THE SELECTION AND PREPARATION OF WHITE OFFICERS FOR THE COMMAND OF BLACK TROOPS IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A STUDY OF THE 41ST AND 100TH U.S. COLORED INFANTRY

Paul D. Renard

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COMMITTEE
Dr. Marcie Boucouvalas, chair.
Dr. Gabriella Belli
Dr. Daniel Kuehl
Dr. Linda Morris
Dr. Harold Stubblefield

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ABSTRACT

American Civil War officer preparation activities were rooted in the broader practices of antebellum military education as applied at West Point, other military academies, and the state militia system. The arrival of black troops in the Union Army led to a radical, if temporary, transformation in the Army’s process for the selection and preparation of officers—but only for the white officers who served with black regiments. Overtly political or casual processes of the early Civil War were replaced in many cases by formal examinations and the centralized review of results, operating in parallel with more traditional political patronage systems of appointment. This study uses the experiences of officers from several black infantry regiments, and particularly the 41st U.S. Colored Infantry from the East and the 100th U.S.C.I. from the West, to illustrate how leaders for black units were chosen, prepared, examined, commissioned, and continued their military education. It focuses on the experiences of the officers, along with the contextual environments of antebellum education, slavery, racism, tactics, and bureaucracy in which they served.
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Connecting to the Community of Scholars

One of the most rewarding part of writing my dissertation has been developing links to the community of scholars who are fascinated with history, the Civil War, and/or my specific area of interest. All of the people below have both encouraged me to pursue my historical passion and have been critical in my pursuit of data.

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DEDICATION

A 2005 visit to Petersburg, Virginia—site of the Battle of the Crater in 1864 and emblematic of the misuse of the U.S. Colored Troops—convinced me of the importance of a continued focus on the efforts of African-American soldiers. The Petersburg Siege Museum’s 1979 orientation film about the city during the War fails to mention African-Americans except in an oblique reference to “servants delivering dinner to their masters” holding the Southern lines. The slaves who dug the Confederate lines, the freedmen who entrenched for the Union, and the black division sacrificed to racism and stupidity by the Union high command were forgotten in the romanticized evocation of the Lost Cause.

My dissertation is dedicated to the officers and men of the U.S. Colored Troops who in the past twenty years are finally receiving the recognition they deserved for their bravery and achievements in the Civil War.
## LIST OF ACRONYMS

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>A.A.A.G.</td>
<td>Acting Assistant Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.A.G.</td>
<td>Assistant Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.D.</td>
<td>African Descent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.G.</td>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGO</td>
<td>Adjutant General’s Office – NARA Record Group 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archives and Records Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCS</td>
<td>Officer Candidate School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q.M.D.</td>
<td>Quartermaster’s Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACC</td>
<td>Records of United States Army Continental Commands – NARA Record Group 393</td>
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<td>U.S.C.I.</td>
<td>United States Colored Infantry</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.C.T.</td>
<td>United Stated Colored Troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.M.A.</td>
<td>United States Military Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>V.R.C.</td>
<td>Veteran Reserve Corps</td>
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IMPORTANT NOTES ON THE TEXT

**Re-Creations**: Throughout this study, I have offered occasional historically accurate recreations that are constructed from the details of unit histories, the personal experiences of soldiers, and extrapolations from the histories of many units. To clearly set these recreations apart from the factual historical text and direct quotations, I have placed them in boxes with a light background and marked them “RE-CREATION” at the top. My goal is to help the reader understand not just the bureaucracies and policies of officer preparation, but to provide an understanding of the experience of officer preparation and its context “from the ground.” In one sense, these sections are works of fiction in that I have overlaid words and thoughts on historical figures or groups. However, the historical detail is accurate to the best of my knowledge and the referenced quotes are from reliable primary sources.

**Footnotes**: Following established practice in the Chicago 15A style, I have attempted to limit the number of footnotes and place them at the end of paragraphs rather than within the body of the paragraph. This can, on occasion, lead to some uncertainty about the provenance of quotes and personal opinions/conclusions versus the opinions of other authors. I have tried to make this as clear as possible in the text without overwhelming the reader with additional footnotes, and have used footnotes in the body of paragraphs when unavoidable.

**Diary page numbers**: Diary entries referenced in notes rarely have page numbers, and are generally designated by the date of the entry.

**Use of [sic]**: I have chosen not to use [sic] to designate misspellings and grammatical oddities in 19th Century quotes. All of the text presented represents the spelling and construction as it appears in the original sources.

**Navigation**: Recognizing that readers of this document may approach it with different goals and looking for different information, the following page provides examples of navigation paths to assist readers who do not want or need to read from cover to cover.

**Capitalization**: There does not appear to be any standard way of determining whether “black” and “white” should be capitalized when referring to military units or groups of people. I have chosen to not capitalize either except when used in the title of a written or electronic source.
Reader’s Navigation Guide

If you are interested in ORIGINAL HISTORICAL RESEARCH, read:

Chapter 5 Preparation, Examination → Chapter 6 Educational Innovations → Chapter 7 Summary of Findings → Prologue

If you are interested in FINDINGS, read:

Chapter 7 Summary of Findings → Prologue

If you are interested in HISTORICAL BACKGROUND and CONTEXT, read:

Chapter 2 Northern Officer Education → Chapter 3 The U.S.C.T. → Chapter 4 Providing Officers

If you are interested in RESEARCH and WRITING PROCESS, read:

Prologue → Chapter 1 Scope of The Study → Chapter 7 Summary of Findings

If you LOVE THE TOPIC and are interested in PROCESS, read:

Prologue → Chapter 1 Scope of The Study → Chapter 2 Northern Officer Education → Chapter 3 The U.S.C.T. → Chapter 4 Providing Officers

Chapter 5 Preparation, Examination → Chapter 6 Educational Innovations → Chapter 7 Summary of Findings
PROLOGUE

“There are days when I feel every one of my fifty years, Henry Cist,” thought Mussey as he looked at the invitation on his desk. A full two decades had passed since the glory days in Nashville, and it seemed as if so many had learned so little. Antipathy toward the Negro had been repugnant when Reverend Lord had advocated slavery back at Dartmouth. It was even worse when friends from the Loyal Legion or the Grand Army of the Republic, who should know better from their wartime experience, still impeded the black man. He had followed Cist’s journalistic career and read each of his stories about the Army of the Cumberland, at first eagerly, then with bemused annoyance that a family friend could be so wrong-headed. Now he heard a book was in the offing, and he could only imagine what Cist would do in it. “I’ll eat my hat if he even mentions my Colored soldiers.”

His mind drifted back to that fool Cheatham in 1864; another one cut from the same cloth. An invitation to review the troops of the Nashville garrison on Independence Day that specifically excluded his men of the 100th U.S. Colored Infantry from the *haute monde* of the city, and his own scathing reply, “I cannot, sir, accept…The Declaration of Independence, whose formal adoption makes the Fourth of July sacred affirms, *all men are created equal*, and until you, sir, and your committee learn this fundamental truth…your ‘celebrations of our National anniversary’ are mocking farces, insults to the illustrious dead, and blasphemy…”

He had done his best to bring white officers and black men together into the ‘terrible swift sword’ that would usher in a new era of justice for the Negro. Hundreds of competent officers and dozens of regiments were the result of his efforts, now being forgotten. The U.S.C.T. and the Bureau, Gen. Thomas and Maj. Stearns, the examination boards and the recruiters—all long gone.

Mussey loved reunions and eagerly anticipated the meeting of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland that was to happen that year. Perhaps he could try once again to set the record straight. His pen scratched at the paper, “Cist, at present, it runs in my mind that it would not be inappropriate to say something about the ‘Colored Troops’ of the Army of the Cumberland who proverbially fought nobly…”

THE JOURNEY OF THE STUDY

Writing this study has been a unique learning experience—truly unique because it is hard for me to imagine that I will ever need to relearn the lessons that were so hard won. While I now believe that I know more about the process of examining and commissioning officers for Civil War black regiments than any human being on earth (which is, of course, the goal of a dissertation), the specific historical knowledge gained

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is miniscule compared to my humbling understanding of what good research demands and how much of an art form it is. Symbolically, I began with the belief that I would be assembling a sturdy wall from clear, discrete bricks of information that, while perhaps scattered across a construction yard, were already bricks. Instead, I discovered that, while there were a few bricks already there, what I really needed to do was find a clay deposit, mine the clay, build a kiln, search for fuel, find water, mix up a slurry, and bake the bricks. Then I could take the ugly, misshapen results and construct something meaningful. Figure P-1 shows an example of much of the raw material that comprised the resources available for research.

![Figure P-1 Applications for Appointments to the U.S.C.T.](National Archives and Records Administration, RG 94-E.369, author’s photo)

At the inception of my background data gathering almost two years ago, I assumed that the voluminous primary and secondary sources about the Civil War would provide me with endless, easily accessible documents on virtually any aspect of the black troops, their officers, and their training. After all, how could the millions of records at
the National Archives be silent on these topics? How could the 125 volumes of the
Official Records or the thousands of pages of The Negro in the Military Service of the
United States be silent? Would the many hundreds of personal reminiscences and
regimental histories have nothing to offer? I believed that I would find all the
information I wanted, even if it were not neatly arranged or clearly marked. What
research task could possibly resist the kind of effort and organization that I would bring
to the study? I was so naïve.

I have learned something about humility. Although I have spent my life in the
casual pursuit of history, I never understood how much information was irretrievably lost
over the passage of time, and what it would take to extract the little that remains.
Reading 300 or so books and articles; spending over a month at the National Archives
and the Library of Congress looking at uncounted thousands of crumbling records;
visiting the historical societies of Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio; corresponding
with the Pennsylvania, Cincinnati, Kentucky, and Texas historical societies; contacting
nearly every major university library in the War’s Union states; trips to the Virginia
Tech, William & Mary, George Washington, and George Mason libraries; visiting the
U.S. Army Center for Military History and the
Army Military History Institute; photographing
and analyzing over a thousand digital images
of documents from NARA and the LOC—I
expected this effort to produce mountains of
information rather than fragments. However,
all I accumulated were shards—the “smoking
gun” of the story of officer education and
examination did not appear to exist.

The Dead Sea Scrolls often came to
mind as I tried to assemble bits of information
into a coherent picture of a complex process. I
kept searching among the Adjutant General’s
records for the one volume that consolidated
all the information that I needed about officer
applicant approvals, or the letter describing exactly what was studied or how it was studied at a regiment’s evening officer recitation session. Instead, I found passing references to events that were undescribed or multiple volumes of unalphabetized records where one piece of information was in one volume and another in a second. The cross-connections and intersections were almost impossible to trace and unsnarl, but some order emerged over time. Many of the fragments became meaningful.

I have learned the value of persistence and the acceptance that everything does not always work out as planned. Pursuit of the information in the George Tate diary is a good example. Over a period of six months, I corresponded with a research librarian at the Huntington Library in San Marino, CA. First I had to establish that the Tate Collection existed, was available for photocopying, and covered the time period I needed. Then I had to convince the librarian to copy the portions I was looking for. As this was impossible, I ended up getting the entire diary photocopied (after a while, the expense became meaningless relative to my desire to actually see Tate’s words.) Finally, a two inch stack of paper arrived in the mail and I began to read. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Tate’s handwriting was relatively clear and the person George Tate began to emerge. A rather surly, well-educated, self-satisfied Victorian who gyrated between extreme piety and occasional depravity (by the standards of the time and in Tate’s own estimation), he had written most days between 1863 and 1865. However, he was not writing with the goal of helping me find the information I needed about his preparation for the U.S.C.T. examination or his approach to education. In hundreds of pages, there were only five or six references that were even marginally relevant, and those typically of only a few words. To my frustration, he had made no diary entry for the day that he appeared before the examination board. On the other hand, I began to feel that I knew him as a person, and could begin to understand his own frustrations with the army, his post-War assignment to Brazos Santiago, TX, and his desperation to return to his family. That growing understanding of Tate does not appear in my study, but was exceptionally rewarding. I felt that I had reached across 140 years and made contact with a real human being, not a historical figure.

Of course, the lack of information from the taciturn Tate would not have been a problem—except that he was the only officer from either the 41st or 100th U.S.C.I. who
appears to have left a diary. Tate’s diary along with Mussey’s official records at the National Archives and personal correspondence at the Dartmouth Library were the only major repositories of writings by any of the nearly 100 officers of the two regiments. I made unproductive, detailed investigations in the National Union Catalogue, the Library of Congress, genealogical sources that might point to living offspring of some of the more senior officers, and review of every bibliographic source of Civil War memoirs, letters, and diaries I was able to find. Most of these efforts produced no information at all.

I have also learned the power of random good fortune—or perhaps apparently random would be more accurate. As I was going through an unrewarding set of Civil War correspondence at the Missouri Historical Society, I found a letter that was written on the back of the 1842 prospectus for the Pennsylvania Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy. The letter was uninteresting, but the prospectus was priceless for my research. This document does not appear to exist in any other repository, and provided key detailed information about one of West Point’s educational offspring in 1842. I have also been fortunate in my meetings with helpful and knowledgeable people. It was a rare trip to NARA or the LOC that did not introduce or reacquaint me with a person who could be helpful. On several occasions, I encountered well-known authors (among Civil War historians) who looked at the records I was studying and asked me what I was doing, or people who were interested in my use of digital photography in the research room and turned out to be respected historians themselves. These conversations invariably led to introductions to other historians who could provide either guidance or encouragement. In the researchers’ locker room at NARA, Dr. Jim Pula of Purdue University glanced at some notes that I had made as he walked by, and suggested that I read his review of Martin Ofele’s book on U.S.C.T. officers of German descent, which pointed me toward Ofele’s very useful bibliography. Lt. Col. (AUS Retd.) Ed Milligan introduced me to Lt. Col. (AUS Retd.) Roger Cunningham who introduced me to Dr. Charles Hendricks, managing editor of Army History, who is working with me on an article for publication. Perhaps “being there” is what is really needed; I am not sure that fortune favors the brave so much as fortune favors those who are in the right place enough times.
I learned to be suspicious. For example, in NUCMC, I found a reference to a diary in the Indiana Historical Society library for Lt. James Iliff of the 41st U.S.C.I. The National Park Service system, however, did not show him as part of this unit. When I visited Indianapolis, I discovered that the NUCMC record had mistakenly added “C.I.” to “U.S.”—Iliff was an officer in the 41st U.S. Regulars. At a higher and more complicated level, problems encountered with a key secondary source discussing R.D. Mussey’s officer “school” demonstrate the analysis needed to make sense out of conflicting evidence. Glatthaar writes of a school developed by Mussey for post commissioning training. In tracing his references to educational activities, there was essentially no substantiation of the school in NARA Record Group 94 or RG 393 where I expected to find them. The *Official Records* were similarly silent. At NARA, I discovered why. Mussey wrote a letter to one of his subordinates on October 24, 1864 that talks about his plans for a school in future, not present tense. From that point forward, no mention of the school appears. Analysis of the strategic and tactical situation in Nashville explains why. Just after Mussey wrote the letter, Hood and Forrest took advantage of Sherman’s march to the sea and attacked Nashville, where Mussey was based and where he commanded the 100th U.S. Colored Infantry *in absentia*. For the next month, Mussey appears to have been distracted by both the management of recruiting activities and field operations, and most likely would not have had time to create any sort of formal school, nor would officers have been able to attend. After the Confederates were driven back, the War was winding down and few black regiments were being formed in the Tennessee area—removing the necessity for aggressive officer training or preparation of many officers for new regiments. My analysis indicates that Mussey’s plans for a school were never implemented. Even the best quality and most reliable sources must be subjected to verification and critical reflection. The NPS system, for example, lists Mussey as Musson and has several privates included among the officers.

I have learned about discipline. In the past twelve months, there have been fewer than 20 days when I have not researched, written, read, or revised this study. The wireless network I installed in my house allowed me to work at the kitchen table instead of my basement office, so that I could at least see my wife while I ignored her. My kitchen chair needs to be reupholstered and, someday, I will put my mountain of digital
document images into a rational order. The shelf on one of my bookshelves collapsed under the weight of Civil War resources and is still on the floor. Still, I did what I set out to do, with all of the flaws that I can see and that hopefully you, the reader, either cannot see or will forgive.

I have learned that you do not need to reinvent work that others have done. Originally, I attempted to write each chapter solely from original sources. While this made sense in the chapter about the examination boards (which are rarely discussed in secondary works), there was much existing scholarship about the U.S.M.A. and the antebellum military academies that could be crafted into a contextual chapter with little original work. Thus, Chapters Two and Three depend heavily on secondary works, and Chapters Four and Five are primarily based on original research. Chapter Six combines secondary and primary sources in even measure.

I have learned about disappointment. *You can’t always get what you want* must be the anthem of historical researchers. Tate’s non-entry on May 4, 1864; the 12 pages of letters from the Mussey Collection at Dartmouth when I expected hundreds; the fruitless search for a Cincinnati equivalent of the Free Military School; the futile exploration of Mussey’s school; University of Michigan Bentley Library’s “we’ll get back to you in a month or two”; Pennsylvania Historical Society’s “our copier is broken and we don’t know when it will be fixed”—how much easier would this study have been if these impediments had never arisen? Chapter Six, Educational Innovations, was my greatest disappointment. I expected to find other schools similar to the Free Military School and a wide variety of educational practices documented in the regiments. The hoped-for primary records did not surface—but not due to lack of searching.

I have learned about the joy of discovery. For each annoying disappointment, there must have been ten or twenty moments of elation. Digging through a series of dusty, disordered boxes of reports from an examination board, I began to find names I recognized; in the Adjutant General’s ledger of applicants for commissions, I found those same names. George Tate emerged from his diary. The Henry Crosby diary found its way to me through melodramatic serendipity, as did the Willis letters. Reading the turn of the century *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, I realized that the Henry Stone writing a section of the book was the same Henry Stone who commanded the 100th
U.S.C.I. in Mussey’s place. The moments of discovery, the people, the flashes of interconnection, and the learning have made this a worthwhile journey.

**ORGANIZATION OF THE CHAPTERS**

The chapters are organized thematically. In Chapter One, I introduce the study topic, the approach used to pursue the topic, the purpose of the study, guiding questions, significance, historiography, and historical method.

For background, Chapter Two has a discussion of the skills needed by infantry officers, formal strategic and tactical educational opportunities for potential officer candidates, and officer selection practices.

Chapter Three contains the genesis and characteristics of U.S.C.T. infantry units that were mustered between 1862 and 1865, with emphasis on the peak recruiting years of 1863-1864. It concludes with the creation of the 41st and 100th U.S.C.I.

In Chapter Four, the sources of officers for the Union Army, and overview of selection practices, and the types of preparation activities that were common between 1863 and 1865 are presented.


In Chapter Six, I present the organization, practices, and policies of educational innovations that were encountered by officers of the U.S.C.I., with particular emphasis on the practices that supported the 41st and 100th.

Finally, Chapter Seven contains a summary of findings from the study, conclusions that are applicable to the study’s time period, and possible areas for future research.
CHAPTER ONE   SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.³

BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

The American Civil War (1861-1865) forced a painful and important reevaluation of many aspects of American life, but in no other case as profoundly as in the reconsideration of race, the bondsmen of the South, and free blacks. An innately conservative society was faced with overwhelming and inexorable change, and something new arose under the American sun to help bring about transformation—regiments of black soldiers enlisted in the cause of the destruction of slavery. Just as men of color enlisted in this crusade, so too did white men step forward, from diverse motivations, to lead black troops in battle.

Between 1862 and 1865, 7,683 officers held commissions with the U.S. Colored Troops (U.S.C.T.) in regiments created by the Union to harness the manpower and thirst for liberty of former slaves and free black men.⁴ The processes and practices used to prepare these officers for command, examine their fitness to hold a commission, and continue their education after assignment to a regiment has received little attention and represents an important gap in the study of both adult education and of military history.

