Type of Document Dissertation Author Abdallah, Hanin I. URN etd-10142005-103102 Title A model of the entry decision of potenial raiders into the bidding for a target firm Degree PhD Department Economics Advisory Committee
Advisor Name Title Cremer, Jacques Committee Chair Eckel, Catherine C. Committee Member Kats, Amoz Committee Member Shome, Dilip K. Committee Member Weinrich, Gerd Committee Member Keywords
- Consolidation and merger of corporations.
- Tender offers (Securities)
Date of Defense 1991-08-02 Availability restricted AbstractThis work is in the spirit of the literature on the understanding and analysis of the
different forces that shape the takeover process. We focus on the strategic interaction
among the raiders and we study their decision to enter the bidding for a target form in a
context of asymmetric information. Each raider incurs a fixed takeover sunk. cost when she
decides to enter the bidding. Therefore she wants to avoid bidding for the firm and losing
the bid to a raider with a higher valuation. We analyze the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in
one-period, two-period and infinite period models where each raider decides whether and
in which period to enter. This decision depends on the takeover cost, the target's
reservation price and the distribution function of the raiders' valuations. We also consider
the case where one of the raiders is a large shareholder and the role of management in
maximizing the shareholders' interests.
We find that raiders delay entry into the bidding when the takeover cost or the
reservation price for the firm increase. Such an increase also implies a decrease in the
probability of a takeover. If one of the raiders is a large shareholder, he will enter the
bidding faster the bigger is the percentage of shares he owns in the target. The existence of
a large shareholder will, however, discourage other raiders from entering. The
shareholders of the target firm might benefit from an increase in the target's reservation
price but they never profit from an increase in the takeover cost.
We conclude with an empirical section that indirectly tests some of our model's
implications. The results of our empirical work indicate that raiders enter the bidding faster
when the management's reaction to the bid proves to be friendly. The premiums offered by
the raiders and the size of the target test insignificant in determining the pre-bidding period.
Finally we find that the existence of a large shareholder discourages other raiders from
entry. However, the large shareholder has on average a longer pre-bidding waiting period
than a raider with no ownership in the firm.
Filename Size Approximate Download Time (Hours:Minutes:Seconds)
28.8 Modem 56K Modem ISDN (64 Kb) ISDN (128 Kb) Higher-speed Access LD5655.V856_1991.A242.pdf 5.54 Mb 00:25:38 00:13:11 00:11:32 00:05:46 00:00:29
If you have questions or technical problems, please Contact DLA.