Overstretched and Underfunded:  
The Status of the US Military in the GWoT

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Abstract

The events of 9-11 caused the US military to deploy across the globe in support of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) with the assurance it would receive the resources needed to fulfill those operations. As a subordinate arm of the government, the US military is entrusted to prosecute the policies of its civilian leadership provided they receive the required resources to do so. As this thesis demonstrates however, the military is struggling to reconcile how to deliver the goals of its civilian administration when it simultaneously fails to receive the resources needed to meet their demands.

The Department of Defense (DoD) is experiencing a stark increase in its deployments and combat operations. Unprecedented ‘peacetime’ use of Reserve and Guard forces and remarkable DoD personnel policies have stretched the military thin. Despite substantial military budget increases, the military fails to receive adequate funding for combat operations. Meanwhile, soldiers fail to receive the appropriate equipment needed to fight the emerging threats of the GWoT. The military continues to thin many of its own operations, increase the stress on its members, and over-work its equipment in order to meet the needs of its civilian government.

Three solutions exist: maintain the status quo, reduce the scope of the GWoT, or begin military funding on par with past wartime budgets. The status quo produced an overstretched/underfunded military. Threats to US security cannot support a reduced GWoT. Therefore, the US should increase DoD end strength, increase GWoT funding, and accelerate weapons research and procurement.
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Introduction

The election of George Bush and the events of September 11, 2001, placed the foreign policy of the United States on the forefront of international politics. The Preemptive Doctrine employed after 9-11 led to the launch of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) and subsequent military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. These new overseas military operations, in addition to the remaining commitments in Kosovo, Bosnia, Korea, and elsewhere, have positioned US military forces in all corners of the globe.

This thesis compares the status of the military before and after 9/11 in conjunction with the foreign policy adopted by the US government and provides an analysis of budget spending patterns versus policy statements and promises. The evidence suggests a military in turmoil: overstretched and underfunded, torn between its obligations to satisfy the missions called for by the current administration’s foreign policy while simultaneously providing the required manning, training, and equipment required for the GWoT. The DoD is not receiving the sufficient funds needed to fulfill the commitments entrusted to it.

After 9/11, the US foreign policy shifted to a preventive doctrine intended to reduce or eliminate current or emerging threats perceived by the American government. This new principle, subsequently termed the Preemptive Doctrine, reserved the US government’s right to take action against those who appeared to harbor hostile intent towards the United States without prior provocation. The government insisted upon eliminating potential threats to the US prior to their ability to harm the US territory. As a result, the American military received increasing duties in order to meet the demands of this new foreign policy.\footnote{This thesis remains outside the debate over the benefits or defects in the Preemptive Doctrine post-9/11.} By analyzing imbalances between the administration’s funding and policies versus the numerous commitments it has placed on the US military, this thesis argues that the US military struggles to fulfill its increased obligations and operations in conditions of limited funds and procurement.

In response to the rise in global responsibilities, the US Administration augmented the funding of the US military by 21\%.\footnote{Increases in annual salaries for military members, improved benefits, and added bonuses have outlined some of the attempts by the current administration to assist the US military with the new responsibilities it assumed post-9/11.} Heavy increases in budgets permitted by Congress, transfers of money from other national...
programs into the defense budget, and special wartime supplements have also highlighted a well-advertised attempt by the administration to give the US military the funding it needs in order to complete the tasks given to it by the Preemptive Doctrine.

Simultaneously with the budget increases for the DoD, the government announced a plan to withdraw forces from several overseas locations to minimize the global ‘footprint’ of the US military and to allow a consolidation of the DoD to make it more refined and mobile. Although the government excluded pre-eminent regions such as the Korean peninsula from this reduction, the administration intended to limit the number of deployed locations manned by the US military by withdrawing its forces from lower-priority areas.

However, there is a growing chasm between the capabilities of the US military and the needs of the current foreign policy despite these factors. Evidence suggests that financial resources were withdrawn from desperately needed modernization programs such as new weapons systems; military forces are finding unacceptable procurement resources left to their use, and the US military’s overseas obligations are actually increasing despite the government’s attempts to limit them. These trends appear opposite to the administration’s promise that the military is getting everything it needs to get the job done in the GWoT.  

The civil-military framework in the US stipulates that the civilian leadership provides its objectives to the military. The framework also insists that the civilian administration provide the military with the tools required to fulfill those demands. The military’s role in the civil-military framework specifies that it must fulfill the tasks given to it by its civilian leadership while remaining subservient to that civilian leadership. Thus, an ‘unequal dialogue’ is established between the two sides as the military must fulfill the goals of its civilian leadership yet has limited control over the necessary funding to do so. As the evidence will show, resources allocated by the civilian administration fail to meet the needs of the military’s current operations to fulfill US foreign policy. Therefore, the military is currently struggling to reconcile how to deliver the goals of its civilian administration when it simultaneously fails to receive the proper funding, manning, and equipment needed to meet the demands of that administration.

After an initial review of the civil-military framework, an analysis of the relationship between the US military and its government in the 1990s will reveal a changing landscape of funding, missions, and responsibilities within the military. By comparing the budgets, manning levels, and obligations from the 1990s to the stated objectives of the current administration as it
took office in 2000, the analysis will then focus on the intended improvements set for the DoD prior to 9-11. Assisted by CBO reports, the General Accounting Office and extensive independent evidence, it appears that the events of 9/11 reversed the trends begun in 2000. Despite well-advertised increases in funding, attempts to reduce overseas obligations, commitments to proper manning levels, and re-funded weapons programs, the obligations set by the Preemptive Doctrine exceed the funding of the US military. As a result, the DoD continues to experience a net loss in its capabilities and further strains a military struggling to reconcile the needs of US foreign policy versus its own demands for manning, equipment, training, and funds.
Section 1

Chapter 1: The Civil-Military Framework

A focused analysis of the military during the GWoT requires investigation into the civil-military structure which frames the relationship between the military and the civilian government. One must understand the struggle between “The Soldier and the State,” as Samuel Huntington terms it. The literature on the subject identifies two main arguments about the proper manner for the military to function with their civilian leadership. The first of these two opinions – termed ‘objective control’ – dictates that civilian leadership provides objectives for the military but allows the military to decide how to accomplish those goals. The second view – termed ‘subjective control’ – places emphasis on the integration of civilian leadership throughout military tactics, strategy, and execution without allowing the military to work free of intervention. These two ideas, combined with additional ethical dilemmas inherent in the civil-military framework, set the stage for understanding the civil-military relationship exposed in the subsequent chapters.

Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State

Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State represents one of the more significant theoretical works detailing the relationship between the military and its civilian leaders. The book outlines the civilian and military roles, expectations, and boundaries of this structure. Huntington details the role of the military as a profession and outlines the distinction between ‘objective control’ and ‘subjective control’ when considering the civilian control of the military. Huntington follows with proposed boundaries for these two ‘controls.’ He theorizes that the civilian leadership may provide objectives for the military but the military must remain in control of its own decisions in order to best meet the objectives set out by the civilian leadership.

Huntington argues that the military is a profession in its own right, similar to that of a doctor or lawyer. According to the author, the soldier maintains an expertise on military matters and abides by the responsibilities and ‘corporateness’ of the military itself. The military

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Huntington’s analysis applies only to civilian-led militaries. It does not apply to military dictatorships or governments constructed around an equal military-civil relationship. This proves crucial as it permits a preparatory in-depth analysis of those issues facing relationships such as the one that exists between the DoD and its civilian leadership.
operates within a democracy as the medium with which the state may use force in execution of its policies. The military “stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state.”4 The civilian leadership needs to provide the overlying objectives to the armed forces yet remain outside the ‘military sphere’ where the civilian leadership lacks such military expertise.5

At first, this division of labor between the civilian and the military in a democracy may seem obvious. However, the author appropriately makes this distinction in order to set the military apart from any civilian counterparts and to establish the military’s expertise in combat matters. Just as one would not want a lawyer performing surgery in a hospital, Huntington asserts that the public should not accept a civilian making military decisions when it comes to military matters. A soldier possesses different qualities and characteristics which make him/her “managers of violence” vice a manager of other civilian skills.6 “A distinct sphere of military competence does exist which is common to all, or almost all, officers and which distinguishes them from all, or almost all, civilians.”7 The acceptance of the military member as a professional, more importantly as professionals in violence, dictates they are the experts in military affairs for a state.8

The author summarizes two approaches to the civil-military framework termed ‘objective control’ and ‘subjective control.’ According to Huntington, ‘subjective control’ represents the ‘civilianization’ of the military. In other words, subjective control suggests a civilian leadership heavily involved – possibly entrenched – in the day to day details of military operations. This control infers that civilian leadership maintains a tight hold on military directions to the point of becoming the strategists, tacticians, and managers of the military’s operations. Contrarily, ‘objective control’ remains on the other end of the spectrum. To Huntington, objective control is exercised when the civilian leadership sets the overarching goals of the military (i.e. win a war, take an enemy’s capital, etc.) but leaves the decision on how to accomplish those goals to the military. Of the two approaches, the author highly recommends the latter.

Huntington’s argument concludes with a strong recommendation for an established boundary between military and political leaders. The military, as managers of violence, are not experts in the field of politics and therefore should remain outside the sphere of political decision-making and policy. Similarly, the civilian leadership is not expert in the art of war and the management of violence and should remain outside the sphere of military implementation of
set goals. According to the author, a proper civil-military relationship dictates that the soldier waits for the civilian leadership to provide military objectives and, more importantly, wants to move towards those objectives free of any political obstruction. By employing objective control, the civilian leadership must ultimately make a strategic decision on goals, and then allow the military to achieve those goals with the means and tools of military professionalism. Once the political decision is made, the civilian leadership must step aside and allow the military to perform what is required in order to meet the objective set to it without attempting to direct military action while providing the needed resources to achieve those goals.

Other Approaches to the Civil-Military Framework

Critics of Huntington’s work have produced a second approach to the civil-military framework. Among them, Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command, challenges Huntington’s theory by employing four examples of civilian leaders directly guiding their military to success. To Cohen and others, the civilian leadership must have a direct role in the administration of the military in war. The civilian leadership can not abide by the strict borders constructed by Huntington and still guarantee success. This second approach acknowledges that the military remains the expert on violence. Yet it also requires civilian leadership to monitor military operations in order to successfully meld the military operations with political objectives.

First, critics claim that Huntington’s insistence upon the distinction between the military and civilian roles continues to dissolve. Although this difference may have been prevalent during the post-WWII years when Huntington produced his theory, critics assert that the development of technology and social constructs since the 1950s have erased the line between civilian and military professions. The current military profession maintains too many of the same norms found in civilian society to be considered an isolated profession devoid of civilian interaction. Thus, the isolation of military procedures from civilian control does not exist and military operations must subsequently fall under the view of civilian leadership.

Second, some find that the political objectives driving military action often violate the boundary between political and military action. In other words, the boundaries between military and political objectives continue to grow blurry and thus distort the distinction between civilian and military leadership advocated by Huntington. For example, many questioned the decision by former President Clinton to attack Iraq in 1998 in the middle of a controversial impeachment proceeding against him. Some asserted that he ordered the military action – a
historically beneficial move for presidential popularity ratings – in order to recoup losses in popularity as a result of the impeachment hearings. This infers that the operations executed by the military were politically driven by the civilian leadership and not driven by national security requirements. This example signals a blurring of lines between military and political objectives and further clouds Huntington’s sterile boundary between civilian and military objectives.

**Additional Ethical Issues**

The current state of civil-military relations raises additional moral issues. James Toner introduces several ethical choices facing the civil-military framework such as the subservient role of the military to its civilian leadership. The military is expected to maintain total obedience to the state and its civilian leadership. However, several instances challenge that total obedience. For example, military leaders confront important moral obstacles if ordered to a mission which would produce the probability that all of his/her soldiers would die. Where does that leader’s obedience lie: to the mission or the soldiers’ lives? Certainly, the military leader would, at a minimum, question the need for the mission in order to justify the risk to his/her soldiers. This situation forces uncertainty on behalf of the soldier and raises the possibility that the soldier may lack total obedience to the civilian leadership in government.

Likewise, Toner highlights additional challenges such as the allegiance of the soldier to the civilian leadership instead of allegiance to the Constitution of his/her country, and the subsequent separation of politics and the military mission in the eyes of the soldier. By using the removal of Gen. Macarthur during the Korean Conflict as his chief example, Toner suggests that the soldier pledges allegiance to the Constitution and the nation which may subvert any allegiance to the current civilian leadership. As stated by Macarthur, a soldier may feel compelled to act on his duty to the nation versus the civilian leadership if the soldier feels that the civilian leadership is not acting on the best interests of the nation. Toner does not advocate such ‘disobedience,’ but merely points out many of the nuances in the civil-military framework which become evident later in this thesis.

**Principles and Assumptions of the Civil-Military Framework**

The previous discussion outlines several principles of the civil-military framework which are elementary to the understanding of this thesis. First, as Toner states, “In the United States, the professional military is wholly subsidiary to the civilians elected to high office in our
Republic.” Huntington, Cohen, Toner, and others all insist upon the understanding that the US military serves both the US Constitution as well as those elected to civilian leadership according to that Constitution. The primacy of the civilian leadership over the military can not be questioned.

Second, Carl von Clausewitz’s classic assertion that war is a continuation of politics through other means still stands true. The execution of military operations remains linked with politics at almost every step. For example, during Operation Allied Force in the Balkans, a US Air Force aircraft mistakenly bombed the Chinese Embassy located in Belgrade, Serbia, during one of the thousands of bombing missions. This event created an immediate political predicament between the US and China as the bombing was suspected by the Chinese to have been ordered on purpose. Thus, what was at one moment a strictly military operation turned instantly into a political issue. The impact of this event plainly stated the political risks attached to military operations and further connected political and military operations. Therefore, Huntington’s theory can not stand as originally devised: objective control can not isolate military duties from the political arm of the civilian leadership or vice-versa.

Third, despite the blurring edges between civilian and military roles, the professional nature of the military soldier remains distinct. The connection between military action and politics does not mean that civilians possess the same expertise on military operations. In other words, just because military action and politics are tied together, the civilian leadership may not claim expertise to military maneuvers nor can soldiers stake claim to political decision-making. This is a crucial principle to understand. Huntington’s claim that the military professional maintains a distinctive characteristic remains. As Toner states, “the principle of civilian control is sacrosanct . . . [yet] one thought runs like a red thread through the fabric of American civil-military relations: the subordinate sovereignty of the US military.” The military must be trusted to provide the best strategies and tactics to insure success within the guidelines provided by the civilian leadership.

In the end, the civil-military framework results in an unequal dialogue between the civilian leadership and the military professional. First, the political ties to military action demand civilian leadership’s interaction with military operations (in violation of Huntington’s premise of objective control). Second, the supremacy of the civilian leadership demands its governance of the operation, funding, and strategies outlining the Department of Defense.
However, this does not warrant civilian leadership’s involvement in the minutiae of military planning and operations. The expertise and professionalism of the military warrants their right to operate with sovereignty over matters under their expertise. This right should only be compromised when it adversely impacts the policies of the civilian leadership.

This framework is best exemplified by the opening relationship between Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks (the Combatant Commander of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom) in 2001. After stating his unhappiness at the time required to develop the warplan for operations in Afghanistan, Secretary Rumsfeld began to integrate himself into many of the mundane and minute details of the operation’s mission planning. General Franks had a simple response: “Mr. Secretary, stop. This ain’t gonna work. You can fire me. I’m either the commander or I’m not, and you’ve got to trust me or you don’t. And if you don’t, I need to go somewhere else. So tell me what it is, Mr. Secretary.”18 This exchange exemplifies the superiority of the civilian control over the military and the requirement that the military must be trusted to execute the objectives set to it by civilians.

The Civil-Military Framework and the Current Discussion

The understanding of the civil-military framework proves significant when considering the following discussion of the overstretched and under-funded US military in the current GWoT. As this thesis will show, the military’s subservient position has caused it to experience substantial reductions in its funding, manning, and weapons procurement while expanding its overseas obligations. The political decisions made by the civilian leadership have created a foreign policy which has placed the US military with additional duties across the globe. Concurrent with those additional obligations however, the civilian leadership has failed to add the required funding, manning and equipment needed by the military as a result of the new responsibilities.