The focus of this study will be on officers of two representative regiments, the 41st and 100th U.S. Colored Infantry (U.S.C.I.), whenever possible. The goal is to provide an illustration of the processes created to select and prepare officers of these regiments. Preparation was a multifaceted concept that included personal study before and after a rigorous qualifying examination, dependence on and use of the educational

approaches developed by the nation to ensure that prospective officers would be competent, and post-examination training to help the new officers to be effective on the battlefield. The study of their preparation is made more meaningful by taking a detailed, contextual look at the educational practices and innovations surrounding the pursuit of a commission.  

The U.S.C.I. consisted of 138 infantry regiments, each with strong similarities but a few with significant differences. The 41st and 100th U.S.C.I. were selected as focal regiments for this study specifically because they are representative of the majority of U.S.C.I. regiments in the ways they were employed (i.e., little fighting but much guard duty). Each came from a different theater of operations, both were formed at the height of U.S.C.I. creation in 1864, and neither is “famous” and well-documented like the 54th Massachusetts. In addition, my prior research on Reuben D. Mussey, summarized in Mussey’s short biography in Appendix C and appearing in a 2006 article in the Journal of the Company of Military Historians (in press), suggested that the 100th may have created some interesting and innovative educational practices, and the connection between the 100th and the Bureau for Colored Troops indicated that more National Archive resources would be available for this regiment than for others with

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5 Note that the process of officer selection in the U.S.C.T. was radically different from that followed by white volunteer regiments at the beginning of the War, while the post-commissioning educational activities had much in common.
comparable characteristics. Similarly, the formation of the 41st at Camp William Penn, Pennsylvania pointed to a connection to a unique educational institution in Philadelphia.6

Unlike some other works, I do not attempt to tell the entire operational story of the two regiments, their combat history, or their post-War epilogue.7 Rather, outside of contextual information exploring the environments of white military education before the War and U.S. Colored Troops themselves, the focus of the study is on regimental officers and their preparation, selection, and training. I believe that the practices that arose around the officers of the 41st, 100th, and other U.S.C.T. regiments represent important foundational steps foreshadowing the future U.S. Army officer candidate schools (OCS) and modern officer evaluation.

Historical context is important to the study, and the depth of information about most aspects of the Civil War makes wading through the plethora of sources difficult. The War is arguably the best documented event in American history, the topic of perhaps 50,000 to 75,000 books and a staggeringly large number of articles discussing nearly every detail of strategy, tactics, sociology, logistics, and a host of other topics. Black troops, after being virtually ignored until the 1960’s, have begun to be extensively documented. Buried within the body of Civil War literature are a number of key topical areas that provided perspective for this study:

- the traditional practices for the selection of volunteer officers that were modified for the U.S.C.T.;
- professional educational opportunities for officers outside of the U.S.C.T.;
- the process used to create U.S.C.T. regiments;
- the Union’s intent for the regiments’ use;
- the constitution and functioning of officer examination boards including the experience of the 41st and 100th’s officers with the boards; and
- mechanisms used to address the problems of officer preparation for the U.S.C.I.

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6 The 54th Massachusetts is familiar to many people as the subject of the motion picture “Glory.” Mussey was commander of the 100th U.S.C.I. and Commissioner for Organization, U.S. Colored Troops for the Bureau for Colored Troops.
Accordingly, my research falls into two general categories: the background and context that led to the educational practices encountered in these areas and a description of the specific practices and innovations that were proposed or implemented within the U.S.C.T.\(^8\)

In light of the discussion above, the research questions addressed were:

1. **Within the context of the examination of officer candidates for the U.S.C.I.,** what educational structures were created to ensure a flow of qualified officers to the U.S.C.I. both prior to examination boards and after assignment to a regiment? What were the environments that shaped these structures?

2. **How did the black regiments of the Civil War come into being, what social and military impediments did they face, and how were their officers selected and assigned to command positions?**

3. **What public and private entities contributed to officer training for the U.S.C.I.?**

4. **What evidence is available of any unique or innovative educational practices developed by the senior commanders of the 41\(^{st}\) and 100\(^{th}\), their supporters, or other regiments? If any, how were these innovations implemented within the U.S.C.I.?**

These questions address issues that are important both to historians and the modern military, using the U.S.C.I. to illuminate poorly understood and sparsely documented foundations of critical modern practices and to close a gap in the literature.

Amidst the Civil War’s radical social, military, and economic changes, new models for military education were emerging—models that carried sociological presumptions about the ability of the common man to rise to the level of “officer and gentleman,” and for officers to effectively command, relate to, and even respect men who were recently slaves and were almost always thought to be inferior. Except among the fringe group of radical abolitionists, a sense of common purpose and action between blacks and whites was rare in the antebellum United States. Even though it took nearly 90 years to come to fruition, seeds may have been planted in this period that were precursors of the integrated

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Army of the 20th century, and ancestors of the Officer Candidate Schools of the late 19th and mid-20th centuries.  

I believe that the U.S.C.I. officer examination and education practices are part of a poorly documented but interesting continuum of adult learning that stretches from Civil War soldiers to today’s troops. In a sense, all graduates of officer candidate schools and, to some lesser extent, Reserve Officer Training Corps participants may owe a debt to the innovators of the U.S.C.T. the Bureau for Colored Troops, and the Adjutant General’s Office. Every officer suffering through an efficiency rating is encountering the distant offspring of the examination boards. This study helps to illuminate and contextualize the sources of modern practices.

Today’s modern, highly technical army is a direct outgrowth of the changes that began to appear during the Civil War. Military historians generally acknowledge the Civil War as a turning point in the technology, practice, and philosophy of modern warfare. The formalized incorporation of tools such as trench warfare, rifled muskets and artillery, explosive mines, breach-loading rifles, military telegraphy, non-linear small unit tactics, and other technologies shifted warfare into a new and radically different era. Modern Army practice and doctrine, as with many aspects of American society, exist as the offspring of Civil War innovations. Comprehending how the Union Army was educated and trained can help to expand our understanding of both our present and our future military. A clear picture of the genesis of current practice will help the Army to execute those practices more effectively and with a greater sense of meaning and purpose. Further, recognition of problems encountered in the past can provide a building block in a stronger foundation for growing towards the future. In the environment of the 2005 Rumsfeld Department of Defense, this is particularly important since many of the traditional concepts of Army force structure, application, forward deployment, and attrition tactics—all ideas arising from the Civil War—are under review and revision.

9 John Hope Franklin, From Freedom to Slavery (New York: Vantage Books, 1969); Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage Books, 1974); Milton M. McPherson, The Ninety-Day Wonders: Officer Candidate Schools and the Modern American Army (University of Alabama Printing Services, 2001), 11. The Army, under the pressure of unexpected expansion, used the concept of Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) during World War I but dropped the practice between 1918 and 1938. The Army’s first formal OCS was instituted in 1941. The Marine Corps OCS evolved between 1891 and 1920. Prior to these years, reserve officer training programs usually were able to fill the gap between required officer manpower and the output of the national military academies.
The Army painfully dealt with similar shifts between 1861 and 1865, and there are potential lessons to be learned from the Civil War process of adjustment and accommodation to radical change.10

An understanding of the background of antebellum military education and the prior nature of army officer preparation is critical to this study. The educational innovations associated with officer training arose in a time of intense change. The United States was undergoing a wrenching transformation from a society that accepted slavery to one that is more recognizable to the modern eye. Industrialization was replacing agrarianism. Blacks and whites were learning that, sociologically and economically, they were more closely intertwined than either ever expected that they would be. A new sense of egalitarian power and purpose was beginning to emerge, along with a more classless approach to leadership as the aristocratic assumptions of the past were being destroyed in the fiery cauldron of civil war. As James McPherson points out, the War was a radical revolution, but not of the South against the North. “Union victory in the war destroyed the Southern vision of America and ensured that the Northern vision would become the American vision. Until 1861, it was the North that was out of the mainstream, not the South.”11

The structure and concept of the U.S. Army was also changing. In the antebellum Army, there were two types of officers: those who went through formal military training at the United States Military Academy or similar institutions such as the Virginia Military Institute, and those who held temporary volunteer appointments during times of national emergency (e.g., the War of 1812, the Seminole War, the Mexican War, etc.) All of the officers in the Civil War’s white regiments fell into one of these categories. It was the introduction of blacks into the army in large numbers that created both complexities and opportunities for innovation in officer selection, examination, and education. New practices appeared not within the white volunteer regiments that were the norm for the Civil War era, but rather in support of the black units.

Radical change placed intense pressure on the systems for managing volunteers and preparing officers. In 1860 on the brink of civil war, the Regular Army had 16,435 officers and enlisted men. The technological state of the art was the muzzle-loading musket and smoothbore brass cannon. Five years later, the Union Army had expanded to two and a half million soldiers including nearly 180,000 former slaves and free men of color. They were armed with rifled muskets and breechloaders, rifled cannon, and early machine gun prototypes. Union soldiers were supported by tactical railroad-based movement, wired communications, and the first glimmers of military aviation. The Union logistical system was the marvel of the military world.\(^\text{12}\)

In the long term, these changes in both the size of the army and its technological resources triggered a corresponding change in the kinds of knowledge soldiers were expected to have and the ways in which soldiers were educated. Prior to 1860, the United States was defended by a small, professional army that was deployed mostly on the Western frontier. The active duty forces of the entire country were the equivalent of 16 wartime regiments—black infantry regiments alone accounted for an eight-fold increase over the pre-War Army. The role of today’s Army Reserve and National Guard was filled by state militia units that were rarely well trained or equipped for battle. Most militia officers held positions through political patronage rather than military competence. The onslaught of civil war immediately demonstrated the problems of a system that had responded somewhat effectively in earlier, limited conflicts but nearly collapsed under the stresses of a continental war.

To supplement the Regular Army, militia units were mustered into federal service as Volunteer regiments, and officers were either appointed by state governors or elected by the troops. In 1861, the War Department decided not to break up the Regular units to form instructional and leadership cadres for the volunteer regiments—helping to explain the Confederate dominance of the Union armies during the early phases of the War. Using the Volunteer system, the Union Army was able to expand to more than 140 times

its pre-War size. The War Department accepted the shortcomings of this system, particularly in officer selection and preparation, until it was faced with a problem and opportunity: a deluge of escaped slaves who could potentially become Union soldiers. Between 1862 and 1865 under the pressures of black enlistment, a new approach to officer preparation, selection, and training arose. For the first time in its history, the Army made a systematic effort to examine and choose officers based on their knowledge of military matters and prior combat experience. Educational mechanisms to prepare prospective officers of black units, including the 41st and 100th U.S.C.I., for examination grew up around the selection process.13

The units of the U.S.C.T. were the raison d’être for these officers, and background information about the creation of black regiments is an important part of the story. At the end of the War, approximately 15 percent of active Union infantrymen were blacks, and in nearly every case, they served in their own regiments and were commanded by white officers. A combination of the solidly abolitionist Northern states such as Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut along with the urban center of New Orleans led in the initial recruiting of the U.S.C.T. One area of confusion that arose after 1863 was the difference between state-sponsored and U.S. regiments. Most of the black regiments raised during the War were composed of freed slaves and were mustered in or near areas that had formerly been part of the Confederacy. U.S. Colored Troops or U.S.C.T. was a general term applied to all black regiments and batteries, whether infantry, cavalry, or artillery. U.S.C.I. was a more specific term associated with the U.S. Colored Infantry who are the focus of this study. Regiments were either immediately designated as U.S.C.T. (e.g., the 62nd U.S. Colored Infantry) or received a state or Corps designation.

13 Occasionally, these officers had Regular Army experience. Ulysses S. Grant, U.S. Military Academy class of 1843, took a commission from the governor of Illinois as colonel of a regiment of Illinois volunteers. Thus he simultaneously held two ranks: his Regular commission as a captain and his Volunteer rank of colonel. The Confederacy did not suborn any Regular regiments, and so by necessity all of its units were “volunteer.” The relationship between Regular and Volunteer Union units becomes clearer in the regimental designations. For example, an infantry regiment might be officially called the 3rd Illinois Volunteer Infantry, and officers holding volunteer commissions in that regiment would place “U.S.V.” after their rank and name (e.g., Lt. John Adams, U.S.V., 3rd Ill. V.I.) A captain in a Regular regiment would use a U.S. regimental designation (e.g., Capt. Reuben D. Mussey, 19th U.S. Inf’ty.)
d’Afrique name that was later changed to a U.S.C.T. number (e.g., the 1st South Carolina Volunteers became the 33rd U.S.C.I.)

Recruits for the black regiments—whether free blacks from the North or former slaves or freedmen from the South—shared the common experience of serving in units that were officered by whites. Relatively few of their commanders had been officers prior to joining their black regiments. Rather, they were often non-commissioned officers or privates from white regiments who, with a wide variety of motivations, chose to seek a commission to lead black troops. To prepare these prospective officers for command and to ensure that they were knowledgeable about drill, tactics, and military administration, the Union armies and private groups created a few formal and informal institutions for educating the aspiring leaders.

Reasons for seeking a commission included commitment to abolitionist ideals, the ability to resign from the Army at will (subject to War Department approval later in the War), social prestige, and the perquisites of a commission. For some officers, it was simply the lure of better pay than they received either as an enlisted man or as a civilian. Marshall Mills wrote to his father that:

I found out one thing since coming back – his [fellow officer ‘Dick’ of the 49th U.S.C.I.] motive for coming into this branch of the service which I

14 Frederick H. Dyer, *A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion* (Dayton, Ohio: The National Historical Society, 1979); Joseph T. Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 35; Dyer, *Compendium*. Overall, about 12 percent of the Union Army was composed of African-American regiments over the course of the War. Fewer than 100 black officers in the early Corps d’Afrique and other black regiments survived War Department purges of late 1863. Of these, less than a dozen served as line officers; most were surgeons, chaplains, or quartermasters (see Appendix A). Eighty-two percent of the U.S.C.I. regiments came from Southern (61 percent) or Border (21 percent) states. Four black State infantry regiments maintained their original designation throughout the war: the 29th Connecticut Infantry, the 54th and 55th Massachusetts Infantry, and the 5th Massachusetts Cavalry.

15 Roger D. Cunningham, "Douglas's Battery at Fort Leavenworth: The Issue of Black Officers During the Civil War," *Kansas History* 23, no. 4 (2001); Records of United States Army Continental Commands (USACC), Applications for Commissions, U.S.C.T., RG 393-E.1146, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, DC. While a small number of black officers had been appointed early in the War, particularly in regiments formed in New Orleans and Kansas, most of them were driven from the service or demoted once the Bureau for Colored Troops was formed in 1863. Only one unit in the Union Army—the Kansas Independent Battery, U.S. Colored Light Artillery—was wholly commanded by black officers. An analysis of all 480 applicants in the Department of the Cumberland illustrates that 86 percent were enlisted men or non-commissioned officers at the time of their application, while 11 percent were already officers and 3 percent were civilians. The distribution of applications shows that nearly all applicants during the second half of 1864 and the beginning of 1865 were not previously officers. NARA and state historical society records for the other groups of examinees from Washington, St. Louis, and Cincinnati show a similar pattern.
little expected and it is this: it was only the pay that induced him to become a ‘Nigger’ Officer and if he could only get half of what he now gets per month he would resign immediately.\textsuperscript{16}

The implications of a purely mercenary motivation were disastrous for Dick’s men who were ignored and despised.

… he has never shown any interest in the welfare of the men in his CO [company] and is so little acquainted with them now (after having been with them 12 months) that he cannot call half of the men in his company by name and if the letters were taken off their cap could not tell you which man belonged to his Co. out of an equal you might meet on the street.\textsuperscript{17}

Sometimes, the motivations were more obscure and personal. August Schmuck, a corporal of the 155th Pennsylvania, applied for and received a commission as a captain with the 41\textsuperscript{st} U.S.C.I.; he had previously been a major in the 26th Pennsylvania. The story behind his demotion and attempt to restore his commission is unknown, but we can infer that he was cashiered for cowardice, incompetence, or criminal activity or received a medical discharge. Other officers such as Joseph A. Ross, a sergeant in the 12\textsuperscript{th} Veterans Reserve Corps (V.R.C.) which used partially disabled soldiers for non-combat duties such as guarding prisons, may have sought a commission as a 1\textsuperscript{st} Lieutenant with the 41\textsuperscript{st} because his health had improved or because he, like many in the V.R.C., was embarrassed to be serving in an inferior unit. William R. Stuckey saw a commission as a passport to a better life after the War:

… I am confident I can get a commition if I stay in the Service until the old turn of the Regiment. I think that would be very nice to have a commition for five or six months then I could come home and build a house and be pretty well free to live then. I am intitle to a commition in a Negro regiment….\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} B. Marshall Mills to C. Mills, June 16, 1865, Caleb Mills Collection, 1863-1865, Indiana Historical Society (Indianapolis).
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. B.M. Mills to C. Mills, June 16, 1865, Caleb Mills Collection.
\textsuperscript{18} n.a., Applications to Enter the Free Military School for Candidates for Command of Colored Troops, April 20 - August 29, 1864, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1864. W. R. Stuckey to Helen Stuckey, June 8, 1864, William R. Stuckey letters, 1863-1864, Indiana Historical Society (Indianapolis). The Stuckey letters were perhaps my most poignant discovery among the primary sources studied. Stuckey was either less heroic or more honest than most of his contemporaries. An early enlistee, he wrote a letter to his wife every week in 1863 and 1864—but unlike most of the private Civil War letters that express nobility and courage, Stuckey simply wanted to be out of the army and away from the War. He tried to malinger in the hospital and sought easier duties, including a U.S.C.T. commission. Still, he served when called to the front, and died on August 7, 1864. The last letter in the Stuckey collection is from his brother to Helen Stuckey telling her of William’s death.
The U.S. government was slow to enlist blacks in spite of the growing number of *contrabands* appearing within Union lines as the armies advanced. The capture of New Orleans and the Atlantic Sea Islands, and the defeat of the slaveholders in Kansas brought the first significant groups of blacks into the Union Army in 1862. In this study, the term *contraband* is used interchangeably with *former slaves*, *freedmen*, and *escaped slaves*. In reality, contrabands and freedmen were exclusively former slaves who had passed within the lines of the Union army during its operations in the southern states. Former slaves may have escaped the South earlier, or may simply be freedmen. However, in assessing prior military training and likely education, the differences among these three closely related groups are insignificant. Free blacks represent an altogether different group—those who had escaped slavery less recently or were born free, had established themselves economically, and were often better educated than the contrabands. Also in 1862, Congress gave Lincoln the authority to recruit black soldiers at his discretion, although he and most other whites doubted that blacks would fight effectively. Lincoln also had to consider the impact that the arming of black soldiers would have upon the citizens of Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, and Missouri as he tried to keep the Border States from supporting the Confederacy, and thus did not immediately exercise his new authority. However, as the incompetence of many Union commanders and the unexpected military capabilities of the South depleted the manpower pool of the North, Lincoln relented and systematically began recruiting black regiments in 1863. Ultimately, over 186,017 African-Americans wore the Union’s blue uniform during the War, with the vast majority of them enlisting as infantrymen.\(^{19}\)

The arrival of blacks into the Union armies produced conflicting emotions among the white troops. On one hand, many soldiers pragmatically welcomed black soldiers to their dangerous world as additional targets and laborers, if not as fighting men. Others

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were prey to their prejudices and the endemic racism of the time, and believed that former slaves and free blacks would never make useful soldiers. This opinion was not limited to enlisted men and low ranking officers. General William T. Sherman, among many senior officers, was adamantly opposed to the employment of the U.S.C.T. in combat situations. General Lorenzo Thomas, Union Adjutant General, characterized Sherman’s attitude toward black troops as, “The general prefers them armed with spades and axes to soldiers.”

