commonly used, the word “wright” is a noun defined as “a maker or builder” (New Oxford American Dictionary). It also is a type of worker, and therefore can be connected to an archaic past participle of “work,” or “wrought.” As the worker who is busy in the creation of “well-wrought” products, the ironwright, wheelwright, cartwright,

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re-assert itself in every new revolution. We need to know the writing of the past, and know it differently than we have ever known it; not to pass on a tradition but to break its hold over us” (1972, pp. 18-19). This call for re-visioning like the other “critical turns” begins with an internal critique of a discipline or object of knowledge in order to create political change in the broader world. The question of course is whether these internal critiques overflow their disciplinary borders and enter the outside world. (Coincidentally, at the time of the article’s publication, Rich was a professor at City College, City University of New York, the same college that the founding members of *The Public Interest* attended. Their critics argue that they undertook a similar project of re-vision regarding the welfare state, finding more fault with it than perhaps actually existed. I explore this critique further below.)
or millwright, can be said to be performing labors that can be regarded as “wrighting” objects or products. Therefore, I adopt this neologism “wright” as a verb from Timothy W. Luke who argues that realist writing in international relations discloses and perhaps co-constitutes fields of forces that also wright new political realities (1996). Wrights here refer to idea-wrights, discourse wrights, and narrative wrights. By wrighting politics, I mean the construction of alternative possibilities for politics. Or as Wendy Brown states,

theory does not simply articulate needs or desires but rather argues for their existence and thus literally brings them into being. As theory interprets the world, it fabricates that world (2002, p. 574).

To argue that journals wright politics may suggest that politics can be constructed and finished like a building that achieves some permanence. Rather, the process of construction is an ongoing one made up, in part, of speech, discourse and debate. So, wrighting politics may include construction but also deconstruction, remodeling, and even demolition.23

I am also using “wrighting” as a metaphor. Laurel Richardson emphasizes that metaphors are “the backbone of social science writing,” and “construction” metaphors are very common when discussing theory (2003, p. 505). Our unconscious use of metaphors should then be made conscious in order to understand how our writing practices shape epistemologies. This brings me to the final point of this introduction. Since I am focusing on these journals as writing practices, I also believe that my writing practice, of which this dissertation is a product, is its own method of inquiry. In other words, the struggle to write

23 Telos also challenged the construction metaphor regarding political theory. At the 1990 Elizabethtown Telos Conference, Paul Piccone gave a paper titled “Does Critical Theory Need a Foundation?,” which was also the title of the panel. “He rejected the question as misformulated, since it presupposes that Critical Theory is comparable to a building yet to be constructed. Today, however, Critical Theory is more like an abandoned theoretical edifice infested by linguistifying squatters and in terrible disrepair. Thus what is needed is something closer to a ’gut rehab’ of an edifice which not only was constructed decades ago but, like so many other grand old buildings was badly remodeled during the 1950s and 60s by haphazard efforts to blend it in with the rest of the academic neighborhood” (Staff, 1989-90, p. 116).
about these journals has taught me much. I did not learn what I needed to say and then write it down. I rather learned what I needed to say as I wrote it down, as I took wrong turns and u-turns and detours, much like these journals themselves. Also, how I write this dissertation says as much about my subject as what I have written. Form and content are both important to any writing practice. As Laurel Richardson argues,

[w]riting as a method of inquiry departs from standard social science practices. It offers an additional—or alternative—research practice. In standard social scientific discourse, methods for acquiring data are distinct from the writing of the research report, the latter presumed to be an unproblematic activity, a transparent report about the world studied. When we view writing as a method, however, we experience ‘language-in-use,’ how we ‘word the world’ into existence. And then we ‘reword’ the world, erase the computer screen, check the thesaurus, move a paragraph, again and again. This ‘worded world’ never accurately, precisely, completely captures the studied world, yet we persist in trying. Writing as a method of inquiry honors and encourages the trying, recognizing it as embryonic to the full-fledged attention to the significance of language (2003, p. 500).

**My Introduction to Journals, or How My Inquiry Began**

Within the first month or so of my doctoral program, two events occurred that shaped this dissertation—Barbara Epstein died and Stefan Collini’s book, *Absent Minds: Intellectuals in Britain* was published. Already, I am not being entirely accurate. I began my doctoral program in late August 2006. Barbara Epstein, one of the founding editors of the *New York Review of Books*, passed away in June 2006, and Stefan Collini’s book first appeared in April of the same year. However, I did not learn of either of these events until August and September, and then they came to my attention through reading periodicals.

My first engagement with Collini’s book occurred by way of a review by P. N. Furbank in the fall 2006 issue of *The Threepenny Review*. I began subscribing to the review in the spring because I had some aspirations toward writing and because I somehow arrived at the conclusion that the review would be a good entryway into the literary
culture. I suppose I had read somewhere else that it would be a good investment of my time. Around that same period, I became familiar with the *Arts and Letters Daily* site of *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. The site is a sort of aggregator. Its editor, Dennis Dutton, now deceased, trolled the Internet, largely the WebPages of periodicals but also blogs, and linked to articles that he deemed interesting. Each link is prefaced with a short introduction to the topic under discussion. Without having to subscribe to more periodicals than I could possibly afford, I now had a means with which I could read widely. (How the Internet alters periodical publication and reading are subjects for future research.) Moreover, someone else had undertaken the task of deciding what was worthy of my time and attention and what was not. In late September, the site linked to an article by James Atlas in the *New York Magazine* that was both tribute to Barbara Epstein and reflection on the review. Other tributes followed, as did other reviews of Collini’s book.

The Atlas piece on Epstein and the *New York Review of Books* immediately attracted me. It portrayed an environment, accurately or not, that embodied intellectual community, writers rubbing elbows with other writers, erudite editors dictating letters to eager interns, and the production of a periodical described as the “premier journal of the American intellectual elite.” I imagined working there meant immersing oneself in the world of ideas but also getting to make a decent living. Previously, I thought the only real chance of such a life meant being a university professor. However, at a review, there were no courses to teach or faculty meetings to attend. Ideally, one simply got to reflect and write and exchange thoughts with similarly inclined people. The only other type of institution of ideas that I had had any real exposure to, and by exposure I mean I had

\[24\] The site continues to exist and operate, now carried on by successors (http://www.aldaily.com).
learned about them in college courses and possibly sent some job applications their way, were think tanks. However, think tanks seemed more constraining; the end product of your work was a policy brief, not a lively and even entertaining essay. I know this may unfairly characterize both think tanks and journals, as some journals may produce essays that look more like policy briefs and some think tanks may produce briefs that read more like essays. Still, an alternative to academia or academic thinking that relied on a deep engagement with ideas was wholly new to me, because it was not an avenue that I previously explored.

Moreover, a journal like the New York Review of Books was a place where questions of politics and culture could be investigated side by side. Any issue could contain politics, economics, philosophy, history, art, sociology, psychology, astronomy, and literary criticism, as well as original poetry. One was not confined to disciplinary boundaries. In the journal’s first issue in 1963, the lengthy table of contents included, among others, a piece by Dwight MacDonald titled “To the Whitehouse,” a review essay by Oscar Glass on Russian economic development, a review essay by Susan Sontag on Simone Weil, a review essay by Nathan Glazer on Herbert Gans's The Urban Villagers, and poetry by Robert Lowell, John Berryman, and Robert Penn Warren.

Critics have rightly described the New York Review of Books as political, its politics progressive or to the left. A favorite anecdote is to tell of the cover printed in 1968 that contained a diagram showing how to make a Molotov cocktail. Philip Nobile in Intellectual Skywriting: Literary Politics and The New York Review of Books (1974) argued that by the early 1970s the review’s politics lacked any bite. Atlas suggested that while this may have been true, the review’s politics reemerged strongly after 9/11. The review itself has never put forth an explicit political program. It has only published one editorial and that
appeared in its first issue. There was no mention of politics whatsoever. Instead, the editors expressed their hopes that the review would serve as the type of literary journal that is needed in America. They would not spend time on books that “are trivial in their intentions or venal in their effects.” The only explicit description they gave of the new endeavor was that it would be a “responsible literary journal” (Epstein & Silvers, 1963). They left open the questions of responsible to who and to what?

I had a fairly parochial upbringing and education, which I describe in more detail below, and I did not really know of the existence of reviews and journals such as the NYROB. I had seen The New Yorker and read a few issues. I had read The Economist and browsed other learned magazines at bookstores. But professors prior to my doctoral degree had never urged me to pick up the latest issue of Dissent. They had never assigned articles from Salmagundi as part of my course reading. Course readers, packets of articles that supplemented textbooks, might contain articles from scholarly journals or even from some of the leading news magazines, but I do not remember them containing anything from journals of opinion, like The Nation or The New Republic, or from other less widely read, non-academic journals, like Telos or The Public Interest. My experience is not all that unique. As Mark Oppenheimer (2008) relates, most graduate students no longer read journals of opinion, unless they sneak onto course required reading lists.

I have re-read Atlas’s article on the New York Review of Books several times since I first saw it in 2006. As I re-read it yet again in order to write this introduction, I noticed something almost immediately that I had glossed over before. The depiction of Epstein’s work and the review is suffused with glamour. First, there are the parties. Atlas writes of “literary cocktail parties,” “Truman Capote’s Black and White Ball at the Plaza”; he even
says "their [the Epstein’s] parties were famous." The settings are enviable and exotic: "a leafy street lined with elegant old apartment buildings known for their wood-paneled walls and double-height living rooms," "marble pillars and chandeliers," the "remote farmhouse in Provence," "a Thames River barge...moored ...on the right bank of the Seine." The lifestyle is luxurious: “pot-au-feu, coq au vin, boeuf bourguignon," “trust fund,” “bottles of champagne,” “high-toned benefactors,” “hunting dogs,” a man “coiffed and tanned, in a beautiful suit like someone out of a movie.”

Then there is the review’s office: “The office was chaos.” It is filled with loose papers, smoked cigarettes, shabby secondhand furniture, walls of galleys, ziggurats of books. They may party hard but they work harder, is the moral. They are not just intellectuals, but intellectuals with distinction. I now wonder what attracted me first, the intellectual community or the status and prestige. I believe it is the former, although the latter does not hurt. Still, the intellectual’s work is always affected by the concern for his/her position in relation to other intellectuals and to society, the need for intellectual differentiation. It is what Richard Hofstadter referred to as “status anxiety” and what Pierre Bourdieu called “distinction.” How does status anxiety or the search for distinction affect their politics? Can they be considered separately? One critic of the New York Review of Books described their political voice as “cocktail-party revolutionary” (Goodman, 1969, p. 71).

Another tribute to Epstein and the New York Review of Books appeared in The Chronicle of Higher Education. In that piece, Mark Oppenheimer argued that Epstein’s intellectual status may have rated high within “literary circles, but in the wider world, she was hardly known” (2008, p. B14). Within the intellectual and cultural fields, she occupied a position of distinction in comparison to editors of more mainstream or middlebrow
journals. She and the review take on entirely new weights depending upon who is doing
the weighing. This is perhaps the trap of most writing about intellectuals. The intellectuals
loom large among their peers, who are often the ones writing about them, but may be
wholly insignificant to almost everyone else.

How then does one judge the influence of an Epstein on society at large when 99.96
percent \(^{25}\) of Americans never heard of her? The percentage is probably only slightly higher
for those familiar with the review. Oppenheimer argues that not even graduate students at
Yale are reading opinion journals like the *New York Review of Books* or *Dissent* or
*Commentary* or, even, *The American Scholar*. (He doubts that most professors read them).
Arguably, not many graduate students are keeping up with academic journals either. For
one, there are far too many within each and every discipline to read. Second, most of them
are incredibly boring or say little that merits attention. However, if the more lively opinion
journals cannot get much of an audience either, then what is the reason?

The usual argument points the blame at mass media, mainly television, for diverting
people from reading, although *Cosmopolitan* and *Sports Illustrated* seem to enjoy wide
circulations. With the Internet, a lot of reading is supposedly done on-line. This is why
newspapers are dying, they argue. Most papers and other periodical literature now
maintain websites, some post all their content, others limit what they make available on-
line. An enormous number of periodicals continue to exist; the Internet and television have
not put them out of business.

Perhaps the argument could be made that journals no longer enjoy the same
influence in American society that they did in a pre-radio and pre-television era. Still, even

\(^{25}\) Admittedly, this is an arbitrary figure, although I loosely base it on the review’s usual circulation
of 127,000.
if almost no one has heard of the *New York Review of Books* or of any of the other periodicals included in this dissertation, journals constitute one of the most frequently used mediums of communication for the transmission of ideas. They also allow intellectuals to connect with an audience, even if it is comprised largely of their peers.

Many authors who write about these journals, journals “at the intersection of academe and the culture at large,” as Oppenheimer describes them, value them as contributors to intellectual culture. Oppenheimer details the number of ways that reading such journals can foster the life of the mind among graduate students and also possibly encourage them to act as “public intellectuals.” These journals also occupy a space at the intersection of literature and politics, which have been mostly separated within the academy.

Like I mentioned, I myself had never read the *New York Review of Books* prior to my doctoral degree (in some circles this would mark me as a philistine), and I had never given too much thought to the concept of the intellectual. I hoped to be considered intellectual, and I was certainly enamored with the life of the mind and ideas—my doctorate would be my fourth degree. However, I grew up in Northern Virginia, attended a small public university in the state, Mary Washington College, known for its educational value, then decided on law school and chose a second tier school because they gave me a scholarship. After law school, I was not sure that I wanted to be a lawyer, so I enrolled in another degree program. This time it was a Master’s degree in Urban and Regional Planning (MURP) at Virginia Tech. I was still in my mid-twenties and did not think that postponing the so-called “real world” for a couple more years would do me any harm. Plus, I felt comfortable at school. My roommate was doing the Master’s program in Public and International Affairs
(MPIA) within the same school. We shared some classes, but she also took courses on International Politics and other theory-heavy ventures. I enviously eyed her textbooks. Who was this Foucault-guy, I wondered? I chose the MURP rather than the MPIA track because I did feel some guilt over not becoming a lawyer. I felt that if I was going to go back to school again, I should at least do something practical. I was told growing up that I should get a good job with a decent salary and in my spare time, do what I love. And the student loans were starting to accumulate and would need to be paid off eventually.

I wrote my Master’s thesis on the integration of water supply and land use planning. I could not have been more bored. But I did not think that I needed to find it all that exciting. I was earning a degree; this was work, not fun. I finished my Master’s and due to personal circumstances, I moved to Miami and took the quickest job I could find—practicing law. For a year and a half, I practiced complex commercial litigation. I also started almost immediately planning my return to school.

I returned to Virginia Tech, because, again, it was affordable and also familiar territory. I entered the Ph.D. program within the same school that housed my Master’s degree. We are a unique program located within the School of Public and International Affairs that formally sits within the College of Architecture and Urban Studies. This may have made more sense when the program was known as Environmental Design and Planning, but as more and more students entered the program to pursue Public and International Affairs, the degree name was changed to Planning, Governance and Globalization. Coming back to Virginia Tech and this program, I initially thought that I would have a research agenda along the lines of my Master’s degree, something that would include my legal background and would focus on environmental issues. However, at
orientation, with my roommate’s bookshelf in the back of my mind, I sought out an advisor who could steer me to those “theory” classes. I enrolled in Contemporary Political Theory, Discourse Analysis, and Collaborative Governance with a theory-focused instructor. Then, as I said above, two events happened that largely shaped this dissertation. Although some scholars may find a more direct route from point A to point B, the materiality of my professional course as accidental, normal, and personal, or contingent, is probably also not unique to me.

I relate this brief autobiography to emphasize two points. First, the world of journals and reviews and the attendant culture that surrounds them was almost entirely new to me. The magazines I grew up with were *National Geographic*, *Time*, and *Seventeen*. The Internet opened up a whole world where I could see the multitude of publications that existed. In the last five years, I have given myself a crash course in this diverse domain.

Second, some existential questioning about my own career as scholar—what it means to be a scholar, what contribution it makes to the world—and my latent (or perhaps patent) attraction to intellectual community drove me to investigate this topic. In choosing a dissertation topic, there is really nothing objective about it, and I think this should be stressed, especially with a research subject such as this one. Scholars, or political theorists, or editors, or essayists, are all motivated by inner or personal desires that cannot always, or are not always, brought to the foreground when discussing their vocations or body of work. In 1802, a group of young men founded the *Edinburgh Review*, which became one of the leading vehicles of intellectual thought at the time. Francis Jeffrey, one of the founders and editors, wrote that the journal was created for the purpose of "personal amusement and improvement" and for “the gratification of some personal and some national vanity”
(Fontana, 1985, p. 3, emphasis added). To pretend that the quest for “truth” or the devotion
to the life of ideas is a selfless act is mistaken. That one can do these things and also satisfy
personal amusement or vanity is possible. This idea or ideal has likely eroded along with
the perhaps once idealized goal of a liberal education – a time and place for intensive but
free-ing/iberating study or even study as leisure.

Further, many people with these inclinations may not feel the freedom to pursue
them because they are constrained by economic pressures or societal pressures or
professional pressures. Disciplinary and professional pressures in the academy steer many
students and professors away from non-academic periodicals. However, sometimes those
pressures may steer intellectuals into beginning a journal when other avenues available to
them have been cut off. The founding members of the *Edinburgh Review* were trained as
lawyers yet their intellectual and political views prevented them from pursuing careers at
the bar or in politics, because they ran counter to the dominant or reactionary politics in
Scotland following the French Revolution. Paul Piccone, the founding editor of *Telos,*
devoted himself full-time to the journal when he was denied tenure at Washington
University, St. Louis.

By writing this dissertation, I have been able to live vicariously in the world of
journals for a time. As I finish this dissertation, I come to a crossroads where I must decide
which path my career will take. I think I would quickly trade the life of a professor for a
career at the *New York Review of Books* in the 1960s or at *Partisan Review* in the 1930s or at
the *London Review of Books* today. There is definitely a strong attraction exerted by the idea
of the literary intellectual and the opportunity to live in a world of ideas that knows no
disciplinary boundaries where leisure, freedom, and maybe even enjoyment is possible.
This desire, however, likely suffers from the same malady of most “other grass is always greener” illusions that elsewhere is always better. As Collini writes, the concept of the “intellectual” is

an object of desire, and it is in the nature of desire simultaneously to pursue and to resist total satisfaction. The stir of appetite is only ever temporarily stilled, the cycle of wanting is ceaseless and inexorable, and no reality can ever measure up to the reach of fantasy by which desire is powered. The here and now is bound to be always more or less inadequate. The figure of the intellectual is clearly invested with a form of desire: perhaps with the hope that thought and imagination should be powers in the world, perhaps with the longing that the reign of rationality and justice might finally begin, perhaps, most simply, with the wish that there should be sources of wisdom, somewhere, about how to live. The words and deeds of any actual individuals could only fall short of these yearnings. Any putative example pointed to in the here-and-now is inevitably bathetic: how could that limited, flawed, largely unoriginal individual possibly be the embodiment of the dream? So desire generates further fantasy, and fantasy, by definition, fastens on the non-here and the not-now (2006, p. 500).

Perhaps part of the role of journals is to keep this desire alive. Arguably, this is also the role of political imagination. My dissertation explores this nexus.
In this section, I provisionally trace the beginnings of the modern state’s disciplinary practices, or to use a metaphor, the state’s “tracks” in time, space and history that are made by the state, but these marks also come to define the state. By tracks, I mean a purposeful advance, more in keeping with the laying of a train’s tracks in the elaboration of a grand system of transport and commerce, than the perhaps forgotten imprints that follow some actor’s path. This purposeful advance requires vision, although I am not arguing that the state’s tracks are always planned or successful. The vision is recorded and transmitted. The view is written down and inscribed on the state’s resources, both its property and its people. These resources are then re-viewed, in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the state’s view.

These practices of seeing, of envisioning or of viewing, not only ground the state’s activities, they also constitute the state. In other words, the modern state is the effect of its practices. Through the practice of viewing and reviewing, the state created a view that both served as a representation of itself and also of society. Such practices cannot be separated from the workings of bureaucracies, especially their records keeping, mapping, and planning. Hence, I then focus on the disciplinary practices of writing as embodied in print technology and the state’s creation of a “scriptural economy” (de Certeau, 1984, pp. xvi-xvii). Prior to the advent of print, the spread of mass literacy, and the development of various sites of upper class or middle-class elite civic debate, the state and/or the church
often monopolized the practices of writing and reading. With the rise of modern capitalist commerce, European nation-states, and their co-aligned global empires, new cross-pressures were created. I argue that the state’s utilization of writing with this proliferation of print technologies as a structuring effect is a monopoly that cracks. In the fissures created by these cross-pressures, many genres of writing can be co-opted or co-operated, as well as co-determined, by a variety of different critics of the state and its practices of rule. In particular, for the purposes of this study, some of these literate critics took up the practices of reviewing the vision projected by the state as well as the tracks left behind its policy practices, and they moved to create the early reviews, or critical journals, to communicate their thoughts. Through this counter-hegemonic practice of re-viewing, they intellectually challenged and discursively contested the state’s views of its power-in-action. Therefore, the political “tracts” of the state’s critics can become competing narratives of power pitched against the state’s disciplinary practices or “tracks” in the evolution of public policies, state agencies, and elite decisions.
Chapter 1.1 State “Tracks”

The Modern State’s Disciplinary Practice of “Review”

As a verb, the word “review” dates back to 1576. In common use at court, to “review” was to inspect military or naval forces. A sovereign power, the state, surveyed the bodies and/or machines that he/she mustered. The perspective or view behind such inspections was that of the sovereign agency anchoring state power, and it therefore can be seen as an attribute of this “cratic” force, which could muster such forces in pursuit of its war-making authority, territorial policing, and overall security. I use “cratic” to refer to the entity of sovereign authority invested in, exercising, or wielding state power. The root words “crac” and “crat” derive from the Greek “kratia” and “kratos,” translated as “rule of” and “strength, power, rule.” When combined with the appropriate prefix or root word to delimit the identity and number of the ruling agents behind this sovereign force, the nature of the “cratic” can be defined. Common examples are “democracy” (rule of the common people), ochlocracy (rule of the mob), theocracy (rule of god), stratocracy (rule of the military), plutocracy (rule of wealth), aristocracy (rule of the best), and autocracy (rule of the self or by oneself).

To explore the tensions between the vision of state authority and the divisions of various resistances, oppositions, or alternatives to the states, I counterpose the “cratic” to the “critic,” the latter challenging the power of the former. The “critic” also possesses authority through his or her powers of judgment and censure. As ideal types for the purposes of this analysis, the “cratic” holds a vision for exercising the power of government, while the divisions poised against such overarching vision are discoverable in how the “critic” reviews and challenges that power, perhaps with the desire to redirect,
rethink or even replace the incumbent projects of the established “cratic” with its own visions and values.

To use Michel Foucault’s example of Louis XIV’s inspection of his troops in 1666, the grandest view belonged to monarchical power. The review, a form of examination, was an action of the modern state meant to ensure that its subjects, here military forces, could be seen, marking in the material forms of martial spectacle with a visible display of power to invisible exercises of power that made its subjects equivalent, identical, manageable and visible as “objects” (Foucault, 1979).26 The formations of the sovereign’s recruits and soldiers then lay down definitive tracks of authority to guide its subjects and citizens by the circulation of normalizing power. “It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection” (Foucault, 1979, p. 187). The disciplining gaze of the state, in turn, produced a view, a representation of how things should be, and then are, in large fact, generally ordered.

To do this, the state worked to make its subjects legible. James C. Scott (1998) argues that a central problem of modern statecraft is legibility. By legibility, he means that a state must render its “national” and “natural” resources, like the populations, territories, waters, farms, factories of its “society,” readable and simplified in order to enable its functionaries and agencies to exercise control over these assets of its authority. Mara

26 Foucault anchors his argument, regarding the transformation—through the examination—of the economy of visibility into the exercise of power, upon the example of Louis XIV’s first military review in 1666, a review of “18,000 men, ‘one of the most spectacular actions of the reign,’ which was supposed to have ‘kept all Europe in disquiet.’ Several years later, a medal was struck to commemorate the event....Let us take this medal as evidence of the moment when, paradoxically but significantly, the most brilliant figure of sovereign power is joined to the emergence of the rituals proper to disciplinary power. The scarcely sustainable visibility of the monarch is turned into the unavoidable visibility of the subjects. And it is this inversion of visibility in the functioning of the disciplines that was to assure the exercise of power even in its lowest manifestations. We are entering the age of the infinite examination and of compulsory objectification” (1979, p. 189).
Loveman also argues that the modern state is “essentially, a symbolic accomplishment,” and therefore, more consideration needs to be given to how states first acquired symbolic power” (Loveman, 2005, p. 1652). She contends that studies that have analyzed the state’s routine exercise of symbolic power have largely failed to explore the state’s primitive accumulation of such power.

To begin to accumulate symbolic power, the state must carve out a new domain of social life to administer, co-opt the administrative practices of other, or wrestle existing administrative functions away from their traditional executors, imbuing them with new meanings in the process (Loveman, 2005, pp. 1657-1658).

Further, “[a]s a given state practice becomes taken for granted, conflicts over the state’s right to engage in that practice become increasingly rare” (p. 1658).

Ironically, societies that are illegible to the state, like Afghanistan or Somalia, allow for the possibility of their inhabitants practicing far more substantive political autonomy than those where the state has a clearly mapped inventory of its assets, like Germany or Singapore. The less mapped domains are not easily administered, because they are unknown to the state that lacks the capacity to discover, order, and police its territories and populations. To make a society known and legible requires a certain narrowing of vision in the service of certain distinct ends, Scott argues.

The great advantage of such tunnel vision is that it brings into sharp focus certain limited aspects of an otherwise far more complex and unwieldy reality. This very simplification, in turn, makes the phenomenon at the center of the field of vision more legible and hence more susceptible to careful measurement and calculation. Combined with similar observations, an overall, aggregate, synoptic view of a selective reality is achieved, making possible a high degree of schematic knowledge, control, and manipulation (Scott, 1998, p. 11).

While it is not a perfect example, Scott uses the case of scientific forestry as it developed in late eighteenth century Prussia and Saxony to demonstrate the gist of the modern state’s legibility project. In an attempt to increase forest revenues, the state
reordered the forests through the implementation of a new technically rooted management system that first quantified all existing stands of forests and then sought to make all future growth within those forests more easily quantifiable.

The fact is that forest science and geometry, backed by state power, had the capacity to transform the real, diverse, and chaotic old-growth forest into a new, more uniform forest that closely resembled the administrative grid of its techniques. To this end, the underbrush was cleared, the number of species was reduced (often to monoculture), and plantings were done simultaneously and in straight rows on large tracts (Scott, 1998, p. 15).

In effect, the forests were made to stand as armies, well ordered, in straight lines, and easily subject to review. Forestry science enabled the state to make forests legible and, hence, produce greater revenues. As the state treated its trees, so did it administer the life and labor of its subjects. However, Scott writes that this utopian dream of the well-ordered forest was never entirely realized in practice. True, but in the short-run, and this means decades, a far greater measure of sustained yield of lumber generation and extraction was made possible. Over time, however, these excessively groomed forests became diseased and declined, and centuries later in the 1970s, the loss of ecological variation, arboreal mutation, and overall biodiversity forced the West German and East German state foresters

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27 Scott writes that “[t]he tendency was toward regimentation, in the strict sense of the word. The forest trees were drawn up into serried, uniform ranks, as it were, to be measured, counted off, felled, and replaced by a new rank and file of lookalike conscripts. As an army, it was also designed hierarchically from above to fulfill a unique purpose and to be at the disposition of a single commander. At the limit, the forest itself would not even have to be seen; it could be ‘read’ accurately from the tables and maps in the forester’s office” (1998, p. 15). Scott continues the military review analogy when he writes that “[t]he visual sign of the well-managed forest, in Germany and in the many settings where German scientific forestry took hold, came to be the regularity and neatness of its appearance. Forests might be inspected in much the same way as a commanding officer might review his troops on parade, and woe to the forest guard whose ‘beat’ was not sufficiently trim or ‘dressed’” (p. 18).
to accept a new term or Waldsterben (forest death), to characterize the outcomes of a unifocal state vision run out to the point of logical absurdity.\textsuperscript{28}

This process of making such elements legible is akin to a mapping function in which the cartographer must decide how to represent everything through concise, coherent, and cogent systems of abstraction. All maps abstract and summarize, just as a state must abstract away from the full spectrum of individualized details in its society and summarize those characteristics in a rational and standardizing manner.\textsuperscript{29} Another dimension in this mobilization of power in Scott’s exploration of the modern state project of standardization and legibility, then, is the cadastral map.\textsuperscript{30} The purpose of German scientific forestry was to improve and also create the state’s vision. The cadastral map both imposed a vision and also recorded it, reifying a particular view of society, one that simplified and objectified.\textsuperscript{31} Scott calls this a “synoptic view” (1998, p. 39). Its logic of implementation summarizes, and what is included in “the summary” is what is important to the viewer, which is the sovereign agent behind the state. For the state, a synopsis of society included, first and

\textsuperscript{28} The decline of the forest was also the result of industrial and auto pollutants.

\textsuperscript{29} Scott (1998) lists five characteristics of state simplification: 1) interested, utilitarian facts, 2) nearly always written documentary facts, 3) typically static facts, 4) aggregate facts, and 5) standardized facts.

\textsuperscript{30} “The crowning artifact of this mighty simplification is the cadastral map. Created by trained surveyors and mapped to a given scale, the cadastral map is a more or less complete and accurate survey of all landholdings. Since the driving logic behind the map is to create a manageable and reliable format for taxation, the map is associated with a property register in which each specified (usually numbered) lot on the map is linked to an owner who is responsible for paying its taxes. The cadastral map and property register are to the taxation of land as the maps and tables of the scientific forester were to the fiscal exploitation of the forest” (Scott, 1998, p. 36).

\textsuperscript{31} Scott emphasizes the utilitarian nature of the state’s view. He writes, “[t]he cadastral survey was but one technique in the growing armory of the utilitarian modern state. Where the premodern state was content with a level of intelligence sufficient to allow it to keep order, extract taxes, and raise armies, the modern state increasingly aspired to ‘take in charge’ the physical and human resources of the nation and make them more productive. These more positive ends of statecraft required a much greater knowledge of the society. And an inventory of land, people, incomes, occupations, resources, and deviance was the logical place to begin” (1998, p. 51).
foremost, methods of revenue production, tax collection, border security or civic order.

Quoting Roger J. P. Kain’s and Elizabeth Baigent’s *The Cadastral Map*, Scott writes,

> The cadastral map is an instrument of control which both reflects and consolidates the power of those who commission it....The cadastral map is partisan: where knowledge is power, it provides comprehensive information to be used to the advantage of some and the detriment of others, as rulers and ruled were well aware in the tax struggles of the 18th and 19th centuries. Finally, the cadastral map is active: in portraying one reality, as in the settlement of the new world or in India, it helps obliterate the old (1998, p. 47).

As the quotation emphasizes, the state’s view through the cadastral map is both active and partisan.

> It actively produces a representation of reality that becomes a replication of the sovereign’s authority as its synoptic vision becomes the definitive mediations of the real that eventually are, in some sense, a working substitute for the populations’ present and past experiences with the physical reality itself. As Timothy Mitchell writes,

> [i]n the metaphysics of capitalist modernity, the world is experienced in terms of an ontological distinction between physical reality and its representation—in language, culture, or other forms of meaning. Reality is material, inert, and without inherent meaning, and representation is the non-material, non-physical dimension of intelligibility (1988, p. xiii).

Mitchell’s distinction between reality and representation is echoed in Benedict Anderson’s thesis that the “nation” is an imagined political community (1983). Neither Mitchell nor Anderson is arguing that representation is imaginary. Rather, imagined (or produced) representations are “real,” in the sense that they have real consequences and exercise real power. As Foucault stresses, power is productive.

> We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes,’ it ‘represses,’ it ‘censors,’ it ‘abstracts,’ it ‘masks,’ it ‘conceals.’ In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth (1979, p. 194).
Therefore, the representation of reality is an exercise of power, a production that produces a particular view.

The state’s view is also partisan because the view belongs to a certain beholder with particular objectives, namely, the incumbent ruling power, or some faction or bureau of that power, with its established rules. Hence, in direct reaction to this active vision from above, the equally active divisions of antagonistic, insurgent, or merely oppositional forces distill the “critic’s” views with differing objectives, which would be, of course, equally partisan. Mitchell emphasizes that the representation of the world is not static. Rather,

the order of this world does not appear as a fixed correspondence between material objects and the concepts they represent—between a realm of things in themselves and their meaning or plan. There is nothing symbolic in such a world, in our own strange sense of that term. Its order, therefore, is not something analogous to a picture, a text or an exhibit. It does not form a single, enframed totality, set up before an observing or reading subject and representing to this subject a ‘meaning.’ Order does not occur, in this sense, in relation to the idealized position of an observer (or reader) situated outside itself. Rather, order occurs as a play of correspondence and difference between things, or perhaps better, between forces; and always as a particular order, contingent upon a point or person formed out of this play (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 173-174).

Therefore, all views are partisan, whether they belong to the state or to a challenger of the state. Mitchell relates the practice of visiting photographers and writers to Egypt attempting to locate the perfect vantage point from which to view Cairo and make an “accurate representation.”

The point of view was not just a place set apart, outside the world or above it. It was ideally a position from where, like the authorities in the panopticon, one could see and yet not be seen (Mitchell, 1988, p. 24).

Fashioning a point of view, then, is a necessary step in exercising authority, or of commanding the representation one seeks to project of the world.

The “cratical” view and all “critical” counterviews of organized order can be thought of as competing, coexisting and perhaps codependent visions, maps or inventories of order
in which the differing narratives of power are the product of competing technological assemblages. However, the “cratic,” or state’s, view is usually more powerful, because its overarching authority can command the resources necessary to impose and distribute its view. Still, its vision coexists with many di-visions within the palace, the city, the economy, the military, the church, the parliament, the bureaucracy, or the university that all cannot be ignored in how the state operates.

The partisan nature of the state’s view is readily seen in the workings of colonial states, if only because its order is imposed from afar, without, and above upon less than willing populations. Anderson writes about the colonial state’s reliance upon censuses, maps, and museums, which

profundely shaped the way in which the colonial state imagined its dominion – the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry (1983, p. 164).

Both colonial censuses and imperial maps worked out the colonizing power’s agenda through a totalizing classification of the colonized territories and populations. Recalling Scott, it is apparent that empires seek to make everything legible for the local colonial state administration as well the distant metropolitan centers of power working to impose their vision on their colonial domains. Everything within the state’s domain or under its government’s dominion needs to be counted, mapped, simplified and objectified in order for the state to exercise control over its colonial territory.32

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32 Census taking was also important at home, where modern states depended on the finances generated through taxation. Censuses made taxation efficient and effective. As Habermas writes, “only an efficient system of taxation met the demand for capital. The modern state was basically a state based on taxation, the bureaucracy of the treasury the true core of it administration” (1991, p. 18).
Additionally, the state’s subjects need to be stripped of any extrastatal individualizing characteristics. Each subject (or object) of the state must stand for any other like subject, and thereby acquire the personality or individuality most well suited to these new spaces of order. As Anderson writes of the colonial powers in Southeast Asia,

after 1850 colonial authorities were using increasingly sophisticated administrative means to enumerate populations, including the women and children (whom the ancient rulers had always ignored), according to a maze of grids which had no immediate financial or military purpose....Here the peculiarity of the new census becomes apparent. It tried carefully to count the objects of its feverish imaginings. Given the exclusive nature of the classificatory system, and the logic of quantification itself, a 'Cochin-Chinese' had to be understood as one digit in an aggregable series of replicable 'Cochin-Chinese'—within, of course, the state’s domain (1983, pp. 168-169).

Religious affiliations of colonial subjects were ignored since they conflicted with the secular state's authoritarian grid-map and constituted difference that challenged the state’s view of interchangeability or fungibility, of like as like. Roots of such lines of sight in the visions of power guide such maneuvers across Europe in the wars of religion from the Peace of Augsburg (1555) to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) whereby the policies of *cuius regio, eius religio* ("whose realm, his religion", that is, more clearly, "in the Prince’s land, the Prince’s religion") becomes the borderline logic of the spaces traced in the cadastral maps of modern nation-states in Europe.

These state practices, whether forestry management, cadastral mapping, or census taking, are disciplinary networks and discursive formations. They constituted or instituted the modern state through “powers generated out of the meticulous organization of space, movement, sequence, and position” (Mitchell, 1991, p. 92).33 These technologies of power

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33 The most ready example is the creation of the modern military. “The new power of the army, for example, was based on such measures as the construction of barracks as sites of permanent confinement set apart from the social world, the introduction of daily inspection and drill, repetitive training in maneuvers broken down into precisely timed sequences and combinations, and the
evolved over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and spread from forests to factories to prisons and to colonial territories. Interestingly, the panopticon, the exemplar technology and metaphor for Foucault’s disciplinary society, was proposed by Jeremy Bentham for the express purpose of use in the colonies. As Mitchell writes, Bentham corresponded with local rulers throughout the colonial world to advocate the use of the panopticon and other techniques of surveillance (1988). I return to Bentham in a subsequent chapter, as he was also one of the founders of the Westminster Review, which I argue is an example of the counter-hegemonic use of the state’s disciplinary power, the review. The fact that Bentham can be found on both “sides” of the state’s disciplinary apparatus underscores Mitchell’s argument that state and society share a fuzzy boundary and that the structuring effects of the state can also provide spaces of resistance (1991).

As Mitchell argues, disciplinary practices also helped to create the representation of the state as a freestanding entity, an object. They created a distinction between state and society, endowing the state with an apparent autonomy. Through a series of ongoing and evolving practices, the state, in a representational sense, emerged. The state, then, is not simply a static structure but a dynamic structuring effect of governmentalizing and warring machineries. “That is to say, it should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist”

elaboration of complex hierarchies of command, spatial arrangement, and surveillance” (Mitchell, 1991, p. 92).

Loveman writes that “[a]dministrative development (or the lack thereof) is better conceived as the cumulative product of concrete historical struggles, of varying types and intensity, over the boundaries of legitimate state practice—and thus, over the practical definition of the state itself” (2005, p. 1661).
(Mitchell, 1991, p. 94). It is these structuring practices and effects that critics re-view. In effect, they are critiquing not only state policies but also the construction or nature of the state itself.

Mitchell emphasizes that the state’s technologies of power are not coherent. Any state practices are created, organized, and implemented by human actors. As Mitchell writes:

Disciplines can break down, counteract one another, or overreach. They offer spaces for maneuver and resistance, and indeed can be turned to counter hegemonic purposes. Resistance movements often derive their organizational forms from the military and their methods of discipline and indoctrination from schooling, and in fact are often generated within the barracks, the campus or other institutions of the state. At the same time it follows that just as we must abandon the image of the state as a free-standing agent issuing orders, we need to question the traditional figure of resistance as a subject who stands outside the state and refuses its demands. Political subjects and their modes of resistance are formed as much within the organizational terrain we call the state, rather than in some wholly exterior social space (1991, p. 93).

I will return to this idea of the counter-hegemonic use of the state’s disciplinary practices in a moment to draw more finely my distinctions between the vision of power and di-visions within power centers that allow and enable re-visions of order along the contested lines made by re-views of power. First, I want to address the state’s use of a specific technology within its practices, namely print, the mechanical reproduction of writing.

As Jacques Derrida (2005a) and others have made clear, writing is also a mechanics or technology. It involves an implement, whether stick, quill, pencil or pen, and the

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35 As Mitchell writes elsewhere, “[t]he methods of order and arrangement created the effect of structure. Like the careful layout of an exhibition, this structure appeared as a framework within which activities could be organized, controlled, and observed; and it also appeared as a plan or program, supplementing the activity with its meaning. The same technologies of order created both a disciplinary power and a seemingly separate realm of meaning or truth” (1988, p. xv). Mitchell differentiates his argument from Foucault’s in that Foucault emphasized the invisibility of disciplinary power while Mitchell argues that disciplinary practices create external and visible structural effects. This, he argues, is what allows the modern state to appear “as an apparatus that stands apart from the rest of the social world” (1991, p. 93).
application of that tool to a medium. Print is both an expansion and magnification of writing, allowing it to be reproduced more efficiently and distributed more widely, but it is also a transformation of writing. It further attenuates the author from the text. It creates new disciplines for texts. It creates new sites of power at the points of distribution rather than just production. It is uniform, linear, ordered and perspectival, and thus commands its representation of the world. The digitization of print can be viewed similarly. Again, writing on-line, and the translation of text onto other screens, is an expansion and magnification of print but also a transformation, leading to an “informationally mediated society” (T. W. Luke, 1989).

The medium of print is both its own practice and also an integral element of other technological practices. For example, maps can be drawn without print, but print plays a necessary role in their efficient reproduction and distribution. Therefore, I would like to explore the technology of print, and by extension writing, and their relationship to the state and politics more fully.

**Writing as Disciplinary Practice and Politics**

If politics is a form or expression of political activity, then the disciplinary practices of the state are political practices. The modern state's employment of writing and recording and the use of print was a disciplinary practice. Foucault writes of the disciplinary “power of writing” that follows the examination (1979, p. 189).\(^{36}\) Making records of what it has

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\(^{36}\) “The examination leaves behind it a whole meticulous archive constituted in terms of bodies and days. The examination that places individuals into a field of surveillance also situates them in a network of writing; it engages them in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix them. The procedures of examination were accompanied at the same time by a system of intense registration and of documentary accumulation. A ‘power of writing’ was constituted as an essential part in the mechanisms of discipline” (Foucault, 1979, p. 189).
reviewed concretizes the state’s view. If writing in this context is a disciplinary practice, then it is also a political practice or so the syllogism should hold.

Writing as politics is akin to Michel de Certeau’s (1984) account of the scriptural economy, the most dominant practice of the “modern age.” The “scriptural apparatus of modern ‘discipline,’ a process that is inseparable from the ‘reproduction’ made possible by the development of printing” privileged the “bourgeoisie” over the “people” and the written over the spoken, the former belonging to the “bourgeoisie” and the latter (or the voice) to the “people” (1984, pp. 131-132). He refers to the installation of the scriptural apparatus as a “‘modern’ mythical practice,” “a fragmented discourse which is articulated on the heterogeneous practices of a society and which also articulates them symbolically” (pp. 133-134). The scriptural apparatus is no longer an originating discourse but instead occurs as a “transport” or practice, specifically the practice of writing (p. 134).

The origin is no longer what is narrated, but rather the multiform and murmuring activity of producing a text and producing society as a text. ‘Progress’ is scriptural in type (de Certeau, 1984, p. 134).

Writing supplants orality as the engine of progress.

In an Enlightenment step of distancing, of “moving forward,” the scriptural apparatus moves beyond the “myth” of pre-rational man.

A frontier (and a front) of Western culture is established by that separation. Thus one can read above the portals of modernity such inscriptions as ‘Here, to work is to write,’ or ‘Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ (de Certeau, 1984, p. 134).

de Certeau’s description of the scriptural apparatus as itself a mythic practice parallels Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s argument that the Enlightenment’s desire to push past the myths of pre-modern man brought into being a new myth, the instrumentalization of reason. For de Certeau,
[t]he variants of this [new] myth are found everywhere, in this time of Renascences [in the seventeenth century], along with the utopian, philosophical, scientific, political or religious conviction that Reason must be able to establish or restore a world, and that it is no longer a matter of deciphering the secrets of an order or a hidden Author, but of producing an order so that it can be written on the body of an uncivilized or depraved society. Writing acquires the right to reclaim, subdue or educate history (1984, p. 144).

Writing then as the engine of progress and the privileged practice of the “modern age” not only acquires the right to reclaim history but also claims the history it wrights as right.

“Writing becomes science and politics, with the assurance, soon transformed into an axiom of Enlightenment or revolution, that theory must transform nature by inscribing itself on it” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 144). Fred Inglis also remarks on the “the peculiarly modernist unnaturalness of turning the exercise of political power into an experiment with theory” (1996, p. 87).37

de Certeau defines “writing” as

the concrete activity that consists in constructing, on its own, blank space (un espace proper)—the page—a text that has power over the exteriority from which it has first been isolated (1984, p. 134).38

Three elements are integral to such a practice: 1) the blank page, 2) the constructed text, and 3) the purpose of the practice. de Certeau describes the blank page as an autonomous place of production for the subject. In effect, the blank page separates the subject from object, what de Certeau calls the “Cartesian move of making a distinction that initiates,

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37 Irving Kristol’s 1958 article “Old Truths and the New Conservatism” appearing in the Yale Review also makes this point, stating: “After 1789, politics ceased to be considered as the prudent management of men and circumstances, in order to become the ‘realization of ideas’” (p. 142).

38 Unlike other western Indo-European languages, the English word “write” is not derived from the Latin scribere. Instead, it comes from the Old English writan, derived from a Germanic root writ- that derives from an Indo-European root wreid- meaning “to cut, scratch, tear, sketch an outline.” The word “write,” and its common etymology with “wright,” then clearly suggests the physicality inherent in writing and the possibility that writing not only inscribes words on a medium but also brings worlds into being. It is all rooted in work, and regards its products as “works.”
along with a *place* of writing, the mastery (and isolation) of a subject confronted by an *object*" (p. 134). On the blank page, the subject can construct a text.

The construction is similar to a machine assemblage, where the input of “linguistic fragments or materials” is processed into an ordered output (p. 134). The construction of the text is a process of systematization, a rationalization that transforms noise into signal by abstracting away ambiguities or difference, like the state’s maps discussed above. As de Certeau writes,

> on the blank page, an itinerant, progressive, and regulated practice—a ‘walk’—composes the artefact of another ‘world’ that is not received but rather made (1984, pp. 134-135, emphasis added).

In this sense, the writing practice not only writes the world but also wrights the world; it is a practice of making, of construction, of building. It is the activity of the master craftsman (builder) or wright. Marx wrote that human consciousness is acquired through a process of labor, of making the world. Humans know the world through their labor, and the world comes into being through their labor. This underscores de Certeau’s third element of writing that the process of construction is not a game.

On the contrary, the ‘meaning’ (‘sens’) of scriptural play, the production of a system, a space of formalization, refers to the reality from which it has been distinguished *in order to change it*. Its goal is social efficacy [sic]. It manipulates its exteriority (de Certeau, 1984, p. 135).

Again, this echoes Marx, specifically Feuerbach’s eleventh thesis that “philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.”

However, de Certeau argues that the writing practice is “capitalist and conquering” (1984, p. 135). He offers Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe* as the exemplar of this modern practice:
The awakening of Robinson to the capitalist and conquering task of writing his island is inaugurated by the decision to write his diary, to give himself in that way a space in which he can master time and things, and to thus constitute for himself, along with the blank page, an initial island in which he can produce what he wants (1984, p. 136).

To the modernist, Robinson’s island is presumed to be a blank page on which a text can be constructed.\(^{39}\) What about the page, though, that is not so blank?

The conceit of the writing practice is to treat all pages as blank, that any page can be written (or re-written). In effect, such a belief that history may be continually written (or re-written) is what allows revolutionaries to make revolution. For de Certeau, revolution is the writing practice at the scale of an entire society.

Revolution, itself, that ‘modern’ idea, represents the scriptural project at the level of an entire society seeking to constitute itself as a blank page with respect to the past, to write itself by itself (that is, to produce itself as its own system) and to produce a new history (refaire l’histoire) on the model of what it fabricates (and this will be ‘progress’) (1984, p. 135).

Revolution then is equivalent to a re-viewing at the level of society as a whole. The re-viewer reconstitutes the state by re-writing and thus re-wrighting the state. The state’s first disciplinary practices that made its subjects legible then can also be considered revolutionary practices. They wrote and wrought the modern state, which in turn conveyed rights of citizenships to its subjects. The state inscribed upon its inhabitants their identity as its subjects.

This modern practice of revolution is in Marx’s terms, a partial revolution: the replacement of one ruling party with a specific interest by another party with again only a partial interest. Power can be construed as a vision mediating the di-visions of power. The revolution that would bring communism to fruition must be a total, or full, revolution that

\(^{39}\) de Certeau’s reference to Robinson Crusoe is another strange point of intersection within this dissertation, as the novel’s author, Daniel Defoe, is discussed further below as the editor of one of the earliest English reviews.
brings to power a party/class with only a general interest to assert, because that class (the proletariat) has no specific interest. However, de Certeau’s analysis of the writing practices raises the question of whether it allows a general interest to be asserted, or whether the “modern” mythical practice of the scriptural apparatus is necessarily inimical to a total revolution. Instead, he offers the “anti-myth” of the celibate writing machine that no longer produces a rational order by doing symbolic violence to the “real” that is inputted.40

It is through this stripping naked of the modern myth of writing that the celibate machine becomes, in a derisive mode, blasphemy. It attacks the Occidental ambition to articulate the reality of things on a text and to reform it. It takes away the appearance of being (i.e., of content, of meaning) that was the sacred secret of the Bible, transformed by four centuries of bourgeois writing into the power of the letter and the numeral. Perhaps this anti-myth is still ahead of our history, even if it is repeatedly confirmed by the erosion of scientific certainties, the massive ‘boredom’ of people at school, or the progressive metaphorization of administrative discourses. Or perhaps it has simply been placed ‘along-side’ a galloping technocratization, like a suggestive para-doxx, a little white pebble (de Certeau, 1984, p. 153).

Pierre Bourdieu argues that the state exercises a near monopoly over symbolic violence and much of the state’s power then comes from its domination of symbolic capital, or the “scriptural economy” (Bourdieu, 1998b; de Certeau, 1984).41 The state’s monopoly derives from its disciplinary practices and the institutions that have sprung up from them.

40 “The key parts of the writing triumphant in Defoe’s work are compromised: the blank page is only a pane of glass to which representation is attracted by what it excluded; the written text, closed on itself, loses the referent that authorized it; expansionist utility is inverted into the ‘sterile gratuitousness’ of a celibate Don Juan or of a ‘widower’ having no generation other than a symbolizing one, a man without woman and without nature, without an other. Writing has become an ‘inscription island,’ a locus solus, a ‘penal colony’—a laborious dream, occupied by this ‘impossible’ to which or about which it thinks it ‘speaks’ (de Certeau, 1984, p. 152).

41 Loveman argues that Bourdieu takes this argument farther than most. “He suggests that the state claims a monopoly of the exercise of symbolic violence analogous to its claim to monopolize the legitimate exercise of physical violence. Just as others have qualified Weber’s emphasis on the state’s monopolization of the use of physical force, Bourdieu’s claim of the state’s monopolization of symbolic power demands qualification as well. Indeed, Bourdieu himself notes in some contexts that the state’s hold on symbolic power is never absolute. But overall, he tends to neglect other loci of symbolic power in the modern world, most significantly, organized religion” (2005, p. 1653 note 5).
The power of the state to impose its view, its representation of physical reality, is an act of symbolic violence. To quote from Bourdieu at length,

If the state is able to exert symbolic violence, it is because it incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity, in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought. By realizing itself in social structures and in the mental structures adapted to them, the instituted institution makes us forget that it issues out of a long series of acts of institution (in the active sense) and hence has all the appearances of the natural. This is why there is no more potent tool for rupture than the reconstruction of genesis: by bringing back into view the conflicts and confrontations of the early beginnings and therefore all the discarded possibles, it retrieves the possibility that things could have been (and still could be) otherwise. And, through such a practical utopia, it questions the ‘possible’ which, among all others was actualized (1998b, p. 40, emphasis added).

Bourdieu emphasizes the importance of re-views, “bringing back into view the conflicts and confrontations of the early beginnings and therefore all the discarded possibles.”

The “review” challenges the symbolic domination of the state and provides alternative views. This process of critique, of reviewing, is the negative function of the intellectual. Bourdieu assigns intellectuals both positive and negative functions; the latter is comprised of the production and dissemination of “instruments of defense against symbolic domination” while the former centers on “contributing...political invention” (2003, pp. 20-21). Again, he encourages “practical” or “realistic” utopias, those that recapture or review discarded possibilities rather than creating new possibilities out of whole cloth (1998b, 2003).

The negative and positive functions of the intellectual or “critic” are made difficult by the censoring powers of the state functionary or “cratic.” Because in its formation the state seeks to monopolize symbolic violence, it censors publication—publication “in the sense of a procedure aimed at rendering a state or act public, at bringing it to everybody's knowledge”—from sources outside the state’s control (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 63 note 31). In
both England and the United States, state censorship prevented the publication of parliamentary or assembly proceedings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{42}

Because of state control, the first periodical did not appear in England until 1622. The origins of the political press commenced in protest of such censorship and monopoly control. However, as I argue below, the political press, including the critical review, was not just a reaction to the state’s monopoly of symbolic violence; it was also a co-optation of the state’s disciplinary practice of writing. It was a counter act of symbolic violence made by those out of power for the purposes of achieving power.

\textsuperscript{42} Mitchell also notes that the colonial government in Egypt attempted to suppress any publications it did not control. While the free press was allowed to develop in the late seventeenth century in home states, colonial powers allowed no such freedom in their colonial territories well into the late nineteenth and perhaps even twentieth centuries. “When the first satirical political journal appeared in Egypt in 1877, attacking the power of the Europeans in the country and ridiculing their Turkish collaborators, it was shut down almost immediately by the government and its editor deported. It has called itself \textit{Abu al-nazzara al-zarqa,} the man in blue-colored spectacles” (Mitchell, 1988, p. 26). As Mitchell explains earlier, the colonial inspectors wore blue and green spectacles during their examinations because to see without being seen confirmed one’s separation from the world and also corresponded to a position of power.
Chapter 1.2 Political “Tracts”

From State View to the Critical Review

The assemblage of facts and reviewing functions of the state that Foucault, Scott, Anderson, and Mitchell describe were enabled by the medium of print. As Ronald Deibert argues:

The state’s interest in standardization (or homogenization, as Tilly aptly calls it), was closely bound up with a desire not only to more efficiently and consistently extract financial revenues, but also to maintain domestic order and security though surveillance of the population and territory—an interest that thrived with the availability of printing (1997, p. 90).

He points to the use of printed maps as one example in which the “disciplinary state” was empowered.

Additionally, what in large part enabled the imposition of the colonial authority’s view was the medium of print. As Mitchell notes, the French arrived to conquer Egypt with a printing press. Upon landing at Alexandria, Napoleon’s first act was to issue a printed proclamation to the Egyptian people (Mitchell, 1988, p. 134). Anderson also underscores the intimate ties between print and the state’s view –

the vectoral convergence of print-capitalism with the new conception of spatial reality presented by these maps had an immediate impact on the vocabulary of Thai politics. Between 1900 and 1915, the traditional words krung and muang largely disappeared, because they imagined dominion in terms of sacred capitals and visible, discontinuous population centers. In their place came prathet, ‘country,’ which imagined it in the invisible terms of bounded territorial space (1983, p. 173).

The process of recording the state’s view through writings also enabled the homogenization that Anderson speaks of above. Language is by nature an abstraction. Signifiers produce meaning through exclusion. A cat is a “cat,” because it is not a dog, and while tremendous differences may exist between cats, they are all labeled “cat.” Writing, especially when transmitted in print, reinforces the abstract and homogenizing properties of language through a process of mechanical representation of the author’s meaning. It
seeks to create an unambiguous meaning, because the printed text serves as a substitute for the author’s presence. The author can answer for his/her words; the printed text cannot.

As Mitchell argues, the political authority of the modern state relied upon this unambiguous effect of an author contained in a printed text.\textsuperscript{43}

This political authority, produced in the modern state the way a modern text produces the unambiguous effect of an author, would appear continuously and mechanically present (Mitchell, 1988, p. 154).

In other words, the structuring effects of the state’s view were never absent and became what Gramsci refers to as “common sense” (1971).

Moreover, the medium of print and the notion of authorship gave additional weight to the state’s view, that it was the product of a “sovereign voice” (Deibert, 1997, p. 98). As Luke argues, the linear organization, or perspectival space, enabled by print allows

\begin{quote}
[t]he sovereign agencies of the state—king, republican assembly, or bureaucracy—[to] stand apart in these linear spaces as an author, who adopts and exercises a ‘fixed point of view’ in its narratives of discipline and domination. Within such typographic fields, the state can be seen as a scribe or draftsman, scrolling its power across its subjects as objects through discourses of visually-anchored classification (1991, p. 13).
\end{quote}

In colonial Egypt, variations on the practices used in Prussia and Saxony to manage forests were used to manage colonial subjects. The colonial state scripted its subjects through a process of ordering and examination.

In order to fix the rural population in their place and induce them to begin producing cotton and other commodities for European consumption, it was necessary to have their places carefully marked out, their duty or quota exactly specified, and their performance continuously monitored and reported. The daily

\textsuperscript{43} Mitchell provides an interesting account of this transformation of the nature of political authority through the transformation in writing in colonial Egypt where Arab practices of writing and the scribe ran up against the printing press of Great Britain. “Both writing and politics ... came to be considered something essentially mechanical” (1988, p. 131). To challenge the authority of the state was to challenge its authorship.
record, or *jurnal* (the word was borrowed from Europe), was the administrative practice with which the regimentation of rural Egypt began in the mid 1820s, when the government established regional and central Bureaux of Inspection, to receive the reports of its local inspectors (*jurnalji’s*) (Mitchell, 1988, p. 40).

The state’s practice of review was recorded in its journals. Fifty years later, the first satirical political journal, *Abu al-nazzara al-zarqa*, would appear in Egypt, which was quickly shut down by the colonial powers. The state’s disciplinary practice of review, as embodied in its journals, was appropriated by the state’s critics and used against it.

Habermas’s *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1991) tells us a similar story of the consolidation of state power through the domination of representation, aided by the medium of print, which was then re-appropriated by the public and used to critique the state. Habermas’s analysis highlights the interconnectivity of state and public. The early “newspapers” were often trade letters that transmitted important information to merchants. The state then co-opted this medium to use for its own administrative purposes, before it was re-appropriated by the public to oppose the mercantilism of the state. However, Habermas may not make clear enough the interdependence of state and society or “public.” As Loveman argues,

> the strength of the state is infrastructural. And infrastructural power is a two-way street. In other words, the state’s power is not derived from autonomy from society, but rather from the webs of interconnections to actors and institutions outside the state. The nature and extent of ‘organizational entwining’ in the early phases of state formation thus becomes a crucial part of the picture if we want to understand subsequent variations in state capacity, and possibly even state form. A focus on organizational entwining as an impetus to the early development of the state also raises a host of questions for future research. For example, what sorts of nonstate administrative and symbolic resources were actually available to be harnessed by states in their early development? What made state actors able and willing to see nonstate actors as potential allies in their quest to concentrate power as opposed to obstacles to overcome or competitors to vanquish? More generally, what determined the chosen route of administrative extension, its likelihood of success, and its consequences for the subsequent development of the state’s infrastructural power? And under what conditions was a particular mode of administrative extension more likely to succeed than others? (2005, p. 1678).
Again, an example of a state-nonstate partnership was colonial Britain’s use of Bentham’s panopticon.

The administrative apparatus of the state, its disciplinary practices, backed by the enforcement powers of its military, created a public authority that was visible and “palpable” (Calhoun, 1992, p. 8; Habermas, 1991; Mitchell, 1988). Habermas stresses the role of the press in helping to constitute this public authority of the state. Again, early journalism was almost exclusively taken over and controlled by the state.

The interest of the new (state) authorities (which before long began to use the press for the purposes of the state administration), however, was of far greater import [than serving the needs of commerce]. Inasmuch as they made use of this instrument to promulgate instructions and ordinances, the addressees of the authorities’ announcements genuinely became ‘the public’ in the proper sense. From the very beginning, the political journals had reported on the journeys and returns of the princes, on the arrival of foreign dignitaries, on balls, ‘special events’ at court, appointments, etc.; in the context of this news from the Court, which can be thought of as a kind of transposition of the publicity of representation into the new form of public sphere, there also appeared ‘sovereign ordinances in the subjects’ best interest.’ Very soon the press was systematically made to serve the interests of the state administration (Habermas, 1991, pp. 21-22).

The press was intimately tied to political power; it was of and for power.

The embodiment of the state through its disciplinary practices, including its use of the press, formed an object that could be viewed and re-viewed by the public. Although, the “public” at this time was a limited one:

A certain educated elite came to think of itself as constituting the public and thereby transformed the abstract notion of the publicum as counterpart to public authority into a much more concrete set of practices. The members of this elite public began

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44 “Now continuous state activity corresponded to the continuity of contact among those trafficking in commodities and news (stock market, press). Public authority was consolidated into a palpable object confronting those who were merely subject to it and who at first were only negatively defined by it. For they were the private people who, because they held no office, were excluded from any share in public authority. ‘Public’ in this narrower sense was synonymous with ‘state-related’...” (Habermas, 1991, p. 18).
45 English journalism became freer of the Crown and Parliament’s influence with the end of the licensing act in 1695.
to see themselves through this category not just as the object of state actions but as the opponent of public authority (Calhoun, 1992, p. 9).

This elite public was then able to re-appropriate the authority of the press from the state, which reverberates the di-visions of power’s visions, and repurpose it to function as criticism, a coexistent and codependent force.

[The] zone of continuous administrative contact became ‘critical’ ... in the sense that it provoked the critical judgment of a public making use of its reason. The public could take on this challenge all the better as it required merely a change in the function of the instrument with whose help the state administration had already turned society into a public affair in a specific sense—the press (Habermas, 1991, p. 24).46

The journal or review form, as a text that contained critical readings of the state, became a means for those out of power to write politics. The form challenged the state’s monopoly of symbolic violence. There, the critics challenged the “cratics.”47 (Additionally, different critics questioned various other critics, and factions of cratics contested other cratics.)48 In

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46 Habermas also writes that “The process in which the state-governed public sphere was appropriated by the public of private people making use of their reason and was established as a sphere of criticism of public authority was one of functionally converting the public sphere in the world of letters already equipped with institutions of the public and with forums for discussion. With their help, the experiential complex of audience-oriented privacy made its way also into the political realm’s public sphere” (1991, p. 51). In other words, the institutions of the coffeehouses, salons, table societies, and the early journals and reviews, made this re-appropriation possible. These institutions are discussed further below.

47 The institutionalization of the review form, as explored more in what follows, can be seen as an exercise of symbolic capital, namely, the legitimation of the form and its authority. The contents of the review, however, can also be analyzed as an exercise of ideological power, defined as “the use of specific symbols, the promotion of specific cultural messages, or the inculcation of particular beliefs” (Loveman, 2005, p. 1656). While both forms of power depend on the use of symbols, as Loveman argues, symbolic power, or “power to ‘constitute the given,’” underscores the “‘cultural’ dimension” of state power (quoting Bourdieu, , p. 1656). If symbolic power is a metapower, while ideological power is a lower-level power (although no doubt a potent one), the question should be asked if the review holds more ideological power than symbolic power and whether the symbolic power it accrued (if it still possesses such power is a topic to be taken up below) was enough to successfully challenge the symbolic domination of the state.

48 Another perspective of “critics” and “cratics” identifies the “critics” as mediators between the people—the state’s subjects—and the “cratics” or state. An example of this perspective is found in Sturr’s analysis of the role of magazines in revolutionary America. He writes: “The political magazine was not as fluid, open, or democratic as physical gatherings of the people, nor was it as
this sense, the political review is a polymorphic critical practice, which some states bring into their internal political debates and divisions while others police as signs of external political resistances. However, a range of political viewpoints can be represented among the critics and, depending upon who the “critics” are, the review can contain both conserving (conservative) and transforming (radical) voices.

The Critics’ Reviews, or the Di-visions within the Ordered Vision

The meaning of the word “review” as understood in relation to a practice of criticism or a “general account or criticism of a recent literary work” dates back to 1649. The word “criticism” also dates back to the early seventeenth century and is derived from the Latin criticus or Greek kritikos meaning someone “able to make judgments.” In the late 1600s, the periodical press that reported daily news and economic activities was supplemented by journals that went beyond the supply of information to give pedagogical instructions, as well as criticism and reviews. In the early eighteenth century, criticism, or critical reasoning, began to dominate the press and created this new genre of periodical (Calhoun, 1992, p. 9).

permanent and authoritative as a written constitution. Contributors to the New-Haven Gazette [...] were eager to see an appropriate distance between the passions of the people and the deliberations of wiser and more sober legislators in properly constituted assemblies. The political magazine could, in their view, be an educating intermediary institution between the people and their representatives. The example of the Worcester Magazine both confirms and adds complexity to this model. While he had a stake in calming the population and protecting a stable government, Isaiah Thomas was unwilling to support state authority without question or dissent. He sought instead to bring the sort of give-and-take that might occur in the street, tavern, or convention within the framework of a periodical. The continued survival of his magazine depended on not allowing any particular voice to become too strong or to go unchallenged. The people did not speak with a single voice, and although governments sometimes needed to make decisions as though citizens were unified, there was no reason for a political magazine to act in the same way” (2005, pp. 197-198).
Criticism or judgment represented so-called “public opinion,” and the emergence of public opinion became regarded as a countervailing force against the state. Within the public’s “opinion” were likely many opinions, or di-visions, that challenged the state’s vision of order, especially when that vision intruded upon what was then considered “private” life. Habermas’s public sphere “defined as the public of private individuals who join in debate of issues bearing on state authority” has become the ideal (and idealized) expression of modern democracy, although it first appeared as a temper on the more absolutist powers of the state (whether monarch or parliament) than as rule by the people, per se (Calhoun, 1992, p. 7). This ideal forum then is grounded in an Enlightenment understanding of the public use of reason as necessary to improving public life. Criticism meant that the public was no longer immature, but could think for itself.  

One of the first known reviews to bear the name was Daniel Defoe’s Review of the State of the British Nation, begun in 1704, about eighty years after the first English periodical originated. Its chosen title underscores my argument that the early critics of

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49 The criticisms of Habermas’s “public sphere” are already known. While the “public” may have come into existence at this time, it was by no means a wholly representative public. Rather, it mainly consisted of middle- and upper class white males. So, “public” opinion was similarly restricted.

50 However, as proponents of the public use of reason such as Immanuel Kant understood, criticism had its place in public life but only in tandem with obedience to authority. In other words, the di-visions could not stray too far from the ordered vision. “But only a ruler who is himself enlightened and has no dread of shadows, yet who likewise has a well-disciplined, numerous army to guarantee public peace, can say what no republic may dare, namely: ‘Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!’” (Kant, 1784, p. n/a). For Kant, “frank criticism” through the use of public reason could aid rulers to better formulate their laws.

51 The review originally bore the title, A Weekly Review of the Affairs of France, due to the political events of the day and Defoe’s belief that the affairs of France were of utmost importance to English readers. The ‘weekly’ was dropped with issue eight, as the paper had become a biweekly with the previous issue, later being published tri-weekly. With the second volume, the title became A Review of the Affairs of France: With some Observations on Transactions at Home,” and in volume three, the title again changed to A Review of the State of the English Nation. The review’s title was adjusted once more after the unification of England and Scotland in 1707, becoming A Review of the State of
the modern state challenged the state’s view through a practice of review. Early political criticism was a viewing and reviewing practice. *The American Magazine*, one of the first magazines to appear in the New World, was published in 1741. Edited and printed by Andrew Bradford, the magazine bore the subtitle, *A Monthly View of the Political State of the British Colonies*. Bradford and Defoe presented their audiences with alternative views to those of the state’s.

Despite a print run of only four hundred copies, Defoe’s *Review* marked a turning point in British journalism.52 No longer concerned only with facts, Defoe printed his opinions, marking the beginning of the periodical essay form and the journal of opinion.53 Lasting until 1712, Defoe’s *Review* initiated a new era, as the better known papers of Addison and Steele, *The Tatler* and *The Spectator*, appeared in 1709 and 1711, respectively.54 With their arrival, the press no longer existed only to report the news but to

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52 The circulation figures are somewhat misleading as researchers have pointed to the fact that rather than purchase journals, most Londoners read them in coffee houses. People who were illiterate gathered in the streets to hear them read aloud. As Secord argues, “[i]t is obvious that the *Review* had an influence all out of proportion to its sales” (1965, p. xxii).

53 Defoe’s *Review* was not the first publication to provide opinion in addition to the news. However, his publication, along with the arrival of Addison and Steele’s journals, are the periodicals remembered and heralded as the initiators of the form.

54 “The periodicals of the early eighteenth century were a primary constituent of the emergent bourgeois public sphere. They were, as A. S. Collins writes, ‘a very powerful educative influence, affecting politics as well by the formation of a broad, national public opinion.’ Jane Jack views the periodicals, with their ‘high-class popularization,’ as the dominant literary form of the first half of the century, and Leslie Stephen described them as ‘the most successful innovation of the day.’ The *Tatler* and *Spectator* marked a qualitative development from what had come before: ‘A number of earlier periodicals,’ reports Richard P. Bond, ‘had been heavily committed to learned works, using abstracts and extracts more than original criticism, and a few papers had admitted belletristic features, but no journal had attempted to elevate taste by giving large attention to the arts, mainly literary, in a way both serious and genial. The *Tatler* was the first English periodical to do this.’ It was still not, of course, ‘professional’ criticism in the modern sense.” (Eagleton, 1984, pp. 16-17).
shape it, and thereby, to shape public opinion.\textsuperscript{55} In the early nineteenth century, public opinion, as captured in the medium of print, would be put forth by the new reviews as a check on the state.

Publication of periodicals really did not begin until the early seventeenth century in England due to a combination of licensing restrictions, Star Chamber regulations, and the royal prerogative in news circulation, along with religious conflict. The first English periodical appeared in 1622.\textsuperscript{56} It was a periodical pamphlet dealing with foreign wars and authorized by the King (then James I). Early periodicals did not contain running titles. The pamphlet form of the periodical followed the broadside ballad. The first isolated pamphlets were known as \textit{Relations} of news. When early periodicals began to appear with titles, or “catchwords,” they were known as \textit{Coranto}, or “current” of news. Essentially, the \textit{Coranto} was a \textit{Relation} of news that made repeat appearances, rather than being confined to one pamphlet. According to \textit{The Cambridge History of English and American Literature}, all \textit{Corantos} dealt exclusively with foreign news until 1641 (Ward & Waller, 2000). After that time, the \textit{Diurnall}, or “newsbook,” of domestic news began publication.\textsuperscript{57} These newsbooks

\textsuperscript{55} Admittedly, early papers that concerned themselves with only printing the news or “the facts,” largely pertaining to foreign wars, also shaped opinion through the act of selection, choosing which news would be reported and in what manner. Additionally, some of those early papers also printed opinion, such as L’Estrange’s \textit{Observer}. However, it was the early reviewers who acknowledged their role and authority as shapers of opinion, and reviewers like Defoe, Addison and Steele, sought to establish this role as legitimate.