The unequal dialogue in civil-military relations in the current US administration has forced the military to undertake operations in conditions of civilian-mandated cuts in funding, procurement and manning. The allegiance demanded by the civilian leadership and the Constitution guarantees a military functioning to the utmost of its abilities in order to produce the objectives set to it by the administration. The requirement for maximum military performance with lacking supplies and funding therefore produces a clear dilemma for military professionals and, as this thesis shows, places extreme strains on the US military.
Chapter 2: The Civil-Military Relationship in the 1990s

At the end of the Cold War, the US military continued a close relationship with the executive branch established during the decades-long arms race and foreign policy reliance on nuclear deterrence. The substantial portion of the fiscal budget allotted for the DoD during the Cold War symbolized this close relationship between the military and its government. Nevertheless, it was increasingly clear to both civilian and military leaders that the end of the Cold War signaled a subsequent end to the strong funding, procurements, and programs supplied to the military by the government. With the elimination of America’s chief opponent, the US military could not justify sustained budgets, manning, and procurements at the Cold War pace.

The subsequent reductions in the US military began a 10 year decline in funding, manning, and procurement for the military. This period placed extreme pressures on the US military as it withdrew its size and capabilities to meet the perceived threats of the 1990s. It also set up a US military with very limited capability to accept a sudden increase in responsibility as will be required post-9/11. By analyzing the drawdown performed after the Cold War, after Operation Desert Storm, and by the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission, the shrinking of the military in the 1990s will come into view. Combined with further reductions in pay, benefits, and civilian leadership support, the military at the end of the 1990s will be asked to undertake more missions and in more places with less people, money, and equipment.

The Post Cold War Drawdown

The US military planned and operated primarily against the threat of the Soviet Union and intended to deter any threat from it and its eastern bloc allies. The dominating nature of the Cold War – including the arms race, the possible use of nuclear weapons, and the ideological dichotomy between the east and west – provided the US military with expanding budgets, personnel, and weapons systems. The US foreign policy of the Cold War projected the US military around the world in order to contain or deter the expansion of Soviet spheres of influence.

With the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the reduction of any threat from the former Soviet Union, the DoD found itself prepared to defeat a non-existent threat. Military operations were defined by few international crises such as Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait and Iraq in 1991. These operations were considered an overwhelming success for the US military. They
forced the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait after its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. After a six-week bombing campaign which virtually destroyed the Iraqi Army before submitting ground troops, the US Army was able to take control of Kuwait in just four days. These operations and their dominant success entrenched the US military as the globally dominant military force. Subsequently, in the attempt to define its post-Cold War mission, the US military committed itself to a “Win-Win” strategy which insisted that the military could engage and defeat any enemy in two different regional conflicts simultaneously.\(^{19}\)

**The Post-Desert Storm Drawdown**

As a result of the operations in the Middle East, the structure of the US military built for Cold War missions, and a weakened US economy, the civilian leadership decided to reduce the size and scope of the US forces in 1991. Operation Desert Storm (and later the war in the Balkans) indicated that post-Cold War threats were more likely to occur in smaller regional conflicts as opposed to pitting global superpowers against one another. Therefore, the military supported a reduction of its size. This was corroborated by the Air Force’s voluntary re-organization and streamlining of many overseas bases and units in the early 1990s before it was subsequently mandated by Congress.\(^{20}\)

Table 1 displays the proposed reductions by service. In 1991, the US Army operated 12 divisions while the Air Force possessed 36 flying wings and the Navy manned 579 commissioned vessels. In the 1991 proposal for the post-Desert Storm drawdown, these numbers were cut by one-third almost across the board. In the proposal, the Army reduced its 12 divisions to 8. The Air Force would reduce its 36 flying wings to 26 and the Navy would de-commission 179 of its ships.

**Table 1. The 1991 proposed $241B reduction of the US military.** This table includes only active duty forces. [http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/HL466.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/HL466.cfm)

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<tr>
<td>New Proposed Levels Post-Reduction 1991</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Reduction</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>31%</td>
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In 1992, the US military witnessed more extensive reductions under a new administration. Cutting an additional $127 billion from the DoD budget, the administration proposed even larger cuts in the DoD forces. These cuts, calculated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), are displayed in Table 2. This table displays the reduction in force structure within the US military from 1991 to 1999. It is important to note how these figures exceed the original planned cuts in Table 1. In 1991, the proposed reductions suggested cuts of one-third across the services. After 1992, the reductions ultimately ranged between 36% for the Army and 45% for the Air Force.

Table 2. The budget of the US administration in 1995 according to the Congressional Budget Office. These figures include active duty and Reserve forces. http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4892/doc18.pdf.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US Army # of Divisions</th>
<th>US Air Force # of Flying Wings</th>
<th>US Navy # of Commissioned Ships</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US Military Levels in 1991</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>579</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Levels in 1995</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Levels in 1999</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Reduction</strong></td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
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Although the military supported the initial proposed cuts of 1991, this second set of reductions was met with skepticism. The US military doubted that it could execute the “Win-Win” strategy when reducing those units that proved most successful in combat. Specifically, the US military’s airpower (in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps) -- which had provided the critical six week bombing campaign which led to the success in Operation Desert Storm -- experienced the main thrust of the reductions.

Table 3 below offers a further, more precise look at the drawdown in end strength of the armed forces from the mid-1980s through FY2004. The table, calculated in thousands, displays the numbers of each service and also displays the total strength of the Reserves per fiscal year. Military levels during the 1980s remained at approximately 3.3 million total force soldiers in the US military. By 1993, the total size of the US military dropped by over 300,000 personnel and continued until it bottomed out at approximately 2.2 million personnel. This equates to an

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End strength is the term for the overall size of each of the armed services. End strength is governed by federal law and therefore requires approval of the Congress and Executive Branch. It permits the services to recruit and retain a specific total number of forces each fiscal year and is the gauge upon which many of the decisions are made concerning the proper size of the services.
overall 33% drop in force structure and personnel manning. Not shown in Table 3 is a reduction in officers by over 25% between 1991 and 1999.\textsuperscript{22}


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The 1991 Base and Realignment Closure (BRAC) Commission

In addition to end strength reductions, the US administration began a series of overseas base closures designed to reduce the overhead costs of the military and consolidate those forces that remained.\textsuperscript{24} The base closures, organized by federal Base Realignment and Closure commissions (BRAC), began work in the early 1990s and accelerated during that decade. 145 bases closed under the 1991 BRAC commission; 300 additional facilities closed under BRAC commissions in the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{25}

Yet as these closures were ordered, the commitment of the US military was increased worldwide. As eight air bases closed in Europe, additional global operations were ordered in Bosnia (Operation Joint Endeavor), Kosovo (Operation Allied Force), and Somalia (Operation Restore Hope) by the civilian leadership.\textsuperscript{26} In essence, the limited forces remaining after the withdrawal of forces and closure of bases ultimately became the linchpins to substantial military engagements.

The ‘Drawdown’ in Pay and Benefits

Aside from the drawdown in armed forces’ infrastructure, the civilian leadership also reduced the comparative pay and benefits of the military versus their civilian counterparts. The new military budget displayed distinct pay gaps between the military and comparable workers in the civilian markets.\textsuperscript{27} For example, pay for the general public rose at a certain percentage level

d RAF Molesworth, United Kingdom, closed in 1991; Hahn Air Base, Germany (1993); Bitburg AB, Germany (1994); Zweibrucken AB, Germany (1992), RAF Alconbury, United Kingdom (1995); Sembach AB, Germany (1995) [Sembach still maintains a depot of 2,000 personnel; the aircraft based there —and the 7000 other personnel to support them — departed in 1995]; RAF Bentwaters, United Kingdom (1993); RAF Woodbridge, United Kingdom (1993).
each year as a result of inflation, improved economy, etc. This rise is called the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The structure of military pay during the mid-to-late 1990s capped salary increases for the DoD at the ECI minus 1.5%. This guaranteed that military pay would lag behind civilian pay increases year after year and ultimately created an 11% difference between comparable pay for civilian workers and their military counterparts.\textsuperscript{28} Figure 1 is a graph depicting the ‘pay gap’ for both officers and enlisted. The horizontal line even with 0 on the left side of the graph represents the civilian wage level of that year according to the Rand Corporation. The black bars beneath the line represent the negative percentage difference in pay for military members versus their civilian counterparts. Green bars above this line display a positive difference in pay growth. Note how officer pay in the military quickly dropped from approximately 5% pay gap to almost 25% in 4 years during the mid to late 1990s. This shows that a military officer’s increase in pay from 1997 to 1998 fell 25% behind that of the civilian sector. Considering that the officer’s pay never measures equal


or above the horizontal line, this shows that officers in the armed forces have continually fallen behind in pay increases as compared to their civilian counterparts, with the largest gaps in the mid to late 1990s.

General benefits outside of pay were reduced as well.\textsuperscript{29} For example, retirement benefits dropped. Veterans of past conflicts (WWII, the Korean Conflict, etc.) had enlisted under the promise of full health care for life as a benefit of military service. However, after serving their
duties, the reduced budgets forced veteran programs to reduce and policies (such as health care for life) to be discontinued. Veterans Administration budgets shrank and active duty service members found themselves forced into a military HMO called Tricare.

Under the Government Travel Card program, military members were forced to pay for business travel (i.e. moves to new assignments, travel to deployed locations, etc.). This program required each military member to register for a credit card and pay for the costs of these official duties with the card. This card program, based on civilian credit card programs, allotted a 21 day grace period before interest was charged to the cardholder (in this case, the service member). Government re-imbursement through its pay system often exceeded this 21 day period however. This caused the service member to shoulder a personal financial burden as a result of official government orders. In other words, the government forced military members to assume risks on their own credit rating to pay for travel required by their federal job – often at huge amounts. 

A Reduction in Weapons Development

Another measure designed by civilians to reduce costs was the placement of new weapons systems development on hold.\textsuperscript{30} This temporary stop on weapons development and production – called the ‘Procurement Holiday’ – stopped development of new weapons systems.\textsuperscript{31} These systems, intended to replace aging weapons from the 1970s in all of the services, forced the military to accept continual operation of systems at increased cost in maintenance and capability. As the former Soviet Union sold many of its advanced systems to whoever paid in cash, the US maintained its Cold War weapons with no plans to develop new ones. The Army needed a replacement to its Vietnam-era armored personnel carrier. The Navy, still operating conventionally powered aircraft carriers and losing ground in its submarine superiority, vied for new ship systems. The Air Force, still operating air refueling tankers and cargo aircraft from the 1950s demanded the development of new airframes to replace those whose tactical relevance and increased operating costs made them borderline cost-prohibitive to

\textsuperscript{e} For example, if an individual in the US was ordered to the Persian Gulf, they would be forced to purchase airline tickets, lodging, and all meals on a credit card under their own name (and credit rating). These costs could easily top $2000 - $3000 a trip and the military member would still be required to meet the credit card payment within the standard 21 day grace period. However, military pay re-imbursement would nominally take 2-3 weeks. Thus, the military member would be forced to assume $2-3000 of credit risk on his name and pay out of his pocket until the re-imbursement occurred. All interest incurred for not paying the credit card in full – a frequent failure as an enlisted person making $18,000/year is unable to fill a no-notice $2-3000 credit card bill – remained the responsibility of the service member.
The civilians insisted that the military had sufficient current weapons systems to meet their missions and pointed to their victories in the Balkans and Kuwait as proof. Thus weapons development stopped almost completely.\(^{33}\)

**Lack of Civilian Leadership Support for the Military**

Further imbalance in the civilian-military dialogue occurred with the unfair treatment of the military by the civilian US administration in the 1990s on several occasions. First, in October 1993, 19 service members were killed during an operation in Mogadishu, Somalia.\(^{34}\) Although portrayed by the civilian leadership as a military failure, recent evidence suggests that the military was restricted by the White House from using weapons systems and tactics the military deemed necessary for success.\(^{35}\) As a result of limited military means to handle the situation, the military failed and bore the brunt of the national criticism without support from the Oval Office.

Second, on June 25, 1996 a bomb exploded in front of a military compound named Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. The bomb, set by members of Hezbollah, killed 19 US military members.\(^{36}\) In the aftermath, pressure from the White House insisted upon blaming the commanding officer of the bombed unit. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Ronald Fogleman, resigned over the perceived scapegoat-ing of the commanding officer despite three independent investigations all clearing the commander’s name.\(^{37}\) In both situations, the military was left to defend itself with no support from its civilian leadership. Worse yet, the military perceived the administration as pre-disposed to sell out the military in hopes for improved presidential approval ratings. In accordance with the civil-military framework, this lack of support by the civilian leadership when the military operated as best possible in support of the civilian objectives led to a heavy strain between the soldier and the state. The military attempted to fulfill the objectives set to it by its civilian leadership but was restricted in its profession by the same civilians. This interference resulted in the ultimate failure of the operations.

By the end of the 1990s, the military underwent significant drawdowns in end strength, financial resources and procurement. Its overseas missions increased while moral support from its civilian administration seemingly decreased. Military members found themselves falling

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\(^{3}\) The military had requested the use of several weapons systems for the operations – chiefly, the AC-130 gunship – which would have proven crucial to the events in Somalia. The administration denied the request as it believed the weapons system could cause an escalation of hostilities and alienate the Somalian population.
behind in pay by comparison to their civilian counterparts. The development of new military weapons systems stopped and the numbers of personnel dropped to very low levels not seen since before World War II. Overall, the military was asked to do more with fewer resources. Realizing these deficiencies, the new US administration in 2001 dedicated itself to rebuilding the military.
Chapter 3: The Civil-Military Relationship from 2000 Leading Up to 9/11

The election of the Bush administration in 2000 suggested a reversal of the policies of the 1990s. Pre-election rhetoric and post-election policy initiatives displayed an increase in military funding and training while reducing the overseas obligations set upon the US military. By analyzing the administration’s policies, funding, and support for the US military, it appeared that it represented the remedy to many of the ills plaguing the US military pre-9/11.

The Proposed Reduction in Overseas Obligations

Starting before his election to the Oval Office, George W. Bush made it clear he had every intention to reduce the overseas burden of the military. In a pre-election speech made September 23, 1999, Bush stated “As president, I will order an immediate review of our overseas deployments – in dozens of countries . . . As I’ve said before, I will work hard to find political solutions that allow an orderly and timely withdrawal from places like Kosovo and Bosnia.”38 In a Presidential debate on October 11, 2000, he reiterated his determination that the responsibilities in Kosovo be replaced by European allies to allow the US military to withdraw.39 This pre-election promise seemed to become strategy after reaching office when he highlighted the overseas responsibilities of the military in a speech to an Army garrison in Georgia in February 2001.40

Yet even as the new administration promised a reevaluation of US military commitments overseas, it also made clear that certain overseas obligations would always remain.41 Notably, there remained no intent to withdraw forces from foreign locations such as Korea. Regions such as these represented clear threats to US interests and its allies. For example, the threat of North Korea’s new nuclear weapons program, the increased US role in Middle Eastern affairs as a result of its forward-basing in Saudi Arabia, and the US’ defense obligations to Taiwan upheld those commitments requiring US military global presence.42

The US administration intended to withdraw forces from many of the outposts across the globe in an attempt to force increase allied participation in conflicts closer to their borders. The key examples given -- Bosnia and Kosovo -- exemplified two substantial locations of American forces in which the administration thought its European allies should shoulder more of the security burden. Although recognizing that the Balkans retained a volatile history, the US administration believed that those locations demanded an increased amount of European military
support considering their proximity to the European region. In initial discussions with European leaders, the US administration frequently commented on the status of forces in the region and the US intent to withdraw as soon as the Europeans would fill in the void.

The withdrawal of forces from Bosnia and Kosovo would also assist the military in reducing its overseas commitments and re-adapt its operations within the new structure and funding of the post-drawdown military. The use of the military as a peacekeeper in the region had drawn on the deployed units’ readiness and capability to train for their wartime tasking. The operations in Bosnia/Kosovo cost the military in lost training, increased operational costs, and increased equipment wear as it performed non-traditional military tasks in the peacekeeping role. With reduced funding, the military wanted to curtail these overseas expenses and use those valuable resources back in the US where they could better use the time and money to train for their primary military roles (vice spending the funds deployed in the Balkans in roles they had not trained for). Thus, the withdrawal of those forces would allow US forces to train in their primary missions and reduce the potential for other units to face the same loss of proficiency in core tasks/duties while making more efficient use of funding and reducing wear on equipment.

As of this writing, the US forces in the Balkans have remained but at a smaller level. The active duty forces originally stationed there have been replaced by Guard units and the total number of US forces in the Balkan region total approximately 1,000.43

Increased Funding for the Military

The new civilian leadership remained equally clear that they intended to increase military pay in order to erase the pay gaps between the military and the civilian sectors.