Black soldiers eventually proved that they could be effective fighting men, which led to a large increase in the number of black regiments in the last two years of the War and a corresponding need for effective officers—but white officers only. The search for qualified officers was concurrent with the creation of the regiments. The peak muster-in period for the U.S.C.I. was from July 1863 to June 1864; 65 percent (90 of 138 regiments) were created during this time span. As the U.S.C.I. regiments were being formed, the War Department faced a series of interrelated problems centered on providing leadership for them. First was the presumption that blacks were incapable of being officers and that whites must hold the command roles. Second was the belief that officers should not be forced to serve with blacks if they did not want to do so. The ability of an officer to resign his commission at any time, subject to the approval of the Army, made coercion impossible even if the War Department had decided to arbitrarily assign offices to the U.S.C.T. Connected to this factor was an understanding of the importance of trust and mutual reliance between officers and men that was key to combat performance—which could not exist if they shared mutual detestation. Third, the political implications of poor leadership—possibly resulting in the massacre of black soldiers—would be costly to the Lincoln Administration, particularly among the radical abolitionist Republicans who were already suspicious that Lincoln was not a “hard war man.” Fourth, the traditional system of appointments in volunteer regiments had proven inefficient. Election of officers from the ranks was impossible in the U.S.C.T. in any case since black officers were not allowed. Finally, the number of officers needed to

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support the U.S.C.I. regiments was larger than for a similar number of white regiments since extra officers were often included to take the place of literate non-commissioned officers who were generally not available among the mostly illiterate black recruits.21

The War Department through its agents, the Adjutant General and the Bureau for Colored Troops, created what, in retrospect, appeared to be a brilliant solution to all of these problems. Soldiers of any rank and civilians with the proper references would be allowed to apply for a commission with the U.S.C.T. To ensure that these candidates were competent, many were required to pass a rigorous examination that would test their knowledge of the essentials of military management and assess their moral character and motivation. Regardless of the candidate’s current rank, the Examination Board would recommend an appropriate rank in the U.S.C.T. based on relatively objective criteria.

Unfortunately for many officer candidates, the minutiae of military command were difficult to learn, and even more difficult to describe under the critical eyes of examination board members. Many talented, battle-hardened, and experienced candidates were unable to answer examination questions that were highly relevant to the officer’s job—tactics, regulations, and history formed the core of the inquiry. As the demand for officers grew and the pass rate for the examination boards was embarrassingly low near 50 percent, educational innovations arose that would have an important impact on the preparation of officers.22

My focus on the officers of the 41st and 100th U.S.C.I. attempted to follow their officers through their preparation, examination, and training during 1864-1865. The 41st U.S.C.I. was a Pennsylvania regiment organized at Camp William Penn outside of Philadelphia in September 1864 and commanded by Col. Llewellyn Haskell. After less

21 Glatthaar, Forged in Battle; Higginson, Army Life; Noah A. Trudeau, Like Men of War: Black Troops in the Civil War 1862-1865 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1998); Dyer, Compendium; Earl J. Hess, The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997); John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New York: Elizabeth Sifton Books, 1987); Bruce Catton, Centennial History of the Civil War (New York: Little Brown and Company, 1961-1965). This analysis includes the 54th and 55th Massachusetts and the 29th Connecticut which did not carry the U.S.C.T. designation (see Appendix A). Because most U.S.C.T. regiments were transferred from state to federal service in 1864, the actual date of their creation is used rather than their official U.S.C.T. formation date. This approach provides a clearer picture of the muster patterns across the span of the War. In many cases, officers were elected by the enlisted soldiers early in the War. Colonels and regimental field grade officers were appointed by the governors of the states where the regiments were created. Patronage, wealth, and popularity were not successful bases for officer selection.

22 Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 45. The pass rate for the Washington examination board in 1863 was approximately 53 percent.
than a month of training, the regiment joined the Army of the James in Virginia where it
provided guards along the Union’s lines of communications. A few small actions helped
to prepare it for the final Appomattox campaign where it was engaged in combat on
several occasions. After the fall of the Confederacy, the 41st was sent to Texas for guard
duty and was disbanded in December 1865.23

The 100th U.S.C.I. was created in Kentucky in May 1864 and spent most of its
service on guard duty for the Nashville & Northwestern Railroad. While officially
commanded by Col. Reuben D. Mussey, its operational commanders were Lt. Col. Henry
Stone and Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Collin Ford. However, during Hood’s attack on Nashville
in December 1864, the 100th under the leadership of Ford and the distant supervision of
Mussey was a successful contributor to the defense of the city. After the pursuit of
Hood’s defeated army, the 100th resumed its guard duties until it was mustered out in
December 1865.24

To be successful as a unit, these regiments needed to mold their new soldiers and
their inexperienced officers into a capable team that could face the demands of the
battlefield. Often, this was a simple, and as tiring, as a long route march. Later, training
included complicated maneuvers and battlefield tactics that were not envisioned in the
first few days of preparation.

**RE-CREATION**

The glaring sun of the Mississippi Valley is merciless, matched only by the
humidity and the mosquitoes. Sweat greases palms and carves rivulets through dusty
faces. Shoulders supporting Springfield muskets feel every one of their ten pounds. Four
and a half feet and more of weapon topped by a fixed bayonet, clumsy in hands recently
from the plantation, dazzle in the reflected sunlight. Dark blue wool coats are a far cry
from a simple homespun shirt or a naked back in a cotton field. Muscles ache from the
demands of activities that do not match the pace of life in the cotton fields.

Rigidly, each group of men stands in frontages of ten, ten deep—Companies A
through K of the 41st U.S. Colored Troops. At attention before and punctuating each
block of black faces are a few white one, perhaps one in thirty, with gold braid, a red

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23 Dyer, Compendium, 1730.
Robert U. Johnson and Robert Buel (Secaucus: Castle, 1989). The shifting command structure of the 100th
U.S.C.I. created some confusion. While Mussey was the titular leader of the regiment, he did not actually
command its day-to-day activities. Lt. Col. Stone was the operational commander before and after the
battle of Nashville, but was attached to Maj. Gen. George Thomas’ staff during the campaign and for some
period afterwards. Maj. Ford commanded during the battle, but reverted to second in command when
Stone returned to the regiment.
sash, and a sword to set them apart further. At a nod from Lt. Col. Stone, Maj. Ford shouts “Battalion!” to be echoed by captains in unison calling “Company”—voices that carry the accents of the North, not the soft cadences of Kentucky plantation life. Is there a quaver of uncertainty in some of those white voices, a pitch or timbre that betrays an officer’s unfamiliarity with his role? A desire to be part of the ranks again in a friendly white regiment instead of leading these alien men from the front?

Ford orders “By companies, right wheel” then “March” and the regiment steps off, Company A in the lead, each company in turn following, down the road from Nashville.

HISTORIOGRAPHY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Historiography is “the imaginative reconstruction of the past from the data derived by that process.”25 In spite of the enormous body of literature on the American Civil War, a review of officer education and training in the antebellum and wartime periods continually points back to a limited number of key sources. There are few works that focus on the wartime education of officers, and even fewer that center on the officers who served with the U.S.C.T. While 1861 to 1865 was a time of intense engineering, political, and social innovation, advances in educational practice do not usually leap to mind when thinking about the War, and emerging civilian philosophies and techniques were slow to make their way into the Army’s thinking.

The most important and frequently referenced sources for this study are described below. The works cited are divided into seven categories: general reference works; officers, their education, and training; examination boards; tactics; slavery and abolitionism; black troops of the U.S.C.T.; and innovative educational approaches. They range from voluminous, broad bureaucratic collections of statistical information to idiosyncratic personal journals and diaries, and everything in between.

General Reference Works

Frederick Dyer’s *A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion* was originally published in 1908 and is the preeminent collection of statistical information about the Civil War. Its two volumes encompass 1,796 pages of data covering every regiment in the Union Army, the commanders and campaigns of each major unit, and numeric

summaries of troops mustered and lost. It is an indispensable tool for researchers. Dyer made no mention of either education or examination boards, but is the best secondary source about the collective histories of all Union units. The War Department’s *Official Army Register of the Volunteer Force of the United States Army for the years 1861, ’62, ’63, ’64, ’65* and Pfisterer’s *Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States* are important resources respectively providing short descriptions of senior Army officers and basic statistical information that appears in many later reference works.26

Controvich and Gordon’s *U.S. Army Unit and Organizational Histories* and C.E. Dornbusch’s *Military Bibliography of the Civil War* begin to fill a large gap in the researcher’s toolbox of Civil War sources. Since personal and unit narratives are not collected or catalogued in a single location, the authors of these bibliographies attempt to create the beginnings of a comprehensive list of sources. While incomplete, they are the best resources available today and are invaluable to the Civil War researcher. Unfortunately, neither of them contained many references to U.S.C.T. units and are most useful when an officer’s white unit is known.27

William Fox’s *Regimental Losses in the American Civil War 1861-1865* is another voluminous post-War collection of statistics about regiments, brigades, divisions, corps, and general officers—with a focus on the casualties incurred by each unit. Fox provides a specialized chapter dealing with the U.S.C.T.28

James McPherson’s *Battle Cry of Freedom* is, in my opinion, the best single-volume history of the Civil War. McPherson communicated the details of politics, tactics, and strategy while making the importance of events and social changes exceptionally clear. He captured the details and spirit of the politics, economics, and sociology surrounding the war in a highly accessible and succinct way. While Craven, Foote, Catton, and many others were talented, insightful, and important contributors to

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26 Dyer, *Compendium*; Frederick Pfisterer, *Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1901); U.S. War Department, *Official Army Register*. Dyer has been criticized for minor inaccuracies. While true that his facts are occasionally imperfect, the *Compendium* is a monumental work. Anyone who studies the same primary sources as did Dyer must gain an appreciation for his scholarship, patience, and lifetime commitment to this work.


28 Fox, *Regimental Losses.*
this study, McPherson is the master of Civil War history. He is Professor Emeritus of American History at Princeton University.\textsuperscript{29}

**General Primary Sources**

Many primary sources are discussed in the sections dealing with categorized topics below. However, there are two general primary sources that were major contributors to this study. In the early 20\textsuperscript{th} Century, Frederick Ainsworth edited *War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* which contains over 100,000 pages of operational and administrative documents collected and catalogued after the Civil War. It is the most easily accessible primary source for military communications, although it is not a substitute for the broader information kept in the National Archives, and represents the late 19\textsuperscript{th} Century War Department’s assessment of what was important rather than the complete raw material of contemporary records.

Ulysses S. Grant’s *Personal Memoirs* was published in 1885 and has been in print ever since. It provides a refreshing and matter-of-fact description that exposes Grant both as a man and as a commander. In trying to reconcile conflicting information about battlefield events and tactics, I found that Grant’s narrative usually gave a clearer and less prejudiced picture than most of the more florid contemporary sources although his personal prejudices for (e.g., William T. Sherman) and against (e.g., George Thomas) particular generals do skew his narrative somewhat.\textsuperscript{30}

**Officers, Education, and Training**

Officer education is generally discussed in the context of the institutions providing that education, and there is a plethora of books, articles and resources about the major and minor schools preparing young men for military life in the antebellum period.

Henry Barnard’s seminal *Military Schools and Courses of Instruction in the Science and Art of War* is cited as an important source in virtually every discussion of military education published since Reconstruction. Barnard investigated military education in a context that included the key military schools and systems of Europe, and


provided a vantage point that allowed for consideration of serious changes in the way the United States produced its officers. No other 19th century work comes close to providing the depth and detail about formal military education that Barnard offered.31

Ira Reeves’ *Military Education in the United States* is an often-cited classic in military educational secondary works, although its relevance to the study topic is limited because of the timeframe that it encompassed. Reeves wrote on the eve of World War I and was interested in describing the then-current state of military education rather than a period-by-period analysis. Thus, his description of officer education was from the point of view of the 1914 status quo. He did include useful data about the surviving antebellum schools, and in-depth information about West Point’s history.32

James L. Morrison’s article “Educating the Civil War Generals: West Point, 1833-1861” provides a wealth of information about the characteristics of formal officer education at the U.S. Military Academy. It gives a deep if general sense of the connection between wartime tactical performance and the cadets’ focus in the classroom.33

While there are few works that focus specifically on the U.S.M.A. in the antebellum and Civil War periods, there are many general discussions of the Academy’s full history. Stephen Ambrose’s *Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point*, Thomas Fleming’s *West Point: The Men and Times of the United States Military Academy*, and Sidney Forman’s *West Point: A History of the United States Military Academy* are important historical studies that provide both depth of detail and an interpretive point of view. Albert Church’s *Personal Reminiscences of the Military Academy from 1824 to 1831*, Morris Schaff’s *The Spirit of Old West Point* and George Strong’s *Cadet Life at West Point by an Officer of the United States Army* are examples of the many memoirs that offer anecdotal evidence of the importance of the U.S. Military Academy in shaping the soldiers who passed through its halls.34

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At the start of the Civil War, there were at least 111 military academies in the United States, 96 in the South and 15 in the North. These schools played a key role for both sides in the War, and provided an important source of drillmasters, instructors, and officers for their armies. At the same time, the short span between the founding of most of these schools and the War minimized their impact since their number of graduates was low. Due to their genesis as philosophical outgrowths of West Point, they did help to create a common training paradigm, and also transmitted many of the psychological negatives that were inherent in the U.S.M.A. The Northern academies are sparsely documented and mostly are discussed in historical journal articles. Lee Duemer’s *The History of Antebellum Military Academies in the North: 1803-1865* and Franklin Cooling’s *Delaware Military Academy, 1859-1862* and are among the few relevant works. Jennifer Greene’s *Books and Bayonets: Class and Culture in Antebellum Military Academies* is an insightful academic thesis on the subject.\(^{35}\)

The Free Military School discussed in Chapter Six was an important innovation and is mentioned frequently in literature about the U.S.C.T. It received the deepest analysis to date in Keith Wilson’s article “Thomas Webster and the Free Military School for Applicants for Commands of Colored Troops.” The prospectus for the school by its chief preceptor, John Taggart, is one of the few other specific works describing the school and its curriculum. Limited primary documents exist with the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. My search for information about a purported similar school in Cincinnati was unproductive.\(^{36}\)

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Examination Boards

The examination boards are mentioned peripherally in several works about the Civil War including those by Joseph Glatthaar, Dudley Cornish, and Howard Westwood in *black Troops, White Commanders, and Freedmen during the Civil War*. The personal memoirs and letters of George Hughes, Joseph Scroggs, George Tate, and others provide contemporaneous accounts of applications and examinations. However, there has not been a full-scale, systematic study of the boards to date. There are voluminous primary materials about the boards in the National Archives scattered between NARA Record Groups 94 and 393.37

Tactics

Most works about the Civil War touch on tactics to some measure. Paddy Griffith’s *Rally Once Again: Battle-Tactics of the Civil War* offered an unusual and iconoclastic point of view. It asked the reader to set aside the commonly-held vision of Civil War tactics and look at them from the standpoint of soldiers in the field at the time. Much of the conventional tactical vision of the War was challenged—Hollywood’s dream of thousands of troops advancing in perfectly aligned order, eschewing natural cover and terrain advantages. Griffith suggested tactical scenarios that, particularly in the later stages of the War, were more similar to modern fire-and-maneuver concepts than to Napoleonic linearity and mass. His work was particularly helpful as an aide to understanding the role of field fortifications in tactical situations and the relationship of squad maneuver to the overall tactics of the period—a useful area of study for those who wish to understand the U.S.C.T. since many black soldiers spent their military careers building fortifications. Moseley’s *Evolution of the American Civil War Infantry Tactics* is equally informative and, if anything, more encyclopedic than Griffith’s work. Demonstrating the unending attention paid to the Civil War, a new work by Brent

Nosworthy, *The Bloody Crucible of Courage*, disputes many of Griffith’s tactical conclusions.\(^38\)

John Keegan’s *The Mask of Command* is a small part of the body of work that makes Keegan arguably the foremost military historian focusing on the psychology and motivation of troops and their commanders. This book provides a detailed description of the importance of training and drill to Civil War units. “Drill, Training, and the Combat Performance of the Civil War Soldier: Dispelling the Myth of the Poor Soldier, Great Fighter” by Mark Weitz described the sine qua non of the era’s training—drill and more drill—as the most important factor in battlefield performance. Bell Wiley’s *The Life of Billy Yank* was the most-often-cited description of everyday life among the common Union soldiers. It provides excellent context for understanding the daily workings of camp life and the battlefield.\(^39\)

An important genre of primary source material for understanding Civil War tactics are the many drill manuals that were used to create a common practice of drill and organization within the Union regiments. These include works by Silas Casey, Samuel Cooper, William Gilham, William Hardee, William Morris, John Reynolds, Winfield Scott, and the U.S. War Department. Casey’s *Simplified Infantry Tactics* is particularly relevant to this study since it was specifically created as a less-complex manual for the U.S.C.T.\(^40\)

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Slavery and Abolitionism

To understand the U.S.C.T., it was first necessary to have some understanding of slavery, and there are a vast number of general works about black enslavement and its impact in shaping the men who eventually served in the U.S.C.T. A few were particularly influential and have become the standard works that the others are measured against. Eugene Genovese’s *The Political Economy of Slavery* and *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* are the classic works on slavery from an economic and sociologic point of view. He ranged across a wider landscape than most authors and, along with the usual discussion of the practice of slavery in the South, covered topics such as the derivation of the distinct language of slaves, their religious identification with the ancient Hebrews, and the white social system that was affected by slavery. His interconnection of unexpected pieces of information to illuminate the oddities and inanities of the slave system is one of the joys of his work. John Hope Franklin’s *From Slavery to Freedom* is a more traditional treatment of slavery, but with the advantage of being written by a black scholar who brought a constant sense of his personal experience to the writing.41

Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman’s *Time on the Cross*, Ira Berlin’s *Slaves without Masters*, and Vincent Harding’s *There Is a River* provide a broader and somewhat more modern picture of the overall issues and problems of slavery, and of the challenges faced by free blacks before and during the War. Finally, Herbert Aptheker’s *Militant Abolitionism* offered insight into the abolitionist communities that agitated with the Lincoln Administration for the use of black soldiers and supplied many of the officers for the U.S.C.T.42


Blacks of the U.S.C.T.

As with the exploration of slavery, there are numerous works about black soldiers. This section only mentions the most influential, as measured by their scope and frequent appearance in the bibliographies of later works. The works fall into two categories: those that are more or less contemporaneous with the War, and modern writings. In the contemporary works, the War Department’s collection *The Negro in the Military Service of the United States (NIMS)* and Thomas Higginson’s *Army Life in a black Regiment* are two of most important sources for much of what was later written about Civil War black troops. *NIMS* is a collection of thousands of primary documents that cover every aspect of black participation in the War: recruiting, education, combat, labor, the pay controversy, and more. It provides an official view of black participation. On a more personal level, Higginson was a brilliant diarist, a prolific writer, and a committed abolitionist who volunteered first as an officer in the 51st Massachusetts and then as colonel of the First South Carolina Volunteers (later the 33rd U.S. Colored Troops) which was formed from escaped slaves in the Sea Islands in January 1863. He resigned from the army in 1864 for health reasons, but continued his crusade in writing for the acceptance of blacks in American society throughout his life.43

Joseph Glatthaar is the most prominent modern author on the topic of black soldiers during the Civil War and the U.S.C.T. His body of books and articles span the recruitment of black troops, the politics surrounding their use, drill and tactics, and unit performance. He is currently on the faculty at the University of Houston and is well-known in military history circles—to the point of being the canonical and most-cited authority on the U.S.C.T. and the officers who commanded them.44

John W. Blassingame was one of the few authors who combined interest in the U.S.C.T. and with an occasional focus on education. He wrote extensively for the *Journal of Negro Education* and was a prominent faculty member at Howard and Yale Universities until his death in 2000. Perhaps more than any other author of the 1970’s, Blassingame presented a view of African-Americans of the Civil War era in a way that

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44 Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle.* In contacting a broad range of Civil War historians and archival specialists, literally the first question that everyone asked when I explained my area of interest was, “Have you read Glatthaar’s Forged in Battle?”
turned from the racist stereotypes of the past and recognized their humanity and complexity.