\textsuperscript{56} William Payne claims that periodicals appeared as early as 1621 in the form of the \textit{Coranto}, and that the first “newsbook,” the \textit{Weekly News}, edited by Nicholas Bourne and Thomas Archer appeared in 1622. The paper contained foreign news (like the “corantos”), as well as “accounts of murders, witches, monsters, miracles, and other ‘wonders’” (1951, p. xi) The first “official” English newspaper would not appear until 1666 with the arrival of the \textit{London Gazette}. “Official” in the sense that it was supposed to contain factually accurate news, as compared to its competitors. As Payne argues, “[t]he Restoration government was fully aware that political news was a power either to arouse or allay the fears of the people” (1951, p. xi).

\textsuperscript{57} The word “journal” also comes from the late Latin \textit{diurnalis} meaning “daily.”
contained no editorial comment. Official journalists, sanctioned by the crown or Parliament, were also established in the 1640s.58

Under Oliver Cromwell’s rule, much journalism was suppressed or strictly controlled. In 1660, under the Restoration, parliament prohibited printed reports of its proceedings and did not remove that embargo until the end of the century.59 In the late 1600s, the periodical press that reported daily news and economic activities was supplemented by journals that went beyond the supply of information to give pedagogical instructions, as well as criticism and reviews. By the early 1700s, periodicals had already developed into a variety of forms, which recognizably persist today—newspapers, scholarly journals, journals of criticism, journals of opinion, and tabloids. Moreover, within the fairly broad category of journals of opinion, a split could already be seen between publications like The Tatler and The Spectator that paid more attention to culture and society and publications like Defoe’s Review that gave more attention to politics and economics.

On April 12, 1709, the first issue of The Tatler appeared on street corners. It sought a readership among the “politic persons, who are so public spirited as to neglect their own

58 These early forms of journalism evolved from the trade newsletters that began to appear in the fourteenth century and formalized in the sixteenth century to facilitate the business of merchants and stock exchanges (Habermas, 1991, p. 16). Hence, the news (the press) and capitalism co-evolved and were inextricably intertwined. As Habermas argues, “the traffic in news developed not only in connection with the needs of commerce; the news itself became a commodity” (p. 21).
59 In 1681, Parliament began to allow the publication of its “votes.” However, they were published through licensed journals that were partial to the government. Rules of confidentiality continued to operate in Parliament through the eighteenth-century. As a Member of Parliament from 1713 to 1714, Richard Steele used his position to breach these rules and publicize parliamentary proceedings in his journals (Knight, 2009). In 1738, Parliament increased the prohibition on the publication of its proceedings so that publication of its debates between sessions was also disallowed. As Habermas reports, only in 1771 did Wilkes, then alderman of London, nullify the law “in fact if not in law” (1991, p. 61).
affairs to look into transactions of state” (Addison & Steele, 1803, pp. 1-2). The paper quickly reached a circulation of 4,000, with a readership that well exceeded this figure, but ceased publication only two years later (Habermas, 1991, p. 260 note 37). Addison and Steele ended The Tatler in 1711 when they began publication of The Spectator, which would have an even shorter lifespan, closing in 1712. The second paper was discontinued due to the stamp tax that made printing the paper a loss. While the Tatler and Spectator may have filled most of their pages with admonitions about how to dress and act, vices to avoid, and charities to sponsor, the public came into being within those same pages (Habermas, 1991).

A later edition of The Tatler, published May 17, 1709, reemphasized the periodical’s ideal audience as those “worthy citizens who live more in a coffeehouse than in their shops” (Habermas, 1991, p. 260 note 36). One of its editors, Richard Steele, promised to

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60 The editors sought an audience among a group of individuals already concerned with the affairs of state, but at the same time, it could be argued that the new publications not only found such an audience but also created it. This recalls Michael Warner’s (2002) argument of the circularity of publics, or as Kathy Ferguson names it, the “chicken and egg” problem—“the public has to exist in order for us to address it, but it can’t exist until we address it” (2010, p. 212). Did this public in fact already exist or did periodicals and editors such as Addison and Steele bring it into being? Determining causality is probably a futile endeavor, as a variety of factors likely contributed to the formation of “public opinion” and to emphasize any one may skew the picture. Or perhaps there is another way to conceptualize the public, which takes into account the criticisms of Habermas’s public sphere. It may be that the viewers/re-viewers, whether “cratic” or “critic,” are the public in nuce made public or publicized via print documents’ scriptural economies. As John Smolenski argues: “... the long-term story is not whether ritual or print is constitutive of provincial public culture. Both are implicated. Rather, it is the history of particular forms of public expression claiming to voice, embody, or articulate a common public good” (2005, p. 50).

61 “The Tatler began as a prime supporter of the Whig government then in power, but it reported foreign news, almost entirely news of the war, and organized its various comments on literature, theatre and society in departments identified by coffee-houses. It ended as rather a different paper, dropping the news entirely and extending its short perceptions into full paper-length essays, now identified by the general rubric ‘From my own Apartment.’ But during its run the government changed from Whig to Tory. Steele decided, or was pushed to decide, to close the Tatler and start another paper, one that utilized more fully the talents of his friend Joseph Addison and that emphasized the Tatler’s pattern of political discourse through indirect implication. The Spectator in particular used the family and the virtuous merchant as model figures of Whig society (Knight, 2009, p. 4).
distinguish the paper from “the other papers, which are published for the use of the good people of England, have certainly very wholesome effects, and are laudable in their particular kinds” but do not steer their patrons correctly in understanding and seizing upon the essential matters of the day (Addison & Steele, 1803, p. 1). Contrary to these weak efforts, The Tatler foresaw its main purpose as

both a charitable and necessary work [that would] offer something, whereby such worthy and well-affected members of the Commonwealth may be instructed after their reading, what to think; which shall be the end and purpose of this my paper, wherein I shall, from time to time, report and consider all matters of what kind soever that shall occur to me, and publish such my advices and reflections...(Addison & Steele, 1803, p. 2).

As papers with editors who believed their duty was to tell the public what to think, The Tatler and its successor, The Spectator, served an important editorial function that discerned between what was worthy of publication and what was not, what was worthy of conversation and what was not.

The formation of “public opinion” then was not just a spontaneous amalgamation of the general middle-class population’s ideas and thoughts. Rather, writers and editors who told the public what to think privately sought to direct “public opinion”. As Charles A. Knight writes,

Steele’s major periodicals, the Tatler and the Spectator, are sometimes thought of as reflecting a consensus on issues of social morality, but they might equally be thought of as efforts to define, elicit, or impose such a consensus in a period of dynastic rivalry, war, religious contention and political uncertainty (2009, p. 3).

Defoe gave himself the same role as censor of opinion when he wrote in the preface to the first volume of his review that “my firm resolution in all I write to exalt virtue, expose vice, promote truth, and help men to serious reflection, is my first moving cause and last directed end” (Payne, 1951, p. 7).
The word “censor” comes from the Latin word *censere* meaning “to appraise, value, judge.” It first appeared in English in the 1530s to refer to the Roman magistrates who took censuses and oversaw public morals. *The Tatler* and *The Spectator* similarly oversaw public morals and advocated for social reform. In that respect, the word “censor” shares a common etymology with the word “census,” which dates to 1610 and in Latin referred to “the enrollment of the names and property assessments of all Roman citizens.” The censuses referred to above, that were the disciplinary efforts of the early modern state, found their non-state counterpart in the early reviews. In other words, the early reviews, begun by private actors, such as Richard Steele, who later became a Member of Parliament, also disciplined society and censored public opinion, which was then emerging as a counterpoint to the state.

Steele referred to himself as the “Censor of Great Britain.” According to Knight,

Steele developed and projected a public persona as a political author. Over the years of his political activity this combination shifted from outright hackery to complex and principled consideration of constitutional issues. He saw a continuum from moral behaviour to political action, and he used his authority as a moral writer, an authority manifested in the highly popular *Tatler* and *Spectator*, to claim an analogous authority as a political writer.... If Steele sought to develop the example of the political writer, his opponents sought to discredit that public example as a warning to other writers. *A key issue was the authority of writers, as writers, to speak of political matters* (2009, p. 2, emphasis added).

In essence, the question was whether writers could participate in politics and also whether writing was a form of political participation. Could the state, specifically the Crown and Parliament, who officially occupied the realm of politics, be challenged in their field by an authority derived from the realm of letters? Many writers previous to and during Addison and Steele’s time published unacknowledged pieces, such as Jonathan Swift, or maintained distinct personas as writer and politician, such as Matthew Prior (Knight, 2009). However,
Steele especially, who served as a Member of Parliament from 1713 to 1714, sought to combine these roles. The “critic” and “cratic” could be embodied in the same person, operating side by side.

The development of Habermas’s public sphere depended upon the existence of a literary public sphere which institutionalized a form of rational-critical discourse about objects of common concern that could be carried over directly into political discussion.... A central topic...was the question of absolute sovereignty versus the rule of general, abstract, depersonalized laws (Calhoun, 1992, pp. 13-14).

Even as social or moral criticism extended to political criticism, the public sphere remained within the institutions of the literary public sphere, including the periodicals of the eighteenth century, which took on an increasingly political tenor in the early nineteenth century. However, Calhoun questions whether Habermas may have overstated “the prominence of a strictly literary public sphere in grounding the eventual political one” (1992, p. 48 note 54). In part, this could be a twentieth-century epistemology unnecessarily dividing literary from political concerns in an eighteenth-century world that saw no such strict division. Or it could be a lack of attention to the historical record of political concerns who organized outside literary journals but whose record may not be as preserved as those of print periodicals. Daniel Defoe’s Review presents an interesting case in that he claimed an authority to speak of political and economic affairs in his journal as a political activist rather than a man of letters. In fact, his novels, Robinson Crusoe and Moll Flanders, were published well after the Review ceased publication. Although a Member of Parliament

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62 According to Knight, “Steele’s efforts, evolving over time, to identify himself as an acknowledged political writer only set out one course to political participation, amid an onslaught of anonymous publications or publications identified with significantly characterized personae. But Steele’s model is now the norm: the acknowledged author who takes public responsibility for what he has written and who can point to his own experience and character as grounds for his authority” (2009, p. 3).
supported the journal, Defoe’s case still raises the question of how the “critic’s” views gain authority and legitimacy to speak on politics from the pages of a periodical. In other words, what power accrues to a journal that re-views the state? This is a key question to ask of critics and their reviews. Obviously, the answer will change depending upon when it is asked and of who. A critic’s view and its authority depends not only on its content but also on how it is transmitted, what position it occupies within the intellectual field, and the make-up of the media ecology of which it is a part.

From the first, Defoe’s Review was a partisan paper, in that Robert Harley, then Secretary of State, sponsored it.63 The Review was in print from 1704 to 1713, preceding and exceeding the life span of both The Tatler and Spectator. Defoe’s journal largely focused on political and trade issues of the day, unlike Addison and Steele’s papers that largely focused on issues of morals and manners.64 Habermas devotes the majority of his attention to the papers of Addison and Steele, mentioning Defoe’s Review almost in passing. He

63 “Some of Defoe’s contemporaries took for granted that his periodical was an organ for the government. ‘Review,’ wrote one of them, ‘you are a damned rascal; do you think to persuade us that you are not writing for the ministry, because you’re writing upon trade?’.... The charges of his contemporaries that he was in the pay of one party or another were not unusual; they were hurled at many contemporary editors. Leslie of the Rehearsal was labeled a ‘High Flyer’ (that is, a High Churchman). Tutchin of the Observer was branded a Whig; Swift of the Examiner was a Tory, as was Maynwaring of the Medley. All possible epithets were applied to Defoe: he was first a Whig, then a Tory, variously a High Flyer and a Papist, in addition a stupid dog, a canting rascal, and—vehemently on the part of an adversary—one who ‘deserves not only the correction of the gallows, but the personal correction of every man that meets you,’ and ‘will be no more sin to cut your throat, than to kill a dog” (Payne, 1951, pp. x-xi). Once again, the divisions between critics, craticus and critics versus craticus are apparent.

64 Defoe’s review did include a section titled “Advice from the Scandalous Club,” which censored morals and manners and provided some entertainment. Addison and Steele largely borrowed from the idea of the club in their own papers. Defoe did not enjoy writing the section and separated it into its own paper, titled The Little Review, and then abandoned it altogether. He realized though that his audience required some entertainment, and he hoped that the inclusion of the Club would “hand on the more weighty and more serious part of the design into the heads and thoughts of those to whom it might be useful” (quoting Defoe’s Review, Vol. 1, “Preface,” February 1704, Payne, 1951, pp. 6-7).
emphasizes Defoe’s connection to Harley and writes of the *Review* as if it were wholly a piece of propaganda:

Harley was the first statesman to understand how to turn the new situation to his advantage. He engaged authors like Defoe (who has been called the first professional journalist), who defended the cause of the Whigs not only in the pamphlets in use up until then but also in the new journals. Indeed, he was the first to make the ‘party spirit’ a ‘public spirit’ (Habermas, 1991).65

The nineteenth-century reviews, which are discussed below, have more in common with Defoe’s *Review* then the papers of Addison and Steele. They were also more concerned with matters of state policy than morals and manners. Additionally, they also were shaped by partisanship, although not strictly partisan journals. While Addison and Steele may have set the bar in matters of writing style, Defoe’s *Review* made matters of state a legitimate subject for writers to take up.66

Further, Defoe’s *Review* may have more sincerely sought an audience among those “politic persons, who are so public spirited as to neglect their own affairs to look into transactions of state” than did *The Tatler* or *Spectator*. As William Payne argues, Defoe’s very subject matter, as well as style, sought an audience neither among the aristocracy nor the masses, but among those so positioned as to be concerned with matters of state and educated enough to follow his essays.

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65 I return to the idea of the “party spirit” becoming a “public spirit” in the next chapter.
66 While Addison and Steele’s papers practiced a certain literary style that helped form the “periodical essay,” other reviews such as Defoe’s gave priority to content over form (Habermas, 1991, p. 42). As Defoe wrote, “Let not those gentlemen who are critics in style, in method or manner, be angry that I have never pulled off my cap to them in humble excuse for my loose way of treating the world as to language, expressions, and politeness of phrase. Matters of this nature differ from most things a man can write. When I am busied writing essays and matters of science, I shall address them for their aid and take as much care to avoid their displeasure as becomes me; but when I am upon the subjects of trade, and the variety of casual story, I think myself a little loose from the bonds of cadence and perfections of style, and satisfy myself in my study to be explicit, easy, free, and very plain. And for all the rest, *nec careo, nec curo*” (quoting Defoe’s Review, Vol. 1, "Preface," February 1705, Payne, 1951, p. 6).
No editor then or now, writing for either extreme, would devote the first eighty numbers of a new periodical to consideration of the war with France and abstract points of strategy—and this almost without relief for forty weeks. It was not ‘the masses’ in England who needed lectures on the duties and responsibilities of members of the House of Commons, not ‘the masses’ Defoe was addressing when he pointed out the errors of the clergy of the Church of England. Even today, when universal education has gone so much farther than in Defoe’s time, it is doubtful whether ‘the masses’ would appreciate a periodical that specialized in essays on the true nature of money and what it symbolizes in terms of wealth; on the nature of credit and its importance in a nation’s trade. Defoe was writing less to either extreme of society than to the great middle group of ‘freeholders’ and ‘electors’ who, if he could arouse them to the dangers in which their country stood from foes abroad and at home, might become partakers of his own high moral purpose as a defender of English liberties and an exponent of what was most important for England’s economy. His own function, as he sincerely believed it to be, he expressed vigorously: “I saw a parcel of people caballing together to ruin property, corrupt the laws, invade the government, debauch the people and in short, enslave and embroil the nation; and I cried ‘Fire!’” (1951, p. xvii).67

Defoe believed that his role as writer for and editor of a review was to cry “fire!” against other narratives of power that might usurp the state’s disciplinary practices and impose their own view. As different factions wrestled for control of the state, the reviews’ job, in the service of or aid to whichever faction, “was ‘to open the eyes of the deluded people, and set them to rights in the things in which they are imposed upon’” (quoting Defoe, Payne, 1951, p. xvi). This purpose of a review can be seen even more clearly in the “great reviews” of the early nineteenth century, which are the subject of the next chapter.

In 1713, Parliament levied a tax of a halfpenny on half-sheet news magazines, a penny tax on whole sheets, along with a tax of twelve-pence on advertisements (Payne, 1951). Defoe wrote about the proposed tax in Volume VIII, No. 172 of his Review, arguing

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67 Payne also wrote that Defoe was not interested in the “social scene” like Addison and Steele and had no entryway into high social places. His interest in ‘society’ was much more akin to our own: he was concerned (in more modern parlance) not with the Four Hundred but with the Four Million; his approach was what we today would call ‘sociological.’ Actually, however, he was less interested in sociological problems than in political and economic questions of the day. The appeal of the Review was not to the dandy, the fop, the ‘gentleman’ or the ‘ladies.’ On more than one occasion Defoe made clear to the aristocracy that he, a mere Grub Street scribbler, was not trying to instruct them. On the other hand Defoe was not—as various modern critics say—writing to ‘the common man,’ ‘the masses’” (Payne, 1951).
that the tax was not meant to raise revenue for the state but to stop the press.\textsuperscript{68} While Defoe was not opposed to putting certain publications out of business or even forbidding all papers from discussing public affairs, he effectively argued that the economic, educational, and religious benefits of periodicals and other pamphlets outweighed their harms.\textsuperscript{69}

While the tax drove many publications out of business, the boom of periodicals rebounded by century’s end. By 1800, at least 264 periodical publications existed in England (Coser, 1997, p. 72). In addition to fighting the state’s censorship, early political journalists often also risked their personal well-being. Defoe was imprisoned multiple times for his writings, and Steele was ousted from Parliament for writing a piece of propaganda, which he later won recognition for in the award of a knighthood. Despite their efforts, however, the institutionalization of the review form did not occur until the beginning of the nineteenth century.

\textsuperscript{68} Payne writes that “[n]ear the end of Queen Anne’s reign, newspapers, broadsides, and pamphlets were of such a violent party nature that the Tory government was determined to put a stop to it. Defoe here objects to a proposal which would double the cost of much printed matter. The tax as finally adopted, and in effect until the mid-nineteenth century, applied to pamphlets and newspapers at the rate of a penny per half sheet. As was intended and predicted, it effectually silenced most of the newspapers” (1951, p. 81 note 1). Habermas (1991) also writes that the stamp tax put some journals out of business while others printed fewer copies and with less volume.

\textsuperscript{69} Here he took a paternalistic view, arguing that the stop in trade would harm the poor, that the unavailability of religious tracts would keep them in spiritual darkness and a lack of publications would deprive them of the advantage of reading.
PART II. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE REVIEW, OR HOW THE “CRITIC’S” RE-VIEW GAINED AUTHORITY

In 2004, a new print journal began publication. \( n+1 \) claimed to be in the tradition of \textit{Partisan Review} or as they put it “like \textit{Partisan Review} but not dead” (Shapiro, 2004, p. n/a). The claimed ancestor began publication in 1936 and ceased publication in 2003, just a year before the new journal began. This act of ancestral claiming is not unique to \( n+1 \). Rather, many journals look to the past for their models. \textit{Social Text} modeled itself after the “little magazine.” However, its founding editors had different “little magazines” in mind. Stanley Aronowitz thought of \textit{Partisan Review}, while John Brenkman had the French journal, \textit{Tel Quel} in mind, and Frederic Jameson pointed to \textit{Les Temps modernes} (Brenkman, 2009). \textit{Telos} claims similar models, namely \textit{Les Temps modernes}, \textit{Praxis}, and \textit{New Left Review} (Staff, 1970).

\textit{Universities and Left Review} (ULR) by its title claimed the unorthodox 1930s Marxist journal \textit{Left Review} as its antecedent. ULR would merge with \textit{The New Reasoner} to form \textit{New Left Review} in 1960. Marking the journal’s fiftieth anniversary, Stefan Collini wrote that the \textit{New Left Review} “as a severely intellectual journal committed, in principle, to the radical transformation of society...had few models to draw on in British history” (2010, p. n/a). He then points to the Left journals, \textit{Commonweal} (1885-90), \textit{Left Review} (1934-38), the \textit{New Statesman} (1913- ), \textit{Tribune} (1937- ), or a more cultural journal, \textit{New Age} (1907-22), before finally settling on the \textit{Westminster Review} as the closest antecedent, a journal he
describes as “another successful journal of ideas conducted at the highest intellectual level by a self-consciously radical group” (Collini, 2010, p. n/a).\textsuperscript{70}

With the arrival of the \textit{Westminster Review}, the \textit{Edinburgh}, and the \textit{Quarterly} in the nineteenth century’s first decades, the review form was solidified and legitimized. Most critical journals and reviews that have followed can trace their lineage to this group. They continue to point to them as exemplars of the genre and as early models. The twentieth-century literary review, \textit{Scrutiny}, described them as the “great reviews,” something to be emulated and marking a time when the review form held a prestigious place in society and garnered a far larger audience than their modern counterparts. These reviews, however, served as more than just models. In effect, they institutionalized the critical re-viewing practice and by so doing, defined the parameters for writing politics.

Interestingly, the \textit{Westminster Review}, the journal of the philosophical radicals, questioned the very use of the review form in its first issue, pointing out the form’s negative effects and heavily criticizing its predecessors, the \textit{Edinburgh} and \textit{Quarterly}. Despite the criticism and the reluctance to use a form that could undermine its very objectives, the \textit{Westminster} began in 1824 and continued publication until 1914.\textsuperscript{71} This part explores the success of the “great reviews” and the nature of the form at its so-called peak, while also analyzing the usefulness of the form to “critics,” like the philosophical radicals,

\textsuperscript{70} Collini writes that \textit{New Left Review}'s closest contemporary may be the \textit{London Review of Books}. However, in terms of a conscious model during \textit{NLR}'s early years, Collini cites \textit{Les Temps modernes}. The American journal \textit{Salmagundi} claims similar antecedents. It first modeled itself on \textit{Partisan Review}. However, as it became less topical and current, the journal focused more on critical works in the vein of the \textit{Westminster} and \textit{Edinburgh} reviews and adopted their style of “long theoretical and practical essays” (E. Anderson & Kinzie, 1978, p. 50).

\textsuperscript{71} In 1836, John Stuart Mill merged the \textit{Westminster} with his recently created \textit{London Review} (1834). The \textit{London and Westminster Review}, itself undergoing several transformations, continued publication until 1914 (Nesbitt, 1966, p. 163-64).
who sought to challenge the status quo. It begins by tracing the institutionalization of the review as a political practice. Then, it examines the necessity of the reviews’ critical independence to their political aims. Finally, it re-views the review form.
Chapter 2.1  The Politics of Reviewing: Visions and Di-visions

In the opening decade of the nineteenth century, the tradition of the so-called "great reviews" began. The first was the *Edinburgh Review*, or *Critical Journal*, launched in 1802. Its subtitle is significant, because it defines the new review form as a practice of criticism. After the *Edinburgh*, two more noteworthy reviews began publication—the *Quarterly Review* in 1809 and the *Westminster Review* in 1824. Beginning in the 1820s, a second generation of reviews proliferated in Great Britain, including but not limited to, the *Foreign Quarterly* (1827), the *British Critic* (1827), the *British and Foreign Review* (1835), the *London Review* (1835), the *Dublin Review* (1836), the *Church of England Quarterly* (1837), the *Foreign and Colonial Quarterly* (1837), the *English Review* (1844), the *North British Review* (1844), the *British Quarterly* (1845), the *Prospective Review* (1845) and its successor the *National* (1855), the *Irish Quarterly* (1851), the *Scottish Review* (1853), the *London Quarterly* (1853), and the *Home and Foreign Review* (1862) (Shatlock, 1980, p. 96).

John Gross gives two reasons for why reviews became more salient in the nineteenth century: 1) “their irrepresible passion for discussion which succeeded the fall of old systems on the French Revolution,” and 2) “the stirring-up of fundamental social questions by the steady advance of industrialism” (1969, p. 2). Nesbitt presents a similar argument, writing that “[p]olitics was the subject of greatest interest and importance to the reading public” (1966, p. 6). The biggest question of the day was reform, including the expansion of the electorate.

[The Tories] proposed meeting the situation by thoroughly safeguarding the old institutions. There must be no concessions to the popular demands.... The Whigs, on the other hand, wanted to save the country by a program of moderate reform.... They also wanted to be in office, though they were out most of the time. It is not surprising, then, considering the gravity of the situation, that Whigs and Tories should be violently opposed not only to radicals but to each other as well; that they
should view with alarm anyone outside their party who could use a pen, and bear down upon him with a violence that today appears incredible. Edinburgh reviewers venomously accused radical poets of revolutionary tendencies and Tory poets of loose thinking; while the Quarterly accused all liberals of revolutionary tendencies and loose thinking—and bad morals, always on the assumption that if one’s morals were bad, so were his writings. The Edinburgh sometimes accused its opponents of bad morals, but not so often as the Quarterly (Nesbitt, 1966, p. 7).72

The politics of the reviews closely aligned with the parties, the Edinburgh giving voice to Whig views, the Quarterly to the Tories, and the Westminster to the as yet non-institutionalized philosophical radicals. In 1986, Stephen Fender wrote of the New York Review of Books that many Americans are surprised “that a review of books should have a politics at all” (Fender, 1986). It does seem somewhat foreign to equate book reviewing with politics, and the “great reviews” did review books and other publications in almost each of their essays.

However, reviewing books and political writing could be and were combined, Fender claimed, and with good reason.73 Historically, the two were introduced together. Fender, in fact, argued that the model upon which the New York Review’s editors based the journal was “really about a century-and-a-half old,” referring to the nineteenth-century quarterlies exemplified by the Edinburgh, Quarterly, and Westminster.

Though ostensibly book reviews, the quarterlies were, after all, frankly political journals, actually established to further the aims of political parties. The Tory Quarterly was formed to counter the insidious influence of the Whig Edinburgh, and

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72 Nesbitt also argues that the question of reform was too important or perhaps too large to leave to the journalists. Therefore, it required the critical analysis of the reviews. “The ‘condition-of-England question’ has at all times been uppermost in the minds of English-men” and at this time a more than usual degree of fear and uncertainty characterized the thinking of all lovers of law and order, the readers of reviews. Memories of the French Revolution were painfully vivid, and it was well known that the revolutionists had had many English sympathizers.... Factories were springing up, hundreds of them, supplanting the stable rural population of a century ago with an urban population of employers and employees.... The journalists could not be depended upon—Leigh Hunt, for one, evidently did not have his price. Too many people in England were clamoring for reform... (1966, p. 6).

73 Writing books could also serve as a method of reviewing politics.
the radical *Westminster* as a plague on both their houses (both the *Quarterly* and the *Edinburgh* cater to the aristocracy, wrote the *Westminster*; the only difference between them is that the former speaks for ‘ministerials’ and the latter for the ‘oppositionists’) (Fender, 1986, p. 198).

Further, while originating as reviews, the quarterlies did not only review books.

Sometimes, they “reviewed” pamphlets or whatever other publication served their purposes. Nesbitt describes the typical review essay of the time:

To a reader of our own book notices, an article from the early 19th century reviews appears a strange thing. It was usually at least fifteen pages in length. It always made some allusion to the book supposedly being reviewed, but generally did not confine itself to the book; the reviewer expressed, in detail, his own opinions on the subject of which the book treated.... Thus an issue of the *Edinburgh* or the *Quarterly*, though ostensibly devoted exclusively to book reviews, affords more variety of content then one might expect (1966, p. 4).

What took priority often was the political writing; the so-called review was a means to an end. In other words, the “reviews” were an opportunity to re-view and express their alternate views, regardless of the supposed objects of their criticism.

For example, in an 1834 issue of the *Edinburgh*, a review begins:

We place the titles of these pamphlets at the head of this article without any design of entering upon the discussion of their contents, or going into the subjects to which they are directed; but in order to make some observations upon the present condition of the Party which still holds out against all reform—all change of any kind—all liberal opinions—all the principles suited to the age we live in, abroad and at home;—we mean those who used to be called Tories, and have lately taken the name of Conservatives (1834, pp. 457-458).74

Fender compares this practice of the early reviews to similar practices in the *New York Review of Books*, specifically “reviews” by I. F. Stone that were jumping off points for his own political opinions. In one essay, Stone “reviewed” a transcript of a hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. As Fender notes, this pamphlet was published by

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74 The titles of the two pamphlets being “reviewed” were “A Protest against ‘The Reform Ministry and the Reformed Parliament.’ By an Opposition Member” and “A Refutation of the Calumnies against the Lord Chancellor in the last Number of the ‘Quarterly Review;' in an Article on ‘The Reform Ministry and the Reformed Parliament.’”
the Government Printing Office for thirty cents—not the type of publication most likely to be found in a periodical devoted to reviewing books, but very much in keeping with the practices of the “great reviews.” The pamphlet allowed Stone to give his opinions on the Gulf of Tonkin episode (Fender, 1986, p. 194).

While calling themselves reviews and writing their essays allegedly as reviews of other work, the journals focused more on politics than literature. The opinions on politics took priority over their literary criticism. As Nesbitt writes,

> Fully half of a typical number of the *Edinburgh* or the *Quarterly* of about 1810 consists of articles on affairs of the day. Such a number also contains reviews of books on travel, of sermons, of mathematical treatises. Perhaps not more than one or two articles are concerned with strictly literary productions, and even these articles are more likely than not to be colored by the politics of the review (1966, p. 5).

The reviews were all partisan, although the *Edinburgh* and the *Westminster* were not intended as party publications.

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75 It may be useful here to distinguish between the review and the nineteenth-century version of its contemporary, the magazine. “For much of the nineteenth century the distinction between a review and a magazine, which has since become so blurred, still held firm. A review consisted of nothing but reviews, while a magazine was a *magasin*, a general store. At first magazines were seldom in any real sense literary: following the pattern set by the venerable *Gentleman’s Magazine*, which hired Samuel Johnson to write up parliamentary debates (and which lingered on, incredibly, until 1907), they were usually miscellanies stuffed with news, public announcements, pastimes, notes and queries, extracts from books or from other magazines. Only with the founding of *Blackwood’s* in 1817 did they come to be thought of principally as collections of original articles, fiction and poetry; but from that date onwards they bulk much larger in literary history than the reviews. For as well as printing imaginative work, they were concerned with manners rather than doctrine, with social attitudes rather than political theory; their tone was intimate, their aim was to make the reader feel at home. The editor of a review might see himself, ideally, as bringing the encyclopedia up to date (and, indeed, Macvey Napier was in charge of revising the *Britannica* before he took over the *Edinburgh*). Conducting a magazine was an altogether less austere occupation, more like running a theatrical troupe” (J. Gross, 1969, p. 10).

76 R. G. Cox writing for the English literary review *Scrutiny* in 1937 remarked that “[t]he *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly* were the mouthpieces of the two great political groups of cultivated society, while at the same time they defined, moulded, and partially formed the opinions of their respective parties, and exercised a literary authority which was the legitimate successor of that of Addison and Johnson” (1937, p. 3).
Criticism was now explicitly, unabashedly political: the journals tended to select for review only those works on which they could loosely peg lengthy ideological pieces, and their literary judgments, buttressed by the authority of anonymity, were rigorously subordinated to their politics (Eagleton, 1984, p. 38).

Further, unlike Defoe, who aimed to make his review an organ of moderation, the tone of the early nineteenth century reviews was the antithesis of moderation, even and perhaps more so, when criticizing literature.

While all three reviews at times exhibited fierce partisanship, Joanne Shattock contends that their party allegiances should not be so strictly defined (1980). She argues that neither the reviews nor their audiences always adhered to party divisions.

Party affiliation and allegiances of other sorts undoubtedly played a part but, interpreted strictly along these lines, a somewhat distorted image of the quarterlies emerges, particularly of their readership. What, in fact, was the composition of this educated, highly intelligent, serious-minded quarterly-reading public? Was it segmented, as [Matthew] Arnold alleged, into Whigs, Tories, nonconformists, and

77 Defoe lamented the partisan rancor of his day, writing in the last issue of the Review, “I acknowledge I cannot find that either recent as in memory or remote as in history, I ever saw, heard, or read the story of any nation, or of this nation, when such heats, such feuds, such rage of men among themselves ever went off without blood. How it should do so now, I know not. Your eyes are upon men and means, without the least deference to the first cause of things; you are erecting party against party, one idol to pull down another, potsherd against potsherd; and if you meet with disappointment, you rage against instruments, as if He that made them all, and can dash them to pieces at His pleasure, had no hand in it; or as if there was some evil in the city, and He had not done it” (Vol. IX, No. 104, June 6, 1713; Payne, p. 67). Defoe later referred to the feuds as “party madness.” While reviews like Defoe’s, Samuel Johnson’s and Addison and Steele’s may have avoided the rancorous tone that the early nineteenth century “great reviews” are said to have adopted, the rancor itself was nothing new to the nineteenth century. Rather, the new eminent periodicals partook in it, whereas the earlier generation of model reviews mainly avoided it.

78 “It is interesting in this respect to contrast the tone of the early eighteenth-century periodicals with that of their early nineteenth-century counterparts. What distinguishes, indeed well-nigh immortalizes, the bourgeois periodical press of the latter period is what one commentator has summarized as its ‘partisan bias, the vituperation, the dogmatism, the juridical tone, the air of omniscience and finality’ with which it conducts its critical business. It is the scurrility and sectarian virulence of the Edinburgh and the Quarterly which have lingered in the historical memory, in dramatic contrast to the ecumenism of an Addison or Steele” (Eagleton, 1984, p. 25-36). Over time, however, the Edinburgh and Quarterly, and even the Westminster, exercised moderation and no longer could be considered “incendiary.”

79 In the first number of the Edinburgh, the review attacked the Lake Poets, not just because the journal did not like their poetry, but also because they did not like their politics, writing that their productions were based on “the anti-social principles and distempered sensibility of Rousseau” (Nesbitt, 1966, p. 8).
High Churchmen? Or was it, in fact, a reasonably homogenous group, vaguely bound by common cultural ties, which read widely if discriminately, sampling most of the reviews available? (Shattock, 1980, p. 96).

Shattock makes similar arguments for the reviewers and reviews, noting in the case of the former, that sometimes a paycheck was more important than party, as reviewers published where they could. Both James and John Stuart Mill published in both the Edinburgh and the Westminster, and many other reviewers of lesser stature could be found in multiple publications.80

The reason for the creation of the Quarterly in 1809 was mainly as a response to the popular Edinburgh and its politics. Tory leaders in London sponsored the new review. As Nesbitt writes, the “review was frankly intended as a political organ, and succeeded admirably in living up to intentions” (Nesbitt, 1966, p. 4). Although it was formulated with a definite political purpose, to combat Whiggism, the Tory Quarterly still maintained a literary rather than political tone. One of its founders was Sir Walter Scott, who previously published in the Edinburgh, leaving the review when it began to assert its Whiggishness too assertively.

The Quarterly saw itself as a review rather than a party paper. However, emulating the review form of the Edinburgh was also a political and tactical strategy. The Quarterly’s editor recognized that the authority of the review’s opinions derived, in large part, from its form. The only way to combat philosophical Whiggism in a review was with another review

80 Fontana writes that “the periodical press, although it reflected the main political and party divisions, could hardly do so with complete fidelity. Contributors were often recruited quite independently of political allegiance. Both the Quarterly and the Westminster employed authors who had at one point written for the Edinburgh; while the Encyclopedia Britannica, under Napier’s editorship, provided further occasion for intellectual exchange across party divisions” (1985, p. 161).
of opposing political opinion. In 1818 and 1819, both the *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly* reached their maximum circulations of around 14,000 copies each. In 1824, the *Westminster Review*, the journal of philosophic radicalism and Utilitarianism, began publication, although somewhat reluctantly. I address the *Westminster* further below.

Understanding the partisanship of the reviews also requires understanding their views on political parties. Biancamaria Fontana (1985) emphasizes the complexity of the *Edinburgh’s* relationship to the Whig Party. She notes that the reviewers themselves were never a unified group, and that they had recurrent disagreements about how explicit the political commitment of the review should be. When Henry Brougham, one of the founders of the review, joined the Whig Party in 1807, the *Edinburgh* took a more partisan turn. However, some of the reviewers felt the journal had gone too far. Fontana argues that the identity of the review was more intellectual than political, and writes that

> their sharing of a common theoretical project exemplified more of the reviewers’ attitude than did the determination to sustain a common party allegiance (Fontana, 1985, p. 7).

The review became the site where the new ideology of nineteenth century Whiggism had its early formation. Perhaps a review too tightly bound to its party affiliation would not have had the freedom to participate in a theoretical project.

The *Edinburgh* also helped to redefine the nature of parties, taking their cue from Edmund Burke’s recent arguments on the role of political parties. Burke envisioned a party system whose partisanship was explicit and aggressive (Fontana, 1985). Parties were not

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81 Sir Walter Scott, the *Quarterly’s* first editor, wrote, “he did not wish the projected review to be principally or exclusively political. That might even tend to defeat its purpose” (Ward & Waller, 2000, Sec. 4, VI, Vol. XII).
82 This question of intellectual versus political identity is taken up further below in Chapter 2.2.
to be merely parliamentary factions. Rather, as the *Edinburgh* expressed, parties should operate throughout the country reflecting di-visions within society and public opinion.

The idea that the Whig party should be a political force *in the country and in public opinion* rather than a parliamentary faction, remained central to the reviewers’ analysis throughout the 1810s and 1820s. The critical question, in the years between 1815 and 1830, became accordingly: which elements of the political nation, which social forces and groups should be identified with the Whigs? (Fontana, 1985, p. 45).

In some sense, the new attitude toward political parties reflected the disciplinary practices of the state. To align the social forces (the population) with one party or another, one first needed to survey them and quantify them in order to then reproduce more members for one’s own party, like the management of the German forests.

While the *Quarterly* was closely tied to the Tories, the *Westminster* did not like political parties, which could have been in part because they lacked one. Over time, however, there would be philosophic radical Members of Parliament. Still, John Stuart Mill writing in the first volume of the *Westminster* considered political parties to be institutions that made public interest subservient to private interests (Collini, Winch, & Burrow, 1983). Attacking a Jeffrey essay on the subject of parties, Mill argued that the party speaking for the general interest would be the party to end all parties.\(^\text{83}\) In the review’s prospectus, the journal wrote:

> The other critical works of the same kind are the saw powerful and efficient advocates of their respective parties, but it is the firm and decided determination of the Editors of the Westminster Review to take part with no faction, to support no body of men, and to perform the duties of the office they have undertaken, and in which they are not untried, as uninfluenced by personal enmity as by personal friendship (quoted in Nesbitt, 1966, p. 35).

\(^{83}\) This argument is very similar to Marx’s argument that the proletariat, a class with a general interest (because it has no particular interest to assert), would be the class to end all class struggle.
Watching from the United States, *The North American Review* noted the new journal’s arrival and took aim at the assertion of non-partisanship from the *Westminster*.

As to being of no party, a position in which the reviewers take pains to make it appear they stand, this is a very good string to strike in the beginning; it will vibrate with notes of melody to the people’s ears; but the thing itself is plainly impossible, in the present state of politics in England. Whoever are not for the ministry are against them; ministerialism is party, and opposition is party; there may be different shades of opposition, and consequently different gradations of party; but still, it is party, and nothing else ("Miscellaneous Notices," 1824, p. 423).

The *North American* commended the *Westminster* on identifying the shared aims of the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly*, describing them as a Scylla and Charybdis, who each in different ways support a tyrannical aristocracy. However, even though the *Westminster* had set a course between these two parties with a common purpose, and while their [the Westminster’s] work may be emphatically styled the *People’s Review*; they are of the party of the people; but, after all, this is a party; and by the reviewers’ own showing, it is a party marked by much stronger lines of distinction from the other two, than they are from each other ("Miscellaneous Notices," 1824, p. 424).

The *Westminster’s* first essay, ostensibly a review of James Shergold Boone’s poem, “Men and Things in 1823,” pays little attention to the poem under “review.” The seventeen-page essay only discusses the poem and its author within the last page or two. The remaining fifteen pages are given to an exposition of the politics of the day and the *Westminster’s* leading argument that government is best entrusted to the people.

Arguing for the increasing importance of the “people,” the radical philosophers of the *Westminster* spoke of a “new power” (Fox, 1824, p. 3). However, this new power belonged to the middle class, not the common masses. According to Nesbitt, the review of

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\[84\] It could be that the *North American* was speaking from experience. The review had over its life span cultivated an appearance of non-partisanship and largely steered clear of political questions.
course meant the middle class. It “was championing certain ‘outs’ who wished to get in” (1966, p. 42).85

The people have made themselves of more importance, and they are felt and acknowledged to be so, by every man that speaks, or writes, upon whatever subject. The manners and spirit of the higher classes would no longer be the sole, or the leading, topics of a dissertation on the state and prospects of the country. They are reduced to their proper dimensions. They have their chapter in the volume along with others, and stand in the index instead of being in the title. The people no longer sit quietly be as spectators, while Whig and Tory, that is, a few great families with their connexions and dependants, and a few pensioned or expectant creatures, play out the political game, in their own way, and for their own benefit (Fox, 1824, p. 2).

With demands for alternative views making their way into the public sphere, the practices of re-viewing reflected this fragmentation and division. In the discussion of politics, the views of “the people” must also be taken into account. The review speaks of members of the House of Commons who now direct their speeches to the gallery, not only to the benches.

The public opinion and its “growing intelligence” is being recognized, the Westminster argues, but the recognition also contributes to its increasing wisdom and importance, being both “cause and effect” (Fox, 1824, p. 6). The recognition comes from both politicians and men of letters along with the institutions that support them. The people represent both votes and new markets for literary products.

The most abstruse controversies, on which the learned used to write in Latin, and discuss as in a secret sitting with closed doors, are now canvassed in cheap tracts, and debated in every village. The book-manufacturers show that respect for the people which all manufacturers show for a new and extensive market. All the standard works of our language make their appearance in cheap editions, or weekly numbers (Fox, 1824, p. 2).86

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85 “James Mill, one of the leading early voices of the review, was no defender of liberty or equality in the abstract. The lower class, ‘brutalized,’ undiscriminating, the prey of violent demagogues, in his opinion obviously could no more be trusted than the aristocracy…. Yet Mill was somewhat ahead of his times; not until eight years later would Parliament pass, and then unwillingly, a Reform Bill giving representation to those whom the Westminster said it hoped to please” (Nesbitt, 1966, p. 42).

86 This increase in the availability of reading materials for a wider public also speaks to the importance of technological developments in the changed materiality of the media ecology. New methods of printing, cheaper inks, different papers contributed to this growing print sphere.
It is because they can purchase literary products that book-manufacturers and sellers are making titles available to them. In other words, the democratization of knowledge in large part depended upon its profitability.\textsuperscript{87}

Boone, the author of the poem under review, deems this democratization of knowledge a "revolution."

It is justly remarked, however, that 'beneath the surface of the present conflict a far wider revolution is going on; and its mainspring, its vivifying principle, is the diffusion of knowledge. The pen is become a far more powerful and effectual weapon than the sword; and they who would oppose the arm of power to the influence of the press, must soon have occasion to rue the hopelessness of the contest' (Fox, 1824, p. 17).

However, he fears this revolution, as political power may fall into the hands of "political enthusiasts, hair-brained speculators, soldiers of fortune, ambitious rebels, [and] hungry, desperate, unprincipled adventurers" (p. 17). To the editors and contributors of the Westminster, this fear might be justified, but the solution is not to take the power away from the people and place it in the hands of government, but to trust the people with that power.

While other quarterlies like the Edinburgh and the Quarterly may have been engaged in a process of revising the state through moderate reforms, improving upon it to meet the needs of their respective parties, the Westminster saw beyond the current state and the power of the Whigs and the Tories. It was not the periodical of a particular party

\textsuperscript{87} The reviews themselves would not have existed if there were no market for them. The Westminster originally attained the services of the publisher Longmans of London. As Nesbitt argues, "Longmans would never have launched into any such expenses without good ground for assurance that Radicalism would either promote, or not prevent the accession of a proportionate number of customers" (1966, p. 35). After reading the attack on the Edinburgh within the Westminster's first issue, Longmans decided to terminate their relationship, as they were also the publisher of the Edinburgh, which was one of its most profitable publications. James Mill then persuaded his own publisher, Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, to undertake publication of the Westminster.
(because at its inception, no philosophical radicals held seats in Parliament), but belonged to an ideological viewpoint critical of the status quo. It imagined a democratic state ruled not by the aristocratic classes, but by the people. Prior to the publication of the Westminster Review, the utilitarian philosophy had not found much influence among the Whigs (and of course, not among the Tories) (Ward & Waller, 2000, Sec. 3, III, Vol. XI). Its political view required institutionalization, including a publication, and representation in Parliament. It acquired both, the former with the creation of the Westminster and the latter with the representation of philosophic radicals, as their political program came to be known.
Interregnum: The Institutionalization of a Way of Seeing

“And it is knowledge of the field itself in which they evolve that allows us best to grasp the roots of their singularity, their point of view or position (in a field) from which their particular vision of the world (and of the field itself) is constructed” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 107).

For Bourdieu, the emergence of a field is also the institutionalization of a particular perspective. If the early journals just discussed practiced a re-view of the state, the formation of the reviews and their institutionalization within an autonomous intellectual field—even a field with different domains, section, layers or divisions—enabled this view with its visions and di-visions. At the same time, the “critic’s” view became subject to its own doxa. Additionally, to have a point of view or perspective on the world also requires a narrowing or concentration of vision. In that respect, the “critic’s” view shares something in common with that of the “cratic’s,” despite perhaps a difference of focus—the object of the gaze, the distance from the object, the magnified sensitivity to the object’s characteristics—along with a difference of scale or measure of value as “censors.” The autonomy of their intellectual field allowed the critics’ view to achieve legitimacy and exercise an influence. It gave them a degree of independence and power. However, the institutionalization of the review form also restricted their independence by setting the “rules” for how their view was formed and applied.

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88 In Pascalian Meditations, Bourdieu analyzes the scholastic field and emphasizes the importance of the scholastic viewpoint to its operations. “Perspective, in its historical definition, is no doubt the most accomplished realization of the scholastic vision. It presupposes a single, fixed point of view—and therefore the adoption of the posture of a motionless spectator installed at a point (of view)—and also the use of a frame that cuts out, encloses and abstracts the spectacle with a rigorous, immobile boundary” (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 21-22). A similar argument can be made for the intellectual field within which the reviews can be placed. The “critics” also had a particular way of viewing and reviewing. As the title Spectator suggests, the reviews practiced a way of seeing, which became institutionalized as the field became more autonomous.
The early reviews emerged as part of a greater intellectual field that came into being in Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In Bourdieu’s essay, “Intellectual field and creative project,” his study reveals that the intellectual field was first born when external legitimizing authorities began to be replaced by a field which could autonomously value its worth creating a competition for cultural legitimacy (1969). Prior to that time, external legitimizing authorities, like the church and the aristocracy, dominated and consecrated intellectual life. They provided patronage and aesthetic standards. Only with the materialization of an autonomous intellectual field could “the condition for the appearance of the independent intellectual” emerge (Bourdieu, 1969, p. 91). Especially in the eighteenth century, institutions of consecration became more complex and diverse. In addition to the journals already discussed, there emerged the academies and salons and coffee houses, as well as publishing houses, theaters, and cultural and scientific associations, along with an expansion and diversification of the public. These different institutions gradually became their own sources of authority.

According to Bourdieu, the intellectual field, as a result, became increasingly complex and independent, governed by a defining logic: competition for cultural legitimacy.

As the areas of human activity became more clearly differentiated, an intellectual order in the true sense, dominated by a particular type of legitimacy, began to define itself in opposition to the economic, political and religious powers, that is all the authorities who could claim the right to legislate on cultural matters in the name of a power or authority which was not properly speaking intellectual (Bourdieu, 1969, p. 90).

But it was not really until the nineteenth century that intellectuals could be said to be autonomous ideologically and economically. With the Romantic movement, the freedom of the creative intention gained greater force, finding its expression in the theory of art-for-art’s sake. In contradiction, intellectuals found autonomy through the development of the
literary and artistic market that pitted commercial concerns against any such Romantic theory of art’s independence.

Rebelling against the conformity of the commercial market and rejecting the need to meet a growing audience’s demands, this early intellectual field split into autonomous and heteronomous divisions, the former being a field of restricted production and the latter one of large-scale production. The autonomous division then values more the cultural capital of the field while not entirely ignoring the economic, and the heteronomous division places more value on the economic capital to be earned while not entirely ignoring the importance of the cultural. Bourdieu writes here that “the ambition for autonomy appears as the specific tendency of the intelligentsia” (1969, p. 94).

The “great reviews” of the nineteenth century discussed in this part exemplify this autonomization of the intellectual field. Unlike the early eighteenth century Tatler and Spectator or Defoe’s Review, which each lasted only a few years or less, the Edinburgh Review, Quarterly Review, and Westminster Review continued to publish for decades, lasting well through the nineteenth century and even into the early twentieth century. Additionally, their editors and contributors could find paid work from other publications, giving them an independence to practice their criticism. Still, many did depend on payment for their work, which required an editor’s or publisher’s approval, and even those that did not need the income valued not only their freedom but also their fame, which necessarily depends on the approval of others within the field. Francis Jeffrey, one of the founders and editors of the Edinburgh, wrote that the journal was created for the purpose of “personal amusement and improvement” and for “the gratification of some personal and some national vanity” (Fontana, 1985, p. 3, emphasis added).
The beginnings of independence of the early eighteenth century journals and its flourishing with the nineteenth century reviews allowed their perspective to acquire cultural legitimacy. Bourdieu’s analysis of the intellectual field then is helpful to understand the emergence of the review practice and its effects. It completes the story of the emergence of the modern state as an object that allowed its critics to coalesce and produce their own authority. Bourdieu argues that studies such as Habermas’s *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1991) are incomplete because they neglect the necessary institutionalization of particular views within autonomous fields that allow the members of those fields to exercise their symbolic capital in other fields such as the economic and political.

To understand this double break [of the emergence of the economy from the symbolic universe and of the various universes of symbolic production from economic concerns], it is not sufficient to take account of one or another of the various social transformations which have accompanied the development of the economic economy, whether the emergence of ‘specialists in practical knowledge’—engineers, technicians, accountants, jurists, doctors—who, as Sartre suggests in his *Plaidoyer pour les intellectuels*, are somehow predisposed, by a mysterious expressive correspondence, to fulfill the role of ‘organic intellectuals of the bourgeoisie’; or the rise of a ‘corporation’ of men of letters, inclined to extend to politics the principle of critical public debate which they have set up in the republic of letters, as Habermas indicates in his analysis of the ‘structural transformations of the public space.’ In fact, all the new agents, who, it is not untrue to say, have

89 Bourdieu explains the double break when he writes, “[o]nly at the end of a slow evolution tending to strip away the specifically symbolic aspect of the acts and relations of production was the economy able to constitute itself as such, in the objectivity of a separate universe, governed by its own rules, those of self-interested calculation, competition and exploitation; and also, much later, in ‘pure’ economic theory which records the social separation and the practical abstraction of which the economic cosmos is the product, while tacitly writing it into the principle of its object construction. But, conversely, it was only by means of a break tending to repress the economic aspect of the specifically symbolic acts and relations of production into the lower world of the economy that the various universes of symbolic production were able to constitute themselves as closed, separate microcosms in which thoroughly symbolic, pure and (from the point of view of the economic economy) disinterested actions were performed, based on the refusal or repression of the element of productive labor that they implied. (The process of autonomization and ‘purification’ of the various universes is moreover far from complete, both on the side of the economy, which still leaves considerable room for symbolic facts and effects, and on the side of symbolic activities, which always have a denied economic dimension)” (2000, p. 19).
contributed to the invention of the universal and even, through the ‘Enlightenment philosophers,’ made themselves its spokesmen, were unable to perform this function only because they were caught up in relatively autonomous fields whose necessity, which they helped to bring about, imposed itself on them (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 19-20).

What is required for this institutionalization and autonomization to occur, which then works upon the field and also allows the field to work upon society so as to help bring about or contribute to those social transformations? To understand the “critic’s” practice, one has to understand the field of the critics, which both structures the practice and is structured by the practice. In other words, an analysis of a review or reviewing practice cannot be made in isolation from the field within which that review operates, and to know the field requires knowledge of its other constituents. Therefore, I use the following framework to analyze the review as an institution of criticism that acts upon the political field, and more specifically, I would position Telos and The Public Interest within this field. I attempt to understand how the intellectual field as it emerged in eighteenth and nineteenth century Western Europe, and which led to the institutionalization of the review form and practice, has changed in its internal make-up as well as in its relationship to other fields, so as to gain insight into the position and practices of American, Cold War journals of the mid-twentieth century.

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90 As Williams writes of the “theory journals,” such as Social Text, diacritics, Boundary2, and Critical Inquiry: “It would be stretching things to say that journals are primary, but they have a hand in creating and shaping an intellectual field. The theory journal, in its profusion and institutional mass, did not only report the developments of theory but created the expectation of theory; like a museum that has a wall of frames of a certain size and color to be filled, it precipitated a certain form of writing. Temporally, the theory journal did not merely gather things after the fact, but prompted the kind of writing known as theory. Perhaps a better way to think of the role that journals have is an analogy to film: while one knows and often identifies film according to its actors and directors, a key part of film history also includes producers and studios. Theory journals are like studios and their editors like producers” (2009, pp. 684-685).
A Framework for Analyzing the Intellectual Field

An analysis in terms of field involves three necessary and internally connected moments. First, one must analyze the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power. In the case of artists and writers, we find that the literary field is contained within the field of power where it occupies a dominated position. (In common and much less adequate parlance: artists and writers, or intellectuals more generally, are a 'dominated fraction of the dominant class.') Second, one must map out the objective structure of the relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions who compete for the legitimate form of specific authority of which this field is the site. And, third, one must analyze the habitus of the agents, the different systems of dispositions they have acquired by internalizing a determinate type of social and economic condition, and which find in a definite trajectory within the field under consideration a more or less favorable opportunity to become actualized (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 104).

Defining the intellectual field is a relational exercise. What is intellectual and what is the intellectual field? They are concepts that have no definition other than systematic ones relative to others. The various fields are differentiated by their underlying logic and the species of capital at stake within the field. Part of the work of defining the intellectual field of these journals is determining what is the specific logic that underlies the field. This notion of logic differentiates fields as no two operate by the same.

In highly differentiated societies, the social cosmos is made up of a number of such relatively autonomous social microcosms, i.e., spaces of objective relations that are the site of a logic and a necessity that are specific and irreducible to those that regulate other fields. For instance, the artistic field, or the religious field, or the economic field all follow specific logics: while the artistic field has constituted itself by rejecting or reversing the law of material profit, the economic field has emerged, historically, through the creation of a universe within which, as we commonly say, 'business is business,' where the enchanted relations of friendship and love are in principle excluded (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 97-98).

If the artistic field’s dominant logic is “art for art’s sake” and the business field’s is profit at the exclusion of all else, then what is the underlying logic of the intellectual field, and more specifically, the logic of the reviews?

Necessarily, the logic of the intellectual field involves a need for autonomy, but can this logic be defined further? Bourdieu gives some other names to this logic: the “cultural
unconscious,” “a modus operandi,” “a mental habit,” and finally, “the cultivated habitus” (1969, pp. 116-118). This shared disposition—a set of values, appraisals, or measures in common—is acquired over time, often being developed within “intellectual training and particularly from his schooling that a thinker participates in his society and his age” (Bourdieu, 1969, pp. 116-117). For example, many of the members of The Public Interest began to form their habitus within “Alcove One” at City College in New York, as discussed further below. Therefore, locating the “habit-forming force[s]” that shaped the logic of the intellectual field is important to my study (p. 117).

These forces may be from schools, but they may also be from social milieus, such as New York’s bohemia, or from antecedent intellectual projects, such as other magazines like the Edinburgh Review or The Tatler or the twentieth-century Partisan Review. Further, this shared cultural logic does not mean that the occupants of the field are in agreement with one another. Even though they may follow similar circuits of thought, they may reach different conclusions. Rather, the shared logic is “that consensus within the dissensus which constitutes the objective unity of the intellectual field of a given period” (Bourdieu, 1969, p. 116). Or perhaps it is a shared project of dissensus within a broader consensus that shapes the intellectual field of a given period. Again, the field can be viewed as a rather autonomous space where individuals and institutions are competing for mastery of a certain form of capital.

There is thus a sort of hermeneutic circle: in order to construct the field, one must identify the forms of specific capital that operate within it, and to construct the forms of specific capital one must know the specific logic of the field. There is an endless to and fro movement in the research process that is quite lengthy and arduous (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 108).
Presumably, for the intellectual field, the species of capital at stake is cultural capital and symbolic capital. Perhaps that capital for the reviews can be more specifically defined as the *theory* they produce or make use of.

To make social theory is frequently to attempt to make history.... Social theories are levers intellectuals use to influence power structures, to facilitate political outcomes, to enable groups interested in exercising control to improve their practice, to justify their ascendancy, to achieve their goals, or to advance their interests (quoting Richard Flacks, Ojeili, 2001, p. 401).

By considering how the journals re-view the state, I also investigate what role this species of capital can play in the other fields, such as the political and economic.

While the political and economic fields may dominate the intellectual field because its occupants do not possess much political or economic capital, some positions within the intellectual field are dominant within the field because they possess a large amount of cultural and/or symbolic capital, or “theoretical capital.” Without it, positions within the intellectual field are further dominated, as

a species of capital is what is efficacious in a given field, both as a weapon and as a stake of struggle, that which allows its possessors to wield a power, an influence, and thus to *exist*, in the field under consideration, instead of being considered a negligible quantity (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98).

Additionally, the “weight” of the species of capital at stake in the intellectual field can be compared to other types of capital that operate in other fields. Can the symbolic capital of the “critics” function as a meta-capital where it can exercise power over other species of capital? Determining the species of capital at stake also allows one to determine the limits of the field.91

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91 “In empirical work, it is one and the same thing to determine what the field is, where its limits lie, etc., and to determine what species of capital are active in it, within what limits, and so on. (We see how the notions of capital and field are tightly interconnected)” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 98-99).
The question of the limits of the field is a very difficult one, if only because it is always at stake in the field itself and therefore admits of no a priori answer.... Thus the boundaries of the field can only be determined by an empirical investigation. Only rarely do they take the form of juridical frontiers (e.g., numerus clausus), even though they are always marked by more or less institutionalized 'barriers to entry' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 100).

According to Bourdieu, "[t]he limits of the field are situated at the point where the effects of the field cease" (1992, p. 101). In other words, the field’s limits begin where the field’s autonomy diminishes. If the autonomy of the field is diminished, then external determinants can bear more forcefully upon the field, possibly causing it to collapse under their weight. Additionally, the shared cultural logic of the field and the functional weight of the species of capital at stake in the field can be viewed as supports within the field.92

The “critics” activity and authority is defined by the position they occupy within the field and their habitus. Autonomous “critics” who may not possess much economic capital, as to be truly autonomous means necessarily to disdain economic capital, may still possess a large amount of cultural capital, making them the dominant within a dominated group. Bourdieu refuted the notion, however, that his analysis leads to the necessary conclusion that intellectuals, or here “critics,” are only self-interestedly motivated in a search for distinction. Rather, he said that his analysis shows that for an intellectual to occupy a distinct position within the intellectual field means that his or her position is different relative to the other position-takings within the field while at the same time being similar in sharing the same capital and adhering to the field’s institutional constraints, or doxa.

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92 According to Bourdieu, “...the external determinants that bear on agents situated in a given field (intellectuals, artists, politicians, or constructions companies) never apply to them directly, but affect them only through the specific mediation of the specific forms and forces of the field, after having undergone a re-structuring that is all the more important the more autonomous the field, that is, the more it is capable of imposing its specific logic, the cumulative project of its particular history” (1992, p. 106).
Defining the autonomous critic within the intellectual field is an exercise that is necessarily relative. As Clyde Barrow argues,

I would suggest that any theorist who wants to argue consistently the autonomy of intellectuals must be able to answer two simple questions: autonomous from whom and relative to what? The concept of autonomy is meaningful only in relation to a specifiable context of institutional and ideological hegemony (Barrow, 1990, p. 256).

The autonomous intellectual field (relative to the fields of power, the political and economic) sets the criteria for what constitutes intellectual production. These criteria then act as gatekeepers to the intellectual field, and setting the criteria becomes an internal struggle for legitimacy. In other words, the reviews, or institutions of criticism, may act in competition with one another, despite perhaps sharing a common project or aim.93

It only gradually became organized into an intellectual field as creative artists began to liberate themselves economically and socially from the patronage of the aristocracy and the Church and from their ethical and aesthetic values; and also as there began to appear specific authorities of selection and consecration that were intellectual in the proper sense...and which were placed in a situation of competition for cultural legitimacy (Bourdieu, 1969, p. 90).

This competition for cultural legitimacy then defines what is intellectual or what is critical work—what constitutes a reviewing practice. So, that what can be considered a review is not an eternal truth but a definition that is dependent on the historical context of the subjects under study. Additionally, defining what is intellectual, or critical, is a struggle for power. For Bourdieu,

[t]he question of the definition of the intellectual, or, rather, of specifically intellectual work, is inseparable from the question of defining the population which can be allowed to participate in this definition (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 269).

The autonomy of the intellectual field then appears as the necessary condition for its existence.

93 Examples of such competition are included below where I discuss some of the “battles” between the left political journals, such as Telos and Dissent.
Bourdieu’s analysis of the intellectual field is then helpful to understand the emergence of the review form, which accompanied the emergence of the autonomous intellectual field. Bourdieu views Emile Zola’s involvement in the Dreyfus Affair in the 1890s as the solidification of the intellectual field’s autonomy. There, the intellectual field exercised its capital and intervened in the field of power and the political field.

[We may see Zola’s *J’accuse* as the culmination of this collective process of autonomization (and emancipation)—a prophetic break with the established order which asserts, in defiance of every *raison d’état*, the irreducibility of the values of truth and justice and, by the same token, the absolute independence of the guardians of these values, the intellectuals, explicitly defined as such in opposition to the constraints and seductions of economic and political life (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 54).

Interestingly enough, by the time of the Dreyfus Affair, the “great reviews” of Great Britain had already reached their peak and the quarterly review was on the wane. Perhaps it can be argued and will be argued below that the autonomization of the intellectual field created too great a distance between itself and society. In other words, as its autonomization increased so did its irrelevance to everyday life.

**Filling the Vacancy within the Field**

Here is a final word on the usefulness of Bourdieu’s field theory to my study. In addition to the insights it provides for mapping the intellectual field and understanding its inner workings and relations to other fields, Bourdieu’s theory also helps explain the impetus to start a review. It too is relational to critics. Very often, a new journal will introduce itself and announce its reason for existence as the response to a perceived *lack* within the intellectual field—all other outlets are filled, while the void or opening beckons. In other words, the critics survey the field and find a hole or gap that they believe can be filled with
the alternative view that they have to offer. I give two examples from nineteenth century American reviews below.

In the *New Englander*’s (1843-1892) first issue, the editors included a prolegomena behind the prospectus, the latter explaining the journal’s editorial ambitions. The purpose of the prolegomena was to inquire as to “whether there is any vacancy in the field” which the new journal could occupy (Kingsley, 1843, p. 4). The section contained brief reviews of the *North American Review*, the *Democratic Review*, the *Southern Review*, the *New York Review*, the *American Biblical Repository*, the *Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review*, the *Christian Examiner*, the *Dial*, the *Christian Spectator*, the *Literary and Theological Review*, and the *American Quarterly Observer*. These eleven journals made up the field that the *New Englander* identified with and sought to join. All the journals were monthlies or quarterlies, as the prolegomena specifically excluded “the daily and weekly journals, the religious and miscellaneous as well as the political,” as well as monthlies that fit into the two classes of “literature of amusement” or “those devoted to specific religious objects or enterprises” (Kingsley, 1843, p. 4). After reviewing the field and its occupants, some of who had already exited the field, the editors stated:

Thus, where there were three quarterly magazines for religious and general literature, we now find none. Admitting that there was not room enough for three—admitting even that they crowded each other from the field—it does not follow that in the absence of them all, there is not room for our undertaking. The New Englander does not offer itself as the successor of all the periodicals which have been named, or of any one of them. It cannot expect to please all of all parties. It does not pledge itself to please any party. Its conductors will utter their own opinions at their own discretion (Kingsley, 1843, p. 8).

So, in part, the high rate of failure among periodicals made space for the new venture, but at the same time, the review’s purported desire to survey the field in order to discover if any free space existed may not really have been its aim. Whether or not it found room
(which it presumably would have looked for before deciding to publish and not after having decided to publish), it is unlikely that the review’s founder and editors would have decided not to go ahead if the field appeared packed, although the review did acknowledge that it would not continue to publish if it met no success, measured in terms of subscriptions. Rather, the “survey” allowed the review to distinguish itself from its competitors. It was an act of “position-taking,” filling a purported gap.

Another periodical to make a similar survey was Putnam’s Monthly: A Magazine of Literature, Science and Art. In 1853, the journal published its first issue which included an “Introductory” that began with a very flowery analogy comparing the starry sky to the field of periodical literature. Much like the New Englander, the new magazine wanted to assure its readers that there was enough room for another magazine. By 1850, about 600 magazines were already in existence in the United States.

Astronomers assert that the nebulous mist with which the ether is charged is perpetually taking form—that the regions of space are but a celestial dairy, in which the milky way is for ever churned into stars. Nor do the new stars extinguish the old; for, as the thirteenth man in the omnibus always says—there is room for one more. It will not, therefore, surprise the public to see a new Magazine (Putnam & Co., 1853, p. 1).

Despite its flowery opening, the magazine would shun the sentimental style of then popular magazines such as Harper’s and practice a more critical commentary. Since it appealed to the more intellectual and politically liberal, it did not reach the same size audience as Harper’s and averaged about 16,000 readers monthly. Therefore, while there may always be “room for one more” within the intellectual field, a journal requires an audience to transmit its view. The British “great reviews” of the nineteenth century in part earned their status as “great,” due to the dominant positions they occupied within the intellectual field and the size of the audience they commanded.
Incorporating Media Ecology into Field Analysis

To help me to discern changes to the field, I will also use medium theory or media ecology. Medium theorists such as Regis Debray, Ronald Deibert, Harold Innis, Marshall McLuhan, and Joshua Meyrowitz (2000; 1997; 2007; 1962; 1985) have all distinguished between communication epochs characterized “by dominant forms of media that absorb, record, and transform information into systems of knowledge consonant with the institutional power structure appropriate to the society in question” (Deibert, 1997, p. 24). An explanation of terms is probably helpful here. Different from what is traditionally considered media studies, the fields of medium theory, media ecology and mediology largely began from the work of McLuhan and Innis, Postman, and Debray, respectively. The work in each of these fields shares much in common, and the terms that define them can be used fairly interchangeably.

The central proposition of medium theory is that changing modes of communication have effects on the trajectory of social evolution and the values and beliefs of societies. Medium theory traces these effects to the unique properties of different modes of communication -- to the way information is stored, transmitted, and distributed through different media at different times in history. It focuses on the material properties of communications environments rather than on the content of the message being conveyed, hence McLuhan’s well-worn quip: “the medium is the message” (Deibert, 1997, pp. ix-x).

Or put another way:

Medium theory stands apart from more generic “media theory” in its exploration of the influences of communication technologies in addition to, and distinct from, the specific content (messages) they convey. Medium theorists argue that media are not simply channels for transmitting information between two or more environments, but are themselves distinct social-psychological settings or environments that encourage certain types of interaction and discourage others. Medium theory analyzes differences among communication environments. Medium theory focuses on the characteristics of each medium (or of each type of medium) that make it physically, socially, and psychologically different from other media. Thus, medium theorists study how television differs from radio, but also how electronic media (including TV and radio) differ from print media (such as books, magazines, and newspapers). Medium theory also examines how communications through a
particular medium or type of medium compare and contrast with face-to-face interaction. The singular “medium” is used in the name of the theory to highlight the focus on the particular characteristics of each medium (Meyrowitz, 2008, p. n/a, emphasis added).

The emphasis on communication environments in Meyrowitz’s definition of medium theory explains the other name for this field as “media ecology.” In Postman’s succinct definition, “media ecology is the study of media as environments.”

Debray’s field of “mediology” somewhat differs from medium theory or media ecology in that it looks beyond traditional communication media to study other human artifacts such as structures within the built environment that also transmit information and ideologies through time (Murphy, 2007).94 What all three fields strongly share in common is an emphasis on the, perhaps obvious, argument “that ideas have no force of persuasion in themselves, but need the intervention of technological and institutional vectors to intervene in society and transform it” (Vandenberghe, 2007, p. 28). In a sense, I am mapping the media ecology of these journals, noting how the different mediums of transmission, the production processes, communication media, institutions, institutionalized discourses, and intellectuals interrelate.

The small, print political journal, essentially independent of academia, functions as a particular site of transmission within a media ecology now becoming dominated by the digital. These journals are the material products of specific individuals with differing goals, agendas, and political doctrines, specific institutions, specific technologies, and specific processes of production and distribution. They are collectively produced and collectively

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94 Arguably, the analysis present in Chapter 1.1, “The Modern State’s Disciplinary Practice of Review” can also be understood as a mediological study. “The study of the idea of a nation become ‘mediological’ when its connection to its networks is excavated—roads, railways, postal routes, telegraph lines, electricity” (Debray, 1999).
understood. If they have been transformed or eclipsed, then why is this so and what implications does this transformation carry? How does the political economy of intellectual production affect their publication? As Philip Elliott argued almost thirty years ago, an emphasis on revenue production, or from the academic viewpoint, on tenure obtainment, has made outlets for intellectual thought that might not accomplish either more obsolete.