“In Consider a few facts: Thousands of members of the armed forces are on food stamps. Last year, more than $21 million worth of WIC vouchers – the Women, Infants and Children program – were redeemed at military commissaries. Many others in uniform get Army Emergency Relief or depend on their parents. This is not the way that a great nation should reward courage and idealism.”44

In that same speech in Georgia, the US administration announced its first defense bill, totaling $5.7 billion, which contained $1.4 billion worth of provisions solely intended for increased salaries.45 Table 4 lists the first two major supplemental funding bills passed in 2001 prior to 9/11. It also displays emphasized funding within each bill in order to best understand the
intended effects desired by the administration (namely, an acknowledged increase in pay and benefits for military service members). By referencing table 4, one can see that this initial supplemental bill – announced less than a month after the inauguration – also provided for increases in active duty and veteran health care along with military housing benefits. Five months later, the administration passed a second supplemental defense bill which increased military pay by $1.9 billion for that fiscal year and included new tax incentives for military members. The President also announced an increased 2002 budget including $2.2 billion more for increased pay for military members.47

These two supplemental bills suggest an administration upholding many of the promises made during the election campaign. It also infers an administration which recognized the DoD’s status as an increasingly overworked force which lacked the funds required to meet its obligations.

**Increased Funding Levels of Weapons Design and Weapons Procurement**

The administration simultaneously introduced policies intended to begin design of weapons systems desperately needed by the US military. A replacement aircraft intended for the Air Force, which had previously faced repeated threats of cancellation, received a boost in funding.48 An Army program named Future Combat Systems received approval for
development. More importantly, the President also approved development of an anti-ballistic missile system intended to provide the United States an umbrella from any missile threat on the globe. The controversial system, vigorously opposed by Russia among others, violated the Anti-Ballistic Missile (or ABM) Treaty signed during the Reagan Administration. This commitment to developing advanced weapons systems responded to a fear that the aging weapons in the US military would not easily defeat the weapons employed by other nations. As table 4 also shows, the government’s first two supplemental bills included over $1.5B in new funds for increased weapons research and development.

Improved Public Support for the Military by Civilian Leadership

The new civilian leaders also supported the US military in ways that had remained missing in the previous decade by defending military operations in public and in the media. On April 1, 2001 a US Navy P-3 aircraft collided with a Chinese fighter during activities over international waters off the coast of China. China accused the US of instigating the event and further claimed that the US Navy aircraft had rammed the Chinese fighter. The administration immediately defended the actions of the P-3 crew and insisted that the Chinese fighter was at fault for the incident. In a speech to the US Naval Academy commencement, in May 2001, the President praised the actions of the crew of the P-3 and fiercely categorized them as heroes. This kind of moral support came in stark contrast with the attitudes of the previous civilian leadership and boosted morale among the military. The uneven dialogue seemed to even out.

In summary, after an aggressive post-Cold War drawdown and controversial civil-military relations, the US administration re-established strong support and funding for the military through increased pay, benefits, and equipment and a commensurate decrease in overseas obligations leading up to the events of 9/11.
Chapter 4: The Post-9/11 Civil-Military Relationship

The events of September 11, 2001 forced the US administration to heavily alter its foreign policy. This new strategy, from hereon called the Preemptive doctrine, established a course of action which changed the obligations set upon the US military. This doctrine dictated that the US would no longer remain passive to developing terrorist networks but would now actively seek out and destroy them. It also stated its intention to eliminate a threat before that threat gained the ability to reach or harm the US territory. In essence, the US government reserved the right to pre-emptively strike any nation or entity that presented a danger to the US. The administration urged the international community to side with the United States in its Global War on Terror. It also implied that the US would not tolerate nations who supported or harbored terrorist organizations.

“My hope is that all nations will heed our call, and eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own . . . But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will.” - President George Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002.

The President’s State of the Union speech given in 2002 implored nations to decide to either ally or oppose the US involvement in destroying terrorism.

This chapter focuses on the requirements of the Preemptive Doctrine – for good or for bad – compared to the military’s capability to fulfill it. It analyzes data regarding the military’s manning and pay, overseas obligations, and funding in relation to actual GWoT obligations. The civil-military framework demands that the civilian leadership provide the proper funds to support the obligations it places on the military. Thus, against the backdrop of a military strained by previous administrations, the sudden application of the GWoT’s duties demanded a commensurate increase in resources for the military in order to insure continued fulfillment of the Preemptive Doctrine. The evidence provided in this chapter shows that the civilian support for GWoT military operations remained lacking.

The Issue of Overstretching Overseas Obligations

In the months prior to American Airlines Flight 11 crashing into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, the US administration set a course for withdrawal of its overseas forces for operations deemed outside the purview of US foreign policy. The events of 9/11, however,
caused a reversal in this policy. By analyzing the use of the US military post-9/11, it appears that the overseas obligations of the US military in fact increased.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)

The Administration’s investigation into the events of 9/11 revealed a terrorist network that originated out of regions in Afghanistan and Pakistan but reached throughout the world with its own global capabilities. This network, Al Qaeda, used a supporting government in Afghanistan, the Taliban, to foster an environment in which the network could train and plan for its missions across the globe. The Taliban refused US requests to eliminate its support for the Al Qaeda network.

Attempting to reconcile a nation reeling from the losses of 9/11, backed by an almost unanimous international community, and armed with a determined military, the administration decided to begin military operations in Afghanistan to eliminate the Al Qaeda network. The civilian leadership tasked the US military with eliminating the terrorist networks within Afghanistan, removing the Taliban regime, and establishing a democratic government within Afghanistan. In accordance with the civil-military framework, the President also promised all the funding, manning, and equipment needed to fulfill those objectives: “To all the men and women in our military -- every sailor, every soldier, every airman, every coastguardsman, every Marine -- I say this: Your mission is defined; your objectives are clear; your goal is just. You have my full confidence, and you will have every tool you need to carry out your duty.”

Some capabilities were already in place overseas to assist the US in this endeavor. In Saudi Arabia, the US still operated Operation Southern Watch (OSW) which contained a large airbase and a Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) outside Riyadh. Bases in Kuwait, also used in Operation Southern Watch, maintained constant US airpower within the region. Finally, an outpost in the middle of the Indian Ocean called Diego Garcia already existed as a refueling and stopover point for transient military aircraft and ships.

The operations in Afghanistan, entitled Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), required a much larger infrastructure, however, than already prepared by the US military and added additional obligations overseas. A large base in Al Udeid, Qatar, was built to accept the tankers required to refuel the aircraft departing Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the way to Afghanistan. Naval carriers, expecting to remain in port for normal repairs and re-constitution, were deployed in large numbers forcing an increase in the percentage of deployed naval
personnel. The US Army mobilized one corps (the 5th), two major divisions and added the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions (totaling over 100,000 personnel). Additional bases for all services were opened in Romania, Bulgaria, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Cuba, and others just as a beginning.

The operation continues as of this writing. As a result, all of the outposts and bases created for OEF remain. Diego Garcia remains an active post supporting the increased levels of personnel and equipment brought in for the operation. Al Udeid still operates its CAOC out of Qatar and additional bases in central Asia continue to be manned by thousands of members of the US military.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

After OEF, the administration focused on Iraq. The reasons behind this focus remain controversial and remain outside the topic of this thesis. The administration argued that Iraq posed a threat to the US for several reasons and therefore required regime change in order to eliminate that threat. First, the US claimed Iraq was manufacturing and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological weapons while attempting to develop nuclear weapons. It was the stated belief of the administration that Iraq intended to use these weapons against freedom-loving countries. Second, the administration claimed that Iraq had ties with Al Qaeda. The potential combination of weapons of mass destruction provided to terrorist organizations proved too threatening for the US government. When combined with the ongoing Iraqi hostility towards the US since Operation Desert Storm, the administration perceived Iraq to be a quickly developing – if not already established – threat to the US, its interests, and its allies.

The civilian leadership set out objectives to its military for operations in Iraq: disarm the Iraqi government (with special emphasis on the discovery and elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction) and the liberation of the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi government. In accordance with the civil-military framework, it also committed itself to the funding and equipping of the DoD commensurate with the obligations entrusted to it. According to President Bush, “We also accept the cost of supporting our military and the missions we give it.” The civilian administration delegated the planning and execution of the operations to the same commander (General Franks) who performed Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

The invasion of Iraq, entitled Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), increased the deployment of forces further. Additional bases were built in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.
Although attempts to use Turkey during OIF failed, the effort to establish bases for military operations demanded increased money, personnel, and equipment. Additional forces were deployed in order to execute the operations in Afghanistan as well as the operations in Iraq. The Air Force established planned cycles for deployments in the mid-1990s to compensate the increased deployment schedules resulting from reduced forces and increased overseas obligations. In order to support OIF, the Air Force temporarily abandoned these planned deployment cycles as it was finding the program overwhelmed by the required resources needed to fill the two combat operations at once. The navy deployed additional carrier groups and flying squadrons outside of the pressed deployment cycles created by OEF while the US Army recalled thousands of Army National Guardsmen to fulfill posts normally reserved for active duty service members. The government recalled 410,000 of the 1.15 million in the Reserve since 2001. These reservists were intended to serve when the nation was at maximum war-fighting capacity.

Despite President Bush’s proclaimed cessation of major combat operations in Iraq on the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003, the high level of commitments of forces overseas remained. There are currently 140,000 US troops in Iraq with over 120 additional outposts, bases and forward operating locations. Each of these locations requires maintenance, housing, food, and operating facilities. This does not include the required infrastructure in order to ensure communication between all of the facilities both through roadways, airfields, and telephone/internet connectivity. The costs of these outposts will be discussed later; it is the extensive deployment of US troops overseas which remains significant here.

Other Battles in the GWoT

The justification for keeping these outposts open remains outside the bounds of this thesis. The fact remains that the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan forced two major increases in commitments upon the US military. In addition to these increases, the US military was assigned new duties in many other outposts aside from Afghanistan or Iraq in support of the GWoT. For example, after the beginning of OEF, a prisoner of war camp was built in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is prepared to accept 2,000 detainees, presumably terrorists who require high levels of security. Officially, it is unclear how many US personnel are located at Camp Delta. According to a Washington Post article, the

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8 Reference [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/iraq.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/iraq.htm) for a full listing of the bases in Iraq.
camp costs $118M a year to operate. It is clear that a substantial commitment of military personnel and resources are required to protect and police 2,000 detainees in addition to protecting the facility, interrogate the detainees, etc.

Other efforts in the GWoT also suggest that extended deployment commitments will be placed on the military. Operations in the Philippines against Abu Sayef networks, in Indonesia against Jemaah Islamiah, and in Yemen have all added more overseas commitments. These increased operations around the world add to the pre-existing commitments in Korea and other regions. More importantly, they indicate that the GWoT forced the current administration to increase the commitments overseas at a rapid pace.

Attempts by the Administration to Reduce Overseas Obligations

As overseas GWoT operations increased, the US administration made attempts to reduce its alternative, non-GWoT overseas obligations. The most obvious example remains the government’s announcement on August 16, 2004, of a major restructuring of military forces. In the plan, the administration proposed the withdrawal of 60,000 to 70,000 military personnel from overseas locations such as Europe and Japan. These withdrawals would shift the US forces in Korea away from the Demilitarized Zone while reducing the overall US troop level in Korea by one fourth. It also clearly stated no intention to maintain or open any bases in Latin America or Africa.

By following through with this plan in locations such as Europe, the administration intended to leave the NATO allied nations responsible for their own national security. The principle also relies on the mobilization of the US military. By depending on the military’s ability to strike within 24 hours around the globe while maintaining the ability to shift large forces within days to a potential threatening region, the administration insists that the reduction of forces overseas will enable the proper training and morale of the US forces while providing the invaluable benefits of stateside basing to military families.

Although the commitment to Bosnia and Kosovo remain, the number of forces in that region has shrunk significantly. In 2000, 10,000 troops were in the Balkan region. By 2003, that number reduced to 4,000. Currently, there are approximately 1,000 personnel in the region. Over 18,000 personnel exist in Afghanistan and over 180,000 currently operate in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
An effective way to understand the manner in which the Preemptive Doctrine placed substantial increases on the military’s obligations may be seen in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 displays the breakdown of US forces between permanent stateside assignments, permanent overseas assignments, and deployed assignments in support of limited operations (such as the Balkans) pre-9/11. In 2001, approximately 14% of the total active duty force was stationed overseas. Table 6 displays the effect of 9/11 and the commencement of the GWoT. According to the table, the same number of overseas assignments remained but the number of deployed personnel increased substantially from 10,000 pre-9/11 to 250,000 in 2005.

Table 5. Pre-9/11 Breakdown of US Forces.
Compiled by author from globalsecurity.com and DoD Press Releases.

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Table 6. Post 9/11 Breakdown of US Forces.
Compiled by author from globalsecurity.com and DoD Press Releases.

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</tbody>
</table>

Between 2001 and 2005, the total number of active duty forces in the US military increased by 42,000 personnel. The number of overseas commitments increased between these periods by 250,000 as a direct result of the GWoT. Therefore, despite an increase of 42,000 personnel, the requirements of the overseas obligations post-9/11 have incurred over 200,000 additional billets. The GWoT eclipsed permanent overseas assignments in numbers and, as a result of the unchanged overseas permanent basing levels, forced the military to fill those positions directly from US-based positions.

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h In 2001, 1.386M personnel were on active duty. In 2005, there were 1.428M personnel. These graphs exclude Guard and Reserve numbers.
In summary, the Preemptive Doctrine and subsequent GWoT led to substantial increases in the overseas obligations set to the US military and heavy increases in deployment rates. High deployment rates stressed the manning levels of the military further and placed an unprecedented reliance on the Guard and Reserve.

The Issue of Manning

The manning levels of the US military did not rise in proportion to the number of overseas obligations accompanying the GWoT. Table 7 presents a typical Air Force personnel office support staff, measured by the number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted personnel in 1992, 2001 (pre-9/11), and 2003 (post-9/11). That office in 2001 held one officer, one non-commissioned officer, and three enlisted members (a net loss of two non-commissioned officers). In 2003, after the 9/11 attacks, that same office lost one more enlisted person. In addition, after 9/11, one of the other remaining enlisted personnel or non-commissioned officers would be deployed on a constant basis in support of the GWoT. The responsibilities of this office never diminished through the reduction in personnel. Doing the same job with fewer staff increased the demands placed on each of the service members. This office’s experiences repeated itself throughout the military after the personnel drawdown and the subsequent increased obligations as a result of the GWoT.

Table 7. A Typical US Air Force Maintenance Squadron Command Support Staff. Note the net loss of 3 people over this period. In addition, one member of the current office is always deployed in support of the GWoT. Compiled by author from personal interviews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Commissioned Officer</th>
<th>Non-Commissioned Officer</th>
<th>Enlisted Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specific personnel policies produced tougher work environments for US military personnel. For example, leave requests by service members are often denied by their supervisors in fear of defaulting on unit commitments as a result of one more person being gone. The

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1 Non-commissioned officers are a critical part of a military unit’s success. These individuals have successfully completed the lower enlisted ranks and retain crucial knowledge and experience in their career field. They often are older than the officers placed above them and, for these reasons, are relied upon by officers heavily with respect to their opinion and experience. A loss of a single non-commissioned officer is often more substantial than the loss of multiple, younger enlisted personnel.
reduction in personnel in one’s office (as in Table 7) came at the cost of the remaining personnel’s ability to take leave. As the obligations among the personnel grew with fewer people, supervisors found themselves unable to sacrifice additional losses due to leave. Therefore, the opportunity for military members to regenerate and recharge from a demanding deployment and work schedule was often denied to them.\textsuperscript{80} A restrictive “Use or Lose” timetable was adopted with respect to the legal vacation of service members. The “Use or Lose” provision stipulates that a service member may not possess more than 60 credited days of leave to their name at the end of the fiscal year.\textsuperscript{81} If a member has more than 60 days to their name, they lose all days above that number.\textsuperscript{82} However, with increased and extended deployments, supervisors have been forced to deny leave if the requested vacation time would result in the unit failing to complete the mission. Since supervisors have the ultimate power to grant time off, much of the decision to grant a vacation is left to their judgment. This new policy led to some servicemen losing their legal vacation time as a result of the increased overseas obligations and lack of sufficient personnel to complete those obligations.