Dudley T. Cornish was a respected historian with a deep interest in African-Americans and the Civil War era. He produced *The Sable Arm*, one of the first comprehensive works on the U.S.C.T., the formation of its regiments, and their military employment. Cornish was Professor Emeritus of American History at Pittsburg State University and, to the best of my knowledge, was the first person to perform any analysis of the Bureau for Colored Troops’ examination boards.\(^\text{45}\)

James Redkey’s *A Grand Army of Black Men: Letters from African-American Soldiers in the Union Army, 1861-1865* is one of the few works spotlighting the writings of black enlisted soldiers. Most of the letters appearing were sent to black newspapers throughout the War, and provide a different point of view than that usually presented in the white press.\(^\text{46}\)

Noah Trudeau’s *Like Men of War: Black Troops in the Civil War 1862-1865* is the final detailed work in the key U.S.C.T. quadruplet. Trudeau’s focus was more on military operations with occasional vignettes dealing with the political and sociological topics than the areas that were important to Glatthaar and Cornish.\(^\text{47}\)

The *Journal of Negro Education* is an excellent source for general descriptions of key topics related to the U.S.C.T. and their employment, and is one of the publications where John W. Blassingame frequently appeared. His article, “The Union Army as an Educational Institution for Negroes, 1862-1865,” was typical of the quality of his writing in this and other journals, and provides a succinct and focused discussion of the impact of army service on former slaves and free blacks. It is particularly helpful as a source of references for letters from black soldiers and the white officers who led them.\(^\text{48}\)

Thomas Moebs’ reference work *black Soldiers – black Sailors – black Ink* is a 1,600-page collection of helpful details about the U.S.C.T. Perhaps its most useful feature is a topically organized bibliography for what appears to be every reference to black members, policies, operations, and writings of the U.S.C.T. collated from many sources.

\(^{45}\) Cornish, *The Sable Arm*.
\(^{46}\) Redkey, ed., *A Grand Army of Black Men*.
\(^{47}\) Trudeau, *Like Men of War*.
sources, but mostly dependent on the NARA holdings and Dyer’s *Compendium*. Unfortunately for my study, the focus is primarily on the black soldiers, so the white officers are only sporadically represented. Nonetheless, Moebs’ work is important, and any scholar studying the U.S.C.T. needs to be familiar with it.⁴⁹

**Innovative Educational Approaches Encountered by the 41st and 100th U.S.C.I.**

There are two key sources about the day-to-day training of prospective officers. NARA archives, specifically Record Groups 94 and 393, provide an administrative and bureaucratic picture of the process of officer selection and commissioning, although with little sense of the personal experience of participants. Surviving personal memoirs and diaries offer insight into the thoughts and emotions of the regiments’ officers. Gathering personal memoirs is a complex task since they are not kept or catalogued in any one location, although Dornbusch’s and Controvich’s works are helpful along with the “name search” feature in the online Library of Congress catalogue and National Union Catalogues of Manuscript Collections (NUCMC). The Historical Society of Pennsylvania is an important source as the repository for the records of the Free Military School, while the historical societies of other states and localities (e.g., Missouri, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Cincinnati) provided guidance about and direction to personal memoirs.

Along with approaching the study from the regimental records, the pursuit of key individuals’ writings and records offer insights into the central questions. People such as Lorenzo Thomas (1804-1875), Charles W. Foster, Reuben Mussey (1833-1892), George Stearns (1809-1867), and Thomas Webster played important roles in the creation and support of the U.S.C.T.

The unit commanders are particularly intriguing. As a seminal character in the Bureau for Colored Troops and colonel of the 100th U.S.C.I., Reuben Mussey was a well-known figure among abolitionists and officers serving with the U.S.C.T. The *Papers of Andrew Johnson* contains several illuminating pieces of correspondence between Johnson and Mussey during his service in Tennessee and his post-war appointment as Johnson’s confidential secretary. Col. Llewellyn Haskell, on the other hand, was more typical of

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U.S.C.T. commanders in that his sole position was as commander of his regiment in that he does not appear to have left personal records. Appendix B contains a list of the known officers from Haskell’s 41st U.S.C.I. and Mussey’s 100th U.S.C.I. used as sources for searches of personal memoirs from likely participants in educational activities.50

A Surfeit of General Riches, Starvation for Specifics

While there are thousands if not hundreds of thousands of additional books and articles on Civil War topics, educational activities for U.S.C.T. officers are poorly represented. By focusing on the officers of the 41st and 100th U.S.C.I., I hoped to provide a clear picture of the range of educational practices available. My literature review demonstrated that the best and often only sources for information about officer education were the National Archives, letter collections in state historical society or university archives, and personal narratives of soldiers who participated in these activities.

The two exceptions to the problem of lack of direct primary sources for the regiments are the letters and archives of Reuben Mussey and the diaries of George Tate. Mussey’s service is discussed in Appendix C. More typical of the enlisted men and non-commissioned officers who joined the U.S.C.T., Tate was a Sergeant Major in the 120th New York and became an officer soon after the War ended. His service with the 41st U.S.C.I. was after the regiment had been sent to the Texas-Mexico border in 1865-66, but his journal provides some insights into the type of man who was attracted to service with the black troops. Unfortunately, a 12 day gap in Tate’s 1865 diary corresponds with the time he spent with the Washington review board so no contemporaneous descriptions by officers of the 41st or 100th have been found for their board appearances.51

HISTORICAL METHOD

"Whatever else it is, history ought to be a good yarn" - Bruce Catton

The following chapters will present the evolution and practice of U.S.C.T. officer education in the context of its time, place, and target units using the historical method of research. Historical method is “the process of critically examining and analyzing the

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50 Appendix C contains a short biography of Mussey. For Haskell, see Appendix D. A search of Eastern and the California historical societies, major university libraries, and national collections did not reveal any of Haskell’s papers. A search of genealogical and census records showed that a possible descendent died in 1991, but no further information about his family is available.

51 George Tate, Diary, Huntington Library (San Marino, CA: 1863-1865). The gap in the Tate diaries is unusual. He recorded his impressions of nearly every other day during 1864 and 1865, up to the point where he boarded a steamer in New Orleans to return to his home in Fredonia, NY.
records and survivals of the past.\textsuperscript{52} It focuses on a particular situation in space and time, establishes relationships between events and people, develops patterns, and ultimately allows the examination of officer education from the perspective of the Civil War era and its pressures. The basics of historical method revolve around finding *documents* (broadly defined as any written, oral, electronic, or photographic source that records an event in some way), establishing if they are authentic, assessing their credibility, and pulling together details from the documents into a connected narrative that increases the understanding of the reader. In this study I have attempted to create a background of understanding of the Civil War time period and the subjects under consideration, looked for primary sources from many venues, and discussed how the events and people of 1862 to 1865 interacted to illuminate the study topic.

Meaningful and insightful history is rarely the simple review or analysis of disjoint people, places, things, or events. History is dynamic—a study of dates and points in time does not provide meaning, understanding, or insight; rather, history must look broadly at the importance of the key individual, the large social trends in the background, and the environment of the historical characters’ present. The distant origins of written history highlight contrasting philosophies of history that are still germane today, and are relevant to the historical approach to be used in this study. Herodotus, the “father of history,” acted in large measure as a secretary for the events of his day, recording what he observed and heard without applying critical analysis. Thucydides, conversely, described historical events through lenses and filters that promoted his political and social views. Plutarch continued in Thucydides tradition, but made the actions and thoughts of individuals the centerpiece of his works. Leaping ahead, Pepys used the minutiae of life to illustrate larger themes and events. I have attempted to synthesize components of all of these approaches into this study. Certainly, historians must be factual and dispassionate, but the words and ideas of the past need to be re-envisioned in light of both later scholarship and changing social consciousness—in this case, about slavery and race. For me, much like Pepys, it is the interaction of details about process, individuals, and bureaucracy that allow a clearer picture of the past to emerge. Nor do they take place in a vacuum, but rather in a richly complicated environment that both had meaning at the

\footnote{Gottschalk, *Understanding History: A Primer of Historical Method*, 47-48.}
time, has implications for our present, and can affect our future. According to Jacques Barzun, “To see these connections is also see that the fruits of western culture—human rights, social benefits, machinery—have not sprouted out of the ground like weeds; they are the work of innumerable hands and heads.”

Due to my reliance on primary sources that have had their provenance established by the National Archives, authenticity-of-source was not an issue. However, as with any primary source, existence and provenance are only parts of verifying accuracy. The Civil War and particularly activities involving the U.S.C.T. were highly politicized. Just because a primary document exists and posits a point of view does not guarantee the factual accuracy of the source.

Shafer’s *A Guide to Historical Method* lays out a process of developing categories of evidence, collecting information that fits into those categories, analyzing the evidence, and critiquing the result to ensure validity. The structure of the study reflects these categories and mirrors their emphasis on the processing, analysis, and critique of the evidence found. Thus, the use of historical method in this study began with broad reading about Civil War strategy, tactics, Army organization, officer selection practices, slavery, and the U.S. Colored Troops. A search for metadata followed among bibliographies, reference works, and libraries. Then I shifted to the sifting of mountains of primary documents from the War Department and personal writings. Finally, my research finished with the assembly of a meaningful description of the study topic based on the words of those who lived through the Civil War.

Writing history properly is too difficult to be anything other than an act of love. The burdens on the historian to be knowledgeable enough about the subject to have an informed opinion, to conduct research in a conscientious fashion, and to delve beneath

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54 Robert Jones Shafer, ed., *A Guide to Historical Method*, 3 ed. (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1980). Metadata, traditionally *data about data*, take the form of historical pointers—pieces of data about information about soldiers and units that potentially could be useful to the study. Metadata are not data in a historical sense, but rather indicators of the existence of meaningful data or indexes to data.
the surface to establish credibility are significant—and not to be undertaken by a person who does not accept the responsibilities that history demands.

**Sources of Data**

Because the scope of the study falls into two general categories—context and targeted research—there were two basic groups of data. Context was provided mostly from the vast body of secondary works that surround the Civil War, with only a few forays into primary sources. The targeted research on specific preparatory, educational, and examination activities was the opposite. Nearly all of the original information in the study came from primary documents at the National Archives and personal or unit journals.

Primary sources of data fall into eight broad areas:

- Applications for commissions with the U.S.C.T.
- Acceptance of applications by the Military Department or the Bureau for Colored Troops
- Records of the proceedings of examination boards
- Lists of and data about officers assigned to the regiments studied (41st U.S.C.I. and 100th USCI)
- Memoirs, histories, and letters of officers from the U.S.C.I. regiments
- Regimental Order books for the 41st and 100th
- Records of the Free Military School for Applicants for Commands of Colored Troops
- Records of other training institutions when available

For this study, I have looked at the records of each officer in the 41st and 100th U.S.C.I. to see if they participated in any officer education activities prior to commissioning; determined if they appeared before an examination board and, if so, how they fared; reviewed the order books for each regiment to uncover post-commissioning educational activities; and reviewed personal memoirs and narratives from these officers for evidence of pre- or post-commissioning education.\(^{55}\)

\(^{55}\) Analysis of data sources for each officer in the two regiments shows no personal memoirs at the Library of Congress, 14 peripheral references that in the Library of Congress, and only two references to any of the officers in the *Official Records*. Mussey’s personal papers are in the Dartmouth Library but almost
Collection and Analysis of Data

In a sense, data collection for this study began when I stood in front of a statue dedicated to an Illinois infantry regiment near the public library in Libertyville, Illinois in 1956 and wondered about the men it memorialized. Moving to Virginia in 1959 cemented my long term interest in the Civil War. From childhood to adulthood, reading about the War, visiting battlefields, and understanding the contextual meaning of the conflict have been a lifetime’s avocation and passion.

Formal data collection was the key challenge of this study. The volume of secondary works that could potentially have contained relevant information about the study topic was immense. These sources were dwarfed by the data available in the *Official Records*, other reference works, and the National Archives.

In spite of these difficulties, a comprehensive search of primary materials focused on the U.S.C.T., Bureau for Colored Troops, and Adjutant General activities within the Union Army collected in the *Official Records* and archived in NARA Record Groups 94 and 393. These included correspondence sent and received by commanders and commissioners, official reports, letters from prospective officer candidates, proceedings of examination boards, rosters of officers assigned to the U.S.C.T., and contemporary action and administrative reports.

To provide insight from today’s perspective, work with the primary sources was complemented by extensive reading of books and journal articles. The selection of works was shaped by an attempt to choose writings from throughout the intervening span of years between the War and the present, and included personal memoirs written in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. These sources were selected based on topic, proximity to the time period under study, and relationship to educational activities. Thus, the focus was mostly on primary works describing Union units between 1862 and 1865.

The analysis of these data required building an understanding of connections and patterns among the disjoint sources. For example, to develop a picture of the workings of the examination boards entailed looking at application letters, endorsements from unit commanders, acceptances from the Bureau for Colored Troops, scores from the boards exclusively deal with his post-War activities. The diary of George Tate of the 41st is in the Huntington Library.
themselves, recommendations for commissions by the boards, commissions granted by
President Lincoln through the Bureau for Colored Troops, and actual assignments to
In the hot mugginess of a July day in the Mississippi Valley, Capt. Amos Williams of Company E read the handwritten order penned by Lt. Col. Henry Stone’s adjutant. The 100th U.S.C.I.’s commander expected discipline and precision from his officers and men, and the initial days of the regiment’s training were drawing to a close. Stone’s General Orders No. 5 laid out a new daily schedule that reflected the transition of his men from recruits to soldiers. It called for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reveille</td>
<td>4:30 A.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>To 5 A.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drill without arms</td>
<td>5 to 5:50 A.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recall from Drill</td>
<td>5:50 A.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Breakfast</td>
<td>6 A.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surgeon’s Call</td>
<td>6:30 A.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guard Mounting</td>
<td>7 A.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fatigue Call</td>
<td>7:30 A.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drill Company with arms</td>
<td>8 to 10 A.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recall from Drill</td>
<td>10 A.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Sergeants’ Call</td>
<td>11:50 A.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dinner</td>
<td>12 Noon</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO Drill</td>
<td>1 to 2 P.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officers Recitation</td>
<td>2 to 3 P.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drill Battalion</td>
<td>3 to 5 P.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recall from Drill</td>
<td>5 P.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supper</td>
<td>6 P.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dress Parade</td>
<td>15 minutes before sunset</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tattoo</td>
<td>8 P.M.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taps</td>
<td>8:30 P.M.</td>
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</table>

Their day consisted of nearly three hours of company drill in the morning, transforming former slaves into a coordinated and efficient fighting machine and toughening the men for the trials ahead. An hour was spent working with the non-commissioned officers. Two more hours of drill with the entire regiment followed later in the afternoon. And perhaps most feared of all, the day finished with a session of the regiment’s officers with their commanders to pay tribute to the old West Point tradition of “recitation”—a detailed and stressful discussion of the tactics and techniques.
of drill and military administration. Recruits experienced seven hours of training, six days per week.\textsuperscript{56}

The 100\textsuperscript{th} had gathered recruits from former Kentucky slaves in May and June 1864 and was at the beginning of its preparation for war. Most of its officers had recently risen from the ranks of white regiments or were civilians directly commissioned into the U.S.C.I. While its home state of Kentucky had been pacified except for nagging guerilla actions, the end of the War was not in sight. Hard work and hard fighting were expected, particularly since the main Union armies were stalled on the road to Atlanta and in eastern Virginia. For the 100\textsuperscript{th} and its officers, the primary task was to learn the grim business of soldiering and to develop skills in drill that would survive the confusion and terror of the battlefield.\textsuperscript{57}

A few months later at Camp William Penn outside of Philadelphia, the 41\textsuperscript{st} U.S.C.I. was molding men from at least nine different states, the District of Columbia, and the West Indies into a fighting unit. Camp Penn was a different place altogether from the impromptu gathering and muster points in Kentucky. As the largest training facility for black troops in the country, nearly 11,000 men learned the School of the Soldier there; the 41\textsuperscript{st} was only one of 11 U.S.C.T. regiments who marched on Camp Penn’s fields in Cheltenham Township, a hotbed of Quaker abolitionism and convenient railway stop for supply trains. But while the facilities were different from Kentucky’s primitive camps, the course of studies was not. New black soldiers still had to learn the basics of tactics and camp life, and their officers had to absorb the School of the Company. In one important respect, the soldiers who trained at Camp Penn had an advantage over their brethren in other camps. Officer candidates from the Free Military School for Applicants for Commands of Colored Troops of Philadelphia used the recruits

\textsuperscript{56} General Orders No. 5, July 10, 1864, AGO, Regimental Books, 100th U.S. Colored Infantry, RG 94-E.112-115; Sheldon B. Thorpe, \textit{The History of the Fifteenth Connecticut Volunteers in the War for the Defense of the Union} (New Haven: Price, Lee & Adkins Co., 1893), 26. Officers’ drill was not limited to U.S.C.T. regiments, but was a common practice in new white regiments too. The 15\textsuperscript{th} Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, for example, had daily officers’ drill from 8:30 to 9:30 AM and additional meetings at 7:30 p.m.

\textsuperscript{57} AGO, Applications for Commissions in Colored Units, RG 94-E.369; Dyer, \textit{Compendium}, 1737-38. Fifty officers of the 100\textsuperscript{th} U.S.C.I. appear in the records of the Adjutant General, the Bureau for Colored Troops and/or the compiled National Park Service Soldiers & Sailors System. Of these, there is sufficient Adjutant General’s evidence to identify the pre-100\textsuperscript{th} careers of 13 officers. The distribution of pre-U.S.C.I. ranks among these men was: civilian-3, private-6, corporal-1, and sergeant-3.
at Camp Penn to practice drill and leadership. Many of the Free Military School’s students gained realistic experience there, and some had an extensive practical education in conducting drill while waiting for a call from the Washington examination board.\(^{58}\)

The military training experiences of the officers from these two regiments appear to be representative of those of nearly 7,700 U.S.C.T. officers commissioned during the War. In essence, that experience fell into three categories. First, prospective officers often benefited from formal or informal education in literacy and basic skills up to and including university courses. Second, the antebellum environment of military education provided direct or secondhand knowledge about military life, tactics, and bureaucracy. Finally and most important, officers learned from their practical experience with drill.

It is hard for the modern reader to comprehend the centrality of drill in Civil War officer preparation. From the vantage point of the 21st century, the War appears to be a frenetic and dynamic cataclysm. Armies lunge across the landscape in desperate and continuous battle. In the East, Bull Run is followed by the Seven Days, Second Manassas, Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg in bloody succession. Westerners have little respite as Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chickamauga, Atlanta, and the March to the Sea all seem to merge. This picture of constant battle is far from reality. Both officers and enlisted men of all regiments, white and black, spent most of their time in camp and with much of that time assigned to drill.\(^{59}\)

To understand officer education just prior to and during the Civil War and to place the 41st and 100th’s training regimens in context, it is helpful to look at the roots of military education in the United States, particularly in the sixty year antebellum period that preceded the War. The body of skills needed by a line officer, military drill, the basics of professional military education at West Point and other military academies, and

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\(^{59}\) Tate, Diary. Between 1863 and 1865, Pvt. (later Sgt. and 2nd Lt.) Tate recorded fewer than 20 days of battle while serving with the 72nd N.Y., the 120th N.Y., and the 41st U.S.C.I.
the practices used to select officers for volunteer regiments combined into a mostly unplanned *system* of education and training that was surprisingly consistent throughout the Union armies. Most if not all of the preparation of U.S.C.T. officers occurred within the context of this system.