The results of relying on these forms of the market [which reduces supply to meet effective demand] are already apparent in the press where the only viable form of journalism is that founded on definable markets as in the leisure interest magazine field....By contrast the political journal and political content is being squeezed out and with it one locus for the operations of critical intellectuals, one forum through which they have contributed to the formulation of policy within the nation state. In so far as politics is not a consumable product, there is no advertising revenue on which political journalism can rely for the support of its services (Elliott, 1982, p. 249).

If independent political journals are lost, then do we also lose the capability for some discourses, for the transmission of certain ideas, or for certain modes of inquiry? I think the quick answer is yes. We lose a method of inquiry that is deeper, more ruminating, reflective, extensive, continuous, challenging, and even bolder. But can I prove this? No. What means could I employ to justify my answer, to offer evidence in its support? There have been many arguments deployed in recent years that changes in our media ecology are transforming the way we think and process information. However, those also have been only arguments, not irrefutable proof. I think, or hope, that people who also value independent political/intellectual journals and believe they contribute something to our political understanding that is worth keeping will continue to produce and read them.

There do seem to be fewer places where critical thought can occur on the page. However, this deficit seems to be something noticed by each generation. Meanwhile, new journals continue to emerge. In recent years, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, a new quarterly
begun in 2006, and *Jacobin*, a glossy magazine whose first issue appeared in the winter of 2011, serve as examples that the impulse to create forums for critical thought is by no means dead. *Democracy*’s opening editorial read:

What could be more anachronistic—in the media culture and political climate of 2006—than the founding of a quarterly journal of ideas? In light of the venomous screeds, discourses on ‘framing’ and political positioning, or any of the other obsessions progressives have adopted of late, who would think that there was an appetite for a meaningful discussion devoted to facts and the basic questions of progressive philosophy? It’s almost as if we were to announce the return of poodle skirts and pet rocks. But we believe that, to regenerate the strength of the progressive movement, big ideas are vitally important. And *Democracy* represents our bet—and the bet of our supporters—that they will matter (Baer & Cherny, 2006, p. 1).

*Jacobin*’s introduction subverts the hopefulness of *Democracy*’s vision but still seeks an audience for a critical view. I quote from it at length:

Publications with tiny audiences have a knack for mighty pronouncements. A grandiloquent opening, some platitudes about resurrecting intellectual discourse followed by issue after issue of the same old shit. We can admire the confidence of our peers, but there is something pathological about this trend. These delusions stem from a well-warranted sense of impotence. The intellectual was born out of, and thrived throughout, the twentieth century, but left a mixed legacy. Perhaps the death of the public intellectual is deserved. And yet, *Jacobin* was founded on the premise that there still is an audience for critical commentary. A survey of the political outlets today yields two kinds of publications. The esoteric ones, sites of deliberate obfuscation, utterly disconnected from reality. They find their foils in unchallenging rags that treat their readers like imbeciles. With mainstream pretenses, high school yearbook prose, and rosy reports of mass movements in the making, their role is even more disorienting. We aspire to avoid both traps. Substantive engagement does not preclude entertainment. Discarding stale phrases and ideas does not necessitate avoiding thought itself. Voicing discontent with the trappings of late capitalism does not mean that we can’t grapple with culture at both aesthetic and political levels. Sober analysis of the present and criticisms of the Left does not mean accommodation to the status quo (Sunkara, 2011, p. 1).

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95 *Jacobin*’s editor, Bhaskar Sunkara, is/was an undergraduate student at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. when he began the publication. The first issue contains articles by Sunkara, along with Seth Ackerman, James Heartfield, and Peter Frase, among others, and interviews with Walter Benn Michaels and Aziz Nafisi. Its brash tone is reminiscent of *n+1*, another critical print publication which began in 2004.
It would be interesting to create an anthology of editorial introductions from independent political journals. There would be more similarity than difference, as seen in the examples reproduced here. This dissertation explores the field they share and their common founding impulse. It tries to understand what generates this impulse and its ultimate effects.
Chapter 2.2  The Institutionalization of the Reviews: A Home for Symbolic Action

“But what is often in the desire to purge the phrase ‘activist intellectual’ of its oxymoronic connotations is that intellectuals are already actors, although in a very special sense. The intellectual is always engaged in symbolic action, which involves the externalization of this thought in any number of ways. ‘Men of ideas’ are noteworthy only when their ideas are communicated to others through one medium or another. The critical edge of intellectual life comes largely from the gap that exists between symbol and what for want of a better word can be called reality. Paradoxically, by attempting to transform themselves into the agency to bridge that gap, they risk forfeiting the critical perspective it provides. What usually suffers is the quality of their work, which degenerates into propaganda. The critical intellectual is in a sense less engage when he is self-consciously partisan than when he adheres to the standards of integrity set by his craft” (Jay, 1973, pp. xxviii-xxix).

As stated in Chapter 2.1, the political view of the Westminster, that of the philosophical radicals, depended upon its institutionalization in the review form in order to support its intervention in the political field. I argue that political writing thatwrights politics requires institutionalization in some form. It also requires the distance that such institutionalization affords. In the nineteenth century, an established and respected review was an effective form for political writing to inhabit.

In the twenty-first century, discerning an effective form is more difficult because the contemporary media ecology contains several mediums and many possible forms. Interestingly, in 2008, the City University of New York’s (CUNY) graduate program in Political Science created a new specialization in “Writing Politics.” CUNY describes the new specialization as follows:

The Writing Politics specialization will train students to write serious political analysis for an educated audience outside of the discipline. This type of political writing, a form of literary journalism or creative non-fiction, can be found in many widely read publications like the New York Review of Books, Harper’s, DISSENT Magazine or the New Yorker, or in books of trade. This specialization, the first of its kind in the political science academy, helps political scientists reach a larger audience and become involved in the public sphere, where diverse sets of ideas and views are shared and debated (CUNY, 2008).

The specialization requires three courses: a seminar on writing politics, a workshop on writing politics, and the choice between courses on the role of public intellectuals. I
mention the new program because it supports my argument that effective political writing requires institutionalization. The CUNY program also underscores the criticism that academic writing for the most part does not travel outside the academic field.

In the early nineteenth century, the reviews acted as their own “schools” for the production of effective political writing. They were self-instituting institutions of criticism because they created a new form of political writing that was shaped not only by its “organized matter” (the equipment) but also by its “materialized organization” (the institution) (Debray, 2000). In other words, it was the institution itself that produced the authority of the reviews and largely shaped their contents. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, while the reviews were primarily concerned with issues of politics, their first loyalty was to a standard of thought or criticism, not to a party. Meaning, first, they were institutions of criticism, or intellectual institutions, then, they were political institutions. The reviews took positions in the intellectual field, not the political field, and they used their positions within the intellectual field to influence politics. I turn now to an exploration of the “great reviews” as self-instituting institutions of criticism.

While a Whig journal, the *Edinburgh* did not toe as strong a political line as the more radical and dogmatic *Westminster Review*.96 In fact, Lewis Coser’s study of nineteenth century British reviews in his book *Men of Ideas* specifically focuses on the two journals, because in his opinion they represent the two major varieties of modern reviews: “the first, the broad review of opinion and the second, the more narrow mouthpiece for a particular set of doctrines” (1997, p. 73). Indeed, James Mill in the first issue of the *Westminster*

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96 “While [earlier reviews] had often been fresh and provocative, they had never been particularly radical; *The Westminster Review* was, by contrast, militant and dogmatically committed to the radical verities” (Coser, 1997, p. 78).
criticized the *Edinburgh* for circumventing major political questions in order to have a broad appeal (Mill, 1824). As Fontana argues, the success of the *Edinburgh* and the review form—its popularization—fragmented philosophic Whiggism, dissipating the very identity of this political ideology. Over time, as more people read the reviews and as the reviews catered more to the tastes of their enlarged readerships, the elitism of the reviews and the “philosophical” side of their political thought was lost. The *Westminster* and its attention to “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” helped bring this about. However, when the reviews began, they measured themselves against a high standard of criticism and thought that anchored their political opinions and philosophy. The motto found on the cover of the *Edinburgh* read “*judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur*, Publius [Publilius] *Syrus,*” translated as “the judge is condemned when the guilty is acquitted.” Similarly, the *London and Westminster Review*, the outcome of the joining of the two reviews in 1834, contained a quotation of John Locke on its title page:

> “Those who have not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets, must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others; and are unreasonable in imposing that as truth on other men’s belief which they themselves have not searched into, nor weighed the arguments of probability on which they should receive or reject it.”
> Locke, *Essay on Human Understanding*

The reviews may not have always met the standard they set. Some critics looking back find the reviews lacking critical depth.97 Literary criticism in certain small circulation

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97 Gross writes: “It is hard for a modern reader not to feel in two minds about the reviews. They presupposed widespread public interest in many topics which have since been handed over almost exclusively to students and specialists; they offered serious writers an enviable amount of space, to say nothing of handsome rates of pay; they set a precedent for the solid journals of opinion—what the Russians call the ‘thick journals’—which were to play such a central role in the intellectual life of 19th century Europe and America. On the other hand, they were unashamed vehicles for party propaganda, often of the narrowest kind, and generally too overbearing and coarse-grained in their approach to encourage criticism of much depth. They were not even particularly well written. In the mid-Victorian period Leslie Stephen was startled, turning up the early volumes of the *Edinburgh*, to find how much padding and slack workmanship they contained, how threadbare they seemed in
periodicals like T. S. Eliot’s *The Criterion* or the Leavis’s *Scrutiny* may have improved upon their “great review” predecessors. Still, for that time, the seriousness and insightfulness of the reviews’ criticism, particularly in matters of politics, is evident.\(^98\) These were not just shouting matches between partisans transcribed, although there was some shouting. The reviews’ essays practiced a relatively high level of discourse and a willingness to train their critique upon their own assumptions and parties.

What distinguished the partisanship of the reviews from the party press was its level of discourse and its willingness to turn its criticism inwards. Reviews like the *Edinburgh* and *Westminster* supported Whiggism and radicalism, respectively, but their partisanship was of a philosophical kind. The ideology of the *Westminster* was labeled “philosophic Radicalism.” This emphasis on thought and ideas was not only a matter of content but also a matter of style. Shattock refers to the *Edinburgh*’s “philosophical Whiggishness” and writes that

Whiggism in its terms was not a creed but a character:\(^99\) “The exact mind which of all others dislikes the stupid adherence to the *status quo*, is the keen, quiet, improving Whig mind; the exact kind of writing most adapted to express that dislike is the cool, pungent, didactic essay.” As such, the *Edinburgh* had an appeal for all thinking men with vaguely liberal sympathies. It was not a sectarian organ. It produced as [Walter] Bagehot had said, ‘suitable views for sensible persons.’ It was essential

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\(^98\) R. G. Cox writing in *Scrutiny* had the following to say about the quality of the “great reviews”: “The critical vigilance of the Reviews when faced with the unequal, the mediocre, or the utterly worthless, could be illustrated from almost any number” (1937, p. 169), and “[t]hey consistently refused to pretend that excellence was ‘common and abundant,’ and with their extraordinary influence and authority, they played the major part in creating for the writers of their age that informed, intelligent and critical public without which no literature can survive for very long, and which is so conspicuously lacking to-day” (p. 175).

\(^99\) Or what Bourdieu might deem a “*habitus.*”
reading, in other words, for that intelligent, educated, serious-minded body, the quarterly-reading public (1980, p. 101).100

As Collini, et al. (1983) argue, perhaps more of the dispute between the Edinburgh and the Westminster was a disagreement over method and style rather than the political proposals for reform.101 Francis Jeffrey, the first editor of the Edinburgh, charged James Mill, a contributor to the Edinburgh in addition to helping found the Westminster, with Jacobinism. Thomas Macaulay, a contributor to the Edinburgh, believed that the philosophical Radicals’ or Utilitarians’ deduction of the “Science of Government from the principles of human nature” was “utterly impossible” (quoted in Collini, et al., 1983, p. 101). The group around the Westminster was charged with following the tradition of the French philosophes, which they did not deny, since the thought of the philosophes had produced results. In 1837, John Stuart Mill explained the meaning of “philosophic radicals,” writing in the Westminster,

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100 Shattock also writes about the fine line the review tread between being viewed as a ministerial journal and criticizing the Whig establishment in the government. She quotes correspondence from Thomas Macaulay, a contributor to the Edinburgh, and Lord John Russell, a Whig politician. “Both Macaulay and Lord John Russell among others were insistent that although the Edinburgh was a Whig review it should on no account feel obliged to support all government measures and consequently never to offer criticism. ‘I do not think that the Edinburgh Review ought to be under the same restraints under which a Whig Cabinet is necessarily placed,’ Macaulay wrote. ‘It should expound and defend the Whig theory of government; a theory from which we are forced sometimes to depart in practice.’ Russell echoed the sentiment: ‘I must repeat that, although a general concurrence of views between the Edinburgh Review and the bulk of the Whig party is very desirable, it would injure both the party and the Review, if the writers in the Review were checked in their general observations, or the party bound to enforce practically all that is speculatively beneficial’” (1980, p. 101).

101 Collini et al. write “[t]he new radical language and diagnosis [of the Utilitarians] abandoned or drastically modified every concept in the Whig theory—mixed constitution, ‘balance,’ ‘interest,’ ‘public good,’ ‘checks,’ ‘party,’ and ‘liberty.’ Instead of conducting constitutional debate in terms of whether the balance within the mixed constitution had been shifted unduly in a monarchical or popular direction, by the strengthening or weakening either of royal or executive ‘influence’ on the one hand, or of popular, extra-parliamentary ‘opinion’ on the other, the Utilitarians made a bid to shift the arena of debate from such ‘means’ treated as ‘ends’ towards acceptance of a single end defined as the greatest happiness of the greatest number, according to which the fitness of all institutional means could be assessed without regard to the institutions that actually existed and the traditions which they embodied” (1983, pp. 105-06).
Those whom...we call philosophic radicals, are those who in politics observe the practice of philosophers—that is, who, when they are discussing means, begin by considering the end, and when they desire to produce effects, think of causes ("England Under Seven Administrators," quoted in Collini, et al., 1983, p. 91).

Further, reviews like the Edinburgh, the Quarterly, and the Westminster maintained an independence that earlier reviews may not have achieved (Coser, 1997). This allowed them to practice a criticism more autonomous from social and market forces.

The [Edinburgh] Review’s independence of judgment was one of the reasons for its success. Although earlier reviews had upon occasion published severely critical pieces, The Edinburgh Review was the first to pay sustained attention to critical standards. From its inception, it gave notice that it would not hesitate to attack even established reputations. Half the review articles in the first issue were adversely critical pieces. They were written with wit and incisiveness and contrasted most favorably with the tepid style readers had been accustomed to in other periodicals (Coser, 1997, p. 76).102

The Edinburgh, according to Harold Innis, “broke upon a stagnant political and literary world” (1942, p. 7).103 Nesbitt similarly writes that at the time of the Edinburgh’s birth, “there was no critical journal worth reading” (1966, p. 4). The inheritors of the Scottish Enlightenment used the review as a forum to continue discussions primarily of political economy, following the example of its short-lived namesake to which Adam Smith contributed.104 As the first publication to successfully establish the new review form, the

102 Still, while the reviews combined literature and politics in their criticism, they did not always deviate from the cultural consensus. Gross writes that Francis Jeffrey, the first editor of the Edinburgh was largely a “spokesman for the approved view of things, the polite consensus. He saw himself as a public watch-dog sniffing out heretics, an official observer (his own phrase) representing traditional values which—or so he announced in the first number of the Edinburgh—it was ‘no longer lawful to question’” (1969, p. 3).
103 Innis also writes that “[t]he deterioration of English journalism and restrictions on newspapers were in part responsible for the appearance of the Edinburgh Review in 1802. Scottish influence was again in evidence as a competitive corrective. The system of education in England which had been dominated by the clergy, supported monopolies in control of knowledge while the system of national education in Scotland provided a background for healthy competition.” Additionally, “[l]ower printing costs favored publishing activity in Edinburgh” (1942, p. 7).
104 The first Edinburgh Review began in 1755 but lasted only two issues.
*Edinburgh* became and remained the standard against which other reviews were measured.

In the minds of the editors and proprietors of almost every quarterly review founded subsequently was the ambition, admitted or not, of imitating, challenging, or overthrowing its position.... Almost from its inception the *Edinburgh* became the review for which most reviewers wished to write and in which authors wished to be reviewed (Shattock, 1980, p. 99).\(^{105}\)

Fontana similarly notes that while the *Edinburgh* has received surprisingly little systematic investigation, it was the “first major vehicle for the popularization of the doctrines of political economy in 19th-century Britain” (1985, p. 2). Further, and important to my argument, it also was “a most fertile and influential workshop for their application to the political and social problems of the time” (1985, p. 3).

The print run of the *Edinburgh*’s first issue in 1802 was 750 copies. By 1814, its circulation had reached 13,000. Fontana writes that

the distinctive character of the *Edinburgh Review* as an intellectual enterprise was exactly that of a popular encyclopedia of both natural and moral sciences, a principled digest of philosophical and scientific opinions for the consumption of the educated middle classes (1985, p. 95).\(^{106}\)

As the review aged, its politics pushed more to the foreground, and its political opponents took notice.\(^{107}\)

Still, whatever partisanship they displayed, it was tame to what occurred in other publications, mainly newspapers. Defoe, Addison, and Steele may have helped legitimize

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\(^{105}\) The *Edinburgh* also exercised its influence in the United States where pirated copies were sold. Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote to Margaret Fuller, “Why should we read many books when the best books do not now avail us to yield that excitement and solid joy which fifteen years ago an article in the Edinburgh...would give?” (quoted in Shattock, 1980, p. 99).

\(^{106}\) Fontana writes that the promotion of political economy remained the “star achievement” of the review (1985, p. 111). She also argues that political economy organized the thought of the *Edinburgh* because the driving question after the French Revolution was “on what basis could one hope to design political institutions suitable for modern commercial society?” (p. 10).

\(^{107}\) As noted above, this is one of the main reasons why the *Quarterly*, the Tory publication, began.
the profession of author and editor. However, being a journalist continued to be considered a rather degrading occupation. An exception was made for those associated with the “great reviews.” A friend supporting John Gibson Lockhart’s decision to become editor of the Quarterly wrote,

Your accepting the editorship of a newspaper would be infra dig and a losing of caste; but not so I think accepting of the editorship of the Quarterly Review.... An editor of a Review like the Quarterly is the office of a scholar and a gentleman; but that of a newspaper is not, for a newspaper is merely stock-in-trade to be used as it can be turned to most profit (William Wright, quoted in Innis, 1942, p. 6).¹⁰⁸

Eagleton argues that the increased venom in the reviews was a product of the impingement of outside forces on the “public sphere”:

What distinguishes these polemics from the bellicose exchanges of earlier Whigs and Tories is their class-function: they are at root reactions to a threat to the public sphere itself from organized social interests beyond it (1984, p. 38).

Those organized interests Eagleton identifies as a “counter-public sphere,” made up of the working-class and radical organizations that manifested themselves in the London “Corresponding Societies, the radical press, Owenism, Cobbett’s Political Register and Paine’s Right of Man, feminism and the dissenting churches” (1984, p. 36). The Westminster’s general denunciation of the periodical form was aimed not only at the

¹⁰⁸ Francis Jeffrey, editor of the Edinburgh, similarly wrote that “[t]he most disgusting peculiarity of the present times is the brutal scurrility and personality of the party press, originally encouraged by ministers, though I believe they would now gladly get rid of it; but from their patronage and general appetite for scandal it has become too lucrative a thing to be sacrificed to their hints, and goes on, and will go on, for the benefit and at the pleasure of the venal wretches who supply it” (quoted in Innis, 1942, pp. 6-7 note 15). Jeffrey however also expressed his reservations about the Edinburgh, writing “[t]he risk of sinking in the general estimation and being considered as fairly articled to a trade that is not perhaps the most respectable has staggered me more, I will acknowledge than any other consideration” (quoted in Innis, 1942, p. 7 note 15).
Edinburgh and the Quarterly but also at the radical press, who they believed equally exchanged immediacy, what grabbed attention, for measured thought.109

A New Institutional Home for the Practice of Politics?

What separated the reviews from other institutions of thought? In an essay titled, “The Great Reviews,” R. G. Cox (1937) writing for Scrutiny laid out the three historical functions of serious reviews. According to Cox, the great reviews provided 1) a focus for current movements of thought and opinion, 2) a means of livelihood and a field of action for the middlemen of letters, and 3) an authoritative expression of critical standards (p. 2).

First, they fostered an exchange of ideas, much like the coffeehouses, by “providing a focus for current movements of thought and opinion.” In this sense, they operated as a print public sphere—this sphere was neither unified nor universal but rather represented many di-visions. However, even if room existed for a variety of reviews and other periodicals, they, taken together, created a critical milieu that contributed to the critique of the state’s view, whether or not it was ever complete or uniform.

Second, the reviews professionalized writing and reviewing by providing a decent living from it, thereby creating an institutional home for writers. This not only materially provided for the writers, but it also gave them a platform from which they could express themselves and find an audience. In other words, the reviews gave writers “a means of livelihood and a field of action.”

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109 Of all the radical publications then in existence, only the Westminster would attain the legitimacy and authority of the review form, soon forming a triumvirate with the Edinburgh and Quarterly as the publications that mattered, despite their different politics. I discuss the Westminster’s critique in more detail below.
Third, the reviews built and maintained a critical tradition, through “an authoritative expression of critical standards” (Cox, 1937, p. 2). They told people what to think. Denys Thompson likened this role of nineteenth century journalism to one of the functions of the church, citing Stead on Morley, who wrote, “To him a newspaper was simply a pulpit from which he could preach” (Denys Thompson, 1935, p. 30).

Cox also argued that the function of the critical reviews served as a replacement for the “conversation and personal contacts of a small and compact society” by focusing critical discussion (1947, p. 267). Coser writes about the reviews as the British equivalent of the French salon (1997). They comprised an institutional setting for intellectual activities. They became necessary as the public who visited the coffeehouses became larger and more separate. As Coser writes,

> although authors no longer necessarily had that close personal contact with one another that had characterized the coffeehouse, they grouped themselves around the [Edinburgh] Review, sharing in a common universe of ideas. For many, the Review provided not only intellectual contact but also the setting for personal meetings. The editorial office became a kind of informal forum where writers would meet with one another, the editor, or, upon occasion, a reader (1997, p. 77).

Early eighteenth-century papers like the Tatler had already begun the substitution of a print public sphere or public culture for the face-to-face culture of the coffeehouses. The reviews continued this trend, linking together writers and readers. However, as the quotation above makes clear, they also brought writers and sometimes writers and readers back together to that face-to-face immediacy that print lacks.

Cox also articulated the “ideal function of the literary review,” something he noted to which “founders of serious periodicals during the last thirty years have devoted much thought” (1947, p. 264). He began with T. S. Eliot who advocated the ideal review as a tendency rather than a program, which is “residual from the play of the individual opinions
of the editor and contributors” (p. 265). Eliot also spoke of the ideal review as vehicle for opinion by saying that the review was

‘[n]ot for the haphazard opinion of a miscellaneous group of writers, or for the opinion of an individual or for the drilled opinion of a school or order, but for the various, divergent, or even contradictory opinion of a widening group of individuals in communication’ (quoted in Cox, 1947, p. 265).

This “corporate personality” of a review allowed room for disagreement but still demonstrated a tendency in its thought. By serving as institutional “group” homes, the “great reviews” became places where men of like (a)vocation could interact. Moreover, this practice allowed a common voice to develop. Often, the reviews did not publish signed articles, preferring a collective “we” or corporate personality (Coser, 1997). Rather than a collection of opinions, the reviews were editorial collectives and advanced a particular mode of thought.

The practice of anonymous reviews not only encouraged the reviewers to be more forthright in their opinions but also assigned the authority of the opinion to the review itself.110 Institutionalizing this authority within an impersonal publication increased the perception of its infallibility. As Nesbitt writes, “[t]his assumption of infallibility added much to the vigor and incisiveness of the articles. Apparently it awed the reading public.... For both [the Edinburgh and the Quarterly] prospered exceedingly” (1966, p. 5).

The American journal, the New Englander, a largely theological organ, sought a similar authority from a more corporate voice. It made a distinction between journals that

110 This represented a change from the papers of Defoe and Addison and Steele where the authority of opinion resided within the man itself. By transferring the authority to the institution, the “great reviews” could outlast any one editor or contributor. Moreover, they gave authority to criticism as an institution rather than to a particular critic.
publish a variety of opinions and reviews that speak their own mind and actively censor opinions.

Its functions therefore in its proper department are analogous to those of the American Journal of Science, rather than to those of a popular Review, which aspires to be a censor of opinions and of parties, and to speak its own mind on whatever topic it undertakes to handle (Kingsley, 1843, p. 5).

As it had stated in its prospectus, the New Englander sought to align itself with the latter type of periodical. Like the “popular Review,” and unlike the scholarly American Journal of Science, it would present its opinions in a common voice. In other words, as Steele stated in the first issue of The Tatler, it would tell people what to think and not present all opinions “objectively” side by side. Further, the journal made it clear that while a variety of topics would be discussed, there would be a consistency to rather than a diversity of opinions.

It will claim the privileges of a corporation in the republic of letters, a person in law, with an individuality and character of its own, and with its own opinions to profound and defend (Kingsley, 1843, p. 2).

The journal chose to buck the trend of relying upon the names of its contributors for its success and presenting a variety of opinions to appeal to a wider audience. Instead, it chose to have a particular point of view. This perspective would be ensured by a collective method of management. A committee of six men, including the quarterly’s owner, would make the editorial decisions.

The “corporate personality” of the reviews can be thought of in terms of the distinction between the universal and specific intellectual along with Bourdieu’s reconciliation of these types. This dichotomy in the theorizing of intellectuals arose in France. Jean Paul Sartre perhaps both created and embodied his self-defined role of the universal intellectual. Embracing the position of the ultimate engage, Sartre, and others like him, returned to the Platonic ideal of the intellectual as critical adviser on all matters.
important to state and society. Similarly, Edward Said (2002) saw the intellectual as the one who “speaks truth to power.” Opposing the seeming self-importance and the necessarily transcendent position of a universal intellectual, Foucault proposed the role of the specific intellectual, who would only speak to the body of knowledge that constituted that intellectual’s domain. Since Foucault’s archaeologies and genealogies were only supposed to be read for themselves as such and not transported into other discourses, it made sense that an intellectual should also not intervene in a discourse which he/she had not studied. Bourdieu attempted to combine the universal and specific intellectual by outlining a program for a universal intellectual that is a composite or corporative association of specific intellectuals (Bourdieu, 1989). Achieving the best of both worlds, intellectuals could speak more truth to power and know what they were talking about. In many ways, the “great reviews” anticipated Bourdieu’s corporation of intellectuals and created an authoritative “we,” which while still allowing for differences, embraced a common tendency of thought. This function of the corporate personality may also have led to the view of journals in the 1960s and 70s in the U.S. as the new form of political organization, a party press albeit without a party, as my introduction argues.\(^{111}\)

The reviews and other forms of “higher journalism” also “provided many intelligent people with a livelihood and an opportunity of using their talent without feeling that it was

\(^{111}\) As Duncan Thompson wrote of his study of the *New Left Review*: “The fact that one may attempt to write such a history of a journal ‘underscores the extent to which the internal life of the *NLR* assimilated certain features of the *modus operandi* of a semi[-]clandestine revolutionary organization’—what one far from hostile commentator reputedly designated a ‘common-law variety of democratic centralism.’ In the unusual case of the *New Left Review*, certain key texts may be treated less as individually authored essays than as collective pronouncements.... It is much more like a party journal, tied to the fortunes of the parent organization—save that for the *NLR* there was no such organization beyond the romance of the proto-party, embodied in the ‘fantasy politburo’ of the editorial committee (2007, p. xii). This new form of political organization is also reflected in the “*Telos* groups,” which are discussed below in Chapter 3.2.
wasted” (Denys Thompson, 1935, p. 30). The fact that the reviews paid their authors further institutionalized the form and the vocation of the critic. The *Edinburgh* paid rates that had not been seen before and forced its authors to accept payment, so there would be no division between “dilettantes” and “professionals” (Coser, 1997). Being able to earn a living through criticism allowed reviewing to become a profession that attracted the best.

It also offered an opportunity to educated and intelligent men who lacked other vocational avenues due to their politics. Young men started the *Edinburgh* and the *Westminster*. The *Edinburgh*’s founder was thirty-one, its founding editor, twenty-nine, and its two most active contributors, twenty-four (Coser, 1997). Three were lawyers and all were highly educated but poor. Tories dominated the Edinburgh bar at that time, making it difficult for Whigs to gain a foothold. The *Westminster* was founded at Jeremy Bentham’s initiative and with his support. However, the group most active in the journal was the Utilitarian Society, and its leader was the seventeen-year old John Stuart Mill.

Although begun by young men, the reviews quickly generated significant audiences. The *Edinburgh* in time reached a circulation of almost 15,000, about six times more than the *Westminster*. Further, the review estimated that at least three people read each copy, ensuring that most members of the intellectual and elite circles comprised its audience. As a direct comparison, the reviews attracted a larger audience than the many twentieth-century reviews, and that is not taking into account the differences in population (Cox, 1937, p. 2). Their audience also constituted a more coherent reading public. Cox stresses that the reading public in 1820 was not very stratified.

It was still possible to write for the reading public as a whole, just as it was still possible for the reviewers to examine the whole output of publishers (1937, p. 3).
A more coherent and educated reading public allowed the quarterlies to practice a style of criticism that was lengthy and intellectual.

Most nineteenth-century reviews appeared as quarterlies, and according to Walter Bagehot, a co-founder of the *National Review*, they were successful because they met a timely need (Shattock, 1980).

The *Spectator* and the *Tatler* had ‘opened a similar vein’ but they were too small: ‘They could only deal with small fragments, or the extreme essence of a subject. They could not give a view of what was complicated, or analyse what was involved. The modern man must be told what to think—shortly, no doubt—but he must be told it. The essay-like criticism of modern times is about the length which he likes. The *Edinburgh Review*, which began the system, may be said to be, in this country, the commencement on large topics of suitable views for sensible persons (quoting Hutton, Shattock, 1980, pp. 98-99).

The early journals of Addison and Steele, as well as Defoe, appeared bi- and even tri-weekly. After the stamp tax was passed in 1713, early journals shrunk even more, publishing fewer pages albeit also using smaller type. Sometimes reaching forty pages in length, the essays found in the nineteenth-century reviews allowed writers more room to expand and expound upon the issues of the day. Other critical reviews had begun in the mid- to late eighteenth century and achieved success like the *Monthly Review* and the *Critical Review*, but reviews during this period often were “puff” pieces that booksellers and publishers produced to sell their wares (Coser, 1997; J. Gross, 1969).

In the United States, the *American Review* (1845-1852), a Whig journal, contrasted its role with that of the mainstay of the partisan press, the newspaper. Although they acknowledged the valuable role of the newspapers, especially those of the Whig party, they also pointed out their shortcomings—mainly brevity and impermanence. On the other hand,
[t]he Review will be a means of presenting more grave and extended discussions of measures and events, and of better preserving them to after times ("Introductory," 1845, p. 2).

Like its opponent, the Democratic Review, however, the American Review argued that a focus solely on politics could not be and would not be the entirety of the new periodical. While it recognized the importance of national politics, especially to a party journal, the review found that literature, philosophy and morals were of equal or even greater importance.

It is not to be doubted, indeed, that these, from the nature of things, are so closely blended with all other elements that go to compose a state, as to make whatever influences affect these vitally, affect also, for evil or for good, the entire political fabric ("Introductory," 1845, p. 3).

The “great reviews” similarly took a wide lens to the important matters of the day, reviewing works on art, literature, travel, and other subjects not explicitly political.

The type of criticism practiced in the reviews may not have appealed to all audiences. That could be said to limit the distribution or transmission of the review’s views. To an extent, that may be true. However, the review’s political perspectives also traveled through the other types of periodicals, as their opinions influenced the monthlies, and the weeklies, and so on. Remarkingly on this refraction, Cox argued that the quarterly reviews, along with the periodicals that appeared weekly or monthly, all contributed to the foundation of criticism or the “irrigation of the surface of society” (Cox, 1937, p. 3).

Another Scrutiny author, H. A. Mason, discussed the “ideal weekly,” using the twentieth-century American magazine, The New Republic, as a model (1938). Mason argued that while the quarterly review may provide the best form for the type of criticism Scrutiny admired—criticism that could dig deep into a subject and adhere to principles rather than passing fashions, it also gave support to publications with a greater frequency. Weeklies
and monthlies could still be valuable in disseminating opinion, as long as the quarterlies
existed to provide the backbone of a critical milieu. Mason reflected on the ideal hierarchy
of M. Duhamel who proposed a pyramidal authority of book, quarterly, weekly, and
newspaper. Even if ideal, all, in practice, Mason argued, contributed to the creation of a
critical milieu, each “completing a certain stage in the dissemination of opinion” (1938, p.
259). However, he made the caveat that

[s]ome kind of consensus of opinion, and a coherent view of society as a whole
(however sketchy be the coherence) is, of course, a necessary preliminary to this
process (Mason, 1938, p. 259).

Even though Mason wrote on the ideal weekly, he stridently affirmed that “[n]o weekly can
flourish independently, that is, can be at the same time the source and the medium of
critical opinion” (1938, p. 259). While the nineteenth century British reviews may have
provided the necessary support to the other periodicals, Mason found the critical milieu of
the twentieth century to be lacking. Its poverty hampered The New Republic despite the
magazine’s internal successes.

Antonio Gramsci made a similar argument about the need for a variety of
periodicals to reach all segments of the public. However, for Gramsci, the aim was not to
create just an intelligent and informed public, but to create a public that could pierce the
ideological veil of capitalism. Gramsci, writing in the early 1930s, argued that journals
could be used to awaken, cultivate, and instruct class-consciousness. Criticism was a tool to
be used to penetrate the dominant bourgeois ideology. It revealed but also educated,
helping to train minds unaccustomed to critical thought.112 Gramsci marveled over the

112 “The ordinary reader does not and cannot have a ‘scientific’ habit of mind, which is acquired only
through specialized work. It is therefore necessary to help him obtain at least a ‘sense’ of it through
an appropriate critical activity. It is not enough to give him concepts already elaborated and fixed in
many material components of daily life that constructed the “ideological structure of a dominant class.”

Its most prominent and dynamic part is the press in general: publishing houses (which have an implicit and explicit program and are attached to a particular tendency), political newspapers, periodicals of every kind, specific, literary, philological, popular, etc., various periodicals down to parish bulletins (Forgacs, 2000, p. 380).

Using models already to be found, Gramsci constructed his ideal partisan press that would consist of three different types of periodicals, in order to meet the needs of a class that was not homogeneous but diverse. It would include “1) journals which specialize in criticism

their ‘definitive’ form. Their concreteness, which lies in the process that has led to that form, escapes him. One should therefore offer him the whole process of reasoning and the intermediate connections in a well defined way and not just by referring to them. For example: a complex historical movement can be broken down in time and space and also into various levels. Thus, although Catholic Action has always had a single and centralized leadership, it displays greater differences (and also contrasts) in regional attitude in different periods and according to the specific problem encountered (e.g. the agrarian problem, trade-union line, etc.)” (Forgacs, 2000, pp. 385-386). Russell Jacoby made a similar argument, writing: “The Last Intellectuals was less a lament than a call for intellectuals to reclaim the vernacular and reassert themselves in public life. Some reviewers saw this as an injunction to sell out—or just plain sell—an anti-intellectual demand to exchange dense and unpopular work for media coverage. I don’t think so. No one can do everything, but intellectual work need not be pitched in a single register. It should be possible for thinkers and writers to be both serious and accessible—not always at the same time, but over time. After all, those thinkers touted as the most original and complex have often sought a broad public. Even the famously difficult Adorno sweated over his radio lectures to ensure they would be clear and understandable. Ultimately, it is not only the larger public that loses when intellectuals turn inwards” (1987, pp. xx-xxi).

113 For Gramsci, the “critics” depended not only on coercion (or force) but also on consent. Therefore, who controlled the press was as important to Gramsci as who controlled the police.

114 “A very common error is that of thinking that every social stratum elaborates its consciousness and its culture in the same way, with the same methods, namely the methods of the professional intellectuals. The intellectual is a ‘professional,’ a skilled worker who knows how his own specialized ‘machines’ function. He has an ‘apprenticeship’ and a ‘Taylor system’ of his own. It is childish and illusory to attribute to everyone this acquired and not innate ability, just as it would be childish to think that a ‘clear concept,’ suitably circulated, is inserted in various consciousnesses with the same ‘organizing’ effects of diffused clarity: this is an ‘enlightenment’ error. The ability of the professional intellectual adroitly to combine induction and deduction, to generalize without falling into empty formalism, to transport from one sphere of judgment to another certain criteria of discrimination, adapting them to new conditions, is a ‘specialization,’ a ‘qualification.’ It is not something given to ordinary common sense. This is why the premise of ‘organic diffusion from a homogenous center of a homogenous way of thinking and acting’ is not enough. When a ray of light passes through different prisms it is refracted differently: if you want the same refraction, you need
or politics, 2) journals that combine criticism, historical material, and bibliography, and 3) journals like the second type that are linked to a newspaper but have a 'weekly' section” (Landy, 1986, p. 65). However, all three types should share a strong editorial line.

"It should in other words have a homogenous and disciplined editorial staff. Hence only a few 'principal' contributors should write the essential body of each number. The editorial line should be highly organized so as to make an intellectually homogenous product, while respecting the necessary variety of styles and literary personalities. The editorial staff should have a written statute which, for what it is worth, can prevent incursions, conflicts and contradictions (for example, the content of each number should be approved by the majority of the staff before publication) (Forgacs, 2000, pp. 384-385).

In addition to recommending a certain editorial policy, he also outlined what content each of the different types should include, which covered the range of current ideas in the various intellectual practices, short biographies, autobiographies, to recent work of a bibliographic nature, reviews of work from other journals and papers, book reviews of the informative type and of a more technical nature, critical-bibliographic analyses situating the work of various individuals in some critical milieu (Landy, 1986, p. 65).

Still, what this combination of content and styles of journal would allow was a penetrating criticism that could pierce the ideological veil.¹¹⁵ This criticism would require a great effort to make a whole series of rectifications of each prism" (Forgacs, 2000, pp. 388-389). Cox made a similar argument regarding the critical reviews, when he argued: “In any large and complex society there must inevitably be a variety of different periodicals approaching from different angles and stressing different interests and preoccupations. Given a normally healthy culture the exchange of ideas between these different groups would contribute to a general centre of consensus in a similar manner to the play of individual opinion within the groups. This, needless to say, is a very different thing from the mere existence side by side of a number of different coteries, each self-contained and exclusive” (1937, p. 268).

¹¹⁵ "Finding the real identity beneath the apparent contradiction and differentiation, and finding the substantial diversity beneath the apparent identity, is the most delicate, misunderstood and yet essential endowment of the critic of ideas and the historian of historical developments. The educative-formative work that a homogeneous cultural center carries out, the elaboration of a critical consciousness that it promotes and favors on a specific historical base which contains the concrete premises for such an elaboration, cannot be limited to the simple theoretical enunciation of 'clear' methodological principles: this would be to proceed merely in the manner of the eighteenth-century philosophes. The work needed is complex and must be articulated and graduated. It requires a combination of deduction and induction, formal logic and dialectic, identification and distinction, positive demonstration and the destruction of the old. And not in the
and time. It was a continuous and cumulative process, and although Gramsci believed that everyone was an intellectual, in the sense that thinking intellectually was a skill that anyone could acquire, the journalistic criticism he envisioned could not be undertaken by many.

Gramsci recognized the importance of journalism, both newspapers and journals, to the long struggle for a new consensus. The journal was one forum for the organic intellectual. As Landy states,

Gramsci’s conception of the role of journalism cannot be separated from his central project of bringing the work of intellectuals to the masses and hence of extending information and criticism to the people (Landy, 1986, p. 66).

Without a press controlled by revolutionary intellectuals, the project of awakening class-consciousness would be hampered. Instead, the press, controlled by the bourgeoisie, would continue to perpetuate its own class ideology that dominated the working class. Walter Benjamin made a similar argument in his essay “The Author as Producer,” arguing that ‘Since on the one hand, the newspaper, technically speaking, represents the most important literary position, but on the other hand, this position is controlled by the opposition, it is no wonder that the writer’s understanding of his dependent position, his technical possibilities, and his political task has to grapple with the most enormous possibilities.’ For Benjamin the notion of political criticism remains an illusion as long as the critical intelligentsia does not control the apparatus of the mass media (Hohendahl, 1982, p. 24).

Gramsci’s perspective on the role or function of the press was closely tied to a specific political program or intervention. A journal did not have to be doctrinaire, but it had a political purpose. Also, Lenin argued that all social democratic literature must become party literature, contra journals without a party. In contrast, today, journals that tackle political questions may not claim to have a political purpose or agenda, they may not

abstract but in the concrete, on the basis of the real and of actual experience” (Forgacs, 2000, p. 389).
be tied to any political party or movement, and over their lifespan, they may embrace a variety of political ideologies or positions. What then is their reason for being? Should they now be lumped together with journals of criticism, literary or otherwise? Is it enough that they participate in a culture of critical discourse?¹¹⁶ Or that they create a forum for so-called rational dialogue?

¹¹⁶ Alvin Gouldner coined the phrase “culture of critical discourse,” to define a practice of discourse that is critical and constructive. One that enables theorists to “dissociate themselves from the dominant and conventional conceptions of social reality, as well as from the institutions that sustain them” but that also creates a space for the construction of a new view (Aya, 1982, p. 909). Gouldner wrote that the purpose of his journal, Theory and Society, was “to nudge open the interface between theory and politics, not to plead some special politics but to enable theory to assume a broader human relevance and to enrich everyday life no less than technical interests...We do not conceive of theory-making or of politics as enclaved forms of heroism but, along with cultural criticism, they are taken to be part of everyday life, helping to make it meaningful, manageable, and bearable.” (quoting Gouldner, Lemert & Piccone, 1982, p. 741). Making theory more relevant is surely a well-intentioned aim. But it still begs the question to what end? Further, as Lemert and Piccone explained, Gouldner’s model for theoretical work was neither that of the scientist nor the politically engaged intellectual, but that of the artist. “Gouldner lived first and foremost as a writer” (Lemert & Piccone, 1982, p. 741). Still, there is value in changing the terms of the writer’s practice. Gouldner envisioned a culture of critical discourse as a means “to wake sociologists up to the social influences on social thought – the unacknowledged dogmas of socially acquired common sense – and to safe-guard the requisites of rational inquiry by founding a community of theorists free to explore new hypotheses in print without having to fold, spindle, or mutilate them to fit the profession’s idea of acceptable scholarship” (Aya, 1982, p. 911).
Chapter 2.3  A Re-view that Wrights Politics?: Evaluating the Review Form

Timothy Mitchell’s study of colonial Egypt pointed to the necessity of a vantage point from which the state’s authorities or “craties” could survey the state. He relates the practice of visiting photographers and writers to Egypt attempting to locate the perfect vantage point from which to view Cairo and make an “accurate representation.”

The point of view was not just a place set apart, outside the world or above it. It was ideally a position from where, like the authorities in the panopticon, one could see and yet not be seen (Mitchell, 1988, p. 24).

Fashioning a point of view, then, is a necessary step in exercising authority, or of commanding the representation one seeks to project of the world. The same can be said for the critics. They also require a vantage point from which to fashion and, perhaps more importantly, transmit their view. At its outset, the Westminster questioned whether the review could serve this role.

A Re-view of Reviews

First published in January 1824, the Westminster Review quickly attacked the Edinburgh and Quarterly. While the issue’s first essay gave some indication of the Westminster’s political opinions, it would be an essay found toward the back of the issue that would attract the most attention. Following the practice of other publications at the time, the Westminster included a “review of reviews,” aiming most of its arrows at the Edinburgh and the Quarterly. While this essay is often read for what it says about the other reviews’ politics as well as those of the Westminster, it also calls into question the review form itself. Specifically, the Westminster appears reluctant to utilize a medium whose characteristics appear inimical to the philosophical radicals’ aims.

125
The *Westminster* sought to challenge the preeminence of the *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly*. It began by including in its first issue a long review of each journal, under the title “Periodical Literature,” the review of the *Edinburgh* being written by James Mill (1824). In fact, the *Westminster* argued that periodical criticism also needs to turn its attention to periodical criticism itself. Essentially, the *Westminster* called for a practice of reflexivity, which would become a fairly regular concern of both *The Public Interest* and even more so, *Telos*.

If periodical criticism is good for any thing, it cannot be less needed in the case of periodical literature, than of any other class of the productions of the press. It is indeed a subject of wonder, that periodical publications should have existed so long, and have come at last to occupy so great a portion of the time and attention of the largest class of readers, without having become subject to a regular and systematic course of criticism (Mill, 1824, p. 206).

In other words, the reviews should review *other* reviews, and, in the case of the *Westminster*, re-**view** the very role of reviews.

[U]nder the guise of reviewing books, these publications [the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly*] have introduced the practice of publishing dissertations, not only upon the topics of the day, but upon all the most important questions of morals and legislation, in the most extensive acceptance of these terms. Whatever occasion, therefore, there can be for that *species of censorship* which criticism exercises over those who assume the task of supplying nourishment to the human mind, it is presented by the publications in question, and with peculiar circumstances of aggravation (p. 206, emphasis added).

The review turned its attention to the qualities of periodical literature in general, observing first that due to their nature, periodicals must sell immediately. Because of this imperative, periodicals must give immediate effect and grasp at the applause of the moment. To do so, periodicals flatter opinions rather than guide them.

The most effectual mode of doing good to mankind by reading, is, to correct their errors; to expose their prejudices; to refute opinions which are generated only by partial interests, but to which men are, for that reason, so much the more attached; to censure whatever is mean and selfish in their behaviour, and attach honours to actions solely in proportion to their tendency to increase the sum of happiness,
lessen the sum of misery. But this is a course which periodical literature cannot pursue. To please the great body of men, which is the object of the periodical writer, he must flatter their prejudices. Instead of calling in question the opinions to which they are wedded, he must applaud them; and the more he can furnish such men with reasons for being in love with their opinions than before, the more he is sure of commanding their approbation, and of increasing their zeal to promote the reputation of his work (pp. 207-208).

Those opinions most flattered are the fashionable opinions belonging to the ruling classes.

It is the propagation of those opinions, the Westminster argues, on which periodical literature’s success depends. For the Westminster, such a practice is unacceptable.

The favourite opinions of people in power are the opinions which favour their own power; those opinions which we have already characterized as being the grand instruments of evil in this world, the ultimate and real cause of the degradation and misery of the great mass of mankind (p. 208).

Although the “cratical” opinions belonging to the ruling class might be the fashionable opinions of the day, the review argued that over time wiser critical opinions would be commonly held. While wise opinions may begin with only a few people, through a slow process of transmission, they become the opinions of many. However, the review argues, periodical literature runs counter to this slow process of transmission because as noted above, it depends on immediate success. The two dominant journals, the Edinburgh and Quarterly, were in no way immune to this characteristic.

The new review recognized that a large audience was not being served by either the Tory or the Whig journals. Their audiences, despite the seeming differences between the two reviews, were still comprised of the aristocratic classes.\(^{117}\) The Edinburgh and Quarterly catered to these ruling classes and their fashionable opinions. In fact, the Westminster argued, the only real difference between the Tories (the ministerial party) and

\(^{117}\) The Westminster clarified what it meant by “aristocratical,” defining it like an oligarchy, or rule by the few, and not confining it to the nobility.
the Whigs (the opposition party) was that at any given time one party might have more power than the other.

If, in the class who share among them the powers of government, there is one part who are pleased with the share which they receive of the advantages, or prefer the prospect which they have of sharing under the favour of the existing distributors; there is also, naturally, a part who are not pleased with the share which they receive, and who are willing to prefer any tolerable chance of sharing by other hands. These are they who, in this country, form themselves into what is called the opposition.... The immediate object of the opposition is to effect a change of the hands by which the distribution of the advantages is made—to obtain hands through which their share will be enlarged.... The plan, therefore, is, to excite disapprobation of the principles and conduct of those who retain the distribution, and to excite approbation of the principles and conduct of those whom they wish to hold it in their stead (p. 217).

In other words, the reviews’ objective was either to maintain power for their party or overthrow the party in power. Whichever party was in power, politics would be exercised by the few and not the many. The review noted that just two hundred leading families returned a majority of the members of the House of Commons each election.

The supposedly different audiences which the Edinburgh and Quarterly addressed themselves to, according to the Westminster, was really just the ruling class divided by the share each side had in the powers of government. As the representative of the opposition party in 1824, the Edinburgh had to play at “seesaw” between the positions of the “people,” who they claimed to address, and the aristocratical class, to which they in actuality catered.

If a portion of the discourse has been employed in recommending the interests of the people, another must be employed in recommending the interests of the aristocracy. Having spoken a while on the one side, they must speak a while on the other. Having written a few pages on the one side, they must write as many on the other.... In this game, o aristocratical and popular, it is sufficiently evident on which side, at last, the winnings remain (p. 218).

The Quarterly had an easier job, as they only claimed to represent the aristocracy and spoke for them. They offered their opinions as the opinions of the country and denigrated any opinion that might be construed as belonging to the “people.” The Edinburgh’s seesaw
act, on the other hand, required that they disparage both sets of opinions referring to those of the ruling class as “despotical” and those of the people as “anarchic” and affirming their own as belonging to the “middle,” by which “they always desire to be understood wise” (p. 220).

Their seesaw act also required, according to the *Westminster*, the use of vague language.

It is essential, in writing upon this plan, to deal as much as possible in vague language, and cultivate the skillful use of it. Words which appear to mean much, and may by those to whom they are addressed be interpreted to mean much, but which may also, when it suits the convenience of those who have used them, be shown to mean little or nothing, are of singular importance to those whose business it is to play the game of compromise, to trim between irreconcilable interests, to seesaw between contradictory opinions. Language of this description is peculiarly needed in making declarations which are meant to gain favour with the people (p. 220).

The *Westminster* stressed that their critique of the reviews applied to their politics and not their writings on literature and other subjects. The review then turned to specific essays published in the *Edinburgh* and *Quarterly*, spending more time with the former. Through a practice of deconstruction, the *Westminster* supported its argument that the *Edinburgh* did in fact seesaw between the opinions of the aristocracy and the people, although its earliest volumes seesawed between the opinions of the aristocracy and established philosophy.

The *Westminster* noted that the review seemed disposed “to avoid grappling with any important and tender subject” (Mill, 1824, p. 234). In fact, the *Westminster* makes clear that the subjects the *Edinburgh* chose to review are those least likely to disrupt the opinions of the ruling classes.

Political economy, indeed, obtains a due share of attention; and the abolition of the slave trade begins to be recommended,—two subjects upon which the Edinburgh Review had rendered important service. And upon these subjects, as well as upon that of Catholic emancipation, which has been laboriously handled, a remark is required. These are precisely the description of subjects which suit a publication, pursuing the career which has been pursued by the Edinburgh Review. The hold
possessed by the aristocracy upon the powers of government, was not likely to be weakened, by any opinions propagated on the subjects of political economy, and the slave trade.... These were subjects, therefore, on which a reputation with the liberal, the enlightened, and the disinterested part of the public, might be courted, without risking much with the aristocratical and prejudiced (p. 234).

The prospectus of the Westminster sought to differentiate the new review from the Edinburgh and Quarterly, writing

'The Editors have great satisfaction in stating that they are the organs of an able and active society of individuals, who have seen with regret and somewhat of indignation that the name of criticism has been usurped with sinister views, and that the interests of literature and of a wise policy, and through them those of the Public have been sacrificed to selfish and unworthy purposes, are resolved to establish a tribunal where a fairer and more unbiased hearing may be obtained...It is their ambition to make this review the representative of the true interests of the majority, and the firm and invariable advocate of those principles which tend to increase the sum of human happiness, and to ameliorate the condition of mankind' (quoted in Nesbitt, 1966, p. 35).

However, no matter what their intentions, the new quarterly was still a review. In other words, despite the Westminster’s criticisms of the form, the philosophic radicals still went forward with the publication. How did they reconcile their criticism with their undertaking? They argued that they would try to do things differently, in the hopes that there also was coming into being a different sort of audience that would appreciate their efforts.

One word of a personal nature seems to be required. We have described the interests which operate to withdraw periodical writers from the line of utility, and we have represented it as nearly impossible for them to keep true to it. What! Are we, it may be asked, superior to seductions to which all other men succumb? If periodical writing is by its nature so imbued with evil, why is that we propose to add to the supply of a noxious commodity? .... We have no claim to be trusted, any more than any one among our contemporaries: but we have a claim to be tried. Men have diversities of taste; and it is not impossible that a man should exist who really has a taste for the establishment of the securities for good government, and would derive more pleasure from the success of this pursuit, than of any other pursuit in which he could engage, wealth or power not excepted. All that we desire is, that it may not be reckoned impossible that we may belong to a class of this description. There is another motive, as selfish as that which we ascribe to any body, by which we may be actuated. We may be sanguine enough, or silly enough, or clear-sighted enough, to believe, that intellectual and moral qualities have made a great progress among the
people of this country; and that the class who will really approve endeavours, in favour of good government, and of the happiness and intelligence of men, are a class sufficiently numerous to reward our endeavours. No matter what our motives may be, the public will soon see whether our actions continue true to the ends which we profess; and that is all by which their interests can be affected; all, therefore, about which they need to care (Mill, 1824, p. 222).

The answer from the Westminster effectively stated that the men who operated the journal (who made up, in part, its “materialized organization”) could overcome any shortcomings inherent in the review’s “organized matter.” They believed that somehow their intentions could counteract the review’s evanescent nature which flatters opinions rather than guides them. Periodicals are transitory, and whether a politics that aims to replace fashionable opinions with wise opinions can be accomplished in a review is a valid question. In what ways does the review form undermine its re-viewing practice? Conversely, does the form’s mode enhance a re-view of the state, an object that does not remain constant and requires an evolving or developing critique? The Westminster’s choice to utilize the review form despite its shortcomings would be repeated by many future critics. In effect, critics or intellectuals would come to be associated with the journal or review as things that go hand in hand.

Critics and Journals

“The geography of the intellectuals’ world is a geography of journals...” – Peter Steinfels (1979, p. 4).

Stefan Collini (2006) argues that journals are the natural habitat of intellectuals. He is not the only one to make this argument. Debray (1981) also argues that the golden age of intellectuals and publishing coincide. His analysis of socialism as an ideology or movement tied to a specific media ecology, namely the dominance of print (the graphosphere), points
to the political journal as the internal organ of intellectuals’ power struggles (Debray, 2007).

Russell Jacoby (1987) argues that periodicals like The Dial, The Masses, and Partisan Review were closely associated with the coming-of-age of intellectuals. He bemoans the loss of the public or independent intellectual who wrote for small periodicals and has now been replaced by academics who write only for professional journals. Similarly, William Pfaff (1986) remembers the golden age of the private or lay intellectual who made a living with the serious journalism of his time, writing for newspapers as The World, The Herald Tribune, The Baltimore Sun, The Chicago Daily News, where value was placed on general cultivation and good writing. Such newspapers no longer exist in the U.S. The monthlies no longer have their old authority, or the audience they once possessed. We have, thankfully, The New York Review of Books, and a few general quarterlies such as the present one [Salmagundi], but contributors are mostly academic... (1986, p. 334).

Hugh Wilford similarly argued that magazines like Partisan Review, politics, and Encounter “were the Intellectual community’s favorite medium of publication” (1995, p. 14). In fact, he used those magazines to anchor his study of the New York Intellectuals, giving two reasons for his approach.

First, as the magazine article was the Intellectuals’ preferred means of written expression, these publications represent invaluable documentary records of the Intellectuals’ changing values and concerns. Second, the Intellectuals’ magazines possess considerable historical significance in their own right, as centers of the NY Intellectual community, as in fact the Intellectuals’ very own institutions (1995, p. viii).

To discuss the New York Intellectuals then, one must discuss their magazines, and to discuss their magazines is to discuss the New York Intellectuals.

Kadushin (2006) also argues that the chief method chosen by intellectuals for the dissemination of their ideas is the intellectual journal. In 1969, when Kadushin first made his study of the American intellectual elite, he found that the elite could be largely located
among the cultural and political journals.118 While his definition of the intellectual elite did not require that they appear in journals and even argued that the printed record should not be all that matters when defining intellectuals, Kadushin did argue that

in contemporary America the ‘board’ or ‘examining committee’ that admits a person to elite intellectual status is the editorial board of the intellectual journal (2006, p. 8).119

Therefore, his study indentified the intellectual elite as those who write for the leading intellectual journals and those whom they name as members of their circles. To find the leading intellectual journals, he asked intellectuals (or professors, writers and editors) to rank the twenty or so journals that would fit such a description.120 Then, the study surveyed 8,000 persons who contributed to the top journals during a five-year period and asked who they considered to be the leading intellectuals. Obviously, this is a bit of a tautological approach. However, most descriptions or definitions of intellectuals are.

Intellectuals are those that fit the role of “intellectual.” As Randall Collins argues,

[t]he intellectual world is a massive conversation, circulating cultural capital in intermittent face-to-face rituals as well as in writing. What makes one an intellectual is one’s attraction to this conversation: to participate in the talk of its ‘hot center,’ where the ideas have the greatest sacredness, and if possible to attach one’s own identity to such ideas so that one’s ideas are circulated widely through the conversation, and one’s personal reputation with it (1998, pp. 30-31).

118 Steinfelds provides a critique of Kadushin’s study: “Two assumptions underlie Kadushin’s method of identifying elite intellectuals: first, that intellectuals deal in ‘high-quality general ideas on questions of values and aesthetics’ for a ‘fairly general audience’ (his emphasis); and, second, that they can be selected by their peers through the ‘gatekeeping’ of intellectually prestigious journals” (1979, p. 202). Essentially, Steinfelds argues that Kadushin limits the category of “elite intellectuals” to writers and excludes other intellectuals such as scientists, other artists, lawyers, politicians, physicians, judges, theologians and so forth, all of whom are less likely to appear in the intellectual journals Kadushin identifies.
119 To use Bourdieu’s analysis, the editors of these journals serve as the gatekeepers to the intellectual field, determining who is a legitimate member.
In a more basic sense, the home of the intellectual is the written page. Edward Said (2002) argues that the words “intellectual” and “writer” belong together. Collins finds that intellectual communities arose historically at the same time as public systems of writing.

What is needed is a social arrangement for writing texts of some length and distributing them to readers at a distance, an autonomous network for intellectual communication.... Intellectuals, as the community uniquely oriented toward writing—those who live for the production and passing on of texts—could only come into existence with the text-distribution service (1998, p. 27)

Grafton, tracing the beginnings of the “Republic of Letters,” writes:

Like us, its citizens made conscious efforts to create communities – both of people and of information—that crossed political, linguistic, and religious borders. Like us, they did their best to manage the huge amounts of information to which they had access.... The tools they forged included not only scholarly correspondence of a personal sort but also both technical and literary methods for stockpiling information and making it available: the bibliography, the filing cabinet, the compilation of ‘historia literaria,’ and the journal. From the 1660s onward, a swarm of new printed publications, in both Latin and the modern languages, compiled new information, reviewed new books, and for the first time made it possible for intellectuals across Europe to have reliable, regular information on the doings of scholars—and kings—in every other corner of the European world (2009, p. 23).

As Karabel states, intellectuals may be seen as “occupants of a site that is privileged in forming and transmitting discourses” (quoting Katherine Verdery, 1996, p. 208). But also consider Debray’s (2000) mediology idea that intellectuals function themselves as a medium of transmission, alongside and in concert with other mediums, such as tools, institutions, and institutionalized discourses. Whether privileged or not, intellectuals, at a minimum, require the availability of some medium through which their ideas can be expressed.

In *Paper Machine*, Jacques Derrida posited three conditions for the intellectual’s existence. First, “a dominant and institutional fraction of society” legitimates certain skills or knowledge that identify the intellectual (2005a, p. 36). These often relate to the rhetorical power of the intellectual, or “how” the intellectual speaks and writes and
intervenes in the world.\textsuperscript{121} Second, a division must exist between private and political event. This allows a particular configuration of the places of public speaking. In other words, it provides the intellectual with \textit{routes of access} to media. Derrida argued that this division was undergoing a radical dislocation. A similar argument can be found in Debray’s \textit{Teachers, Writers, Celebrities} (1981) in which he charts the changes from the intellectual’s place in the university to the publishing house and now the mass media. Derrida’s third and last condition is an assumption of a division between intellectual and non-intellectual labor.

These dislocations also underlie Jacoby’s arguments of the loss of public intellectuals. Even when routes of access exist, they are not equally available to all. Writing a critique of Irving Howe, the editor of \textit{Dissent} and a regular contributor to other journals of opinion such as \textit{Commentary}, Richard Kostelanetz argued in the pages of a newly arrived magazine, \textit{Salmagundi}:

The social commentator who lacks such congenial outlets can either remain silent, resort to books (which probably won’t be prominently reviewed, if noticed at all),\textsuperscript{122} or flood editorial offices with an endless barrage of manuscripts. Indeed, the more I study the thought of the recent period, the more conclusively I recognize that the major reason why significant but unusual ideas (e.g., those of McLuhan, Fuller, Hall, Claude Shannon, Noam Chomsky, Rudolf Carnap, E. S. Carpenter, etc.) take an

\textsuperscript{121} Equally important to the changing function and position of the intellectual is the question of how they write. In a study of three moments in Germany’s intellectual and social history, Peter Hohendahl chooses to focus on this question: “What interests me in this discussion is not so much the philosophical ideas and systematic statements of these authors, but the question of style. What interests me, in other words, is a formal problem: How does the intellectual write? Is there a difference between the approach and style of an intellectual and that of a scientist or a member of the political elite?” (1997, p. 217).

\textsuperscript{122} In 1967, Kostelanetz believed that books were more open to new and different ideas than periodical publications were. “[N]o serious thinker writes an essay unless he thinks he has a place to publish it; and as magazines or serious opinion are, for better and worse, generally less tolerant about ideas than publishers (the rationale usually being ‘the magazine’s conception of itself’), an essay full of really original and unfashionable ideas, particularly from an unknown writer, is not likely to be published at all...” (1967, pp. 55-56). Now the argument might be made that publishers too lack such openness to “unfashionable ideas.”
unconsciously long time to enter intellectual circulation is the smug chauvinism of
most serious American magazines (1967, p. 56).

In the United States, Kadushin also traced a transformation of the intellectuals, from
locatable to non-locatable, similar in result to Jacoby’s analysis. In the early 1970s, when
Kadushin first made his study of the American intellectual elite, he found that they could be
largely located among the cultural and political journals; the same elite also formed
intellectual circles that sometimes intersected with each other, creating a visible network.
In a recent forward to an updated edition of his study, Kadushin noted that it is much
harder now to find the elite intellectuals; their circles seem to have disintegrated, and the
cultural and political journals are no longer what they were.

Collini (2006) defines intellectuals in a cultural sense by identifying four elements
necessary to their role. One of those elements is a channel of access by which intellectuals
can reach a “public.” Historically, that channel or medium has been the periodical.

[It was for long true, and may still be so, that the single most important form of
these media has, in practice, been the periodical or journal or review, terms which I
shall use interchangeably to cover that variety of weekly, monthly, or quarterly
publications that fall in the space between books on the one side and newspapers on
the other. The history of public debate in Britain since at the least the early
nineteenth century can be written in terms of the changing fortunes of different
types of periodical, from the great days of the heavyweight quarterlies, such as the
Edinburgh and the Quarterly, up to the most recent arrivals, such as the London
Review of Books and Prospect (Collini, 2006, p. 54).

He also argues that periodicals establish intellectuals’ reputations and thereby give them
access to other channels of communication, stating that “access breeds access” (2006, p.
54). Further, the medium of journals is also the place where “the question of intellectuals
has been most frequently put” (p. 435). Since the variety of periodicals that can occupy the
space between books and newspapers is large and diverse, Collini chooses to categorize
intellectual periodicals not by material properties but by their dedication to a “discourse of
general ideas.”

This, it seems to me, is the constant lying behind the shifting terminology used to
pick out the emblematic occupant of this space—‘a general cultural periodical,’ ‘a
review of ideas,’ ‘a literary journal’ (Collini, 2006, p. 435).

Like his construction of “intellectual,” he prefers to keep the concept of the
intellectual periodical similarly general. In this light, periodicals are again most valued for
their contribution to (general) intellectual culture. But, if a journal like the New York Review
of Books also expressed a particular politics, then could their contribution extend beyond
intellectual culture? Or maybe, and more pointedly, can intellectual culture really be
understood as a neutral term without a politics? Or is the idea that intellectual culture
affects politics or the political simply a grand delusion of the intellectuals, a way for them to
feel more satisfied with what they do?

Writing that Wrights Politics?

This returns me to the questions I raised at the outset of this dissertation. Does political
writing wright politics if such writing has no specific political program in mind but rather
participates perhaps in a common theoretical project whose re-visioning of the state takes
a long view instead of the immediacy of electoral politics? For the Westminster, such a
project, or long view, was the only way to effect any real change in the state. It was the only
way for the “critics” to overcome the fashionable opinions of the ruling classes, or “cratics,”
a necessarily slow process of transmission of alternative ideas. The downside being that
the long view is just that—long, and any gains may not be visible in the near future.

Francis Mulhern, a member of the editorial committee and frequent contributor to
the New Left Review, published a book-length study of Scrutiny, a journal more concerned
with principles and standards of literary criticism than political interventions. Mulhern referred to the journal as “the practical instrument of a cultural ‘party’ that aspired to make a difference in history” (1979, p. 3). Terry Eagleton wrote of the journal that “no more militant, courageous and consistent project is to be found in the history of English criticism” (quoted in Mulhern, 1979, p. 327).

Genuinely militant writing does not consist in partisanship clamantly asserted (though this may on occasion play a necessary part). Its fundamental precondition is an analysis and perspective capable of determining the meaning and potential of particular conjunctures and so, the character of the interventions to be made in them (Eagleton quoted in Mulhern, 1979, p. 327).

Such an assertion seems to run counter to the prevailing idea that militant writing is necessarily partisan. But Eagleton’s argument fits with the model of the critical attitude that fiercely challenges all doxa, even when belonging to the political view with which the critic finds the most affinity.

Anna Boschetti, in her study of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Les temps modernes, argued that the review provided a “fascinating paradox of free commitment” (1988, p. 171).

At one extreme, the review rejects any literature or science which in its claim to be ‘pure’ is not ‘responsible’; at the other, any compromise with the powers that be or any party commitment which might bind ‘choices’ to orthodoxy (1988, p. 171).

Could the critical attitude also be described as one of free commitment? Is there an end somehow to be found within the means? Or does a lack of commitment to a particular destination cripple the process itself?

In the conclusion to his study, Mulhern wrote that Scrutiny’s discursive organization was one defined by a dialectic of ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’ whose main and logically necessary effect was a depreciation, a repression and, at the limit, a categorical dissolution of politics as such. Nothing could be more disorienting for socialist cultural theory than the ingestion of a discourse whose main effect is to undo the intelligibility of its ultimate concern: political mobilization against the existing structures of society and State (1979, pp. 330-331).
This signals a tension within the review form itself. It began as a critical form. However, its criticism was not directed only against the state but also against culture. What creates the tension though is not that the reviews lacked a clear political line, further muddied by their attention to culture, but that any political critique present in the reviews was necessarily bound up in culture due to the form of the critique itself. The intellectual field of the reviews is concerned with more than politics. Moreover, the critique of politics often practiced within the field is at heart a critique of a way of thinking, or perhaps more accurately, a way of doing, a privileging of practice over thought.

In a review of The New Republic, H. A. Mason wrote of political writing:

It is true that the work with which Scrutiny [the journal in which Mason wrote] is associated eventually breeds a general critical attitude. But it will not do, as has been pointed out, to infer directly and naively from the prose style of a politician his capabilities as a statesman. On the other hand, I cannot suppose that Scrutiny accepts as the intelligent man’s view of politics or economics those of Mr. Bernard Shaw or Mr. Cole, or endorses complacently the tone of the political side of the New Statesman. Surely the work undertaken by Scrutiny does have political implications? This is no call for a general line-up on one side or the other of the barricades. It is merely that Scrutiny should give its general attitude some more tangible shape. It seems to me that this is a task not being attempted elsewhere (1938, p. 260).

This is a good articulation of the perhaps necessary gap between the critical attitude of the review, which has often concerned itself with more than politics, and its more tangible political implications. The construction of a culture of critical discourse, as Alvin Gouldner (1975-76) so named it, or the articulation of a common theoretical project, can then be considered a political act, even if, and perhaps especially if, it takes the long view of breeding a general critical attitude, which in Gramsci’s hopes will some day pierce the ideological veil.123

123 Reviewing political writing in early twentieth century America, Steven Biel argues: “If, however, politics is defined more broadly than factional contests for power and quarrel over specific matters of policy, the work of building a critical community was unquestionably a political act. Opposition,
In 1796, the London Corresponding Society, a radical political body seeking parliamentary reform, specifically the representation of the working class, published *The Moral and Political Magazine* which included news, letters from readers, book reviews, poetry, essays on many subjects and a serialized history of the Society. The magazine was quickly successful selling between three and four thousand copies, which rivaled the most popular monthly reviews of that decade. The monthly magazine replaced the Society’s first attempt at a periodical, the weekly *Politician*. As John Barrell writes, the weekly “died of its readers’ boredom inside a month,” while the new monthly magazine was an intriguing attempt to move beyond the single-issue program of the London Corresponding Society and to foster a popular radical literary culture of an ambitiously general kind (2003, p. n/a).124

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124 Gramsci also recognized the need to appeal to readers. He spoke of the appearance of journals and their cost. He wrote: “The exterior appearance of a journal is very important, both commercially and 'ideologically,' in ensuring loyalty and affection. In reality, in this case it is difficult to distinguish commercial from the ideological matters. Factors: page, margins, the width of columns, (line-length), the compactness of the column, i.e., the number of characters per line and the choice of typefaces, the paper and the ink (esthetics of the headlines, clearness of the typefaces due to the major or minor wear of the fonts or the artwork, etc.).... The fundamental problem of every periodical...is that of insuring stable sales (possibly in continuous growth), which means then the possibility of developing a commercial scheme (in development, etc.) Certainly, the fundamental factor in the success of a periodical is the ideological one, i.e., whether or not it satisfies definite intellectual and political needs. But it would be a great error to believe that this is the only factor and especially that it is valid when taken in ‘isolation.’ Only under exceptional conditions, in terms of definite booms of public opinion, is an opinion, whatever the exterior form in which it is presented, a success. Usually, the manner of presentation has great importance for the stability of the enterprise, and this importance can be positive as well as negative. Giving away *gratis* or below cost is not always a ‘good speculation,’ as it is not good speculation to have one pay too much or give too ‘little’ for ‘one’s money.’ That is true at least in politics. The public distrusts an opinion whose publication does not cost anything, it sees a trap. Likewise, it ‘politically’ distrusts those who do not know how to manage the funds which the public contributes. How could a party be considered capable of managing State power which does not know how to select individuals to manage well a newspaper or a journal? On the other hand, a group with scarce resources which knows how to obtain appreciable journalistic results demonstrates that it will manage even broader structures competently. This is why the ‘exterior’ of a publication has to be dealt with the same care as the ideological and intellectual contents; actually the two are inseparable and rightly so. Usually, a good principle is to give the outside of a publication an appearance which makes it
More than one hundred and fifty years later, another journal of radical politics in England would also recognize this need to include more than politics. The editorial introduction of the *New Left Review*, published in 1960, explained the program of the new journal, which was the product of the conjoining of two previous journals, the *New Reasoner* and *Universities and Left Review*.