Additional manning problems exist as a result of the smaller US military and increased military obligations. First, Rand Organization studies in 2000 and 2004 suggest that the military is undergoing a withdrawal in quantity and quality of enlistees in the service.\textsuperscript{83} More importantly, they report that the services are suffering from a reduction in re-enlistments. The latter of the two issues, in specific, may be causing substantial problems. As each member of the military leaves and does not re-enlist, the service loses a trained individual who possesses an increased skill level, experience, and wisdom when compared to the new recruit enlisted to replace him/her. Resource-wise, it is cheaper to keep a trained individual in the military than to pay for the training required for a replacement. According to Rand, this reduction in retention rates results from the increased deployment rates, the advantages of civilian over military professions (most notably salary differences), and the unhappiness among service members about absorbing the additional duties of those individuals eliminated during the post-Cold War drawdown.\textsuperscript{84}

Second, recent reports have evaluated an increasing number of divorces in the US military since 9/11. In June 2005, the US Army announced that the divorce rate among its troops had risen at a drastic rate since 9/11. According to Figure 2, the divorce rate among officers climbed by 78% since 2003 and by over 350% since OEF and OIF began.\textsuperscript{85} For the enlisted
force, the divorce rates went up 28% and 53% respectively.\textsuperscript{86} The Army admitted that the increased deployment rates and unpredictable quality-of-life for its service members explained the remarkable increase in divorces.\textsuperscript{87}

![Army Divorces per year](image)

**Figure 2.** US Army divorce rates as reported by the US Army, FY 2001 - 2004.

Third, a report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) finds that DoD commitments have exceeded active duty limitations and therefore required the service of the Guard and Reserve forces. Therefore, members of the Reserve and Guard were called up – most done involuntarily. Over 335,000 of 1.2 million Reserve/Guard members have been activated.\textsuperscript{88} According to the report, these activations were executed quickly and with little forethought to the permanent effect they may create. For example, the Army recalled over 230,000 Guard/Reserve outside of the established guidelines for any planned activation of those forces. In the effort to meet short-term requirements, the DoD changed the policies regarding the activation and possible deployment frequency for Guard/Reserve members.\textsuperscript{89} Members were told to expect deployments up to 24 months while also allowing no reconstitution for the members back at their home and civilian job. In other words, any Reserve/Guard member could be activated for 24 months and, the day after that activation concluded, could be activated again.

Figure 3 represents the average duty days served per year by the average Guard/Reserve member. Aside from the increased activity in 1991 as a result of Operations Desert Storm, one can see the Guard-Reserve possessed a steady and reliable activity level. However, post-9/11 this pattern increased significantly. The rate at which the Guard/Reserve activated has tripled. More importantly, the trend continues to climb.
This certainly had an effect on the recruitment and retention of Guard/Reserve members whose expectation to serve rested on rules abolished by the DoD. For example, a GAO report found that the Guard and Reserve is failing to meet current recruiting goals. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld admitted the Army Guard was having trouble meeting their enlistment and retention rates by admitting they were at 88% of their desired levels – the first time they had fallen short since the late 1970s.

The concept of the All Volunteer Force (AVF) has also proven problematic under the new military obligations encountered post-9/11. At the end of the Vietnam War, the Nixon Administration decided to ensure that those in the military were made up of volunteers. This eliminated the draft as a technique of conscription and instead used the benefits and advantages of military service to attract American youth to the military as a voluntary profession. Incentives such as the GI Bill, worldwide travel, job security, and steady pay all highlighted the benefits for potential enlistees to attain an AVF. The AVF has remained ever since.

During the recent operations, the concept of the AVF has come into question. Although a draft has not been implemented, DoD personnel practices have created some controversy. The most obvious of these procedures is the concept of ‘Stop Loss.’ Stop Loss, a common policy option for each of the armed services, involuntarily prohibits members from separating or

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The GI Bill was developed in 1944 to help active duty service members pay for collegiate education. It is currently offered for active duty, Reserve, Guard, honorably discharged, and retired personnel. The bill compensates these individuals for some or all of their college tuition and is a considered a strong benefit for those entering the services directly from high school and who lack the money to pay for college during or after service.
retiring from active duty.\textsuperscript{94} Stop Loss can be instituted by the Secretary of Defense as it was on September 24, 2001 just after the 9/11 attacks.\textsuperscript{95} Critics of this policy called this measure a ‘back door draft’ as it points out how members were forced to remain under active duty in apparent violation of the AVF.\textsuperscript{96} Stop Loss, for certain high demand career fields, is still in effect as of this writing.\textsuperscript{97}

The debate over the justification of Stop Loss falls along two lines. One side claims that a service member affected by Stop Loss had signed on ‘the dotted line’ and therefore accepted the possibility that Stop Loss would occur. Critics of that view believe that the advertisement of the US military as an \textit{all-volunteer force} inferred that \textit{involuntary} retention of service members in the military would not occur and therefore could not have been expected (much less accepted) by a potential enlistee. Looking at a service member’s enlistments as a contract, critics also view the service member as having served their portion of the contract and therefore having every right to leave the armed service. In addition, they argue that if the service maintained a higher level of troops, Stop Loss would never have to be an option.

Since the 1990s, each of the military services have created systems to provide predictability for deployments to the service members while meeting the high operations tempo associated with foreign policy objectives. Recognizing the demands of the military drawdown versus the sustained operations in Operations Southern Watch, Northern Watch, and those in the Balkans, military leaders initiated programs intended to provide predictable deployment patterns for the military units. The Air Force, for example, established the AEF (Air Expeditionary Force) cycle on 1 January 2000. It constructed 10 deployment cycles which scheduled each service member to be ready for a 90-day deployment every 15 months.\textsuperscript{98} Each Air Force unit was assigned to one of the 10 AEF cycles with the intent that this schedule provided predictability for deployments and permitted units to perform normal training and duties during the 12 months they were not deployed. Figure 4 below represents a graphical depiction of the AEF cycle and the manner in which the Air Force schedules assorted units for predictable deployments in support of the military’s overseas obligations. Therefore, by scheduling the deployments, each service member knew when they would deploy, for how long, and could expect a full year non-deployed back at their assigned station upon completion of each 90-day deployment. The Air Force built this concept with the intent of continuing it indefinitely.
considering the sustained commitments and no expectation of a manning increase. The enduring nature of the AEF suggests that the military leadership acknowledges the permanently deployed status of the military. Since the beginning of the GWoT, the original 3 month deployment duration has since been extended to 4 months by the Air Force military leadership as overseas commitments required units to remain in theater for longer periods.

The DoD’s civilian leadership insists that a key solution to the manning issues concerns the ‘misuse’ of its military members. The civilian leadership believes that too many military members are serving in non-combat positions. By outsourcing those non-combat positions to contractors or civilians, the civilian leadership believes that the military will free up thousands of individuals who can then fill combat, specifically worldwide deployable, positions. Therefore, the military does not require more troops; the military simply needs to re-organize those positions which could be filled by contractors or civilians and use the military personnel in warfighting positions.

"They've [the DoD] got 123,000 possibly in Iraq and Afghanistan together and maybe 270,000 deployed all over. So, needless to say, that does pose some stress on the force. On the other hand, when you think they're drawing off a million people, and we're only using 270,000 deployed, it's pretty clear that the problem is not a shortage of people. The problem is that they're 'malorganized.'" -Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, August 5, 2004
In an interview with National Public Radio in August of 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld insisted that no one inside the Pentagon had requested an increase in end strength and therefore he saw no need for an increase.100

However, others (both military and civilian) differ on this view. According to a report by the Defense Science Board, the US military is ill-prepared at its current state for the commitments being placed on it. The United States Defense Science Board, abbreviated as DSB, is a committee of civilian experts appointed to advise the Department of Defense on Scientific and Technical matters.101 “Current and projected force structure will not sustain our current and projected global stabilization commitments,” the report reads.101 The report continues that the inadequate level of troops in the DoD and the lack of long term endurance capability explain this inability to meet current and projected threats.102 The report further suggests that the military could default on its commitments if its recommendations are not implemented before the next operation.103 Five months after Secretary Rumsfeld’s interview with National Public Radio, the DoD made an emergency increase in end strength by 36,000 personnel.104 Therefore, despite the civilian leadership’s public relations insistence that the military did not require additional forces in the military, it in fact made a subsequent request for more troops. This suggests that the DoD leadership recognized the need for increased Manning despite its public stance to the contrary.

The Issue of Funding

Beginning with its presidential campaign and continuing through the GWoT, the current US administration proudly advertised its policy of increasing funding for the military. The White House website’s first two bullets concerning its national security policies list the additional funding for the US military.105 Among the increases in fiscal budgets for the DoD, the GWoT (including OEF and OIF) have received multiple supplemental additions from Congress outside the normal budgetary processes. Many of these increases went towards military pay, benefits, military weapons designs, and the GWoT. Despite these increases however, further evidence indicates that these funding levels remain inadequate relative to the increases in the military’s missions as a result of the new Preemptive Doctrine.
Funding Outside of the GWoT

Increases in pay and benefits for the military indicated a civilian leadership attempting to meet the needs of its military but did not fully make up for the losses of the 1990s. When the current administration entered office, the DoD had a fiscal budget of $305.4 billion dollars for Fiscal Year (FY) 2001. Table 8 represents all of the supplemental and budgetary funding for the DoD not directly affiliated with the GWoT. The table shows the extensive increase in funding for the military on issues other than the GWoT. Following promises made during his election, the President quickly proposed a $5.7 billion increase for the FY2002 military budget to begin the process of rebuilding the military. Along with the proposed FY2002 budget, the administration put forward a supplemental bill to the existing FY2001 budget. Two months later, Bush added another supplemental budget request to the FY2001 budget by adding $39 billion. This second supplement to the FY2001 budget added $8 billion to the development of new weapons systems. The administration stated that this supplemental bill would not fund all of the systems needed to replace aging equipment and the new missile defense program the

Table 8. Funding for the Military not affiliated with the GWoT. This table displays the initial funding for the military by the US administration leading up to 9/11. Compiled by author from CBO and GAO studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Original FY DoD Budget</th>
<th>Supplemental Appropriations Added After Original DoD Budget</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY2001</td>
<td>$305.4 B (set by previous administration)</td>
<td>$1.9 B</td>
<td>Included a Tax Cut for Military Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2002</td>
<td>$355 B</td>
<td>$39 B</td>
<td>$8 B for New Weapons Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2003</td>
<td>$369 B</td>
<td>$5.7 B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2004</td>
<td>$375 B</td>
<td>$2.5 B</td>
<td>Near-Term Defense from 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005</td>
<td>$391 B</td>
<td>$10.5 B</td>
<td>Military Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$36 B</td>
<td>Military Pay and National Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All Supplemental Bills Made for FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005 Go Directly to Funding the GWoT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
President advocated. The supplemental placed the budget of the US military back to levels of the Reagan administration funding at the height of the Cold War.

After 9/11, another supplemental emergency package contained $2.5 billion intended to supply the near-term defense needs of the nation in reaction to the attacks. Three months later, the President signed a bill increasing funding for military housing by $10.5 billion. A month afterwards, the president signed an additional appropriations bill which provided for a substantial increase in military pay. It also funded the newly announced National Missile Defense program.

The administration added $37 billion to the FY2002 budget late in 2002. This appropriations bill provided an increase (totaling over $355 billion versus the $305 billion originally budgeted) and remained the largest increase for a FY defense budget in 20 years. Among the additions to funding was a 4.1% increase in pay for military members, an $11 billion increase for weapons procurement, and $7 billion dollars for the national missile defense system.

In the fall months of 2002, and two months after the appropriations bill was signed for FY 2002, President Bush signed the DoD budget for FY 2003. This budget totaled $369 billion, which is $14 billion increase over the previous FY. It included even more increases in government construction, new weapons systems acquisition, and additional overseas operations.

The signing of the FY2005 defense bill in August of 2005 produced another substantial increase in the funding of the DoD. The funding -- $391 billion – soared $86 billion over the budget supplied to the military when President Bush took office. The bill’s chief purpose provided increased pay for the military.

Therefore, outside of the GWoT, military members received increases in pay, benefits, and equipment. These increases began to compensate military members for the heavy decreases in benefits and the salary gap incurred during the 1990s. However, the increases in weapons procurement – even by the White House’s admission – still did not meet the requirements set by military professionals in DoD.

Direct Funding for the GWoT

With these non-GWoT budgets in mind, the events of 9/11 expanded the funding needs of the military further. Since the administration had approved the FY budget prior to its launch
of the GWoT, no resources had originally been in place for the GWoT. Thus, the military did not receive funding until an additional appropriations bill could be passed.

The increased overseas obligations required massive funding. The necessary bases and outposts to support OEF and OIF were in fact small cities – not just the military tools required to provide combat power. For instance, an air base built in Kyrgyzstan in response to OEF required maintenance of a former-Soviet runway to bring it to western specifications. It also required the manufacture of facilities for the specific types of aircraft forward-based there. The base also required lodging and dining facilities, medical offices, and other non-military subsidies needed to sustain a war fighting unit. Therefore, the costs of opening these types of bases reached heavy amounts. The government attempted to fund these increased operations but the evidence suggests that in fact very unreliable and insufficient funds were allocated to these military needs.

Table 9 lists all of the fiscal year budgets and supplemental bills set for the DoD with direct relation to the funding for the GWoT. It compares the total funding from the bills and compares them to projected costs for the GWoT according to organizations such as the CBO, GAO, and information released by the DoD.

In January of 2002, four months after the initiation of hostilities in Afghanistan, the president signed the bill which earmarked a broad increase in military spending. $3.5 billion of the $30 billion appropriations bill specifically focused on the payment for the operations in the GWoT. Afterward, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) calculated that the first six months of OEF in Afghanistan (Oct 2001 – Mar 2002) would cost $5.8 billion.\textsuperscript{119} The CBO claimed the operations in Afghanistan would cost an extra $10 billion unaccounted for in the FY2002 budget.\textsuperscript{1120} It is likely that the costs of the GWoT outside Afghanistan made the price of the GWoT even higher.

The CBO’s report also stated that OEF between April – September 2002 (the second six months of the operation) would cost over $4.4 billion. In October 2002, the President signed a bill adding $5 B to the GWoT in FY2002. The two funding bills by the US administration – one for $3.5 B and the other for $5 B – fell short of the CBO’s total estimate of $10.2 B figure for the cost of the first year of OEF. Thus, the DoD was forced to pay for the remaining portions of OEF out of other portions of its own budget.\textsuperscript{121} Again, these figures do not include the non-OEF

\textsuperscript{1} Note how these costs only include the operations in Afghanistan and do not include the other military commitments in the GWoT including East Africa and the Philippines.
Table 9. Graphical Summary of Funding Versus Costs of GWoT. Compiled by author.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Projected Costs of GWoT</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Funding for GWoT</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2001 – Mar 2002</td>
<td>$5.8 B</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Jan 2002</td>
<td>$3.5 B</td>
<td>Defense Appropriations Bill</td>
<td>-$2.3 B</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2002 – Sep 2002</td>
<td>$4.4 B</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Oct 2002</td>
<td>$5.0 B</td>
<td>Defense Appropriations Bill</td>
<td>+$0.6</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$10.2 B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$8.5 B</td>
<td></td>
<td>-$1.7 B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2003</td>
<td>$61 B</td>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Oct 2002</td>
<td>$10.0 B</td>
<td>FY 2003 Budget</td>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$62.0 B</td>
<td>Emergency Supplemental Bill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$61 B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$72.0 B</td>
<td></td>
<td>+$11.0 B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2004</td>
<td>$77.0 B</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Nov 2003</td>
<td>$65.0 B</td>
<td>Supplemental Bill</td>
<td></td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>$77.0 B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$65.0 B</td>
<td></td>
<td>-$12.0 B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005</td>
<td>Estim. $80-85 B</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Oct 2004</td>
<td>$25.0 B</td>
<td>FY2005 Budget</td>
<td></td>
<td>d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$75.9 B</td>
<td>Supplemental Bill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>Estim. $80-85 B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$100.9 B</td>
<td></td>
<td>+$15-20 B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Totals</td>
<td>Estim. $228-233+ B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$241 B</td>
<td></td>
<td>+$13 – 18 B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Notes:

a. The CBO cost figures only account for OEF in Afghanistan. Other global operations in support of the GWoT remain unaccounted for and would likely drive the actual costs up.
b. The $10 B allocated in the FY 203 Budget was termed in the bill to be used only ‘if needed.’ It is assumed here that it was needed and used.
c. The figure for the cost of the GWoT in FY 2004 results from the DoD’s report that, despite funding, they would fall $12 B short from what was funded.
d. The cost figure is calculated by the CBO’s report claiming that the FY2005 budget failed to fund the GWoT by $55-60 B. The CBO’s estimate makes two crucial assumptions: 1) previous estimates had been repeatedly beneath the actual costs of the GWoT and 2) that the estimates made assumed a decrease in forces in Iraq and reduction in US activity there. This second assumption proved false as the numbers of US forces in Iraq have not diminished which would make the overall cost of the GWoT much larger.
costs of the GWoT (i.e. those operations outside of Afghanistan but still part of the GWoT).