**SKILLS NEEDED BY CIVIL WAR INFANTRY OFFICERS**

Civil War officers in volunteer regiments were most often amateurs who began their military careers almost completely ignorant of drill, logistics, tactics, and strategy. Ironically, that lack of knowledge was not limited to the non-professional leaders of the army; it was also shared by Regular officers. Remediating this situation called for discipline and interminable drill, but tactical education had to begin at the top. Before the troops could learn their drill, their officers first had to do so.\(^60\)

Training was anchored by a series of “schools”—official and unofficial instruction manuals published by several different officers over the preceding 20 years. Drill manuals by Scott, Hardee, Morris, Cooper, Gilham, Reynolds, Casey, and the War Department were readily available and frequently consulted by many Regular and amateur officers. Each laid out the School of the Soldier, School of the Company, School of the Battalion, evolutions of the Brigade and Division, and School of the Corps d’Armée. Every individual was expected to know the School of the Soldier: how to stand at attention, march, and load, fire, and maintain a musket. Captains and lieutenants studied the School of the Company which instructed them on how to maneuver their unit of 100 men. Colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors learned the School of the Battalion which applied to their regiment of 1,000 men. Finally, colonels and general officers had to know how to maneuver brigades, divisions, and corps. An officer who was either interested in promotion to a higher rank or forced into more senior command responsibilities by casualties had to be familiar with the Schools for ranks above his own.\(^61\)

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\(^{60}\) See Formal Military Education below.

\(^{61}\) Michael J. Varhola, *Everyday Life in the Civil War* (Cincinnati: Writer's Digest Books, 1999), 129-131. The nominal size of each Civil War company as set by the War Department was 83 to 101 men of all ranks, with 64 to 82 privates. In reality, companies almost always had far fewer men since most regiments had no formal provision for replacements during the first half of the War and rarely in 1864-1865. It was not uncommon to see a company of 20 to 30 men or fewer, particularly after a major battle. In a new regiment such as the 41st or 100th U.S.C.I., companies were closer to the nominal target—at least until disease or
Coupled with a detailed knowledge of the relevant School, it was important for an officer to develop an ability to educate and discipline his troops, and particularly so with the U.S.C.T. given the soldiers’ antecedents and recent escape from slavery. He needed rudimentary tactical skills that included the creation of impromptu fortifications, map reading, and an appreciation for the effects of artillery and cavalry. Much of an officer’s duties were administrative and included endless reports, requisitions, passes, vouchers, and appreciations. Finally, and perhaps most important of all given the War’s casualty statistics, was an understanding of camp hygiene.62

Training and discipline complemented each other, and officers usually adopted the disciplinary tactics of the Regular troops to keep their soldiers under close control. While measures such as the Buck and Gag, standing guard duty carrying a heavy log, being tied up by the thumbs, or riding the "wooden mule" appear brutal to the modern eye, they may have been justified by the extraordinary pressures that the 19th Century battlefield placed on soldiers. Without discipline, effective combat was impossible. The range of engagement for Civil War troops is nearly inconceivable by modern standards—the distance between the opposing lines on Henry House Hill at Bull Run are about the length of a hockey rink, and across the killing ground at Cold Harbor little more than two football fields. From the Union picket lines at the Petersburg Crater to the explosion site is an undemanding stroll of a minute or two. In these congested spaces filled with tens of thousands of men, with the constant noise and smoke of gunfire and horrible casualties all around, it was critical to maintain control of the troops. Furthermore, to fight effectively, the soldiers had to have confidence in each other, their commanders, and their combat occurred. Colonels often commanded brigades, in place of the traditional rank of Brigadier General for that level of responsibility. Brigades were expected to contain three to four regiments and 3,138 to 4,184 men. Because the size of regiments was highly variable, a brigade with strength of around 2,000 might contain as many as a dozen regiments. Civil War divisions usually had a complement of 5,000 to 6,000 in three to four brigades—once again, the brigades were severely understaffed relative to War Department standards.

62 AGO, Regimental Books, 41st U.S.C.I; AGO, Regimental Books, 100th U.S.C.I; Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 203-18; Dyer, Compendium; Fox, Regimental Losses. The records of the 41st and 100th do not indicate the previous bondage status of their recruits. However, the 80 percent of the 41st and 95 percent of the 100th who were listed on the rolls as “laborers” and “farmers” were likely recently escaped slaves—particularly in the 100th which was formed in Kentucky. A statistical review of Dyer’ Compendium and Fox’s Regimental Casualties very incomplete mortality statistics for the U.S.C.I. agree on proportional deaths in combat of about 19 percent and by disease of 81 percent.
skills. Only constant and unremitting discipline and training in company and battalion drill allowed troops to function under these stresses.\textsuperscript{63}

Knowledge was only part of the skills demanded of officers. The Civil War era assumed an extraordinary degree of courage as the prerequisite of an effective officer. Officers were expected to lead physically, and the high casualty statistics from generals to lieutenants bear witness to the willingness of officers to place themselves in front of their men. An officer without courage was thoroughly detested, and would find that his company or regiment was a cold and unfriendly home—if not a dangerous one.\textsuperscript{64}

Individual idiosyncrasies and relationships were also an important factor in building the bonds among officers that would help them on the battlefield. As with any group of men gathered somewhat randomly and thrust into the close quarters of a regiment, assigning an officer to a unit did not necessarily result in King Henry’s \textit{we happy few, we band of brothers}.\textsuperscript{65} John Habberton, Lieutenant of the 20\textsuperscript{th} U.S.C.I., described his fellow officers with a jaundiced eye:

Capt. Rouse knows considerable, but having known more than any one in the small town where he lived he deems to be under the impression that he is an intellectual prodigy. Every man has his faults, though, and his is not one of the worst. Capt. Barnaby is very handsome, rather vain, well-informed, slightly mean at times. Capt Wafe is a chap with no pretensions but promised of a good deal of common sense. Capt. Putnam is a little, noisy blowing, blustsorial chap, good natured, well-read, knows everything by theory, but nothing by practice – thinks that worshipping God means look out for No. 1. Capt. Hull is one of the most honest men alive, does his own business right up to the handle, enjoys a joke or a game of chess, and lives about as decent, honorable, and honest life as any man I am acquainted with. Capt. Curry is an ignorant, conceited chap, knowing nothing but tactics, regulations, etc. but knowing them well...Lt. Phelps is a graduate of Yale. He is fearfully and [undecipherable] fully lazy, and a

\textsuperscript{63} Glatthaar, \textit{Forged in Battle}, 99. For the “Buck & Gag,” the soldier’s hands were tied together behind his back and fastened at the waist. A stick was tied between the arms and the torso, pulling the shoulders back painfully. Finally, the soldier was gagged tightly. The “Wooden Mule” forced the miscreant to sit astride a sawhorse with his feet off the ground.

\textsuperscript{64} Fox, \textit{Regimental Losses}, 38, 48. Civil War officers pursued a dangerous profession. The ratio of officers to men in a typical regiment was 1:28. The ratio of casualties among officers to casualties among men was 1:16.3—an officer was nearly twice as likely to be killed or mortally wounded as an enlisted man or non-commissioned officer. Large battles produced horrific casualties among the officers; 27 percent of officers engaged at Gettysburg were killed or wounded, and 21.3 percent at Shiloh. Comparative statistics for the entire War for white volunteer units is 5 percent deaths in battle versus 1.6 percent for the U.S.C.T. Total deaths for white units were 15 percent versus 20.5 percent for black units.

fellow experiences a touch of ennui simply on looking at him. Lt. Eaton, the new first lieutenant, is a disgrace to the regiment, the Service, the country, and the world generally. As everybody hates him, Col. Bartram has taken him up – probably because their conditions are about alike. I’ve yet to find a virtue he possesses and to think of a vice that he doesn’t.66

Newly promoted 2nd Lt. George Tate had a similar, less than flattering assessment of his company commander in the 41st: “Lt. Kepner don’t seem to like my way of doing business. I see something is wrong and ask him what the trouble is, and he relates his grievances – wants it distinctly understood that he commands the company – has position, rank and command on his brain. Confess my fault and promise to be more careful in future. I will be more lazy and keep in the background that I may not obscure the light of his glory.”67

Albert Rogall, a captain of the 27th U.S.C.I. and later lieutenant colonel of the 118th U.S.C.I., was more succinct in his diary entry for February 19, 1865: “General, colonels and all officers playing the devil, quarreling, preferring charges against each other. I am going to resign.” From this and more idealistic raw material, the Union Army built its officer corps and the men who taught its common soldiers how to fight.68

THE PRIMACY OF INFANTRY DRILL

Much if not most of the Civil War infantryman’s time was spent in a specialized form of training: drill. Oliver Norton, 83rd Pennsylvania Infantry, summarized his wartime experience as “The first thing in the morning is drill. Then drill, then drill again. Then drill, drill, a little more drill. Then drill, and lastly drill.”69

The company and regimental officers who were primarily responsible for drill and training labored under the weight of histories—the history of the Napoleonic Wars, the history of the pre-Civil War regular army, and the educational history of the cadets who attended more than one hundred military schools throughout the United States. These

67 Tate, July 6, 1865, Diary.
common sources were both an advantage and a burden. With the widespread understanding of and agreement upon what drill meant, there was little room for misunderstandings and poor coordination. At the same time, drill had been codified to the point that tactical innovation was nearly impossible. With rare exceptions such as Emory Upton in the battle of Spotsylvania, officers operated by the book and did not challenge the established tactical paradigm.70

Early wartime tactics required troops to move about the battlefield in compact, orderly, linear formations as if on a parade ground. The legacy of the Napoleonic wars told commanders that it was only through these formations that officers could maintain control of their troops and maximize the firepower of the unit. Before soldiers could operate in this highly disciplined environment, they needed to learn the basics and then the advanced techniques of infantry drill. This would have been an easier process if more of new officers had a prior knowledge of drill—not to mention a sense of strategy, creativity, or aggression.71

Drill usually did not arise from an innate desire for regimentation or from officers’ love of pageantry. It was a logical response a real danger that came from the introduction of gunpowder to the battlefield, and became increasingly important as the proportion of soldiers equipped with muskets increased. To achieve decisive firepower with weapons that were inaccurate and slow to load, soldiers needed to stand in two or three ranks and coordinate their firing so that all ranks were not reloading at the same time. Their actions, of course, were taking place in the face of the enemy’s troops and often under hostile fire. If every detail of their actions were not coordinated, they were as likely to cause casualties to themselves as to their foes. Drill was to some extent the institutionalization of safety measures and the recognition of the technical limitations of the time’s firearms. However, it was rarely welcomed. Lt. Tate of the 41st expressed the veterans’ distain for drill: “Drills and parades – they have lost their novelty and glory to me. They seem like sports for children more than duties for men.”72

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70 Combining the columnar mass tactics of the early armies of the French Revolution with contemporary tactics and the element of surprise, Upton broke the Confederate line at Spotsylvania in the 1864 Overland campaign.
71 Griffith, Rally Once Again; Nosworthy, The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War.
72 Keegan, The Mask of Command; Tate, February 3, 1865, Diary.
Appreciation of drill began at the highest levels of the Army, and sometimes that appreciation was too strong. George B. McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac and the man who rebuilt the Army of the Potomac after the debacle at Bull Run in 1861, was an inspired drillmaster—matched only by his unwillingness to commit his wonderfully trained troops to decisive battle. The pressure to balance training with action in the field was intense, and leaders who could not bring their well-trained troops to the field were targets of ridicule:

…What are you waiting for, George, I pray? --
To scour your cross-belts with fresh pipe-clay?
To burnish your buttons, to brighten your guns;
Or wait you for May-day and warm Spring suns?
Are you blowing your fingers because they are cold,
Or catching your breath ere you take a hold?
Is the mud knee-deep in valley and gorge?
What are you waiting for, tardy George?\(^73\)

In answer to criticisms of his failure to strike the rebels in 1862, McClellan noted the importance of drill with a self-serving description of his record. His goal in training was “to bring about such a condition of discipline and instruction that the army could be handled on the march and on the field of battle, and that orders could be reasonably well carried out.” Always combative (except on the battlefield) and often paranoid, McClellan defended himself, saying "No one cognizant of the circumstances and possessed of any knowledge of military affairs can honestly believe that I bestowed unnecessary time and labor upon the organization and instruction of that army whose courage, discipline, and efficiency finally brought the war to a close … the time spent in the camps of instruction in front of Washington was well bestowed … Not a day of it was wasted."\(^74\)

A far more effective soldier, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, pointed to the same keys to efficient battlefield performance: education, discipline, and drill. The lessons he learned

\(^73\) George Henry Boker, “Tardy George,” http://home.earthlink.net/~poetry61-65/union/officers/mcclellan/george-exp.html, (accessed 4/29/2005). McClellan’s sluggishness to engage the enemy frustrated not just Lincoln but many others in the North. Appendix E contains a slanderous but accurate poem about the “Young Napoleon” that captures this dissatisfaction. George Henry Boker articulated the anger that some in the Union felt about ineffectual West Point graduates early in the War. It is included as a curiosity of the times, and expresses the essence of the methodical and perfection-seeking approach that West Point inculcated into most of its graduates.

\(^74\) George B. McClellan, *McClellan's Own Story: The War for the Union* (New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1887), 98.
as a young lieutenant in the Mexican War were ones that he was able to apply with notable success in the Civil War: “The victories in Mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior numbers…General Taylor had a small army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best of drill and discipline.”

Reaching this state of professionalism with the vastly larger armies of the Civil War was difficult. Whereas the Mexican War saw American forces of thousands, the Union armies comprised hundreds of thousands at any day between 1862 and 1865. It was beyond the ability of the small professional officer corps and the men introduced to drill in military academies to immediately prepare mobs of volunteers for battle, or to absorb them into a professional corps of soldiers. Regiments marched to war with little drill or training, and sometimes with weapons that they had not yet fired. The implications of leading the untrained into battle were predictable, as Grant discovered during the first day at Shiloh in 1862 when the inexperience of three-fifths of his troops nearly led to disaster: “Many of them had arrived but a day or two before and were hardly able to load their muskets according to the manual. The officers were equally ignorant of their duties. Under these circumstances it is not astonishing that many of the regiments broke at the first fire.”

Remedying this situation called for discipline, unrelenting drill, and study. Civil War literature often depicts the amateur officer, yesterday a civilian and today responsible for a company, studying Morris’ or Hardee’s Tactics by candlelight to be ready to drill his men the next day. A common refrain from unit histories of early War regiments was that “none of them knew anything about the evolutions laid down in Hardee’s Tactics, which had been adopted by the War Department. However the difficulty was soon overcome by persistent study and close application. With few exceptions the men made surprising progress in learning the maneuvers.”

Many regiments, including the 100th U.S.C.I., conducted afternoon or nighttime schools for their officers to perfect their drill capabilities. The drill manuals provided guidance; Morris’ Infantry Tactics specifically ordered that every commanding officer

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75 Grant, Memoirs, 84.
76 Ibid., 179.
“will assemble the officers together for theoretical and practical instruction as often as he may judge necessary.” An understanding of the importance of officer education was not limited to the 41st and 100th. General Orders No. 9 from Col. Ulysses Doubleday of the 45th U.S.C.I. demanded called for “at least one lesson weekly in the Manual of Instruction for Target Practice recited at each Regtl School” and attendance by field officers and company commanders every Saturday evening.” Similarly, Lt. George P. Hart of the 2nd U.S.C.I. in General Orders No. 4 instructed that “there will be a recitation of Commissioned Officers this evening at 8 o’clock. Session from the first to the fiftieth page of 1st Vol. Casey’s Tactics. Company Commanders will devote one hour each day to the drill of the non-commissioned officers.”

Only vestiges of the remarkable effort spent in teaching Union soldiers how to function within the strictures of the School of the Soldier remain in the modern Army, but soldiers still are taught to march in step and to maneuver as a unit. Today’s drill field is a reminder of the pastures where millions of troops learned the proper pace, the soldierly demeanor, and the precise motions that allowed them to fight effectively as a unit.

FORMAL OFFICER EDUCATION

The process of creating officers from enlisted men or civilians was deeply rooted in the formal educational structures of the antebellum era, and the problem of officer education was not a new one for the American Army. Henry Knox, Brigadier General of the Continental Army, wrote in 1776 that “We ought to have men of merit in the most extensive and unlimited sense of the word. Instead of which, the bulk of the officers of the army are a parcel of ignorant, stupid men who might make tolerable soldiers but [are] bad officers.” Washington and his Revolutionary companions discovered that the lack of professional officers was harmful if not deadly to the prosecution of war, and that formal military training was an integral part of a strategy that would bring success on the battlefield. Unfortunately, there was little that the infant United States could do to promote the creation of a truly professional and skilled officer corps.

Prior to the Civil War, the options for formal education of prospective officers were limited to the U.S. Military Academy, and to a handful of military schools whose focus was not on preparation for a commission in the Regular Army. The graduates of these institutions, with the arrival of the War, became the pool from which the Union Army was able to draw many of its most able commanders. Although none of the officers of the 41st or 100th attended West Point, and U.S.M.A. graduates were virtually non-existent in the U.S.C.T., the form and content of education at the Academy shaped the training for officers throughout the Union Army. It was the foundation from which all other military education practices of the Civil War arose, and philosophically fed both the expectations of the U.S.C.T. examination boards and the preparations of officer candidates. An appreciation of wartime U.S.C.T. officer formation practices is impossible without an understanding of their antecedents at West Point.80

The United States Military Academy

Perched on a bluff above the Hudson River and enshrined in American military mythology as the source of the Long Gray Line, the United States Military Academy has had a profound effect on both education in the United States and on its military history. Furthermore, when looking at the American Civil War through the lens of drill and education, in spite of the relatively small number of West Point graduates in the years preceding the War, it is impossible to underestimate both the direct and collateral impact that West Point had on both tactics and the preparation of troops for battle in both the Union and Confederate armies. Thus, an extended look at West Point practices sets the stage for understanding the educational activities of black and white units in the War.81

In the early 19th Century, four trends in American higher education coalesced to provide the philosophical justification for a national military academy and the widespread

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80 George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., from Its Establishment in 1802 to 1890 with the Early History of the United States Military Academy*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1891). Among the graduates from 1850-1861, only one served with the U.S.C.T. and that was in a senior command role. John Parker Hawkins (1830-1914) of Indiana graduated from West Point in 1852 and entered the Civil War as a commissary officer in Missouri. Hawkins was promoted to brevet Brigadier General of Volunteers in 1863 and Maj. General in 1865. While commanding the District of Northeastern Louisiana in 1864, he also led the 1st Division of the U.S.C.T. in the siege of Mobile. He remained with the Army after the War and retired in 1894.

81 Barnard, *Military Schools and Courses of Instruction*; Cullum, *Biographical Register*. See Appendix F. Only 1,995 men graduated from West Point from its inception through 1862, and few of the 661 from classes before 1832 served in the War.
enthusiasm for military education of both North and South. The legacy of Renaissance education focused on the creation of \textit{a gentleman and a scholar} who was versed in the classics. The Reformation presented a view of education as a source of moral uplift closely connected to the religious development of the student. The American Enlightenment stressed the importance of education as a source of civic leaders who stood for the ideals of the Republic. Finally, the scientific revolution added the idea that education should prepare the individual to understand the physical world and to dominate it through science and engineering. Most antebellum American universities and colleges based their philosophies of education on some combination of these schools of thought, but West Point attempted to synthesize a wholly new way of thinking about these philosophies.\footnote{Ambrose, \textit{Duty, Honor, Country}, 16.}

Its \textit{raison d’être} was based on the practical combination of liberal arts, useful studies that could improve the country, moral development, and training in citizenship—concepts that grew out of the non-military academy movement that preceded its creation and was solidified in its establishment as one of the first American academies to be created after the War of Independence.\footnote{Kurt A. Sanftleben, "A Different Drum: The Forgotten Tradition of the Military Academy in American Education" (Ph.D. thesis, College of William & Mary, 1993), 24.}

The U.S. Military Academy had a difficult birth. Although it arose from an idea of George Washington’s with all the prestige inherent in his support, it was a pallid and ultimately stillborn precursor to the Academy that came into being in 1794 with the President’s recommendation. Geography played an important role in the genesis of the U.S.M.A. and the selection of its location. Even before the Revolutionary War, the Hudson Narrows at West Point had strategic importance, and were the \textit{quid pro quo} demanded by the British to prove that Benedict Arnold was truly returning to the King’s cause. Both prior to Arnold’s treachery and after the Revolution, West Post was garrisoned by a small unit of artillermen whose mission was to prevent enemy access to Albany and upper New York. The garrison was increased to include cadets who were expected to attend classes and learn from the artillery and engineering officers at the fort. The number of officers was increased to provide additional teachers. Unfortunately, in spite of Congressional appropriations for books and instructional materials, the handful of
cadets detailed to the Point spent most of their time drilling and working on tasks that the officers did not want to do themselves. Books were not purchased and classes never materialized. Since no specific curriculum was ever laid out, it is not surprising that little was done to train the cadets.  