In particular, we are anxious to maintain the wide scope of *NLR*. We are convinced that politics, too narrowly conceived, has been a main cause of the decline of socialism in this country, and one of the reasons for the disaffection from socialist ideas of young people in particular. The humanist strengths of socialism—which are the foundations for a genuinely popular socialist movement—must be developed in cultural and social terms, as well as in economic and political (p. 1).

Unlike the London Corresponding Society’s new magazine, however, the *New Left Review*’s cultural commitment would be more in the form of cultural studies than publishing original poetry and literary reviews.

Another journal with a complicated relationship to the question of the political was *Partisan Review*. As its name suggests, the journal originally had an explicitly political function. It was an organ of the John Reed Club of New York and “as such it ha[d] a specific function to fulfill” (Jimonville, 2007, p. 56). The John Reed Club was established to support leftist and Marxist writers and artists. In 1930, the clubs officially affiliated themselves with Moscow and became a part of the American Communist Party. *Partisan Review*’s editorial statement in 1934 read,

We propose to concentrate on creative and critical literature, but we shall maintain a definite viewpoint—that of the revolutionary working class…. The defense of the Soviet Union is one of our principle tasks (quoted in Jimonville, 2007, p. 56).

Despite this strong partisanship, the editors also stated that

noticeable and remembered: it is free publicity, so to speak though not always, because it depends upon the psychology of the particular audience to be captured” (1977, pp. 149-150).
We shall resist every attempt to cripple our literature by narrow-minded, sectarian theories and practices (quoted in Jumonville, 2007, p. 57).

This latter statement in short time won out over the review’s partisanship. Within two years, the journal was dissolved and reconstituted. The new Partisan Review was no longer affiliated with the John Reed Club or the American Communist Party. In 1936, the new editorial statement read

Any magazine, we believe, that aspires to a place in the vanguard of literature today, will be revolutionary in tendency; but we are also convinced that any such magazine will be unequivocally independent....Partisan Review is aware of its responsibility to the revolutionary movement in general, but we disclaim obligation to any of its organized political expressions. Indeed we think that the cause of revolutionary literature is best served by a policy of no commitments to any political party (quoted in Jumonville, 2007, p. 60).

Partisan Review’s commitment to a radical literary culture took priority over any question of politics as such. While the New Left Review may have viewed a commitment to culture as part of a larger commitment to a socialist movement, Partisan Review was wary of a commitment to politics, believing it could get in the way of a revolutionary literature.

Jean-Paul Sartre’s Les Temps modernes also professed a commitment to a radical literary culture. The review began publication in 1945 and, as Anna Boschetti states, in the introduction Sartre is

not content with simply proclaiming that literature has a moral and political function; he proudly stresses the point that such a conception of literature constitutes a radical break with the entire literary tradition, and he claims that he is forcing others to recognize that it is the only legitimate conception (1988, p. 58).

Through the pages of Les Temps modernes, Sartre promulgated existentialism, a school of thought that engaged literary and political culture. Regis Debray argues that it is the review form itself that allows thought to overcome such boundaries.

So we see that the review is isomorphic with the separate fields of the aesthetic avant-garde, academic research and political action, and welds them together. It
both materializes and symbolizes the possibility of a translation, if not an equivalence, and therefore communication between them (1981, p. 72).

However, the review form has not always been implemented in such a manner.

Some of the earliest reviews to achieve prominence in nineteenth century Great Britain, like the *Edinburgh Review, Quarterly Review*, and *Westminster Review*, could perhaps be viewed as forerunners of Debray’s review. They combined a sharp focus on political questions with reviews that covered literary works as well as works of science, history, art, and travel. They provided a model for future journals that viewed themselves as institutions of criticism. Some of these journals retained the early reviews’ political focus, while others pay little or no attention to politics. In many of these journals, political and literary criticism has become divorced. Journals like *Scrutiny*, a British review not unlike the American *Partisan Review*, made the case that literary criticism was necessary to the question of the political. In an advertisement for *Scrutiny* that ran in the inaugural issue of the American *Southern Review* in 1935, the journal stated that it

> aims at consolidating a public of those who, finding it impossible to be indifferent about the cultural drift of the English-speaking world, believe that a concern for the health of literary criticism is immediately relevant to the political and economic urgencies of the time ("Advertisement for *Scrutiny*," p. n/a).

Their opening editorial in 1932 called for a journal “that combines criticism of literature with criticism of extra-literary activities” (Mulhern, 1979, p. 48).

The first issue of the *Southern Review* in 1935 contained essays such as “Political Radicalism in France,” and “The Covenant of the League of Nations as a Pact of Peace,” as well as poetry by Wallace Stevens and Robert Penn Warren and fiction by Katherine Anne Porter. A recent copy of the review contains little that could be considered political. In that respect, the *Southern Review* today is not unlike many other literary reviews that avoid
politics. Some of these journals are independent, while many are reviews and quarterlies affiliated with universities.

*Antioch Review* began publication in 1941. A small group of faculty at Antioch College began the review in order to establish a political forum for liberalism. Moreover, their inaugural editorial proclaims a desire to write the political. The editorial read:

> We do not propose to remain silent and it is our purpose to provide a forum for others who feel as we do. We believe in democracy, so strongly that we think it should be enormously extended. We believe that no scholar can fail to view with concern threats against basic human values, whether they originate inside or outside the country. We believe in an instrumental theory of knowledge and in the application of scholarship to the solution of social problems. We believe that the social role of the intellectual in our time is to employ ideas to further democracy in the fullest sense. We believe in the promise of American life and we would seek for the seeds of that promise. This is our purpose in founding a magazine ("Editorial," 1941, p. 14).

The journal’s political focus continued after the war but began to dwindle in the 1960s as more pages were devoted to poetry and fiction. A special issue of the magazine published in 1969 was titled “What’s Happened to Magazines?” That year, the review underwent a major change as its editorial control shifted from a collective to a single editor. In the editorial of the special issue, the new editor wrote that the review, to his knowledge, was the only *academic* journal of its time that was established with a political purpose. Now, however, the review would no longer have a commitment to a particular political program.

> [W]e do not now have a political ‘line,’ or in any case one that could subsume an editorial policy, but like our predecessors we will hope to be prepared to apply ourselves and our resources to the solution of political problems ("Observations," 1969, p. 124).

The review pledged to “try to maintain an open book” in the matter of political viewpoints that would be represented. By the mid-1970s, the review contained more fiction and continued a commitment to the literary essay as a form. In 2009, the editor described the
function of magazines like the Antioch Review as providing “good ground’ for much of what is vital in our literary culture” (Fogarty, p. n/a).

The Antioch Review’s founders took up writing for political purposes. Over the review’s life span, writing took on more and more of a solely literary purpose. Similar transitions can be seen in other journals that started out as reviews with political and literary intentions. As Debray argued, the ideal review does try to translate across these concerns. Then there are journals and reviews that mainly exclude literary writing and focus only on the political, such as New Left Review and Telos, to name a couple. They have also taken up writing for political purposes. Over their life spans, they have struggled with their engagement with the political, one of the main questions being is political writing a sufficiently political practice? Further, in what ways does political writing as a re-viewing practice inhibit its very aims?
In 1965, when *The Public Interest* began publication, a solid consensus still stood in place, namely, that liberalism, Keynesianism, and the welfare state were good for the country. Of course, the consensus had its opponents, most notably from the movements of the New Right as well as of the New Left. Still, there was a notable center ground that clung to these ideas. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who would become a frequent contributor to the journal as well as a member of several presidential administrations and a senator, thought they should name the new journal, *Consensus*, after a favorite term of President Lyndon B. Johnson (Moynihan, 1975). However, whatever degree of consensus still existed in the mid-1960s, new visions and di-visions quickly eroded it.

The “great reviews” also began publication during times of rapid political change. They followed in the wake of the French Revolution and wielded their greatest influence in the years leading up to the Reform Act of 1832. They represented differing views on the state’s current policies and had different hopes for its future. They shared a commitment to the review form and its practices, holding it up as a forum for critical debate that sometimes erupted into partisan rancor. The reviews provided theorists or intellectuals, or “men of letters” as they were more likely to be called at that time, with a position from which to critique the state (Heyck, 1980). More than a hundred years later, this institution, the review, or critical journal, continued to provide this position. Perhaps not as many members of the public read *The Public Interest* as read *The Edinburgh Review* and not as
many read *Telos* as read *The Westminster Review*. Their common theoretical projects may not exercise much influence on state policies, if any. However, the review form continues to persist with new print and electronic journals and reviews beginning each year. They continue to act as corporative associations of theorists or intellectuals—or whatever designator is most appropriate for people who write political criticism, and their reviewing practice continues to act as a coexistent and codependent force, of whatever negligible amount, with the state and its practices or policies.

The reviews or critical journals challenge how the state “sees” by “seeing again.” Some of their views create visions that are very different from the state as it actually exists, while other views tend more toward reform rather than wholesale revolution. Sometimes these reviews are effective because they revise understandings of the past. By the mid-1960s in the United States, as the quotation above notes, the welfare state was under attack from almost all quarters. These attacks often painted different pictures of the welfare state and its policies, its successes and its failures. *The Public Interest* began with plans for its completion, which fairly quickly changed to plans for its reform, and then to plans for its abandonment. *Telos’s* vision had little hope for the U.S. welfare state, when it finally gave it any attention, and challenged the modern state and its different manifestations found throughout the globe. Both journals criticized a bureaucratically bloated administrative apparatus that depended on a regime of New Class technicians for its operation. While the welfare state was being critiqued, it was being replaced by a neoliberal state that opposed state intervention in the economy at the same time as it depended upon it. A wave of “neos” joined the political fray, “neoconservatives,” “neoliberals,” “neopopulists, and “neofederalists,” among others.
Without tracing all the contours of this changing political landscape, this part examines the role played by these two journals, Telos and The Public Interest, and their reviewing practices during this time. It investigates how these institutions of criticism and their political writings re-viewed the state and its policies, whether they sought a new vision for the state, or merely sought to reform the existing vision. Important to this investigation, and where I begin, is how they viewed their practice of re-view, in other words, their reflexivity, as well as their view of other institutions of criticism that comprised the intellectual field of these journals. This part also explores how the journals’ materiality, both their “organized matter” and “materialized organization” affected their views. Of course, each of these sections informs the other. The conflicts between critics affected their view of the state and its critics. The materiality of the critics’ transmission process affected their view and affected their position within the intellectual field which affected their position vis-à-vis other critics, and so on and so forth. Finally, this part asks whether the political writing of these journals wrought/wrights politics, and where possible, provides an answer.
Interregnum: Reviewing – A Transitory Practice?

“Books have their destinies. They can be lost, forgotten, reappear. Even books that remain present for a time have their destinies. New editions are like the shorelines against which, with every changed situation, with every new generation of readers, a wider stratum of unforeseen reaction sediments. It is different with periodicals: they themselves prevent such a reception. Journals limit their own actuality with the rhythm of their appearance. Every new number devalues the preceding one; and with its last number a journal wanders into the archives. Periodicals are more intimately bound up with their date of publication than monographs with the year of their first printing. Instead, they have a different fortune: they can, if only they have absorbed enough of the spirit of time, become a document. And sometimes even documents have destinies.” – Jürgen Habermas (1980, p. 116).

As I have been arguing about political writing, journals always experience a number of changes. Part of my challenge has been to absorb those changes into this work. Since I began, the journal Telos went on-line;\(^{125}\) the former editors of The Public Interest, Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell, passed away; National Affairs, in many respects a reincarnation of The Public Interest, began publication; New Left Review celebrated its fiftieth anniversary; Social Text published its one hundredth issue as a special issued dedicated to the journal’s history; Dissent merged with the on-line journal Democra tiya; and the Jewish Review of Books began publication. I am sure there were other happenings as well, other journals that began, ended or transformed.

That is part of the nature of journals. Like the di-versions of critics, and their debates over critical policies and critical struggles, journals are often fleeting. The main journals I focus on here are anomalies for that reason. They have had long life spans. The Public Interest published for forty years. Telos has been publishing for more than forty years and continues to exist. The American Review lasted only seven years, while the Westminster Review lasted ninety years, although it underwent many transformations during that time. So many other journals and magazines have appeared and disappeared within a few years

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\(^{125}\) By this I mean that the journal now provides the last ten years of its issues in digital form on its web site and also increased the offerings available electronically, such as a blog. The journal additionally plans to have all of its back issues to No. 1 digitized by Fall 2011.
and sometimes only a few months. Within that short time, some have managed to make large impressions, such as the American cultural magazine, *Seven Arts*, which lasted barely a year from 1916 to 1917. As Perry Anderson remarked on the fortieth anniversary of *New Left Review*,

The life-span of journals is no warrant of their achievement. A couple of issues, and abrupt extinction, can count for more in the history of a culture than a century of continuous publication. In its three years, the *Athenaeum* put German Romanticism into orbit. The fireworks of the *Revue Blanche*, the first journal of a modern avant-garde, lit Paris for barely a decade. *Lef* closed after seven issues in Moscow. These were reviews at the intersection of aesthetic innovation with philosophy and politics. Journals of criticism have often survived longer—*The Criterion*, in various incarnations, for most of the inter-war period, *Scrutiny* from the thirties into the fifties. Reasons for closure might be external, even accidental, but typically the vitality of a journal is tied to those who create it. In heroic cases, a single individual can defy time with the composition of a personal monument: Kraus writing *Die Fackel* alone for twenty-five years, Croce rivaling the feat with *La Critica*. Usually, life-cycles of journals are more adventitious and dispersed. Editors quarrel, change their minds, get bored or go bankrupt, for the most part well before they go to the grave themselves (2000, p. 5).

Anderson’s comments highlight the importance of the materiality of reviews. They are necessarily bound up in the contingencies of everyday life. Can a journal survive a strong editor that quits or passes away? Can reviews survive increases in costs, like the parliamentary tax that affected the early reviews, or the more modern postal rate increase?

Regis Debray writes that “[t]he necessary life-span of a review is a generation, between twenty and twenty-five years, after which it either changes or outlives its purpose” (1981, p. 73). Similarly, Randall Collins (1998) argues that the minimal unit of intellectual change is a generation. Discussing “tendency journals,” Michael Denning recommends that they have an expiration date of maybe ten years.

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126 Randolph Bourne’s essay “Twilight of Idols” advocating that the United States not enter World War I appeared in the journal.
127 He estimates a generation to be approximately thirty-three years and writes: “It takes at least that long for a significant change to take place in philosophical premises; and it takes at least
because most of the great intellectual journals became much less interesting than they were at the beginning. Their tendency becomes a cliché rather than a new metaphor (interviewed in Cohen, 2008, p. 120).

In a similar vein, Piccone wrote at the twentieth anniversary of Telos that

> [u]nlikely people who reach maturity at that age, journals are more like cats and dogs: twenty years of age usually designates, not the flower of youth, but incipient senility (1988, p. 3).

For journals that have lasted much longer, outlasting founding editors, undergoing significant and insignificant transformations, they become a challenge to study. On one hand, they offer so much rich material to explore and analyze. On the other hand, one wonders whether they should be studied as a single continuous subject.

To think of a journal as a body of work is perhaps a bit strange. As Jill Lepore writes in *The New Yorker*:

> Magazines are ephemeral, timely at the expense of timelessness. They evanesce. Each new issue displaces the last; a magazine molts. Quite possibly the most unmagaziney thing that ever happened to magazines is the digital archive, as curious a collection of what was as jars of sharks’ teeth or boxes of hair swept from the barbershop floor (Lepore, 2010, p. n/a).

It might be unfair to compare a magazine’s archive with the hair collected from the barbershop floor. However, even editors of important journals have questioned the enduring value of their work. Max Horkheimer locked up the old issues of the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, the early journal of the Frankfurt School, in the basement of the Institute to keep it away from the younger generations (Habermas, 1980).

Libraries often treat journals with a similar attitude putting old issues on difficult microfiche or film or squirreled away in offsite storage units. Virginia Tech’s library,
where I conducted my research, kept only the issues since 1980 of The Public Interest and Telos in its stacks, the older issues were in remote storage.\textsuperscript{128} If it were not for the digital archive, that “most un-magaziney thing,” I would have had a more difficult time completing my dissertation. A digital archive made all the issues of The Public Interest available to me instantly on the website of its successor journal, National Affairs. Without this service, I would have had to request each issue before 1980 to be retrieved from my library’s remote storage building, as I was forced to do with Telos.

Over its forty-year lifespan, The Public Interest published one hundred and fifty nine issues. Regular issues averaged around one hundred and thirty pages in length with some special issues reaching close to two hundred pages. Even if every issue remained the length of an average issue, the total number of pages in The Public Interest archive would be about 20,670. The journal, Telos, has just published its one hundred and fifty first issue. Its average issue length is closer to two hundred and fifty pages, meaning its archive contains around 37,750 pages and counting. The task of thoroughly reading and digesting either archive, let alone both, is daunting.

Unlike a book, even a very long one in several volumes, a journal’s archive is not a unitary work. There are numerous contributors, not a single author, and while some journals try to attain some form of corporate personality, a struggle that becomes evident in these two journals, the contributors’ contributions differ and disagree. Further, over the course of forty years, contributors and editors may come and go, with successive generations bringing new perspectives to the journal. Journals that exist for so long also

\textsuperscript{128} Library fine policies also underscore the timeliness of periodicals. While a late book may cost the negligent holder a dollar a day, a late journal is often five times the fine, implying that its value is more intimately tied to its publication date.
encounter many changes in the world, and they grapple with these changes in their pages. Whatever the source of change, whether internal or external—if that difference can be maintained as external changes can produce internal ones and internal changes can cause what is external to be viewed differently—change can produce seeming contradictions in a journal. What someone wrote in the journal in 1969 might be completely contradicted by something written in 1981, whether by the same contributor or someone else. Nothing is static, not the intellectual field, the critic’s view, or the state.

Rather than considering journals as unitary texts that can be probed for some consistent message, it is more productive to think of them as writing practices that unfold over time. This is not to deny that there could be some consistency of message, but it shifts the analysis from trying to distill an essence from tens of thousands of pages to something more expansionary that seeks to understand how that writing practice unfolded or evolved, although that implies progression. Both of these journals began with some sort of mission, although they would both likely reject such a formulation. Still, their titles alone (The Public Interest, Telos) imply that there was an ideal they were at least at one point in time moving toward. An analysis of their writing practices is an analysis of that movement—how did they travel, with whom, under what conditions, did the destination remain the same or change, who did they pick up along the way, who did they leave behind, who piloted, who navigated, how many times did they ask “are we there yet?”129

129 Distilling an essence out of 30,000 pages would not be easy, but in a way, it might be easier than tracing a practice. If I were just looking for a neat summary of what was The Public Interest or what is Telos, then I could exclude much of what be might considered superfluous to the essence. For example, the sometimes wry and humorous “Notes on Contributors” found within Telos might be indicative of the journal’s personality but could be considered superfluous to what the journal had to say. I might also excise what is contradictory, convincing myself, for example, that an off-the-wall article is a minority opinion among the journal and not what the journal was really about. I could
What I am trying to do though is to resist reifying either journal so that they can be easily digested. This is made more difficult, in a sense, by the fact that both journals have written their own “autobiographies.” Their recollections provide me with interesting insight into both journals. This is especially helpful when written by editors or contributors who have died and can no longer tell their stories. Additionally, the journals have contained reflexive observations at various points in time, providing snapshots as they have aged. The Public Interest produced anniversary issues at twenty and thirty years. The last issue at forty years also contained some reflection. All three issues contained articles by the editors and leading contributors that attempted to explain the journal and its trajectory. Additionally, there have been reflections outside the journal in other publications.

Although there is no book-length study on The Public Interest, several books on the New York Intellectuals have contained sections on the journal and/or its editors. These books concentrate more on the early life of the editors and do not examine the journal as thoroughly. On the other hand, several books on neoconservatism and conservatism have paid more attention to the journal and its role in those movements in the latter part of the twentieth century. Finally, a documentary, Arguing the World, was made about Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Irving Howe, and Irving Kristol, all but Howe served as editors of the journal. The documentary was also issued in book form. Reading and watching these men tell the story of the journal and their involvement in it makes it difficult to resist the stories they tell. It is easy to adopt and repeat their narrative.

sift and funnel the 30,000 pages into a concise two hundred-page synopsis that could easily be read as a substitute for the journal’s archive. In a sense, this is what any dissertation must do to make a subject manageable. And since I am writing a dissertation, and one of a length that my committee would be willing to read, I cannot pretend that I am presenting a complete picture of either journal. However, narrowly defining either journal imposes a uniformity and cohesion that does not exist. Further, it overemphasizes the product at the expense of the process.
The same goes for *Telos*. Although not receiving the same level of attention as *The Public Interest* and its editors, for reasons that will be elaborated upon later in the dissertation, the journal has published its own reflections and “autobiography.” Reflective pieces have appeared in issues 50, 75, 101, all milestone issues, and 131, upon the death of the journal’s founding editor, Paul Piccone. Further, the reports from various *Telos* conferences over the years also contain much material elucidating the workings of the journal. While various contributors and editors wrote the reflective pieces, so that no one story predominates, a fairly consistent narrative does emerge. Finally, an edited volume of reflective essays on the journal will be published soon. I myself contributed an essay to a volume that otherwise contains pieces written by individuals closely involved with the journal, at least at one point in time. Again, these essays gave me useful material to consider, but I do not want merely to repeat here what has already been said. Nor do I believe that the internal reflections of either journal fully represent what I am trying to do in this dissertation. As Jürgen Habermas wrote of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, “for a journal is, after all, quite a different thing from the key theoretical articles it contains” (1980, p. 116).
Chapter 3.1 The Founding of The Public Interest and Telos: Why There, Why Then, Why Thus?...

This chapter explores the self-institution of two institutions of criticism which while pursuing different re-viewing practices also were bound by the common form of the review or journal and its historical practice.

An Introduction to The Public Interest

As mentioned above, The Public Interest began in 1965 during Johnson’s Great Society and the final years of Keynesian welfare economics. One of its founding editors, Irving Kristol, while still in his twenties, began his editorial career at Commentary in the 1940s, a liberal Jewish publication at the time (Kristol, 1995b).\footnote{Kristol also briefly operated his own magazine, Enquiry: A Journal of Independent Radical Thought, which he began with a few others when he was in his early twenties. The magazine only ran for about two years. Some of his articles from this early publishing effort can be found in The Neoconservative Persuasion (Kristol, 2011b).} Kristol also considered himself positioned on the left, if somewhat uneasily, as first a Trotskyist and then a liberal.

However, some of his pieces for Commentary contained the early hints of a conservative viewpoint that would become more visible in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, in a 1960 review of Friedrich Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty, Kristol echoed Hayek’s criticism of the welfare state, asserting:

> Above all, his book encourages us to take another look at our welfare state, which—lacking any general idea of ‘welfare’—is coming more and more to resemble a monstrous pork-barrel (1960, p. 354).

Kristol also highlighted four of Hayek’s tenets that later would become central to The Public Interest, namely 1) that our ignorance is greater than our knowledge, 2) that the more we know, the more we do not know, 3) that actions have unforesceable consequences, and 4)
that the senselessness of coercing men to “build a better world” lies in the certainty that our children will detest this world (1960, p. 354).

In 1952, Kristol was given the opportunity to co-founded the journal, *Encounter*, in London. Supposedly without the editorial staff’s knowledge, the CIA at least in part funded the journal in an effort that was a soft power offensive against the spread of communism. While in England, Kristol became friends with several British conservatives. He quickly found them to be like-minded and admired a conservative tradition that he thought was lacking in the U.S. At the end of his time with *Encounter*, Kristol returned to the U.S. and for a short while worked for *The Reporter*, which was rather dictatorially run by its editor. Kristol quit and began to pursue the possibility of again beginning his own journal. With the help of a wealthy friend, *The Public Interest* was born. Although perhaps more center or left-of-center at its outset, the journal made its rightward turn after the editorial staff’s disillusionment with the effects of Johnson’s Great Society and the failure of Keynesian welfare economics beginning in the late 1960s and becoming more evident by the early 70s. The journal became a home for other so-called “reformed leftists,” such as Daniel Bell, Sidney Hook, and Nathan Glazer, and led to the articulation of “neoconservatism.”

Again, the first issue of *The Public Interest* appeared in the fall of 1965.\(^{131}\) The quarterly’s subscription price was five dollars per year. The new journal’s masthead listed

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\(^{131}\) Reflecting on the year in 1995, George F. Will wrote, “rarely has there been a year eventful in the way 1965 was” (1995, p. 3). He then went on to enumerate some of the more notable events: Fidel Castro’s announcement that Che Guevara had left Cuba to combat imperialism; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced that there were now 130,000 troops in Vietnam when there officially had been none at the start of the year; Republican leaders denied any connection between their party and the John Birch Society after Goldwater’s trouncing in the previous election; President Johnson signed a bill liberalizing immigration; and, in Crawfordville, Georgia, state troopers turned away African-American children trying to board buses bound for all-white schools. Will also points out that *The Sound of Music* was the most popular movie of the year and *Bonanza*, the most popular
Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol as editors and Warren Demian Manshel as publisher.\textsuperscript{132} The journal’s editorial office address was “in care of Basic Books,” the big publishing house in New York City where Kristol was currently employed. The journal’s subscription office address was care of Freedom House, also based in New York City.\textsuperscript{133} Manshel established a company, National Affairs, Inc., to publish the journal.\textsuperscript{134}

The first issue contained an article by Daniel P. Moynihan on “The Professionalization of Reform,” two articles by Robert M. Solow and Robert L. Heilbroner on “The Great Automation Question,” two articles by Nathan Glazer and Eveline M. Burns on the question of “Why Are The Poor Still With Us?” and other articles by Robert A. Nisbet, Daniel S. Greenberg, Jacques Barzun, Timothy Raison, and Daniel Bell. There was also a brief section titled “Current Reading” that provided short reviews of recent publications. The editorial written by Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol titled “What is the Public Interest?” laid out the journal’s program. The number of pages of each issue hovered fairly consistently at around one hundred thirty, although specials issues could reach two hundred pages.

The contents of each issue generally contained longer essays, often around ten to twenty pages in length, although tending to the shorter rather than longer end of that television show. The economy was strong, and Frank Sinatra’s “It Was a Very Good Year,” was one of the most popular songs.

\textsuperscript{132} The journal also had a “Publication Committee,” whose members included Murray L. Silberstein (chairman), Leo Cherne, Daniel P. Moynihan, Arthur J. Rosenthal, Leo Rosten, Martin E. Segal, and Stanley Simon.

\textsuperscript{133} A note below the masthead read: “The Public Interest is sponsored by Freedom House as part of its educational program and as a contribution to – the public interest. But the views expressed in the magazine are to be attributed only to the authors and, where appropriate, the editors. Freedom House believes that it is out of such a confrontation of thoughtful views that a more enlightened and more responsible public opinion will emerge.”

\textsuperscript{134} This company would continue to be the publisher of the journal. After the journal ceased publication in 2005, the corporation continued to operate. It now publishes the quarterly opinion journal \textit{National Affairs}, the company’s eponymous inheritor of \textit{The Public Interest}’s mantle.
range. Articles frequently quoted documentary evidence, such as Moynihan’s article, “The Professionalization of Reform II,” which reproduced long (meaning several pages of) sections of policy documents from the Clinton Task Force on health care (Moynihan, 1995). Some articles would be grouped around a common question and could be in response to one another. The table of contents never divided an issue’s contents into sections but headings on the pieces themselves might categorize them into “Comments,” “Notes,” occasionally, “Communication,” and sometimes by topic, such as “Media.”

Each issue ended with a section titled “Current Reading,” which contained, short condensed reviews of relevant works. The “Current Reading” section eventually morphed into the “Books in Review” section, which also expanded the space devoted to reviews. Sometimes longer reviews appeared in the journal and could be found in special supplements, like the “Summer Books” supplement that appeared in Issue 68 (Summer 1982). Most issues also contained brief biographies of its contributors under “Contributors to This Issue.” The contributors mainly consisted of university professors, federal government employees, and other policy analysts in the private and public sectors, often at various think tanks and foundations.

Bell and Kristol named the magazine, designed it, and made its first print run about 1,200 copies. Daniel P. Moynihan, who attended some of the early planning meetings for the journal, suggested that they call it “Consensus,” after Lyndon B. Johnson’s then-favorite term. Moynihan recalls that Kristol paused for a moment at the idea of Consensus: A Journal of the Public Interest. But as it turns out, it was only a pause.

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135 Skinner described this as “the journal’s tolerance for loose, complicated writing” (2005, p. n/a). He said that the quotations could be so long that they could be mistaken for articles themselves.

136 The notable entry under “Communication” was the exchange between Irving Kristol and the editor of the New York Times, which I discuss below.
They solicited articles by calling on friends and acquaintances, who they believed “to be on our ‘wave length’” (Kristol, 2005, p. 6). Said “wave length” was a skepticism toward or, more arguably, a strong critique of the War on Poverty. The articles all focused on domestic policy. A sampling of policy topics paid attention by The Public Interest in its early years include, but are not limited to: the question of automation, technology and unemployment, welfare, the high cost of hospitals, suburbia, education, crime, housing, the draft, public television, class, and pollution. The editors decided at the very beginning that the journal would not discuss foreign policy or foreign affairs. Kristol wrote:

> Vietnam was arousing a storm of controversy at the time, and we knew that our group had a wide spectrum of opinion on the issue. We did not want any of the space in our modest-sized quarterly to be swallowed up by Vietnam. The simplest solution was to ban foreign affairs and foreign policy from our pages (Kristol, 2005, p. 7).

The journal maintained this policy throughout its forty-year life span. However, in order to accommodate interest in foreign policy, Kristol began the sister journal The National Interest in 1985. Interestingly, it was an editorial decision at an earlier journal (The Public Interest) that would lead to the later journal’s creation.

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137 All of us at the core of The Public Interest had grown up in lower-middle-class or working-class households—unlike the academics who had authored the War on Poverty—and we knew that becoming politically militant was no way for poor people to lift themselves out of poverty. This, it seemed to us, was just a sociological echo of an older socialist idea that a ‘Great Society’ could only come about as a consequence of class struggle. There were many other such fantasies floating about at that time (Kristol, 1995c, pp. 29-30).

138 Skinner writes that the early journal displayed “a tolerance for eccentricity, especially in writers’ choice of subjects” (2005, p. n/a). He points to several articles on the topic of the mafia for support.

139 Public Interest writers found an outlet for their views on foreign policy in the pages of Commentary, which as Kristol notes gave birth to the Committee for the Free World, headed by Donald Rumsfeld. Here may also lay the foundation of late neoconservatism that focused on foreign rather than domestic affairs (Kristol, 2005).

140 As Kristol writes: “Even before moving to Washington [in 1987], I did have one final idea for a new magazine I would like to be involved in, one that was to be located in Washington. As I have noted, The Public Interest only dealt with domestic affairs. But as the Soviet regime showed signs of unraveling, it became clear to me that some kind of post-Cold War foreign policy would be needed.
Writing a critique of The Public Interest in 1970, Maurice R. Berube and Marilyn Gittell questioned how a journal so devoted to the question of improving American life could overlook questions of foreign policy. Their argued explanation for the lack of attention to Vietnam was not because of space restrictions or a difference of opinion among the editors. They pointed to one editor in particular, Kristol, and contended that the journal ignored Vietnam because Kristol had in 1952 written a piece in Commentary magazine ostensibly defending McCarthyism. Berube and Gittell pointed to Irving Howe’s essay in Partisan Review, titled “The Age of Conformity,” which charged Commentary with being a journal devoted to advancing liberalism as a method for adapting to the American status quo. “This is precisely our objection to The Public Interest,” they argued, its conservation of the status quo (Berube & Gittell, 1970, p. 7). Regardless of Kristol’s own opinions towards the war, it is a valid criticism to make, that no journal could tackle the question of the

Such a policy would have to steer its own course between Wilsonian internationalist utopianism and a ‘pragmatism’ that was little more than opportunism. In short, I foresaw a ‘neorealist’ foreign policy journal that would complement the ‘neoconservatism’ of The Public Interest. The idea for such a magazine took shape in the course of discussions with Owen Harries, an Australian political scientist, former Australian Ambassador to Unesco, now an American resident, and one of the wisest analysts of foreign policy. He was willing to be the editor of The National Interest (as it was to be called), while I would be merely the publisher, watching over the budget. The first issue appeared in the fall of 1985, and it is now, together with the long-established Foreign Affairs, the leading journal in its field” (1995c, p. 38).

141 The new journal began with a grant of six hundred thousand dollars from the Olin Foundation. As Patrick Allitt writes: “It, too, was a neoconservative vehicle, dedicated to providing the same sort of insights in foreign policy that its predecessor, The Public Interest had done in domestic affairs twenty years earlier. This time around, says the historian Gary Dorien, ‘Kristol made no pretense of avoiding ideology.’ Its contributors included Kristol himself, Robert Tucker, Owen Harries, and Henry Rowen, who began gathering evidence to show that by the late 1980s the Soviet Union, far from being more powerful than ever before, was desperately weak internally, falling to pieces economically, and scarcely able even to feed its people” (2009, p. 252).

142 The essay was titled “‘Civil Liberties,’ 1952, A Study in Confusion.”
public interest while at the same time ignoring an issue so important to the nation at the
time.\textsuperscript{143}

The articles \textit{The Public Interest} collected were described as “gentlemanly essays, not
dissertation chapters” by Mark Lilla (1985, p. 68).\textsuperscript{144} Although the purpose of the journal
was to know better what one was talking about, the articles during the publication’s first
decade were written for a more general audience. They did not overly rely on statistics or
“science.” This began to change in the 1970s. Economics began to dominate the field of
policy analysis, and the journal’s articles began to grow more specialized. Presumably, the
readership of \textit{The Public Interest} also reflected this specialization. Additionally, more policy
journals began publication, many of which were narrower in their focus.\textsuperscript{145} As Lilla
remarks, “[t]he ‘policy intellectual’ writing for \textit{The Public Interest} in 1975 was not the
gentlemanly social scientist of 1965” (1985, pp. 70-71).

Kristol’s byline only appeared in the journal twenty-one times during the forty years
of the journal’s existence and 160 issues.\textsuperscript{146} Several of those appearances were brief
editorial notes and introductions to issues. Two pieces were reflections on the journal at its
ten twentieth anniversary and on its final issue. Interestingly, his byline appeared about twice

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{143} However, the lack of attention to foreign policy is the main separator between the early
“neoconservatism” of \textit{The Public Interest}, which was primarily concerned with domestic affairs, and
later “neoconservatism,” almost wholly associated with foreign policy in the 1990s and 2000s.
\textsuperscript{144} Skinner associates this gentlemanly style with an editorial system that “let intellectuals be
intellectuals.” He is not clear on what comprised such an editorial system or what defines an
intellectual, but the system’s and intellectual’s output appears to be a certain style: “showy,
disputatious, charming, brilliant” (2005, p. n/a). According to Skinner, Moynihan was emblematic of
this style. “[H]e could indulge in the first person, wax poetic here, wonkish there, then insert a long
passage quoting himself, and get away with it. Never restrained, always winning, his essays in the
eyear issues, like most everything else he penned, still read well” (p. n/a).
\textsuperscript{145} Lilla argues that those journals were more academic in their style and statistical in their
approach (1985).
\textsuperscript{146} Technically, there were 160 issues of \textit{The Public Interest}. A special issue in 1980 bore no number.
as much in Commentary.¹⁴⁷ He also made monthly contributions to the Wall Street Journal from the early 1970s for about twenty-five years ("Irving Kristol," 2009). Unlike Kristol, most of Telos editor Paul Piccone’s writings appeared within Telos. While both journals largely represented the voice of these editors, it is interesting that Kristol published more outside The Public Interest, including many of his pieces devoted to an articulation of neoconservatism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Editor</th>
<th>Number of Contributions</th>
<th>Years as Editor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irving Kristol</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1965-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Bell</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1965-1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathan Glazer</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1973-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Wolfson</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2003-2005</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Bell, who edited the journal for only eight years, appeared as an author eighteen times, sharing the editorial introduction to the first issue with Kristol and making his last contribution to the journal in Issue 95 (Spring 1989) with the essay, “American Exceptionalism’ Revisited: the Role of Civil Society.” Arguably, Bell contributed more substantive articles to the journal over the course of his tenure than Kristol did, publishing such important pieces as “Notes on the Post-Industrial Society,” and “The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism,” which he also published in book form. It was Nathan Glazer though who would be the most prolific editor-contributor, publishing forty-nine pieces in the journal between 1965 and 2005, and averaging a little more than one contribution per year. Adam Wolfson, who would serve briefly as the journal’s editor from Issue 150

¹⁴⁷ Also of note, the two collections of Kristol’s writings, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea (1995) and The Neoconservative Persuasion (2011), contain very few of his Public Interest contributions. The former contains only two, and the latter, just three. This suggests that while the journal as a whole may bear the mark of Kristol, such distinction owed more to his editorial role than his authorship, which he reserved for other publications.
(Winter 2003) until its final issue, contributed twelve essays to The Public Interest between 1995 and 2005.

The Public Interest’s founders were already middle-aged when they began the journal, and they wrote in their first editorial that they intended for the journal to have a middle-aged readership. Several of their editors and contributors, including Daniel Bell and Sidney Hook, would fit Russell Jacoby’s (1987) definition of “public intellectual” having published books that reached mainstream audiences.

Despite the academic backgrounds of many of the journal’s contributors, The Public Interest began firmly outside the academic milieu and for the most part, remained outside that milieu, despite some of its editors later finding academic positions for themselves. Its founders had been associated with journals such as Partisan Review and Commentary and most had avoided positions as professors in their early careers, working and making a living as editors and writers instead (Kristol, 1995c). They were perhaps the last generation to benefit from any remnants of bohemia, and they belonged to intellectual circles in New York traced and defined as the American intellectual elite (Kadushin, 2006).148 They belonged to the New York Intellectuals and their magazines, which held a dominant position in the intellectual field. Their cultural capital derived from those intellectual circles and magazines and later translated into a relatively significant force in the political field.

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148 A portion of Charles Kadushin’s analysis of the American intellectual elite was published as an essay in The Public Interest in Issue 29, Fall 1972.
Still, even while specialization may have increased at the journal as it “matured,” an attention to larger questions continued. In large part, this attention to questions of political philosophy existed due to the founding milieu of the journal’s members. Their time spent at City College and their association with the “intellectual” journals of the “New York Intellectuals” habituated them to the study of big ideas.

The founders of The Public Interest had not always been middle-aged. They were young once too. Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol, along with later co-editor, Nathan Glazer, have all been named as members of the “New York Intellectuals,” a description mainly used to define those individuals associated with the prominent New York intellectual journals, namely Partisan Review, Politics, Commentary, Dissent, and The New York Review of Books, and also The Public Interest. Bell, Kristol, and Glazer came to know Partisan Review while students at City College of New York, an affordable public institution with an overwhelmingly Jewish student population (Bloom, 1986). All three men were the sons of Jewish immigrants, and all came from working class homes. City College did not offer a rigorous education inside the classroom, these men recalled. So, they found their education elsewhere, largely through a culture of fierce intellectual discourse practiced in the college cafeteria at lunchtime and between classes.

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149 Kristol emphasizes that there were no economists among the core members of The Public Interest and that they came later as the journal “matured” (1995a, p. 88). Kristol, himself, undertook a study of economics, specifically supply-side economics, while a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (Kristol, 1995c).

150 The list could also include Menorah Journal, The Nation, The New Republic, Encounter, Reporter, and The New Leader, to which members of the New York Intellectuals also contributed and sometimes edited.

151 Their cafeteria debates may not be all that unique, although they are a large part of this generation’s intellectual legend. André Schiffrin, the publisher of The New Press, recalls a similar scenario at his high school. “I often found myself in long debates in the school cafeteria with other children, some much to my left” (2007, p. 94). He later learned this practice was not unusual when his friend, Gabriel Kolko from Akron, Ohio, shared a similar experience.
The lunchroom had various booths or “alcoves” where the students segregated themselves according to various characteristics, some based on political affiliation. Bell, Kristol, and later Glazer sat at Alcove No. 1, which belonged to the Trotskyists. Next door, was Alcove No. 2, which belonged to the Stalinists. The members of Alcove No. 2 were forbidden from talking to the members of Alcove No. 1. There they read and argued over Marx’s texts along with those of Engels, Trotsky, Luxemburg and others. They also were introduced to *Partisan Review*, a journal originally begun as an organ of the John Reed Club, the literary club of the Communist Party. However, the journal’s editors, William Phillips and Philip Rahv, would break with the Communist Party, taking up an anti-Stalinist position.

As Irving Kristol said:

*Partisan Review* played a very important role in my life because it was a left-wing anti-Stalinist magazine, very highbrow. The essays in *Partisan Review* were very hard for a young person of limited education. I used to read those articles five times over trying to make some sense out of them. So I didn’t just read *Partisan Review*, I studied *Partisan Review*. But it’s a very good way to cut your intellectual teeth (quoted in Dorman, 2001, p. 72).

Nathan Glazer added,

There were these essays that everyone felt they had to read. They weren’t essays in a classic sense of graceful and discursive, they were concentrated analysis. They presented us with an ideal. I know my first book reviews had to include in them everything that was relevant, everything about the world (p. 72).

Perhaps it was his introduction to *Partisan Review* that prompted Kristol at the age of twenty-three to help found the small magazine *Enquiry* (Dorman, 2001).

Kristol also served as an infantryman in Western Europe during World War II. After V-E day, he was transported to Marseilles where he spent about a year. During his time there which he called “a postgraduate sabbatical,” he worked first in the library and then as chief company clerk, both positions allowing him much freedom and time to study.
I spent my days reading French journals—*Les Temps Modernes, Critique, L’Esprit, Les Cahiers du Sud*, and others. I was especially fond of *Critique*, which gave excellent critical accounts of authors who were worth reading about but not worth reading (Kristol, 1995c, p. 14).

Kristol’s only short story to be published was set in Marseilles; the story, “Adam and I” was his first publication to appear in *Commentary*. He also wrote a novel that he never published.

Kristol went on to be an assistant editor at *Commentary*, then co-editor of *Encounter* in London, and finally worked as an editor at Basic Books before co-founding *The Public Interest* at the age of forty-five. Daniel Bell held senior editorial positions at *The New Leader* and *Fortune*. After leaving his editorial position at *The Public Interest* in 1973, Bell went on to found *Correspondence*, a quarterly journal of ideas and cultural commentary. (Another of the occupants of Alcove No. 1, Irving Howe, would found the journal *Dissent* in 1953.) In a certain way, then, these editors of *The Public Interest* were not only embarking upon a project of criticism but were also the products of criticism.

What they inherited from these older journals also influenced their editorial policies and practices. On producing the journal, Kristol wrote:

> I designed the magazine the way I had designed *Encounter*: by borrowing from the format of existing or previous magazines and changing things around a little. What was important was that, given our lack of staff, it should be as ‘idiot proof’ as possible. So the articles for the first issue came in, the printer delivered as promised, and there we were, with two thousand copies ready to be mailed to subscribers

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152 Issue 32 (Summer 1973) was the first issue to replace Daniel Bell with Nathan Glazer as Kristol’s co-editor on the masthead.

153 Even *The Public Interest*’s office, once the journal had its own office, was set up to mirror the *Commentary* offices circa 1952 (D. Skinner, 2005). Peter Steinfels would later describe neoconservatism as a blending of literary criticism and social science “aspiring to the rank of political philosophy” (1979, p. 72). It was the result of the merger of two *habitus*, the blending of their early lives in Alcove One and among the New York Intellectuals milieu with their later academic and policy orientation.

154 Ten years later, Kristol would remember this figure as 1,200 (2005).
who had answered our ads as well as to a list of people who ought to have been interested (Kristol, 1995c, p. 30).155

On the whole, *The Public Interest* had the look and feel of a professional journal. It had a clean design and was generally free of errors. It had a publisher and a sponsoring institution. Its issues appeared on time and with regularity. There were no advertisements or any other extraneous material. There was no artwork, no graphics, no poetry, only a smoothness and innocuousness.156 To flip through an issue is to be bored. The articles themselves were not always boring, despite the inaugural editorial’s promise to publish “dull” articles.157 However, the journal remained mostly unflappable.

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155 Kristol continued the story: “My secretary, Vivian Gornick, was an intelligent, pleasant young woman who had done graduate work in English literature. She had done the proofreading, dealt with the printer, and now she went down to the post office with a small truckload of copies to be mailed. But the post office refused to mail them—it turned out we had failed to get some necessary permits. Vivian came back in despair, and I was stumped. Then Vivian said that we should try again. It worked this time. Vivian simply sat on the loading dock, burst into tears, and the kindly older supervisor was so touched that he waived his objections.Shortly thereafter, Vivian wrote her first article for *The Village Voice* which launched her career as a feminist—an increasingly radical feminist—writer” (1995c, p. 30).

156 Skinner however argues that “the contents were always livelier than the sober, all-type covers suggested. The contributors were overwhelmingly academic, but the writing wasn’t. It was direct, usually informal, sometimes journalistic, sometimes even literary” (2005, p. n/a). Steinfels makes a similar argument. Although, he notes, articles in *The Public Interest* were not the “spectacular” battle pieces, the “frontal assaults” or “verbal rocketry” of those appearing in *Commentary*, they were even better within their special range than those of the latter. Regarding the journal’s promise of dull articles, Steinfels writes: “In fact, they have more than occasionally transformed what had every likelihood of being a dull article into a fascinating one. The specialty of the house is the blending of personal tone, general principles (ideology, if you will, which they won’t), and evidence, often quantitative and drawn from social science research, government reports, or census data, into a literate and persuasive essay” (1979, p. 21).

157 This is not only my opinion. Comparing *Commentary* with *The Public Interest*, Ehrman wrote that the latter’s tone was “detached and objective, without the passion or anger that often animated *Commentary*” (1999, p. 169). Further, “the affable Kristol worked to maintain a collegial atmosphere, and the *Public Interest* avoided the factional feuds and personality disputes that marked *Commentary*. Such an approach has not made for much excitement and the articles, while carefully researched and argued, often were a little dull; the *Public Interest*’s early circulation was 2,000-3,000 and it still is under 6,000” (p. 170). Ehrman later referred to the journal’s tone as “measured” and “even regretful” in its criticism (p. 170).
The professional appearance of *The Public Interest* then owes much to the earlier editorial experience of the journal’s founders. The professionalism of *The Public Interest* stands in some contrast to *Telos.* I take up the question of professionalism more fully below, since it was not just a matter of style but also attitude. *Telos,* whose editors lacked such experience, also lacks the professional appearance of *Pl.* To an extent then, the degree of professionalism in each journal is explained in part by the staff’s level of experience in addition to their opinion of “professionalism” as such. However, the matter of money made it altogether easier for *The Public Interest* to be more put together.

The journal was begun with funding from Manshel, one of Kristol’s wealthy friends, and over its lifespan, the journal received foundational and institutional support, notably from the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank.\(^{158}\) Manshel gave Kristol and Bell the initial funding, a $10,000 grant, to begin the journal.\(^{159}\) Upon his death in 1990, a brief obituary appeared in the journal, which read:

> We are saddened by the passing of our friend and publisher, Warren Manshel. In addition to his many other contributions to the public interest—as Ambassador to Denmark from 1978 to 1981, founder of *Foreign Policy* magazine, etc.—Warren has been the publisher of *The Public Interest* ever since its inception twenty-five years ago. It is impossible to exaggerate the contribution he has made over this quarter-century. We shall dearly miss him. Signed, The editors and members of the Publication Committee (Issue 99, Spring 1990, p. 3).

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\(^{158}\) Arguably, Kristol and the journal helped make the American Enterprise Institute the prominent think tank it became.

\(^{159}\) Kristol recalls Manshel’s involvement as such: “It was not until the beginning of 1965 that a potential publisher appeared on the scene. At a dinner at Sidney Hook’s, we found ourselves in the company of Warren and Anita Manshel. We had known Warren when, as a newly minted Ph.D. from Harvard, he had come to work in Paris for the Congress of Cultural Freedom. There he had met and married Anita, the daughter of a very successful Wall Street investor. He was now himself on Wall Street, struggling with boredom because his heart belonged to politics. I mentioned the magazine idea and he was interested. How much would it cost, he asked? I explained that, by my calculations, $10,000 could see us through the first year (i.e., four issues). The editors—Dan Bell and myself—would work *pro bono* (as they [sic] have ever since). He agreed to put up the money and became our publisher. Over time, in the following years, he invested much larger sums in what became *The Public Interest,* until such times as some foundations became interested in us” (1995c, p. 29).
It is not clear how much money Manshel gave to the journal over those twenty-five years. As Kristol notes in his reflection, “Forty Good Years,” the increased circulation of the journal caused the subsidy from Manshel, by definition a patron, to increase to several tens of thousands of dollars per year (Kristol, 2005). Since the journal only ever reached a circulation of about 6,000, it is unlikely that it was ever able to support itself through sales revenue.

At the outset, the editors decided upon a policy of non-remuneration to keep costs at bay. Also, they did not want to take money from their friend. Until its closing in 2005, the journal continued to abide by this “principle.” Whether all the staff remained unremunerated is unclear. Mark Lilla, who served as an executive editor in the 1980s, recalls earning a salary of around $11,000, which he described as “absolutely nothing” (Dorman, 2001, p. 201).

For the most part, the journal kept the operation small, as is the nature of journals with restricted audiences. Other than the editors, the publisher, and the publication committee, no other positions appeared on the masthead until the journal’s seventeenth issue (Fall 1969), which introduced “Associate Editor” Paul Weaver and “Assistant Editor” Myrna Chase Engelmayer, who was also the first woman to appear on the masthead.

Nathan Glazer replaced Daniel Bell as Kristol’s co-editor in the summer of 1973 with Issue 32.\(^\text{160}\) Bell, however, continued to be associated with the journal, now as the chairman of the publication committee. With Issue 70 (Winter 1983), he would no longer appear anywhere on the masthead. He made his final contribution to the journal in 1989.

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\(^{160}\) Bell and Kristol disagreed over the 1972 election, with Bell supporting McGovern and Kristol supporting Nixon. Bell quietly left his editorship shortly after the election (Dorman, 2001).
The masthead changed again with Issue 40 (Summer 1975), introducing managing editor and associate managing editor positions.

In the winter of 1978, Elizabeth Kristol, Irving’s daughter, became an assistant editor at the journal, making the journal a family affair. Although Elizabeth never contributed any essays to the journal, her brother, William, who never served on the editorial board, published five essays in *The Public Interest*. In 1995, William co-founded *The Weekly Standard*. His wife, Susan, also contributed an essay to *The Public Interest*. Irving’s own wife, Gertrude Himmelfarb, who published widely, made four contributions to her husband’s journal.

The editorial staff of *The Public Interest* would continue to grow in the 1980s with new positions added, such as “Consulting Editor” Marc F. Plattner, “Executive Editor” Mark Lilla, and additional “Assistant Editors” and an “Assistant to the Editors.” These new positions could signal a relinquishing of the reigns by editors Kristol and Glazer, who were now in their sixties. Adam Wolfson, who became executive editor in 1995, would succeed Kristol and Glazer as editor of the journal in 2003. With that change, Kristol and Glazer became “Senior Editorial Associates.” In an address “To our readers” appearing in Issue 150 (Winter 2003), Kristol and Glazer wrote:

> It is time for a change at *The Public Interest*....It has been a happy and successful partnership, but we are now elderly citizens and the magazine is clearly entitled to a new infusion of talent. We have therefore resigned as editors and have named Adam Wolfson as Editor of *The Public Interest*. Adam has been with us since 1994 and has earned our trust and confidence as an editor and our respect as a thinker and writer. We are fortunate that he is willing to assume his new position and responsibilities. As for us, we shall be available to collaborate with Adam as “Senior Editorial Associates”—a unique, if awkward, title (2003, p. 3).

Wolfson wrote no editorials for the journal, but his essay “About the Public Interest,” appearing in the journal’s last issue, reflected on his time at the publication. He referred to
his experience as “a graduate education in itself for the junior staffers and a post-graduate one for the senior editors” (2005, p. 21).\footnote{The journal took a strong interest in its young assistant and associate editors. Several have remarked that their time spent at The Public Interest was like a sort of graduate school experience. The young editors were also given a large share of responsibility. As Skinner reports, Mark Lilla jokingly called it “scandalous” that he “was empowered to edit so many distinguished contributors” (2005, p. n/a). Another young editor, Craig Turk, remembers raising questions about an article George F. Will, a prominent contributor, had submitted. (The young) Turk was shocked when Kristol told him to call up Will, and ask him the questions that his manuscript had raised (D. Skinner, 2005). Anyone was allowed to suggest topics for articles, and several published their own.\footnote{Kristol designed the office in this manner in order to promote conversation and the flow of ideas among the staff, which Joseph Dorman attributes to Kristol’s days in Alcove No. 1 at City College (2001).}}

Wolfson notes that this education was gained by the close proximity to senior editors Kristol and Glazer whom with the staffers worked. He described The Public Interest’s office as a single room with the editors’ desks clustered around each other, including Kristol’s.\footnote{Basic Books was then a small publishing house specializing in psychoanalytical works. The publisher and editor-in-chief, Arthur Rosenthal, wanted to expand the house’s list to also publish general works in the social sciences. Kristol was hired for that purpose, first on a part-time basis and eventually becoming executive vice president of the company (Kristol, 1995c).} The first office of The Public Interest was Kristol’s own office as an editor at Basic Books.\footnote{His staff consisted of his secretary-assistant Vivian Gornick, who would become a feminist and a writer for the Village Voice. The journal received its own office on East 53rd Street in 1973. The Public Interest would remain in New York until 1988, when it moved to Washington, D.C.} The journal received its own office on East 53rd Street in 1973. The Public Interest would remain in New York until 1988, when it moved to Washington, D.C.

The Public Interest ceased publication in 2005. In its later life, the journal, to extend its scope of influence beyond domestic issues, would spawn a sister publication on foreign affairs titled The National Interest, which continues to publish, an interesting question considering the fate of the publication that gave it life. Just what were the editorial practices and policies of the journal remains unknown, in large part because the journal’s
operations had no formal structure. For example, what did the publications committee really do? There was a hierarchy of positions, but the journal was a small operation with an average staff size of four. Aside from its early policy decisions not to include foreign affairs and not to pay the editors, no other policy decisions are on record. And in forty years of publication, it is likely that the journal never had an editorial meeting. At least, the editorial staff does not recall any.\textsuperscript{164}

At the time I began my dissertation, Kristol, Bell, and Glazer were all still alive, although they were in their late 80s and early 90s. On September 18, 2009, Irving Kristol passed away.\textsuperscript{165} Like Paul Piccone, the editor of \textit{Telos}, he too had been the main driving force and guiding voice of the journal.\textsuperscript{166} Kristol applied the social sciences to questions of public policy and while not solving the many policy problems analyzed in the journal, he helped create an intellectual program for a new ideology. It was his name and image that people conjured up in association with the term “neoconservative.”

\textbf{An Introduction to Telos}

\textit{Telos}, began in May 1968 as a journal of radical philosophy. Paul Piccone, the founding editor of the journal, stated that “[i]t is no accident that one of the early subtitles of \textit{Telos}

\textsuperscript{164} “Craig [Turk] also remembers a film crew coming into the offices, working on \textit{Arguing the World}—a 1998 PBS documentary chronicling the political formation of Kristol, Bell, Glazer, and Irving Howe at New York’s City College in the late 1930s. The crew wanted to obtain footage of a typical day at the magazine, and wondered if they could shoot an editorial meeting. Only one problem: The \textit{PI} didn’t have editorial meetings. Since everyone sat in a single room within 10 feet of everyone else, if you had something to say, you just raised your voice. The best that could be done under the circumstances was for Irving to ask Craig about some article ‘our friend’ was writing about ‘you know.’ Irving didn’t want to speak about any of his authors on camera. So Craig nodded and said something equally banal.... ‘I venture to guess that Irving never had an editorial meeting,’ [Turk said]” (D. Skinner, 2005, p. n/a).

\textsuperscript{165} Daniel Bell passed away on January 25, 2011.

\textsuperscript{166} The role both men played greatly contributed to the long lifespans of each journal. However, as discussed further below, their strong editorships may also have driven the journals in more univocal directions.
was ‘a journal definitely outside the mainstream of American philosophical thought” (1988, p. 5). Telos published its first issue as a fledgling student journal on the campus of the State University of New York (SUNY)—Buffalo. The price for one issue was one dollar, or two dollars for a yearly subscription. The first issue contained five articles and three brief reviews. The length of the articles ranged from seven to eleven pages while the reviews, printed in a much smaller font, were only one to three pages long. The entire issue reached only fifty-three pages and contained no extraneous material, such as advertisements. The articles in the first issue were written by students at SUNY–Buffalo, the University of Oklahoma, and the University of Minnesota.

In 1968, SUNY-Buffalo’s philosophy department was the second largest in the country. The journal playfully described its founding as such:

Once upon a time (around Spring 1967) a group of graduate students in philosophy found themselves in a nouveaux riche university which, as a result of the political ambition of the state’s governor (Rockefeller), had been ‘nationalized’ from a provincial private institution into a major educational showpiece – a worthy feather for the cap of any would-be president. Since universities, unlike oil fields, cannot be drilled into the ground in a couple of days, the great ‘State University of New York’ project turned out to be an institutional dinosaur with academic credentials as large as a flea’s brain. Thus, although the local philosophy department was the second largest in the world, all that could be learned – with a few exceptions — was nit-picking symbolic logic, the pompous imbecility of cunni-linguistic anal-ysis, and the theoretical opportunism of pragmatists. This, of course, was a reflection of the disastrous state of Anglo-American philosophy in general, whose only claim to fame has been to offer a confusing account of even the most simple phenomena that ultimately obfuscates the inherent irrationality of not only American philosophy, but American society as well. It is thus understandable that some of the intellectually starved graduate students sought a radical alternative (Staff, 1970, pp. 294-295).

The founding members of Telos came from working class backgrounds. Paul Piccone, the editor, was an Italian immigrant. Additionally, young people, still students, founded Telos.

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167 These are not typos but intentional puns.
In early issues of the journal, the Notes on Contributors emphasized their ages. The brief notes, usually only a sentence long, in that first issue in which they appeared all stressed the ages of the contributors who were in their mid-twenties to early thirties. After a few issues, the “Notes on Contributors” disappeared, only to reappear with Issue 21. The ages of the contributors were never given again. Instead, the notes almost uniformly gave the contributors’ teaching positions, except for the odd graduate student still publishing in the journal. The notes also displayed an irreverence that emphasized the journal’s anti-professional intentions. Moreover, many of the contributors had ties to other journals that made *Telos* a member of a larger intellectual milieu. Other journals to appear in the bios of early contributors included *Les Temps Modernes, Socialist Revolution, Radical America, Liberation, Studies on the Left, L’Esprit*, and *Science and Society*. By Issue 21 (Fall 1974), the most common thing to appear in the “Notes on Contributors” was faculty positions.

The first issue of the journal contained three sections: “Articles,” “Notes,” and “Reviews.” A brief editorial introduction to each issue could be found on the inside of the front cover or among the front matter. Along with a handful of advertisements and the odd graphic or drawing, this was the extent of each issue. Issue 9 expanded the “Notes” section to “Notes and Commentary,” and Issues 31 and 33 introduced three new sections that

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168 Contributors’ Notes did not appear with every issue. A section devoted to “Notes on Contributors” only began to appear with Issue 11 (Spring 1972).
169 Issue 12’s Notes included the following: “Stuart Ewen is in his thirties and teaches someplace in the Albany, N.Y. area – probably sociology or history. An associate editor of *Radical America*, Ewen is into all sorts of interesting things. C. Sills is in his late twenties and teaches Karate in the San Francisco area.” The most irreverent notes were those of Moishe Gonzales, a fictional character who served as a sometimes pseudonym for Piccone and other *Telos* contributors. But more on him below.
170 Although not titled as such until Issue 4.
appeared intermittently, “Internal Polemics,” “External Polemics” and “Communications.” Letters from members of the Telos circle and general readers would occasionally be printed under one of these sections. Other than these changes, the structure of each issue remained much the same from the journal’s early issues to today.

The journal’s first editorial board consisted of five individuals. The masthead of the first issue included no hierarchy or assigned positions; the editorial board appeared to be an editorial collective. That quickly changed with the second issue, which listed two co-editors, an assistant editor, and a three person editorial staff. By Issue 3, Paul Piccone was the “Editor,” with three associate editors, a review editor and three staff members. Issue 4 had no review editor, and Issue 5 introduced a managing editor. With Issue 6 (Fall 1970), Paul Breines had refilled the review editor position, and as the issue’s introduction noted,

[unlike the last issue that included only two reviews, since Breines has taken over as Review Editor we have been able to deal with more and better works recently published on radical philosophy and Marxism (p. n/a).

Issue 6 also listed a circulation manager and an expanding staff. By Issue 8, all staff members had become associate editors. With Issue 11 (Spring 1972), the total size of the Telos team numbered twenty-four. Eight members of the team now also bore the designation “Production Staff.” However, the size of the staff sometimes wildly fluctuated.

The very next issue listed only seventeen members, five of whom also produced the

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171 The five members were Alison Jaggar, Marilyn Myerson, Paul Piccone, Peter Redpath, and Jewel Wecker. Only Piccone would remain with the journal after the first issue, although Redpath, who would publish a tribute to Piccone in Issue 131, continued to attend and host Telos conferences. Beginning with the second issue, there was also a more hierarchical editorial structure. Now assigned positions, the editorial staff was comprised of Co-editors Peter Kauber and Paul Piccone, Assistant Editor Joseph Ferrandino, and Editorial Staff members Anna Maria Sioli (of the Univ. Bocconi, Milano), Silvia Federici, and Claudia Haley. It is hard to ignore the gender split between positions. Ferrandino also provided the cover design for the first three issues of the journal, which resembled a sort of white iceberg image against a solid colored background, first white, then red, and then yellow. Starting with Issue 4, the covers began to take on the standard look of title and table of contents.
journal.\textsuperscript{172} When the Toronto \textit{Telos} group made its first appearance with Issue 22 (Winter 1974-75), the staff numbered thirty-five. In 2005, Tim Luke compiled an index of editors associated with the journal during its life span.\textsuperscript{173} While not complete, the index includes seventy-four persons, a number of whom are well-known academics.

Considering the question, “who were \textit{Telos’} readers anyway?,” Genosko et al. responded: “the readers slowly became the editors and writers in its self-constitution as a critical institution” (2002, p. 10). This may be a better description of the journal’s early years and its staff’s evolution. However, over time, individual subscriptions were replaced by institutional subscriptions, mostly university libraries. Additionally, the journal filled many foreign subscriptions, and those subscribers, for issues of geography, did not become staff members. Further, as with any journal, not all of the journal’s readers held the same view as \textit{Telos} and were unlikely to join the journal’s circle. Individuals affiliated with \textit{Dissent} and members of the \textit{Public Interest} crowd or its like probably read the journal to keep abreast of \textit{Telos}’s heterodox view but not because they felt much affinity with it.

From its inception, \textit{Telos} sought to distinguish itself from other players within the intellectual field. It sought to fill the perceived gap or vacancy in the field, a continuing tendency which arguably contributes to its longevity. First and foremost, the journal chose

\textsuperscript{172} The production staff did the grunt work necessary to physically produce each issue of the journal.

\textsuperscript{173} After the disclaimer of incompleteness, Luke’s introduction to the list read: “[The list] simply provides a select overview of the range of individuals who have worked with the journal over the past years for now nearly four decades. As the list indicates, it is an eclectic group of critical thinkers and writers from around the world as well as from across a wide variety of disciplinary fields in the arts, humanities, and social sciences. \textit{Telos} clearly has benefited from the diversity of their perspectives, the intensity of collaborations together, and variety of work that they contributed to the journal as writers, reviewers, and editors.” A copy of the list may be accessed at the end of “The Trek with \textit{Telos}: A Remembrance of Paul Piccone” in \textit{Fast Capitalism} 1.2 at: \url{http://www.fastcapitalism.com} (2005).
to separate itself from academia as best it could. Despite its birthplace being the philosophy department at SUNY-Buffalo, the journal was never formally institutionalized as belonging to SUNY-Buffalo or any other university. For the journal’s founders, academia was not a productive setting for the type of philosophical and political thought that interested them.

Whatever still passes for radical thought today has long ceased to be an alternative promising to revitalize or threaten anything; it lingers as a barely tolerated subspecialization for marginal intellectuals seeking to bypass traditional exclusionary mechanisms of an academic establishment infested through and through, like all similar institutions, with clientelism, nepotism, and assorted run-of-the-mill biases. Today’s academic radicalism prefigures, at best, only a modest academic career and a comfortable intellectual retirement (Piccone, 1988, p. 4).

The journal’s strategy to place itself outside the scholarly field and into the intellectual field would cause many of its editors and contributors to live double-lives, writing for a journal that garnered little favor in academic circles, especially when it came to tenure review, but holding jobs within academia that could professionalize even the most resistant.

The journal’s desire to position itself outside the bounds of academia precluded, as mentioned above, the journal from ever finding a university home, or much regard within the university. This strategy of non-institutionalization, however, exceeded any anti-

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174 Lest this be considered a harsh indictment of academia, Piccone also had this to say, “today Telos thrives outside a mainstream which mostly does not understand it, does not appreciate it, and, because of the widespread prosperity generated by new technological innovations, need not take it seriously. Safely mothballed in universities, most intellectuals write articles no one reads, debate issues no one cares about, and continue miseducating students in dire need of official certification (who are actually acculturated not by the universities, but by the culture industry). Seemingly obsessed with seeking to resolve self-perpetuating pseudo-problems of race, class, and gender, most intellectuals, posturing as the self-righteous opposition, while, in fact, legitimating the totally administered society, are even worse off than Gregor Samsa, who at least was troubled by his strange metamorphosis. Presumably, it beats the hell out of holding a regular 9-to-5 job. Within such a context, Telos remains the project of a few intellectuals and of a limited readership still interested in Truth, and optimistic that, despite the general cultural decline, there are still a lot of possibilities for a society so mesmerized by its material success to be able to ignore or even to formulate its spiritual impoverishment” (1999, p. 148).

175 “Although it proclaimed itself to be a philosophical publication, its actual disciplinary attachment was hardly clear, which to most academics signified incoherence rather than promise, not to mention the fact that, instead of currying favor or buttering careerist bread, the opening editorial
academic intention to include a fear of institutionalization of any sort. Piccone asserted that this non-institutionalization saved the journal from conformity (Piccone, 1988). The journal “chose” a dominated pole rather than the dominant pole of the intellectual field. How much of this choice was a conscious strategy, or maybe more accurately, how much of this choice was a choice, implying that other options existed, could be debated. However, choice or not, this non-institutionalization, in academia or elsewhere, helped keep the journal distinct from other positions within the field, and it reveals a kinship to artists within the field of cultural production that choose to practice “art for art’s sake,” disdaining the economic and political power found at the dominant pole because it would interfere with the “purity” of their art (Bourdieu, 1993).

This strategy also made the journal an amateur affair as contrasted with the professionalism of The Public Interest. Since Telos was a student journal without much support, production was a low-budget affair. Early issues were printed in Italy, then by The Spectrum at SUNY-Buffalo, and then at a place in Crawfordville, Indiana. When Piccone took a teaching job at the University of Toronto for the 1974-75 school year, the journal’s production efforts were split between Toronto and the journal’s home in St. Louis.

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statements in the early issues calmly denounced as totally bankrupt and conformist virtually every known school of American philosophy. The editorial group, moreover, was composed of graduate students, meaning that manuscripts were not refereed by known scholars. Finally, in this connection, Telos was emphatically and explicitly linked to Marxism and to the Left at a time when intellectual work from this camp had not yet achieved credibility in university environs” (Breines, 1988, p. 40). Jacoby makes a similar argument, writing: “The fate of Telos accurately registers the fate of critical thought in the universities; it migrated from a department of philosophy to a department of sociology to the friendlier quarters of a US post office box. The persistent difficulty of enlisting new and younger contributors suggests that the universities have upped the ante; in a profession never famous for its gamblers, contributors know they chance disapproving clucks from departmental superiors. The most arcane journal with an academic imprimatur looks better on a resume than Telos, edited by an Italian-American with no regular address or academic clout” (1981-82, p. 122).
During this period (and for some years later), the journal was produced in St. Louis, and members of the production team, composed mostly of graduate students at York University, would make the long drive to St. Louis, with Piccone and managing editor Patricia Tummons, to produce it. The energy, enthusiasm and collective sense of the project’s urgency that marked these junkets cannot be understated (Genosko, et al., 2002, p. 2).