The transfer of funds from one DoD initiative to another is not easy. Federal law requires that the appropriation of funds set out by Congress be used for the explicit purposes Congress intended in the legislation. For example, if Congress budgets $10 billion towards the construction of new defense buildings, the DoD can not take $2 billion out of that $10 billion and use it for OEF funding without Congressional approval. Therefore, the unfunded operations in OEF proved very difficult to fund by the DoD considering the limited amounts of unrestricted funding it could use to pay for OEF.

The administration continued to increase the funding compared to previous budgets. In the fall months of 2002, and two months after the appropriations bill was signed for FY 2002, the administration approved the DoD budget for FY 2003. This budget totaled $369 billion – an increase $14 billion over than the previous FY – and included a provision for $10 billion should the GWoT require it.⑪⑫

Military operations in Iraq began on March 19, 2003.⑪⑬ Included in the build-up for those operations were the same requirements as seen in OEF. Namely, the construction of new outposts in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates all added costs to the DoD’s ability to fulfill the civilian administration’s foreign policy towards Iraq. Additional deployments of personnel and partial re-distribution of resources from Afghanistan to Iraq further added to the costs of preparing for OIF. Six days after the beginning of hostilities in Iraq, the administration announced a proposed wartime emergency supplemental bill for the DoD totaling $79 billion.⑪⑭ The intent of the bill was to pay $62 billion for the increased maintenance and operation of the DoD in response to the increased commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq, along with the other fronts of the GWoT.⑪⑮

According to the GAO, the GWoT operations cost $61.0 billion dollars in FY 2003.⑪⑯ The military received $72 B in that same FY (the $62 B in the appropriations bill and the $10 B included in the original FY budget). The GAO reported that the costs of OEF, OIF and GWoT roughly matched the funding provided by Congress and the Bush administration. Therefore, despite the initial loss of funds by the DoD in OEF, the supplemental funding provided by President Bush and Congress in April 2003 allowed the operations to continue without forcing the DoD to cannibalize other budget allotments.
After the announcement of the end of major OIF combat operations in May 2003, the obligations for the military remained. Figure 5 shows the totals and breakdown of costs for the GWoT with total costs of over $61B in 2003 alone. This is more than the GWoT costs for FY2002 and is less than the $72B costs calculated by the GAO. Thus, despite the formal end of combat operations, military activities continued and were accompanied by the commensurate needs for funding.

The next funding bill for the DoD was passed in November 2003. The president signed a supplemental bill authorizing $87 billion for the GWoT and $65 billion specifically earmarked for the increased operations tempo sustained by the US military. $20 billion of the bill, almost the entire remaining amount outside the operations $65 billion allotment, remained to provide funding for the new governments of Iraq and Afghanistan. However, according to a GAO report in July 2004, this funding did not cover the costs of the operations overseas. In the report, the services reported an expected shortfall of approximately $12 billion dollars. In response to these shortfalls, the DoD stated it would cannibalize funds from peacetime training and operations into the funds required to pay for the GWoT. As the report also states, this cannibalization, while permitting the increased operations tempo for the GWoT in fact delayed the funding required for other obligations. In other words, the DoD was forced to fund the GWoT by taking funds from other, non-GWoT programs and operations such as training.
missions, equipment, and military exercises. In order to regain the proficiency and training lost as a result of this transfer of funds from training to the GWoT, the DoD would be forced to request substantially more money in future budgets in order to catch up on the training.

Seven months later, in a letter to the Senate Budget Committee in June 2004, the Congressional Budget Office stated that the costs of OEF, OIF, and the GWoT would exceed the DoD’s funding for those operations by $55 – 60 billion. Two specific items make this figure very important. First, the CBO admitted that it had previously underestimated military needs and cautioned the committee that the $55-60 billion figure could be too small. Second, the CBO report also stated that the figure assumed a gradual shrinking of forces in Iraq for OIF which, to date, has not occurred. These assumptions, when compared to actual events, infer that the lack of funding most likely exceeded the $55 – 60 billion by 2004 and that the DoD may require even more than this amount in order to break even.

The assumptions used to predict costs differ from reality as actual costs can never perfectly mimic the projected costs. This produces differences between perceived versus actual costs. For example, the CBO’s estimates include assumptions on the number of troops, aircraft, ships, and supplies required for the military operations. The CBO admitted the uncertainty of its data, “as appropriate, it [the CBO] used cost data from prior and current military operations—most notably, the operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Desert Shield/Desert Storm” in order to assess costs of OIF. In addition, the CBO’s estimates of OIF included a gradual reduction in the number of forces required to remain in Iraq. This reduction has not occurred which, as a result, produces clear differences between the funded amounts and the actual costs of the operation.

“Estimating the costs of the war in Afghanistan beyond fiscal year 2002 is very difficult because of the indeterminate nature of the conflict . . . Thus, CBO cannot estimate with any certainty what the costs of the war in Afghanistan might be for fiscal year 2003.” – Letter to the Honorable Pete V. Domenici, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C., April 10, 2002

Therefore, unless an analyst makes a perfect prediction, the estimates used to draft budgets will not equal the funds required (whether it is a surplus or deficit). This is a crucial factor in the assessment of whether the military is receiving the proper funding. If the CBO reported that the government underfunded the GWoT by $55 – 60 billion and their assumptions under-represent the actual GWoT costs, then the DoD is under-funded by more than the stated $55 – 60 billion.
Considering these factors and the increased operations in the GWoT when compared to the assumptions made by the CBO, it appears the costs of the GWoT are much heavier and the underfunded nature of the military is much worse.

The signing of the FY2005 defense bill in August of 2004 provided $391 billion for military pay raises along with $25 billion specifically earmarked for the GWoT.\textsuperscript{139} On 11 May 2005, President Bush signed the latest funding for the GWoT: the “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief Act, 2005.”\textsuperscript{140} It was the first funding for the GWoT in over 18 months. This substantial bill supplies $75.9 billion to the GWoT.\textsuperscript{141} Although substantial, further investigation will reveal that the delay since the previous bill has induced some doubt in the DoD about the reliability, timeliness, and sufficiency of federal funding for the GWoT.

The Problems with Funding

Although the civilian leadership provided the military with increases in funding, those increases appear unsteady and unreliable when considering the budgetary obligations placed upon military commanders. The DoD received budgetary funding in 5, 6, 11, and 7 month increments after the first 12 months of OEF with no ability to predict when or how much the next budget would arrive to pay the costs of their military commitments. Table 9 shows how the funding first surpassed the DoD’s expenses by $11B, then fell short by $12B, followed by a surplus of $15B+. Thus, despite the apparent surplus in funds, the unsteady amounts caused a strain on military budgeting.

Most notably however, the best evidence that the military remains under-funded can be seen in their reaction to the administration’s $75.9B budget in May 2005. Two days after the bill became law, the military announced that the Air Force was reducing its flying training hours across the service in order to help pay for the costs of the GWoT operations.\textsuperscript{142} In other words, two days after receiving an apparently large funding bill, the DoD reacted with additional budget cuts and reductions. This reaction suggests a military awareness of budgeting needs not shared by the civilian leadership; if the budget proposed and approved by civilians would have sufficed, the DoD would not subsequently cut other programs in order to further fund the GWoT. This reaction also indicates a struggling military caught between wartime obligations and operational and financial dependency on its civilian administration. Despite overall drastic increases in military budgets to support GWoT, the evidence suggests that the increases still lagged behind
the unprecedented costs of the Preemptive Doctrine and the GWoT. The unequal dialogue between the military and its civilian leadership initiated in the 1990s unfortunately continued.

The Issue of Weapons and Equipment

The military experienced unpredictable trends in weapons procurement as well; while some weapons were approved, many others were canceled. Despite the additional funding for new weapons equipment, the time lag between development of new weapons to their full entry into service left the military operating much of the same equipment that it used during the Cold War. Meanwhile, since the height of the Cold War, the costs of developing new equipment rose considerably. Other nations expanded their exports of military weapons systems that targeted American-made systems. Considering the recent US military victories, some questioned the need for new weapons as the recent successes inferred an already superior force in no need of improved equipment. Yet evidence indicates that the US, as a result of a Procurement Holiday, suffers from technological parity with an increasing number of nations. More importantly, despite increases in weapons procurement and a recognized need for weapons improvements, the time and money required to re-establish weapons superiority may exceed the costs Congress and the American people are willing to pay.

The Procurement Holiday

In one of his first series of testimonies in front of Congress, the current Secretary of Defense commented that a ‘procurement holiday’ in the 1990s had left the DoD in a disadvantageous position. This belief followed late 1990s CBO testimony which argued that the ‘procurement holiday’ had dropped procurement and development levels too low for too long to sustain the force. The CBO testimony already foresaw the impact of the reduced weapons system procurement on the military that the Defense Secretary identified in 2001. In addition, the testimony claimed that the procedures initiated in the 1990s to fund procurement would likely fail and therefore place the military in dire straits.

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\textsuperscript{m} As this thesis will display later, the extensive time required to bring a weapons system from the drawing board to production caused the military to operate old equipment longer than expected while its newer replacement equipment underwent development, funding, testing, and approval.
An Issue of Time and Money

As the post-Cold War drawdown began, the costs of developing new weapons systems grew considerably. The current air superiority fighter in the US Air Force inventory – the F-15 Eagle – cost $30 million per aircraft during production in the 1970s and 1980s.\textsuperscript{146} The aircraft currently under design to replace it – the F/A-22 – is currently under production for $187M per aircraft (over six times the cost an aircraft had in the 1980s).\textsuperscript{147}

Higher technology and manufacturing costs increased the time required to develop and produce a combat-capable weapons system. Table 10 lists three past US Air Force weapons systems and their time required for development, expected lifetime of service, and cost per unit. There are several remarkable items to note in this table. First, note how the years of service given by these three weapons increased from 18 to at least 27 with each successive generation of aircraft. Second, the cost for each new aircraft rose by 40\textsuperscript{50}\% since 1954; the F-100 cost $664,000/aircraft whereas the F-16 cost $26.9/aircraft in 1998. Third, the time for development, testing, and production of replacement equipment has continuously increased. The F-100 served only 4 years before the F-105 replaced it. Twenty years later, the F-16 replaced the F-105.

Table 10. An example of the increasing costs, time, and required future planning in order to enter a military system into service. Compiled by author from Globalsecurity.org.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Aircraft System (Year Entered Service)</th>
<th>Years in Service</th>
<th>Cost per System (aircraft, ship, etc.)</th>
<th>Time Req’d for Development (in Years)</th>
<th>Time Before Replacement</th>
<th>Amount Used Past Design (if applicable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAF Fighter Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-100 (1954)</td>
<td>18 (1954-1972)</td>
<td>$664,000</td>
<td>3 (1951-1954)</td>
<td>4 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-105 (1958)</td>
<td>22 (1958-1980)</td>
<td>$2.2M</td>
<td>7 (1951-1958)</td>
<td>20 Years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-16 (1978)</td>
<td>27+ (1978-?)</td>
<td>$26.9M (in 1998)</td>
<td>6 (1972-1978)</td>
<td>30 Years</td>
<td>100% (4000 flying hours) past original design</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The replacement for the F-16 however, already 30 years after the F-16’s development, has yet to enter production. Therefore, using these as an example, the services are forced to rely more on older systems, pay more for each new weapon, and wait longer for a system’s replacement. Further data reveals that development of a replacement system takes considerably longer. In 1972, it took 6 years to turn a concept into an operational fighter aircraft (the F-16).\textsuperscript{148} The F-22, the replacement aircraft for several of the F-16’s missions, began as a concept in 1985 and the first aircraft was delivered in 2003 (almost three times the time it took for the F-16).\textsuperscript{149} Clearly, the increased costs and time required for development are causing the US military to operate equipment for extended periods of time.

Considering this lifetime and the many years required to develop a replacement system, it has become imperative to fund the design of a replacement to ensure that the new weapons system would be ready once its predecessor became outdated. With each new weapons system, the costs to develop such a system continue to rise. Therefore, early development of a replacement system proves more economically sound as opposed to making last-minute production decisions (where weapons development costs are highest).

\textit{The Current Age of Military Weapons Systems}

As early as 2001, DoD civilian and military leaders acknowledged that as weapons systems got older, it became exceedingly more expensive to operate and keep them operational.\textsuperscript{150} The classic example currently under consideration by policymakers is the KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft. The US Air Force maintains approximately 500 tankers and over 100 of them can be found in depot (i.e. in-depth maintenance normally lasting approximately 160 days) at any one time.\textsuperscript{151} The average KC-135 is over 40 years old and the Air Force already plans on using them until they reach at least 56 years of age.\textsuperscript{152} Therefore, the Air Force is operating aircraft averaging 4 times the age of commercial airliners and currently has no replacement designed for them.

According to a CBO study, the pace of operations in the GWoT is having a negative effect on the equipment and the costs required to sustain them.\textsuperscript{153} According to the report, the simple wear and tear of equipment in support of the GWoT will total $8 billion for the FY 2005 alone.\textsuperscript{154} Army vehicles are being driven at 10 times the rate previously experienced.\textsuperscript{155} Hostile environments including dust storms are causing even more fatigue. Therefore, not only is the
equipment old but it is being used at a rate that is exponentially increasing operating costs for the services.

*The Proliferation of Technologically Advanced non-US Weapons Systems*

During the American procurement ‘holiday’, the world also grew in both its military technology and capability. The break-up of the Warsaw Pact triggered economic instability in most Russian industries at the same time the US had its Procurement Holiday. That instability marginally affected the defense industry sector. One of the strengths of Russia’s economy was its inherited military technology which remained at high standards throughout the Cold War. Russian companies were able to refine and market technologically advanced weapons systems at low prices in order to assist the new Russian economy. Former Soviet aircraft, vessels, tanks, electronic combat systems, and other military products were sold on the world market to nations outside the former Warsaw Pact. This combination of American military recession and Russian foreign military sales permitted world nations (some of which were in the middle of civil wars or territorial disputes) to obtain cheap, but advanced military weapons.

Nations such as Iraq, North Korea, China, Israel, Greece, Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia, among others, purchased some of the most sophisticated weapons systems available. Entire regions including Latin America and southeast Asia rose with impressive military capabilities. Some of those nations aggressively employed their domestic engineers to improve the Russian products even more. Most importantly though, as a part of the purchase of the weapons, these nations also profited from the tactics developed by the former-Soviet Union to counter western weapons systems. Thus, many nations now have systems at the same caliber originally reserved solely for the Soviet Union and could operate them effectively against western (namely American) systems.

Several traditional weapons purchasers entered into weapons system production. These nations are joining into informal coalitions to share information and tactics to counter US capabilities. The American hiatus left an economic void in the weapons system market which ultimately was filled by Russia, France and Israel among others. By the 1990s, the US found itself still operating the same weapons a decade later but facing multiple threats with highly sophisticated capabilities.

A recent exercise in India proved as much. In February 2004, a US Air Force fighter squadron deployed to India to practice aerial combat against the Indian Air Force in an
unprecedented exercise. Unexpectedly, the Indian Air Force proved very capable of countering some of the best aircraft the US Air Force could provide. Without releasing exact circumstances, commander of Air Combat Command Gen. Hal Hornburg stated: “The United States has grown accustomed to having global air superiority, yet we haven't put much very much money in the last generation into maintaining that advantage . . . so of course the rest of the world is finally starting to catch up.”

*The Current Increase in Weapons System Procurement*

The current civilian leadership committed new funding for systems intended to re-establish American dominance in weapons system production. Yet this funding displays the same pattern of discrepancy between projected and actual costs. In 2000, the proposed procurement budget was $60.3 billion. The 2005 budget had $78.6 billion set out for procurement – a 24% increase. The current administration scrapped weapons programs which were decades old and whose advantage had waned during the 1990s. Other systems that guaranteed a future US advantage were funded. Most importantly, the controversial National Missile Defense program received enormous increases in funding. Overall, the administration promised an initial increase of $20 billion for weapons procurement.

Yet each new weapons system also costs an exceedingly large amount of money compared to the amount Congress is willing to approve. Although it has become generally accepted that the ‘procurement holiday’ has produced extreme needs for new military weapons systems, the built up costs for all of the delayed programs approaches an inconceivable amount if fully funded. For example, the Army’s Future Combat System costs approximately $110 billion – over $40 billion over the latest DoD budget’s entire procurement appropriation. The Littoral Combat Ship will ultimately cost $12 billion. The Joint Strike Fighter procurement recently topped estimates at $44.6 billion. These three programs represent only a few of the chief programs desired by the DoD in order to rebuild the health and comparative advantage of the US military. Their combined price tag is $166B, an amount that is unlikely to be approved by Congress given its past approval patterns. Other programs – such as the F-22 and V-22 Osprey – cost even more.
What is Getting to the Battlefield

Most importantly, the key indicators that the military fails to receive the proper equipment needed for the GWoT rests in the actions of its members. On December 8, 2004, a soldier in Kuwait asked the Secretary of Defense why he was forced to scrimmage through scrap metal in order to apply the proper armor for his military vehicles.\textsuperscript{166} A USA Today article discussed a similar situation in which soldiers bought equipment from commercial retailers to assist them in combat as they were either not provided the correct equipment or received faulty equipment from the US government.\textsuperscript{167} These public displays of lacking resources display a significant factor faced by the American soldier. The fact that an enlisted person would publicly challenge the Secretary of Defense on such an issue suggests definite urgency to the equipment problems suffered within the military.