However, this first attempt at the creation of a military school did introduce the idea of cadet to the United States. The term, contrary to its European usage, came to mean junior officers assigned to the Artillery Corps at West Point. Cadets were part of the chain of command, although a lowly part. They could sit as members of court-martial boards and functioned in a command space between the real officers and the senior non-commissioned officers. Their primary purpose was to attend classes taught by older officers and learn military skills. They achieved this goal—if military skills were defined as artillery drill, paper work, and policing the grounds. There was no effort to teach tactics, strategy, logistics, systematic military administration, or leadership.

The War Department, having been given the task of providing education for future officers, did not give up easily. Another abortive attempt to offer instruction at West Point occurred in 1796. Lt. Col. Stephen Rochefontaine tried to carry out his orders from the War Department to teach engineering drawing to the officers of the post. In an age that suffered from an over-sensitivity to personal honor, the prospective students burned down the building where the classes were to have taken place since Rochefontaine’s charter implied that they had something more to learn about their profession.

In 1798, the collateral implications of the Napoleonic Wars moved the United States into conflict with France and triggered the naval Quasi-War that could easily have expanded into a more serious conflict. Alexander Hamilton attempted to develop a comprehensive system of military officer education during this period, but was stymied by Congress whose leaders objected to the creation of an effective officers’ school. First, the finances of the new Republic were particularly shaky and there was no money for an academy. Even more important, a professional and competent officer corps could be a threat to the nation, and the civilian authorities were less worried about the French than

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84 Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, 11.
85 Fleming, West Point.
they were about the possibility of a military *putsch*. Regardless of this paranoia, ongoing military incompetence was also dangerous to the Republic, but the ultimate development of West Point as a technical institute rather than an academy of military science is more easily explained in the light of the mixed political concerns emanating from Washington, and resulting in the continued reliance on untrained volunteer officers in cases of national emergency.86

Threats from the French and the British were not the only problems that faced the infant United States. The U.S. Constitution’s acceptance and protection of slavery, combined with socioeconomic forces that segregated major industrial development in the North, led to increasing problems with sectionalism. By the early 1800’s, there was a desire among Unionists to create a national university to offset sectional divisiveness. Jefferson, who supported this concept, built on Washington’s original ideas and added two goals: to create scientists and to break down sectional animosities. He understood that by creating a scientifically-focused military academy, he could build an environment where students from all sections of the country could learn, where they could develop the scientific and engineering skills necessary for the growth of national infrastructure, and where they would have the opportunity to develop personal friendships that would transcend regional boundaries. It is ironic that while all of these goals were met, the divisiveness of sectionalism was stronger, bringing close personal friends into conflict on the Civil War battlefields.87

When another attempt to create a national military academy occurred in 1802, Jefferson’s continuing desire was to develop an officer corps made up of technicians, scientists, and military commanders. In peacetime, he envisioned, graduates of the country’s latest scheme for military education would build bridges, canals, and roads. In war, they could lead the nation’s army into battle. Unfortunately, the school that arose under Jefferson’s leadership had little relationship to this ideal since its primary—often only—educational focus was on civil engineering. The official creation of the U.S. Military Academy occurred by Congressional order and provided for books and scientific equipment, along with a superintendent, faculty, and a small group of cadets; and this

87 Ibid., 18; Forman, *West Point*.
attempt was finally successful. The Federal government had accepted its responsibility to
provide a professional and scientific education for its military officers—at least in
theory. 88

Or perhaps not. The first years of the Academy’s official existence were marked
by little or no support from the War Department, few faculty, minimal facilities,
unqualified students, and a unfocused and somewhat irrelevant course of studies for
military officers. These problems arose from a combination of demography, recurrent
Congressional mistrust, financial misadministration, and ostrich-like behavior by the
nation’s leaders. As the veterans of the Revolutionary War aged, the sense of national
purpose and the recognition of the importance of military preparedness faded with them.
Bitter fights erupted in Congress over the role of a professional military versus the state
militias. The lack of a tax system and the resistance of the South to the tariff hamstrung
the government financially, leaving little or no money for military appropriations. 89

Lack of focus was also an issue. The first officially-designated superintendent of
the Academy, Jonathan Williams, shared this duty with his role as commander of the
Army Corps of Engineers. He unsuccessfully attempted to create a school that would
meet national goals for officer education. The Academy drifted along for a decade, and
eventually came under the control of Capt. Alden Partridge, a key figure in both the
creation of West Point and in broader, antebellum American education who spent much
of this time as a faculty member at the school, and occasionally as the only teacher.
Partridge also reappears in the history of American military education later. 90

Between 1802 and the War of 1812, support for the Academy was tepid. West
Point often had fewer cadets than were authorized, and the War Department made no
commitment to graduating cadets that they would receive commissions in the Army.
Presidents Monroe and Madison both tried to arrange for Congressional appropriations to
improve the curriculum at the Academy, but their ineffectual dithering and the War

88 Sanftleben, "A Different Drum", 24; Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country; Fleming, West Point; Forman,
West Point.
89 Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country; Craven, The Coming of the Civil War.
90 Fleming, West Point, 17.
Department’s hostility to the Academy brought it near collapse as war loomed. With only a few cadets and no professors, West Point was on the edge of dissolution.91

With the advent of war in 1812, the United States once again was confronted by the reason why it needed a professional officer corps and a national military academy. It found itself with a large army of untrained volunteers and few professional officers to lead them. In the ten years since its foundation in 1802, West Point had only produced 71 officers. The early abysmal performance of the Army and the unreliability and incompetence of militia troops finally convinced a few key politicians of their responsibilities for national defense. Congress reorganized the Academy, provided an academic and living facility separate from the artillery unit’s barracks, created a full time faculty, and recognized West Point as a degree-offering academic institution.92

Reforms continued as the war sputtered to a close in 1815. Congress enlarged the cadet corps to a nominal 250 and created permanent professorships in mathematics, natural philosophy, and engineering. In an important move, Secretary of War William Crawford dispatched two officers to France to observe military schools, learn from their experience, and collect textbooks for use at West Point. Capt. Sylvanus Thayer and William McRee scoured the country, returning home in 1817 with thousands of books, maps, and charts, mostly from the famous French military engineering school L’École Polytechnique, but also from schools focused on cavalry and artillery.93

Although it was not apparent at the time, the Academy was poised to become the United States’ foremost university of the 19th Century, and to set the standards for military education throughout the country. However, to become a great school, West Point first had to discover the shape of its academic soul.

The school faced a seemingly irreconcilable identity crisis in its early years. It took in raw material in the form of young American men from all parts of the country and all walks of life “having the health, character, vigor of body, maturity and aptitude of mind, and preparatory knowledge, to profit by the opportunities of the special military

training provided by the government for his corps, and a decided taste and expressed desire for a military career."\textsuperscript{94}

It welcomed them to the “one place left in our country where the vanity of asserted ancestry, and the too frequent arrogance of speculative, purse-proud, and fortuitous commercial leadership, find a chill”—an egalitarian and merit-based environment that was consistent with the nation’s republican principles but out of step with its aristocratic cultural biases.\textsuperscript{95}

From these resources and in this environment, it promoted and produced men who primarily saw themselves as scientists and engineers, not field commanders or warriors. Casual observers may believe that the primary mission of the antebellum U.S.M.A. was to teach the strategy and tactics that made its graduates effective commanders during the Civil War. In fact, the main emphasis in the Academy’s curriculum was on civil engineering, mathematics, and general science rather than military education.\textsuperscript{96}

After its early artillery-focused beginnings, the Academy became the province of the Corps of Engineers, and found both its reason for being and its intellectual soul in the pursuit of engineering science. Professor Dennis H. Mahan stands an archetype for the academic worldview of West Point. His \textit{Elementary Course of Civil Engineering}, the engineering bible for first year cadets used in the capstone course \textit{Civil and Military Engineering and the Science of War}, gives a sense of both the Academy’s depth of interest in engineering and the minimal importance of military science in the cadet’s academic life. This work, created by the leading intellect of the Academy, provides insight into the minor role that military matters played in engineering education. Among hundreds of pages detailing how to build roads, bridges, canals, and tunnels, there are none that describe impromptu or permanent field fortifications or entrenchments. Although later courses introduced the drawing and construction of fortifications, the Science of War was disposed of in a single nine hour class.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{94} Barnard, \textit{Military Schools and Courses of Instruction}, 788.
\textsuperscript{95} Schaff, \textit{The Spirit of Old West Point}, 17.
\textsuperscript{96} Morrison, "Educating the Civil War Generals."
\textsuperscript{97} D. H. Mahan, \textit{An Elementary Course of Civil Engineering for the Use of the Cadets of the United States' Military Academy} (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1838). Morrison, "Educating the Civil War Generals." Professor Mahan was the father of Alfred Thayer Mahan: naval officer, US Naval Academy professor, and author of \textit{The Influence of Sea Power on History}. 
It is ironic that the nation’s foremost military school was relatively uninterested in teaching specifically military subjects. However, given the mindset of the Academy’s leaders and its political sponsors, this makes perfect sense. West Point existed to create engineers who would build the national infrastructure and would also have some military capabilities—not to create charismatic military heroes on horseback.  

Understanding the nature of West Point and its strengths and weakness requires understanding two of its earliest superintendents: Alden Partridge (1815-1818) and Sylvanus Thayer (1818-1833.) These men had the most significant impact on the education offered at the Academy, and set the stage for both the successes and failures that were the outcomes when life at the Point was translated to the battlefield.

Although West Point graduates did not stand out in the War of 1812, President James Madison believed in the growing abilities of the institution and sponsored a series of changes in 1815 that led to the appointment of its first full time, dedicated superintendent, Alden Partridge. Partridge was described as “well versed in the science and the practice of artillery, passionately fond of the field exercise of the infantry, and even the smallest minutiae of the manual of arms.” He was also despised by his successor as “a bundle of deceit and hypocrisy, artful and plausible as he was revengeful and malevolent.”

Partridge was remarkably energetic, almost manic, and an excellent drillmaster—a skill that lived on in the Corps of Cadets beyond his tenure. Under his direction the Corps began to take shape as he provided an infrastructure to manage the cadets’ lives. A soldiers’ code of honor was articulated and enforced, military delinquencies were recorded, and absences were not tolerated—except at the whim of the Superintendent. Some of the important administrative details necessary to run the Academy were ironed out—among them, an agreement that all new cadets would start on the same date rather than whenever they were appointed or chose to arrive. What Partridge lacked was a guiding vision of what he wanted to accomplish and a sense of academic mission. For example, if the sun was shining, Partridge would hold outdoor drill. If the weather was bad, he would teach whatever subject appealed to him that day. The combination of

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98 Ibid., 110.
Partridge’s acerbic and disorganized personality coupled with Congressional disinterest and lack of appropriations kept the Academy in continuing disrepair and despair.\textsuperscript{100}

Partridge was popular with the cadets in one area of study. He was an inspired drillmaster who could move beyond the rote application of the drill manual and added a measure of military reality to battalion drills. He often choreographed reenactments of great historical battles to demonstrate important tactical concepts.\textsuperscript{101}

Because of his rocky relationships with virtually everyone associated with the Academy, Partridge was accused of malfeasance and fraud in 1816 by the faculty, tried, and acquitted. Both the academic vision for West Point and Partridge’s eccentric personality were at the heart of the dispute. The faculty wanted West Point to be an institution of classical liberal learning combined with science and engineering, with little emphasis on military subjects. Partridge was more interested in drill, tactical instruction, and satisfying his own idiosyncrasies. These differences were irreconcilable, although the victory of the purely academic faction in 1817 was possibly a contributor to the poor tactical performance of many Academy graduates in the Civil War.\textsuperscript{102}

History’s judgment on Partridge is mixed. While some believe that “had the views of Capt. Partridge prevailed, the institution never could have become what it is,”\textsuperscript{103} the cadets of his time protested his removal and supported an abortive mutinous attempt by Partridge to resume his superintendent’s position after his dismissal. Regardless of his positive and negative legacies at West Point, he would soon reappear as a key character in American military education, and have an unexpected impact on many of the sectional academies that were to appear. After leaving West Point, Partridge created a new career for himself that was important for education in the United States as an advisor and promoter of military training outside of West Point. He also indulged in a vindictive attempt to have the U.S.M.A. closed, sending suggestions for the dissolution of West Point to Congress in 1820 and 1838. Both were rejected, although the school often received severe criticism from hostile congressmen.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{101} Ambrose, \textit{Duty, Honor, Country}, 49.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 57.
\textsuperscript{103} Barnard, \textit{Military Schools and Courses of Instruction}, 731.
\textsuperscript{104} Duemer, "The History of Antebellum Military Academies in the North: 1803-1865," 129.
Partridge’s forcible departure in 1818 was immediately followed by the arrival of Sylvanus Thayer, the man who became known as the Father of the U.S. Military Academy. For good and ill, Thayer embodied what came to be the Spirit of West Point—impartial justice in dealing with the cadets, rigid and uncompromising honesty within the Corps, and literal and unquestioning obedience of orders from higher commanders.105

Thayer’s significance cannot be overestimated: “The arrival of Colonel Thayer constitutes the most important epoch of the history of West Point.” Many of the West Pointers who served in the Civil War graduated during Thayer’s tenure. The Academy created attitudes and characteristics in this group that appeared on the battlefield, and Thayer placed his personal stamp on virtually all of the graduates.106

To the faculty of West Point, Thayer’s attitude and worldview were far more compatible than Partridge’s. Thayer was an academician, not a seat-of-the-pants tactician. His study of the methods of the École Polytechnique where France’s military and civil engineers were trained gave him a broader picture of what military education could be than had previously existed in the United States. He had systematically reviewed the French Artillery and Engineering schools at Metz and the border fortifications as well as defenses at Lille, Cherbourg, and Brest. He collected and arranged for the purchase of over one thousand books on military art, engineering, and mathematics, and five hundred charts and maps, which became the foundation of the Military Academy library.107

After wrestling command away from his entrenched predecessor, Thayer began to carry out the ideas he had developed in France. He was able to apply an organizing academic principle to West Point that had eluded Partridge. He dismissed incompetent students and grouped the remaining cadets into three academically similar classes. He appointed a commandant of cadets and an academic board of visitors to review the operations of the school. His curriculum, while strong in engineering technology, included lessons in French, ethics, natural philosophy, chemistry, geology, geography,

105 Forman, *West Point*, 49.
107 Forman, *West Point*, 42.
and astronomy. Thayer’s reforms changed West Point from a casual training ground for cadets to an academically rigorous university with a specific purpose and focus.108

Unlike Partridge’s stubborn reluctance to submit to oversight or control even from the War Department, Thayer invited public scrutiny of the Corps of Cadets. He recognized that the Academy belonged to the American People, and that popular support would help it thrive. To keep his cadets in the public eye, he held summer marches to Hudson, New York; Philadelphia; Boston; and Goshen, New York. He was hospitable to visitors, and particularly to the Board of Visitors who conducted their examination of West Point each June.109

Thayer’s tenure ended in 1833 after he felt that he had been insulted by the Jackson administration, but he and his faculty changed West Point into an institution capable of producing the scientific leaders and engineers needed to build the infrastructure of a modern America. In his pursuit of this goal, however, the military aspects of the Academy were reduced to a few short classes on military science and the pro forma pursuit of drill. It is this last aspect that is so important to the training of Civil War troops. In a wartime situation and without much practical education in military tactics and strategy, almost the only military capability other than engineering skills that the West Pointers could bring to the field was their excellence in drill, and thus they pursued what they knew while ignoring what they did not know about strategy and tactics.110

Thayer closed out his life at West Point by casually walking down to the dock on the Hudson, shaking hands with a few friends who were nearby, climbing aboard a steamboat, and leaving forever—until his body was returned for burial.111

**The Psychology of West Point**

*March in step. Follow orders, no matter what. Respect all lawful authority. Stay in line. Brace up. Find a solution now. There is a textbook answer to every problem.*

Many of these are useful dictates for military officers and all have their place both in the

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109 Forman, *West Point*, 47.
110 Ibid., 50.
barracks and on the battlefield. However, West Point elevated these limited aphorisms to
directing principles that governed how its graduates operated and saw the world.

Perhaps the greatest failure of West Point on the eve of the Civil War was that it
was firmly entrenched in a repressively pedagogical philosophy—an approach to
education that assumes a fundamentally child-like need on the part of the learner to be
directed by a teacher. It emphasizes following instructions, while learning what is
presented. In most pedagogical systems, the learners have little or no say in the selection
of their course material. Most schools in the United States up to grade 12 (and often
beyond) employ pedagogical systems. At West Point, individuality was suppressed and
individual skills were minimized. Intellectualism was a sin. Uniformity was everything.
Cadets were uniformly clothed and uniformly fed. They all received sixteen dollars per
month which could not be supplemented from home. Each had an allowance of the same
two rations per day. They were similarly quartered two or three to a single room which
was a combination of heatless and waterless bedroom and study, and their beds were
straw mattresses on the floor. Among the few distinctly military characteristics of West
Point was that the cadet’s primitive life was governed by printed regulations; he was
called to classes and military exercises by the drum and bugle. Every aspect of cadet life
was regimented and initiative was forbidden.\footnote{Forman, \textit{West Point}, 59.}

When coupled with an academic structure that consistently provided similar
conditioning, the effect was profound. Cadets learned that following orders was the most
important act they could perform. On top of this, they absorbed an academic worldview
constructed by the superintendent. Thayer moved West Point towards a primarily
scientific curriculum based on French concepts and philosophies of education. Whether
consciously or unconsciously, he asserted the superiority of the academic curriculum over
strategy, and the importance of science over tactics and leadership, along with the
dangers of creativity and initiative. This resulted in a scientific culture that emphasized
rationalism and obedience over intuition or impulsiveness. A side effect of his approach
was a widespread belief in the idea that all problems had an immediate and simple
solution. The recitation model of education supported this unspoken, powerful, and
seductive view. Questions were posed to the cadets, and they were expected to have a
simple and definitive answer. If they did not, they were expected to find one quickly. Ambiguity and complexity were frowned upon, and nuanced thinking was actively discouraged. At the same time, Thayer deemphasized the classics—often an effective source for the study of philosophy, psychology, and the human condition. The complexities of humanity that great leaders understand and leverage were lost in the pursuit of simplicity and rationalism.\footnote{Barnard, \textit{Military Schools and Courses of Instruction}, 733.}

To achieve the goal of uniformity, every cadet went through a similar formation process. The transition to soldier, or even the simulation of a real soldier, was not instantaneous:

> In our first appearance as a military body, marching to dinner, we offered, as every class before us had offered, the usual and perhaps most amusing spectacle that meets the eye at West Point. We were a column of gawky boys of all sizes, from five to six feet tall, clad in all sorts of particolored raiment; our eyes fixed, yes, glued, on the coat collar of the boy in front of us, a grim dismalness hanging in every face; all of us trying mechanically to point our toes and to comply with the fierce orders from sergeants and lance corporals who trod the earth proudly on each flank, filling the air with “hep! – hep!”\footnote{Schaff, \textit{The Spirit of Old West Point}, 40.}

For those who stayed at West Point, at least a superficial change occurred:

> See them four years hence, marching up to the commanding officer at their last parade! What a transformation! Oh, the step now! No sergeant’s or lance corporal’s commands are necessary; they walk proudly and gracefully; the grim dreary cloud of plebedom has drifted off, and the faces are lit up with a flushing pride.\footnote{Ibid., 41.}

Unfortunately, the ability to march in step and look soldierly was not enough to guarantee battlefield effectiveness. West Point not only encouraged but demanded a mechanistic outlook to learning and education, but its graduates encountered environments between 1861 and 1865 that needed a more flexible and creative spirit. The cadets who learned to tolerate constant supervision, regulation, recitation, and evaluation by the Academy’s faculty became officers who were exceptionally good at following orders and operating \textit{by the book}. Unfortunately, what they needed to learn
was initiative and imagination if they were to effectively deal with a rapidly evolving tactical and technological environment; and these were two qualities that West Point did not provide along with its uniforms, books, spartan accommodations, and bad food.\textsuperscript{116}

Ulysses Grant’s \textit{Personal Memoirs} aptly describe the implications of the Academy’s worldview on the battlefield in the aftermath of the battle of Shiloh.\textsuperscript{117} Nearly the entire Western command structure of the Union Army embodied in Halleck, Buell, Rosecrans, and a host of underlings, unconsciously conspired to lose the strategic initiative in Tennessee and Northern Mississippi through rigorous adherence to the \textit{rules} as taught at West Point. The fortifications that Halleck built at Corinth are a good example of the predominance of an engineering mindset over strategy—a vast fortress of earthworks and redoubts that were beyond the capability of the Union armies to man, and a diversion from the Union’s need to pursue the defeated rebels. The combined Union armies were broken up into small groups busily engaged in protecting their supply lines through hostile territory, per the West Point \textit{book}. In the Eastern theater, Lincoln finally removed McClellan from command when his West Point-fostered caution and obsessive attention to detail allowed Lee to escape after Antietam, when aggression and initiative were needed instead.\textsuperscript{118}

The sense of class hierarchy and elitism that arose through the Academy system also had an impact on the performance of West Point graduates in the War. When this feeling of superiority and entitlement to military respect came into contact with the casualness and democratic values of Civil War volunteers, problems were bound to occur. The failure of some of the Academy’s engineering elite to excel as commanders in the War was a by-product of the arrogance they learned at West Point.\textsuperscript{119}

The performance evaluation system at the Academy contributed to the best students’ conceit. At any instant, they knew their exact class standing, number of demerits, and performance in class. They could predict their post-graduation assignment, and typically wanted to be among the engineers—heaven forbid an assignment to the lowly infantry. They were rewarded with rank and responsibility, and pampered with

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{116} Morrison, "Educating the Civil War Generals."
\bibitem{117} Grant, \textit{Memoirs}, 121.
\bibitem{118} Catton, \textit{Mr. Lincoln's Army}, 323-27.
\bibitem{119} Morrison, "Educating the Civil War Generals," 108-9.
\end{thebibliography}
privileges according to their standing. A top-performing cadet was encouraged to see himself as on a higher and more important plane than his lesser colleagues or enlisted men.

Few of the top graduates had the right human touch for dealing with common regular soldiers (with, of course, a few notable exceptions such as Robert E. Lee who was ranked second in the Class of 1829 or James McPherson, the top student in the Class of 1853), and even less so for the independent volunteers of the War. Even a mediocre and unassuming cadet such as Grant absorbed the unconscious prejudices of West Point, although his innate common sense and outstanding strategic judgment overcame these tendencies in the Regular troops in the Mexican War: “The rank and file were probably inferior…but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all there was in them.”

The ingrained philosophy and psychology that West Point imparted to its cadets was more important than any other aspect of learning at the Academy. Consider, for example, the practice of drill to the underlying psychology of West Point. Catton suggests that the focus of Civil War drill had its genesis in the practices of West Point. Regardless of whether the drillmaster himself was instructed on the Plain at West Point, attended a military school that was an outgrowth of the Academy, or learned from a drill manual that was written by an Academy professor or graduate, the influence of West Point is undeniable. Far beyond the mechanics of drill, however, is the importance of the West Point view of life, the soldier, and the battlefield. This entered into the collective psychology of the Union armies, and produced a way of thinking and acting that condemned the nation to unnecessary years of bloody warfare. If only McClellan had moved swiftly and decisively on the Peninsula or after Antietam, if Buell had attacked after Shiloh or Meade after Gettysburg, if Burnside had not been slow at Petersburg … each of these were to some extent a product of the West Point way of thinking, and leading to missed opportunities to end the War. To fully understand this psychology and

its strengths and weaknesses, it is useful to look at the people who attended the Academy, how they were admitted, and what they studied while they were there.\textsuperscript{121}

**Demographics, Admission, and Retention at West Point**

In 1861, as state followed state out of the Union and the defections of West Point officers added up, the nagging sense that the Jacksonians had been right about the Academy—that it was a Southern-dominated, elitist school for traitors who would abandon the nation at the first call of the *slaveocracy*—ballooned into intense criticism of the institution. Failure on the battlefield and the generally poor performance of West Point graduates (e.g., McDowell, Fremont, McClellan) in 1861-1862 further solidified the belief that the South had “owned” the Academy. Leaving combat performance aside, the demographics and enrollment numbers for West Point do not support this conviction.\textsuperscript{122}

Between 1802 and 1861, almost 4,100 cadets attended West Point. From 1843, they were appointed based on Congressional representation, which was calculated from the decennial census. The regional demography of the Academy should have been a close approximation of the nation as a whole although, relative to the white population, the South did have the advantage of having each of its slaves counted as three-fifths of a white person. Congressional representation was increased accordingly, and therefore the Southern allocation at West Point was enlarged too. Table 2-1 shows the proportional mix of cadets by region according to combined census records and the Academy records.\textsuperscript{123}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total Allocated</th>
<th>Percent of Total Allocated</th>
<th>Actually Attended</th>
<th>Percent of “Actually Attended”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>2,382</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4,098</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{122} Ambrose, *Duty, Honor, Country.*

While the Southern states did have a 7 percent edge relative to the Congressional allocation of spaces at West Point, there were still almost twice as many cadets from the Northern states who attended the school. The percentage advantage of the South was offset by a slightly higher attrition rate among Southern cadets due to poor prior academic preparation; 35.7 percent of entering Southern cadets graduated between 1802 and 1872, while 40.8 percent of those from the North graduated in the same time period. The rebellious Southerners did not have the numerical predominance at the school that many Wartime contemporaries believed.124

Of all the defining characteristics of West Point, the ones that changed most between 1802 and 1861 were its admissions requirements. In its early days, a young applicant was subjected to a nearly meaningless physical examination and asked to demonstrate a basic knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Students from the North, who had access to a more highly evolved system of public and private education, had a distinct academic advantage over cadets from the South or West.

The early admission procedures for West Point were erratic and casual. Generally, a candidate (or his father) would write to the Secretary of War requesting admission. Age and academic qualifications were rarely considered. For example, David B. Hunter was accepted into the Academy in 1829 at the age of fourteen years, eight months—the youngest cadet at that time.125

By 1843, Congress had removed the appointment of cadets from the War Department and the Executive Branch. By tradition in the 1830’s, there had been an attempt to select a cadet from each Congressional district. These good intentions by the War Department were turned into policy, and Congress became the main source of appointees. Even with this change, political ties were usually an important part of the appointment process. Milo S. Hascall of the Class of 1852, like many Academy cadets, took advantage of his ties to local politicians to gain admission. Stephen D. Ramseur, Class of 1860, failed in his first attempt to attend the Academy and enrolled in Davidson

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124 Ibid. My calculation, see Appendix G. Cullum, Biographical Register. Of 483 U.S.M.A. graduates between 1850 and May, 1861, 118 or 24.4 percent joined the Confederacy.
College where he impressed Professor D. H. Hill. Hill used his connections with a North Carolina congressman to secure Ramseur’s appointment. Perhaps the most interesting case of political influence in gaining admission is that of George Pickett, Class of 1846 and remembered as the leader of Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg. His family was so adamant about sending him to West Point that they moved him from Virginia to Illinois where they prevailed upon an obscure local politician, Abraham Lincoln, to recommend Pickett. After securing an appointment for him, Lincoln corresponded with and mentored Pickett both as a cadet and as a young officer.126

By 1820, the admission requirements had stabilized into criteria that remained relatively constant through the Civil War. Along with needing a Congressional appointment, a candidate had to be at least 16 years old, over 5 feet tall, without deformities, and able to withstand the stress of the military life. He had to be unmarried and have basic skills in reading, writing, and arithmetic.127

Once a cadet was admitted, expectations for academic performance were unrelenting. Academic life was governed by recitations. Every day, cadets were expected to be able to respond to complicated and detailed questions in each class session, and would prepare for these trials by the light of their smoky whale oil lamps in their stifling or freezing rooms at night. When called upon by a faculty member, a cadet would write his answer as best he could on the blackboard and then explain his conclusions to the class. He would receive a grade ranging from zero for total failure to three for success. This process could reduce fearless warriors like Stonewall Jackson into quaking cowards when, for example, the subject was mathematics.128

High academic expectations led to a high attrition rate. Low barriers to entry meant that ninety-three percent of cadets who applied to the school between 1833 and

126 Fleming, West Point, 112; Cullum, Biographical Register; Stephen E. Towne, "West Point Letters of Cadet Milo S. Hascall, 1848-1850," Indiana Magazine of History 90, no. 3 (1994): 279; Gary W. Gallagher, "A North Carolinian at West Point: Stephen Dodson Ramseur, 1855-1860, North Carolina Historical Review 62, no. 1 (1985):1-28; Fleming, West Point, 110. Hascall spent one year in the army after graduation and resigned to enter business. He rejoined at the beginning of the War, became a Union brigadier general, and embarrassed the Lincoln Administration with his suppression of local Democrats in Indiana. He was encouraged to resign, returned to his business ventures, and died in 1904. Ramseur became a Confederate general and division commander. He was mortally wounded at the battle of Cedar Creek in 1864. D.H. Hill rose to corps command in the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and returned to academia after the War as a college president.

128 Ibid.: 36; Fleming, West Point, 108.
1861 were admitted. Over a quarter of them failed to graduate due to academic insufficiencies. Failure to graduate, however, was not an insurmountable impediment to military advancement during the War. Eleven cadets who were dismissed from the Academy became Union generals.\textsuperscript{129}

**Curriculum**

For those who are familiar with the modern system of military education that balances science and tactics with the liberal arts, the antebellum curriculum at the Academy is something of a conundrum. It was a military school in which pursuit of most distinctly military subjects was actively discouraged.

With its distrust of intellectualism, it is entirely conceivable that many West Point graduates never read a book on strategy or tactics once they completed their education, and may not have looked at writings on those subjects while they were there. West Point was both the beginning and the end of most officers’ military education—until they faced the less-forgiving teacher of the battlefield. Most officers were uninterested in strategy and did not have access to strategic resources at their remote postings in the Western United States. Grant was a typical post-graduate who reminisced on his preparations for battalion drill in 1862: “While I was at West Point the tactics used in the army had been Scott’s and the musket the flint lock. I had never looked at a copy of tactics from the time of my graduation … In the Mexican war in the summer of 1846, I had been appointed regimental quartermaster and commissary and had not been at a battalion drill since.” Only a few Academy graduates like McClellan and Lee were interested in strategy and tactics, and continued their military studies after graduation.\textsuperscript{130}

The curriculum imposed by Thayer and warmly embraced by the faculty only minimally changed between 1818 and 1860. Academics at West Point had little in common with contemporary universities. Rather than studying Latin and Greek, the


\textsuperscript{130} Barnard, *Military Schools and Courses of Instruction*; Morrison, "Educating the Civil War Generals," 109; Grant, *Memoirs*, 128. The modern concept of service schools was not entirely foreign in the antebellum period. The War Department attempted to establish and maintain schools of practice in the Army after the Revolutionary War, but made no headway until several years after the War of 1812. The disasters of 1812-1815 could be traced directly to the lack of trained officers. A School for the Instruction of Infantry was established at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri in 1826 but soon closed.
Academy’s cadets built on their basic knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic. They focused on engineering above all, then science and modern languages. Students in their first year studied English, grammar, French, algebra, geometry, and logarithms. Modern languages took on an importance far beyond what students at the traditional colleges encountered since Thayer saw French as “the repository of military science.” In their second year, students continued with French, geometrical construction, application of algebra, measurement, trigonometry, conic sections, and drawing. In the third year, cadets studied natural and experimental philosophy (general science), astronomy, and drawing. Finally, students in their fourth year concentrated on engineering, geography, history, and ethics. Calculus, chemistry, mineralogy, and natural law were added later. Note the subjects that are not listed: strategy, tactics, military administration, or leadership.131

The underlying presumption on the part of the Academy’s administration was that military skills would be learned by osmosis and by observation, and that the single most important military talent was the ability to follow orders without question. Cadets were required to live like soldiers in conditions that were primitive even for the early 19th Century, served under strict military regulations that governed every aspect of their lives, and tolerated their daily experience of the infantry drill that they would teach the volunteers of the Civil War.

Over a cadet’s four or five years at West Point, seventy-one percent of his classroom hours were focused on engineering, mathematics, and natural philosophy: chemistry, physics, and general science. Languages and the other liberal arts filled out the remainder of his schedule, with military tactics a minor portion of this small subset of his time. Even when a five year curriculum was adopted in 1854, the additional class time was mostly spent on languages, history, and law. Highly unpopular with the cadets, the five year program was ended when the War began, and the fripperies of additional liberal arts were pushed aside in favor of science and engineering.132

The Academy was not entirely resistant to modifications to the curriculum. Superintendents Robert E. Lee, John G. Barnard, and Richard Delafield introduced

131 Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country, 39; Barnard, Military Schools and Courses of Instruction, 733-34; Forman, West Point, 43.
academic changes that added Spanish and improved the scientific laboratories. As sectional differences were enflamed and war loomed, the curriculum did add more military topics. When William J. Hardee became superintendent in 1856, he placed much more emphasis on infantry tactics and drill than in the past. During the War, a recent graduate described a course of instruction including “infantry tactics and military policy, mathematics, the French language, natural philosophy, drawing, chemistry, and mineralogy, artillery tactics, the science of gunnery and the duties of a military laboratory, engineering and the articles of war, geography, history, and ethics, the use of the sword, and cavalry exercise.”

Table 2-2’s summary of the time spent in recitation (i.e., in the classroom) provides a particularly clear picture of the low level of importance that West Point placed on strictly military topics.

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Table 2-2  West Point Recitation Schedule 1833-1854  for the Four Year Curriculum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Time in hours during each term unless otherwise indicated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fourth (Freshman)</td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>1.5 daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French</td>
<td>1 on alternate days 1833-46;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>thereafter 1 on alternate days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spring term only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 on alternate days, 1846-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rhetoric</td>
<td>1 on alternate days, 1846-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third (Sophomore)</td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>1.5 daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French</td>
<td>1 daily 1833-39; 1 on alternate days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>days 1840-45, 1 daily 1846-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 on alternate days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drawing</td>
<td>1 on alternate days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second (Junior)</td>
<td>Drawing</td>
<td>2 daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td>1 on alternate days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural Philosophy</td>
<td>1.5 daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First (Senior)</td>
<td>Rhetoric, Moral &amp; Political</td>
<td>1 on alternate days, 1833-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>1 on alternate days, 1843-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law, Moral Philosophy &amp; Logic</td>
<td>1 on alternate days, Spring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mineralogy and Geology</td>
<td>Daily with Drawing for 3 hours and 1.5 for the remainder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil and Military Engineering;</td>
<td>1 on alternate days during Fall and Spring; daily in Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Science of War</td>
<td>1 on alternate days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>1 on alternate days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Academic failure rates were high. Between 1833 and 1860, over 26 percent of the cadets failed one or more subjects, and the implications of failure were significant. Cadets who could not pass a course were either dismissed from the Academy, or demoted to a lower class and repeated a year of study. Almost 90 percent of these failures were in mathematics, engineering, and science, while only two cadets were dismissed for failure in tactics. Poor conduct accounted for approximately six percent of the overall failure rate. These statistics highlight both the amount of time that was allocated to each area of study and the importance that the Academy’s administration placed on them. West Point was absolutely consistent in its view of the formation of the future officer. Science and engineering were the critical subjects, and the institutional expectations of discipline were more stringent around them.\(^{135}\)

Discipline was all. From the vantage point of later in the 19th Century, Barnard reminded us that “nothing can be more certain than the decline of discipline in modern civil institutions.” The Academy presumed that the erosion of discipline must be stopped

\(^{135}\) Ibid., 109.
at all costs. West Point enforced its draconian discipline in several different ways. Regardless of the drill requirements, the spartan accommodations, the hazing, and the regulations that made the Academy resemble a society of celibate warrior monks—all reminders of the strict control that ordered every phase of the cadets’ lives—West Point made the pursuit of discipline in academics paramount. The Academy assigned scoring to its curriculum components that clearly illustrates its priorities. Points toward class standing as shown in Table 2-3 were allocated according to the following proportions:

Table 2-3 Allocation of Points toward Class Standing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy and Mechanics</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering and Military Science</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry and Mineralogy</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral and Political Philosophy</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Tactics</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery Tactics</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drawing</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of 2,100 possible academic achievement points, approximately 330 or 15.7 percent were associated with strictly military subjects—with the generous assumption that ten percent of the Engineering and Military Science course was actually related to military issues. An additional 50 points from the Moral and Political Philosophy course’s discussion of history and strategy raised the militarily-focused percentage to 18 percent.

Points were used to determine class rank, which was the key to the plum post-graduate assignments. Cadets who did not accumulate enough points academically were asked to leave the Academy. Along with the average 26 percent of cadets each year who were at risk of dismissal from academic failure, there were many others who departed the Academy for a wide variety of reasons ranging from Gustavus DeRussy who was “allowed to resign” in 1838 for drinking, to Davis Tillson who left in 1851 after he lost a foot in an accident. Both of these men later became Civil War Union generals. An earlier cadet, Lorenzo Thomas, was expelled from the Academy in 1822 for having liquor

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in his room but was reinstated within a few days—a fortunate turn of events since
Thomas became the Union’s Adjutant General during the War and was one of the leading
proponents of the formation of the U.S. Colored Troops. For many reasons, but
particularly because of the grueling lifestyle that the Academy required, the graduation
rate at West Point as shown in Table 2-4 was never high by modern standards of
retention. In a very good year, half the cadets who entered West Point would graduate
with their class.\footnote{Webb, \textit{Union Generals from West Point}; Michael T. Meier, "Lorenzo Thomas and the Recruitment of
Blacks in the Mississippi Valley, 1863-1865," in \textit{Black Soldiers in Blue: African American Troops in the
Barnard, \textit{Military Schools and Courses of Instruction}, 783.}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{West Point Graduation Rates by Decade}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Decade & Percent Graduating \\
\hline
1802 to 1811 & 6 \\
1812 to 1821 & 29 \\
1822 to 1831 & 38 \\
1832 to 1841 & 47 \\
1842 to 1851 & 51 \\
1852 to 1861 & 52 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Expectations of personal discipline were extraordinary. The honor code at West
Point was stringent and was rigidly enforced by both the administration and cadets in
most matters. One oddity of the code is that cadets often made a game of attempting to
steal examination questions from the faculty, and tales of harrowing escapes occur
throughout the West Point literature. If violations of regulations were discovered, they
were invariably punished—often with extra guard duty and demerits, and occasionally by
dismissal from the school. Cadets could file a written excuse in response to charges
against them, although these excuses were rarely accepted.\footnote{Fleming, \textit{West Point}; Francis F. McKinney, \textit{Education in Violence: The Life of George H. Thomas and the History of the Army of the Cumberland} (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), 13.}

When a cadet accumulated 200 demerits in a single year, he was dismissed. The
Corps of Cadets frequently took disciplinary matters into their own hands in cases where
they felt that the offender had embarrassed or dishonored the Academy, and their
impromptu punishments were usually followed by the resignation of the miscreant.
How did the Academy approach the complex field of strategy? West Point had a simple answer for those who were concerned with it. Cadets were told that all they had to do was follow Professor Denis H. Mahan’s dictum to “use common sense.” However, before Mahan—one of the great intellects of the U.S.M.A.—is dismissed as a strategic imbecile, it is important to remember that he did offer tactical concepts that were highly useful when then were applied by the Academy’s Union graduates. He urged the use of decisive speed in engaging the enemy, the collection and use of accurate intelligence about enemy dispositions, and the rapid and ferocious pursuit of a defeated army. He encouraged the cadets to be loved and feared by their troops, admired for their skill, and confident. All good advice; but a modicum of actual strategic training would have been helpful too, particularly in an age where technology was profoundly changing the nature of the strategic environment.139

Mahan was one of four key faculty members who dominated antebellum West Point. Each was an Academy graduate himself, brought a measure of brilliance to the school, was recognized as an important contributor to the scientific body of knowledge of the time, and had the insight and skill to create what became a standard text for their subject of expertise. A member of the Class of 1824, Mahan was professor of engineering and tactics. Although he had never been in battle, Mahan had a broad and incisive theoretical grasp of tactics that were based on the experiences of his virtual mentor, Napoleon. William H. C. Bartlett from the Class of 1826 taught science and worked with optics, photography, physics, and electricity when each of these was in its infancy. Jacob Bailey, Class of 1832, taught chemistry, mineralogy, geology, botany, and physics. He pioneered the use of the microscope in botany in America. Finally, Albert E. Church, Class of 1828, was the highly unpopular professor of mathematics. Although he too shared the brilliance of his colleagues, it was unleavened by humor or personal feelings. Church was responsible for more academic failures at the Point than any other faculty member and was hated by many cadets. Each professor left his mark on the future Civil War leaders.140

139 Morrison, "Educating the Civil War Generals," 109; Fleming, West Point, 111.
140 Waugh, "Life at the Point," 62.
The Basics of Military Education and Drill at the U.S.M.A.