Early production efforts included making each page camera ready for phototyping.

Mistakes appearing in the journal are an indicator of the “amateur” production staff and the necessary haste with which issues were often put together. Piccone and Patricia Tummons did most of the early production work.

Some of the early issues also contained notes on corrections to previous issues. In Issue 9 (Fall 1971) after a particularly bad butchering of a submission, the Corrigenda read:

As usual, last issue included a whole series of major and minor catastrophes. First of all, the Russell Jacoby review of Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectics of Sex was so misedited that the author totally dissociated himself from it…. Apparently, our efforts to break the distinction between ‘mind’ and ‘body’ by having the whole staff physically participate in making the issue has met serious obstacles. To show how serious we are about preventing further errors, we offer a free sub to any reader who can find ten or more errors in this issue” (p. 160).

No report is given of how many claims for free subscriptions had to be honored.

The most humorous instance of an editing error to appear in the journal occurred over a key misspelling. I reproduce the response to the error here not only because it is funny but also to indicate that the journal may have traveled in wider circles than it expected. The International Bakers Association, based in Washington, D.C., wrote a letter to the editor, which was reproduced in Issue 66 (Winter 1985-86). An excerpt from the letter reads:

It has come to our attention [that a book review in a previous issue made mention that] international bakers were the only beneficiaries [of a crisis in the Argentine economy in the last decade]…. But we did not make any ‘dough’ in Argentina.

The editors responded:
Telos wishes to extend its apologies to the International Bakers’ Association. Professor Hughes did not refer to ‘international bakers’ but to ‘international bankers’ as benefitting from the crisis in Argentina. Our typesetters, however, who tend to do more baking than banking, mistakenly omitted the all important ‘n.’ Word has gone out to them that any more errors of this kind will result in the impounding of their ovens and cookie sheets. The typesetters deny all guilt.

The whole episode is reminiscent of something from a Monty Python sketch, a spirit that on occasion invaded the journal. One of the more irreverent elements to appear in the journal was the creation of “Moishe Gonzales,” who I discuss further in Chapter 3.3.

The journal also somewhat distanced itself from the political movement that it appeared closest to, the New Left. Piccone insisted that the publication of the journal’s first issue in May 1968 was strictly coincidence. Still, a group of graduate students, young people like the founders of the Edinburgh and Westminster, did form the journal during this time—a group largely comprised of working-class and lower-middle class students in philosophy at SUNY-Buffalo. Further, while not identifying themselves with the New Left movement, the journal’s editors and contributors saw their project as one in common with the New Left, although not the same.

The objective [of the Telos project] was always to vindicate the ineradicability of subjectivity, the teleology of the Western project, and the possibility of regrounding such a project by means of a phenomenological and dialectical reconstitution of Marxism in conjunction with the New Left (Piccone, 1994, p. 180).

However, even though their project may have been in common with the New Left, Telos was not a comfortable traveling companion. Rather, “for the New Left, from the very beginning Telos was, as Eugene Genovese once described it, a kind of theoretical Listerine: necessary, but not very pleasant, and to be spit out as soon as possible” (Raventos, 2002, p. 134).176

176 In addition to members of the New Left, Marxists/Leninists also regarded the journal as unpleasant or even dangerous (Raventos, 2002, p. 136; Ulmen, 2008, p. xviii).
With the collapse of the New Left, Piccone labeled the journal a “political orphan,” and asserted that the journal needed “to rethink its identity and to revise its project” (1988, p. 13). These comments were made retrospectively in 1988. Six years later, again in one of the journal’s reflexive analyses of its past, Piccone added that

[t]he phenomenological project of an epistemological foundation for an otherwise arbitrary dialectic (understood as the Weltanschauung of a movement presenting itself as a radical alternative to the given) did not collapse. It only became superfluous with the disintegration of the political structure that it was ultimately meant to support (1994, p. 180).

This latter statement seems to suggest that the journal’s identity was not necessarily dependent on the existence of the New Left, but that the journal’s project became irrelevant, or “superfluous” without it.

Other editors and contributors may disagree with Piccone’s assessment. I argue though that this difference lends support to placing Telos within the intellectual field rather than the political, like the early reviews and critical journals, and again points to the journal’s kinship to those artists practicing art for art’s sake. Not meant disparagingly, Telos practiced theory for theory’s sake, and this placed the journal farther away from other publications more directly influenced by or positioned within the economic and political fields. Telos did not attend to politics of an immediate nature. Current events rarely made their way into the journal’s pages.177 Rather, it maintained a critical distance and separated itself from other magazines and journals that commented upon or tried to influence current events in American political life.

177 After the events of 9/11, the journal published a symposium on terror. It solicited contributions just a few days after the attacks. The introduction to the symposium noted that Telos generally does not deal with current events. However, the journal published similar symposiums on Kosovo and the Gulf War. So, while Telos ordinarily kept its distance from the events of the day, it did not bury its head in the sand. There is a contrast to be noted here with The Public Interest, which refused to publish anything on the Vietnam War, defending its position as an editorial choice to deal only with domestic issues.
This distancing from other publications was also a product of the journal’s style and content. The former, what one of Telos’s past contributors called the “journal’s notoriously hermetic style” distinguished the publication from other New Left publications that were more accessible and could be more easily culled for slogans and statements for the movement (Breines, 1988). Beginning with Issue 9 (Fall 1971), Telos expanded the “Notes” section to also include “Commentary.” They explained the move as such:

This does not mean that only material in this section is politically relevant and open for discussion: it only indicates some more immediate topics concerning which debate in the pages of the journal is most welcome (inside front cover, p. n/a).

At the Antioch Telos Conference in 1977, the editors decided to expand the book review section. However, they would not eliminate the “Notes and Commentary” section in order to provide room for the expanded review section. This decision was made despite the opinion of some editors who felt the “Notes and Commentary” section acted more as “a graveyard for essays of dubious value” (1977, p. 191). The attempt to make a section more politically relevant had also, in a sense, dumbed part of the journal down, in the opinion of some. Again, the parallel can be drawn to the artists in the restricted field of production creating art that could (or should) be read neither by the bourgeoisie nor the masses.

After the first issue, whose “Statement of Editorial Policy” asked for “critical and original contributions from students everywhere,” no submission guidelines appeared in the journal until Issue 31. In Issue 31 (Spring 1977), the “Author/Submission guidelines” included the following:

178 At the conference, some also suggested that the section be divided into a literary and a political section, but no consensus was reached on the matter. No literary section ever appeared in the journal, although the journal included some works of literary criticism and even occasionally published a poem.
Authors must provide three copies of each manuscript, and allow a minimum of three months for consideration. Papers should make sense, be free of jargon, and avoid rambling. For more on style, consult Mark Twain, ‘Cooper’s Prose Style’ (p. n/a).

The issue of unsolicited manuscripts was debated several times within the Telos circle as reported in the journal’s conference reports. At the St. Louis Telos Conference in early 1977, the members of the Telos circle present discussed the quality of the submissions they received. As Piccone reported to the remaining editors not present at the conference, they asked,

why is it that the overwhelming majority of pieces that we receive for consideration is out and out junk, and even the occasional piece that exhibits some remote potential is always terribly written? Apparently, another manifestation of the phenomenon of universalized commodification is what Jacoby calls ‘the falling rate of intelligence’ and a complementary inability to write. In fact, since nearly all of the material that comes in is hardly worth more than a laugh, it was suggested that we should stop accepting unsolicited manuscripts (Piccone, et al., 1977, p. 179).

Supporting this possible change in policy was the fact that upon review of recent issues, the editors found that little of the material that made it into the journal was unsolicited. And that the unsolicited material which was included was also the weakest part of each issue. However, the editors, at that time, chose to continue their policy of accepting unsolicited material for review. To do otherwise they argued would only further intensify the journal’s isolation. They held out a future hope for a policy change if and when the then fledgling Telos groups could grow in number, increasing the Telos circle to a more tolerable degree of isolation, as well as providing more material for the journal.

Less than a year later, at the Antioch Telos Conference in the summer of 1977, the editors returned to the question of unsolicited manuscripts. Piccone again suggested that they discontinue their policy of considering unsolicited manuscripts.

He argued that the unsolicited material is invariably nonsense and that editorial consideration of it only wastes time, money and effort. But once again, this idea was
not well-received. Fekete and Miller suggested that the St. Louis group perform a more rigorous filtering of papers, so that the obvious junk is rejected without further ado. Most of the group concurred, except the members of the St. Louis group, who reminded everyone that this was already being done (1977, p. 191).

In Issue 33 (Fall 1977), the guidelines were appended with the information that “[o]n the average, Telos accepts less than five percent of unsolicited manuscripts” (p. n/a).

A look to the past provided the foundation and beginnings of Telos and also influenced its style. As Piccone stated, “[w]e began to search for forgotten and repressed texts that we had occasionally seen mentioned in passing or referred to in stray footnotes” (1988, p. 6). Remembering may help orient a journal, allowing it to see how it differs from other projects. As Adorno remarked,

‘All reification is forgetting,’ and criticism really means the same as remembrance – that is, mobilizing in phenomena that by which they have become, and thereby recognizing the possibility that they might have become, and could therefore be, something different (T. W. Adorno, 2000, p. 150).

Telos’s dependence on past texts shaped its identity. Whereas most academic journals in political science or sociology consider their intellectual heritage—what they reference and honor—to be the past five or ten years, Telos looked to the past fifty or one hundred years (Agger, 2000). 179 As Piccone stated, “[o]ur critique had to speak a language other than that of our opponents, and this necessitated the resurrection of otherwise forgotten philosophical traditions” (1988, p. 4, emphasis added).

Further, many of the figures the journal published and wrote about were individuals who had also lived on the margins, having little political impact and small audiences. Paul Breines, who resigned from Telos in the mid-80s due to disputes, recalled a question posed

179 However, this reach farther back into the past could have its problems. “[T]he very impulse to construct a historical tradition [Western Marxism from the 1920s-1950s] for ourselves tended to blind us to much of the originality of our own historical situation and of the social movement to which we were definitely, if often uneasily, linked” (Breines, 1988, p. 39).
by Robin Blackburn of the *New Left Review* at an early *Telos* conference in Waterloo, Ontario, where Blackburn essentially asked why *Telos* was so interested in publishing these marginal figures.\(^{180}\)

I do not recall how any of us responded at the time, but I would say now that the very lack of political success, the distance from actual power typical of these figures, their isolation, are in crucial respects the very things that drew us to them, their marginality serving as the ideal outpost for the activity of continual criticism. That we ourselves, for reasons both circumstantial and subjective, were in fact far less marginal than were our models and heroes is also part of the picture – the picture of *Telos*’ formative desires (Breines, 1988, p. 41).

Bourdieu traces a similar return to the past by avant-garde artists, calling this “return to the sources” the “strategy par excellence,” as it forms “the basis of all heretical subversion and all aesthetic revolutions, because it enables the insurgents to turn against the establishment the arms which they use to justify their domination” (1993, p. 84).

*Telos* introduced these largely European theorists into political discussions occurring in the United States in the late 1960s and 70s. On *Telos*’s twentieth birthday Frank Adler, a member of the editorial group, commented on this Europeanization:

Understandably, the more ‘European’ the journal became, the more removed its network became from American intellectuals and the closer it drew to Europe regarding research leaves, conferences, colleagues and friends. Paradoxically, within non-moribund intellectual circles *Telos* became better known in Europe than in the U.S., and manuscripts increasingly arrived in foreign languages to be published originally by us (1988, p. 54).

Other groups on the left followed suit. Members of *The Public Interest* would blame this Europeanization of “traditional American liberalism” as a corrupting force, transforming the left from its reformist Progressive tradition to a more subversive or revolutionary contemporary liberalism. As a result, *The Public Interest* would propose neoconservatism as an alternative view to this hijacking of liberalism by other “critics.”

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\(^{180}\) Of course, in keeping with Clyde Barrow’s arguments referenced above, the questions should be asked: marginal to whom and in what context?
Paul Piccone passed away on July 12, 2004. At one time, Piccone had been a tenure-track professor in the sociology department at Washington University, St. Louis. He was turned down for tenure despite being unanimously approved by his department and having the outside recommendations of Daniel Bell, Herbert Marcuse, and Jürgen Habermas among others. He appealed the decision and was again denied; he appealed the appeal futilely. A dean reviewing the matter, during one of the appeals, remarked that Piccone’s contribution “bears a problematic relation to the main currents of development in the social sciences” (quoted in Jacoby, 1987, p. 138). Neither Piccone nor Telos ever sought to swim with the main currents of social science as determined by the flagship journals and departments that defined “main currents.” As a result, both remained relatively marginal to these institutions.

At their outsets, each journal had an ostensible purpose. The Public Interest wanted to improve the state of knowledge on issues of public policy so that more informed policy decisions could be made. Telos wanted to improve the state of philosophy so that issues of significance could be more critically explored. However, to use this crude analogy of a non-profit organization with some social aim, these expressed purposes were a sort of “mission statement,” while the journals’ titles reflected a far greater “vision statement.” What was The Public Interest’s view of “the public interest” throughout its life span? What was the telos of Telos, and would its telos be re-viewed and changed over time? What ultimate aims, whether explicitly recognized or unconsciously motivating, drove these journals in their

181 There are not many intersections between The Public Interest and Telos or their circles. Bell’s recommendation for Piccone’s tenure application is one of them.
evolving practices of criticism? Finally and most importantly to the arguments outlined in this dissertation, how did their practices of criticism re-view the state?\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{182} Again, I am more interested in this question of “how,” than “what.” In other words, this dissertation does not make a full analysis of the welfare state and the many critiques put forth by each journal. No single analysis could be so encompassing.
Chapter 3.2  Presses without Parties? A Re-view of Writing as Political Practice

As discussed in the introduction, an argument circulated around the time of these journals’ beginnings that perhaps journals were the new form of political organization, other more traditional avenues of organization having failed or being no longer available. This turn to journals as political practice was at least in part a response to political disappointment. For the members of The Public Interest, the journal became a place to voice the disappointment of their expectations for the welfare state. They were then able to channel this disappointment or frustration into a new political view, neoconservatism, which would have a significant impact on late twentieth century politics.

As Habermas wrote in an article for Telos, “neoconservatism emerges from a response to disappointment” (1983, p. 75). Similarly, in his study of the New Left Review, Duncan Thompson writes that

intellectuals are perhaps peculiarly vulnerable to the moods of an evolving zeitgeist, weather vanes of profounder socio-economic and political winds of change. For intellectuals of the Left, political disappointment and defeat, particularly following previously high hopes, is a sure path to the right, witness the rapid turn of such as the ‘New York intellectuals’ of the forties, and the Parisian ‘nouveaux philosophes’ of the seventies. 1968 (like 1956) had been a formative and defining moment, significantly over-determining the politics of the generation that was touched by it (2007, p. 161).

Thompson refers to 1968 as “a moment of intense expectation, followed ultimately, by sharp defeat” (2007, p. 162). Telos began as a journal disappointed with both politics and the theoretical analyses of such politics then available. Whether as a result of disappointment or due to their role as critics, both Telos, a theory journal, and The Public Interest, a policy journal, maintained some distance from politics—a greater distance for Telos, a lesser distance but still a distance for The Public Interest.
Throughout their writing practices, the journals raised the question of what position and/or distance should the critic maintain when re-viewing the state. The question of how involved in politics a review should be and in what manner has been asked by critics since the review's earliest incarnations. This chapter analyzes the ways in which these two journals answered these questions. Neither journal appears to have really produced a satisfactory response for themselves. Instead, they continually returned to the theme of political writing as political practice.

*Telos: From a Radical to a Critical Re-view*

In its first issue, its articles aspiring to the standards of professionalism—if not correctness—then present in philosophy, *Telos* announced its editorial policy. The statement would only be published in this first issue, and merely five issues later, the journal backed away from it or, more accurately, smashed it with a hammer. The statement is reproduced in full here:

*Telos is committed to philosophical synthesis. There exists a need for an American journal so committed. We are concerned to offer alternatives to the many forces operating to further the existing fragmentation of knowledge and human existence. It must be emphasized that ‘philosophical synthesis’ is not intended to exclude any philosophical school; it is directed against only those philosophical efforts which are solely technical, and thereby isolated, achievements.*

The editorial introduction to the issue highlighted the phenomenological bent already present in the journal.

In this first issue, Wertz examines Brentano’s concept of intentionality, a very central concept which, in the hands of his student Edmund Husserl, becomes the hinge upon which the whole school of phenomenology revolves. Piccone, pursuing the investigations begun by Husserl and developed by the Italian school of Banfi and Paci, offers a reinterpretation of the scientific revolution as a socio-historically determined moment in the development of ‘European man.’ Robbins analyzes Salmon’s attempt to blur the basic difference between inductivism and deductivism and restates the fundamental issue involved in such a dispute. Poole compares Hegel and Goethe, and Edwards traces the development of modern science from
Averroes to the scientific revolution. Future issues are scheduled for publication in the Fall of 1968, and in the Spring of 1969. \(^{183}\)

However, the editorial staff of Issue 6 criticized the journal’s first editorial policy as insufficiently radical, calling it “pluralistic, indeterminate, and committed solely to bourgeois abstractions such as ‘academic excellence’” (Staff, 1970, p. 295). References to a desired pluralism and perhaps an implicit indeterminacy can be found in the editorial policy. However, a commitment to “academic excellence” or any other such “bourgeois abstraction” is notably absent. Piccone, the only surviving editorial member from Issues 1 to 6 was either recalling editorial discussions that did not appear in the journal’s pages or was lumping Telos’s first efforts in with all the other student and professional philosophy journals that promoted “academic excellence” over critical inquiry. (He took aim at these journals in Issue 3, to be discussed below). The entire first issue was derided as “an amateurish microcosm of ‘professional’ philosophy” (p. 295). The staff believed that the first issue displayed an inferiority to other journals, already too numerous, especially since it only allowed graduate students to contribute to it.

While later ruptures in Telos’s editorial board drew some attention as evidencing theoretical and political disputes over the journal’s direction, the editorial staff experienced its first split as early as between issues one and two. Again, Piccone was the only member of the journal to survive from the first issue to the second. The early split was between the “pluralists” and the “radicals,” or everyone else and Piccone,

\(^{183}\) SUNY-Buffalo also housed the journal, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, founded there in 1940. The journal continues to be published today, now housed at Brown University and published by Wiley-Blackwell. The philosophy journals of SUNY-Buffalo then appear to excel in longevity. Telos’s introduction to their first issue already promised two upcoming issues, despite the journal having not yet found its stride.
the former were committed solely to a journal meant to introduce professional
cretinism at the graduate student level, and the latter sought a concrete negation of
the officially available nonsense. A cursory look at the table of contents of the
second and third issues readily shows who won that fight (Staff, 1970, p. 295).

The introduction to the second issue read:

*Committed as it is to investigating new philosophical horizons that seek to rescue
philosophy from the triviality and meaninglessness in which it presently finds itself,*
TELOS presents in this issue two outstanding European thinkers whose works,
though quite popular in the continent are almost wholly unknown in the Anglo-
American world: Enzo Paci, and Karel Kosik.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, in view of the recent
socio-political events, this issue includes a long essay on the dialectic, the logic of
change, by Piccone, a detailed review of the leading works that have precipitated the
“New Course” in Czechoslovakia [sic] by Sioli, and additional material dealing with
the present crisis of official Central-European Marxism.¹⁸⁵ Pursuing studies in the
phenomenological problem-area, Ferrandino and Dunlap inquire respectively into
parallelisms obtaining between Husserl and Joyce, and Husserl, James and Hume.
Similarly, Rovatti outlines a criticism of Marcus’s judgment of Husserl on the
charge that the concept of the *Lebenswelt* has not been properly understood.
Further issues of TELOS will include contributions on Psychoanalysis [sic].¹⁸⁶
Structuralism, Philosophy of Science, Political philosophy, the Students’ movements,
and Phenomenology (Issue 2, emphasis added).

By the second issue, *Telos* had set forth what would be recurring themes within at least the
early years of the journal: phenomenology, Western Marxism, the Frankfurt School, and

¹⁸⁴ This focus on non-American theorists, who were also unfamiliar to American audiences, would
become a defining trait of the journal. In its early years, these theorists were primarily Western
Marxists. As John Fekete wrote in the article “Telos at 50,” in the Winter 1981/82 issue, “[i]t is now
recognized that *Telos* has been one of the most important vehicles for making continental Marxism
available to English-speaking readers” (p. 164).
¹⁸⁵ *Telos’s* focus on the “present crisis of official Central-European Marxism” was to the exclusion of
a focus on present political crises occurring in the United States. It would not be until Issue 31 that
the journal would promise to pay more attention to American problems. The introduction to Issue
31, which was the return of the “Introduction” after an absence of many years, ended with the
following: “Far from being exhausted in this number of *Telos*, these issues [the importance of
Gramsci, the project of the Frankfurt School, the work of Karel Kosik, recent events in
Czechoslovakia, the falling rate of intelligence among British Marxists] are likely to be pursued in
future numbers, where, among other things, a sustained effort will be made to begin to relate these
issues to a current understanding of the U.S. Our exile into European theory may be nearing an
end!” (p. 4).
¹⁸⁶ While the presence of typos may be a rather mundane subject, they underscore the production
efforts of a student-run, unfunded journal. I return to this mundane subject which sometimes
produced hilarious results below.
Eurocommunism. Also, the journal made clear its desire to introduce American readers to European and other foreign thinkers otherwise unnoticed in the United States.187

Introductions appeared fairly regularly in the early issues of *Telos* but then fell off. In Issue 31, Piccone announced that the practice of writing “Introductions” for each issue would be restarted. He argued that it had been discontinued previously due to “its alleged dubious value in creating a false thematic unity” (Piccone, 1977a, p. 3). He and/or the editorial staff had decided to renew the “Introduction” because “[i]f nothing else, it will serve to explain why we publish what follows” (p. 3).

At the Antioch *Telos* Conference in 1977, several persons present argued that the journal needed to “escape the theoretical archaeology that has characterized *Telos*” (K. T. Group, 1977, p. 191).

They claimed that the tradition of left-wing scholasticism should be abandoned for more concrete studies that utilize our critical-theoretical tools for social analysis. While there seemed to be considerable agreement on this issue, D'Amico and Arato suggested that left-wing archaeology still performs an important critical and informative function. Miller and Schmidt felt that the journal should not only consider more work of a more concrete nature, but also should deal with a wider variety of theoretical orientations (p. 191).

The journal began publication in the spring of 1968, a particularly political moment. However, the journal always maintained a critical distance from any party or political movement, including the New Left. Its struggle with its relationship to the political is evidenced in its subtitle.

As John Fekete (1981/82) remarked, its subtitle self-description changed fourteen times within its first fifty issues, and thirteen of those changes occurred in its first sixteen

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187 The second issue was almost triple the length of the first, including five essays, one note, and four reviews. Piccone’s article “Dialectic Logic Today” alone ran to almost fifty pages, nearly the length of the entire first issue. Advertisements for other journals also began to appear. (More discussion of advertisements within the journal appears below). Interestingly, this issue gave attribution to a printer “Tipograph – Arti Grafiche” based in Milan, Italy.
issues. The first subtitle to appear was “the official publication of the Graduate Philosophy Association of the State University of New York at Buffalo.” This subtitle was then subsumed under “a philosophical journal definitely outside the mainstream of American philosophical thought.” By issue seven (1971), the subtitle read “an international interdisciplinary quarterly.” Issue nine wore the subtitle “a Marxist quarterly” on its back cover, almost as an afterthought. That issue contained Paul Piccone’s article “Phenomenological Marxism,” and the editorial introduction promised “a systematic examination” of that theme. It dropped the association with Marxism in the next issue (1971) and instead bore the subtitle “a journal of revolutionary thought” on its front cover. A second subtitle, “a journal of radical thought,” appeared on its back cover, testimony to the somewhat slapdash publication efforts of its small editorial team.

Further changes followed. Issue 70’s subtitle—“post critical thought”—only appeared for that issue; the subtitle then reverted to the previous designation “a quarterly journal of critical thought.” Starting with issue 105 (1995), the journal ceased printing a subtitle, begging the question whether the journal had given up on trying to settle its identity. Online and in its advertisements, however, the journal has a new subtitle, “A Quarterly Journal of Politics, Philosophy, Critical Theory, Culture, and the Arts”? What does this new subtitle say about the journal? That it is looking for any material of quality? Rather than eschew any identity, it picks a more universal or all-encompassing identity? The new designation is reminiscent of the earlier reviews, which were critical organs, period. Their goal was to foster a culture of criticism rather than practice a criticism that would produce a specific politics. The more encompassing title also bears a likeness to the expansion of *Thesis Eleven*'s journal description when it became a Sage publication, as discussed in the
introduction. Perhaps this relinquishment of an imposed identity also has something to do with a journal’s age?

The subtitles help break the journal into three periods. The first period lasted from the journal’s early 1970s issues through issue 53 in 1982 when the journal described itself as devoted to radical thought. Beginning with issue 54, the journal’s subtitle evinced a dedication to “critical,” rather than “radical” thought. This second period lasted until issue 104 in 1995, and as already mentioned, had a slight interruption with Issue 70’s subtitle of “post critical thought.” Since 1995, Telos has carried no subtitle for its print issues, marking the third period.\footnote{See Table 1 in Appendix 1 for a complete breakdown of the subtitle changes.}

Even at its most explicitly radical moments, the journal’s subtitle always spoke of the journal as one committed to “thought” or “theory,” not politics. Rather than lay out a manifesto for action, the journal instead “proposed a systematic reexamination of the trajectory of radical thought during the last century...” (quoting Piccone, Raventos, 2002, p. 136). When Fekete reviewed the journal’s history at issue fifty and its changing subtitle, he noted that

the main problem for a critical journal such as Telos, whose main consistency has been its searching and at times self-lacerating commitments to its critical purpose, is severe. Its place on the institutional map is never secure and always subject to dislocation or even extinction. At the same time, its own trajectory may have generally exhausted, at the level of content, the main inherited traditions of critical thought, that is, of instituted criticism. It needs to survive, more than ever, as a self-instituting project. Yet its own thematizations of the global situation indicate a further institutional dilemma that leaves in uncertainty the form and the mode of existence of the institution of criticism (1981/82, p. 169).
Telos never explicited a specific political program. It did not encourage political activities and, as “Moishe Gonzales”\(^{189}\) argued, most of its editorial members were not politically active. “[A]s with almost all radical professors, almost no one in Telos engaged in any significant political activity” (Gonzales, 1985). This lack of a political program or active politics from the start can be compared to the activities of the early New Left Review, where the journal promoted and participated in political action. As Stuart Hall writes:

> [s]ince the New Left is so often tagged as mainly an intellectual formation, it may be more appropriate to remind readers that the ‘first’ New Left, however mistakenly, thought of itself as a movement rather than simply a journal. Shortly after the publication of the first issue, ulr [university and left review] called its first ‘readers’ meeting’ on an inauspicious Sunday afternoon, which was followed by the foundation of the London ulr Club (2010, p. n/a).\(^{190}\)

When the ulr merged with the New Reasoner to form the New Left Review, the newly formed journal also committed itself to political engagement, encouraging its readers to participate in the activities of the Left Clubs ("Letter to Readers," 1960). As for Telos, the journal announced in the introduction to its fiftieth issue:

> Unaffiliated with any larger group, party or institution, Telos remains entirely a project of its editors and contributors. As such, it shares the predicament of the small entrepreneur in the age of monopolies. In defending its autonomy, it confronts a knowledge industry whose products are trivialized and automated inside the academy and commodified by the publishing industry outside of it. Yet, it survives and thrives not just as the stubborn refusal of its producers to capitulate to

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\(^{189}\) “Moishe Gonzales” was an occasional pseudonym used by Piccone and Frank Adler. Its use is discussed further below.

\(^{190}\) The New Left Review served as a point of comparison for the New Left student magazines in the United States. “The New Left Review people have a student movement and a political party to work within. We have no such institutions of this sort yet. Given this dismal reality, we are much more limited to the scholarly radicalism of disclosure rather than being able to take directly programmatic political stands in our journal” (quoting Eleanor Hakim, Mattson, 2002, p. 239). Mattson notes that Studies on the Left, a journal founded in 1959 and based at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, began a section titled, “On the Movements,” in 1965. This new section and the attention paid to the then-burgeoning movements of the New Left, allowed the journal, according to Mattson, to become less academic and “more optimistic about the dawn of a newly engaged political intellectual” (2002, p. 239).
'business as usual,’ but because of a growing international circulation\textsuperscript{191} that is not reflected by the impact the journal has had on the American Left or its few remaining intellectuals (p. 3).

In the wake of the New Left, scholars and activists that still considered themselves on the left but without an explicit political program began to consider the journal form itself as the new organizational means of praxis.\textsuperscript{192} Within the editorial circle of \textit{Telos}, the question of theory and practice arose time and again, but unlike some other journals on the Left that began in the 1970s and 80s, \textit{Telos} never made an explicit claim to represent its work as a form of political activity. Neither did it say that it was not. Instead, the question of praxis was debated within its pages, at its conferences, and in editorial correspondence. It was (perhaps still is) an ongoing debate that never reached a conclusion. Similarly, the journal never finally answered the question of “what next?” The answer was ever evolving, as the journal interrogated diverse sources of political thought that carried the journal into discussions that some inside and outside the journal sharply criticized. Perhaps this “relentless restlessness” is what has allowed the journal to survive for more than forty years of publication.

While \textit{Telos} found its voice between Issue 1 and Issue 6, it would struggle with (or contest) its nature and purpose throughout its life span. In Issue 6, the journal stated that it

\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Telos}'s overseas subscriptions were significant compared to its domestic readership. Currently, the journal’s subscriptions are split 60/40 with sixty percent of the subscribers in North America (both the United States and Canada) and forty percent international.

\textsuperscript{192} Kevin Mattson, a contributor to \textit{Telos}, wrote the book-length study \textit{Intellectuals in Action}, chronicling the indigenous roots of the New Left movements in the United States. He points to Dwight Macdonald’s \textit{politics} as a forerunner to the student journals of the New Left. Mattson quotes Robert Scheer’s 1964 piece, “Notes on the New Left,” which stated: “[The New Left] found a home in the burgeoning student publications such as \textit{Studies on the Left} and \textit{New University Thought}. These magazines are the closest we have to a new movement. This creation of magazines rather than organizations is the confession of ideological uncertainty and political weakness, but given the position of the left in American society, it is perhaps the only honest response to be made” (2002, p. 229).
fashioned itself after *Les Temps modernes, Praxis* and *New Left Review*, although the latter would become a favorite target of the journal’s in later issues. The journal’s early editorial statements, in whatever form they appeared, never made claims that the journal was Marxist or committed to advancing any political goals, no matter what the stripe. It began as a journal of radical philosophy, although it did not carry that designation from the outset either. However, the journal’s first conference was dedicated to “The New Marxism” and its second conference to “Political Organization.” Both conferences dealt with the New Left and its disintegration. A book published from the proceedings of the first conference described its purpose as such:

> Aware of the rapid internal disintegration of the New Left movement...[we] organized a conference...in order to investigate the possibility of salvaging valuable theoretical indications from the forgotten Western Marxist tradition (Issue 19, book advertisement for *Towards a New Marxism: Proceedings of the First Telos Conference*, p. n/a).

The announcement for the second conference on “Political Organization” declared the issue of organization for the American New Left to be urgent, implying that without this attention paid, disintegration would continue apace.

However, unlike other journals such as *Studies on the Left* or *New University Thought*, which began publication in 1959 and 1960 respectively, *Telos* did not consider itself a journal of the New Left. In fact, *Telos* would maintain a critical distance from what remained of the movement(s). Piccone later referred to the New Left movements as a product of “artificial negativity.”¹⁹³

> Of course, *Telos* came out of the American New Left. To leave it at that, however, would be too simple and maybe even misleading.... Such a short answer would not explain, for example, why from the very beginning, *Telos* was always dismissed, if not hated outright by most of the “really existing New Left,” and why the journal did not follow the self-destructive trajectory of the movement. Rather, it thrived long

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¹⁹³ I discuss the concept of “artificial negativity” more fully below in Chapter 3.4.
after drugs and opportunism reduced the prominent New Left ideologies to rationalizing mechanisms, whose unintended impact was ultimately to reinforce the irrationalities of the very establishment they had sought to transform (Raventos, 2002, p. 133).

If the New Left was criticized for its shallow engagement with theory, no similar criticism could be made of Telos. Rather, the deep engagement with theory within the new journal hardly made it amenable to political activists wanting to know what to do next.

*The Public Interest: A Pragmatic and "Non-ideological" Approach to Politics*

Unlike Telos's brief paragraph announcing its editorial policy, the opening editorial of *The Public Interest* ran three pages long and contained a paradox, a disquisition on ideology, a critique of public policy analysis, a pre-selection of audience, and an explanation of the journal’s title. It announced the paradox in the first sentence: “The aim of *The Public Interest* is at once modest and presumptuous.” What sort of purpose could be both modest and presumptuous? The editors continued,

> It is to help all of us, when we discuss issues of public policy, to know a little better what we are talking about—and preferably in time to make such knowledge effective (Bell & Kristol, 1965, p. 3).

The qualifying language “a little” must have been what they meant by “modest,” because the rest of the purpose, to help know what we are talking about and make such knowledge effective, is presumptuous and ambitious. It presumes that people pre-PI (pre-*The Public Interest*) do not know what they are talking about, or to reintroduce the modesty, do not know well enough what they are talking about.

While this critique was made in an even and measured tone, unlike the more spiked language of Telos's second expressed editorial policy that pointed to philosophy’s “triviality” and “meaninglessness,” the critique is nonetheless present, as is the arrogance.
Because to presume that people do not know well enough what they are talking about, is also to assume that the author(s) does. The editors continued their critique with a brief description of contemporary policy analysis:

The past decade of American history is just chock full of Great Debates that never happened. Indeed, the more typical arguments over public policy in the United States proceeded something like this: (a) it is asserted that we need program A to solve problem X; (b) it is retorted that we don’t need program A because problem X, in so far as it exists, is on the way to solving itself; (c) a modified version of program A is enacted; (d) it is eventually discovered that problem X is really an amalgam of seven other problems—none of which is on the way to solving itself, and only a few of which will be significantly affected by program A. By this time, however, an agency has been established, monies appropriated, people and resources committed—and the knowledge is not likely to be effectual, or even very welcome (p. 3).

The editors thus argue that policy analysis proceeds before the right questions are asked and before the right information is gathered. Moreover, they accuse the policy process of a species of anti-intellectualism. So, policy analysts (largely social scientists) were being remiss in their duties, and policy makers could care less.

The editorial that introduced the first issue in 1965 was one of only a handful of editorial interventions to appear in the journal. A few other editorial notes introduced specials issues of the journal or marked some occasion such as a change in editorship. However, for the most part, the editors remained in the background, carefully cultivating each issue no doubt, as well as contributing articles, although doing so from behind the scenes.

It would be unfair though to accuse The Public Interest and Telos of arrogance or “knowing better” without pointing out that the quality is shared by most intellectuals and journals. Why else would you start one, unless you believe that you can provide a better understanding, a better analysis, a better criticism, a better view than those currently available? John Ehrman writing about The Public Interest’s founding stated that Bell and
Kristol “shared a deep concern regarding the state of the social sciences, which they viewed as plagued by poor research and nonsensical conclusions” (1999, p. 169). Further, no available journals were willing to publish more critical analyses of policy, as “so many journals had given into the optimism about reform” (p. 169). This was the impetus for the founding of The Public Interest.

Re-viser vs. Re-viewer?

In Bell’s The End of Ideology, he defined “ideology” largely as the radical left ideologies of socialism and communism. Further, Bell distinguished between scholars and intellectuals.

The scholar has a bounded field of knowledge, a tradition, and seeks to find his place in it, adding to the accumulated, tested knowledge of the past as to a mosaic. The scholar, qua scholar, is less involved with his ‘self.’ The intellectual begins with his experience, his individual perceptions of the world, his privileges and deprivations, and judges the world by these sensibilities (Bell, 2006, p. 364).

The intellectuals/ideologues, or how The Public Interest circle likely would have referred to the Telos circle, therefore prefigure the world according to their subjective inclinations, while the scholars investigate the world objectively. The Public Interest then was developed as a forum for the scholar, or as put forth in the journal’s first article, for the scholar as professional reformer. Looking back twenty years later, Nathan Glazer wrote, “What better example of ‘the end of ideology,’ the reign of professionalism?” (Glazer, 1985, p. 19).195

194 Earlier that year, John Schaar and Sheldon Wolin publicly condemned social science and the administration of Berkeley in a series of articles written for the New York Review of Books. “In these pieces, they pointedly located the potential for a ‘new politics’ in precisely the force they believed most opposed the technocratic vision—the student movements of the 1960s” (Hauptmann, 2004, p. 41). The Public Interest would largely condemn the student movements of the New Left, most notably in a special issue title “The Universities” (Fall 1968, Issue 13) that contained articles on the student unrest at Berkeley and Columbia.

195 In 1985, Glazer provided another definition of “ideology”: “a principled opposition to governmental involvement in these areas [welfare, public housing, urban renewal]” (p. 18). Such opposition was “clearly ‘ideological,’ just as Marxist insistence on the necessary conflict between the social classes was ideological. Rather, the proper scope of argument over arrangements in these
The new journal’s hope for the professionalization of reform was underscored by their choice of Walter Lippmann’s definition of “the public interest” for their opening editorial. After noting that “the public interest” is a much debated topic, there also being those that believe it to be nothing more than the aggregation of individual interests, and not wanting to presume to settle “a theoretical issue that has vexed political philosophers for over two thousand years now,” the editors argued that there does exist something like “the public interest,” even if it is difficult to articulate (Bell & Kristol, 1965, p. 5). They therefore borrowed Lippmann’s definition, which reads:

The public interest may be presumed to be what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently (p. 5).

Lippmann was known for his belief that science was “the discipline of democracy” (2006, p. 165).

In Lippmann’s 1914 work Drift and Mastery one can also see where Bell received his inspiration for The End of Ideology. There, Lippmann wrote:

Almost all men do require something to focus their interest in order to sustain it. A great idea like Socialism has done that for millions. But Socialism simply as a great passion can easily produce its superstitions and its barbarisms. What men need in their specialties in order to enable them to cooperate is not alone a binding passion, but a common discipline. Science, I believe, implies such a discipline. It is the fact that scientists approach the world with an understood method that enables them to give and take from each other whether they live in Calcutta or in San Francisco. The scientific world is the best example we have to-day of how specialists can cooperate. Of course there are profound disagreements, intrigues, racial and national prejudices, even among scientific men, for a common method will not wipe out the older cleavages, and it is not a perfectly cohesive force. But for the kind of civilization we are entering it is as yet the best we know (2006, p. 169).

areas was, properly, technical, and among these, policies that made use of economic incentives to achieve publicly beneficial action by employers, workers, property owners, renters, physicians and hospitals and sick patients, had high favor. But this was not considered ideological; this was practical, in avoiding costs and heightening efficiency” (p. 18).
Science, however, is not for everyone, and superstitions and barbarisms can be captivating, or so essentially *The Public Interest* argued.

In 1970, Maurice Berube and Marilyn Gittell published an article titled “In Whose Interest Is ‘The Public Interest’?” in the first issue of the new journal *Social Policy*.196 Under the subheading “Conservatism as Non-Ideology,” they wrote:

> This ideology of non-ideology, moreover, masks more conservative instincts. The professional reformer, theoretically, can bypass values; the major task then becomes a technical one—how to apply resources, both intellectual and physical, to the problem. Implicit, however, is a commitment to a very narrow and limited adjustment of the system. What we have is an ideological mercenary, whose expertise transcends narrow political maneuvering.... But is the professional reformer really less ideological? Or is his ‘objectivity’ merely a cover for acceptance of limited change? The unhappy fact is that more often than not, this breed of reformer tends to be a gradualist whose advocacy of gradual reform becomes a prop for the status quo (Berube & Gittell, 1970, p. 6).

Elsewhere in the article, they refer to the journal’s “professional angle of vision,” which they argue is a constricted one; hence, the ideology of non-ideology’s “commitment to a very narrow and limited adjustment of the system.”197 For Berube and Gittell, the journal’s reviewing practice is essentially a practice of slow and minor revision.198

*Telos’s* reviewing practice was one of a more wholesale, revolutionary view. The journal’s second issue revealed the inspiration for the journal’s title. It came from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. For Husserl, life must have an ideal or *telos* toward

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196 Interestingly, this journal was advertised in *Telos* along with the table of contents of its first issue, which is how I happened to come across the article. This is one of the few intersections of the journals, again with some degrees of separation.

197 Writing on the journal’s 30th anniversary, George Will argued, however, that the journal produced an alternative view of the world for its readers: “That journal’s pages repeatedly have given its readers the pleasurable shock of nonrecognition—of seeing that the world is not as we have been used to seeing it” (1995, p. 14).

198 Berube and Gittell end their article with the argument that professional reform is anachronistic and “more suitable to the American Welfare State of some thirty years ago” (p. 9). Instead, they argue, “what is needed is a fundamental restructuring of social institutions. And the key to such reform is enabling a public to determine its own policy” (p. 9). This is the New Left’s familiar call for direct or participatory democracy. The editors of *The Public Interest* believed such calls were empty and ill-founded.
which it moves. In "The Phenomenological Encyclopedia and the Telos of Humanity," Enzo Paci explained the character of the unattainable but motivating nature of Husserl’s telos concept:

What we have said, generally speaking, concerns a very important aspect of Husserl’s thought. But it becomes decisive when we notice that the object the cogito thinks or imagines, or the object upon which the cogito works is never considered as a reality accomplished once and for all. Every object, in so far as it is thought of, imagined, worked upon by men, goes beyond its own reality. It appears as a better vision, as an improvable task, even if only accomplished in certain aspects, i.e., as a telos. This is an elaboration of Husserl’s thought. It can be expressed by saying that the object of phenomenology is intentional in so far as it has a telos (1968, p. 8, emphasis added).

Husserl’s conception of a telos is similar to the notion of democracy in Jacques Derrida’s The Politics of Friendship. In Derrida’s closing remarks he asks us to continue to question democracy’s arrival even when it seems to already be in existence.

[Even where there is democracy, it never exists, it is never present, it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept. Is it possible to open up to the ‘come’ of a certain democracy which is no longer an insult to the friendship we have striven to think beyond the homo-fraternal and phallogocentric schema? When will we be ready for an experience of freedom and equality that is capable of respectfully experiencing that friendship, which would at last be just, just beyond the law, and measured up against its measurelessness? O my democratic friends . . . (Derrida, 2005b, p. 306).

In many ways, the choice of title for the journal was fitting. The dictionary defines “telos” as “an ultimate object or aim.” In a sense, telos is an empty signifier since multiple meanings can constitute a telos. Paci defined Husserl’s telos, writing

[The meaning of truth, both for the natural as well as the social sciences (Natur- and Gesiesswissenschaften), is the constitution of a society of subjects where no one is exploited or turned into an object. This society is human and free, and it is socialist and democratic, in the more positive sense of these two words (1968, p. 15).

But as noted above, a telos is an ideal to move towards, an ultimate object. Ultimate signifies that something has come to an end. Historical materialism whether in its bastardized forms such as Francis Fukuyama’s proclamation of the “end of history” or in
the Marxist notion of communism as the final stage of history are impossible if a telos is an ultimate object that in fact cannot be attained. Like Derrida’s democracy, a telos contains a spiritual, or even messianic quality, implying that heaven cannot be achieved on earth, while still requiring that it be attempted. Piccone described Marx’s regard of the revolutionary telos as “impossible to envision before its actual realization, promising to usher in utopia, but also risking to degenerate, as was often the case in the 20th century, into the horrors of Auschwitz, the Gulag, and Hiroshima” (Raventos, 2002, p. 134).

The journal, Telos, questioned any false claims of heaven on earth, never being satisfied with any philosophical or political assurances of humanity’s improvement. Telos opposed the chimeric promises of liberalism and communism that instead produced what it believed were objectified societies to the telos the journal followed, the hope of a non-objectified society and the recovery of the subject of history. While a chimera is illusory or impossible, a telos is possible but always in the future. It must be continuously worked towards.

Again, as Paci explained:

Every object, in so far as it is thought of, imagined, worked upon by men, goes beyond its own reality. It appears as a better vision, as an improvable task, even if only accomplished in certain aspects, i.e., as a telos (1968, p. 8, emphasis added).

A telos can then be understood as an evolving “view,” one that should not be reified or fixed but that should develop. The critics contrast this measure, or ideal, with the state as it actually exists. Since neither the state nor its view is ever fixed, the critics’ telos requires a constant re-viewing, with each step toward it being another approximation. Among the critics, there are competing views, or narratives of power. These views contest each other as well as the view belonging to the cratics. They all offer different visions for the state,
different possibilities. The state’s view, contrastingly, fixes upon an object and imposes its perspective upon others. Its view too may change over time to accommodate changed circumstances or needs, but the state’s view is a reflection of the state. It is prefigured, while a telos can never be prefigured. John Fekete on the occasion of the fiftieth issue of Telos wrote that the journal exhibited a “relentless restlessness” (1981/82, p. 161). As the journal moved into the fourteenth year of its publication, it continued to search for its identity, its telos, something arguably which it continues to do.

The editors of The Public Interest recognized that their more scientific and “non-ideological” approach would not appeal to everyone. They acknowledged that the “ideological essay,” the type of essay found in Telos, is often more interesting than “a more matter-of-fact and more truthful essay” (Bell & Kristol, 1965, p. 4). While the editors promised to make the new journal “lively,” readable,” and “as controversial as possible,” they also promised to publish “the occasional ‘dull’ article that merely reports the truth about a matter under public discussion” (p. 4, emphasis added). For them, ideology distorts the truth or ignores it. However, the “truth” was a product of their view, one which Michael Harrington described as “abstract and unhistorical” (1973, p. 454).

The editors argued that “[o]nly the incurably adolescent mind” will be distressed by the lack of excitement of non-ideology (p. 4). They happily accepted the portrayal from a certain “eminent man of letters” that their new journal would be a “middle-aged magazine for middle-aged readers” (p. 4). After all, they argued,

Young people tend to be enchanted by glittering generalities; older people are inclined to remember rather than to think; middle-aged people, seasoned by life but still open to the future, do seem to us – in our middle years – to be the best of all political generations” (p. 4, emphasis added).
While likely to have eschewed such a characterization, *The Public Interest* could perhaps be described as a “theory journal” for the middle aged. The journal’s audience would likely be reform-minded professionals themselves. Unlike *Telos*, which scorned the professionalism of philosophy and aspiring professionals, *The Public Interest* welcomed professionalism as a means to correct and reform (or revise) society’s problems. *Telos* viewed professionalism as part of the problem, not the solution. Professionalism helped create the philosophical crisis, which in turn hollowed out philosophy as any sort of response to the contemporary problems of society.\(^{199}\) Professionalism created *doxa*. The scholastic bias of the professional philosophers makes possible a “view which is indifferent to context and practical ends” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 13). Could policy really be discussed without a consideration of ends? In short time, the *Public Interest* would decide it could not.

James Q. Wilson, a frequent contributor to *The Public Interest*, took up the question of scholars vs. intellectuals or revisers vs. reviewers in a 1981 article to appear in the journal titled, “‘Policy Intellectuals’ and Public Policy.” He noted that public policy was once again under the influence of ideas and intellectuals—the first great period of influence having been the 1960s. He contrasts the two groups though, the policy intellectuals of the 1960s being liberal and those of the 1980s being those influencing Reagan’s administration “to reverse, or at least stem, a political tide that has been running for half a century or more” (Wilson, 1981, p. 31). While he easily gives the label “liberal” to the 1960s policy intellectual, he gives no such label to the new policy intellectuals. He argues though that

\(^{199}\) As Harold Rosenberg wrote in “The Twilight of Intellectuals”: “For what is a crisis but a situation in which the practical men of affairs, who are always the people in power, have already failed, exposing the limits of the practical intelligence” (Jamonville, 2007, p. 193).
[i]n the 1960’s, the ‘policy intellectuals’ saw themselves as priests of the established order; today, their counterparts think of themselves as missionaries in a hostile country (1981, p. 31).

The description sounds somewhat personal, pointing perhaps to Wilson’s own membership in this new group. However, as is common with the critics, he evaluates this new group from a necessary distance.

Wilson notes that while the policy intellectuals of the 1960s exercised a considerable influence, they did not write policy themselves. In other words, the critics remained separate from the critics. Instead, and importantly in Wilson’s view, the intellectuals framed the policy discourse.

If the influence of intellectuals was not to be found in the details of policy, it was nonetheless real, albeit indirect. Intellectuals provided the conceptual language, the ruling paradigms, the empirical examples (note that I say examples, not evidence) that became the accepted assumptions for those in charge of making policy. Intellectuals framed, and to a large degree conducted, the debates about whether this language and these paradigms were correct. The most influential intellectuals were those who managed to link a concept or a theory to the practical needs and ideological predispositions of political activists and government officials. The extent to which this process occurred can be measured by noting the number of occasions on which a government official (or businessman, or interest group leader) was able to preface his remarks with the phrase, ‘as everyone knows....” (1981, p. 33).

According to Wilson, intellectuals choose which policy problems will be tackled, what is commonly referred to in political science jargon as “agenda setting.” He distinguished intellectuals from scholars by noting that the former often lacked evidence for their arguments. Scholars, conversely, are the persons who produce and test ideas under rules governing the quality of evidence. *The Public Interest* hoped to be a forum for scholars when it began, a place where policies could be rigorously tested and evaluated.

However, in 1981, more than fifteen years of the journal’s founding, Wilson found that not all scholars do their job well either. Interestingly, he finds more fault with scholarship that produces results contrary to his world view than he does with scholarship
that corresponds to his view, although he admits this up front. Regardless, due to scholarship’s failures as a prognosticating tool, *id est*, its ability to decide in advance which policies are beneficial to pursue, he finds a limited role for said scholarship in the policy process.

If my argument is correct, then the role of intellectuals as scholars (rather than as partisan advocates or insightful citizens) can play in the making of public policy is likely to be small (Wilson, 1981, p. 43).

Such scholarship should be relegated to retrospective evaluations rather than prospective analyses. It can contribute to an ongoing “intellectual dialogue” or culture of critical discourse, which may produce new ways of thinking about policy.

Somewhat surprisingly then, Wilson finds a larger role in the policy process for the intellectual as intellectual. He notes that the intellectual’s ability to structure the policy discourse has little to do with their training as scholars, if they have such training. Wilson concludes that the true influence of intellectuals in the policy process is not knowledge, but theory.

Someone once jokingly referred to a well-known west-coast think tank as ‘the leisure of the theory class’; the phrase was mistaken only in implying that theorizing and leisure are compatible activities. We have seen one peculiar kind of theory—the notion of economic man, rationally pursuing his self-interest—make great headway in some quarters only to be met by other theories moving in a different direction. There is little point in denouncing theory as an inadequate substitute for experience, knowledge, or prudence (which it is); it will be propounded, it will affect policy, and those skilled at formulating it will rise in influence. Moreover, theorizing is not the same as empty talk. Good theory calls attention to obvious truths that were previously overlooked, finds crucial flaws in existing theories, and reinterprets solid evidence in a new light. And some theories, if adopted, will make us all better-off. The problem is to know which ones (1981, p. 46).

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[^200]: He writes that intellectuals “lead us to see old relationships in new ways. They do this without drawing on any special training or expertise and their conceptual language is rarely susceptible to verification; in short, what a natural scientist or social scientist learns in preparing himself to be an intellectual is rarely what gives him that influence that some intellectuals have” (Wilson, 1981, p. 45).
Wilson’s 1981 article effectively traced the transition among *The Public Interest* crowd, from scholars (revisers) to intellectuals (reviewers), or at least from realizing that as intellectuals (which perhaps they already were in 1965), they could more effectively influence the cratics and their policies.

**A Press as Politics?**

Despite its professed models being *Les Temps modernes, Praxis, and New Left Review*, *Telos*’s touchstones may be better considered the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* and Gramsci’s “Notes on Journalism.” *Telos* occupied some middle position between the two. Distancing itself from the New Left, the journal was not a “partisan press” as described by Gramsci. However, at different times, it sought to achieve more immediate political relevancy than the Frankfurt School’s *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*.

Writing in *Telos*, Jürgen Habermas gave a brief history of the *Zeitschrift* in an issue with a special tribute to Leo Lowenthal, a member of the Frankfurt School. Habermas spoke of the journal as the “organizational core and the intellectual center of [the Frankfurt School’s] work” and that it therefore “played a constitutive role” (1980, p. 114). In other words, the journal was not merely a place for the various members of the school to publish their articles and essays.\(^{201}\) Rather, as Martin Jay quoted Lowenthal, it “was ’less a forum

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\(^{201}\) Intellectual developments often depend upon communities of thinkers. Such communities are traced in the works of Randall Collins (1998) and Anthony Grafton (2009). The latter wrote: “We learn first as students and then as practitioners of disciplines, members of communities, users of libraries, habitués of archives, apprentices, and friends – as lurkers in particular intellectual, social, and institutional corners from which we look out at the wide world” (Grafton, 2009, p. 6). Grafton’s claim echoes Bourdieu’s theory of the intellectual field. Its autonomy provides critics with the *habitus* to develop their theoretical capital that may then be exercised in the intellectual field and possibly also in the political and economic fields. In a sense, the field disciplines the critics as much as it provides them with relative independence. Further, within the field, different intellectual
for different viewpoints than a platform for the Institut’s convictions,’ even though other authors continued to contribute occasional articles” (1973, p. 26).

However, the School’s reticence to engage with everyday politics and its firm belief that its philosophy should not serve as a roadmap for anyone’s politics kept the journal from ever becoming anything like a partisan press. In fact, after the journal moved to the United States with the School and was published at Columbia University, Jay notes that the journal’s tone took a pessimistic shift and also began to avoid words like “Marxism” and “communism” substituting “dialectical materialism” and “the materialist theory of society” (1973, p. 44). “Careful editing prevented emphasizing the revolutionary implications of their thought” (p. 44). Part of the reason for this shift was to avoid rocking the boat at Columbia. Additionally, however, as Jay argues, the changes were also a reflection of their fundamental aversion to the type of Marxism that the Institut equated with the orthodoxy of the Soviet camp. But in addition they expressed a growing loss of that basic confidence, which Marxists had traditionally felt, in the revolutionary potential of the proletariat (1973, p. 44).

Habermas argued that the journal lost its intellectual drive after the move to the United States, not just because their political thought was undergoing a transformation but due to a more material reason. The move cut them off from the connections on the European continent. It was those connections that fed the “review” section of the journal, what Habermas described as the real heart of the journal.202 The book review section allowed the journal to fulfill its mission of “social research” – “the idea of a theory of society oriented to the present epoch, and subject to the criterion of empirical research in all communities develop, meaning that the “critics” is never a uniform group. Rather, “critics” oppose one another and their views as much as they oppose the “cratics.”

202 The book review section occupied more than a third of the space of each issue of the journal. Each year more than 350 books were reviewed (Habermas, 1980).
social-science disciplines” (Habermas, 1980, p. 117). When the “review” section of the journal floundered, its new objects of review were mainly works published in English, the whole journal lost motivation.

Whoever takes a look at the book review section of the four English-language issues sees why the journal folded – the umbilical cord to the scientific culture of the homeland was cut through (p. 118).

Book reviews were present in Telos from the first issue. This section was expanded under Paul Breines as book review editor, as discussed below, and then expanded again as the journal approached its ten year anniversary. At the Antioch Telos Conference in the summer of 1977 (Issue 32), the editorial staff unanimously agreed to expand the book review section. They hoped to do so by generating more reviews internally, rather than depending upon over-the-transom submissions or soliciting them from non-Telosers, which continues to be the practice to an extent. To accommodate the expanded review section, the journal would reduce the number of original essays and translations published. Over the next few issues, the section began its expansion. Issue 36 (Summer 1978), published a year after the new policy had been adopted, saw the expanded review section brought to its fruition. The introduction announced:

This issue finally includes a considerably expanded 84-page review section. Given the present lack of a clear political or theoretical direction, elaborate critical reviews may provide the best means to come to grips with various problems. Consequently, this section of the journal will probably continue to grow in future issues (p. 4).

The journal’s reliance on the practice of reviewing in order to orient itself and fulfill its purpose as a critical journal is reminiscent of the attitude at the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. As Habermas explained, essays that defined the School’s standpoint were a regular feature of the journal; however, they took up less than half of each issue. More than a third of each issue consisted of book reviews. He noted that due to the brevity of each
review and the amount of space accorded to the section, the journal reviewed more than 350 publications each year. Horkheimer explained the rationale for the reviews as the following:

When because of intellectual confusion the undaunted pursuit of certain ideas in various fields of social theory is especially necessary, still every sort of philosophical thinking needs constant observation of work in the individual sciences. This orientation should be made easier for the reader of our journal mainly by the book reviews. We try to at least mention every publication of any importance for the theory of society, even in remote fields. The main articles section is supplemented by such studies by specialists, which have some connection with questions of social science. Differences of theoretical attitude here play a far lesser role than the clarification of particular contents. Critique of positivism does not prevent us from recognizing and promoting its technical achievements (quoted in Habermas, 1980, pp. 116-117).

The reviews then help orient readers to the intellectual field and the journal’s position within it. Habermas praised Leo Lowenthal for his work on the book review section, noting that without the section, the journal would have been unable to live up to its purpose as a journal of “social research,” namely, “the idea of a theory of society oriented to the present epoch and subject to the criterion of empirical research in all social-science disciplines” (1980, p. 117).

In Issue 32 of Telos, almost ten years after it had begun publication, the journal included a translation of Antonio Gramsci’s “Notes on Journalism.” For Antonio Gramsci, political writing was a necessary part of political organization. Discussing whether Gramsci could also be considered a literary critic, Arshi Pipa writes:

Everything Gramsci wrote in prison, be it on politics or economics, history or education, literature or folklore, is politically motivated. A militant Marxist turned into a writer by dint of circumstance, Gramsci makes his prison writings an extension of his political activity as a Marxist leader. The difference between Gramsci as a political writer and the typical literary critic is glaring in this respect. For whereas a political writer resorts to writing for political purposes, a literary critic makes of writing his or her raison d’être (1983, p. 85).
Gramsci believed political writing was political practice and not just writing practice, as long as it was writing with a political purpose. While Gramsci was in prison, he really had no other method of political activity available than to write. In those writings, though, he detailed a plan of revolutionary political journalism.

Gramsci, writing in the early 1930s, argued that journals could be used to awaken class-consciousness. Criticism was a tool to be used to penetrate the dominant bourgeois ideology. It revealed but also educated, helping to train minds unaccustomed to critical thought. Gramsci marveled over the many material components of daily life that constructed the “ideological structure of a dominant class” and made it hegemonic.

Its most prominent and dynamic part is the press in general: publishing houses (which have an implicit and explicit program and are attached to a particular tendency), political newspapers, periodicals of every kind, specific, literary, philological, popular, etc., various periodicals down to parish bulletins (Forgacs, 2000, p. 380).

To overcome this hegemony, an opposing ideological structure with its own processes for the transmission of thought would be necessary.

The editors of Telos addressed these concerns in the introduction to Issue 32 which raised the question of what Gramsci’s comments originally written in early 1930s Italy meant for a radical American journal in 1977. Obviously, the authors of the introduction, Andrew Arato and Paul Piccone, pointed out, the conditions of 1977 in the United States are far different from what they were in Italy in the 1920/30s.

Because Gramsci presupposed both a potentially revolutionary working class and a viable party structure, most of his comments cannot apply to our present historical context. Yet, they do provoke reflection on the function of the radical journal. If it is not a catalytic and pedagogical means to the formation of radical consciousness, what is it? Leninist answers that would salvage the ‘mandarinism’ by restricting it to party functionaries certainly will not do for Telos, which long ago exposed the authoritarian, repressive and fraudulent character of all efforts in this direction (Arato & Piccone, 1977b, p. 4).
While the semi-vanguard role Gramsci outlined for a partisan press may no longer be appropriate, especially in light of the absence of a party, the authors also rejected the model of critical theory. Although they did not mention the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, this may have been one of the examples they had in mind.

Likewise, the answer of traditional critical theory will not do. While critical theory holds that the safeguarding of truth is possible only by intensifying the obscurity of theoretical discourse, which thus ends up entrusted to a few intellectuals in our ‘totally administered society,’ it altogether fails to indicate how the truth salvaged in this manner can ever be effective again. Further, critical theory tends to address a readership so restricted that *printing* a journal becomes pointless: carbon paper alone is adequate to reproduce sufficient amounts of whatever is written to supply the demands of the readership (p. 5).

*Telos* would devote itself then to cultivating critical intellectuals.

In the present situation, when all academic fields find themselves in serious crisis, a ‘critical-historical-bibliographic’ journal in Gramsci’s sense becomes the theoretical conscience of increasingly instrumentalized, positivized and bureaucratized disciplines. Given the growing need for internal renewal, *the cultural aim of radical journals should be to vindicate the emancipatory moment in theoretical discourse*—a moment whose elimination is the main reason of that very crisis. Thus, the more modest political goal (with respect to Gramsci’s) is *to stimulate the growth of a critical intelligentsia* able to engage in this type of discourse and thus able to provide potentially emancipatory solutions to the particular crises. In a situation typified by declining internal opposition, growing bourgeois world hegemony and the total lack of a viable socialist model, this is one of the few projects that can still be viably undertaken. Gramsci’s notes provide the starting point for a critical reconsideration of the political function of non-Leninist radical intellectuals (p. 5, emphasis added).²⁰³

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²⁰³ A similar discussion of the journal’s purpose occurred in the early days of *Partisan Review*. Founding editors William Phillips and Philip Rahv wanted the journal to devote itself to the arts, while Dwight Macdonald, who joined the editorial team, wanted the journal to focus on politics. “An exchange of letters between the editors printed in *Partisan Review* revealed the seriousness of their disagreement about the magazine’s function. Macdonald had hoped that it would ‘serve as a forum and a rallying-point for such intellectuals as are still concerned with social and political issues’, as, in other words, a vehicle for the radical vanguard. Phillips and Rahv found such a view constricting and regressive. ‘The truth is that Macdonald tended more and more to think of the magazine as an organ of political propaganda.’ The conception of *Partisan Review’s* function which they advanced was based instead on the role which the little magazine had historically performed for the cultural avant-garde” (Wilford, 1995, p. 47). Macdonald would later leave the magazine and form his own, titled *politics*, at C. Wright Mills’ suggestion. Macdonald wanted to call it the *Radical Review*, but Mills believed such a title would be off-putting to “potential readers and contributors in institutional employment” (1995, p. 139). The format of *Partisan Review* and *politics* was very distinct. The former maintained the appearance of a “little magazine,” with paperback covers,
The Public Interest also questioned its role vis-à-vis politics. As stated in its inaugural editorial, the aims of the journal were to improve the knowledge surrounding public policy and, hopefully, to use that knowledge effectively. In other words, the journal did not want to discuss ideas only; it also wanted to put those ideas into action. This desire was underscored by Moynihan’s lead article in the first issue that argued such translation would be easier from hereon out as reform had become professionalized. An article by Adam Yarmolinsky titled “Ideas into Programs” appeared in the journal’s second issue. In it he argued,

we need to make it easier for people to move back and forth between the world of ideas and the world of action….we ought to expand the area of governmental and public affairs activity in which new ideas can be tried out as limited-scale programs (quoted in Ehrman, 1999, p. 170).

Irving Kristol said that starting the journal was his contribution to politics:

The 1960s were full of big ideas, most of them fantasies, and we decided to have this magazine which would take a very realistic, somewhat skeptical view of social policy. I and Dan Bell and Nat Glazer, we got together and started The Public Interest. The only thing I could think to do. I didn’t run for office. We started a magazine—on a shoestring (Dorman, 2001, p. 157).

Even when Kristol began to rub shoulders with the politically powerful in Washington, D.C., he still kept a certain distance from politics. Joseph Dorman states that Kristol “played a major behind-the-scenes role in the Republican party”; however,

Kristol still maintains a careful personal distance from politics and government. He cannot bear to be wholly a party man. The same sixteen-year-old who preferred to remain on the periphery of the Trotskyists has become a force in Republican politics.
by remaining in his perch as coeditor of *The Public Interest*, free to criticize and instruct (2001, p. 193).\textsuperscript{204}

This points again to a perceived necessary distance from which criticism can be effective.

Similarly, James Q. Wilson, a regular contributor to the journal stated:

> [W]e thought that the role of social scientists in public policy—and I still haven't changed my mind—is not to advise presidents, not to whisper in the ear of the candidate, but to sit down and figure out whether a policy that the government is undertaking will or will not achieve the results the government has stated (quoted in Dorman, 2001, p. 160).

However, this practice of “sitting down and figuring out” should not be thought of as passive or inactive. As discussed more below, Kristol actively pursued a program to put the journal’s ideas into action.

**The *Telos* Network:**\textsuperscript{205} *A Cultivation of Critical Intellectuals*

The idea of having groups of people in various locations not only actively engaged in the running of the journal but also constituting intellectual communities sharing their work and even engaging in limited political efforts is very attractive—as an idea. In practice, it is not quite that easy (Piccone, et al., 1977, p. 180).

*Telos* from its second issue began to run advertisements for other journals. The practice of running ads for other journals within your own is fairly common and usually a reciprocal relationship known as “exchange advertisements.”\textsuperscript{206} *aut aut: A Bimonthly Journal of Philosophy and Culture* (Milan, Italy) was one of the first journal ads to appear, it being the

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\textsuperscript{204} The picture is drawn of a critic among cratics, but whether the representation is accurate is another question. Perhaps maintaining the appearance of a “critic” has its benefits for some of those more accurately described as belonging to the “cratics.”

\textsuperscript{205} Fekete on the occasion of *Telos*’s fiftieth issue identified five components of the journal’s network, namely 1) the *Telos* groups, 2) two reviewing networks, 3) an internal newsletter, 4) conferences, and 5) direct contacts with other radical and European journals (1981/82, p. 163). Most of these are discussed further in this section. I do not provide an analysis of the newsletters, of which I have not yet obtained copies.

\textsuperscript{206} Like *Telos*, Dwight Macdonald’s radical publication in the 1940s, *Politics*, also filled most of its advertising space with exchange ads for other magazines (Wilford, 1995, p. 147).
journal of Enzo Paci who Telos relied upon for his merging of phenomenology and Marxism.207

In addition to advertising journals, Telos also included a number of other ads, such as for presses, including their own, and political ads, including an ad to free Angela Davis (Issue 6) and an invitation to join a Marxist commune (Issue 9). Issue Nine which contained the ad for the Marxist commune and only two journal ads for Radical America and Socialist Quarterly was also the only issue to be designated with the subtitle, “A Marxist Quarterly,” tacked onto its back cover.

Direct relationships between Telos and its staff and contributors with other radical journals also established its position within the intellectual field. Piccone stressed the relationship between Telos and other journals. In addition to the journal having fashioned itself after Les Temps modernes, Praxis, and New Left Review, it was “directly linked with several European journals and similar radical publications” (Staff, 1970, p. 294). Andrew Feenberg, an early associate editor with Telos, was also a member of the first Social Text collective. In the first issue to feature “Notes on Contributors,” the contributors’ affiliations with other journals were emphasized: Paul Breines was a former editor of Studies on the Left,208 Marco Macció was a frequent contributor to Les Temps modernes and aut aut, and

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207 Other ads to appear included one for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, another journal housed at SUNY-Buffalo. However, it was a senior citizen compared to Telos having been founded in 1940. Catalyst: A Journal of Radical Sociology was yet another journal at SUNY-Buffalo in its early years, later transferring to Trent University in Canada. The journal, Radical America, also appeared in an early issue of Telos, describing itself as “A serious New Left journal.” From the outset, Telos advertised foreign journals. Many of the journal ads were for philosophical journals, yet, there were also a fair number of radical journals included. A table listing exchange ads to appear in early issues of the journal can be found in Appendix I.

208 Breines wrote a history and analysis of his experience with the journal, titled “Germans, Journals and Jews/Madison, Men, Marxism and Mosse: A Tale of Jewish-Leftist Identity Confusion in America.” The article also mentions his time spent with Telos. He writes of the journal: “Regarding the issues at hand, I would describe it as the work of an Italian Jewish male clique into whose
Dick Howard was a frequent contributor to *L’Esprit, Radical America*, and *Science and Society*. The journal affiliations of the contributors to Issue 12 (Summer 1972) included *Les Temps modernes, Socialist Revolution, Radical America, Liberation, Harvard Education Review*, and the *Newsletter on Comparative Communication*.

While in St. Louis, the journal’s office was next door to Alvin Gouldner’s, the editor of *Theory and Society*. Gouldner would contribute to *Telos* and participate in editorial discussions and conferences. At the time, Gouldner was working out his take on New Class theory. One articulation of this was published in *Telos* as “A Prologue to a Theory of Revolutionary Intellectuals,” which distinguished between creative intellectuals and technical intelligentia. In part through this material contingency or coincidence of proximate office space, New Class theory would migrate into the pages of *Telos*. However, different from Gouldner’s, it would more closely resemble the neoconservative view of the New Class as a bureaucratic/managerial elite responsible for an overly expanded state. Perhaps different though from the neoconservative view, *Telos* also held the New Class responsible for assisting the state in the elimination of particularity by substituting its particular interests as a general or “public interest,” which arguably was the program of *The Public Interest* at its outset, whether it was conscious of this or not. I discuss *Telos*’s engagement with New Class theory further below in Chapter 3.4.

*Telos* would also develop a close relationship with another journal, *New German Critique*. Eventually, Telos Press would serve as publisher for the journal, a relationship that lasted a number of years, before *New German Critique* found a new home with Duke

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shifting ranks WASPs, women and others have entered, often at their own risk – the journal owes much to their courage. I mean to say only that it has not been a Jewish affair, unless you take the view of some *Telos* associates that all Italians are really Jews and vice versa” (Breines, 1980, p. 102).
University Press. Internal editorial disputes would help contribute to the formation of new journals, including *Thesis Eleven* and *Constellations*. In a sense, a critical theory network, although not necessarily closely related, would form. *Telos* also publishes a bookline through Telos Press Publishing, Ltd., which has published such authors as Gramsci, Jean Baudrillard, Carl Schmitt, and Ernst Jünger, among others. By its fiftieth journal issue, the press already had published twelve book titles.