This evidence suggests that the military has not been provided the weapons required to successfully fulfill the Preemptive Doctrine when considering the increased tactics, technology, and demands involved in the GWoT. The DoD continues to employ many decades-old systems when opponents continue to increase their weapons capability and lethality. Further, the evidence suggests that the budget required to properly equip the military far exceeds the acceptable amount historically approved by Congress. This places the military with increased obligations in increasingly lethal operations without a significant, foreseeable improvement in their own equipment.
Section 2
An Unrealized Promise: The Status of an Overstretched and Underfunded Military

The evidence shows that the campaign and election of the current administration suggested an imminent increase in pay, manning, reduced overseas commitments, improved systems, and an overall improvement in the status of the US military. While an initial attempt was made to increase pay and alleviate the condition of an underfunded military immediately after the 2000 elections, the military’s experience with the 1990s mantra – “do more with less” – returned again after 9/11. Despite the civilian promises for increased levels of funding and support for the military, the demands of the new post-9/11 foreign policy have exceeded those increases in funding and support. As a result, as civilian demands on the military increased, the military remained unable to recover from the deficits experienced in the 1990s and continued to experience a net loss in funding, manning, and equipment. This continuous loss depicts an overstretched military without the required people, money and equipment.

Initial Promises Kept

Before 9/11, it appeared that the civilian leadership upheld the promises of increased funding, less overseas obligations, and new equipment. For example, the administration attempted to reduce the number of forces in the Balkans. Although it did not support an increase in end strength for the military, the administration and the Secretary of Defense committed themselves to a transformation of the military in order to streamline the use of those in the military most effectively. Funding for military pay, housing, and tax benefits increased at a remarkable rate for the US military. Most importantly however, the funding for the military and its new weapons systems grew heavily. These new funds proved critical for the retention of military members and their families while also providing crucial funds for the previous policy deficiencies of the 1990s.

The Impact of 9/11 and the Imbalance Between Obligations and Funding

After 9/11, the foreign policy of the US understandably changed. Yet the new foreign policy initiatives post-9/11 relied upon an overstretched and underfunded military. The events of
9/11 sparked the GWoT and subsequent OEF and OIF. It increased operations in Africa, Asia, and increased deployment rates to the Middle East. The military’s equipment increased use exponentially as a result. Yet evidence suggests that the required funding for these increased tasks did not increase enough. Since 9/11, an imbalance between the increased military obligations and the supporting funding has produced a gap between what the US military needs and what it receives from its civilian leadership.
Chapter 5: Stretching the Military through Increased Overseas Obligations

Operations OEF and OIF increased the overseas obligations of the US military by stretching its combat potential to dangerous levels. GWoT missions currently exceed the military’s ability to deliver in their current structure. Figure 6 below displays the history of overseas basing by military personnel from 1980 to 2002. The 1990s drawdown is plainly visible. The figure shows no reduction in forces overseas between 2000 and 2002 when the administration had committed itself to the planned reduction of forces overseas.

A review of the deployment history in US military units reveals the replacement of obligations to the Balkans with increased obligations in support of the GWoT. The 1st Cavalry Division was scheduled by the US Army to deploy to Kosovo from May to November of 2003. The division, however, deployed to southwest Asia in support of OIF instead. The 6 month deployment to Kosovo was replaced with a 14 month deployment to Iraq. Thus, the unit still deployed and, worse yet, for 14 months instead of the previously planned 6. It appears that the civilian administration can claim it reduced forces significantly in Kosovo but only to redeploy them to OEF and OIF. Despite the claim of reduced overseas basing, there has been no reduced deployment load placed on the US military.

Figure 6. US Military Forces Permanently Stationed Overseas, by service, from 1980 to 2002.

Appendix C lists most US Army units and their deployment rates in support of the GWoT.
The GWoT Deployed the Military Even More

The increased overseas obligations as a result of 9/11 burdened the military with an overwhelming deployment rate as another unit shows. The 10th Mountain Division deployed to Afghanistan in support of OIF in October 2001. They returned four months later in January 2002. In the fall of 2003, they redeployed to Afghanistan and returned to the US after 9 months in May 2004. The 10th Mountain Division redeployed again to Iraq one year later. Thus, this unit experienced three overseas deployments totaling 20 months deployed in a 48 month period. This is an overwhelming pattern for a unit expected to maintain readiness, satisfactory morale, and proficiency in combat operations.

No End in Sight

An analysis of the proposed withdrawal of forces announced in August 2004 raises additional questions. First of all, the lack of a timetable for overseas force withdrawal indicates that the proposal remains contingent on OEF and OIF. According to the civilian administration, OEF/OIF forces “will not stay a day longer than necessary” but forces will not come home until “the mission is done.” The mission, according to the administration, remains the stability of the new Iraqi government, the destruction of insurgent and terrorist forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the establishment of democratically-based governments who can enforce the sovereignty of their own borders.

In October 2005, the President further outlined a five-point strategy for the GWoT. This plan called for missions to: 1) prevent terrorist attacks before they occur; 2) deny weapons of mass destruction from outlaw regimes; 3) deny radical groups the support and sanctuary of outlaw regimes; 4) deny terrorists the control of any nation; and 5) deny terrorist organizations the ability to recruit militants with hatred and resentment against western nations. This strategy provides more specific goals for the GWoT and was intended to silence critics demanding a declaration of the government’s aims for the GWoT.

Yet, the fulfillment of these mission objectives remains open to interpretation and to the discretion of the civilian administration. A definition of “the stability of a new Iraqi government” or the “establishment of democratic forces” has not been officially offered. Thus, the duration of OEF/OIF – and therefore the duration of the extreme deployment schedule loaded upon the US military – remains at the discretion of the US administration.
In sum, while the civilian administration proposed a reduction in overseas military obligations, its post-9/11 foreign policy actually has increased them. The government heavily increased the commitments overseas, withdrew from other certain commitments (such as the Balkans) to feed OEF, OIF, and the GWoT, and has not set a definite timetable for the withdrawal of forces after its intangible goals of the operations are met. In the eyes of the 1st Cavalry Division for example (among countless other active duty and Guard/Reserve units in the US military), the deployment pace increased despite the proposed plan to slow it down. The commitments made by the civilian leadership have deeply strained the US military with an unstable timetable which places the DoD in an uncertain status as to their ability to keep up the pace.
Chapter 6: Doing More with Less: Personnel Overstretch

The US military continues to experience constant strains among its personnel as a result of faulty personnel policies. Reductions in personnel benefits, higher workloads, and a lack of attention to the ‘military family’ ultimately produced a decrease in recruiting and retention and threaten the concept of the All-Volunteer Force. Members of the US military are leaving the profession and forcing the civilian military leadership to replace them with younger recruits who lack the experience needed in the current GWoT. This also results in a military forced to rely on Guard and Reserve units traditionally intended to be used only in emergency roles such as national disaster response.

The Impact of Doing More with Less Troops

The reduction in end strength from the 1990s impacted the military in more ways than simply being ‘short on staff.’ For example, military members are faced with an increase in daily tasks at an exponential rate as a result of smaller forces. The combination of increased tasks combined with a decrease in the manpower equaled an enormous increase in the responsibilities placed on each individual service member.

Table 7 offered an Air Force office example where an office never experienced a decrease in the number of tasks it had to complete despite smaller staff. This places an increased burden on the remaining service members by increasing workload and hours. Duty days are expected at 12 hour minimums during the week. Weekend time, historically off-duty time for service members and their families as it is in the civilian sector, are now often duty days. Service members are given less time with their families and less time for morale-increasing activities.

Second, leave requests by service members are often denied by their supervisors in fear of defaulting on commitments made by the unit as a result of one more person being gone. Service members work, are most likely deployed for 3 months to a full year, are subsequently denied leave, and then punished by having not taken leave despite their best efforts.

The Services’ Core Values

The reasons for these contradicting personnel policies may lie heavily in the services’ core values. The military developed core values to instill a ‘warrior ethos’ within each of the
service members. They are intended to cement the principle within its soldiers that the profession of the military requires that service members place his/her own safety at risk in order to meet the military objectives set to it by the civilian leadership. In other words, as a result of the civil-military framework and the profession of the military, military members must accept that they may need to sacrifice their life in order to achieve the objectives set to it by the civilian leadership. These core values are required knowledge among each service member.

The Army, Air Force, and Navy (and thus the Marine Corps) possess their own core values (reference Appendix A). All three specifically place the needs of the service above that of the individual. An informal survey of the American Forces Network -- the radio and television service provided to American service members overseas -- referenced the core values of the services 6 times in a 1-hour period on television. Understandably, the possibility that each service member may have to make the ultimate sacrifice must be made plain. In addition, service members must know that the military requires substantial sacrifices as a part of the profession. Therefore, it is obvious why these tenets of the core values must be included. However, some military leaders take these personal sacrifices too far by denying leave, off-time, and in the worst examples re-deploying certain troops too quickly after the conclusion of an overseas deployment. The US Army acknowledged that increased divorce rates are attributable to the prolonged deployments and strain being placed upon the US Army since 9/11.

Recruiting, Retention, and the Declining Quality of those Entering the Military

Another impact of deficient manning practices may prove the most threatening to the health of the armed forces in the near future. The increase in commitments is forcing potential military members to strongly consider other professions while driving current service members to reconsider re-enlistment. Recently, a report stated that Army recruiters are pressuring potential recruits through illegal tactics in order to make quotas. This is in response to the Army’s failure to meet its recruiting goals by 6,000 personnel.

Simultaneously, Rand Organization studies in 2000 and 2004 suggest that the military is undergoing a withdrawal in quantity and quality of enlistees in the service. The GAO found that the DoD failed to use all its resources to retain service members and therefore is suffering an increased amount of separations. More importantly, they report that the services are suffering from a reduction in re-enlistments which replaces experienced soldiers with new recruits.
The Abuse of the National Guard and Reserve

Personnel policies within the DoD have also begun to rely on the Guard and Reserve forces more heavily than in the past. In reaction to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the military found itself employing the Guard and Reserve in unprecedented numbers and often in missions they were not trained to perform. According to the GAO in Figure 3, the pace at which Guard and Reserve are being called to active duty has almost tripled since 9/11. Aside from a brief one-year spike for Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the Guard and Reserve are experiencing operational tempos exceeding anything seen in recent history. Many attribute this use of the Guard and Reserve to the massive drawdowns in the 1990s and the thinning of the active duty military to numbers inconsistent with the potential operations that may be given to the military.\(^\text{o}\) Regardless, these increases have resulted in heavy impacts on those in the National Guard whose expectation of service did not include these increased overseas deployments, the impact this has on Guard and Reserve soldiers’ civilian employers, and the soldiers’ families.

Additionally, evidence from the federal government’s handling of the Hurricane Katrina disaster infers that the DoD has relied too much on the Guard and Reserve. According to the CBO, 33% of the deployed forces overseas are Guard and Reserve.\(^\text{181}\) Yet those same forces are those relied upon to aid in natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and tornadoes.\(^\text{182}\) Although the debate over the federal government’s reaction to Hurricane Katrina remains outside the scope of this thesis, some suggest that the lack of Guard or Reserve forces to assist in the disaster occurred as a result of those forces being sent overseas. National Guard officials admitted that the forces stationed overseas in Iraq were needed back home in the southern states for rescue operations as they had been used before.\(^\text{p}\) After the hurricane struck the southern states, the DoD permitted many of the soldiers from the ravaged areas to return.\(^\text{183}\) Those positions, however, were replaced on short notice by other active duty and Guard/Reserve forces – many of whom had just returned from deployments in support of GWoT. This places


\(^\text{p}\) “Missing the personnel is the big thing in this particular event. We need our people,” said Lt. Andy Thaggard, a spokesman for the Mississippi National Guard, which has a brigade of more than 4,000 troops in central Iraq. Louisiana also has about 3,000 Guard troops in Baghdad.” “Strain of Iraq War Means the Relief Burden Will Have to Be Shared” Washington Post article, August 31, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/30/AR2005083002162.html.
additional strains on other portions of the military as Guard/Reserve forces are re-adjusted from deployments overseas to the ravaged regions hit by Hurricane Katrina.

*The Breakdown of the All-Volunteer Force*

An additional factor in the issue of military manning is the viability of the All Volunteer Force (AVF). Although a draft has not been implemented, DoD personnel practices have implemented policies that conflict with the definition of the AVF. The civilian administration has insisted that the AVF will remain without any draft or similar conscription. Yet Stop Loss is a clear example of involuntary membership in the military. The forced retention of forces infers, by definition, that the loss of additional service member would place the military in unacceptable positions when considering its manning.

It would seem that an increase in troop levels or a decrease in commitments for the military would be expected. Yet the GWoT requires the current operations tempo and therefore can not risk a reduction in the commitments made upon the military. The selection of the former option however, despite the clear advantages of adding more personnel to relieve the pressure on the military, appears to be just as unlikely.

*Transformation: A Long Term Solution Failing Short Term Problems*

The civilian leadership believes that many military members are mis-employed in positions that do not require a deployable, combat-ready soldier, and could be occupied by a non-military contractor or civilian by transforming the military. This term – in existence since the 2001 administration – possesses no tangible directive or policy statement but, according to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is a mindset. The Secretary himself has defined transformation as,

> "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world."

In the eyes of the civilian DoD leadership, the replacement of active duty military in non-combat positions by civilian or contractors allows the military to re-distribute its service members to
actual combat units. While acknowledging the increased overseas obligations, the Secretary of Defense insists that an increase in troop end strength is a mistake.\textsuperscript{187} The ability to perform the proposed transformation may not exist with the current stress on the military. A shifting of substantial jobs from military to contracted employment produces substantial side-effects. First, the Secretary of Defense has stated that the bureaucracy supporting civilian government employees “is not cutting it.”\textsuperscript{188} Yet this proposal encourages the hiring of additional civilian employees into that faulty system. Despite remarkable changes to the civilian hiring system in 2003, civilian DoD officials admit the system is still “outdated.”\textsuperscript{189}

Second, the DoD must properly assess those positions within the military which can be changed to civilian employment. Each unit must be analyzed along with projected needs of the services to dictate which positions change. This analysis will take substantial time considering the time required by similar commissions such as BRAC.

Third, assuming the DoD is able to properly analyze those positions that may change to civilian employment, the military members in those positions can not immediately fill combat roles. A dental technician replaced by a civilian requires substantial training to become an infantry soldier. Thus, additional time is required for military members to be retrained and for new recruits (originally intended for the non-combat positions) to be trained into the combat roles. The time required for these adjustments takes years.

Fourth and most importantly, transformation will not occur with the haste required to alleviate the current overstretched state of the military. As the evidence shows, the need for more people in the military to shoulder the burden requires relief in the next months as opposed to years. Ultimately, if the plan is successfully implemented, its end result will be too far in the future to help with the military’s current problems.

Others have concerns with DoD manning. According to a report by the Defense Review Board, the US military is ill-prepared at its current state for the commitments being placed on it. “Current and projected force structure will not sustain our current and projected global stabilization commitments,” the report reads.\textsuperscript{190} The report continues that the inadequate level of troops in the DoD and the lack of long term endurance capability explain this inability to meet current and projected threats.\textsuperscript{191} The report further suggests that the military could default on its commitments if its recommendations are not implemented before the next operation.\textsuperscript{192}
This situation specifically highlights the issue of unequal civil-military dialogue. Public contradictions in proper end strength levels have exposed potential disagreements between the civil and military leadership within the DoD. In the build-up for OIF, Gen Erik Shinseki was asked by Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan) in the Senate Armed Services Committee how many forces would be required for post-combat operations in Iraq. He testified that the number would be in the hundreds of thousands which ran in direct conflict with the DoD civilian leadership’s claim of approximately 75,000. Currently, 135,000 personnel are in Iraq. Quickly following Gen Shinseki’s testimony, the Deputy Secretary of Defense testified: “we don't know what the requirement will be, but we can say with reasonable confidence that the notion of hundreds of thousands of American troops is way off the mark.” Obviously, the civilian and military leadership did not agree on a key component of the operations affecting OIF.

Gen Shinseki was not alone however. Secretary of the Army Thomas White and very senior on-scene commanders in Iraq even stated a concern that they did not have the personnel required to fulfill the commitments placed upon them. Soon after his comments in the Senate, Gen Shinseki retired from his post under the suggestion that he was fired for openly disagreeing with the DoD’s civilian leadership. Secretary Thomas resigned soon after also. Repeated offers to other generals in the Army to replace Shinseki were turned down including the highly popular Gen Tommy Franks – the mastermind of OEF and OIF. The position was finally filled by a general coming out of retirement who has since emphatically stated that he adamantly opposes any increases in troop end strength. The rejection of an offer to be the Chief of Staff of one’s armed service is out of the ordinary. The rejection of this offer by multiple generals is even more remarkable. With this in mind, an inference could be made that the Secretary of Defense’s insistence on no increase in end strength and his previous treatment of those who do not walk his party line could explain the lack of calls from the military leadership for more troops.

Evidence in this chapter shows that the US military personnel policies further undermine the status of the military. Increased deployments have produced unprecedented reliance on the Guard and Reserve while divorce rates among active duty members continue to rise. Under DoD pressure, the services have been forced to implement policies such as Stop Loss and Use or Lose which further strain the military service members and reduce the benefits of military service. The civilian military leadership insists that transformation will properly re-distribute the military forces. Yet the DoD continues under the strain until those changes take place. Simultaneously,
more military members are leaving the DoD, the services are failing to recruit the required numbers to replace those leaving, and the quality of those recruited also continues to decline. Clearly, the personnel policies within the DoD are straining the AVF and pressuring the civil-military framework as the military struggles to meet the civilian administration’s obligations without the proper number of troops.
Chapter 7: The Underfunded Military

Despite the increased funding allocated to the US military post-9/11, evidence suggests that the military fails to receive the *sufficient* funding required by the new post-9/11 foreign policy. The unpredictable and unprecedented costs of the GWoT, the pressures of an increased military infrastructure, and the need to repair those deficiencies continued from the 1990s have placed a demand for money not met even with the large military budgets approved since 9/11.

*A Commander’s Decision: Pay for the Current War or the Costs of the Last One*

It is important to note the choices presented to military commanders when considering their budgets. Budgets in the 1990s had been slashed to fractions of their original size yet the commitments overseas increased (like Somalia and the Balkans) which further strained the DoD’s ability to properly fund its personnel and training. With decreasing budgets, personnel, and supplies, commanders were forced to decide between funding current combat operations or reconstituting their forces from previous operations as the DoD budget could not fund both. In the face of failing an international operation, commanders chose to fund the combat operations and postpone the refurbishment of their forces. With additional operations in Iraq, east Africa, and smaller outposts throughout the world, this decision further delayed any ability to rebuild the military dismantled during the 1990s.

*The Costs of the GWoT*

A comparison of GWoT costs versus funding outlines a clear lack of money for the military’s commitments. Post-9/11 funding displays an unsteady, yet substantial stream of money into the DoD. By analyzing Table 9, several key factors come into view at first.

The first year of the GWoT exemplify the continuing struggle within DoD to reconcile its costs with the funding practices of its government. The DoD was forced to pay $2.3B out of pocket for the first four months of OEF and, when re-imbursed by Congress, only received 60% of those expenses. The next six months of OEF came completely out of the military’s pocket as it took another 10 months for the government to provide the next funding. Subsequent funding maintained this unsteady and intermittent pace as the DoD received budgetary funding in 5, 6, 11, and 7 month increments. There was no ability to predict when or how much the next budget would arrive to pay the costs of their military commitments.
One must consider the difficulty in paying for operational expenses when the next budget is not dependable for being large enough to defray previous costs. Failing to properly fund operations for six months (as in the case of March – November 2003 for example) forced commanders to take money from other programs, cut benefits, and economize costs. Even if the next budget provided a surplus, commanders had to keep cutting or reducing costs as there was no guarantee that the next budget would be just as large. Most of those surplus moneys were required to repay those programs previously unfunded or cut as a result of intermittent and unstable government funding and therefore could not be used to reconstitute the military.

An Unlikely Response: The Military Makes Further Cuts When It Is Funded

Ultimately, the best evidence that the military remains under-funded was provided by their reaction to the administration’s $75.9B budget in May 2005. Two days after the bill became law, the military announced that the Air Force was reducing its flying training hours across the service in order to help pay for the costs of the GWoT operations. Training sorties for units back in the US, funding for the training of new airmen, and the budgets for non-combat programs were drastically reduced.

Cuts made by the Air Force, up to that point, revolved around funding for new equipment, new supplies, etc. It now affected all of the actual non-combat operations of the service. Units preparing for combat operations lost sorties intended to prepare them for their overseas deployments. Thus, the impact of under-funding now affects those units not directly involved in combat by impacting their ability to be prepared for combat. This affects the overall combat capability of the military and hints at an overall effect on DoD capabilities.

Other Cuts in the DoD Point to a Lack in Funding

Additional signals indicate a deficiency in funding. Announcements referencing budget cuts continue to surround military units despite the advertised funding of the military by the current administration. In a radio interview in June 2005, after the last budget provision, the Command Master Chief of the United States Forces in Korea stated that bus routes connecting units in Korea were being slashed as a result of ‘budget cuts.’ Exercises required by DoD regulations have been denied to non-GWoT units. An Air Force unit in Arizona has run out of budget money a full quarter prior to the end of the fiscal year. Thus, personnel are being asked to purchase supplies required for their job with their own personal money with no provision for
repayment by the government.\textsuperscript{201} Pacific theater units have had their annual budgets reduced by half midway through the 2005 fiscal year (which therefore left them with no money for the second half of the fiscal year). These cuts have all occurred after the civilian administration stated the military continued to receive everything it needed to support the DoD’s operations in the GWoT.\textsuperscript{202}

\textit{The Bigger Risk of Under-Funding}

In summary, the evidence shows that the budgets approved by civilians for military operations are failing to adequately supply the costs of the DoD in the GWoT and additional military commitments. The under-funding of the DoD is beginning to erode at units’ ability to prepare for combat. The evidence suggests that current funding levels can only fully pay for the GWoT operations or non-combat training but not both. Commanders are subsequently forced to pay for current operations or repairs from past operations. Considering the obligation to succeed in the current GWoT, the commander must choose to fund current operations and postpone any reconstitution or training of his/her unit. Therefore, the DoD’s under-funding is producing units who are gaining proficiency \textit{in combat} – while getting shot at – versus gaining proficiency prior to entering combat operations. This further highlights the unequal dialogue between the military and the civilian leadership as the military lacks the required support for the obligations placed on it by the civilian administration.
Chapter 8: The Loss of US Weapons Supremacy and the Risks of Operating Old Equipment

The US military faces a seemingly insurmountable obstacle considering the age and reliability of its current equipment and weaponry. Resulting from a ‘Procurement Holiday’, the US military operates old equipment that increasingly grows in cost to operate and maintain. Combined with the increasing capabilities of potential US adversaries, the US faces a crisis of equipment which may result in a rude realization that the US’ combat pre-eminence has been compromised. The procurement of new weapons systems remains very expensive and the price of a single system often exceeds an acceptable procurement budget for the entire DoD. Therefore, the US government faces tough decisions about which weapons systems to purchase and in what amounts in order to replace an entire military filled with aging equipment that are failing at faster rates.

The Lack of Sufficient Weapons Funding

The current administration substantially increased the funding for new weapons systems prior to 9-11 as a response to the 1990s Procurement Holiday. Despite these large additions, those efforts were not enough to have an appreciable effect between the onset of the current administration and the events of 9-11. Although the current administration has made efforts to continue the development of several systems, it appears that the military faces a crisis of equipment and lacks the required funds to solve the problem.

The Increasing Costs of Aging Systems

The military is operating equipment well past its intended lifetime. Aircraft intended for 15-20 year lifetimes are currently in operation past their 40th birthdays. Artillery equipment in the Army remains some of the same systems used during Vietnam. Marine helicopters are using the same airframes used to rescue downed pilots in the 1960s. The GAO discovered that equipment continued to increase operating and maintenance costs as a result of their age. The GWoT funding vacuum already led to withdrawal of resources from the existing weapons systems. A soldier’s comments in a Defense Department town hall meeting in Kuwait suggest a lack of required parts as the soldier described scrimmaging through junkyards looking

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\(^9\) This fact becomes more clear when one considers the years required to implement weapons procurement compared to the 8 months separating the current administration’s inauguration and the events of 9/11.
for armor for his Humvee in the Middle East. According to the US Army, the FY2004 supplemental budget bill lacked $200M for equipment required by troops deploying in support of the GWoT. Another report by the US Army reported that troops were paying for equipment with their own money as the government-issued equipment failed often in combat. The evidence suggests that required equipment is not making it to the battlefield.

The GWoT operations are also applying pressure on the aging equipment already in use. A CBO report references equipment used at 10 times their normal levels. The GAO arrived at the same conclusion in a separate report. The increased operations are reducing the capabilities of equipment and continue to reduce the effective lifespan of certain systems. In addition, the CBO report states that the increased usage is producing costs for the DoD that have not been funded by the government in excess of $13B. Thus, as long as the GWoT continues, the capabilities of the current US military equipment will continue to decrease.

The Demise of the Soviet Union and the Proliferation of Advanced Weapons Technology

Meanwhile, the capabilities of other nations and regions have risen considerably. Several root causes are to blame for this parity in weapons capability. First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s was followed by a Russian government in dire need for cash. The sale of key weapons systems to global nation-states for cheap prices armed many smaller nations across the globe with current-day military capability.

Among the regions that have enjoyed substantial increases in military capability include Asia and the Middle East. North Korea, China, Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Malaysia have each profited from the demise of the Soviet Union and subsequently raised their military capabilities. The exercise between India and the US in 2004 already proved the marked decrease in US capability against India as a result of the increased military technology versus the stagnant US arsenal.

In the Middle East, nations such as Iran, Syria, and Israel have acquired extensive military capabilities. The shipment of Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen and the sale of gunboats to Iran signal additional arms sales that are spreading advanced weapons more quickly than the US can develop systems to counter back. Israel has individually modified weapons bought from the US in the 1980s and brought them to current day capabilities. Alarmingly, with this advanced capability, the Israeli government has blocked manufacture of these upgrades for the US which further cements their superiority.
The international sale of arms is not new; the sale of weapons superior to US capabilities is. As a result, nations across the globe have achieved substantial capabilities. More likely however, the potential for a crisis against one of these nations raises the specter of a US military unable to win in battle. The standing armistice with North Korea, the increasing concern with a war in Iran, and the potential for conflicts with China or between India and Pakistan produce the possibility that the US military would not possess the systems required to defeat the opponent.

Why the Recent US Victories Do Not Guarantee Future Success

Some civilian critics believe that recent US victories prove US military dominance. The US recently demonstrated its capabilities against Afghanistan and Iraq in its recent military operations. This criticism, however, fails on several key points. First, Afghanistan’s military maintained few weapons of any complexity or currency. Its successes against the Soviet Union in the 1980s stand as one of the prominent lessons among first-world nations on how not to fight third world armies. The Afghan successes resulted more from Soviet over-confidence similar to America’s in the Vietnam conflict.

Likewise, the American success in Iraq may have defeated the 5th largest army in the world yet further review reveals that this success is better understood in its context. First, the Iraqi army had been unable to purchase the same weapons as other nations during the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a result of the post-Desert Storm UN sanctions. Second, OIF began after 12 straight years of Operations Southern and Northern Watch. Both operations, executed by the US, France, and Great Britain, controlled 2/3 of Iraq’s skies and ultimately permitted 12 straight years of highly detailed surveillance of Iraq. Thus, when the war began, the US already knew accurate levels of troops, their location, and enjoyed 12 years of watching the operational style and procedures of the Iraqi military. At the outset of OIF, Iraq already faced an enemy with an equal number of troops, preset control of the skies, and the advantage of a dozen years of detailed surveillance. The US victories in OEF and OIF do not (and can not) be compared to potential battles with more substantial opponents in the world.

The Cost Prohibitive Nature of Current-Day Weapons Procurement

The US government finds itself in an almost impossible position of paying the increasing costs for weapons system production versus the increasing number of DoD priorities. Previous examples such as the Army’s Future Combat System or the Joint Strike Fighter represent two of
several dozen systems in demand by the DoD. More importantly, as the GWoT continues to deteriorate the current systems in use, the number of needed replacement systems will increase even more. All the while, the cost of weapons development continues to rise simultaneously.

The US government is thus faced with the decision of how to fund so many demanding and costly systems without dedicating gross chunks of the federal budget solely to military development. Beginning with the current administration, it is clear that weapons system procurement is a priority. Yet the increases made – 24% more funds in last year’s budget alone – still pale in comparison to the total costs of each of the systems. Clearly, funding each of the DoD’s procurement systems in their entirety is not politically viable. Even a heavy increase in the procurement budget can only fund portions of each program.

Thus, the government is forced to decide on how to fund the systems. In the recent past, the government has decided to spread its weapons budget across most of the systems. Scattering the budget across many systems causes one of three things to happen: some systems are cancelled, other are forced to reduce the total number of systems to be produced, or the programs lacking full funding slow in progress to the point of making the project stale and no longer state of the art. If systems get reduced in number as a result of numerous competing priorities, the cost per piece continues to rise. Although the government continues to increase the funding of these systems, the total numbers of new systems put in service decreases.

A fierce debate continues over the ability of these superior weapons systems to win a battle with these lower numbers. The government has repeatedly reduced the number of systems (of the F-22 as an example) in order to provide funding to the many weapons systems required. According to the GAO, the Air Force originally ordered 438 F-22 fighters as a replacement for its aging F-15 aircraft at a cost of $142.6M/aircraft in 1996. After repeated budget cuts in the 1990s, the Air Force now plans on receiving 180 aircraft at $200.4M per aircraft. Yet some potential US adversaries – India for example – possess opposition fighters in the hundreds whose capabilities do not fall too far behind the F-22. Worse situations, like a war with China would produce unbalanced scenarios with enemy forces outnumbering US forces by 2:1 or 3:1 ratios. This issue questions the ability for few superior systems to defeat numerically superior/technologically inferior weapons owned by opponents as the projected order numbers continue to be cut.
The civilian and military DoD leadership, the GAO, the CBO, the current administration, and key members of Congress all agree upon the dire status of military equipment as a result of the procurement holiday. The GWoT continues to wear down the current military equipment at an increased rate. Yet the new replacement systems cost so much that the government is unable to fully fund each of them in their entirety. This scenario can be considered an involuntary procurement holiday on its own. The DoD is forced to cancel some systems and reduce the expected number of others. Ultimately however, this decrease in numbers may not sufficiently support the needs of the DoD considering the increased threats emerging from various nations around the world. Two choices emerge: either the US accepts the heavy increase in costs and drastically funds the systems to the request of the DoD; or, accept the possibility of the US military relinquishing global military dominance in lieu of parity with dozens of other nations.
Conclusion

The evidence presented in this thesis clearly details a military overstretched, under funded, undermanned, and lacking the proper equipment for the emerging threats facing the US. This condition has very risky consequences should it continue indefinitely. As displayed by the events of 9/11, the current enemies of the US are increasing the complexity and power of their attacks. The US is no longer capable of passively waiting for threats to emerge – especially when one considers the destructive force of terrorist-born Weapons of Mass Destruction targeting the US. The subsequent change in foreign policy charges the US military with extensive global obligations. Yet, the facts display a military reconciling a lack of funding, manning, and equipment unequal to the increased obligations set to it by its civilian administration.

The Disconnect Between the Military and the Civilian Administration Post 9/11

The evidence also shows a disconnect between the needs of the military and the support/funding provided to it by its civilian leadership. Simply put: the government has repeatedly promised to provide the funding and equipment needed to do the job. Yet training is being reduced, military members are forced to pay for portions of their job out of pocket, and they are deployed more often despite advertised government plans to keep them home. As well, there are less people available to do increasing amounts of work while continually working without the proper military equipment needed to execute the tasks placed before them.

Adherence to the civil-military framework forces the US military to execute the GWoT to the maximum extent possible. As a result of that framework and the principles defining the military profession, the military will continue to find ways to fulfill the objectives set to it by the civilian administration. This drive comes at a cost however. The military continues to thin many of its own operations, increase the stress on its members, and over-work its equipment in order to meet the needs of its civilian government. Their profession demands that they advertise their needs to the government but they are in no position to guarantee they receive what they need.