Lasting less than ten years during the journal’s more than forty-year life span, a series of *Telos* groups hailing from cities other than the journal’s home were listed on its masthead. There were seven groups in total in addition to a group of International *Telos* Associates that appeared in three issues. While the idea to have such groups arose at the first *Telos* conference in 1970, Issue 22 (Winter 1974-75) was the first issue to include such a group, namely the Toronto Group, and Issue 53 (Fall 1982) was the last issue to contain any groups. As Piccone explained, while the groups may have been an ideal way to organize the journal, they could not materialize out of thin air:

The formation of such groups requires a great deal of energy and personal effort—generally more than even the most committed editors are willing or able to invest. It virtually requires that there be a pre-existing infrastructure of friendships and social relations among the people involved, the close proximity of all members of the group, a specific task to achieve, and a great deal of patience. In large cities such as Boston, where there is already a considerable cultural life and the normal pattern of anonymity can only be broken through a lot of work, it has been difficult to form a *Telos* group. Furthermore, in New York, where there is no room large enough to accommodate any two given egos without resulting in a three-way split, the project has never gone past the formation of study groups whose life-span seldom exceeds a month to five weeks (1977, p. 180).

At the St. Louis *Telos* Conference in 1977, the *Telos* circle debated what to do about the low-quality unsolicited manuscript submissions they received. They decided that they could only discontinue the policy of accepting unsolicited manuscripts if the *Telos* groups,
which then consisted only of the Toronto and St. Louis Groups, became more numerous
and also a larger and more integral part of the journal. As Piccone noted, however, the
creation of such groups was no easy task. However, the conditions seem to have been right
in Toronto.

It was possible to form a group in Toronto only because the people there already
shared a great deal, happened to congregate in the same general areas, and turned
out to be personally compatible (for the most part). It may be possible to form
groups in Kansas, Los Angeles, and Texas, if the theoretical and psychological winds
blow in the right direction in the near future, but as things are now, it seems
premature to re-organize the journal around the Telos groups (p. 180).

Interestingly enough, Piccone’s predictions for future groups were not far off the mark. A
steady Kansas group did form; a Texas group made a brief, one issue appearance, and a
Berkeley, rather than Los Angeles, group formed in California.209

The Toronto Telos Group was the longest running of all the groups, their presence
spanning almost twenty issues.210 A study by Genosko, Gandesha and Marcellus (2002) of
the Toronto Group found that it had the largest presence out of all the groups associated
with the journal.

Unlike other longstanding groups such as St. Louis Telos, which spanned some 16
issues from Telos 25 (Fall 1975) through Telos 41 (Fall 1979), members of the
Toronto contingent had a regular presence in the pages of the journal and occupied
key positions on the production staff and editorial associate posts (2002, p. 2).

The Genosko et al. study also attempted to apply the theory of artificial negativity to the
question of the groups to determine if the viability of the Toronto Telos Group could be
explained by the theory. They argued that in the 1970s Toronto lacked a “considerable

209 A table listing the groups and their life spans can be found in Appendix I.
210 The group first appeared in Issue 22 (Winter 1974-75) and was a consistent feature of the
journal until Issue 38 (Winter 1978-79). The group made one final appearance in Issue 41 (Fall
1979). Even though the Toronto group no longer formally appeared on the masthead, it continued
to be responsible for the “Short Journal Reviews” under coordinating editor John Fekete until Issue
49 (Fall 1981).
cultural life” and also, like major American cities, had not been “destroyed by one-dimensionality” (p. 12).

In short, Toronto had the flavour of those ‘lingering pre-capitalist formations’ where radical theorists could realize the production of a more or less spontaneous ‘organic negativity,’ an autonomous critical opposition resisting rationalistic bureaucratic apparatuses (p. 12).

The Genosko study also surmised reasons for the groups’ eventual disintegration. They pointed to three possible reasons: 1) Piccone’s shift away from academia, 2) his relocation to New York, and 3) his conservative shift in political interests (2002, p. 3). All three reasons centered on Piccone himself, the journal’s editor, emphasizing the central and determining role he played.211

Conferences were another way the journal established a network.212 In the report from the very first Telos conference, the journal noted the irony inherent in a radical journal organizing a bourgeois-like conference.

A Telos Conference is, at first sight, a contradiction in terms. Telos is essentially a radical anti-establishment journal devoted to – among other things – demolishing most of the present-day nonsense that goes under the name of philosophy while at the same time rediscovering things such as what has been called the ‘hidden dimension’ of the continental philosophical tradition: European Marxism. Conferences, on the other hand, are bourgeois institutions for professional academicians who must periodically escape their boring routine (preferably with their mistress) to far-away and exotic places where these meetings are usually held. Consequently, a ‘Telos Conference,’ if not a put-on, would indicate the embourgeoisification of the journal and the senilification of its staff. Neither is the case (or so we hope) (1970, p. 294).

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211 Genosko et al. also compared Piccone’s editorial role to that of Horkheimer’s with the Institut für Sozialforschung. “For despite the complexity and heterogeneity of the group structure of the journal, each group with its own intrinsic references, organizational and working principles, and the opportunities that regular Telos conferences provided for intergroup communications, Piccone exercised final editorial authority over the work that would appear in print. Piccone’s editorial power obviously shares some similarities with that of Max Horkheimer’s administrative power... Whether, in this sense, Piccone modelled either his editorial style after Horkheimer or even thought of Telos as an American version of the fabled Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung remains, at this point, an open question” (2002, p. 3).

212 A table listing the known conference reports to appear in the journal can be found in Appendix I.
Much like the Westminster’s hesitation to use the journal form, Telos was hesitant to organize a conference. Still, despite their reservations, the journal saw the benefits of a meeting of the journal’s group, possibly its audience, as well as interested others.

To the extent that people are always much more than what they write, it became obvious that if the Telos project were to be anything more organic than simply a collection of disconnected articles written by pure minds dispersed through the world, we had to meet and find out what we were like behind the categorical niceties of our writings. It was precisely at this point that the Federation of Students at the University of Waterloo offered to sponsor a philosophical conference dealing with the kinds of problems and issues discussed in Telos. What was to be pompously labeled the ‘First Telos International Conference’ was initially conceived as a coming-together of these people – a relatively well-read and philosophically sophisticated group interested in re-examining and evaluating Marxism and its history to see how and to what extent it was relevant and applicable to today’s realities. Since these problems are not the monopoly of a small number of ‘experts,’ it was expected that a heterogeneous audience of interested leftists, as well as various students in different stages of their development, might also benefit from these discussions (1970, p. 295).

Three different groups were present at the first Telos conference: 1) Telosers, 2) “an amorphous mass of students attracted by the theme of the conference,” and 3) “a number of ‘activists’ who, frustrated by the political setbacks of the last couple years, sought some theoretical elaboration of their contradictory political predicament to lead them out of the corner into which the New Left has gradually painted itself” (1970, p. 296). The journal crowd quickly recognized that they needed three separate conferences to satisfy the three different audiences: “an introductory one on Marxism for most of the green local students,

213 Once the reservations were overcome, the journal struggled with how best to organize such a conference, “around themes, by historical periods, or what? Like most questions of this type, it was hopelessly academic. Since the Telos people were no more than a bunch of names associated with certain aspects of Marxism and would have had extreme difficulty in agreeing on anything specific, it was decided to concentrate on various aspects or interpretations so as to be able to obtain a common perspective whence to proceed (one of these days) towards a concrete analysis of our socio-historical predicament and determine how to bring about revolutionary social changes. In a sense, the nature of Telos and its contributors determined from the very beginning what type of conference it was going to be: an audio-visual carbon copy of Telos. To try anything else would have been pretentious and inappropriate: revolutions are made in the streets, not in conference rooms” (Staff, 1970, pp. 295-296).
a tactical one for the activists, and what was originally planned for the *Telos* group” (p. 296).

The conflicts that developed in the course of the conference can largely be explained in terms of the incongruous and conflicting interests of these three groups for, if the conference had been aimed at the local students, it would have appeared simplistic and irrelevant to the other two; if it had been aimed at the ‘activists’ it would have lost its original philosophical character and disillusioned both the local students and the *Telos* group; while if directed at the *Telos* readership it would have appeared abstract, obscure, and incomprehensible to the other two groups. As it turned out, the conference was attacked for being abstract, obscure and incomprehensible. The organizers’ only defense from these charges is that people for whom names such as Lukacs, DeLeon, or Korsch connote the local brand of hot dogs or Spanish *conquistadores* should not have bothered to come or, if they chose to come, they should have listened rather than immediately demanding ‘how can I use things such as Lukacs’ theory of reification to obliterate the bourgeoisie?’ (p. 296).

However, by the end of the conference, which had been interspersed with complaints that the orientation of the conference was not politically relevant enough, “most people left with a general feeling that a conference dealing with theoretical problems might be a good idea” (p. 317).214

*Telos* Issues 7 and 8 contained advertisements for “The Second *Telos* International Conference: Buffalo, November 11-14, 1971” on the topic of “Political Organization.” The ad in Issue 7 described the purpose of the upcoming conference as the following:

> Without question, the problem of organization is very urgent; the whole future of the American New Left depends on it. This conference will attempt to bring together an international group of activists, organizers and scholars interested in this issue.

214 From the first, the *Telos* conference reports gave clear and sometimes scathing accounts of any internal disputes. External disputes were also covered. At the first *Telos* conference, the attendees were warned that the venue was a non-smoking space. The warning guard “had been quickly ejected from the smoke-filled room and threatened with bodily harm if he tried to make the scene again, the pigs had been called to clear the building. They would have done so, were it not for the rhetorical finesse of a couple of the organizers, who succeeded in convincing the keepers of ‘law and order’ that the smoke in the room was actually steam rising from hot coffee cups.” This is the only account I found of entanglements with any outside authorities, here referred to as “pigs” in the language of the 1960s. This might also be one of the few times where any rhetoric from *Telos* mirrors that found within the New Left (Staff, 1970, p. 312).
The advertisement in Issue 8 was similar but tacked on an additional sentence claiming that “In addition to formal presentations of papers, there will be several panels and workshops dealing with *specific concrete problems*” (emphasis supplied).

The conferences never appeared to be scheduled on a regular basis. Sometimes they occurred every year or even multiple times within a year, while at other times, several years would pass between conferences. After Piccone’s death, his wife, Marie, instituted annual *Telos* conferences beginning around 2005, always taking place in New York City. However, symposia and roundtables supplemented and filled in between conferences. Some of these were meetings in person while others involved written responses either to “survey” questions or to other works, such as books written by *Telos* contributors. More details about *Telos* conferences were also contained in Editors’ Newsletters written by Paul Piccone and circulated among *Telos* staff.

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215 Both advertisements appeared on the back covers of the journal; thus, there is no page reference. A report of this conference did not appear in the journal. The reason for the omission could be that the two issues following the conference, Issues 10 and 11, were special issues devoted to Georg Lukács and only contained material related to him. Perhaps the editorial board thought that to include a report on the conference as late as Issue 12 (Summer 1972) would be too long after the conference had occurred, or perhaps, no report was prepared.

216 Reports from these reinstituted conferences have not been published in issues of *Telos*, since they seemingly have not been made.

217 I have not yet been able to obtain a full set of these newsletters and hope to continue and further my analysis at a later time once I have gained access to them and any other staff memoranda.
"Who, exactly, are the neoconservatives? They are, to begin with, a party of intellectuals" (Steinfels, 1979, p. 4).218

In 1972, Robert Bartley, then a journalist in the Wall Street Journal's Washington bureau, called Kristol for an interview. In May, his article, “Irving Kristol and Friends,” appeared in the paper. Kristol writes that at that time The Wall Street Journal was a paper that “few American intellectuals had ever seen, much less read,” a generalization that shed more light on his circle of intellectuals than other intellectuals, including Marxist ones, who did read the paper (Kristol, 1995c, p. 32). However, the article gave them national exposure, and as Kristol recalls,

[a] few years later, Bob was appointed editor of the editorial and op-ed pages, and I became a frequent contributor to those pages. More important, the editorials themselves began to reflect, in some degree, the mode of thinking to be found in The Public Interest—analytical, skeptical, and implicitly ideological in a way we did not ourselves at the time appreciate (Kristol, 1995c, p. 32, emphasis added).

Kristol also wrote that The Public Interest along with Commentary and the Wall Street Journal acted as “something like a national force, and politicians and editorial writers began to pay attention” (1995a, p. 87). He later described the three journals as a “troika,” the Russian term for

a team of three horses pulling a carriage. It is astonishing to think that the combined efforts of these three publications (two with very modest circulations) should have been so consequential—or so it would seem today, to judge by the extraordinary interest displayed throughout the world in neoconservatism (Kristol, 2005, p. 10).

The Public Interest developed a significant, if modest, readership. Early issues made announcements of reprints for sale in order “to meet the constant stream of requests.” The journal also began to devote entire issues to single topics of domestic importance. Special

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218 A few pages later Steinfels amends his statement to emphasize that the neoconservatives are not just a party, but also a “powerful” party of intellectuals (1979, p. 7).
issues were often funded by outside donors such as the special issue on New York (Issue 16, Summer 1969) funded at least in part by the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation, or their series on professional education, which began with Issue 79 (Spring 1985), and was funded by a grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Special issue topics included: the Universities (Issue 13), Focus on New York (Issue 16), Capitalism Today (Issue 21), The Great Society: Lessons for the Future (Issue 34), and the Crisis in Economic Theory (Special Issue, no number, 1980), among others.219

In the early 1970s, after Bartley’s article appeared, Kristol began to write editorials for the Wall Street Journal. In one of those editorials, he urged foundations to stop being reactive to the welfare state and start being proactive in regard to a conservative response. It was in reaction to that editorial, Kristol argued, that foundations began to support the journal.

First was the Smith Richardson Foundation, which consisted, in its entirety, of Randall Richardson, his secretary, and a large pot of money from his family fortune. Randy became a friend and supporter and was soon followed by the Olin Foundation, headed for the last two decades by another friend and ally, James Piereson. Finally, there was the newly created Bradley Foundation under former Olin executive Michael Joyce, who became a tower of strength in the years ahead (Kristol, 2005, pp. 7-8).

Kristol’s advocacy for conservative intellectual thought helped create the next generation of conservative intellectuals, including his son, William Kristol, who went on to found a journal that was clearly conservative from its outset, The Weekly Standard (Dorman, 2001).220

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219 As discussed above, Glazer argued that the journal’s cessation of such issues after 1990 helped push it in a more conservative direction.

220 Vaisse makes the same argument, noting: “If Kristol can...claim the title of ‘godfather of neoconservatism,’ it is because he played a key role in building a neoconservative network, a separate ‘establishment’ that contributed significantly to the growing power of a broader

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In 1988, *The Public Interest* published its first issue from Washington, D.C. After having spent more than twenty years in New York City, the publishing and arguably, intellectual, capital of the country, the journal moved to the State capital. In the 1970s, Kristol had been offered an associate fellowship with the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). At that time, Kristol had only visited Washington, D.C. once and that was while on a short trip home in the U.S. to persuade Walter Lippman to submit an article to *Encounter*. Kristol’s relationship with AEI would continue to grow, and in 1987, he was offered a senior fellowship at the institute. He and his wife decided to retire from their professorships in New York and make the move. The journal went with them. As he explains their decision behind the move:

> We were, and to a large extent remain, New Yorkers, but we found life in New York not only disagreeable in the details of daily living but boring as well. That our children and grandchildren were in D.C. was surely a large consideration, but I do believe we would have made the move anyhow. New York is the national center of the arts, the communications media, and finance, but if you are keenly interested in public policy, as we had gradually become, D.C. is the place to be—especially since public policy these days has its own cultural and intellectual aspects (Kristol, 1995c, p. 37).

However, even prior to the move, as early as the late 1960s, the journal already described itself as a “Washington magazine.” Or as Bell said, “We don’t think of ourselves as a New York magazine. We’re really a Washington and Cambridge magazine” (quoted in Goodman, 1969, p. 72). The move brought them to the cratic’s seat of power. It also helped blur the conservative ‘counterestablishment’ that competed with liberal elites and their traditional institutions in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s” (2010, p. 203).

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221 As Kristol writes: “I was still very much a New Yorker, still as much a free-floating intellectual as a serious ‘policy wonk’ in my thinking” (1995c, p. 33).

222 Goodman continued: “He [Bell] is pleased to think that *The Public Interest* is read at the Assistant Secretary level in Washington—where, of course, Moynihan himself is now employed—and by planners at M.I.T., the Rand Corporation, the Brookings Institute and like precincts. ‘It’s fundamental reading for people who have to develop and carry out important social policy’” (1969, p. 72).
line between critics and critics, a hallmark of a journal which had some contributors who also held political and other governmental office.223

In 1995, Irving Kristol published a book titled *Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea*. It was mainly a collection of previously published articles and essays appearing in such periodicals as *Commentary, The American Spectator, the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, Encounter, The Atlantic Monthly, The American Scholar, The National Interest*, and of course, *The Public Interest*, although only two essays originated from it. The book began with a newly written “Autobiographical Memoir” of some forty pages in length. With hindsight, Kristol traced his intellectual career as the “godfather of neoconservatism.” Describing the founding of *The Public Interest*, he argued that he was becoming increasingly skeptical of the Great Society and the liberal ideas behind it.224 He began to write op-ed pieces for *The New Leader* expressing his skepticism, but he felt the urge to do something more, namely begin his own magazine. The next thought is striking. He writes that he and Bell thought the only existing conservative journal, the *National Review*, “was not to our tastes—at that time insufficiently analytical and ‘intellectual,’ too

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223 For example, Daniel Patrick Moynihan was a senator and served in four presidential administrations. As Steinfelds writes: “Moynihan’s case illustrates the fact that the neoconservatives’ power does not rest simply on their access to the reading – or even the TV-watching – public. They have direct access to officeholders and the political elite generally” (1979, pp. 8-9).

224 Kristol recalls his own “rightward turn” with the following: “In the sixties crime became a problem. Drugs became a problem. I found myself, *without even moving all that much*, more of a conservative and less of a liberal. I began to see that not just the left-liberal answers, but the official liberal answers were inadequate and have been inadequate ever since. One had the sense that the liberal impulse was out of control. After all, look at 1972. The Democratic party moved left. It was no longer the party of Hubert Humphrey. It was the party of George McGovern. And the Republican party moved center after Barry Goldwater. It was no longer the Goldwater party. Nixon was no Goldwater. I found myself getting more and more disillusioned with what was then regarded as the official liberal position. Even on the basis of what works, one was forced to become more conservative. In the mid-seventies I decided, to hell with it, and I reregistered as a Republican. After all, Pat Moynihan was in Nixon’s cabinet, Henry Kissinger was in Nixon’s cabinet. A lot of the cabinet or subcabinet people I met were perfectly reasonable, intelligent people” (Dorman, 2001, p. 167, emphasis added).
stridently hostile to the course of American politics ever since 1932” (1995c, p. 29). As stated earlier, Kristol and Bell began the journal in part because they could find no other outlet for the type of material they wished to publish. Here, however, in retrospect, the type of outlet Kristol finds lacking is a conservative one.

Although Kristol described a “neoconservative” as a “liberal mugged by reality,” Nathan Glazer in 2005 reviewed the journal for its final issue in an essay he titled “Neoconservative From the Start.” Glazer explained that the journal’s neoconservative tendencies appeared early, raising the question of whether the journal and its associates underwent a transformation (a “mugging”) or whether liberalism and neoconservatism are simply the two sides of the same coin. Further, as Nisbet argued in 1985,

Kristol had never been a liberal, really; from youthful Trotskyism he went almost directly to an eclectic philosophy that had more of the conservative’s skepticism about modernity than the liberal’s acceptance of it. In several essays written before he founded Encounter, most notably one on the origins of McCarthyism in America, he stirred up liberal sensibilities as they had not often been stirred up before. In the early 1970s the Left duly appointed Kristol Godfather of the neoconservatives (Nisbet, 1985, p. 136).

To further support the first charge that the journal moved in the same direction since its beginning, one can point to events like Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s address to the Americans for Democratic Action in 1967, in which he called for a “politics of stability” (Nash, 1976, p. 303). True, the journal was already a little over two years old by this

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225 Glazer wrote: “What astonishes me in glancing over those early issues was how soon the simple notion that science and research could guide us in domestic social policy became complicated, how rapidly this theme was reduced to a much smaller place than originally expected, how early the themes that were shortly to be dubbed ‘neoconservative’ emerged. Managing social problems was harder than we thought; people and society were more complicated than we thought” (2005, p. 13).

226 Three elements of the speech included the following: “1. Liberals must see more clearly that their essential interest is in the stability of the social order; and given the present threats to that stability, they must seek out and make much more effective alliances with political conservatives who share their interest and recognize that unyielding rigidity is just as great a threat to continuity of the social order as an anarchic desire for change... 2. Liberals must divest themselves of the
point. But it is difficult to imagine that any institution can establish a firm identity in the span of two years and then undergo a transformation, or come out of the closet. More likely, the journal already contained the elements necessary to its “neoconservative” emergence at the outset. There may have been some hesitation to reveal those true colors, but if there was, it did not last long. By the early 1970s, there could be little disputing the journal’s political stripes, despite the various degrees to which its members wore them.

Additionally, critics from early on identified the journal’s conservative or neoconservative leanings. In 1970, an article critical of the journal appeared in Social Policy. The authors identified The Public Interest’s “ideology of non-ideology” as conservative. Three years later, in the pages of Dissent, Michael Harrington used the label “neoconservative” for the journal and its associates in an article titled “The Welfare State and Its Neoconservative Critics.” Harrington accused the “neoconservatives” of

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227 Väissé argues that the emphasis on the limits of social reform was implicit in the journal from the start. “One can of course ask whether this shift in the focus of The Public Interest was not implicit in the journal’s initial plan. To stick scrupulously to the facts, to substitute realism and rigor for the noble sentiments of Great Society liberals, to banish ideology, not to say politics or even simply ambitious goals for the future—did not these aims ultimately imply setting extreme limits to any attempt to change society?” (p. 54). That recognition of limits became an insistence on limits and hence a “neo-conservatism” may have taken some time to develop.

228 In 1971, Glazer published the essay “The Limits of Social Policy” in Commentary. In the article he argued that “the breakdown of traditional modes of behavior is the chief cause of our social problems” and that “some important part of the solution to our social problems lies in—traditional restraints” (quoted in Nash, 1976, p. 303). That same year, Kristol published “Pornography, Obscenity, and the Case for Censorship” in the New York Times Magazine. There, Nash argues Kristol acknowledged the influence of the conservative Straussian scholar Walter Berns.

229 Some argue that Harrington coined the word, but he stated: “I am not sure that I did in fact ‘coin’ the word. It was in common use among Dissent editors and other associates of mine, and I do not have the least idea who was the first to use it. It was occasioned, not by some tempest in a sectarian...
possessing an “abstract and unhistorical view of the welfare state” which creates a response of “timidity and acquiescence” (quoted in Vaïsse, 2010, p. 73).

Harrington’s use of the word “neoconservative” was not its first appearance in print. As Justin Vaïsse uncovered, Robert Bartley used the term “neo-conservative” in his 1972 article on the journal, “Irving Kristol and Friends.”

A year and a half before the oft-quoted Harrington article cited above, the columnist Robert Bartley, who would soon become editor of the Journal’s op-ed page, a place where neoconservatives would frequently express themselves, pointed to a ‘distinct group of thinkers that is distinctly identifiable but lacking a good label’ in the course of a review of Kristol’s On the Democratic Idea in America. Casting about for a label, he considered several possibilities: ‘the Public Interest crowd’ (too narrow), ‘the radical centrists’ (too confusing), and ‘the neo-Whigs’ (too imprecise). Despite the fact that certain members of the group discarded any label that incorporated the word ‘conservative,’ Bartley, who rejected Herman Kahn’s suggestion ‘conservationists,’ opted for ‘neo-conservatives’ as the most appropriate choice, in particular because it emphasized the difference from the conservative movement (Vaïsse, 2010, pp. 74-75).

Bartley expressed hope for this new type of conservative, believing they could create a new intellectual movement for the Republican Party. The label then was not used first as a chastisement (pace Harrington) but as a portent, a future vision. After 1975, Kristol embraced the new description, perhaps recognizing its force, while other members of The Public Interest continued to reject the label.230

Even Bartley though was not the first to detect a new conservatism. Members of such a tribe were already being identified in the 1950s. However, this was a different type of new conservatism and Samuel Huntington, for one, found it lacking. Huntington, who would come to be known as a neoconservative, published an article in The American Political Science Review in 1957 titled “Conservatism as an Ideology.” There, he set forth

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230 Glazer, Bell and Moynihan were all none too fond of the label.
three different conceptions of conservative ideology. More importantly, he perhaps laid the groundwork for the future neoconservative movement.

He did so by defining conservatism as an “institutional ideology,” meaning that as opposed to non-conservative ideologies, which are ideational, conservative ideologies are institutional or immanent. They do not seek to protect a set of ideas but a set of institutions; hence, the desire to preserve the status quo.

No political philosopher has ever described a conservative utopia. In any society, there may be institutions to be conserved, but there are never conservative institutions (Huntington, 1957, p. 458).

Conservatism as an institutional ideology derives from his third conception of conservatism, the “situational definition.”231 This definition views conservatism as the ideology arising out of a distinct but recurring type of historical situation in which a fundamental challenge is directed at established institutions and in which the supporters of those institutions employ the conservative ideology in their defense. Thus, conservatism is that system of ideas employed to justify any established social order, no matter where or when it exists, against any fundamental challenge to its nature or being, no matter from what quarter (Huntington, 1957, p. 455).232

Radicalism is the opposite of conservatism, Huntington argues, because it opposes the same institutions that conservatism protects. However, it is also like conservatism, because they are both institutional ideologies. “Conservatism and radicalism derive from

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231 The first two conceptions are the aristocratic theory, which defines conservatism as the ideology of said class’s response to the revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the autonomous definition, which posits a set of conservative ideas independent of any historic period or particular class. He discards both these definitions in favor of the situational definition (Huntington, 1957).

232 Huntington also describes conservatism as a positional ideology, meaning that it does not belong to a particular social group but depends upon relations between groups, i.e., the aristocratic class responding to the revolutionary demands of the middle classes. “Positional ideologies reflect the changing external environment of a group rather than its permanent internal characteristics” (1957, p. 468). There is some affinity here to Bourdieu’s field theory and position-taking within said field.
orientations toward the process of change rather than toward the purpose and direction of change” (Huntington, 1957, p. 458).

More importantly, Huntington argues that conservatism and liberalism in America are not oppositional. Since conservatism in the United States has no ideational foundation, because there was no feudalism, it cannot be opposed to an ideology that is based on a particular set of beliefs, such as liberalism. “No necessary dichotomy exists, therefore, between conservatism and liberalism” (Huntington, 1957, p. 460). To apply Huntington’s theory to the group surrounding The Public Interest, a liberal then, who has experienced liberalism as the consensus of his age, might become a conservative should that consensus (and the institutions in which it is embodied) be threatened. As Huntington emphasizes,

Conservatism is not just the absence of change. It is the articulate, systematic, theoretical resistance to change (1957, p. 461).

In the article, he also discusses an emerging type, the “new conservatives.” He names Russell Kirk as an example of this new type. Kirk’s 1953 book, The Conservative Mind, traced the development of Anglo-American conservative thought. Coupled with the 1955 founding of William F. Buckley, Jr.’s National Review, to which he contributed, the book acted as a focal point for a mounting conservative challenge to the liberal consensus of the 1950s. Hunting on articulated three deficiencies within this new conservative movement:

1. Many new conservatives appear uncertain as to what they wish to defend.
2. Many new conservatives are astonishingly vague as to the nature and source of the threat to what they wish to conserve.
3. The effort to uncover a conservative intellectual tradition in America (1957, p. 471).

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Nisbet notes that while liberalism remained the national philosophy through the 1950s, a growing conservative culture and network began to appear at the end of that decade. Most important to that network was National Review (1985).
As critics, they lack a clear vision of their future as critics. Huntington largely took issue with their misplaced efforts to defend ideas rather than institutions. Those institutions that should be defended, he argued, are liberal, popular, and democratic. Hence,

[j]ust as aristocrats were the conservatives in Prussia in 1820 and slaveowners were the conservatives in the South in 1850, so the liberals must be the conservatives in America today. Historically, American liberals have been idealists, pressing forward toward the goals of greater freedom, social equality, and more meaningful democracy. The articulate exposition of a liberal ideology was necessary to convert others to liberal ideas and to reform existing institutions continuously along liberal lines. Today, however, the greatest need is not so much the creation of more liberal institutions as the successful defense of those which already exist. This defense requires American liberals to lay aside their liberal ideology and to accept the values of conservatism for the duration of the threat. Only by surrendering their liberal ideas for the present can liberals successfully defend their liberal institutions for the future (Huntington, 1957, pp. 472-473).

Huntington thereby set out the program for the “neoconservative” movement that began to emerge in the 1960s. The former liberals, now neoconservatives, no longer needed to transmit liberal ideas but rather needed to conserve those already transmitted.

Was there such a thing as a neoconservative movement developing in the 1960s?

And was The Public Interest at its center?

As the New Left and the counterculture began to reshape liberalism—as can be seen by a perusal of The New York Review of Books and even The New Yorker—and, eventually, to reshape the Democratic party, disenchanted liberals began to find themselves harboring all kinds of conservative instincts and ideas. Something like a ‘movement’ took shape, with The Public Interest at (or near) the center. It never really was a movement, however, since no organizational efforts were made or even thought of. It would more fairly be described as a current of thought, represented by not more than a few dozen people who were rather more articulate and familiar with ideological controversy than most conservatives at the time. The political implications of this current of thought were gradually to reveal themselves under the pressure of events (Kristol, 1995c, pp. 31-32).

How effective was this movement? Did a magazine really create a political change? Kristol himself was convinced that The Public Interest could make a difference and have an impact, no matter how low the circulation. He stated:
We had a circulation of a few hundred to begin with. That didn’t bother us. With a circulation of a few hundred, you could change the world (quoted in, Dorman, 2001, p. 158).

The circulation of the journal increased beyond a few hundred; however, it remained meager, perhaps topping out around 6,000. Still, copies made it into the right hands.\textsuperscript{234} Kristol argued that the journal acted as a focal point for what he described as a “neoconservative impulse” (1995a, p. 81).\textsuperscript{235} Yet, he continued, its impact was amplified because it was taken up and read by the young staff in the editorial and op-ed departments of the \textit{Wall Street Journal}. As Vaisse argues:

The fundamental work done by neoconservatives in the period 1960-1990 undoubtedly helped to lay the intellectual foundation of the conservative revolution, which came to dominate the Republican party. ‘Without \textit{The Public Interest}, no Newt Gingrich,’ as columnist George Will summed things up. In other words, if the neoconservatives had not done their part by mounting an intellectual and ideological critique of liberalism—an informed, sophisticated critique from within the ranks of liberalism itself—Republicans would not have been able to implement the conservative reforms they pursued under Reagan, Newt Gingrich (who served as Speaker of the House from 1994 to 1998), and George W. Bush (2010, p. 205).\textsuperscript{236}

Journals as a Political Retreat?

Considered as a type of monastic practice, a place of retreat, where theorizing may more closely resemble literary production than political intervention, the small print political

\textsuperscript{234} As Peter Steinfels wrote: “When Nixon, upon taking office, recommended to his cabinet a \textit{Public Interest} article in which Peter Drucker asserted that modern government had proved itself incapable of doing anything effectively except waging war and inflating the currency, it obviously was not the case that Nixon happened to be perusing \textit{The Public Interest} one day and came across this interesting tidbit” (1979, p. 9). Rather, as Steinfels explained, it was the direct contacts between associates of the journal and government officials and the political elite that gave the journal its influence.

\textsuperscript{235} The journal’s neoconservatism was described as an impulse, a tendency, and a mode of inquiry, rather than an ideology. It raises the question whether there is a difference between the way of seeing the world and the vision itself?

\textsuperscript{236} Under President G. W. Bush, the Office of Strategic Initiatives and its director, Peter Wehner, sent mass e-mails to opinion leaders and scholars directing their attention to important new essays or articles (Troy, 2010). The office was responsible for keeping the administration informed of policy debates in the world of serious opinion writing. Arguably, his administration recognized the importance of policy journals like the \textit{Public Interest}. 236
journal might keep the flame of critical thought alive but is less likely to light anything on fire, as any spark produced may be quickly snuffed out by more dominant mediums. But even this may be valuable. Bourdieu sees intellectuals as having two competing claims upon them, one, the autonomous protection of their cultural position and works, and two, political engagement in the social totality (Bourdieu, 1989). He believes, as stated in “The Corporatism of the Universal: The Role of Intellectuals in the Modern World,” that protecting their autonomy from political and economic power is necessary to intellectuals’ political engagement, and serves in a way to recharge their batteries. If intellectuals sit along a spectrum from disengagement to engagement, then their position may depend upon historical circumstances.

A retreat then into the cultural to preserve their autonomy would not preclude the intellectual from later reengaging with the political. Whether they actually do reengage is another question. Gramsci (1971; Morrow, 1991) also saw intellectuals as intermediaries between culture and politics, although perhaps this mediation was more synchronous than the diachronic mediation that Bourdieu’s theorization implies. Further, if a retreat into a small hermetic print journal is necessary to preserve the intellectual’s autonomy, then such a movement must indicate that other avenues for communication are not an option, that they have been too overtaken by economic and political power.

The Public Interest may not have had the voice that other mediums possessed, but it was still able to wield influence over the state and its policies, in part due to its advantage of proximity to the critics. It is difficult then to consider the journal as a place of retreat for its critics. It is easier to think of it as a place to mount an attack. For Telos, a recurring criticism from within the ranks would be that the journal retreated too often into
theoretical obscurity. Still, it acquired a substantial international readership and may have
had some influence on the Eastern European dissidence movements, but it is difficult to
offer any proof. Jerry Brown, at one point, was also a reader, and he attended a *Telos*
conference prior to Piccone’s death. Now California’s governor again, one wonders if he
continues to read the journal.
Chapter 3.3  The State of the Re-view: Critics vs. Critics

“It follows that the relations which each intellectual can maintain with each other member of intellectual society or with the public and, a fortiori, with all social reality outside the intellectual field...are mediated by the structure of the intellectual field, or more precisely, by his position in relation to the properly cultural authorities whose powers organize the intellectual field: cultural acts or judgments always contain a reference to orthodoxy” (Bourdieu, 1969, p. 109).

Just as with the “great reviews,” the intellectual field of Telos and The Public Interest in the 1960s and 70s is comprised of visions and di-visions. The position-takings of each journal are the result of both the view which they take of the state as well as their relation to other members of the field. To put it more simply perhaps, the journals articulate their views through their principles and theory as well as through distancing themselves from other journals. Telos holds the views it holds because they are derived from certain traditions of thought but also because they are different from the views held by Dissent, for example.

The intellectual field offers a variety of ways of seeing the state and its policies. There are affinities among the views that cause certain actors to cluster around one another, while differences separate them. Interestingly, conflicts can also arise within those journals of similar position-takings. One such dispute, discussed more fully below, can arise because these journals may also see themselves in competition with one another over the capital available in the field. As Bourdieu writes,

Indeed we each have a suspicion that a number of disputes which are apparently situated in the pure realm of principle and theory derive the least mentionable aspects of their ‘raison d’etre’ and sometimes their entire existence from the latent or patent tensions in the intellectual field. How else are we to explain why so many ideological quarrels of the past are incomprehensible to us today? The only real participation possible in past disputes is perhaps the kind that is authorized by similarity of position between intellectual fields of different periods....The ultimate cause of the conflicts, real or invented, which divide the intellectual field along its lines of force and which constitute beyond any doubt the most decisive factor of cultural change, must be sought at least as much in the objective factors determining the position of those who engage in them as in the reasons they give, to others and to themselves, for engaging in them (1969, p. 112).
This chapter examines some of the di-visions found within the intellectual field of these journals and how they position themselves vis-à-vis one another. Di-visions are not only external but can also arise internally within a journal. Reflexivity or internal critique may also alter a journal’s view. This chapter concentrates more fully on *Telos* than *The Public Interest*, since the former offers more material for analysis in this regard. An interesting question that arises in the contest over theoretical capital between critics, who share more than they differ, is whether it diminishes the force of their view. Further, it begs the question of whether more heat is generated among critics than against cratics.

**Telos’s Project of Re-examination, or Re-view**

In its third issue, the *Telos* staff wrote a short essay titled “Graduate Student Journals: Predicaments, Prospects and Pitfalls.” The staff noted that within the last few years at least three new graduate student philosophy journals had begun publication, including *Telos, Dianoia,* and *Kinesis.* The staff attributed the number of new journals to an oversupply of educated students necessary to fulfill the personnel requirements of the New Industrial State.

This contradiction of contemporary American society of requiring trained personnel while at the same time having to give them a sort of education has resulted first in the student movement and, on a smaller scale, in pockets of young people who proceed to systematically re-examine the nonsense that is passed as orthodoxy in

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237 Gramsci finds such internal di-visions, and attention to multiple issues, as well as perspectives, beneficial to a review. He writes: “A journal, like a newspaper, a book, or any other didactic mode of expression directed at a certain public, having as its aim a definite average reader, listener, etc., cannot make everyone happy to the same degree, cannot be equally useful to everyone, etc. The important thing is that it be a stimulus for everyone since no publication can substitute a thinking brain or define intellectual and scientific interests *ex novo* where there is only interest for gossip where it is thought that one lives just to have a good time. Therefore, one should not be troubled by the multiplicity of critiques: rather, the multiplicity of critiques is proof that one is on the right road; when instead there is a single critical theme, there is cause for reflection: 1) for it can be a matter of real journalistic deficiency; or 2) its publication may have been based on a mistaken view of the ‘average’ reader it addresses, and thus one works to no avail, ‘for eternity’” (1977, p. 150).
their respective disciplines. The new graduate student journals of philosophy are avant-garde expressions of these radical tendencies since, in Husserl’s words, philosophers are the functionaries of mankind, and modern philosophers have failed in their calling by systematically occluding the state of crisis and diverting their inquiries into areas that are not only socially and politically irrelevant, but which reinforces the status quo through their very existence, while simultaneously confusing those areas of inquiry where philosophical ‘analysis’ is largely unwarranted (Staff, 1969a, pp. 132-133).

Telos criticized modern philosophers for obscuring the “view” and also for not turning their gaze onto the proper objects of inquiry, i.e., onto anything that was socially or politically relevant. Ironically, as a result of the state’s mass education of young Americans in the 1960s, more people were being equipped with the tools necessary to examine critically the state’s view.

In the Telos article on graduate student journals, the staff warned of the pitfalls of publishing such a journal—the largest pitfall being the lure of professionalism.

The task of these journals, however, is not as easy as it might seem. The system is always ready to co-opt any possible opposition and accordingly presents attractive incentives to young scholars to use these journals as a means through which to publish mediocre but orthodox material and thus obtain credit towards future employment. The bankruptcy of pluralism in American philosophy has reached such a degree that nowadays many departments of philosophy bestow raises in salaries and position advancements not in terms of the quality of the contribution, but in terms of the quantity of publications on the individual’s curriculum vitae. In this fashion philosophy too becomes quantifiable!!! The new graduate student philosophy journals thus run the risk of degenerating into mere junior members of the philosophical community, reproducing at an inferior level the same kind of nonsense that goes on in the officiale establishment philosophy. As such, graduate student philosophy journals of the latter type are not only unnecessary, but downright harmful in so far as they reinforce precisely the bankrupt trivial philosophy presently in fashion (Staff, 1969a, p. 133).

238 The critique of professionalism and disciplinary discipline would recur in Telos's pages and among its contributors. In Issue 31 (Spring 1977), Jon Wiener’s “The Footnote Fetish” appeared. The article originally was originally published in Dissent in 1974 and then reprinted in Telos. Its author pointed out the insidiousness of the seemingly innocuous Social Sciences Citation Index, stating that its purported purpose of identifying scholars “who have had a major impact on their fields,” belies its true effects of disciplining the field, using the example of Marx to demonstrate that due to his lack of citations during a period, he must have had no impact on the social sciences. Further, Wiener highlights that certain journals have not been included in the Index, journals such as Telos, Dissent, Monthly Review, and Radical America. Wiener writes, “If a footnote to your work
Telos believed it could avoid this mediocrity by turning to international contributors and readers.

It is extremely difficult to start anew in the intellectual desert of American philosophy whose only possible oasis turn out to be symbolic logic cacti. European philosophy is likewise bankrupt, but in a different respect. Consequently, we find it extremely useful as a frame of reference from which to construct a kind of critical theory in philosophy (p. 133).

Turning its attention to the other new student journals, Dianoia and Kinesis, the Telos staff found them to be without a clear purpose or plan. Moreover, they found their articles “at best, mediocre” (p. 133). They further charged the journals with being uncommitted to critical philosophy. Their editorial staffs were willing to accept anything for publication provided it met “establishment standards of ‘competence’” (p. 135).

Granted, standards must be maintained; but which standards? The fact of the matter is, there is no function served by a graduate journal of this type except to reproduce second-rate articles. This seems hardly a worthwhile aim (p. 136).

Further, the Telos staff highlighted that Kinesis was blatant about its professionalism, or “junior professionalism” as the staff called it. They noted that the journal’s policy statement included the purpose of “providing department chairmen with the leads on prospective teachers” (p. 136). The staff then questioned what doing philosophy had to do with teaching philosophy anyway. Telos made clear what it felt its purpose as a graduate student journal was.

Dianoia, Kinesis, and Telos are expressions of a philosophical crisis which, however, is not recognized by the first two journals. We think it necessary to undertake a dialogue on this issue and thus establish our identity and function. If it is true that

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appears in Commentary or the Public Interest, you get counted; if it appears in New Politics, or Social Policy, or Dissent, you don’t. Could it be that there is some logic behind these choices of the editor? Those who want their work to be indexed ought to ponder this question with particular care” (1977, p. 177).

Or whose standards? As Bourdieu emphasizes, the control of the intellectual field is a struggle for legitimacy that defines the field itself.
‘the unexamined life is not worth living,’ uncritical journals may not be worth publishing (p. 137).

Again, the new journal emphasized the need for critique and review. Moreover, such review should be directed not only outward but also inward. Telos would make a regular practice of reflexivity.

Telos continued its harangue against “professional” (non-student) philosophy journals in the next issue as part of a report on the 1969 American Philosophy Association Convention. This report was also attributed to “Telos staff,” which criticized the editors of these journals first for pretending to neutrality, citing quality as the only necessary criteria for publication:

But this entails a fundamental contradiction since the very determination of what constitutes ‘quality’ presupposes criteria – which rules out the originally avowed neutrality. Thus, it is no secret that each journal has a line, even though they all deny the existence of any party affiliation. The result is that they confuse naïve, would-be authors who, believing that pluralistic neutrality is actually the rule, submit anything for publication – since philosophical advancements these days are directly related to quantity of material published (independently of quality). It is no wonder that, as the editor of Review of Metaphysics distressedly remarked, he is flooded with junk! Were he explicit about what his journal was about, such a state of affairs would not obtain! (Staff, 1969b, p. 207).

Telos emphasized that there was no such thing as a neutral view; all are partisan. The Public Interest willfully believed that a “non-ideological” view could be instituted through reason, although they also never claimed that such a view would be neutral.

Telos then made two further criticisms of the “professional” philosophy journals. They practiced an intellectual irresponsibility by equating relevancy with supply (id est, if papers are submitted on a topic then it must be a relevant topic):

the editors of Philosophical Review have the naïveté (???) to remark that it may be the case that some type of philosophy is not being published. In fact, two years ago they decided to publish Islamic philosophy and suddenly they were flooded with more excellent papers on the subject than they could possibly handle! What is overlooked is that, were Philosophical Review suddenly to decide to publish on the
philosophy of Mickey Mouse (which is probably what they have been doing for the past twenty years anyway), they would immediately discover all sorts of specialists in the field (pp. 207-208).

And also, they prioritized process over substance:

This kind of intellectual irresponsibility was the *leit motiv* of the meeting which, unable to come to any conclusions about even the existence of such a philosophical board of directors, rapidly degenerated to a technical discussion about finances. Thus, journal P was found to be in the red, journal Q broke even, while Journal R was in the black. What was R’s secret? After a short discussion it was discovered that the success formula consisted of (1) publishing overseas and (2) exploiting student labor. Questions concerning the *quality* of American philosophy – which would have necessarily entailed a philosophical discussion – was, of course, avoided, thus removing the *raison d’être* of the whole meeting. It is no wonder that, at the end of such a meeting, no one was sure about what they were doing there!!! (p. 208).

The tirade ended with the *Telos* staff wondering why the United States had spent so much money to send a man to the moon, since obviously the APA was already there.

I reproduce these critiques not only to position *Telos* within its intellectual field but also to reveal its general tone and style. The tone is caustic, and the style no holds barred. It is easy to determine that this student journal did not share *Kinesis*’s purpose of serving as a teacher showcase for future employers. By Issue five, the journal’s subtitle no longer associated them with the Graduate Philosophy Association of SUNY-Buffalo. In the introduction to the issue, the journal stated that the essays in the “Notes” section would deal “with a series of more polemical and immediate issues” and “criticize certain fashionable trends that presently *infest* the academic scene” (Issue 5, pg. n/a, emphasis added). Issue six included the report of the first *Telos* conference on “The New Marxism” and cemented the journal’s tone and style.

**Polemics**

The heat generated within the *Telos* circle occasionally made its way into the journal’s pages. In Issue 31, the introduction announced that it was changing course from its usual
“never wash dirty laundry in public” policy and beginning a new section titled “Internal Polemics.” Piccone, the author of the issue’s introduction, explained the change by saying that printing the polemics would give the reader a glimpse of the people and issues behind the scene. The correspondence published here deals with many problems that are currently under discussion. Among other things, these letters should help to dispel the Prussian academic image that Telos has unfortunately built up over the years (1977a, p. 4).

Due to the outside response to the “Internal Polemics” section, the journal created a “Communications” section with Issue 33. The editorial staff wrote that “[i]f nothing else, these letters indicate what some readers think of the journal’s general direction” (T. Luke & Piccone, 1977, p. 4).

Issue 33 (Fall 1977) also included the creation of the “External Polemics” section which in that issue (perhaps the only issue to have such a section) consisted only of Piccone’s rant to the journal, The Insurgent Sociologist, titled “On Infantile Diseases and Senile Diagnoses: The Case of Horton and Filsoufi” (1977b). The piece included a discussion of Piccone’s reaction to the lead article in the journal’s Winter 1977 issue along with copies of the letters he wrote to the editor and the offending article’s authors. Piccone stated that he published the piece in Telos in order “not only to set the historical record straight, but as an indication of the growing “falling rate of intelligence” among American ‘Marxist-Leninists’” (1977b, p. 145). Below is an excerpt from Piccone’s letter to the editor:

During the last few years you have managed to publish some pretty rotten stuff, but the lead article in the last issue really takes the cake.... I have not bothered to deal with the more ridiculous aspects of Horton’s and Filsoufi’s paper (such as the half-assed recycling of structuralist Marxism or the completely idiotic critique of Lukács and Korsch) (1977b, p. 145).

And the letter to the offending authors included:

240 This would become a common theme in the journal—that the crisis of criticism was at least in part a result of the “falling rate of intelligence” among critics.
Let me say right off that I have read incompetent articles in my time, but yours was by far one of the worst that I have ever seen.... Before making a fool of yourself again, I suggest that you do at least some minimal research before writing anything further along these lines. It is an insult to the intelligence of every American Marxist and or sociologist to publish such utter nonsense (p. 146).

Piccone’s tirade toward *The Insurgent Sociologist*, a journal which had been advertised within *Telos* and had also been the subject of its “Short Journal Reviews,” reveals Piccone’s contemptuous and wounding style but also his almost righteous anger at anyone, especially a journal, behaving intellectually irresponsible.

The “Communications” section of Issue 33 included a few exchanges between authors, reviewers and interested third parties regarding earlier book reviews. It then contained a series of letters to the journal/editor in reaction to the “Internal Polemics” section found in Issue 31. Interestingly, the end of Issue 33 also included an apology for perhaps having gone overboard in an earlier attack. In the Introduction to Issue 32 (Summer 1977), Andrew Arato and Piccone wrote:

> While on the subject of Frankfurt School historians, it is only fitting to point out that the following article by Martin Jay was originally rejected by every single *Telos* editor who had read it. The occasion now for our publishing it is Jay’s otherwise inexplicable (given their diametrically opposed politics) defense of [Perry] Anderson’s *Considerations on Western Marxism* (1977b, p. 4).

Both Arato and Piccone responded in Issue 33 by writing that

> The ‘Introduction’ to *Telos* 32 contained an unnecessary and unwarranted manhandling of Jay’s article on the totality and his reply to the original review of Perry Anderson’s work. If *Telos* is to be a generally non-sectarian journal allowing a variety of divergent views in its pages, then it does not help to specify in the introduction that ‘every single Telos editor’ rejected the article. After all, it should be well known by now, after the polemics with Jacoby and Schmidt [in Issues 21-23], that Jay is not an orthodox Teloser. Yet his range of interests definitely falls within the scope of Telos and his views should be treated respectfully as those of a concerned colleague—even if a dissenting one. Consequently, we deplore the

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241 The next issue (34) also drew attention to the fact that the journal included contributions from non-orthodox “Telosers” when the contributor’s note for Stephen Bronner read, “definitely out of the *Telos* mainstream, whose review is published here out of pluralistic considerations, [he] is a graduate student and budding novelist at Princeton University.”
general tone of the introduction and hope that nothing of the sort will happen in the future (1977a, p. 169).

Obviously, Jay accepted the apology (if one was even necessary) and reappeared in the journal in Issues 45, 54, 62, 71 and 93 (Fall 1992), his last contribution being a memoriam to Leo Lowenthal.

Telos returned to the “public laundromat” with Issue 53 (Piccone, 1982, p. 201). The issue’s introduction again pointed out the pluralistic nature of the journal’s circle and that inevitably as a result differences would arise. While those were “normally dealt with in a democratic and generally friendly way,” they on occasion needed “to articulate them in print” (Cavalcanti & Piccone, 1982, p. 4). This is an interesting contrast, suggesting that when the internal polemics appear in the journal, the controversies within the Telos circle are no longer being dealt with democratically or pleasantly. The introduction added that another reason for putting their internal differences in print showed that “among ourselves, we are even more severe than with opponents” (p. 4). That addition seems unnecessary in light of some of the earlier conference reports to appear in the journal that on at least one occasion described the conferences as “Wrestlemania.”

Whatever editorial disputes may have taken place behind the scenes at The Public Interest; it never aired its dirty laundry in public.242 One of the few times any real polemics occurred in the journal is when the editors decided to reproduce a letter from the managing editor of The New York Times responding to Kristol’s article about the Times in the previous issue. The letter began:

I have rarely seen a commentary on the American press that was more wrongheaded and ill-informed than Irving Kristol’s article about The New York

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242 Ehrman remarks that The Public Interest’s history had little of the drama of Commentary’s (1999).
"Times in the Winter 1967 issue of The Public Interest. One is astounded that a man so prone to error would have the temerity to lecture the press on its shortcomings (Daniel & Kristol, 1967, p. 119).

The letter went on to give a laundry list of inaccuracies in Kristol’s article, including the fact that the staff of the Times are not uneducated but rather are subsidized in their educations by the paper. The editor even mentioned that his secretary was getting a degree in European history. Kristol’s response to the letter began:

I should like to congratulate Mr. Daniel on his good fortune in having a secretary who spends her evenings taking courses in European history. But I do hope this estimable young lady understands that she need not keep plugging away, year after studious year, on my account. She should feel absolutely free to drop out whenever she pleases, and I promise not to hold it against The Times (Daniel & Kristol, 1967, p. 121).

Kristol continued by arguing that while the Times’s response to his factual inaccuracies was all well and good, which he rebutted anyway, what the paper had failed to respond to was the substance of his argument, mainly that American journalism is fundamentally weak.243 This exchange was the height of heat in the journal’s early years and arguably, over the course of its life span. Even when the essays unleashed their criticism on whichever policy issue, they tended to retain an urbanity that belies the journal’s Alcove No. 1 ancestry. As Irving Kristol wrote, “[t]he tone of The Public Interest, from the outset, was skeptical, pragmatic, meliorist” (Kristol, 1995a, p. 85). Telos, on the other hand, while publishing the dense and somewhat obscure works of European social theorists, contained much heat and even a few laughs.

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243 Another interesting exchange occurred between Robert Solow and John Kenneth Galbraith in Issue 9 (Fall 1967). Solow reviewed Galbraith’s book The New Industrial State in an essay titled “Son of Affluence.” Galbraith responded in the same issue with “Review of a Review,” to which Solow issues a rejoinder. Despite being an exchange between two (eminent) economists, it is an interesting read.
Both journals, however, experienced editorial splits. Daniel Bell left his editorship at *The Public Interest* after Nixon’s election, as mentioned above. Although Bell continued to publish in the journal for a few more years, his reflective piece on the journal’s twentieth anniversary was clearly critical of the journal’s neoconservative, and what Bell described as “ideological,” turn. *Telos*’s editorial team was numerous and varied over the journal’s life span. However, it also experienced a fairly large split.

At the time of the journal’s founding, Critical Theory was beginning to undergo a linguistic turn. Many of the first generation of Critical Theorists passed away in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Herbert Marcuse, one of the last, died in 1979. The second generation of Critical Theorists, most notably Jürgen Habermas, pursued a linguistic turn that focused on communication theory. Habermas published *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, followed by *Theory and Practice, Legitimation Crisis*, and *A Theory of Communicative Action*. Piccone described the second generation of critical theory as having sacrificed whatever was critical in the first.

In a *Telos* conference on the state of higher education, which took place in 1996, David Pan provided a representative critique of what would become *Telos*’s position on communication theory and the notion of the “public sphere.” In short, he argued that the liberal public sphere is not neutral. Deliberative discourse similarly should not be thought of as neutral or a process that produces an outcome in which particular interests are mediated into a general interest shared by all. Instead, Pan asserted that

[t]o the extent that it [the public sphere] professes openness to all perspectives, it in fact attempts to reduce all perspectives and cultures to the formal and conceptual level of public discourse. Of course, the public sphere is necessary in order for particular cultures to interact with each other. But once this sphere develops its own infrastructure and is penetrated by the federal government, the danger arises that a national culture will develop – one based in the ’public sphere’ but attempting
to extend its influence into the private sphere. At this point, the public sphere no longer mediates between particular cultures but seeks to advocate the Enlightenment ideology of which it is an integral part and from which it derives its legitimation as a ‘neutral’ space. It presents itself as ‘universal,’ but is in fact a particular culture serving the interests of the federal government (1998, p. 7).

In essence, Pan argued that theories predicated upon deliberative democracy or civil society, largely the direction that the second generation of Critical Theory took, only serve to erase particularity.

*Telos* did engage with Habermas, and what Piccone would describe as the “Habermanniacs,” throughout the 1970s and into the mid-1980s. Habermas appeared in the journal about a dozen times during this period, either as author or interview subject.244 However, internal disputes began to surface more and more over the intellectual and/or political value of the linguistic turn. The journal devoted its 1984 conference to these internal divides, hoping that some theoretical resolution could be achieved.245 Around the same time, the journal made its move from St. Louis to New York City.246 In the conference report, Alt noted that “Piccone expressed hope, that with *Telos* relocating in New York, a major conceptual housecleaning would take place...” (1985, p. 122). Writing as “Moishe Gonzales,” Piccone noted that the internal consensus began to unravel as early as 1975 with the journal’s (or Piccone’s) abandonment of Western Marxism. It continued to unravel as the journal began to focus its attention on “more immediate political questions,” dating back to 1982 (1985, p. 165).

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244 Piccone would later refer to this as one of the “dead ends” that the journal pursued, another being East European Marxism (2008b, pp. 302-303).
245 Alt notes that due to the number of outside audience members who expected more formal presentations, the conference was unable to achieve its goal of internal debate, which would have to wait for a future occasion.
246 Robert Antonio noted the irony of *Telos* arriving in New York at the end of the age of the New York Intellectuals (2009).
As Piccone explained later, the split with the Habermasians or “Habermaniacs,” a Gonzales-ism, was not over political positions, of which he asserted there was little correspondence with theoretical positions. As he described it,

[t]here was an initial flirtation with the ‘second generation’ of Critical Theory, since it presented itself as the Frankfurt School’s main legacy.... We soon realized the extent to which this ‘second generation’ had rejected all the original ideas of ‘the founding fathers,’ in favor of an eclectic reconfiguration of Critical Theory as a synthesis of American social science and English analytic philosophy. All that seemed to have survived was the German accent. *Telos* actually split on this issue, and the followers of Habermas eventually left the editorial board (Piccone, 1999, p. 138).

The journal experienced another split over “the redemption debate,” which centered around whether the journal should “abandon any lingering grandiose plans to change the world,” a question put to the journal by recently added staff from East Europe (Piccone, 2008a, p. 254).247 Piccone pointed out that this redemption debate reflected a greater concern over radicalism in general. He noted that the “conservative turn” in the journal reflected a similar process within American society (2008a, p. 256).248 However, after describing these various theoretical turns and debates, Piccone concluded that the real reason for the editorial split in the late 1980s was a result of differences over proofreading and other matters of office management. Robert Antonio adds to this story that the journal’s embrace of the theory of artificial negativity, discussed further in the following

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247 The addition of the Eastern European staff did help to produce a number of critical pieces on the state of affairs in Eastern Europe. As Sharon Zukin notes, this work was largely atheoretical and in her view, more valuable for it. “Looking back, moreover, this work was by and large correct. Subsequent events and ‘revelations’ only implied that *Telos* must have been read under the bedclothes by flashlight inside the Kremlin and other walls” (1988, p. 50).

248 Piccone elsewhere elaborated on this thesis arguing: “All journals of this type become the personal projects of the people involved in them. In the case of *Telos*, this has been all the more true, since there has been an exceptional editorial continuity over the years. This unforeseen longevity, however, has necessitated adaptations in terms of theoretical as well as thematic redefinition. Thus, the history of the journal tends to exemplify *in nuce* the dynamics of American society in general and of the Left in particular” (Piccone, 2008a, p. 232).
chapter, also served as a boundary line between members of the *Telos* circle (2009).

Whatever the reason for the split, many people left the editorial board during the mid- to late 1980s, including Mark Poster, Seyla Benhabib, Joel Kovel, Habermas, Andrew Arato, Jean Cohen, Jose Casanova, and Joel Whitebook. The journal would embark upon new theoretical directions, namely federalism and populism, after the split. I discuss those later turns further in the following chapter.

**Transgression for Transgression’s Sake**

By the early 1970s, the journal was becoming more and more outspoken against the Soviet Union, and “actually existing communism.” By the late 1970s, the journal had given Marxism, or “communism in theory,” its “proper burial.” For some, these interventions amounted to a rejection of communism, not that the Marxism, and specifically Western Marxism, that the journal investigated since its beginnings was at all what was happening in the Soviet Union. As Breines recalled,

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249 The positioning of these two statements is not meant to imply that the Soviet Union and its policies resembled Marxism, however one defines Marxism. Many of *Telos’s* critiques of the Soviet Union and other communist states focused on the bureaucratic and authoritarian administrations of these states. That *Telos’s* anti-statistm coincided with an eventual anti- or post-Marxism is also a question they explored: namely whether Marx’s theoretical project necessarily led to such an authoritarian, administered and centralized state. *Telos’s* subsequent investigations concentrated on populism and federalism as the rejection of governance by a governmentalized state.

250 During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the journal was also experiencing a number of external changes that may have also influenced the journal’s position. In the fall of 1982, *Telos* still called itself a “radical” journal. In the next issue, the journal’s subtitle changed to a “critical” quarterly (Issue 54, Winter 1982/83). Four years later, in Issue 71 (Spring 1987), the journal would publish its first articles on the German legal theorist, Carl Schmitt, one issue after its subtitle designated the journal as a journal of “post critical thought.” The end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s was a crucial time for the journal. Piccone was refused tenure at Washington University in 1977 (Tim Luke, 2005). He then engaged in a two-year appeals process that was ultimately unsuccessful. Next, he moved with the journal to the Lower East Side of Manhattan where he physically constructed the journal’s first office. Within a nine-month period from 1979 to 1980, a number of individuals important to the Left passed away, including Herbert Marcuse, Rudi Dutschke, and Jean Paul Sartre. Georges Haupt, Peter Ludz, Hans Gerth, and Nicos Poulantzas also died during the late
[t]hat this amounted to an articulation within the journal of the broader neo-conservative tendency underway outside\textsuperscript{251} seemed to me, as it did to some other editors as well as some discontented readers, quite obvious. But that only enhanced...its dynamism. For leaving aside the substance of the issues, Telos' new anti-communism drew energy from the very act of violating a number of not only Old Left but also New Left taboos, and transgression (in political if not in social or cultural terms) is in our milieu \textit{a highly valued activity} (1988, p. 44, emphasis added).

Piccone suggested that the journal's "conservative turn" could be a source of energy and/or creativity.\textsuperscript{252} Breines points to the value of transgression in the intellectual field as, I would argue, an end in itself for purposes of position-taking. Transgression for transgression's sake, perhaps functionally alike but more routinized than art for art's sake, becomes a position within the field in and of itself.

In his discussion of avant-garde art, Bourdieu examines the "ritual sacrilege" of certain artists attempting to destroy any link between the artist and the economic field. However, these are failed attempts, since

\begin{quote}
[a]rt cannot reveal the truth about art without snatching it away again by turning the revelation into an artistic event. And it is significant, \textit{a contrario}, that all attempts to call into question the field of artistic production, the logic of its functioning and the functions it performs, through the highly sublimated and ambiguous means of discourse or artistic 'acts'...are no less necessarily bound to be condemned even by the most heterodox guardians of artistic orthodoxy, because in refusing to play the game, to challenge in accordance with the rules, i.e., artistically, their authors call into question not a way of playing the game, but the game itself and the belief which supports it. This is the one unforgivable transgression (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 80-81).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{a}1970s. Issue 44's introduction announced the "end of an age." Alvin Gouldner's death in 1980 was announced two issues later.

\textsuperscript{251} Telos had earlier published an article by Habermas on the neoconservative movement in which he stated: "It is an accomplishment of the neoconservatives in the United States that a conservative government is able to rely on theoretical perspectives and not merely on pragmatic considerations and the general climate" (1983, p. 75).

\textsuperscript{252} At a time when the collective amnesia of a generation raised on MTV tends to collapse the past in the immediacy of the image, traditional conservatism may take on a new radical role. As Gross has put it, by refunctining alternative models, tradition provides the means to establish a critical distance from an otherwise ubiquitous present whose very being constitutes its own legitimation (Piccone, 1994, p. 206).
While *Telos* has taken pride in its transgressions over the years and used its functionality to carve out an identity, I think it completely oversimplifies the journal to say that its mode of operation is just transgression for transgression’s sake, and not just because to think this way would imply that *Telos* disregards the intellectual field *in toto*. However, the journal’s style and its affinity for the margin, and letting everyone else know that it prefers the margin, may give the impression that heterodox is not just a manner of critique but a way of being.

To the charge that the journal has become “right-wing,” one of its not-uncritical contributors replied in 1994, “[n]ow most of those who say this are just not reading the journal closely (or are reluctant to question old beliefs). But our style *invites* misinterpretations” (Ost, 1994, p. 140). Again, the journal’s style, a strategy for positioning itself in a certain place within the intellectual field, can substitute appearance for substance. And, perhaps, a different appearance can constitute a change in substance, especially if you are among the first to do so.

A 1969 article in *The Antioch Review* reported on *The Public Interest’s* already apparent conservative tendencies.

It has been suggested by critics of the Bell-Kristol approach (which includes virtually the entire left) that by taking a technician’s view of social problems they become to some extent servants [*but to some extent critics*] of the status quo, not to say lackeys of the Establishment, from whom no radical [*but, some*] criticism is to be expected. And some go further and charge that the seeming objectivity only conceals an in-built predisposition to conservatism in their attitude toward many [*many, but not all*] aspects of the existing system. There is something to this—men have been known to be co-opted even by the scent of power, and there is considerable power in the air today around our new technocrats (Goodman, 1969, p. 72).

The article appeared in a special issue reviewing the state of magazines with the somewhat pessimistic title, “What’s Happened to Magazines?” In the article, “On the (N.Y.) Literary
Left” by Walter Goodman, the Public Interest was named alongside The New Leader, Commentary, Dissent, and The New York Review of Books. Goodman opened his article by describing this New York politico-intellectual press as a cloistered circle with a low circulation who mainly write for each other.\textsuperscript{253} Additionally, this New York intellectual scene has largely held left-leaning political views since its birth in the pages of The Masses, Seven Arts, and Dial, among others, in the opening decades of the twentieth century. A direct ancestry, whether through shared editors and contributors or shared audience and style, can be traced through these magazines and journals, from The Masses to The New Masses to The New Leader to Partisan Review to Commentary to Dissent to The New York Review of Books.\textsuperscript{254}

Now, Goodman notes the New York intellectual journals occupy different positions on the political spectrum. Not that there have not always been differences, but they have

\textsuperscript{253} They are also linked directly through shared editors and contributors: “Despite all the pleasure taken in this neighborhood in the insult, the near-insult and common back-biting, there has always been considerable human commerce from one publication to another. Not that a Sidney Hook or an Irving Kristol is likely to show up in the pages of the New York Review—except possibly as a signatory to an aggrieved letter—or that Staughton Lynd will find his way into The New Leader. But Theodore Draper, who is on The New Leader’s Editorial Board, has written notable analyses of our foreign adventures for Commentary and the New York Review, both of which also publish the reflections of Paul Goodman, a Contributing Editor to Dissent. Irving Howe, Dissent’s editor, not only writes for the New York Review, but criticizes it in the pages of Commentary, which has itself been criticized in the pages of Dissent. Public Interest co-editors Bell and Kristol are both listed as Regular Contributors to The New Leader, and Daniel Moynihan and Nathan Glazer, regular contributors to The Public Interest, continue to write for Commentary and have even turned up there along with the New Left guru Herbert Marcuse, who would certainly be more at home in the New York Review. Confusing perhaps, but characteristic” (Goodman, 1969, pp. 72-73). Piccone often criticized academia for this same practice of writing for each other rather than an outside audience.

\textsuperscript{254} What is most striking about this community of intellectual journals is that it is a community, a community of critics institutionalized in a family of magazines and journals that may have their differences but also share a great deal. This milieu of institutions of criticism bears a great deal of resemblance to its even earlier ancestors in nineteenth-century Great Britain, where journals and magazines also held different political opinions but were not so strictly divided as to keep contributors from writing for several publications, even when they were politically opposed, or to keep readers to partisan lines.
generally remained differences within the Left. In 1969, they held positions on the left
(New York Review of Books and Dissent) and the right (The Public Interest and The New
Leader). Still though, Goodman identifies this political spectrum as “confined,” and while

[the differences between them are critical, ...there are substantial areas of
agreement as well, and not infrequently they differ less on the substance of an
argument than on how far they are prepared to carry it and in how intemperate a
spirit (1969, p. 73).

Further, most of these journals, except at the time The New York Review of Books, found a
common enemy in the New Left, which they viewed as a challenge to liberal values that
they sought to defend.255

However, Goodman argues that what is even more off-putting to The Public
Interest’s critics is not their politics but their tone and style, their “cool manner,” which he
contrasts with the polemics more commonly found among the New Left’s social movements
(1969, p. 72).256

For all their success in awakening the nation’s conscience to the sore places in the
society, the radicals have shown little patience or skill for formulating programs to
deal with the ills about which they have been so eloquent. Until they are prepared to
undertake that laborious work, it seems churlish of them to come down so hard on
intelligent men who are trying to apply themselves to problems on a different level
from the rhetorical (Goodman, 1969, p. 72).

255 As Goodman writes: “Things change; things remain the same. Three decades ago democratic
socialists stood fast against a tide of Stalinist fellow travelling that helped to undermine whatever
authentic radical impulses existed in this country. Now they again find themselves in opposition to
a movement which, under some cherished old slogans of the left and some rousing new ones,
appears willing, at least in theory, to put at hazard liberal values that doubtless seem stuffy to those
who are able to take them for granted. It is a battle of which most of America is blissfully
unconscious, but the waging of such battles has always been the main business of the New York
intelligentsia and its polemical press” (1969, p. 75). One can easily see what side of the argument
Goodman and the Antioch Review stand on.
256 The liberal Antioch Review shared a similar sentiment in their Winter 1965-66 issue when the
editor wrote: “It is not surprising that the fiercely impatient ‘new’ left reserves its greatest scorn for
the kind of liberalism The Antioch Review has tried to represent. It is hard for them to believe that it
is not the strength of our passions but the way they are expressed that makes them seem different.
Their generation grew up in the shadow of the bomb, but our generation has perforce a more acute
sense of mortality. If we are senioring citizens and have only a few jumps left, we are painfully
concerned that they be in the right direction” (1965-66, p. 467).
Interestingly, this was also one of the arguments for disagreement between the *Edinburgh* and *Westminster*, that it was a matter of style of argument more than what they argued over. In the intellectual field, “dissensus” could exist over the outcomes of debate but not about the manner in which the debate was conducted. Entry into the intellectual field requires some acceptance of the terms of intellectual combat itself.

It is difficult to assess a journal’s position within the intellectual field, because it is never stable or fixed. Even though Piccone once wrote in 1988 that after the Habermasians (or “Habermaniacs”) left the journal’s editorial board the time was ripe for the journal to settle its theoretical identity, arguably, no such settling has occurred (Piccone, 1988). My argument here is that such a consensus is not possible, since it depends upon fixing the journal at a particular time and place. Further, with changes in the media ecology and the often temporary nature of new media, this “fixing” becomes even more difficult. Positions do shift more easily or can be made to appear transitory, consider the “swiftboating” of presidential candidate John Kerry. And such a consensus would also depend upon the perceptions of the audience—the journal’s readers, and their perception also shifts with changes in society. To quote from Piccone at length,

If a journal manages to survive for 100 issues, it is reasonable to assume that the editorial board has managed to reach some sort of internal consensus and can finally rest on its laurels. Such is not the case with *Telos*. Far from constituting a self-congratulatory occasion, the editor’s critical reflections on the history of the journal amount, at best, to a collective roast or, at worst, a theoretical free-for-all. The closest they come to a consensus is a general sense that there has been a conservative involution, that the analyses being published are becoming increasingly indistinguishable from those articulated elsewhere, and that there is a tendency to follow popular political fads. Whatever this may mean, it certainly does not betray internal complacency. After all of these years, **nothing seems to be settled** [emphasis added], and the editorial board remains a hopelessly heterogeneous group still trying to come to some agreement concerning many crucial and not-so-crucial issues, such as precisely what constitutes this conservative involution, who has fallen victim to it, what the journal originally sought to accomplish, what it in fact has accomplished, and what it should be doing
now and in the future. While predicaments of this kind usually denote widespread confusion, they can also be the source of creativity. This is why this theoretical *bellum omnium contra omnes* may be interpreted as evidence of lingering internal vitality, an unwillingness to take anything for granted, and a suspicion of all positions even faintly resembling conformism and passivity. The point of departure in confronting such a predicament must be a critical reevaluation of what *Telos* has been for more than a quarter of a century, and where it fits both within the short parabolic trajectory of the New Left and, more generally, within contemporary intellectual history (1994, p. 173).

Fast-forward to today and *Telos* itself is the subject of a journal critique within the *Times Literary Supplement*. While the journal desired to be chosen for a *TLS* critique, presumably so as to gain a wider audience, I wonder if this move does not run counter to the journal’s long-professed intention to be a marginal journal. Now, in the *TLS* anyway, it is one journal among other “Learned Journals,” the title of the section where the critiques appear, which also makes it appear old and stodgy. Lastly, the critique explicitly questioned the journal’s carefully cultivated (former?) position within the intellectual field, stating that “*Telos* still vaunts its anti-orthodoxy, but might not many of the ruling powers in the world today, if they shared the vocabulary, define their own double-thinking views similarly?” (Leslie, 2008, p. 24). Presumably, the “double-thinking views” is the author’s reference to the journal’s use of controversial figures like Carl Schmitt in what was, or what was read as, a journal on the Left. However, the *TLS*, exercising its censorial impulse, is implicitly defining what counts as an orthodox or anti-orthodox position or what can properly be considered as the “Left.”

**A Re-view of Reviews: Conflicting Institutions of Criticism**

When Paul Thibaud took over the editorship of the French journal *Esprit* in 1978, he introduced a new section, “a review of reviews” (Howard, 1978, p. 150). The occasional section focused on either a special issue of a journal or on a new journal or an important
foreign journal. It was very similar in practice to Telos’s section. However, the practice hardly began with these two journals, one in the United States, the other in France, in the 1970s. Going back to the early nineteenth century, the Westminster introduced a “review of reviews” aiming its first critiques at its rivals, the Edinburgh and Quarterly reviews.\textsuperscript{257} Appearing in its very first issue, the “review of reviews” allowed the Westminster to establish its difference from the two competitors and also carve out a space for itself in the intellectual field of that age.

Similarly, the “Short Journal Reviews” within Telos allowed the journal to situate itself within the field or survey the field, as Genosko et al. describes the function. Brian Singer, a member of the Toronto Telos Group, interviewed for the Genosko et al. study, commented:

The Telos style which we all imbibed from Piccone was rather high handed and certain of us withdrew and rejected that. I don’t think any of us did what he tended to do, which was always to place oneself on the cusp of that Hegelian moment when everything would become revealed and the totality would become transparent.\textsuperscript{258} I think the original purpose basically was situating ourselves and also providing sources for other people in terms of which articles might be of interest et cetera et cetera, and to do it in a fairly broad sense. You know, both to cover journals that people would feel like they had to know about anyway, like the New Left Review or the Monthly Review or those kinds of things, but also journals that people wouldn’t know about and possible wouldn’t even read because they were in foreign languages ( quoted in Genosko, et al., 2002, p. 6).

Telos positioned itself within the field by introducing the practice of short reviews with Issue 22 (Winter 1974-75). That first issue to begin the practice included thirty-five very brief reviews of a wide variety of journals.\textsuperscript{259}

\textsuperscript{257} An analysis of the Westminster’s “review of reviews” can be found in Chapter 2.2.
\textsuperscript{258} Wodek Szembrang, another member of the Toronto Telos Group interviewed by Genosko et al. described the practice as “the result of a sort of desire for a Hegelian sweep, we’re on top of you, you’re not on top of us. We know what you are up to” (quoted, 2002, p. 6).
\textsuperscript{259} The nature of the reviews changed within issues and from issue to issue. Genosko et al. provides a useful summary: “Some articles in the mix received special attention owing to personal
Table 2. Journals Reviewed in Telos Issue 22

Alternative; Arena; Australian Left Review; Aut Aut; Berkeley Journal of Sociology; Critique; Economy and Society; L’Homme et la Société; The Insurgent Sociologist; Kaptalistate; Kursbuch; Liberation; Marxismus Digest; Monthly Review; New German Critique; New Left Review; Our Generation; La Pensee; Political Theory; Politics and Society; Praxis; Quest: A Feminist Quarterly; Radical America; Radical Science Journal; Review of Radical Political Economy; Science and Society; Social and Economic Studies; Social Praxis; Socialist Register; Socialist Revolution; Socialist Thought and Practice; Tel Quel; Les Temps modernes; Terzo Mondo; Theory and Society

A fair number of the journals reviewed were also journals advertised within Telos.

The journal’s Toronto group was largely responsible for writing these critiques, although the St. Louis Telos group also made many contributions through the 1970s. At the Antioch Telos Conference in 1977, Piccone criticized the short reviews, remarking that they were “objectivistic and lacking critical perspective, and suggested that [the section] be drastically ‘spiked’ or completely eliminated” (1977, p. 191). The others present at the meeting felt the section was valuable and preferred that it be “spiked” rather than cut. Members of the Toronto group remember being directed to make the reviews “damning” (Genosko, et al., 2002, p. 6). Once again, Telos sought to distinguish itself from the other occupants in the field, especially those similarly situated. “[T]he self-image of Telos rested from the very beginning of the publication on special, most often not very flattering, attention being paid to other new journals, especially those staffed by other graduate students” (Genosko, et al., 2002, p. 4). This practice of “Short Journal Reviews” continued until Issue 53, carried on by connections (a ‘future member’ of the group such as Andrew Wernick writing in Catalyst on Durkheim; 23 Spring 1975), superstars of the American Left get royal treatment (Paul Sweezy and Monthly Review), and attention is duly paid to the editorial statements of new journals and how they have/have not fulfilled them (i.e. Quest and The Second Wave in Telos 22 and 23). By the summer and fall of 1975, the reviews had become, on the whole, slightly less fact-minded, one-line summaries of articles and more engaging (a good example being a review of an issue of Radical Science some two pages long and full of carefully argued, lively, and critical observations marking a radical contrast with the other summaries; Telos 24 Summer 1975)” (2002, pp. 6-7).
various Telos groups. Issue 53 was also the last issue to include Telos groups. In addition, the subtitle changed with that issue from a journal of “radical thought” to “critical thought.”

Howard’s review of Esprit and the new editorship of Thibaud appeared in the “Notes and Commentary” section. Telos also positioned itself by reviewing other journals at greater length in this section. Journals that received longer attention in the “Notes and Commentary” section included Contemporary Marxism (Issue 47), Dianoia (Issue 3), Dissent (Issue 48), East European Reporter (Issue 66), Esprit (Issue 36), Kinesis (Issue 3), La Lettre Internationale (Issue 63), Libre (Issue 36), Marxist Perspectives (Issue 47), Praxis International (Issue 48), Thesis Eleven (Issue 47), and Tikkun (Issue 69). A couple of these deserve attention here.

The review of Dissent appeared in the journal in 1981, almost thirty years after Dissent began publication and thirteen years after Telos began publication. It was included in an article titled “Rethinking Radical Politics” and was written by “Moishe Gonzales,” the pseudonym used by Paul Piccone and sometimes others, which is discussed further below. The article begins by noting the general decline of the Left that seems to have gone unnoticed by some members of the Left, which “compounds the problem” (Gonzales, 1981, p. 105). However, Gonzales notes, Michael Walzer’s Radical Principles and the new series of Praxis International offer a review of the Left’s current state and therefore, they too should be reviewed. Walzer is an editor of Dissent, and Praxis International was the re-establishment of the former Yugoslavian journal Praxis.

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260 The Toronto Telos Group continued to be responsible for the reviews until Issue 49. The Carbondale Group prepared the reviews for the last issues in which they appeared.

261 The reviews of Dianoia and Kinesis are discussed above.
Gonzales first takes aim at Walzer's book arguing that “[i]f a work on *Radical Principles*, this book contains very few—and none of them radical” (1981, p. 106). He finds that Walzer’s lack of radicalism is merely an extension of the same “social democratic phobia” found in the pages of *Dissent* (p. 110).

The bottom line is that the *Dissent* vision is too shell-shocked by Stalinism to allow for any radical principles. Its limited conception of politics rules out all but operational pragmatic principles of collective co-existence—procedural justice. Consequently, it can never generate a systematic critique of the present compelling enough to fuel a movement even comparable to the modest dimensions of the New Left. But when all is said and done, Walzer’s mostly justified bitching and moaning about the New Left—which goes on for more than 75 pages—are really sour grapes and resentment sparked by its constant rejection of stale *Dissent* politics over the years. At any rate, the dusty back issues of *Dissent* are poor place from which to sift out an historical evaluation of the New Left (Gonzales, 1981, p. 110).

Several issues later, *Dissent* again appeared in the pages of *Telos*. This time it was in Fekete’s review of *Telos* on its fiftieth issue. Fekete noted that *Telos* had gained some new respect and new attention due to “new spaces for criticism, the professionalization of critical discourse, and the new academic respectability of Marxism” (Fekete, 1981/82). As a result, the journal was also undergoing expectations of a new “respectability.” To illustrate this and also the conflicts between institutions of criticism in competition over social power, Fekete related the story of the argument between Paul Piccone and Irving Howe, editor of *Dissent*, over the publication of Sartre’s last interview.

*Telos* published a translation of the interview in its special tribute to Sartre following his death in 1980. Howe wrote to *Telos* to complain that *Dissent* had exclusive rights to the piece. Howe accused *Telos* of “literary piracy” and that the act of publication was “irresponsible, immoral and illegal.” Piccone replied to Howe and tried to explain that they did not know the interview would be forthcoming in *Dissent* and that normally they request permission from the author, but in this case, he was already dead. A substantial
number of Telos articles over the years were translations and reprints of foreign authors’ works, and sometimes without permission. Many of these had been originally written years earlier.

Howe responded by publishing an open letter to the editors of Telos, The New Republic, The Nation, Partisan Review, Democratic Left, Socialist Review, In These Times, and The New York Review of Books. Howe must have felt that these journals represented the quadrant of the intellectual field concerned with political and cultural issues on the left. In other words, these journals took similar positions within the field, and according to Bourdieu, would be the journals vying for the same cultural or theoretical capital. These were the comrades in arms but also the competitors. In the letter, Howe again accused Telos of piracy, arguing that at least in part that is how the journal survives. Piccone replied at length to this charge. He centered his rebuttal on the commodification of ideas, noting that it is only after Sartre had become a “marketable intellectual commodity” that Dissent bothered to have anything to do with him. Further, Telos for a long time rejected the notion of copyright, only copyrighting the journal at Issue 25 due to a mailing regulation.

Moral of the story: we have always placed the divulging of important ideas ahead of commercial considerations—which explains our policy not to bother too much with these bureaucratic details. Of course, you are free to talk to your attorney and further thin your already scarce resources to attack another left journal of even more precarious means, but it does not appear to be a stroke of political genius. We barely

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262 Although occupants of the intellectual field of reviews may be vying for the same cultural or theoretical capital putting them in competition with one another, they still share membership in a field that may sometimes be in competition with other fields, or may come under attack from other fields, such as the political or economic. In those instances, competition within the field may need to be put on hold while a common defense is mounted. In their history of the magazine in America, John Tebbel and Mary Ellen Zuckerman relate the anecdote of Harper’s near demise in 1980. “There were editorials in newspapers all over the country expressing both displeasure and disbelief that Harper’s would die. Even William Buckley, owner of the right wing National Review, declared that Harper’s and other ‘serious journals’ should be subsidized if they could not get enough advertising. It would be a public cost, like public education, he said, no doubt surprising many of his own readers” (1991, p. 320).
manage to survive—as you very well know, since I described to you in detail the way we operate over a year and a half ago.... With a law suit, not only will you manage to look silly, but after a couple of years of litigation, all you would be able to claim—if you succeed—would be the sinking of our imaginary pirate ship and probably be awarded as a damage our debts as well as a bunch of back issues presently collecting dust in my garage (quoted in Fekete, 1981/82, p. 169).

Piccone signed the letter, “Alleged Pirate-In-Chief.”

For Fekete, this exchange highlighted some interesting questions regarding fellow institutions of criticism.

Irving Howe says ‘the rights of authors and magazines must be protected.’ What are the rights of authors and magazines, especially those with critical aims? Are there rights to do with cultural appropriateness and intellectual affinity, or are there only property rights? Suppose we regard commodity competition in the realm of ideas as a key mechanism of the colonization of cultural spaces, and suppose we favor the deinstitutionalization of cultural spaces in order to make the reciprocal exchange of significations freer and to make space for the instituting creativity of the radical imagination. How do we then, on behalf of the institution of criticism, assign a value valency to piracy as a challenge to the instituted relations of circulation? (Fekete, 1981/82, p. 169).

To return to the review of Walzer’s Radical Principles and the related critique of Dissent, Gonzales also reviewed the rebirth of Praxis as the new journal, Praxis International. The journal, Praxis, began in 1964 in former Yugoslavia. Its inaugural editorial contained the following:

There are so many journals today, but too few people read them! So, why another journal? Despite the abundance of journals, it seems to us that we don’t have the one that we want: a philosophical journal that isn’t narrowly ‘expert,’ a philosophical journal that isn’t just philosophical, but also discusses the actual problems of Yugoslav socialism, the contemporary world and man. We don’t want a philosophical journal in [the] traditional sense, nor do we want some general theoretical magazine without a central thought and without physiognomy. The idea to start such a journal hasn’t emerged from a pure desire to realize just another theoretically possible physiognomy of a journal: the idea has emerged through the conviction that a journal of this kind is a vivid need of our time ("Why Praxis?,” 1964, p. n/a).263

263 A new journal that begins without a sense of its timely importance and need would be the exception rather than the rule. What would be interesting would be to analyze when journals begin while also analyzing their type to investigate whether certain events or periods bring forth a particular kind of journal or project. As Habermas states, “A press that had evolved out of the
Seyla Benhabib described *Praxis* as “one of the most important European publications, heralding ‘Marxist humanism’ and ‘democratic socialism’ in the European context in the early 1960s” (1995, p. 675). In 1981, Richard J. Bernstein, Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor and Albrecht Wellmer reestablished *Praxis as Praxis International* in order to assist Yugoslav colleagues who had been removed from their university teaching posts. It was this journal that Moishe Gonzales reviewed for *Telos*, claiming it as an example of the Left’s theoretical exhaustion internationally. Like Walzer, it also substitutes “bourgeois” political theory for radicalism, leaving Gonzales to remark that “the task of rethinking radical politics is still on the agenda” (1981, p. 113). For Gonzales, the main fault appears to be public’s use of its reason and that had merely been an extension of its debate remained thoroughly an institution of this very public: effective in the mode of a transmitter and amplifier, no longer a mere vehicle for the transportation of information but not yet a medium for culture as an object of consumption. Prototypically this type of press can be observed in times of revolution, when the journals of the tiniest political groupings and associations mushroom—in Paris in the year 1789 every marginally prominent politician formed his club, and every other founded his journal; between February and May alone 450 clubs and over 200 journals sprang up. As long as the mere existence of a press that critically-rationally debates political matters remained problematic, it was compelled to engage in continuous self-thematization: before the permanent legalization of the political public sphere, the appearance of a political journal and its survival was equivalent to involvement in the struggle over the range of freedom to be granted to public opinion and over publicity as a principle” (1991, pp. 183-184). Williams also argues that new types of journals seem to emerge at particular points in time “emerging and taking the field in concert” (2009, p. 690). Williams traces the rise and fall of the little magazine (early decades of 1900s to 1930s), the academic little magazine (1940s to 1960s), and the theory journal (1970s to present). As Williams points out, this genealogy begs the question: “what new kind of journal is looming now?” (2009, p. 690).

*Praxis International* continued publication until 1991 when the editorial board decided to stop the journal. The former Yugoslavia had broken up and war began between its member states, and Mihailo Markovic, one of the professors that the journal sought to aid and also a leading contributor, subsequently became an adviser to Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian president. As Benhabib recalls, “Many of us felt that the wool was being pulled over our eyes by our colleagues in former Yugoslavia in what they were or were not publishing in the pages of the journal about conditions in their own country. The question of nationalism was too hot to touch; and because of our distance from the events, on at least one occasion we published a piece on the Kosovo crisis by Mihailo Markovic, which, now in retrospect, I consider racist-nationalist propaganda” (1995, pp. 675-76). However, the American editors of *Praxis International* desired the continuation of a collaboration with East European intellectuals, something that had been central to *Telos*, and in 1993 began the journal *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory*. 265
that these journals continue to hold on to any form of socialism. Socialism is inherently flawed, and radicalism no longer depends upon socialism. But Gonzales does not provide any answers as to what radicalism would look like without socialism or Marx.

Five years later, Gonzales published another critical review of a journal, this time of *Tikkun*, a new Jewish progressive magazine to challenge the now neoconservative *Commentary*. Gonzales finds little of merit in the journal, except for perhaps an article by Christopher Lasch,265 “What’s Wrong with the Right?” that states: “The idea of a ‘left’ has outlived its historical time and needs to be decently buried.” Gonzales agrees. Further, he finds a “terminal crisis pervading both Jewish and liberal thought” (Gonzales, 1986, p. 130).

It results from a confused understanding of what it means to be a liberal and/or a Jew and, in a desperate attempt to patch together a viable *Weltanschauung*, contribute precisely to the malaise it seeks to cure: the intellectual involution represented by *Commentary*. Lacking a clear identity, it cannot project a vision beyond the most trivial political commonplaces of a middle-aged *New Left*, contraposed to which *Commentary*, its conservatism and dogmatism notwithstanding, can only appear as a rock of coherence, determination and honesty (Gonzales, 1986, pp. 130-131).

This is the key point. A journal that lacks an identity has no vision to impose. The journals of the left have been undergoing an identity crisis, while those of the right have cemented around a consistent identity through which they have exerted a strong influence. The catch-22, however, is that a cemented identity is something the left ideally eschews. Therefore, how can the left ever expect to project as strong a vision as the right now possesses.

Further, the right’s vision is most often merely a re-vision (or revising) of the status quo rather than the left’s re-viewing that contains a call for a transformative change of what

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265 Lasch’s first article for *Telos* appeared in 1980, and he became a favorite figure of Piccone’s.
currently exists. The former gains power from its similarity to what is already in power. The latter fights against the tide.

In his review of *Esprit*, Howard paid special attention to its “journal movement” character. Genosko et al. (2002) pointed out the irony of comparing the everybody-pitches-in spirit surrounding *Esprit* to that at *Telos*. They underscored the irony by quoting Piccone’s comments on the internal rife within *Telos* after its move to New York in the early 1980s:

> ...there were no breaks within the editorial board until well after the New York move was completed. Reminiscent of a similar sequence of events within *Iskra* when Lenin’s Bolshevik’s and Plekhanov’s Mensheviks parted ways on the basis of ‘irreconcilable differences’ concerning proof-reading or such-like momentous questions of office management, the Habermasians eventually left the editorial board in 1987 because of earth-shaking issues of this type (1988, p. 25).

There was more to the editorial disputes than proofreading issues. The disputes also centered around the direction of the journal, its evolving view, and the role of artificial negativity within that view. On the other hand, the editorial splits also could have been a product of certain editorial members and contributors moving on to other projects and other institutions or no longer having time or energy to contribute to the journal. There are likely a multitude of different reasons for why editors and contributors came and went. Piccone’s personality also played a role.

Some of this internal strife was taken up at the 1984 *Telos* conference.266

Apparently, the discussion did not prevent the editorial split which followed in 1987. Even

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266 The conference report stated: “The *Telos* editorial board has not been unaffected by the progressive disintegration of the left over the last few years, a disintegration precipitated by the rapid fading of the Marxist model—whether Western, Marxist-Leninist, or other—and the inability to substitute a new one to confront the rise of neo-conservatism. Various factions, consequently, have developed that can roughly be identified as Habermasian, post-Adornian (the artificial negativity wing), proto-Freudian, or even post-structuralist. At the same time, the journal’s turn toward more political themes has also generated heated internal debate over the German peace
more ironic was the comparison of the liveliness of *Esprit*’s “journal movement” to that belonging to *Telos*. Genosko et al. were quick to recall Breines’ description of *Telos* conferences as “philosophical harbingers of the more recent and far more popular phenomenon known as ‘Wrestlemania’” (1988, p. 39).

The valorized characteristics of a ‘journal movement’ such as those mentioned by Howard above were subject, especially in the pages of *Telos* and on the rostrums and in the business meetings of its conferences, to a certain degree of wooden predictability, on the one hand, and volatility, on the other—a predictable volatility, if you will. A comparison with wrestling is not out of order (Genosko, et al., 2002, p. 4).

Despite the open brawling which gave the journal’s conferences their Wrestlemania flavor, a character was created at the journal to deliver some of the more brutal blows. “Moishe Gonzales” was a pseudonym first used in Issue 47 (Spring 1981) by Paul Piccone. Piccone continued to use the pseudonym over the next twenty or so years, although Frank Adler was also known to write items for *Telos* under the pen name of Moishe.267 The name itself expresses the impertinence of *Telos*. According to one member of the editorial team, the idea of an Israeli-Latino was to them highly improbable; the name also served as a send-up of affirmative action.

Not stopping there, Piccone and/or Adler gave Moishe ever-changing “bios” to be included in the “Notes on Contributors.”268 When he first appeared in Issue 47, he was teaching gastronomy at the University of Labrador. The note in the succeeding issue remarked, “Moishe Gonzales is quickly becoming one of the most prolific *Telos* movement, feminism, the nature of the Soviet Union, etc. Notwithstanding the fact that there seems to be absolutely no correlation between theoretical and political divides, it was generally felt that an ‘internal’ conference dealing with a number of these topics might help clarify the various outlooks and new developments” (Alt, 1985, p. 121).

267 A table listing “Moishe’s” contributions to the journal can be found in Appendix I.

268 The “Notes on Contributors” were often a place of wit and sarcasm, as noted elsewhere. There were also other pseudonyms. Issue 31 featured “Benjamin Snow” whose bio said he “is a ridiculous pseudonym for a *Telos* editor who wishes to remain unidentified.”
contributors. He still teaches gastronomy at the University of Labrador” (Issue 48). By Issue 57, he was a construction worker in New York City, and in Issue 62, he had moved on to teach astrology at Oral Roberts University in Oklahoma. Modeling himself after Dale Carnegie, Moishe was specializing in “making friends and influencing people in New York City” in Issue 66. Seven issues later, he was a free-lance private intellectual; the oxymoron was obviously intended. In Issue 78, he became a scapegoat as the “Telos editor in charge of quality and standards.” And by Issue 81, he was back teaching “personal relations in Dale Carnegie University.” This last entry was the most telling. The pseudonym was used most often for pieces that attacked, for example, in the journal reviews discussed above.

The pseudonym is also a throwback to the early 18th century journals that often used characters as authorial voices. Both Addison and Steele liked to write in the periodicals under assumed names or characters and could then bring a “diversity” of viewpoints to an otherwise homogenous perspective. Additionally, the personalities they assumed may have helped them gain a critical distance from the personal subject matter about which they wrote. As Phillip Lopate remarks,

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Moishe Gonzales did not only appear in the pages of Telos. He also had a bit of a web presence, providing occasional biting remarks on other’s websites. For example, Gonzales commented on the website of “The Political Compass,” an online analysis tool that places users on a political spectrum depending on their answers to a number of questions. The website features a page of “Professional Feedback” stating that much of the feedback “comes from people with a professional interest in the concept” (http://www.politicalcompass.org/profeedback). Inserted into the middle of about eight pages of all positive comments is the comment from Gonzales which reads “You are a pack of dummies...” and is signed “Moishe Gonzales, M.D., Ph.D.” Arguably, there could be a real live Moishe Gonzales out there on the Web, but it is too much of a coincidence to believe he would have similar interests as his pseudonymous other and the same acerbic style. Gonzales’s latest appearance with Telos was a post on TELOSscope, the Telos Press blog in October 2008. Titled “More Good Judgment from Colin Powell,” the post consisted of an excerpt from an Anchorage newspaper reporting on Powell’s character witness testimony for former Alaska Senator Ted Stevens. Gonzales also appears on the Telos masthead as an “Editorial Associate.” Finally, Russell Jacoby awarded himself the Moishe Gonzales Folding Chair in Critical Theory 2007-08 at UCLA.
As part of their ironic modesty, personal essayists frequently represent themselves as loafers or retirees, inactive and tangential to the marketplace. The shiftless marginality of the essayist’s persona is underscored by the titles of some of the most famous essay series: *The Idler, The Rambler* (Samuel Johnson), *The Spectator, The Tatler* (Addison and Steele). Perhaps by affecting the role of lazy scribblers, essayists make themselves out to be harmless, thereby able to poke fun at will (1995, p. xxxiii).

This use of characters afforded a double distancing from the object of critique and the critique itself. It is unclear why Adler and especially Piccone required such a character as Moishe Gonzales, since nothing about *Telos* really prevented scathing critiques. Perhaps it was just to have a (not so?) secret joke or to keep editing a journal for almost forty years from becoming monotonous. “Moishe Gonzales” is emblematic of the conflicts between institutions of criticism. As the *Westminster Review* pointed out more than one hundred and fifty years earlier, the reviews themselves must be subject to re-view. This criticism clarifies the holder’s view. But is the pressure to criticize as much a product of the intellectual field’s nature as it is necessary to the articulation of a view? In other words, is such criticism always productive or merely destructive? In the metaphor of wrighting, does the criticism do more demolition than construction? And when might one be more valuable than the other?
Chapter 3.4  The Re-view of the State: Critics vs. Cratics

“The welfare state, that bastard offspring of a sentimentally socialist mother and a practicing capitalist father, has been under fierce attack from both left and right for two decades. Philosophically vulnerable to criticism from any integrated viewpoint with ethical content, it is an affront to both American individualism and socialist equity; devoid of charm and allure, a source of endless bureaucratic abuse, its logical inadequacy has been proved time and again to no avail. Buried in countless radical tracts it survives and even thrives, a sturdy transplant on these individualist shores because it satisfies the competing demands of freedom and communal obligation for the vast majority of the population.” – Telos, “The Reagan 'Revolution': 1978-1981, R.I.P.,” (Siegel, 1984, p. 129).

“I suspect that traditional conservatives will remain prophets and guerillas of the past. Ideology can become habit-forming. Look at the socialists in our time. It is entirely possible that conservatives and socialists will become better acquainted all the time in the years ahead. Socialists too speak from the sacred past that Marx's present has now become. Socialists have little if any more affection for the liberal welfare state than do traditional conservatives. They too are guerillas as well as prophets of their distinctive past. Between the two forces there could be some exciting raids on the present in the foreseeable future.” – The Public Interest, “The Conservative Renaissance in Perspective,” (Nisbet, 1985, p. 141).

The disillusionment or disappointment with the welfare state became the new consensus by the late 1960s. In The Public Interest, Peter F. Drucker expanded this disappointment to government as a whole, writing:

The disenchancement with government cuts across national boundaries and ideological lines. It is as prevalent in Communist as in democratic societies, as common in white as in nonwhite countries. This disenchancement may well be the most profound discontinuity in the world around us. It marks a sharp change in mood and attitude between this generation and its predecessors. For seventy years or so—from the 1890’s to the 1960’s—mankind, especially in the developed countries, was hypnotized by government (pg. 4).

Michael Harrington, who was thought to have first labeled the circle at The Public Interest “neoconservatives,” believed there was reason to be disappointed with the state. However, he also argued that different responses to the state were the result of different views, and the view belonging to the neoconservatives was unhistorical and abstract. In a clear example of di-visions or critics vs. critics, Harrington wrote:

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270 Specifically, he accuses the neoconservatives of erroneously believing that: 1) government did too much, 2) government was too egalitarian in its policies, 3) the consequences of government intervention are, more often than not, unintended and usually negative, and 4) a preference for
So, the very phenomenon of the welfare state, as well as its American exemplar, is based upon a conservative power structure. In [the neoconservative’s] reading of the sixties, one crucial error the neoconservatives make is that they ignore the hidden agenda which follows from these interrelationships of power. By taking official declarations at face value, they conjure up an egalitarian, innovating, semi-radical decade—which never existed. Moreover, even if it may sound a little arrogant, it should be remembered that this writer and *Dissent* and others on the democratic Left were not taken in, that we predicted the intended consequences of the real American agenda (1973, pp. 451-452).

Drucker’s assertion then that “the greatest disappointment, the great letdown, is the fiasco of the welfare state” represents what Harrington believes is a limited view that cannot see, or chooses not to see, the power structures underlying the welfare state (1969, p. 7).

Drucker’s proposed solution for “the sickness of government” is effectively the franchising of the state, a decentralizing process of using nongovernmental institutions to fulfill what previously were state functions. He terms this policy “reprivatization” and believes it could be effective because should those institutions fail at their jobs, they could be more easily eliminated since business is the one institution that society will permit to disappear, a now laughable statement after the experience of “too big to fail” (Drucker, 1969, pp. 7, 20).

Drucker’s assessment that the government was sick was an assessment of the state’s condition. The word “state” emerged from the meaning “condition of a country.” It is derived from the Latin *status*, meaning “condition” or “status.”[271] Interestingly, this definition evolved out of the literature addressed to the “cratics,” in the early advice books and then in the writings more commonly known as the mirror-for-princes literature that

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[271] “As early as the fourteenth century, the Latin term *status* – together with such vernacular equivalents as *estat, stato*, and *state* – can already be found in general use in a variety of political contexts. During this formative period these terms appear to have been employed predominantly to refer to the state or standing of rulers themselves” (Q. Skinner, 1989, p. 91). “By the end of the fourteenth century, the term *status* has also come to be regularly used to refer to the state or condition of a realm or commonwealth” (p. 92).
appeared in late-medieval Italy (Q. Skinner, 1989). That literature was also a product of the political organizations which were its objects of re-view and critique. In a sense then, political writing and the state dialectically helped to structure each other. However, the modern understanding of the state as an entity separate from both the rulers and the ruled would not emerge until the later part of the sixteenth century, around the same time as early journalism in England. Skinner argues that this double impersonality of the state was a conservative concept. It strove to separate the state from the ruled, or popular sovereignty, a more direct democracy or Marxist concept. This conservative view arose from the defenders of more absolutist forms of government. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the conservative view of the state, as an object separate from ruler and ruled, became the consensus (Q. Skinner, 1989).

I bring up this etymology to highlight the importance of the critic’s view to the construction of the state. Also, the history of the concept underscores my argument of reviewers and revisers. The latter largely adhere to this conservative conception, treating the state as an object that can be amended and reformed. The reviewers are still contesting this understanding of the state, arguing that the state is not wholly separate from ruler and ruled. In this chapter I provide some examples of Telos’s and The Public Interest’s state

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272. Skinner points to the importance of Hobbes in the formulation of this concept: “Hobbes’s ambition as a political theorist had always been to demonstrate that, if there is to be any prospect of attaining civil peace, the fullest powers of sovereignty must be vested neither in the people nor in the rulers, but always in the figure of an ‘artificial man.’ Surveying this final redaction of his political philosophy, he at last felt able to add that, in speaking about the need for such an impersonal form of sovereignty, what he had been speaking about all along could best be described as the state” (1989, p. 121).

273. Russell Berman’s 1988 article, “Rights and Writing in South Africa,” began with a critique of Ronald Reagan’s State of the Union address, centering on the phrase “we, the people.” Berman argued that Reagan took the phrase out of its Constitutional context. Reagan used the phrase to assert “the revolutionary notion that the people grant government its rights, and not the other way
view and views of the state. I am mainly concerned with the first twenty years of the journals’ existence.

A Critique of the “Cratics,” or a “Cratical” Critique?

Telos’s “concrete negation of the officially available nonsense” and The Public Interest’s critique of the officially available policy knowledge were then both projects of criticism, but criticism with an aim toward what? Telos was suspicious of the bureaucratized governmentality of the state, or its governmentalization. The journal was critical of the way the state works as a “regime of rationality.” The Public Interest paralleled this view. However, their originating intention was to correct the “regime of rationality,” not eliminate it. In their view, the regime was not run by the right “regiments,” and it was not in

around” (quoting Reagan, 1988, p. 161). To Berman, the rhetoric underscored an “effort to subvert the welfare state, regulatory agencies, minimal efforts to redistribute wealth, affirmative action, in general: an agenda derived from a liberal universalism, now to be replaced by a defense of privilege, protected by the appealing alibi that less government is, simply, good government” (p. 161). Daniel Bell made a similar critique of Reaganism three years earlier in the pages of The Public Interest. The article, “The Revolt Against Modernity,” contained opinions that ran contrary to the dominant views being espoused in the journal by the mid-1980s (Bell, 1985). Still, either as evidence of the journal’s continued open-mindedness or as deference to one of its founding editors, the article was published in The Public Interest’s twentieth anniversary issue. There, Bell argued that “[w]hat is extraordinary today is the new rhetoric of Ronald Reagan” (p. 56). He continued, stating: “The populist conservative seeks to instill public tutelage in private moral conduct and to remove all public restraint on private economic conduct. This set of contradictions carries over among the neoconservatives as well” (p. 57). He also lamented that “the death of socialism as a political fact is, as I once noted in these pages, the most tragic political fact of the twentieth century” (p. 57).

Foucault describes the art of government as connected to both the administrative apparatuses of the “cratic” and “the set of analyses and forms of knowledge” which comprise the science of the state, or its “statistics” (1991, p. 96). The state is thus governed “according to rational principles which are intrinsic to it and which cannot be derived solely from natural or divine laws or the principles of wisdom and prudence; the state, like nature, has its own proper form of rationality, albeit of a different sort. Conversely, the art of government, instead of seeking to found itself in transcendental rules, a cosmological model or a philosophico-moral ideal, must find the principles of its rationality in that which constitutes the specific reality of the state” (p. 97).
the right formation. Simply put, Telos was interested in restoring subjectivity and
conserving particularism, while The Public Interest sought a general interest to remedy the
state. However, as Telos would point out with its critique of the New Class, any supposed
public or general interest was merely the substitution by the New Class of a particular
interest for a multiplicity of interests.

The Public Interest’s early view, as stated in their opening editorial, was that the
state could be meliorated through a program of objective and scientific research. Their aim
was “anti-ideological,” and their hope was “that a public philosophy would emerge out of a
reasoned [non-ideological] discourse” (Bell, 1985, p. 57). They believed that knowledge or
facts could be neutral and serve relatively neutral purposes. Or, at least, they believed that
ideology got in the way of “knowing better” because it preconceived reality, perhaps
conveniently forgetting that knowing better also relies upon a preconceived reality, an
ideal other.276

It goes without saying that human thought and action is impossible without some
kinds of preconceptions – philosophical, religious, moral, or whatever – since it is
these that establish the purposes of all thought and action. But it is the essential
peculiarity of ideologies that they do not simply prescribe ends but also insistently
propose prefabricated interpretations of existing social realities – interpretations
that bitterly resist all sensible revision. The Public Interest will be animated by a
bias against all such prefabrications. We shall doubtless publish ideological articles,

275 As Drucker concluded his article on the sickness of government: “We do not face a ‘withering
away of the state.’ On the contrary, we need a vigorous, a strong, and a very active government. But
we do face a choice between big but impotent government and a government that is strong because
it confines itself to decision and direction and leaves the ‘doing’ to others” (1969, p. 22).
276 Bell clarified this idea in an interview in 2001 when he said: “Being ideological means you have
prefabricated ideas. You cut and trim the ideas to fit the formula and insofar as we were trying to
show that these problems were probably much more complex than people realized—needed some
kind of database, some more thorough analysis—it had to be nonideological. It wasn’t the explosion
of myth, it was the idea of taking a cool look at public policy and finding out how complicated it
was” (Dorman, 2001, p. 158). Perhaps this is a performative contradiction, the idea that you can
approach public policy without prefabricated ideas.
if they seem particularly challenging and perceptive. But, we hope, not many; and not often (Bell & Kristol, 1965, p. 4, emphasis added).

Bell, just five years earlier, had published his collection of essays, *The End of Ideology*, which argued: “For ideology, which once was a road to action, has come to be a dead end” (2006, p. 362). The journal’s founders believed that a non-ideological approach would allow for the “sensible revision” of state policies. Their view as critics held that the state could be amended or revised through a careful process that applied social scientific knowledge to policy problems as they existed. What they would come to oppose was the overwhelming vision of the Great Society “cratics” who proposed such ideologically-driven programs as a “War on Poverty,” without fully investigating the ramifications of such a “war.” In essence, the journal’s opening editorial pointed to a “cratical” shortfall in contemporary policy making. This failure required an intervention, a “critical” re-view.

In 1972, *The Public Interest* published an article innocuously titled, “The Evidence of Busing.” Written by David J. Armor, the article analyzed the results of the Boston METCO study on integrative busing and argued that mandatory busing had few positive effects on improved student achievement or racial integration and instead could cause further negative effects. Armor’s article also examined the role of social science research in public policy decisions, concluding that “[s]ociety can only benefit by those ties which combine the advantage of social science knowledge with a clear awareness of its limitations” (1972, p. 116). The article generated much controversy and was reported in the media even before it was published. The journal’s editors accompanied the article with this statement:

> While his manuscript was being copy-edited in our office, its findings were being ‘reported’ in the national press...and they have been denounced publicly by critics who have never seen the results of his studies themselves (1972, p. 90).
Two issues later, *The Public Interest* published a critical response to Armor’s article (Pettigrew, Useem, Normand, & Smith, 1973). The authors argued that Armor’s study was too limited for the conclusions he drew. They took issue with some of his assumptions and his interpretations of the available evidence.

Within one year, *The Public Interest* had published two articles on the policy of mandatory busing as a solution to racial integration – an article in favor of busing and an article opposed. James Q. Wilson, a regular contributor to the journal, in a response otherwise defending the value of social science, decided he could only come to two conclusions, or “general laws,” regarding social science evaluations of public policy programs (1973). First, policy interventions produce the intended effect if research is carried out by those implementing the policy or their friends, and second, policy interventions do not produce the intended effect if research is carried out by independent third parties, especially if they are skeptical of said policy.277

In an article in *Telos*, Joan Roelofs (1979) raised the question of whether there could be a liberating social science, one that could aid the critics in their re-view of the cratics. For Roelofs, it was less a question of whether social science produced accurate results,

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277 Wilson further explained that he did not intend these laws to be cynical observations about the role of social science in policy analysis. He argued that these observations did not mean that social scientists were making up their results. Rather, he asserted that different evaluations could be the product of “different standards of evidence and method” (Wilson, 1973, p. 133). If not a cynic, he also was not an optimist about social science’s impact on policy making. He concluded: “Social science begins by attempting to simplify human affairs in order that they can be more easily explained, but it often ends by making them even more complex than originally supposed. It is perhaps this tendency that leads some persons, impatient for change, to charge social scientists with being ‘conservative’ (an otherwise hilarious accusation, given the political predispositions of most social scientists). The more complex a situation is thought to be and the greater the importance of subjective, as opposed to material, conditions in explaining it, the more intractable it will seem to be. In the long run, the Second Law tends to cover more cases than the First Law. But in the long run policy will be made whatever social science may say and, indeed, the commitment to policy change is in many cases a necessary precondition for an evaluative study” (p. 134).
something *The Public Interest* was coming to have less and less faith in, as it was a question of whether a view of “the good life” could be attained. To quote from Roelofs at length:

> The association of ‘social science’ and ‘socialism’ is not entirely accidental. Positivism lies at the root of modern social science as well as Marxism. Implicit in both are the notions that a science of man is possible, that misery can be averted through human action (rather than passivity), that the course of history can be altered, and that the good life is knowable and attainable on this earth. These ideas are also in accordance with the original Greek conception of political science. If this positivist ethic is rejected, political scientists and sociologists might as well close up shop: they would have no function. Historians, mystics, journalists and pollsters could absorb the remaining business (1979, p. 112).

Roelofs hope for a liberating social science echoed the opening editorial of *The Public Interest*. As they lost hope for the role of social science, they essentially were putting themselves out of a job. Or as I argued in Chapter 3.2, they were trading in their role as social scientist/scholars for a role as journalist/intellectuals. *The Public Interest* began with the intention of objectively evaluating public policy with the help of social science. Seven years later, the journal appeared to have lost faith in the ability of social science to review the state and its policies. What was once a “critical” shortfall now appeared to be a “critical” shortfall as well. The journal was also undergoing another shift around the same time.

Nathan Glazer wrote on the journal’s twentieth anniversary that when *The Public Interest* began publication, “[t]he business of the day was the completion of the welfare state...” (1985, p. 19). The welfare state would be completed through a process of social reform under the guidance of professionals from the social services, universities, and research organizations—in essence, the pool of people who would contribute to the

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278 On the journal’s 30th anniversary, Kristol returned to the journal’s founding impulse, stating: “All of us had ideas on how to improve, even reconstruct, this welfare state—we were meliorists, not opponents, and only measured critics. It was when the Great Society programs were launched that we began to distance ourselves, slowly and reluctantly, from the newest version of official liberalism” (1995a, p. 85).
journal. Experts and professionals would drive the completion of the welfare state, not mass demand. For the journal’s editors and main contributors, this was a non-ideological position. To be against the state, or “anti-statist,” was to be ideological. Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater and William F. Buckley’s Jr.’s National Review were ideological in their opposition to the welfare state.279 As Kristol wrote, “I deemed that kind of ‘anti-statism’ to be a species of political hysteria, and I felt its reaction to the New Deal excessive” (1995a, p. 83). Like Glazer, Kristol also had hopes that the project of The Public Interest would help improve, not dismantle, the welfare state.

All of us had ideas on how to improve, even reconstruct, this welfare state—we were meliorists, not opponents, and only measured critics. It was when the Great Society programs were launched that we began to distance ourselves, slowly and reluctantly, from the newest version of official liberalism (Kristol, 1995a, p. 85).

This goal of completing the welfare state would fall within the explanation of Telos’s concept of artificial negativity, discussed further below. In brief, the critics no longer offered enough criticism of the state to keep it going. Without criticism or correction, the state would experience crisis and collapse. The state therefore had to produce criticism to make up for the shortfall. The Public Interest, a journal that was home to “cratic” as well as “critics” and sometimes effectively acted as a shadow government or backbench, could provide this needed but artificial critique.

Mark Lilla, a later member of the editorial staff, remarked that the journal’s hopefulness for the completion of the welfare state was apparent in the first five years of the journal. After 1970, the skeptical hopefulness became increasingly disenchanted with

279 In 1985, Glazer commented: “It was perhaps even more fortunate in justifying The Public Interest’s approach to public policy that it was launched in the wake of Lyndon Johnson’s enormous victory over Barry Goldwater, the last Republican candidate for President to campaign against the welfare state” (1985, p. 18).
the welfare state. “One senses no uniform retreat from the welfare state among our contributors, but one does sense a pause” (Lilla, 1985, p. 68). By 1975, with the publication of the special issue on the American bicentennial, the growing consensus within the journal held that not only were the new programs and expansion of the welfare state flawed but that the very foundations of the welfare state itself should be questioned. Bell later charged the journal with deriding the social sciences in favor of “common sense” (1985, p. 57). Bell argued that this change ran parallel with the journal’s ideological campaign against liberalism, which I discuss further below.

**Capitalism and the State**

Through its analyses of the politics of foreign countries, *Telos* was able to examine the state of “the state.” In one such article, Norberto Bobbio wrote, “The connection between the fear of Left subversion and the birth of Right terrorism is so evident that any further comment is superfluous” (1982, p. 123). However, for Bobbio, the larger problem facing Italy was the end of the parliamentary Center-Left coalition.

The fragmentation of Italy into multiple parties encourages a variety of possible combination; this, in turn, favors the rapid passage from one coalition to another and is surely one of the causes of governmental instability.... Governmental crises have thus become so commonplace that each government is already in crisis when it

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280 *Telos* often focused its critiques on states other than the United States. Articles appeared in the journal on the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Germany (East and West), Yugoslavia, Poland, Spain, Greece, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Hungary, Japan, Iran, Algeria, Italy, Argentina, South Africa, Israel, Brazil, Albania, Romania, France, Austria, China, and Guatemala – all within *Telos*’s first twenty years of publication. Focus on Third World not occurring until towards end of this period. While occasional pieces examined the condition of the United States, the journal did not formally announce its intention to analyze its home environment until 1977, when in the introduction to Issue 31 Piccone announced that the journal would begin to apply its theoretical discussions to a current understanding of the U.S. “Our exile into European theory may be nearing an end!” Early articles examining current issues in the United States included Herb Gintis’s “Activism and Counter-Culture: The Dialectics of Consciousness in the Corporate State” (Issue 12, 1972), Antonio Carlo’s “Towards a Redefinition of Imperialism” (Issue 20, 1974), John Zerzan’s “Unionization in America” (Issue 27, 1976), and James F. Petras’s “The Myth of the Decline of U.S. Capitalism” (Issue 28, 1976).
is being formed... The state of crisis is the normal state of affairs.... Instead of
Permanent Revolution, Italy’s political crisis has invented the permanent crisis (p.
125).

The title of the article, “Italy’s Permanent Crisis,” referred to a crisis of democratic
institutions, which Bobbio traced back to 1968. He viewed the resources of a democratic
state as being of a finite supply. Therefore, they should be used carefully and not wasted.
The Center-Left coalition could be thought of as a conservation of those resources. On the
other hand, the overuse of referenda by the Radical Party was an abuse of democratic
assets.

The request for a referendum can only be justified in the case of a serious problem
dividing the country into two parts having presumably the same clout. When the
request to abrogate a law is rejected by 80% or 90% of the voters, it is a sign that
the request never had any real support. So precious a good as popular participation
in referendums should not be squandered if one does not wish to see it dissipated.
The squandering of popular participation is a crime of democratic abuse which
some day will be paid for (1982, p. 127).

He pointed out other examples of Parliament’s loss of power and stated:

One day, when I was in a particularly bad mood, I wrote: ‘The State is in tatters. In
the meantime our weavers – the simile of rulers and weavers goes back at least to
Plato – continue to weave wefts ever more inconsistent on fabrics ever more fragile
and worn out’ (p. 128).

Despite these governmental failings, Bobbio admitted that the state was still intact. Instead
of a crisis of institutions, Bobbio described the current state of affairs in Italy as an
“institutionalization of the crisis” (p. 128). However, he also argued that another reason
why the state had not failed was because the state government operated alongside, or
above, a sub-government and crypto-government, the latter comprised of syndicated
crime. The former he defined as

that area of political power occupied by public bodies or public interest groups
through which a large part of the country’s economic policies is carried out, an area
that has been slowly but immeasurably enlarged during the last decades as the State
has assumed ever new functions that were foreign to the classical liberal State (p. 132).

Since the sub-government was never in crisis, Bobbio argued that this underlying foundation supported the state and its official government, preventing its collapse despite its volatility.

The expansion of the state into new arenas of social and economic activity was the target of much criticism in the United States following President Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty programs. However, arguably, state expansion was at least in part fueled by the private activities of foundations – a thesis put forth by Joan Roelofs in her 1984 *Telos* article, “Foundations and the Supreme Court.” There she wrote, “[m]any ‘Great Society’ programs were based on pilot projects financed by the Ford Foundation” (1984-85, p. 72). The foundations were the means by which the Court, an elite institution, received and processed elite demands. Her earlier 1979 article, “The Warren Court and Corporate Capitalism,” revealed the motivations behind the Court’s judicial activism and social engineering. They were mechanisms by which to ensure elite control and channel demands from the masses into safe and mild reforms. The foundations aided this process (Roelofs, 1979).²⁸¹

Roelof’s article on the influence of foundations on the Supreme Court highlighted the effect of corporate spending channeled through intermediaries on public policy. *The

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²⁸¹ Roelofs argued: “Foundations do not want to look as if they were trying to arrange the world to suit themselves. In fact, they even go as far as to sponsor some ‘artificial negativity.’ An early device to hide their hands was the creation of universities (e.g. University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins) and research institutes (e.g. American Law Institute, Brookings) whose findings would be regarded as detached and objective. More recently, there has been the creation or vital patronage of ‘grassroots’ organizations. What is striking about such groups (e.g. Planned Parenthood, Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund) is the passivity of membership (where there is any), reliance on professionals, and focus on litigation techniques” (1984, p. 59). I return to the subject of “artificial negativity” below.
*Public Interest*, itself a major influence on policy thinking, often relied on foundation support for the publication of special issues. Certain key articles also received funding from foundations.

Roelof's arguments along with others found in *Telos* borrowed from right-wing critiques of the state but demonstrated that an expanding welfare state was not in the interests of the poor and disenfranchised or any other group practicing identity politics. Rather, the necessarily expanding state was a product of the demands of neoliberalism and the continued control of corporate capitalism. Roelofs argued in “The Warren Court” that the Court's 1937 turn from a protector of *laissez-faire* capitalism to a promoter of Progressivism was an adaptive change of means to accomplish the same end.

Perhaps not surprisingly, owing to the influence of foundations among other things, *The Public Interest* contained criticisms of big business, or corporate capitalism, but not with an aim of any major reform, rather just enough to satisfy those harmed (Bell, 1971; Kristol, 1970, 1975). However, just as with James Q. Wilson’s evaluations of bureaucracy, which I discuss below, Bell's and Kristol's evaluations of big business held their subject up to a strict scrutiny that did not offer easy answers. In his analysis of corporate capitalism, Kristol also takes a historical approach that includes both the rise of big business as well as its populist opposition. Kristol sees negative and positive aspects of both corporate capitalism and its populist response.

In the case of the large corporation, we see a healthy populism and a feverish paranoia simultaneously being provoked by its sudden and dramatic appearance. The paranoia takes the form of an instinctive readiness to believe anything reprehensible, no matter how incredible, about the machinations of 'big business’ (Kristol, 1975, p. 127).
Kristol attributes this early twentieth century paranoia in part to the understandable confusion over the role of the big corporation as an institution in American life.\textsuperscript{282} However, Kristol is quick to point out that these populist critiques of big business were not anti-capitalist as such. Rather, the assumption underlying the critique was that the large corporation was subverting capitalism. Kristol contrasts this early populist response, rooted, as he claims in the tradition of “Progressive-reform,” with what he calls the current “anti-liberal Left” and its condemnation of big business as a sure sign of the trouble with capitalism (1975, p. 131).\textsuperscript{283} Contrasting these two different groups of “critics,” Kristol writes:

\begin{quote}
In the past decade...[‘Progressive-reform’] has experienced a transmutation of ideological substance, while preserving most of the traditional rhetorical wrapping. That is because it embraced, during these years, a couple of other political traditions, European in origin, so that what we still call ‘liberalism’ in the United States is now something quite different from the liberalism of the older ‘Progressive-reform’ impulse. It is so different, indeed, as to have created a cleavage between those who think of themselves as ‘old liberals’—and are now often redesignated as ‘neo-conservatives’—and the new liberals who are in truth men and women of ‘the Left,’ in the European sense of that term” (p. 131).
\end{quote}

Kristol blames this transformation of the left in part on the New Class who reject the acquisition of money for the acquisition of power, pursuing careers in universities and the over-grown government bureaucracy. They prefer “being” instead of “having,” according to

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{282} “In its concentration of assets and power-power to make economic decisions affecting the lives of tens of thousands of citizens—it seemed to create a dangerous disharmony between the economic system and the political. In the America of the 1890s, even government did not have, and did not claim, such power (except in wartime). No one was supposed to have such power—it was, indeed, a radical diffusion of power that was thought to be an essential characteristic of democratic capitalism” (Kristol, 1975, p. 128).
\textsuperscript{283} Kristol defines the movement of “Progressive-reform” and contrasts it with the “anti-liberal Left” when he states: “...in the main it accepted as fact the proposition that capitalism and liberalism were organically connected, and it proposed to itself the goal of ‘mitigating the evils of capitalism,’ rather than abolishing liberal capitalism and replacing it with ‘a new social order’ in which a whole new set of human relationships would be established. It was an authentic reformist movement” (1975, p. 133).
\end{quote}
Kristol, inspired by Marx’s phrase, “The enemy of being is having.”284 By which I believe Kristol means, they prefer a certain way of life rather than money for money’s sake, or recognize that money itself will not satisfy. A university professor is willing to forego a larger salary in the world of business, for example, in exchange for a certain intellectual environment and perhaps a more flexible schedule.

And corporate capitalism does have the great merit of being willing to provide a milieu of comfortable liberty—in universities, for example—for those who prefer *being* to *having*. But the trouble with the large corporation today is that it does not possess a clear theoretical—i.e., ideological—legitimacy within the framework of liberal capitalism itself. Consequently the gradual usurpation of managerial authority by the ‘new class’—mainly through the transfer of this authority to the new breed of regulatory officials (who are the very prototype of the class)—is almost irresistible (p. 137).

As a result of the afore-mentioned, Kristol argues that the large corporation is no longer a private institution but a “quasi-public” institution (p. 138). What Kristol fears is not that the large corporation could overwhelm the public sphere, or more specifically out-power the state, but that the corporation could become absorbed into the public sector.

The transformation of American capitalism that *this* would represent—a radical departure from the quasi-bourgeois ‘mixed economy’ to a system that could be fairly described as [a] kind of ‘state capitalism’—does constitute a huge potential threat to the individual liberties Americans have traditionally enjoyed. One need not, therefore, be an admirer of the large corporation to be concerned about its future (p. 139).285

That is so because the fate of corporate capitalism is inextricably intertwined in Kristol’s opinion with the fate of liberal democracy.

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284 He writes: “Or, to put it more accurately: They cease to think of acquiring money and begin to think of acquiring power so as to improve the ‘quality of life,’ and to give *being* priority over *having*. That is the meaning of the well-known statement by a student radical of the 1960’s: ‘You don’t know what hell is like unless you were raised in Scarsdale.’ Since it is the ambition of capitalism to enable everyone to live in Scarsdale or its equivalent, this challenge is far more fundamental than the orthodox Marxist one, which says—again all the evidence—that capitalism will fail because it *cannot* get everyone to live in Scarsdale” (Kristol, 1975, pp. 136-37).

285 The argument regarding a corporation’s private and public character is very interesting and continues to be a subject of debate, e.g., in *Citizens United v. FEC*, should the private corporation have a voice in public, political debate?
Bell’s article (1971) on the corporation and society appeared four years earlier than Kristol’s defense of corporate capitalism. Bell first raised the issue that backlash against corporate capitalism had become ideological, and “[a]ny issue that becomes ideological becomes distorted” (1971, p. 7). Bell stuck to the journal’s founding intentions to examine problems free of the distortions of ideology. However, the view that emerged from Bell’s “non-ideological” approach bore some difference from Kristol’s. Interestingly, in 1985 Bell would accuse The Public Interest and impliedly Kristol for being “enlisted in an ideological campaign against liberalism,” the very liberalism that Kristol seemingly sought to preserve through his defense of American corporate capitalism (1985, p. 57).

Bell argued that while the criticisms of corporate capitalism had become ideological, they still held some validity. Notably, he recognized the problem of externalities and the government’s responsibly to hold corporations accountable.

Just as it has been public policy to provide tax inducements to help corporations expand plant capacity (by investment credits, or more rapid depreciation allowances), so it will be public policy to provide tax penalties either to force corporations to bear the burdens of social costs generated by the firm, or to favor an alternative technology or supporting system if the social costs can be minimized by the alternative system or the social benefits enhanced. Given the collective effects of private decisions, this involvement of public policy in corporate policy is inescapable (1971, p. 21).

However, for Bell, what is more important to consider are not the specific policies that must be put into place to ensure that corporations do not harm society but rather the degree of responsibility the corporation owes to society and its place in it. As Kristol

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286 Bell wrote: “A feeling has begun to spread in the country that corporate performance has made the society uglier, dirtier, trashier, more polluted and noxious. The sense of identity between the self-interest of the corporation and the public interest has been replaced by a sense of incongruence” (1971, p. 7).

287 Bell argues: “To the extent that the traditional sources of social support (the small town, church and family), have crumbled in society, new kinds of organizations, particularly the corporation, have taken their place; and these inevitably become the arenas in which the demands for security,
admitted, the journal had always been more interested in social than economic problems, despite its increasing supply of economic analyses.\^{288}

Bell pointed to six areas on which the degree of obligation the corporation owes to society had not yet been settled: 1) satisfaction on the job, 2) minority employment, 3) relative pay,\^{289} 4) responsibility to a community, 5) responsibility for the environment, and 6) the confrontation with moral issues (i.e., whether a corporation need be concerned with them) (1971, pp. 22-25). Bell believed the corporation was at a turning point and that the question of social responsibility would become “crucial” in the next few years (p. 26). One side of the debate would line up with Milton Friedman and the argument that a corporation is an “artificial person” at the behest of its shareholders. Bell seemed unwilling to agree with this characterization.

The heart of the matter is the question of the nature of the corporation. Is the corporation primarily an instrument of ‘owners’—legally the stockholders—or is it an autonomous enterprise which, despite its particular history, has become—or should become—an instrument for service to society in a system of pluralist powers? (1971, p. 27).

Bell rejected the idea that the corporation simply acted as an agent for its shareholders, because he believed that ownership today is a legal fiction.

Most stockholders, he recognized, have little “ownership” in the sense of responsibility for or control over a corporation. They own stock through mutual funds and such and are not directly involved in the corporation’s activities. If the owners are not
involved, then who is is the question Bell raises. He sees a greater claim on the
corporations made by the employees than the owners.

True owners are involved directly and psychologically in the fate of an enterprise;
and this description better fits the employees of the corporation, not its
stockholders. For these employees, the corporation is a social institution which they
inhabit. It is politically and morally unthinkable that their lives should be at the
mercy of a financial speculator. In other words, the corporation may be a private
enterprise institution, but it is not really a private property institution (p. 29).

What may have been morally unthinkable in 1971 became all too much a part of reality by
the economic crisis of 2008. However, Kristol in 1970 believed that capitalism’s moral
failings were not to be blamed on capitalism itself.

The Public Interest produced a special issue titled “Capitalism Today” in the fall of
1970.290 There, Kristol published his article, “‘When Virtue Loses All Her Loveliness’--Some
Reflections on Capitalism and ‘The Free Society.’” In the article, he argued that capitalism
no longer held out the promise of a “virtuous life and a just society” (1970, p. 6).291
According to Kristol though, the cause of capitalism’s loss of loveliness cannot be found
within capitalism itself. Instead, he writes:

From having been a capitalist, republican community, with shared values and a quite
unambiguous claim to the title of a just order, the United States became a free,
democratic society where the will to success and privilege was severed from its
moral moorings (Kristol, 1970, p. 8).

290 The journal would publish another special issue devoted to the economy in 1980, titled “The
Crisis in Economic Theory.” In the introduction to the issue, the editors wrote that the journal had
so far largely neglected economic theory when discussing economic policy. Perhaps they meant
they had not discussed theory explicitly. Since they now had realized that all policy discussions end
up as controversies over theory, they decided to devote an issue to the question. This special issue
was funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.
291 Allitt argues that the journal’s rightward turn beginning in the 1970s was a product of The Public
Interest’s increasing attention to moral questions, a traditional ground for conservatives to take a
position. “The Public Interest approach...was to gather statistics on urban problems, analyze them
objectively, by computer when possible, review proposed responses, and advocate those that
proved most effective in practice. Only gradually did the authors realize that all the issues they
addressed contained unavoidable moral elements; as they stressed this moral dimension their
work began to take on a conservative coloration” (2009, p. 204).
In essence, Kristol argued that too much democracy is to blame for the loss of virtuousness. He and other contributors to the journal argued that the state play a role in the restoration of civic virtue. *Telos* also took up the question of civic virtue through an engagement with Christopher Lasch’s work. Lasch argued that liberalism assumes the state can dispense with civic virtue. However, unlike the members of the *Public Interest,* Lasch did not believe that civic virtue could be restored through the state, but rather it required a more populist or communitarian origin.

Writing in *Telos,* Frank Hearn (1983) recognized the blame put on “too much democracy” as a common complaint of the neoconservatives. In his article, “The Corporatist Mood in America,” Hearn argued that corporatism, “a consensus to defer to expertise,” found support among neoconservatives, the liberal wing of the Democratic party, and the left advocates of reindustrialization (1983, p. 43). Corporatism, akin to Bobbio’s argument of a sub-government or Drucker’s call for franchising the state, institutionalizes private groups to participate in the administration of the state. Under corporatism,

> [p]olitics is to become scientized, separated from normative questions, reduced through rational administration to an instrument of adaptation to reality (1983, p. 43).

This bears a remarkable similarity to the founding aims of *The Public Interest,* a tradition inherited from the Progressive era. Neoconservatives favor corporatism, Hearn argues, because it is rule by elites. Too much democracy destabilizes capitalism and constitutes a “crisis of democracy,” notably not a crisis of capitalism, to the neoconservatives.

Another article to appear in the same issue of *Telos* also analyzed the state of the economy and the policies of the state. John Kane and Ian Shapiro’s article, “Stagflation and the New Right,” re-viewed the economic policies of the New Right, more specifically,
Reagan and Thatcher, the current “cratics” in the U.S. and U.K. (1983). They provided an alternative view about the causes of stagflation and the New Right’s response to it. Echoing a common refrain of The Public Interest, they argued that “[t]he power of governments to affect the economy consists all too often in the power to make things worse” (Kane & Shapiro, 1983, p. 34). They claimed that the more likely cause of inflation was the monopoly power of business and/or the increasing concentration of capital since the 1950s, i.e., structural causes. They did not take a friendly view of corporate capitalism, as Kristol and Bell, to an extent, had done. Kane and Shapiro reached three main conclusions:

1) the New Right does represent a radical break with the past (a wholesale re-view or re-visorning) because it rejects the corporatist consensus of the Keynesian and New Deal eras;

2) the ideology of the unrestricted free market is mystifying;\(^{292}\) and 3) the New Right’s policies are not helping but they also are not the cause of stagflation. Again, as the authors argued, the blame belongs with monopoly capitalism. However, the authors still fear the “cratics” view:

As for their political consequences, the policies of the New Right are more frightening than those of their social-democratic predecessors; in the short term because of the misery they are creating among millions of workers, and in the longer term because they underscore the increasingly authoritarian social character of advanced monopoly capitalism (1983, p. 39).

A year earlier, Telos published an article by Hyman Minsky (1981-82). The publication is notable because Minsky definitely represented an alternative view of economic theory not represented then. As a result of the 2008 economic crisis, Minsky has

\(^{292}\) While some items in The Public Interest appeared to align with the free market ideology espoused by Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and the crowd at the National Review, I do not think the journal ever fully absorbed this view. There are many places where the journal daisains the ideology of what would become known as neoliberalism. Kristol also maintains that he has never read Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom and that he could not accept the National Review’s blind faith in free enterprise (Kristol, 1995a). I think then it is a mistake to equate neoconservatives with neolifers. However, that argument is worthy of a dissertation unto itself.
gained more attention as his “Financial Instability Hypothesis” provides an explanation for the current crisis (Mihm, 2009). In his Telos article, Minsky argued that the “welfare state is good for capitalists” (1981-82, p. 51). This was similar to Roelofs’ argument that the expanding welfare state was necessary to the continuing demands of corporate capitalism and the neoliberal direction in which the state was heading. Minsky’s article led the Telos editors to write in the issue’s introduction that there do not appear to be any alternatives to state intervention in Western economies (Piccone, 1981-82). The journal hoped that such intervention could be avoided in the future. It did not hold this view because the journal’s circle was comprised of free marketers/neoliberals but because they were largely anti-statists. As Luke wrote on the occasion of the journal’s one hundredth issue,

> Despite the many zig-zags in the history of Telos, the journal remains consistent. Never convinced that the state is either just or rational, Telos has been emphatically anti-statist.... Telos has continually highlighted the irrational side of allegedly rational-bureaucratic state authorities... (1994, p. 106).

> Dissimilarly, The Public Interest was not an anti-statist journal, even when they became vociferous critics of the welfare state produced by Johnson’s Great Society. Perhaps recognizing the truth of Roelof’s and Minsky’s arguments that the welfare state is good for capitalism, Kristol asserted that a tenet of neoconservatism was not hostility to the welfare

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293 In a simplified and brief version, the hypothesis holds that periods of economic stability set the stage for inevitable economic crisis.

294 As Sharon Zuckin commented in the issue devoted to the journal’s twentieth anniversary, “At best, writing in Telos tended to equate capital with the state as an overwhelming source of social terror as well as totalizing contradiction. The conjuncture, moreover, of the debates on peace movements and “Soviet-type” societies led to the journal’s most explicit normative statement to date, that it some states were bad, others that opposed them must be better. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe thus constituted a regional system even worse than capitalism. If this system threatened world peace by local wars and nuclear arms, it followed that it must be opposed by equivalent means” (1988, p. 49). In essence, certain forms of the state were bigger threats than capitalism.
state but only to its Great Society version (2011c).\textsuperscript{295} One of the problems with the welfare state was its vast bureaucracy, according to \textit{The Public Interest}. In its sixth issue, \textit{The Public Interest} published an article by James Q. Wilson, who would become a prolific contributor of the journal, titled “The Bureaucracy Problem.” The article began:

The federal bureaucracy, whose growth and problems were once only the concern of the Right, has now become a major concern of the Left, the Center, and almost all points in between. Conservatives once feared that a powerful bureaucracy would work a social revolution. The Left now fears that this same bureaucracy is working a conservative reaction. And the Center fears that the bureaucracy isn’t working at all (Wilson, 1967, p. 3).

Wilson argued that liberals, in the past, favored bureaucratic power at the federal level, because federal bureaucrats could not be easily corrupted by state and local influences. Further, they reported to a Presidential administration whose election depended upon the votes of urban, labor, and minority groups.

The New Deal bureaucrats, especially those appointed to the new, ‘emergency’ agencies, were expected by liberals to be free to chart a radically new program and to be competent to direct its implementation. It was an understandable illusion (pp. 3-4).

However, as Wilson argues, it is an illusion that has come to an end for those on all points of the political spectrum. With so much agreement that something must be done to fix the bureaucracy problem, one should expect some change. Yet, Wilson contends, “there is not one bureaucracy problem, there are several,” or five, to be more exact (p. 4).

1. There is the problem of accountability or control.
2. There is the problem of equity – like cases should be treated alike.
3. There is the problem of efficiency.

\textsuperscript{295} Kristol also wrote: “Neocons to not like the concentration of services in the welfare state and are happy to study alternative ways of delivering these services. But they are impatient with the Hayekian notion that we are on ‘the road to serfdom.’ Neocons do not feel that kind of alarm or anxiety about the growth of the state in the past century, seeing it as natural, indeed inevitable” (2011a, p. 192). The journal still found a role to be played by the state. In the journal’s later years this role would be the inculcation of virtue, except they were not sure how that could be accomplished and offered few suggestions.
4. There is the problem of responsiveness.
5. There is the problem of fiscal integrity (pp. 4-5).

Wilson argues that this diversity of problems engages diverse segments of the public.

Therefore, it is not an easy set of problems to solve. Wilson stresses that first and foremost any attempts at a fix must be grounded on the principle that “[t]here are inherent limits to what can be accomplished by large hierarchical organizations” (p. 6). Some of the reasons for this are that such organizations are comprised of people. Posts can be filled by “good people,” such as professors, to use one of Wilson’s examples, but as he argues, merely filling in with good people only gets you so far. Those people, particularly professors, are not familiar with the specific problems facing the bureaucracy and will try to apply general solutions that will not work. Another reason for the failure of bureaucracies is that there are never enough “good people” to occupy so many positions.

Some things literally cannot be done – or cannot be done well – because there is no one available to do them who knows how. **The supply of able, experienced executives is not increasing nearly as fast as the number of problems being addressed by public policy** (p. 7).

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**Notes:**

296 Wilson points out that the opposite view is more often in vogue. “If enough people don’t like something, it becomes a problem; if the intellectuals agree with them, it becomes a crisis; any crisis must be solved; if it must solved, then it can be solved – and creating a new organization is the way to do it. If the organization fails to solve the problem (and when the problem is a fundamental one, it will almost surely fail), then the reason is ‘politics,’ or ‘mismanagement,’ or ‘incompetent people,’ or ‘meddling,’ or ‘socialism,’ or ‘inertia’” (p. 6).

297 This issue of supply seems to be of particular importance to Wilson since he continues to sound the drum, stating: “This constraint deserves emphasis, for its is rarely recognized as a constraint at all. Anyone who opposed a bold new program on the grounds that there was nobody able to run it would be accused of being a pettyfogger at best and a reactionary do-nothing at worst. Everywhere except in government, it seems, the scarcity of talent is accepted as a fact of life. Nobody (or almost nobody) thinks seriously of setting up a great new university overnight, because anybody familiar with the university business knows that, for almost any professorship one would want to fill, there are rarely more than five (if that) really top-flight people in the country, and they are all quite happy – and certainly well-paid – right where they are. Lots of new business ideas don’t become profit-making realities because good business executives are both hard to find and expensive to hire. The government – at least publicly – seems to act as if the supply of able political executives were infinitely elastic, though people setting up new agencies will often admit privately that they are so frustrated and appalled by the shortage of talent that the only wonder is why disaster is so long in coming. Much would be gained if this constraint were mentioned to Congress before the bill
Wilson’s elitism was not uncommon among the members of *The Public Interest*. After all, they believed that they were “able” and “experienced” enough to critique the state and its policies.