According to that same civil-military framework, it is the responsibility of the civilian leadership to provide the military what it needs. The evidence presented outlines a military that requires more personnel, more money, fewer overseas obligations, and newer equipment. On each of these issues, evidence shows that the supply of these resources fails to meet the needs of
the military and the GWoT. A division between the needs of the military and the policies of the governing civilian administration clearly exists.

It remains unclear where that disconnect is occurring. The decisions to limit military end strength results from the civilian administration’s conclusion that transformation will cure the military’s personnel ills. Few debate the viability or need for transformation except that the results of such a program are years away. This solution appears inadequate in the short-term considering the military’s immediate requirements. The money provided to the military initially appears to be at levels commensurate with their requests. The military’s subsequent cuts after the most recent substantial defense budget, however, display a similar detachment between the needs of the operational military leaders and the civilian leadership who supplies that funding. Likewise, the civilian leadership attempted to limit overseas obligations. The events of 9/11 changed this trend and, contrarily, the military now finds itself deploying overseas even more in support of the civilian leadership’s directives. Finally, the lack of current military equipment finds its roots in the policies of previous civilian administrations. Nevertheless, the result of those past policies has produced a military currently lacking the proper equipment. Considering the extended time needed to develop replacement equipment, the military must accept these lacking weapons for years before relief will arrive.

Three potential causes have produced this chasm. First, it is possible that the US military has misrepresented its actual needs and therefore limits its own budgets by failing to adequately represent what it needs. Second, the civilian leadership may receive the appropriate requests from the military but has decided to limit the resources provided to the military for unknown reasons. The firing of Gen Shinseki infers this possibility as the civilian leadership insists upon its own perceptions of what is required while refusing to consider other possible conclusions. Third, there may be a combination of these two scenarios which may explain the gap between the military’s needs and what it is receiving. For example, perhaps the disconnect exists within the DoD but still between the soldier and the state. This could be inferred when one considers the publicly stated position of the Secretary of Defense that the military is in good shape when a senior general testifies he had to cut readiness and funding in other units to meet the costs of GWoT.

Assuming the military is correctly representing its needs to the civilian administration, the US government faces three difficult options. First, some suggest reducing the commitments
in light of the GWoT. It appears this option is not much of a choice when considering the dedication and sophistication of those bent on destroying the US. Too many threats devoted to the elimination of the US exist – more importantly with the capability as a result of nuclear proliferation and the weapons black market – to allow a reduction in foreign policy and reducing the current funding/manning.

Second, the civilian leadership may maintain the status quo. The facts provided underscore a strained military struggling to reconcile the overwhelming obligations of the US foreign policy and the unequal funding provided to it by its civilian administration. The ramifications of continuing this policy remain unclear. The administration has insisted upon the health of the military while others have speculated a potential military failure in light of the sustained stress placed upon the military. If this latter conjecture proves correct, and if the military does fail in an obligation set to it by the civilian leadership, the political ramifications could prove disastrous as the American people are unaccustomed to losing military operations. Worse, the realization of American inferiority could encourage the overt actions of nations opposed to US foreign policy.

The third option available to the civilian administration would accelerate the current funding trends and retain US armed dominance across the globe. This solution requires an unequivocal outburst of increased funding to the DoD. The levels required for the DoD would rival the portion of the GDP seen during World War II. Sudden and immense budgets would need to procure new weapons systems. End strength must be increased in order to supply the vast operations of the GWoT that literally span the globe. US service members must possess the money required to do their jobs and assist in the recruitment and retention of the military vice relying on questionable policies such as Stop Loss.

Each of these options requires money and must be realized by the US civilian government, and more importantly, by the tax payers. The amount of money needed would easily surpass any viable budget currently viewed as acceptable by the American people. Prior to 9-11, the current administration appeared to have a plan for the refurbishment of the US military to resolve the discrepancies of DoD management. Unfortunately, the events of 9/11 forced the President to enter into the GWoT and the hopes of a rebuilt military were lost simultaneously. Heavily increased funding is required to make up for almost two decades of decreasing resources. In addition, if the country is at war as the President has stated, then a
commensurate budget on par with previous national wars should be expected by the public. The public must understand that wars require wartime military budgets.

The US military is not receiving the required funding, manning, and equipment needed to support the GWoT. The current condition of the US military raises the possibility that the military dominance enjoyed for so long will soon retreat to relative parity with growing numbers of opposing and threatening nations. Although the Cold War is over, a threat of mass destruction has simply altered from superpower nuclear exchanges to dirty bombs and chemically-armed terrorist organizations. Unlike the Cold War however, the reality of this threat became all too clear on 9-11. In light of current threats which menace the US way of life, the risks of an overstretched and underfunded military are too much for any government (or people) to accept.
Appendix A: The Core Values of Each Armed Service

The United States Navy and Marine Corps Core Values

Honor
I am accountable for my professional and personal behavior. I will be mindful of the privilege I have to serve my fellow Americans.

Courage
Courage is the value that gives me the moral and mental strength to do what is right, with confidence and resolution, even in the face of temptation and adversity.

Commitment
The day-to-day duty of every man and woman in the Department of the Navy is to join together as a team to improve the quality of our work, our people and ourselves.

The United States Air Force Core Values

Integrity First
Service Before Self
Excellence in All We Do

The United States Army Warrior Ethos

I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade.
Appendix B: Letter to the US Air Force by Its Leadership

To the Airmen of the United States Air Force

Release No. 05140
NOTE: The following commentary is adapted from a Sept. 2, 2005, letter by Gen. T. Michael Moseley, Air Force chief of staff.

By Gen. T. Michael Moseley
Air Force chief of staff

WASHINGTON – We are a Nation at war. Sept. 2 marked the 1,426th day we've been fighting Operation Enduring Freedom. World War II lasted 1,347 days.

We've now been fighting the Global War on Terror for 2 ½ months longer than World War II. From the day Desert Storm kicked off, Jan. 17, 1991, the Air Force has been in continuous combat. For 14 years our enemies have shot at us and for 14 years we've returned the favor.

But no matter how long the road, we must never lose our focus on winning this fight.

Today, we are engaged more than ever ... from across the globe to here at home. From taking the fight to the enemy in Iraq; to rebuilding lives in the wake of Hurricane Katrina; to controlling satellites on the other side of the world; to fighting forest fires in the Rockies; to patrolling the skies over America - you can be proud of the work your Air Force is doing to protect our country.

I'm incredibly proud to be a member of an Air Force family that has more than 106,000 Airmen assigned or deployed in 64 countries, on every continent, and in every time zone throughout the world.

We have handled each and every task brought before us with lethal efficiency because of you. It is an honor to work and fight alongside you in service to our republic.

The 684,000 active-duty, Air Force Reserve Command and Air National Guard members and civilians of the United States Air Force are truly a total force. We stand alongside our Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marine brethren ready to answer the nation's call. We fight together. We triumph together. Our promise to the joint team is that as Airmen we will always be the best in the world at what we do: dominating Air and Space from 1 inch above the ground to 100,000 miles above the earth.

Today, we have three major challenges facing our Air Force. First and foremost is accomplishing the combatant tasks the president and secretary of defense assign. The tasks will be ones we've done before and ones we've never undertaken. Second, we must preserve that which makes us the most feared air force in the world – our people. Our culture of excellence must continue to develop Airmen ... Airmen who are the most adaptable, most skilled, most professional and most lethal the world has ever known. Third, we face the difficult task of operating the oldest inventory in the history of the United States Air Force. My senior leadership will work to break this vicious cycle. I need you, our Airmen on the line, to continue making the mission happen.

As we work towards a more secure, more peaceful tomorrow ... look around. Behind us you'll see a proud, rich heritage. And in front of us is a limitless horizon. So let's push it up, go to work and make the mission happen.

(AFRC News Service)
# Appendix C: History of US Army Unit Deployments in Support of the GWoT

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## Deployment Progression

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## Post-Deployed

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## Stryker Brigade Conversion

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## 1st Armored Division

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</table>
### 2nd Brigade "Black Jack"
- **Fort Hood**
- **III Corps**
- Jan 2004 - Deployed to Iraq
  - mid Apr 2003 - Deployment Alert Cancelled
  - Jan 2003 - Alerted to Deploy to Kuwait
  - Mar 2002 - Returns to Ft. Hood
  - Nov 2001 - Deploys to Kuwait

### 3rd Brigade "Grey Wolf"
- **Fort Hood**
- **III Corps**
- Apr 2004 - Deployed to Iraq [OIF 2]
  - mid Apr 2003 - Deployment Alert Cancelled
  - Jan 2003 - Alerted to Deploy to Kuwait

### 5th Brigade Combat Team
- **Fort Hood**
- **III Corps**
- Apr 2004 - Deployed to Iraq [OIF 2]?
  - xxx 2004 - Formed ?????

### 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized)
#### 1st Brigade "Devils"
- **Fort Riley**
- **V Corps**
- Mid 2005 - Deploying to Iraq - OIF 4
  - Aug 2003 - Deployed to Iraq
  - 22 Jul 2003 - Ordered to Deploy to Iraq
  - Feb/Mar 2002 - National Training Center

#### 2nd Brigade "Dagger"
- **Schweinfurt**
- **V Corps**
- Feb 2004 - Deploys for OIF 2
  - 22 Jul 2003 - Ordered to Deploy to Iraq
  - Mar 2003 - Elements deploy to Turkey

#### 3rd Brigade
- **Vilseck**
- **V Corps**
- Jan 2004 - Deployed to Iraq - OIF 2
  - 22 Jul 2003 - Ordered to Deploy to Iraq
  - Mar 2003 - Deploys to Iraq

### 2nd Infantry Division
#### 1st Brigade "Iron"
- **Camp Casey**
- **8 US Army**
- Aug 2004 - Deployed to Iraq - OIF 3
  - Jul 2004 - Deploying to Iraq

#### 2nd Brigade "Strike Force"
- **Camp Hovey**
- **8 US Army**
- Nov 2004 - Returned from Iraq
  - Nov 2003 - Deploys to Iraq
  - 22 Jul 2003 - Ordered to Deploy to Iraq
  - 27 May 2003 - Completes JRTC
  - 17 May 2003 - Begins JRTC
  - 11 Apr 2003 - Completes NTC Rotation
  - 01 Apr 2003 - Begins NTC Rotation

### 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized)
#### 1st Brigade "Raiders"
- **Fort Stewart**
- **XVIII Airborne Corps**
- Jan 2005 - Deployed to Iraq - OIF 3
  - 01 Jun 2003 - Begins redeployment
  - 20 Mar 2003 - Enters Iraq
  - 27 Jan 2003 - Full BDE in Kuwait
  - 03 Jan 2003 - HHC deploys to Kuwait
  - 01 Jan 2003 - Ordered to Deploy to Kuwait
  - Aug/Sep 2002 - National Training Center

#### 2nd Brigade "Spartan"
- **Fort Stewart**
- **XVIII Airborne Corps**
- Jan 2005 - Deploying to Iraq - OIF 3
  - Mar 2004 - National Training Center
  - 04 Jan 2004 - Begins redeployment to NTC
  - End 2003/2004 - BDE Realignment
  - 11 Aug 2003 - Returns to the Ft Stewart
  - 23 Jul 2003 - Begins redeployment
  - 20 Mar 2003 - Enters Iraq
  - Nov 2002 - Completes Rotation
  - Oct 2002 - Begins Desert Spring Rotation
  - Apr 2002 - National Training Center

#### 3rd Brigade "Sledgehammer"
- **Fort Benning**
- **XVIII Airborne Corps**
- Jan 2005 - Deployed to Iraq - OIF 3
  - Nov 2004 - Deploys to Iraq
  - Aug 2004 - Joint Readiness Training Center
  - Feb 2004 - Completes NTC Rotation
### 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

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<td>16 Apr 2003 - Full BDE in Kuwait</td>
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<td></td>
<td>late Mar 2003 - Deploys to Kuwait</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>20 Jan 2003 - Ordered to deploy to Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Brigade &quot;Warhorse&quot;</td>
<td>Fort Hood</td>
<td>III Corps</td>
<td>Mid 2005 - Deploying to Iraq - OIF 4</td>
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<td>late Mar 2003 - Deploys to Kuwait</td>
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<td>3rd Brigade &quot;Raider&quot;</td>
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<td>End Mar 2004 - Returns</td>
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<td>End Mar 2004 - Returns</td>
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### 10th Mountain Division

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<td>Fall 2003 - Deploys to Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Jan 2002 - Elements return from Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Oct 2001 - Elements deploy to Afghanistan</td>
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<td>2nd Brigade &quot;Commando&quot;</td>
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<td>Jul 2004 - Deployed to Iraq - OIF 3</td>
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<td>28 Dec 2003 - Elements 2-14 in Iraq??</td>
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<td>Dec 2003 - C Co, 4-31 returns from HOA</td>
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<td>Oct 2001 - Elements deploy to Afghanistan</td>
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### 25th Infantry Division (Light)

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<td>06 Feb 2003 - Ordered to deploy to Kuwait</td>
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<td>Jan 2003 - Alerted to Deploy to Kuwait</td>
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<td>Jul 2002 - Returns from Afghanistan</td>
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<td>4th Brigade</td>
<td>Fort Drum</td>
<td>XVIII Airborne Corps</td>
<td>Mid 2005 - Deploying to Iraq - OIF 4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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- Environmental Restoration Division of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory [www.erd.llnl.gov](http://www.erd.llnl.gov)
- Federation of American Scientists [www.fas.org](http://www.fas.org)
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- Foreign Policy Research Institute [www.fpri.org](http://www.fpri.org)
Personal Narratives/Interviews/Experience

Endnotes

4 Huntington, Samuel, p. 84.
5 Huntington, Samuel, p. 83-84.
6 Huntington, Samuel, p. 11.
7 Huntington, Samuel, p. 11.
8 Huntington, Samuel, p. 11-14.
10 Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command, p. 252.
13 James H. Toner, p. 34.
16 James H. Toner, p. 36.
17 Eliot Cohen, p. 263.
Operation Southern Watch, like its sister Operation Northern Watch, operated as a monitor over Iraq in response to United Nations resolutions. Executed by the United States, United Kingdom, and France, the operations were intended to ensure no violations of the southern and northern No-Fly zones placed over Iraq after the first Gulf War. It is important to note that this obligation met with zero objections by the military. The US people felt retribution for 9/11 was easily warranted and the US military saw its role as the executor of that need. The memory of 9/11 remained fresh in the military’s mindset when approaching the battle with those blamed for the attacks.
Personal interview with Capt. Rebecca H. Nelson, former personnel officer and Section Commander, 31st Maintenance Squadron, Aviano AB, Italy.

From personal experience, leave has been denied four times and existing leave requests have been forced to change three times or be cancelled.


For example, if a military member has 70 days credited to their name for leave at the conclusion of 30 Sep, then they will possess only 60 days of leave to their name the next day. They lose those 10 extra days under the “Use or Lose” provision.


“Soldiers’ divorce rates up sharply”, Gregg Zoroya, USA Today, June 8, 2005.


For comparison, the highest average age of a commercial airliner in the past 10 years was 13.6 in 1998 (the current average age is 12 years).


“1st Cavalry Division: “First Team”” Military Fact Sheet posted by GlobalSecurity.org on September 21, 2005.


Informal survey performed on March 22, 2005, in Osan AB, ROK.

“Soldiers’ divorce rates up sharply”, Gregg Zoroya, USA Today, June 8, 2005.

“Recruiters Go to School” CBS News online. Posted May 19, 2005.


For example, the funding takes place in January 2002 after four months of combat in Afghanistan. This represents 2/3 of the first six months of the war. The CBO calculated OEF as costing $5.8 billion in the first six months or, in other words, $3.828 at the time of the signing of the bill by President Bush. The bill appropriated $3.5 billion which already indicates that the funding is lagging the actual costs of the operations just four months into the GWoT.


Radio interview on Armed Forces Network radio in Korea, June 9, 2005.

Pacific Air Force units which, by Air Force regulation, are required to attend annual exercises in order to retain proficiency have been denied for the third consecutive year as a result of budget restraints.

Attributed by personal experience.
One may question how detailed this intelligence may have been after the obvious revelation that the much advertised possession of WMDs failed to bear fruit. Although the debate over the validity of WMDs or the intelligence claiming they existed remain outside the scope of this thesis, it is imperative to know that military commanders possessed knowledge about their Iraqi opponents to impressive levels. Many commanders knew the names of his opponent, details of his forces, and often knew the capabilities of those forces better than the Iraqi commander himself. The debacle behind the WMD intelligence does not discredit the US commanders’ well-established intelligence gained on the Iraqi military through twelve years of concentrated listening. Commanders had the advantage of watching Iraqi army exercises, listen to their procedures, and watch their styles in manners which US commanders could anticipate every move and capability of the Iraqi army before going into battle.

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