For Wilson, the bureaucracy problem(s) can only begin to be solved once “we decide what it is we are trying to accomplish” (p. 8). To use the pronoun “we,” is to imply that it is Wilson and other members of *The Public Interest* who must decide what the state is trying to accomplish. The next logical conclusion is to find that the members of *The Public Interest* considered themselves to be the “cratics,” or to have enough influence over the “cratics” to influence the state. Wilson continued that only programs with clearly defined goals stand a chance of navigating the bureaucracy maze and producing the desired results. However, Wilson acknowledges the difficulty of his recommendation.

Thinking clearly about goals is a tough assignment for a political system that has been held together in great part by compromise, ambiguity, and contradiction. And if a choice must be made, any reasonable person would, I think, prefer the system to the clarity. But now that we have decided to intervene in such a wide range of human affairs, perhaps we ought to reassess that particular trade-off (p. 9).

The bureaucracy problem then could be directly associated with the expanding welfare state, where new programs, such as Johnson’s War on Poverty, had begun without clearly articulated objectives. By linking the bureaucracy problem to the expansion of the state,
Wilson set the stage for *The Public Interest* to critique the purposes of the welfare state.\footnote{For instance, in 1972, Kristol's article, "Of Populism and Taxes," said this of the welfare state: "I have suggested that much of our working-class discontent is over the structure of the welfare state. I would add that this discontent is exacerbated by the ways in which the welfare state is spending its tax revenues—for ever-growing welfare rolls, for an educational system that seems to be falling apart, for a police force that cannot cope with increased criminality, for low-income housing that converts itself into instant slums, for Medicaid to the poor which inflates medical costs for the non-poor, etc. It would not be an exaggeration to say that much of the present discontent with taxation is provoked by the fact that the welfare state, which these taxes support, is too committed to equality—to expenditures that benefit primarily the minority who are poor" (p. 11). Whereas turn of the century populist discontent was aimed at the big corporations, the populist dissent of the early 1970s, according to Kristol, aimed itself at big government. “The problem is the bureaucractization of American society—and the fact that this bureaucractization has failed to accomplish the only thing no bureaucracy dare fail at: the efficient delivery on its promises” (p. 11). *Telos* would later pose populism as an antidote to the over-bureaucratization of the federal government.} Eight years and thirty-five issues later, Wilson’s article, “The Rise of the Bureaucratic State,” did just that.

Wilson’s 1975 article on the bureaucratic state traced the early history of the Republic in keeping with the issue’s bicentennial theme, charting the gradual expansion of the executive branch and its explosion after World War I, the Depression, and World War II. Wilson argued that the sheer size of the government or how much money the government spent did not create a *de facto* bureaucracy problem. Instead, Wilson highlighted three ways in which bureaucratic power could be gathered so as to have a bureaucratic problem:

…by the growth of an administrative apparatus so large as to be immune from popular control, by placing power over a governmental bureaucracy of any size in private rather than public hands, or by vesting discretionary authority in the hands of a public agency so that the exercise of that power is not responsive to the public good (1975, p. 80).

The article then gives detailed histories of the Post Office and Department of Defense as examples of expanded bureaucracies. However, despite their size and defects, Wilson believes that these organizations do not pose a bureaucratic problem because they have not created a shift in the locus of political authority.
Wilson instead argues that what begin to lead to a bureaucracy problem was the period after 1861 in which “the government began to give formal, bureaucratic recognition to the emergence of distinctive interests in a diversifying economy,” such as the new departments of Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce (p. 88). A pattern of clientelism which originated with the early nineteenth century Pension Office continued in these new departments and also at the state level in client-oriented bureaucracies such as the occupational licensing agencies. As Wilson states:

These licensing boards—for plumbers, dry cleaners, beauticians, attorneys, undertakers, and the like—frequently have been criticized as particularly flagrant examples of the excesses of a bureaucratic state. But the problems they create—of restricted entry, higher prices, and lengthy and complex initiation procedures—are not primarily the result of some bureaucratic pathology but of the possession of public power by persons who use it for private purposes. Or more accurately, they are the result of using public power in ways that benefited those in the profession in the sincere but unsubstantiated conviction that doing so would benefit the public generally (p. 90).

Wilson cites the New Deal as the high water mark of at least the theory of bureaucratic clientelism. The increase in clientelism is founded in the “cooperative federalism” promoted after the 1913 passage of the federal income tax.

Whereas federal money was once spent in response to the claims of distinct and organized clients, public or private, in the contemporary period federal money has increasingly been spent in ways that have created such clients. And once rewarded or created, they are rarely penalized or abolished. What David Stockman has called the ‘social pork barrel’ grows more or less steadily (p. 92).

While Wilson believes that the size of the Post Office or Department of Defense would not give the Founding Fathers pause, he argues that they would be discouraged by the extent of bureaucratic clientelism to be found throughout the government.

He contends that while many of the programs engaging in clientelism were created through majority will, rather than by the particular or special interests which they serve, these programs create political relationships that are difficult to later alter by majority
coalitions. “What was created in the name of the common good is sustained in the name of the particular interest” (p. 93). Interestingly then, the bureaucratic problem, according to Wilson, is fed by local and particular interests. The bureaucracy is not a number of behemoth institutions located far, far away dictating the outcomes of individual lives remotely. As Wilson concludes:

> All democratic regimes tend to shift resources from the private to the public sector and to enlarge the size of the administrative component of government. The particularistic and localistic nature of American democracy has created a particularistic and client-serving administration. If our bureaucracy often serves special interests and is subject to no central direction, it is because our legislature often serves special interests and is subject to no central leadership. For Congress to complain of what is has created and it maintains is, to be charitable, misleading. Congress could change what it has devised, but there is little reason to hope it will (p. 103).

For *The Public Interest*, a solution to such a problem would be to remove control from particular interests and give it instead to political elites that knew better what they were doing and would not suffocate the state with such requests.³⁰⁰ This over-bureaucratized system would also be a large topic of interest to *Telos*, although they would approach the problem from an alternative view.

**Artificial Critics?**

In its early years, *The Public Interest* dropped its original aim of “completing the welfare state,” instead becoming increasingly critical of the welfare state and its policies. A change

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³⁰⁰ Wilson’s detailed history and analysis of the bureaucracy problem in the United States was almost thirty pages in length – long for an article in *The Public Interest*, although articles in special issues could be more substantial. That same issue, on the bicentennial, also contained Irving Kristol’s article, “Corporate Capitalism in America.” The preface to the issue announced its distinctive focus on questions of political philosophy rather than the journal’s usual focus on questions of social policy. The issue also marked the journal’s tenth anniversary, and as Mark Lilla argued, its shift away from the welfare state. Such a lengthy disquisition on a subject as somewhat tedious as bureaucracy could only find a home in a journal such as *The Public Interest* or *Telos*, a throwback to the lengthy essays to first appear in the “great reviews.”
of course also occurred at *Telos*. Although never committed to fulfilling the revolutionary goals of overthrowing the capitalist class, the journal began with at least one foot planted firmly in the Marxist tradition. In early 1977 Piccone, however, announced the death of Marxism\(^3\) at the St. Louis *Telos* Conference and advocated, “we should dump such a theoretical albatross and focus our attention on other, more relevant radical traditions” (Piccone, et al., 1977, p. 180). He argued further that “[t]he complete collapse of the Marxist-Leninist model forces us to seriously rethink what kind of institutional arrangements can allow for the *maximum negativity to develop,*” since the proletariat, or the class-for/in-itself, is no longer the fulcrum point from which the force of criticism or revolution can be multiplied (Piccone, et al., 1977, p. 182, emphasis added). The journal developed the concept of “artificial negativity” as produced by the over-bureaucratized, governmentalized state as an aid to understanding the continued vitality of capitalism and its co-option of intellectuals as members of the New Class.

Interestingly enough, perhaps the first articulations of what would become the concept known as “artificial negativity” were made outside the journal. Appearing in an issue of *New German Critique* in 1976, Piccone gave early hints of what was to come. The article, “The Return of Critical Theory,” detailed the revival of critical theory in the United

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\(^3\) Piccone wrote: “What had originally attracted us to Marxism—the project of human emancipation—has turned out to be only in the most superficial sense embodied in any of the various ‘Marxisms’ that we have painfully rediscovered in the last ten years. Not only that, but many of us have re-examined the critiques of Marxism put forth by people such as Bakunin, Landauer, Castoriadis, Lefort, and many others whose work has become victim of both ‘bourgeois’ as well as ‘Marxist’ social amnesia, and have come to realize that the naïve contraposition of a fundamentally sound Marx to a degenerate Second International, Third International, Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism, Maoism, Trotskyism, etc., is no longer tenable: the problem can be located in the sanctified work of Marx himself! We must stop blaming Kautsky, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin for “Marxism” in the effort to pump formaldehyde into a theoretical cadaver which, after all, died of a legitimate disease. Looking back over the last eight years, it can be said that our historical function has been primarily to provide Marxism with a decent burial” (p. 180-81).
States, an irony since critical theory was all but defunct in its homeland, Germany. Describing Adorno’s themes as “brilliant elaborations of the logic of entrepreneurial capitalism,” he argued that Adorno’s analysis of domination is but an extension of exploitation and that late capitalism calls for a different analysis.

Thus, the destruction of particularity and otherness—which was Adorno’s basic analysis of anti-Semitism and racism in general—is the historically specific task of an earlier phase of capitalism, whereas in its late monopoly state the continued viability of the system of universal domination can be guaranteed only by salvaging and even artificially stimulating this otherness and particularity to generate that negativity without which the system cannot efficiently operate (Piccone, 1976, pp. 103-104, emphasis supplied in bold).

In other words, in the transition from entrepreneurial capitalism to monopoly capitalism, the system became too adept at domination eliminating all particularity and negativity (or criticism). However, without negativity, the system cannot reproduce itself; capitalism being a beast that adapts to crises and criticism by correcting course and renewing itself. Therefore, monopoly or late capitalism began to artificially create various strains and currents of negativity to cure itself.302

In essence, the “cratic’s” lost their foil, ”the critics,” is how the argument goes. If the move from entrepreneurial capitalism to monopoly capitalism is dated somewhat earlier to the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution than the years between World Wars as argued by the Frankfurt School and adopted by Telos, then the loss of the critical view of the state would also correspond to the decline of the “great reviews” tradition, which faded away in

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302 Minsky's and Roelof's arguments that the welfare state is good for capitalists is an example of this. The Great Society version of the welfare state provokes critique from its opponents, largely conservatives but also those on the far left. This “artificial negativity” is then incorporated into the state to “cure” its deficiencies, which are not really deficiencies since the welfare state’s programs allow late monopoly capitalism to continue, but then capitalism and the welfare state are improved or strengthened, or so the theory of artificial negativity goes.
the 1860s. Or perhaps the loss of the critical view occurs within the technocratic transitional phase.

In the American context...where the technocratic transitional phase is over and the new monopoly capitalism reigns supreme, the system is rapidly discovering that it is too repressive for its own good. Its effectiveness, in fact, can be guaranteed only by critical watchdogs that had earlier almost entirely been eliminated. As a result, not only are official organs of repression dismantled from above, but some free space is artificially created to allow for the growth of the needed critical dimension (Piccone, 1976, p. 104).

Additionally, the system withdraws in some areas to create necessary spaces where negativity can grow, perhaps even allowing the generation of organic negativity. However, this early articulation of the theory did not yet discuss organic negativity. Some Telosers would argue that Piccone never clearly explained or investigated what he meant by “organic negativity.”

The first appearance in the journal of Piccone’s concept of artificial negativity was made in a conference report, rather than fully expressed in an essay. Since someone other than Piccone wrote this report on the Antioch Telos Conference, the theory entered the journal secondhand. The report stated that Piccone’s paper, “Beyond Critical Theory,” was “the boldest and most exciting of the presentations and, consequently, drew the most

303 At the KansasTelos Conference in 1980 on the subject of “The Crisis of the Left,” Piccone, in essence, explained the existence of the “New Left” (which he redefined as an artificially mass-media generated phenomenon) as a product of artificial negativity. In the discussion that followed, Robert Antonio argued that Piccone failed to adequately define “organic negativity.” “Piccone responded that he had tried to explain ‘artificial negativity’ to Antonio for over four years without success, so he doubted that he would succeed now” (K. T. Group, 1980-81, p. 85). Still, he made another attempt, explaining the concept as presupposing “individuality, a ‘genuine opposition,’ and a ‘new vision’—none of which currently exists. Programs which assume the presence of these factors are doomed to failure. Their ‘emancipatory possibilities’ cannot be realized until ’Marxism, environmentalism, and pseudo-Leftist authorities’ are replaced with a coherent Leftist vision and alternative lifestyles” (p. 85). Also, see below for my argument that Piccone’s understanding of organic negativity evolved over time.

304 The byline for the report read “KansasTelos Group,” and Robert Antonio, then a member of the group, later took credit for it.
criticism” (K. T. Group, 1977, p. 190). The summarization of the paper is interesting and informative, so I will reproduce it at length here:

By elaborating Marcuse’s original account of one-dimensionality, whereby the system feeds on its internal opposition, Piccone argued that in the late 1970s, the full collapse of the Russian and Chinese models of socialism had paved the way for unchallenged U.S. world hegemony, with the result that the main internal contradiction within advanced capitalism was the lack of internal opposition necessary to provide the system with much-needed control mechanisms. Thus, the most striking characteristic of the new phase of monopoly capitalism was the reversal of the transition phases’ drive toward homogenization, standardization, and the ruthless elimination of all specificity and otherness—the reversal of the dialectic of Enlightenment. In this phase, the system finds itself increasingly forced to sponsor its own internal opposition—artificial negativity—which, inasmuch as it is just an extension of the logic of one-dimensionality, is counter-productive and will not succeed in providing the needed organic negativity. The latter can only be provided by lingering pre-capitalist formations not yet destroyed by one-dimensionality, and by radical intellectuals. Given these alternatives, the task of radical theory becomes one of devising ways of combining emancipatory possibilities within the organic negativity which it will be forced to provide. In conclusion, Piccone saw Marxism as the theoretical expression of entrepreneurial capitalism, critical theory as the expression of the transition phase, and only a subjectively or phenomenologically grounded new version of this tradition as adequate to the new monopoly phase (p. 190).

Not everyone at the conference agreed with Piccone’s assessment, just as not everyone at the St. Louis Conference had agreed with his burial of Marxism. The two largest critiques of the paper were: 1) the discussion of a phenomenological grounding was inadequate, and 2) the concept of organic negativity was not elaborated. Piccone admitted that the theory was still in a gestation phase and needed further work. However, as the report admitted, despite—or perhaps because of—the criticisms, frontal attacks, and the fact that it did not seem all that far removed from critical theory (at least not yet), Piccone’s theory of artificial negativity provoked the most substantive and interesting dialogue of the meetings (p. 191).

Piccone’s theory of artificial negativity made its “official” appearance in the journal three issues later with essays by Piccone and Tim Luke. The journal was in its tenth year of publication. Just three issues before, it had published Gramsci’s “Notes on Journalism.” It is easy to argue that part of the motivating force behind this new theoreticization of the
the possibility of criticism was a reevaluation of the journal’s own purpose and existence. Issue 35 contained Tim Luke’s “Culture and Politics in the Age of Artificial Negativity” (1978) and Paul Piccone’s “The Crisis of One-Dimensionality” (1978). The introduction to the issue stated:

In the attempt to come to grips with post-1968 events, recently there has been much internal discussion concerning ‘artificial negativity.’ In this issue, two articles attempt to outline what it is all about, as well as to provide some idea of how it proposes to synthesize many hitherto unrelated baffling social, political and cultural phenomena. Again, traditional Marxist analyses and New Left variations turn out to be wholly inadequate for this task of grasping the latest thrust of advanced capitalism—so much so that they have even ceased to function as cannon fodder to rationalize further that very system that they have hitherto indirectly regulated by means of sustained internal critiques. In this context, it becomes necessary to recreate artificially the previously destroyed free space within which new regulatory critiques can be developed to help regulate an over-bureaucratized system too successful for its own good (“Introduction,” 1978, p. 3).

The theory of artificial negativity then also argues that the “critics” prop up the “cratics” through their criticism; they are a necessary part of a functioning capitalist state.

Within that same issue, a report on the 1978 St. Louis Telos Conference appeared where Piccone had used the theory of artificial negativity to provide an understanding of recent developments within advanced capitalism. He reiterated the theory and then argued that the system’s need for “organic negativity” leads to “a lessening of repression and to a partial dismantling of the administrative apparatus whenever possible” (S. L. T. Group, 1978, p. 181). Therefore, a space develops in which critique can occur. However, Piccone continued that “[n]ow the left is able to put forth a critique of the existing order, but either it no longer has anything to say, or there is no one who will listen” (pp. 181-182). One could also say that a space for transmission was available but either there was nothing to transmit or no one available to receive.
The first issue of The Public Interest contained an article by Daniel P. Moynihan titled “The Professionalization of Reform." The professionalization of reform, Moynihan argued, is the product of an economic revolution, the professionalization of the middle class, and the exponential growth of knowledge. The economic revolution has allowed countries to learn how to manage their economies and be able to put those increased revenues to some good social purposes. The professionalization of the middle class has created a culture in which the professional is viewed as someone with “an independence of judgment, esoteric knowledge, and immunity to outside criticism” (Moynihan, 1965, p. 13). The exponential growth of knowledge has created the foundation for the government “to respond intelligently and in time to the changing needs and desires of the electorate” (p. 15). In all, the practice of reform, the quest to fulfill “the public interest,” has been made more possible than ever.

They are less and less political decisions, more and more administrative ones. They are decisions that can be reached by consensus rather than conflict (p. 12). However, Moynihan argues, the price to be paid is a potential "monocracy of power" (quoting Harold D. Laswell, Moynihan, 1965, p. 16). The professional reformers will rule, and the public will lose interest in their “public interest.” To the Telos crowd, Moynihan’s reform professionals could be viewed as an example of artificial negativity. As the public loses interest, does not animate resistance, and stops pushing for reform, the professional “knowing betterness” becomes an artificial negativity. Moynihan revisited this article upon the journal’s thirtieth anniversary (Moynihan, 1995). There he pointed to an earlier comment he made in The New York Times that “there is a movement to turn Republicans into Populists, a party of the People arrayed against a Democratic Party of the State...”
(quoting himself, 1995, p. 40). This too could be construed as an example of artificial negativity, replacing absent critics of the state with Republicans as Populists.

As usual, Piccone’s elaboration of the concept sparked heated discussion. As reported, Alvin Gouldner questioned the worth of the very notion of artificial negativity.

First, he argued, it seemed to presuppose the one-dimensionality thesis; and secondly, it was a critique without politics because it reduced all political projects to mere regulatory means condemned to become victims of the system’s assimilative power (p. 183, emphasis added).

In essence, politics becomes all crtical, or without critics. Barry Commoner went even farther calling Piccone “a threat to the Left,” specifically to any future left whom “in their gullibility might be taken in by Piccone’s account” (p. 183). The theory remained a controversial one within and outside the Telos circle and was in part responsible for some of the editorial rifts that occurred over the next decade.

In essence, the critics of the artificial negativity thesis argued that the theory actually proscribed an emancipatory politics. It was not a case of a divorce of theory from practice. This was different from Adorno’s intentional obscuring of theoretical discourse to avoid its instrumentalization. This was a theory that eliminated the possibility of a politics, they argued. Their criticisms though raised the question of what is politics? Validly though, their criticisms also broach the matter of what role does a journal like Telos play in an age of artificial negativity? Is its critique or negativity also artificial?

Despite such criticisms, Piccone stood by the theory. At the Elizabethtown Telos Conference in February 1990, he compared artificial negativity to Habermas’s “communication theory,” which he argued had “generated a whole series of wrong forecasts concerning the direction of modern society during the past decade and a half,” some of which he enumerated.
Compared to this record of failure of Panglossian projections, matched only by the new communication theory’s inability to produce anything beyond duplicating arguments and results obtained elsewhere in the established disciplines, the projections made on the basis of the artificial negativity analysis have turned out much more accurate. The increasing involution of bureaucratic apparatuses has proceeded as fast as projected; the disintegration of the Soviet empire to a series of junior partners vis à vis the West is rapidly becoming a historical fact; almost every kind of internal opposition in the West has been integrated and legitimated by the system (first and foremost, whatever remained of Critical Theory) with no significant system rationalization or amelioration of existing pathologies; while inequality, injustice and irrationality are ever more pervasive (1989-90, pp. 116-117).

Although criticized as a pessimistic theory and a nonpolitical theory—and more importantly a theory that prevents politics—all these criticisms containing some truth, Piccone maintained the theory for the duration of his engagement with the journal. However, in his last interview in the journal, and his second to last contribution to the journal before his death, Piccone’s explanation of the theory, especially the concept of “organic negativity,” seemed to have taken on a slightly more optimistic note.305

As these crises unfold, the theory further stipulates that the system will attempt to reconstitute artificially the needed subjectivity (negativity as one of the system’s most important internal control mechanisms) through bureaucratic and administrative means. Such a strategy, however, is doomed to fail, to the extent that subjectivity, creativity and negativity cannot be spun out administratively—artificially—without simultaneously becoming extensions of that same apparatus they are meant to rationalize and modulate. The only way out is to roll back the administrative apparatus to allow the natural gestation of ‘organic negativity’—autonomous individuality—thus reintroducing precisely that subjectivity essential for any self-sustaining social system. This state of affairs, however, exposes the predominant system to challenges it cannot deflect, resulting in radical qualitative changes (Raventos, 2002, p. 134).

However, not to end on too positive a note, Piccone quickly added that while these radical qualitative changes could be the early harbingers of Marx’s utopia, they could just as quickly degenerate into such 20th century horrors as Auschwitz, the Gulag, and Hiroshima.

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305 Piccone’s last essay to appear in Telos was “The Perseverance of Stalinism,” published posthumously in Issue 131 (Summer 2005).
The concept of “artificial negativity” became a hallmark of the journal and can be viewed as a contribution made by the journal to political theory, although it is not without its critics. For example, Boris Frankel described the theory as giving the “State” extreme omnipotence (1982). Telos’s own reflections on its history and also reflections found outside the journal have emphasized the journal’s introduction of the artificial negativity concept. This memorialization of the contribution, in a way, serves to reify the concept.

Further, to return to Bourdieua’s concept of the field, it is indicative of intellectuals’ need to label themselves or other intellectuals with identifiable markers that position them within the intellectual field. “Oh, you’re talking about the Telos crowd, the ones that came up with artificial negativity.” Immediately, this places the journal and its associates in a certain place within the field, perhaps on the Left, on the dominated pole, near Theory and Society, sort of, and opposed to neoliberal ideas. This classification scheme makes the reader’s (or non-reader’s) job easier by associating thinkers and/or journals with a hallmark concept that defines and neatly packages the perhaps more diverse and sometimes contradictory thought they espoused. In the case of Telos, some of its editors

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Frankel continues, “Piccone and Luke argue that ‘the New Left along with the various counterculture movements of feminism, black consciousness, and student activism were part of the constitution process of artificial negativity.’ So too were the victories in Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, plus nearly every anti-capitalist protest and struggle during the 1960s and 1970s. Without all these internal and external forms of opposition American capitalism would become irrational and develop internal problems with which it could not cope. Thus what is needed are ‘social counter-weights to the bureaucracy. In order to provide these, it is necessary to reconstitute internal critique and opposition—so much so that where these critiques and oppositions do not develop spontaneously, they tend to be bureaucratically planned.’ It is interesting to note that Piccone and Luke’s extreme pessimism goes together with an overinflated admiration for the foresight of ‘State’ and ‘Capital.’ In this scenario the ‘rationality’ of capitalism can never really lose; for if all the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s were merely necessary developments for the continuation of ‘the system,’ how can one ever engage in social struggles that are ‘genuine negations’ and not ‘artificial negations’?! The absence of large working class parties in North America (compared to Western Europe) seems to breed a peculiar form of abstracted radical pessimism where faith in the capacity of capitalism is widely shared by both its apologists and its so-called opponents such as Piccone, Luke and Willhelm” (Frankel, 1982, p. 111).
and contributors embraced the artificial negativity thesis and begin to incorporate it into their own work, while others did not.

I am not yet making the argument that the journal sought to distinguish itself with the concept of artificial negativity or wanted the journal to become self-identified with it. However, this thematization, as Jameson has named it, while carving out a certain identity for an intellectual position can become totalizing (Jameson, 2009). Adorno warned of this tendency when he said,

As very often happens in the case of major intellectual phenomena, when the unity and grandeur of their original conception disintegrates, individual fragments are torn out by the epigones, who each seek a chunk for themselves, if you will forgive me in this inelegant image, and regard it as the philosopher's stone by which absolutely everything can be explained. In contrast to this, the truly important conceptions are almost always distinguished by the fact that they do not include any such magic words, that they do not have any specific category by which everything can be explained once and for all. Rather, they form contexts or constellations of categories as a means of explanation, instead of calling on one of them to be a maid-of-all-work. But—and this is a socio-psychological observation—just when a theory has a keyword, such as Jung’s ‘collective unconscious’ or Durkheim’s ‘collective consciousness’ or whatever it may be, such ‘maxims,’ as Hegel already termed this phenomenon, take on a peculiar suggestive power. And one can only encourage scholars who want to make their mark in the world and have a big success in the market to think up such a ‘maxim,’ some single category that can be attached to everything, so that everything under the sun is given a label (2000, p. 113).

While artificial negativity may never have achieved the level of a “major intellectual phenomena,” I think it is fair to say that the theory played a big role in the journal and perhaps foreclosed, and also opened, other investigations or theoretical avenues after its introduction.

The journal began to think past conventional categories of Left and Right and began to explore the new terrain of federalism and populism. Gary Ulmen, who wrote the introduction to the collection of Piccone’s essays titled Confronting the Crisis, remarked that “[o]nce Telos moved beyond Left and Right, it found the American focus it had sought from
the beginning,” that focus centered on “postmodern” federalism (2008, p. xxiii). Piccone wrote that after traversing through the labyrinths of East European communism and communication theory, which took over a decade of the journal’s time, _Telos_ was then able to rediscover America and political theory (Piccone, 2008b). Beginning in the late 1980s, after the editorial splits, it did so through the work of two theorists, Carl Schmitt (political theory) and Christopher Lasch (populism). Special issues on Schmitt in 1987, populism in 1988 and 1991, and federalism in 1991 and 1992 gave the journal the space to make these explorations.

Following the special issue on Schmitt, the journal published a correspondence titled “Reading and Misreading Schmitt: An Exchange,” between Jeffrey Herf, a historian of twentieth-century Germany with a focus on the Nazi period, and Paul Piccone and Gary Ulmen. In the correspondence, Herf stated that “[t]he issue devoted to Carl Schmitt is a sad event in the history of _Telos_,” due to Schmitt’s affiliations with Nazism (Herf, Piccone, & Ulmen, 1987-88, p. 133).307 Herf would not be alone in this assessment, as discussed further below. Why was _Telos_ interested in publishing and analyzing such a controversial figure? As Piccone explained it, Schmitt and his friend/foe distinction and critique of liberalism, although limited, provided the journal with the political theory it was lacking.

Even the most popular brand of German “Critical Theory” has broken with the founding fathers and joined the new liberal bandwagon leading to promising academic careers, but contributing absolutely nothing aside from a new fashionable jargon. It is for this reason, among others, that it may be useful to re-examine the foundations of political theory – even if this involves dealing with such an unsavory and problematic figure as Carl Schmitt.... Whatever one may think about Schmitt’s Nazi affiliation, his work deserves the kind of scrutiny it has not yet received. A confrontation with his ideas can only invigorate whoever undertakes it – and, clearly, Left political theory can use all the help it can get (1987, p. 4).

307 Although _Telos_ was one of the first, if not the first, critical forums to engage with Schmitt in the U.S., other “leftist” thinkers would also explore his thought, including but not limited to, Gopal Balakrishnan, Slavoj Zizek, Chantal Mouffe, and Jacques Derrida (Wolfe, 2004).
While Piccone’s treatment of Schmitt’s questionable background may sound cavalier here, the journal did not embrace Schmitt without reservation.\textsuperscript{308}

Piccone noted that internally there was considerable opposition to the undertaking, mostly from the Habermasians, who would depart the journal around this time. Piccone also noted that nothing on Schmitt appeared in English before 1970. However, members of Telos’s editorial circle were exposed to Schmitt in the mid-1960s when Mitchell Franklin came to teach philosophy at SUNY-Buffalo. He had been a member of the U.S. legal team at the Nuremberg trials and through that work had become acquainted with Schmitt’s oeuvre. The journal was also connected to Schmitt through Gary Ulmen, who was a close friend of George Schwab, the author of The Challenge of the Exception. Through Schwab, Ulmen met Schmitt. It was Ulmen who proposed the special issue on his work (Piccone, 1999). Piccone’s response to Herf was essentially that the journal chose to focus on Schmitt because the journal is a forum for such “repressed, ignored, or passed over” thinkers (1987-88, p. 140).\textsuperscript{309} The journal would continue to trot out this defense of anti-orthodoxy

\textsuperscript{308} Piccone also remarks that they tried to read Schmitt as a Nazi. However, “[i]t did not work. It made much more sense to read him as a profound critic of liberalism and as a political theorist. But even that did not lead us to Schmitt’s more provocative and original ideas, since most of what is written on Schmitt focuses almost exclusively on the concept of the political and the critique of parliamentarianism. Only later did we discover his constitutional theory, his vindication of Ordnungsdenken, his political theology, his reconstruction of the history of international law, his account of legality and legitimacy, his concept of Grossraum, etc. – positions having nothing to do with Nazism and which are extremely useful to analyze the contemporary world” (1999, pp. 145-146). I am not a student of Schmitt, having read only a limited amount of his work. It is likely true that at least some of Schmitt’s political theory can be separated from his Nazism. However, it seems in error to dissociate, for example, his concept of Grossraum from Hitler’s view of Europe as Germany’s backyard.

\textsuperscript{309} More fully, Piccone’s reply to Schmitt included the following: “As an alternative to Schmitt [for a special issue], you dig up a whole series of personalities, some of which are only remotely related to political theory. The point is not so much their theoretical relevance, but the limitations and casuistry of what can be published by a small independent journal. Our task is not to belabor the obvious by doing, as you suggest with a straight face, a special issue on Churchill or anyone else
when it faced further criticism of its inclusion of other controversial groups and figures, such as the Lombardy League and Alain de Benoist.\textsuperscript{310}

The journal’s engagement with Schmitt contributed to its embrace of federalism and also populism, which Ulmen claims is presupposed by a genuine federalism (2008, p. xxiii).\textsuperscript{311} The federalist and populist turns are also products of the journal’s anti-statism, present from some of its earliest pages.\textsuperscript{312} Only with federalism and populism could the journal envision a form of government that could be held accountable and in which organic negativity could possibly emerge. As Luke remarked,

Much of the federal populism Telos is examining more closely in many of its recent issues is an attempt to think beyond the mechanical fusion of states and markets, which often sees abstract state power as a defender of popular class interests against predatory capital (T. Luke, 1994, p. 107).

In essence, the journal’s investigation of federalism continued its critique of an overly bureaucratic and bloated state.

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\textsuperscript{310} “Telos' openness to unknown, ignored or outlawed approaches to many philosophical and political questions, which more conventional organs systematically avoid, has brought controversial and unorthodox insights into public debate from alternative thinkers ranging from Baudrillard, Heidegger and Bobbio to Husserl, Schmitt and Kosik” (Staff, 1989-90, p. 129). By adopting such a strategy of conceptualizing the journal as a forum for anti-orthodox thinking, it perhaps allows the journal to escape some of the fallout for particular thinkers. This is a rather inarticulate way of saying that Baudrillard and Schmitt are both unorthodox, but only one joined the Nazis. Alan Wolfe, in a piece that uses Schmitt to understand the failings of the Left (non-political) and the success of the Right (political), writes that “Telos developed a fascination with neofascist thinkers and movements in Italy, as if to proclaim that anything would be better than Marx's contemporary, John Stuart Mill, and his legacy” (2004, p. n/a).


\textsuperscript{312} As Piccone wrote, “Telos' recent populist turn does not constitute a break with the past, but the culmination of a quarter century of efforts to relate continental thought to American realities, Critical Theory to concrete politics, and to reunite that subjective moment vindicated by phenomenological Marxism with its otherness presently alienated in Washington and other administrative centers of bureaucratic domination” (2008b, p. 306).
Decentralization requires, however, local communities capable of governing themselves. *Telos* therefore turned to populism and Communitarianism.\(^{313}\) However, it is a bit of a chicken-and-egg argument since federalism depends on strong communities and as the argument goes, federalism also contributes to strong communities, “preserving a degree of cultural particularity and specificity inconceivable within either unitary nations of the federal state” (Bishay, 1994, p. 77). While a call for federalism associated the journal with conservatives, returning to President Richard Nixon’s calls for a new federalism. The journal’s exhortations for a possible new populism encouraged even more negative associations.\(^{314}\) As Piccone remarked,

[p]opulism is hated and misunderstood all over the world, especially by the New Class and academics, who immediately associate it with fascism and other authoritarian regimes. The problem with this association is that populism is usually a reaction against democratic deficits and is always much more democratic than any system based on representative democracy (quoting Piccone, Raventos, 2002, p. 147).

Piccone went on to argue that the New Class fears populism because it rejects the distinction between intellectuals and non-intellectuals. In many places, Piccone argued that the type of populism he advocates in the journal is neither racist nor fascist.

Cultural particularity...does not refer to a closed universe, but to a dynamic tradition, inevitably engaged in a continuous dialogue with other similar cultures, and able to learn and to change organically as a result. In other words, this means that Lombards in Italy accept the Sicilians living among them as their equals, Saxons in Germany regard the local Turks as their peers, and Bretons in France respect Algerian immigrants as permanent neighbors. Communities have nothing to do with

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\(^{313}\) Piccone remarked: “While *Telos* does not have and never has had a collective political position shared to the letter by all of its editors and collaborators, its political sympathies are predominantly communitarian...which helps explain the consistency with which it is attacked by what remains of the doctrinaire Left and many *soi-distant* Rightists” (1999, p. 144).

\(^{314}\) Michael Harrington’s critique of the neoconservative crowd included a discussion of an article by Nathan Glazer that sought to revive *Gemeinschaft*. In response, Harrington wrote: “In some ways, this celebration of the organic as against the rational is the most unfortunate aspect of neoconservatism” (1973, p. 448). It is thus easy to see why *Telos‘* federalist and populist turns associate them with conservative and neoconservative views.
race and ethnicity, but with their particular histories, modes of interaction, institutional orders embodying common values, and a shared future (1999, pp. 155-156).

I do not have the space available here to fully investigate Telos’ engagement with Schmitt, federalism, populism, and other topics that have provoked controversy. Members, former and current, of the Telos circle have questioned the journal’s use and analyses of these topics and themes. The journal remains a place where such unorthodox or radical ideas can be investigated. The criticism that cannot be ignored is whether Telos has not sufficiently critiqued these ideas. In other words, a journal devoted to criticism, described by one contributor as representation of “the pure urge to criticize somehow materialized in a journal format,” gains a reputation as a forum that ruthlessly criticizes everything existing (D. Gross, 1994, p. 110). If the journal then turns in new directions but does not continue that ruthless criticism, it could be thought to be deceiving its readers or at least depriving them of its re-viewing practice. As David Gross put it,

[p]opulism, communitarianism, and federalism, then, are what comprise Telos’ ‘vision’ at the present time. Though there is nothing wrong with this vision as such, it might seem strange that Telos has identified itself with it, for over the years Telos has acquired the reputation for being one of the most abstractly theoretical journals to come out of the 1960s New Left. Can a journal as theoretical as Telos still be convincingly populist or communitarian? (1994, pp. 114-115).

Reversals?

On its tenth anniversary, The Public Interest published a special issue on the bicentennial.

In the preface announcing the “special” issue, the editors wrote:

Whether or not it has special merit, we leave it to our readers to decide. But it certainly is special in size and also distinctive in its focus on issues of political philosophy, as against our usual focus on questions of social policy. This shift in focus would seem appropriate to the occasion. Whatever the costs or benefits of particular social policies, it is on fundamental issues of political philosophy that the American republic is likely to stand or fall (Kristol & Glazer, 1975, p. 3).
The journal’s shift from questions of policy to questions of philosophy began even earlier however. As Glazer noted in his retrospective essay, “Neoconservative From the Start,” the journal quickly realized that questions of policy or “means” were very dependent on questions of values or “ends.” To evaluate whether a social policy actually meliorated the public interest, one first needed to know what the public interest was.

We began to realize that our successes in shaping a better and more harmonious society, if there were to be any, were more dependent on a fund of traditional orientations, ‘values,’ or, if you will, ‘virtues,’ than any social science or ‘social engineering’ approach (Glazer, 2005, p. 13).

As early as 1971, Kristol wrote an editorial in which he noted a shift in public policy discussion from means to ends. His editorial gives the impression that the journal was merely reacting to outside change when it was the journal that played a great role in shaping public policy discussion.\(^{315}\)

Discussion of public policy today is in an interesting state of confusion—interesting, because the confusion reflects an unnoticed shift in the terms of the discussion. The shift is from argument over the selection of priorities to controversy over the choice of goals—a shift from means to ends, from economics to political philosophy as the articles by Daniel Bell and E. J. Mishan put it. It is hard to imagine a more important distinction—yet it has been blurred by the fact that so many people still talk of ‘reordering our priorities’ when what they have in mind, more often than not unwittingly, is actually the redefinition of the purposes of our political life (Kristol, 1971, p. 3).

For Kristol, at root is the question: “What kind of society should America be?” (1971, p. 4).

In 1985, Mark Lilla wrote in the journal’s twentieth anniversary issue that most authors appearing in *The Public Interest* no longer believed in the very thing the journal named itself after.

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\(^{315}\) Robert Nisbet noted in the journal’s twentieth anniversary issue: “*The Public Interest* became in short order a very center of the policy thinking in this country that dealt with the relationships between the private and public sectors—with a historically rare interest in such matters as localism, regionalism, decentralization, mediating structures, and so on” (1985, p. 136).
Not that our pages have changed that radically in twenty years. The continuities are still apparent: standard, sober articles on social policy, and a great many articles—on higher education, science, law, political philosophy, the electoral system—that do not fit the mold at all. Yet slowly, almost imperceptibly, ‘the public interest’ became as obscure as the purposes of the welfare state itself (Lilla, 1985, p. 74).

The turn from policy to political philosophy was also an acknowledgement of the limits of social policy. The emphasis on limits had begun in the early 1970s, an example being Glazer’s 1971 piece “The Limits of Social Policy” published in Commentary. If policy could not accomplish desired change, then the question the journal needed to ask was whether the problem was with policy itself or with the desire for change. In effect, the journal was questioning its role as critic.

Vaïsse argues that The Public Interest’s critique of social intervention was based on three key ideas (2010).

1. The state cannot do much to remake society.
2. The state itself creates expectations it cannot satisfy, thereby endangering stability.
3. The fundamental obstacle to successful state intervention was not a social or economic but a cultural phenomenon, a matter of ideas and morals (p. 55).316

In essence, The Public Interest’s critique of the state shifted from wanting the state to do better to wanting the state to do less, because they saw it not doing better by wanting allegedly always to do more. The journal became a mouthpiece for neoconservatism and its limited role for the state. Moynihan, writing in 1985, remarked that the journal’s rightward shift was one of the great migrations in twentieth-century American politics. “The Republican Party and the conservative cause acquired an intellectual class.... By 1980, Republicans ‘had become, or were becoming, the party of ideas,’” representing a merging of

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316 Vaïsse explained in regard to the third factor that capitalism, according to Kristol, did not provide a moral foundation for society. However, the solution was not to critique or change capitalism, but to return to a traditional basis for society. For Kristol, religion suited such purposes.
conservatism with liberalism, an ideational ideology (quoting himself, Moynihan, 1985, p. 112). In other words, conservatism became capable of offering a re-view of the state grounded in theory or ideas. Moynihan attributed this shift to the type of discourse prominent on the left at the time of the journal’s founding. Liberals reacted to this “debasement of the standards of political discourse” by migrating to the right (Moynihan, 1985, p. 126). The journal, in effect, became more of a “theory journal.”

_Telos_ also underwent a shift, as argued above. The journal titled _The Kansas Telos Conference_ in 1980, “The Crisis on the Left.” The Kansas _Telos_ Group opened the conference report by asking:

> What? Four cats talking about the crisis of the Left in the middle of Kansas? The Left must be hurting.” It is. Not only is the old liberal coalition practically disintegrated and traditionally Left programs discredited, but New Left values as well as Left theory in general have not held up very well under critical blows coming from all directions. While there is no direct relation between the kind of esoteric discourse carried out in journals such as _Telos_ and national or international politics, unless it is possible to outline a coherent set of values and a series of measures to bring about that projected, desirable state of affairs, Left politics becomes meaningless (1980-81, p. 81).

With the decline of the New Left, the pessimism engendered by the theory of artificial negativity, and the rise of the video age, the journal began to look to rather controversial sources for new inspiration that caused the journal to gain a reputation as “conservative” and “right-wing”. (As still, relatively-speaking, a youth, I might add that the ageing, coupled with the institutionalization in university-life, of the journal’s earlier founders, editors,

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317 “One’s income does not necessarily determine what one thinks, but in the long run experience proves that a mental attitude becomes untenable when it no longer fits in with the way one produces one’s means of subsistence. It is never easy to think one way and live another. An intellectual who lives on the right and thinks on the left is in a precarious position and is constantly torn in two. It is not surprising that there are fewer and fewer of them, or that there are more and more men and women who are sincerely convinced that the words ‘left’ and ‘right’ are meaningless: it is cheaper to change a way of thought than to repudiate a way of life” (Debray, 1981, p. 224).
and contributors may have also played a role). For Piccone, this conservative involution could itself be considered a radical move.

At a time when the collective amnesia of a generation raised on MTV tends to collapse the past in the immediacy of the image, traditional conservatism may take on a new radical role. As Gross has put it, by refocusing alternative models, tradition provides the means to establish a critical distance from an otherwise ubiquitous present whose very being constitutes its own legitimation (1994, p. 327).

It makes almost no sense to try to divine some break where *Telos* abandoned its “Leftist” roots and joined the “conservative camp.” However, criticisms, like the following, are fair, because they question not an identity or fixed position but the product instead.

The problem is that *Telos* has moved out of its marginality, but seems unwilling to face the responsibilities that come with this. *Telos has in fact become a kind of policy journal.* But it has done so only half-way. *Telos* is now routinely crammed with recommendations for the dismantling of all kinds of state programs that allegedly only help the interests of the New Class elite. At the same time, there is an almost complete absence of any systematic analysis of the real implications of such policy recommendations. The problem, in other words, is not that the journal has changed, but that it has not changed *enough* (Ost, 1994, p. 138, emphasis in bold).

Interestingly, the journal’s shift was accompanied by (or a product of) its increasing attention to the state and its policies, such as affirmative action.

Also of interest is the role that special issues played in the shifts of both journals. *The Public Interest* did not publish only what could be described as “neoconservative” analyses. It kept more of an open book policy at least through the 1970s. Ehrman argues that this approach was in part responsible for its growing influence during that decade.

*The Public Interest*’s influence grew during the 1970s, at least in part because it did not preach a narrow dogma. The heterodoxy of its opinions made it difficult for critics to dismiss it as a reflexively conservative mouthpiece, as some already were saying about *Commentary*. In addition, Bell, Glazer, and Kristol continued to maintain high intellectual standards and ensured that articles were based on solid data and analysis. This, combined with the scope of its discussions and the sophistication of its contributors—Kristol was careful not to alienate his authors...meant that its views would be taken seriously. This was especially the case after 1975, when spreading popular disenchantment with perceived government failures brought increasing prominence to neoconservative critics and made many
of the Public Interest’s early analyses of the difficulty of reform seem prophetic (Ehrman, 1999, pp. 171-172).

Glazer echoes Ehrman’s argument noting that the journal continued to publish pieces favorable to liberalism and even socialism through the 1980s and even 1990s. However, the main force of the journal’s neoconservative thrust as pushed by the increasingly ideological editor Irving Kristol outweighed this open book policy. Glazer in part blames the journal’s “rightward turn” on the journal’s abandonment of special issues in the 1990s.

It was our special issues that helped us to reach out and shape the debate. In their absence, one was too dependent on what came in over the transom, and these submissions reflected the increasing energy of conservative think tanks and foundations. Many of these conservative ideas were indeed powerful. But, as they began to dominate the debate over policy, we should have done more to examine them critically (Glazer, 2005, p. 16).

Glazer’s argument is interesting, because it underscores the relationship between a journal’s material practices and its theory. Here, by discontinuing its practice of publishing special issues, The Public Interest took an increasingly uniform theoretical view.

With Issue 10 (Winter 1971), Telos ran its first special issue, this one dedicated to Georg Lukács. The introduction to the issue explained that it was not usual policy at the journal to run special issues. However,

What happened in this Special issue is that we found ourselves with so many excellent articles dealing with Lukács that we simply decided to publish a special issue dealing exclusively with the problem (p. n/a).

In fact, they received so many worthwhile articles on Lukács that the special issue had a sequel in Issue 11. However, after the sequential special Lukács issues, the journal would

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318 “Liberal students of public policy did not disappear from the pages of The Public Interest. Many respected its commitment to reason, argument, facts, and research, even if so many articles were promoting a conservative agenda, and they continued to submit articles, some of which we published” (Glazer, 2005, p. 16).
319 Part of the reason for not running special issues may be because, as the staff explained, it delays the publication schedule (“Introduction,” Issue 10, p. n/a).
produce such issues sparingly. Issue 55 (Spring 1983) was a special issue on French socialism. It would be another four years before the next special issue. This one (Issue 72) infamously focused on Carl Schmitt. More special issues exhibiting the journal’s controversial explorations followed. Issue 90 (Winter 1991-92) contained a special section on the Leagues in Italy. Issue 95 (Spring 1994) revisited “fundamental concepts of political theory.” Issue 98-99 (Winter 1993-Fall 1994), a special double issue, was devoted to the French New Right, while Issue 100 (Summer 1994) concentrated on federalism and Issue 103 on populism (Spring 1995). As discussed above, Glazer argued that the loss of special issues at *The Public Interest* in the 1990s closed the journal to alternative views. In essence, Glazer believed that organizing the special issues gathered more diverse voices within the journal. Conversely, *Telos’s* use of special issues seems to point to an opposite

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320 *Telos* published several articles on the terrorism of authoritarian regimes. Juan Corradi’s 1982 article, “The Mode of Destruction: Terror in Argentina,” described two types of systemic, generalized violence that destroyed civil societies, that belonging to totalitarianism, or “total state order,” and that belonging to the unbridled market (1982, p. 67). In the Southern Cone, these two types of violence combined. “The dissociation of the invisible government from the social relations of ordinary life, the withdrawal of the state from the public sphere – a process paralleled and reinforced by the abandonment of social regulation to the ‘automatic’ mechanisms of the market – made systematic terrorism possible” (p. 70). Interestingly, Corradi’s analysis of Argentina, a state, which he argued, did not meet the classical definition of the “state,” called upon the friend-enemy distinction of Carl Schmitt to explain the military’s governance process. In a footnote, he described Schmitt’s *The Concept of the Political*, as a “text [in which] we find a clear spelling of the somber logic of extreme authoritarian situations...” (p. 66, note 6). This may in fact be the first mention of Schmitt in the journal. It would be another five years before *Telos* would fully engage with his works, publishing a issue on the theorist. In Corradi’s view, Schmitt’s thinking provides a good explanation for the destructive terrorism practiced in Argentina. “By reducing political rivals to ideological non-existence, such discourse [of friend-foe] frames them for ‘treatment.’ The construction and maintenance of this order of discourse involves the deployment of particular non-discursive sanctions which may be characterized as practices of abJECTION (expulsion, confinement, torture, ‘disappearance,’ and extermination)” (p. 66). The same issue published articles by Frederick Johnstone on state terror in South Africa and by Istvan Lovas and Ken Anderson on state terror in Hungary.

321 The special issues were also a strategy for getting more solicited papers, to help ameliorate the problem of an overflow of unsolicited manuscripts that were often of poor quality.
phenomenon. Beginning in the late 1980s, its accelerated use of special issues discouraged some contributors from writing for the journal (Antonio, 2009).

*The Public Interest* published its last issue in 2005, which coincided with the first year of George W. Bush’s second term. However, the journal continues to have an influence. The new journal, *National Affairs*, began publication in 2009. It is the inheritor of *The Public Interest’s* mantle. Still, some argue the *Public Interest* reached its peak of influence in the 1980s and declined since. There are several arguments for why this might be the case. One, the journal won its arguments, and no longer had anyone to convince. Two, forums for similar arguments began to proliferate in the 1980s and decreased the effect of any one institution.

Ehrman argues that the journal’s influence peaked in the early 1980s when supply side economics became the policy of the Reagan administration (1999). (The journal was the first to publish an article on the Laffer curve in 1975.) Associates of the journal also received government appointments, and the journal’s influence gained notice in the press (Ehrman, 1999). Ehrman further argues that the journal’s original point, the complexity and difficulty of reform, had now become an almost universally accepted idea (1999). Therefore, with its main argument won, the journal no longer held a place of prominence, or perhaps was even needed.

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322 The journal’s support of supply-side economics did not end in its pages. Rather, as Patrick Allitt argues, “Kristol introduced Laffer to Robert Bartley of the *Wall Street Journal*, to Congressman Jack Kemp, and to other influential conservative opinion makers and politicians, ensuring that his ideas would gain a respectful hearing in high places. He also gathered his own articles on economics and business (most of them from the *Wall Street Journal*) into an anthology, *Two Cheers for Capitalism* (1979). Capitalism needs only two cheers, he said (paraphrasing E. M. Forster’s ‘two cheers for democracy’), because it is not a beautiful thin in itself, merely a system that works well in practice” (2009, p. 231).
As for the second argument, *The Public Interest* was neither the first policy journal nor the first conservative intellectual journal, and it certainly was not the last of either. As already noted above, many more policy journals came into existence beginning in the 1970s. However, during the late 60s and 70s, it was arguably the most influential. A large number of conservative journals of different tendencies began to appear in the 1980s, following in the steps of *National Review*, but also *The Public Interest* and *Commentary*, among others.\(^\text{323}\) As Ehrman notes,

> [i]t is ironic that conservative writers have more outlets and a greater potential audience than they did 30 years ago but no assurance that any particular article will reach a significant readership (1999, p. 177).

In effect, the intellectual field became more crowded with the new entrants, and as they made similar position-takings, they diluted the impact of any one outlet. The fact that *The Public Interest* and its associates had an influence can also be supported by the fact that most histories of the conservative or neoconservative movement in the latter half of the twentieth century include *The Public Interest* as a major player (Ehrman, 1999; Nash, 1976; 1997).

\(^{323}\) “Gone, too, was the time when *National Review, Modern Age, Human Events*, and *The Freeman* comprised the virtual totality of intelligent conservative journalism in the United States. By the late 1980s, and increasingly thereafter, it seemed that every strand of the conservative movement had its own publication—its own literary branch, as it were, on the family tree. For libertarians there were such periodicals as *Reason* and *The Cato Journal*; for militant traditionalists, *Chronicles*; for militant Southern traditionalists, the *Southern Partisan*; for neoconservatives, *Commentary*, *The Public Interest*, *The National Interest*, and *New Criterion*. For conservatives interested in social and religious issues, there were such periodicals as *Crisis* (formerly *Catholicism in Crisis*), *The Family in America* (formerly *Persuasion at Work*), the *Human Life Review*, and *First Things*. Conservative historians had *Continuity: A Journal of History*; conservative political scientists had the annual *Political Science Reviewer*; for Straussian political philosophers there was for a time the *Claremont Review of Books*. For conservative (and liberal) scholars appalled by the plague of ‘political correctness’ and erosion of standards in colleges and universities, the journal *Academic Questions*, published by the National Association of Scholars provided a forum. In Michigan, Hillsdale College—honored among conservatives for its principled resistance to federal intrusion into higher education—published a monthly called *Imprimis*, whose circulation rose into the hundreds of thousands” (Nash, 1976, pp. 332-333).
Steinfels, 1979). Telos continues to publish and is cited as a strong influence on the development and distribution of critical theory in the United States. However, it is more difficult to trace the impact of its view, if any, on the state in the U.S. Perhaps its influence has been to foster another generation of critics, having succeeded at its aim of helping to form more critical intellectuals.

Telos now maintains an on-line presence with a website sponsored by Telos Press that includes: TELOSscope, a blog with multiple authorship, which readers can respond to with comments of their own; TELOSthreads, an indexing service that clusters articles since 1998 around various topics such as “Liberalism,” “Schmitt,” and “Critical Theory”; Telos Online, which provides electronic copies of its articles since 1998 that can be searched by a variety of filters such as author, issue number, keyword and so forth; and, a catalog of Telos Press’s publications, among other features.

The journal has also made recent forays into social networking sites like Facebook (it currently has 518 fans), Twitter, and LinkedIn. How does Telos’s on-line presence affect its position in the intellectual field? Does a marginal journal tweet? How do such efforts shape the journal’s audience? The TELOSscope blog now creates more interaction between journal and audience. Readers can become writers as they post comments (reactions) to the blog posts written by Telos contributors. The journal digitized may also now be able to cross into other fields that it previously was excluded from, perhaps simply because it was unknown to them. The journal’s new on-line subtitle lends credence to this idea, calling

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324 Ehrman also cites E. J. Dionne’s Why Americans Hate Politics (New York: 1992) and Sidney Blumenthal’s The Rise of the Counter-Establishment (New York: 1988). “Political analyst E. J. Dionne, for example, has called the founding of the Public Interest a ‘key event in a pivotal decade,’ and Sidney Blumenthal, who as a liberal journalist wrote critically of the conservative movement, argued that through the Public Interest, Kristol almost single-handedly brought about the rise of supply side economics” (p. 172).
itself now, “A Quarterly Journal of Politics, Philosophy, Critical Theory, Culture, and the Arts,” as opposed to its earlier subtitles such as “A Marxist Quarterly,” “A Journal of Revolutionary Thought,” or “A Journal of Radical Thought.” The web presence and social networking could also be an effort to reach out to a younger generation as the journal’s original founders and contributors reach their sixties. Without younger readers and contributors, the journal would eventually age out and fade away.

The very existence of a website for the journal may allow it to reach more readers than it otherwise would, but how do all these new media extensions of the journal affect the journal’s project? Someone’s energies, whether owner’s, editors’ and/or contributors’, are going into the creation and maintenance of these electronic manifestations of the journal rather than into the construction of the print journal itself. Does the understanding of the journal as an embodiment of both print and electronic forms also affect the nature of the journal’s project? In other words, do they affect the telos of Telos? I can only begin to ask these questions as most of these new media changes to the journal are in embryo. However, what I can say with more certainty is that Telos is an ongoing pursuit, and I doubt that it has reached its final position within the intellectual field.
"The left Hegelians, said Marx, were only littérateurs. (For them a magazine was ‘practice.’) For Marx, the only real action was in politics.” – Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, 1960

"The aim of The Public Interest is at once modest and presumptuous. It is to help all of us, when we discuss issues of public policy, to know a little better what we are talking about—and preferably in time to make such knowledge effective.” – Daniel Bell, Irving Kristol, "What Is the Public Interest?,” The Public Interest, Issue 1, Fall 1965

“Thus, the more modest political goal (with respect to Gramsci’s) is to stimulate the growth of a critical intelligentsia able to engage in this type of discourse and thus able to provide potentially emancipatory solutions to the particular crises. In a situation typified by declining internal opposition, growing bourgeois world hegemony and the total lack of a viable socialist model, this one of the few projects that can still be viably undertaken.” – Andrew Arato & Paul Piccone, Telos, Issue 32, Summer 1977

Daniel Bell’s remarks in The End of Ideology are misleading. They imply that Karl Marx had no use for the practice of a magazine in his political program. True, Marx was critical of the Young Hegelians, writing in The German Ideology that they were fighting phrases with phrases.\(^{325}\) And, perhaps, the Young Hegelians did believe that their journalism practice,

\(^{325}\) In full he wrote: “Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared them the true bonds of human society) it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young Hegelians logically put men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret reality in another way, i.e. to recognise it by means of another interpretation. The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly “world-shattering” statements, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of them have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against “phrases.” They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world. The only results which this philosophic criticism could achieve were a few (and at that thoroughly one-sided) elucidations of Christianity from the point of view of religious history; all the rest of their assertions are only further embellishments of their claim to have furnished, in these unimportant elucidations, discoveries of universal importance” (Ehrman, 1999, p. 149).
which Bell relegates to *belles-lettres*, was a form of political practice. However, while Marx argued that revolution could not be based on an idealistic or transcendental discourse as was the mode of the Young Hegelians, he did not think that what *could* be expressed in a journal was limited to such discourse. In other words, the practice of a journal (or magazine) could be considered a *political* practice. Gramsci took up this notion, especially with his ideas about a positive role for ideology and building consensus.

In addition to Marx’s frequent journalism throughout his career, he participated in the creation of a journal, the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, which he founded with Arnold Ruge in Paris in 1843.\(^{326}\) Arnold Ruge was a young Hegelian, and it may have been their differences of opinion over the direction of the journal that prompted Marx to write in *The German Ideology* a year after the journal’s dissolution that “[i]t has not occurred to any one of these philosophers [Young Hegelians] to inquire into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, the relation of their criticism to their own material surroundings” (1978b, p. 149). A journal that failed to connect abstract theorizing with the actual state of affairs, economic, social, and political, fell outside Marx’s definition of criticism as political practice. Interestingly, one of Marx’s more famous short pieces, “For a Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing,” comes from his correspondence with Ruge regarding the journal project. Arguably, he envisioned that a journal could fulfill this role, that it could provide a re-view that may in time w/right politics.

The last point I would like to emphasize is that we, as academics, need to pay attention to the institutionalization of our writing. As scholars, we spend most of our time writing. We write syllabi, comments on students’ work, grant proposals, peer reviews of

\(^{326}\) The journal was edited in Paris and printed in Zurich.
journal articles, monographs, course proposals, conference abstracts, and other publications. Writing so much perhaps dulls our appreciation that when we write we produce, and that what we produce is our vision of the world, our view. Academics produce knowledge, but that knowledge is not the Cartesian reflection of the material world. Rather, our intellectual production helps the wrights of the world. I am not arguing that the world would not exist but for our writing. However, I am arguing that our writing shapes how others and we understand the world.

The extent to which academics have lost sight of this fact or ignore it is well seen in our journals. Quantity supersedes quality, whether in number of publications necessary for tenure, or journal evaluation through aggregation of citations. If the American Political Science Review is the flagship journal of the political science discipline, and it mainly publishes empirical (positivist/behavioralist) work, then less attention in the field is paid to normative visions of politics—although, positivism and behavioralism produce their own views of the political, even while pretending not to.³²⁷ As Laurel Richardson argues,

³²⁷ Things are not all that much better in the discipline’s more theory-oriented journals. As Jeffrey Isaac writes, “Articles like ‘Constitutionalism in Habermas,’ for example, or ‘Locke on Constitutional Government,’ clarify problems of constitutionalism in only the most remote and mediated way, typically devoting most of their energy to a critique of the existing exegetical literature, presenting some textual commentary of their own, and offering little insight into substantive political concerns. While there is surely nothing wrong with such inquiries, they need to be linked to the project of understanding constitutionalism, not simply the project of understanding Habermas and/or Locke” (1978b, p. 646).
science journals, but they are not prima facie evidence of greater—or lesser—truth value or significance than social science writing using other conventions (1995, p. 506).

As I wrote (write) this dissertation, I feel the competing pressures of reflexivity and professionalism. This work reflects who I am as a scholar. It reflects my intellectual capacities, my scholarship, my education, and my point of view. But who I am as a scholar is also determined by other material considerations. This work is also a product of the institution where I wrote it, the members of my committee, the amount of funding I received as a graduate student, the quality and organization of the library where I worked, and the amount of time and energy I could devote to it while I juggled other obligations such as teaching and publications. Graduate students have a difficult time competing on the job market without already having an impressive portfolio of courses taught and articles, or even books, published. In other words, this dissertation is also a product of the academic political economy within which I write. How it is received, whether it will be published, whether it will be read and to what effect, and how well it will contribute to my professional advancement are all also impacted (or constrained) by the academic political economy of intellectual production or the broader literary political economy.328

Literary political economy is a concept coined by Ben Agger who uses it to explain the commodification of writing, and also, within the academic world, the confinement of

328 Similar to the notion of academic political economy that I put forward here, Clyde Barrow refers to the instrumental order among intellectuals which “is always historically contingent upon their possession of some instruments of production. Marx called these tools the ‘material means of mental production.’ The particular conditions and specific form in which these instruments are utilized define the intellectuals’ labor process. It is the intellectual labor process that constitutes what legitimately counts as teaching and scientific thinking in any society as opposed, for instance, to propaganda, ideology, or opinion. The modern university, in licensing and employing those claiming to be intellectuals, certifies them as competent to engage in social practices which are presumed to yield objective knowledge. It thereby bestows upon certain intellectuals the normative image of ‘scientists’” (2003, p. 12).
writing within disciplinary constraints.\footnote{Literary political economy...helps us understand what happens to writing and writers when they become merely white-collar employees losing both autonomy and vision. They work, write and live for others, whether in popular culture (advertising, journalism, trade fiction, television, movies) or in academia. Their literary craft is dictated by their status as wage laborers in the culture industry, no matter that they are white-collar workers with ample emoluments, even corporate benefit packages. The commodification of culture inevitably degrades it where it blocks the critical imagination by diverting it into the narrow profit and disciplinary requirements of popular culture and academia, respectively" (Barrow, 1990, p. 121).} In many ways, it is an extension of the Frankfurt School’s critique of the culture industry. As Ben Agger writes,

[t]he rapid metabolism of academics’ literary lives causes amnesia about the pre-history of one’s intellectual problems. Writers do not have the time (or space) to reconstitute their fields in ways that open their topographies to critical examination (Agger, 1991, p. 78).

To move beyond the life of a fledgling graduate student/scholar, I also reiterate the argument, made by others, that the effectiveness of any political critique, whether that of Karl Marx or Francis Fukuyama, is dictated by the relations of production structuring the political economy within which their work is produced and received rather than by the inherent quality of the work.\footnote{Additionally, as Gramsci writes, “the most coherent and intellectually wealthy movements are not the ones which always triumph. In fact, often a movement triumphs precisely because of its mediocrity and its logical elasticity: there is room for everything in it, the most striking compromises are possible and these can be exactly the reasons for its triumph” (2000, p. 149).} This is another point all too easily overlooked in academia. Some work may not be well received; it may be overlooked, ignored, or marginalized and not because of some defect but because it runs counter to the dominant relations of production that validate scholarship.

I include these reflections since they inform the main analysis I have undertaken here. My dissertation focuses on one form of intellectual production: the journal. The primary question I investigate is the following: if journals (and journal articles) are producing reality, a view of the world, then what is being produced and how is it being produced? Further, by considering journals as a form or genre, and looking beyond the
more narrow field of academic journal publication, I believe this dissertation both challenges the conventions of academic publication and requires us, as academics, to think more deeply about how and why we write.\textsuperscript{331} What reality are we producing?

Some academics asked this question of their disciplinary journals, and it led them to create alternative journals.\textsuperscript{332} Many of these continue to publish today, although some radical journals have become less independent, now published by mega academic publishers, such as \textit{Thesis Eleven}'s publication by SAGE. However, new journals have also emerged and will likely continue to do so, whether in print or on-line. Still, most standards of academic success continue to use journal indices and citations reports and depend upon the “star” journals in each field. In other words, disciplined views are more likely to be rewarded, rather than writing that radically re-views. Of course, there are exceptions. However, it is too easy to lose sight of the purpose and potential of academic writing, of scholarship, when there are disciplinary benchmarks to be met. We forget that journals are not just objects but also disciplinary practices of viewing the world. Effectively, I am arguing that in order to understand what we do as academics when we write, we need to consider what journals do as institutions and as material interventions in the world as our writing circulates there.

Lastly, I remain of two minds about “the leisure of the theory class.” An exchange between Adorno and Horkheimer recently published for the first time in the \textit{New Left}

\textsuperscript{331} Jeffrey Issac makes a similar exhortation when he argues: “As contributors to, reviewers for, and readers of \textit{Political Theory} and other journals like it, it seems to me that we are obliged to interrogate these media of inquiry and communication, and continually ask ourselves whether there are other ways of theorizing and writing that might be more meaningful and appropriate” (1977, p. 648).

\textsuperscript{332} A slew of these emerged in the 1970s and 1980s and included \textit{New Political Science, Antipode}, and \textit{Signs} to name a few. They resisted, at least in part or for a while, the “demands of performativity” (Isaac, 1995, p. 21).
Review takes up the question of why theorists write. Adorno and Horkheimer do not arrive at a final answer, nor do they agree on a partial answer. Horkheimer writes that “[a] theory that has ceased to have any connection with practice is art” (2005, p. 58). He questions whether they are doing theory as pure construct, which he finds lacking. He does see some value in creating a stock of theory that may find some use in the future. On the other hand, Adorno seems to embrace the characterization of theory as art, writing “[i]f I had the choice between a construct and the stockroom, I would always choose the construct. To think thoughts because it is fun seems more dignified” (2010, p. 59). For the present, I remain as torn as Adorno and Horkheimer, albeit without as much insight as to why.
### Table 3. *Telos* Subtitle Changes

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<th>Date</th>
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<td>Spring 1968</td>
<td>&quot;the official bi-annual publication of the Graduate Philosophy Association of the State University of New York at Buffalo&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Spring 1969</td>
<td>&quot;a philosophical journal definitely outside the mainstream of American philosophical thought&quot;</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Summer 1971</td>
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<td>&quot;a quarterly journal of post critical thought&quot;</td>
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<td>The Perseverance of Stalinism</td>
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Table 5. “Moishe Gonzales” Contributions to *Telos*

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<td>Marxist Perspectives (1978-81) and Beyond</td>
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<td>48</td>
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<td>Kellner’s Critical Theory: A Reassessment</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>The Secrets of Heller</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>Against the Post-Marxist Pseudo Left</td>
<td>Fall 1986</td>
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<td>Commentary on <em>Tikkun</em></td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>Jacoby’s Paradox</td>
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<td>Weber, Rationality and the Disintegration of Sociology</td>
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<td>Race vs. Gender: The Post-Modern Politics of the Thomas Confirmation</td>
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<td>106</td>
<td>Affirmative Action and Its Discontents</td>
<td>Winter 1996</td>
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<td>110</td>
<td>Liberalism vs. Populism</td>
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Table 6. Journals Advertised within Early *Telos* Issues

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<td><em>Aut aut; Radical America; Social Theory and Practice; The Monist; Soviet Studies in Philosophy; Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</em></td>
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<td>6</td>
<td><em>Catalyst; Abraxas; Radical America; Social Policy</em>; The Philosophical Forum; The Monist; Soviet Studies in Philosophy; Socialist Revolution; Philosophy and Phenomenological Research; Social Theory and Practice; Cultural Hermeneutics**</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td><em>Socialist Revolution; Social Theory and Practice; Radical America; Social Policy, The Philosophical Forum, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research; Soviet Studies in Philosophy</em></td>
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<td><em>Radical America; Socialist Revolution</em></td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td><em>New German Critique</em></td>
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<td>18</td>
<td><em>Terzo Mondo; Berkeley Journal of Sociology; New German Critique; aut aut; Socialist Revolution; Merve Verlag</em></td>
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<td>19</td>
<td><em>New German Critique; The Insurgent Sociologist; aut aut</em></td>
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* The first issue of *Social Policy* advertised in *Telos* contained a review of *The Public Interest*. This may have been the only time that *The Public Interest* was referred to within the pages of *Telos*.

** *Cultural Hermeneutics* won *Telos'*s first, and I believe only, "Loser-of-the-Year-Award." The journal's ad was edited by the *Telos* staff to include biting comments explaining why after "having examined an incredible number of terrible journals, we have decided—without any hesitation—to give this year’s Loser-of-the-Year-Award to a dark horse: the pompous piece of nonsense, *Cultural Hermeneutics.*"
Table 7.   Telos Groups

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<td>Toronto (Piccone, Ben Agger, Ilene Crawford, John Keane, Steve Levine,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Folke Lindahl, Janet Lum, Ray Morrow, Peter Murphy, Patrick Patterson,</td>
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<td>Greg Renault, Brian Singer, Wodek Szemberg, Nick Xenos)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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### Table 8. *Telos* Conference Reports

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<td>Does Critical Theory Have a Future?***</td>
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<td>Populism vs. the New Class: The Second Elizabethtown <em>Telos</em> Conference</td>
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<td>The Future of Higher Education****</td>
<td>David Pan</td>
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* This is not a report on a *Telos* conference. However, I include it because *Telos* members attended the APA Convention and made clear the differences between the APA and what they envisioned for the journal.

** This is a series of letters written by various *Telos* members in regard to the St. Louis *Telos* Conference conducted earlier that year. Piccone’s letter is first in which he outlines what occurred at the conference.

*** This is also the first Elizabethtown *Telos* Conference.

**** This piece reports on the Telos Institute sponsored conference on higher education which took place at California State University, Chico, from October 18-20, 1996.


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333 While *Telos* has compiled a very thorough index of all of its issues forward to Issue 147, I have noticed certain omissions, including an almost total absence of conference reports, which may be indicative of a modern indexing logic that focuses solely on articles or reviews, rather than the more “extraneous” material of a journal. Digital journal archives also regularly exclude such material as the front matter and advertisements, making any future studies of journals less complete. Therefore, this table is composed of reports I found while combing the issues on my own. Since the title of the article almost always does not indicate that it is a report of a conference, there may be some reports that I overlooked. Although I at least skimmed 151 issues of *Telos*, I can hardly say that I read each thoroughly.
APPENDIX B. SELECT INDEX OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST

While each issue of The Public Interest is now available on-line as a .pdf file at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/archive/public_interest/default.asp and can be browsed by issue or author, I have not found an index for the journal. I have put together an incomplete index that covers the first fifty-eight issues of the journal through Winter 1980 as well as anniversary issues eighty-one (Fall 1985) and one hundred twenty-one (Fall 1995). An index for Telos can be accessed at http://www.telospress.com/main/index.php?main_page=page&id=83&chapter=0.

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