While the uses and importance of drill as a preparatory instrument for battlefield performance were not emphasized, Cadet George Strong reported that West Pointers were familiar with its requirements from their first moments at the Academy:

We were formed, by dint of much pushing and pulling on the part of our instructors, into two ranks at parade rest, and having received a short lesson, enunciated without commas, on the subject of springing like a flash of lightning from this position to that of attention at the command "tion," the roll was called and we started for the mess-hall. We were marched, in close order, in squads of fifteen or twenty each, losing the step of course, and tumbling over each other all the way, at the same time receiving bitter rebukes for our “inattention.”

Cadets learned to be soldiers by practice, not by classroom study. They were introduced to the School of the Soldier as they arrived at the Academy, and practiced its most basic marching maneuvers as they moved between classes, crossed the grounds, or performed the simplest of tasks. West Point cadets learned how to march, and march well, by continuous drill. They also learned a philosophy of drill that they carried with them into the War—that individuality was the enemy, that drill would allow an officer to keep control of his troops even in savage battlefield conditions, and that drill could never be too perfect.

Some aspects of military life were an intrinsic part of getting from place to place, eating, breathing, and sleeping at West Point. All cadets were formed into battalions, companies, and squads. They performed guard duty, lived in barracks during the academic year or tents in summer camp, and endured a highly disciplined environment that constrained what they ate, how often they bathed, and what they did with their free time. Although a cadet might spend four years at West Point and learn little about tactics and nothing about strategy, it would have been impossible for him to avoid learning about Army routine and military bureaucracy.

In common with enlisted soldiers in the Regular Army, cadets began their military instruction with the School of the Soldier. Initially, they learned basic marching skills,

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141 Strong, *Cadet Life at West Point*, 63. George C. Strong graduated in the Class of 1857, became a Union brigadier general, and died from wounds he received during an attack on Battery Wagner outside of Charleston, SC.

142 Morrison, "Educating the Civil War Generals," 110.
the manual of arms, inspection routine, the manufacture of cartridges, and musket drill. They progressed to the maneuver of small unit formations and combined these into the progressively larger and more complex Schools of the Battalion, Brigade, Division, and (rarely) Corps d’Armée. Cadets would simulate large formations of troops and practice the complicated maneuvers needed to move and use these formations.

The same rigidity of tactical thought that appeared so often among all but the best commanders in the Civil War found its genesis on the Plain at West Point, its central drill field. Tactical instruction at the Academy was the source of many complaints by the cadets, and of occasional investigations by the Army. In 1843, an investigating board found that tactical instruction was limited to the mechanics of drill and movement without reference to the enemy or terrain. Subsequent inspections by the school’s Board of Visitors observed that, while the academic performance of the Corps was excellent, their tactical training was both minimal and completely acceptable to the War Department. Cadets were neither expected nor encouraged to study tactics or consider innovations.

Their main opportunity to learn and practice the military arts beyond infantry drill came during the summer encampments that all cadets attended during three of their four years at the Academy. During summer camp, there was a strong focus on military engineering, with twenty-four drill periods where the cadets conducted surveys, learned orienteering skills, laid out fortifications, and built bridges.143

The summer camps also provided the opportunity for cadets to be introduced to tactics; study foot, cavalry, and artillery drill; learn horseback riding; and become proficient fencers. These subjects also sporadically appeared on the schedule during the academic year. During his four years at West Point, a cadet would encounter 540 infantry drill sessions, 204 for artillery, 268 for cavalry, and 108 for fencing.

At the conclusion of his time at the Point, cadets were commissioned as second lieutenants assigned to an Army corps of practice. The best students, based on their deportment and academic performance, went to the elite engineers, topographical engineers, or the ordnance corps. The lower ranking cadets were assigned to the infantry, cavalry, or artillery. An analysis of the U.S.M.A. Class of 1856 in Table 2-5 provides an

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143 Ibid., 109.
example of the Wartime service of the 49 members of this graduating class; none of its members served with the U.S.C.T. This class was chosen because of its high percentage of officers who both were still active in the Army at the time of the War, and but who would have had enough prior experience to perform as field grade officers.144

Table 2-5 U.S.M.A. Class of 1856 Civil War Postings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commissioned Into, Rebelled, or Died Prior to the War</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Class ranks of 1,2,3, and 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>While 11 were commissioned into the Infantry, seven served during the War in non-Infantry positions (i.e., quartermaster, commissary, adjutant, provost, staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Seven from the bottom 50 percent of the class, of these five from the bottom 25 percent (five of the total 12 in the bottom quarter) – Southern students often performed more poorly academically than their better-educated Northern counterparts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died before War</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the intellectual elite of the Academy prepared for the Civil War in the least warlike of the Army’s occupations, and the results that the reader would logically expect occurred. With a small number of outstanding exceptions, few of the cadets from the top graduating spots of the antebellum period performed exceptionally well as wartime commanders.145

Between 1805 and 1862, there were 48 graduating classes of West Point cadets, and 96 students who were ranked either first or second in their class. Of these, 21

144 Cullum, Biographical Register, 1711. Regular Army officer ranks were 2nd Lieutenant, 1st Lieutenant, Captain, Major, Lt. Colonel, Colonel, Brigadier General, Maj. General, and Lt. General. Combat or other exceptional service could result in brevet ranks which were, for the most part, honorary and filled the same role as medals in the modern Army. The Regular Army authorized brevets in 1806, and Volunteer forces could use them after 1863. No additional pay or command position was attached to a brevet promotion, although brevet ranks were sometimes applied at courts martial to qualify officers to sit in a proceeding against an officer of higher permanent rank but lesser or equal brevet rank since an officer could not be tried by those of lower rank.

145 Morrison, "Educating the Civil War Generals," 110. I have defined “Elite” as those in the top 10 percent of the graduation class with class ranks of one to five. However, the term has no specific qualitative meaning other than an indication of willingness to follow orders and the ability to perform well during recitations.
became Union generals during the War while another five became Confederate generals. In my opinion, of the 39 pre-War graduates with a class rank of one through five who became Union generals, only eight were better than average field commanders. The West Point prejudice towards engineering and science potentially accounts for much of the low battlefield performance of the top students.  

West Point established the baseline for what was broadly seen as the only viable model for military education and preparation before the War. Anything what would be done, either in private or state military academies or preparation programs for volunteer officers, would be viewed through the lens of the Academy experience and measured by similar standards.

PRIVATE AND STATE MILITARY ACADEemies

The U.S.M.A. was not the only source for an academic military education before the War. In the antebellum United States, there were at least 111 military academies in the United States—96 in the South and 15 in the North. These schools played a key role for both sides in the War, and provided an important source of drillmasters, instructors, and officers for their armies. At the same time, the short time span between the founding of most of these schools and the War minimized their impact since they had little time to produce many graduates. Due to their genesis as philosophical outgrowths of West Point, they did help to create a common training paradigm, and also transmitted many of the psychological and philosophical negatives that were inherent in the U.S.M.A.  

Beginning in the 1820’s, private and state-sponsored military academies began to appear in the United States. Their primary goals were to turn young men from self-indulgent and undisciplined wastrels into productive citizen-soldiers who were skilled in the sciences, and to develop manliness, religious belief, courage, loyalty, and patriotism. As with many if not all generations, there was a concern among the parents of antebellum youth that their children were not going to become the serious and sober citizens that the

146 Webb, Union Generals from West Point.
Republic needed. The mission of the academies was to prepare its graduates to serve both the country in times of crisis and the community as a contributing civilian.147

Often these academies would spring into being with great hope and local fanfare, survive for a few years, and collapse due to disinterest, misadministration, or the nemesis of many schools in an era when public funding was rarely available—lack of financial support. The schools rarely received funding from their states, and only the U.S.M.A. was supported by the federal government. Two of the most successful schools of the time, the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and South Carolina’s The Citadel did receive substantial stipends from their state legislatures. By the 1850’s, many Southern states began to support the idea of military education, and not solely because of their growing animosity towards the North. The academies became a ready source of teachers in a region that was perennially short on educators. The North’s greater alternatives to both military education and subsidized teacher education via military schools lowered its commitment to the academy trend.148

The timing of the proliferation of military academies was not random. Although a series of sociological, religious, political and economic factors were supporting the enthusiasm for military education, the growth in interest in military academies was also closely connected to Alden Partridge, the former superintendent of West Point who we met earlier.

**Alden Partridge – Proponent of Military Education**

The last time we encountered Partridge, he had been forced out of his position at West Point in disgrace. An abortive attempt to prevent Thayer from assuming his role as superintendent had been thwarted and it appeared that Partridge’s educational career was over. However, in spite of his flaws, he was not a man to be underestimated. Following his tenure at the U.S.M.A., he took on a role that had more significant implications to the country than had his service at the Point. His impact on military education in the United States transcends a single school, and provides a unifying explanation for some of the commonality of drill and education during the Civil War. Partridge was the founder of

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148 Ibid.: 11.
and inspiration for an entire class of schools where the value of military discipline was recognized. He played a key role in American educational history.\textsuperscript{149}

Partridge opened the second significant American military academy in 1820 in his home state of Vermont. Angry and embittered by his ouster from West Point and convinced that the training of officers was much too important to be left to the national military establishment, he opened the private American Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy at Norwich. His stated commitment was to develop citizen soldiers of exemplary character and deep practical skill. Partridge opened the Virginia Literary, Scientific, and Military Institute at Portsmouth, Virginia in 1839, and the Pennsylvania Military Academy around 1842 near Wilmington, Delaware (later moved to Chester, Pennsylvania)—an institution that he hoped would become a national school of officer education replacing West Point.\textsuperscript{150}

By 1830, five similar schools, all directed by former Norwich cadets, were opened in Buffalo, New York; Oxford and Fayetteville, North Carolina; Rice Creek, South Carolina; and Jefferson College, Mississippi. Graduates of these schools, in turn, founded their own academies, and dozens of military schools were established throughout the country. West Point contributed a large number of teachers to these new institutions. Between 1833 and 1853, forty professorships in mathematics and sixteen in engineering at American colleges and academies were filled by West Point graduates.\textsuperscript{151}

Many of the early military schools operated in remote rural areas and with limited budgets, and called on former West Point and military academy graduates to help launch them. For example, William T. Sherman was the founding headmaster of the Louisiana State Seminary of Learning and Military Academy, now Louisiana State University. The schools tended to be small with a few dozen students and had a high economic failure rate because of the lack of public funding. However, some did thrive. Before the War, the most successful schools were Norwich University, VMI, and the South Carolina Military Academy (The Citadel).\textsuperscript{152}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{149} Barnard, \textit{Military Schools and Courses of Instruction}. \\
\textsuperscript{150} Sanftleben, "A Different Drum", 27; Barnard, \textit{Military Schools and Courses of Instruction}. \\
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.; Fleming, \textit{West Point}, 98. \\
\textsuperscript{152} M.A. Howe, ed., \textit{Home Letters of General Sherman} (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909); Sanftleben, "A Different Drum", 29-30; Brooks D. Simpson and Jean V. Berlin, \textit{Sherman's Civil War}: \end{flushleft}
MILITARY ACADEMIES OF THE NORTH

Early in the War, Lincoln, Congress, and the country might have wondered if there had been any military education in the North prior to 1861. Incompetence and sloth seemed to characterize the Union high command—so much so that the 37th and 38th Congress’ Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War investigated West Point to see if it had colluded in only training Southerners to be skilled at warfare. After the War, the persistent mythology of the Southern Lost Cause, combined with early Northern ineptitude, created a broad perception that the North was a military backwater that was unable to develop great military leaders. The fact that the North won the War and produced generals such as Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Logan, and McPherson became lost in the post-apocalyptic romantic haze that obscures the time period.

True, the South did send cadets to West Point at a slightly proportionally greater rate than did the North, and there were many more military academies in the South than in the North, by a factor of 6-to-1. However, while military academies flourished in the South, this was often because traditional schools had difficulty obtaining funding from the state legislatures, and military academies were able to extract money by providing a service to the state by creating both militia officers and more disciplined boys. Life in the South also had more of a frontier flavor. From the vantage point of the 21st Century, it is easy to forget how untamed the antebellum South was, and how little tradition of common public support for education existed. Nor was the South more significantly enamored of militaristic trappings than the North. While many in the South loved military displays and valued the military, these beliefs were popular in the North too.

The Northern military academy movement sprang from Alden Partridge’s efforts. His American Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy (later Norwich University) was founded in 1820. Its primary focus was on engineering and it was the first American school outside of West Point to require military training although Clinton Military Academy, where military preparation was not initially mandated, predated it by four years. Norwich was the academic cradle for many Union officers and the source of

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Ross, "To Prepare Our Sons," 6.
drillmasters for the recruits of the early War. Stephen G. Abbott, 1st New Hampshire Volunteers, was just one of hundreds of new recruits who received their first lessons in soldiering in 1861 from Norwich cadets.155

Other schools soon appeared. Pennsylvania Military College (Widener University) of Chester, Pennsylvania was founded in 1821 as the Bullock School, then became the Alsop School, the Hyatt School, and finally the Delaware Military Academy in Wilmington, Delaware. The school was moved to Chester in 1862 and military instruction was introduced in 1858. Kemper Military School was founded in 1844 in Booneville, Missouri and, because of its location in a border state, produced officers for both the Union and Confederacy.156

Several other small military schools appeared in the North during the same period. Partridge’s influence is evident from the frequency of the Literary, Scientific nomenclature of many of these institutions. Most of these schools had a short life span and, similar to Pennsylvania Military College, did not introduce tactical drill immediately. The military curricula of the schools became increasingly sophisticated over time as the points of view of both Partridge and Thayer were disseminated via the graduates of Norwich and West Point. Eventually, the schools that did survive offered programs very similar to those of West Point with a great deal of engineering and science, but also had a strong focus on drill and tactics in imitation of the program at Norwich.157

Table 2-6 shows the known antebellum and wartime Northern academies.158

156 Reeves, Military Education in the United States, 180, 171. The frequent changes in name and location are indicators of the often insolvent financial state of these schools.
Table 2-6  Northern Military Academies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Founded in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brinton Military, Scientific and Collegiate Institute</td>
<td>Brinton, Pennsylvania</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pembroke Gymnasium and Military Collegiate Institute</td>
<td>Pembroke, New Hampshire</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton Military Academy</td>
<td>Clinton, New York</td>
<td>1816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwich University</td>
<td>Norwich, Vermont</td>
<td>1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitesborough Scientific and Military Academy</td>
<td>Whitesborough, New York</td>
<td>1826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pikesville Literary, Scientific and Military Academy</td>
<td>Pikesville, Maryland</td>
<td>1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harlem Literary and Scientific Academy</td>
<td>Harlem, New York</td>
<td>1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Literary and Scientific Academy</td>
<td>Buffalo, New York</td>
<td>1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duff Military Academy</td>
<td>Cooperstown, New York</td>
<td>1838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania Military, Scientific and Collegiate Institute</td>
<td>Bucks County, Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Prior to 1842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Military Institute</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burlington Military College</td>
<td>Burlington, New Jersey</td>
<td>1846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yonkers Military Institute</td>
<td>Yonkers, New York</td>
<td>1852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagleswood Military Academy</td>
<td>Perth Amboy, NJ</td>
<td>1861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collegiate and Commercial Institute</td>
<td>New Haven, Connecticut</td>
<td>1863</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1842 Prospectus for the Pennsylvania Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy provides a sense of the management and educational philosophies of these schools. Students lived a spartan existence; their few possessions were “… a single mattress and pillow, with the necessary bedding, two chairs, a medium sized table, with drawer, or a writing desk, with a small book case at the back, four napkins, a pitcher and two tumblers.”\(^{159}\)

The academics were demanding and eclectic. Students were taught:\(^{160}\)

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\(^{159}\) Alden Partridge, Prospectus of the Pennsylvania Literary, Scientific, and Military Institute, Sweringen Family Papers, Missouri Historical Society Collection (St. Louis: 1842). See Appendix H for the complete Prospectus.

\(^{160}\) Ibid.
Admission standards, however, were not similarly rigorous. Basic English language skills, penmanship, grammar, and arithmetic were prerequisites, but not at a high level since eleven year-old students (and younger) were allowed to apply. The school’s goal, inferred from the curriculum, was to offer young men a broad, liberal education surrounded by the discipline of military life. In this, the academy was similar to most of the military academies, North and South.

**MILITARY ACADEMIES OF THE SOUTH**

A look at Southern military educational opportunities provides a useful and informative counterpoint to those of their future Northern adversaries. Until secession, the United States was one country, and the approaches to military education did not recognize the Mason-Dixon line. Educational themes that arose in the South were often as relevant to the Union Army as those that developed in the North.

Proportionally, education in the South was significantly more militarized than in the North, and was a subject of debate even before the War began. An in-depth discussion of the nature of militarism in the antebellum South is beyond the scope of this work. However, a summary of the contrasting points of view provides context for understanding the popularity of military academies in the region.
Some scholars of the antebellum South, and particularly historian John Hope Franklin in *The Militant South*, contended that Southerners were peculiarly militaristic and that their aggressiveness contributed to regional tensions and ultimately to the Civil War. The frequency of duels, the popularity of militia service, the romantic panoply of a *land of cavaliers*, and the violence of slave suppression all point, and point correctly, to a region that loved a violent life. However, many of the same factors, and exacerbated by growing economically-based violence (e.g., labor uprisings in the coal fields of Pennsylvania), demonstrated that the South did not hold a monopoly on aggression or violence.\(^{161}\)

Did this militancy translate into a peculiar attraction to military academies? Franklin and Hanson suggest that the Southern support of regional and state military academies was another contributor to its aggressive spirit. However, a question of cause and effect arises. Did these schools enjoy public support because they reflected Southern militancy, or because they fostered it? The South’s increasing paranoia about the North’s intentions toward slavery also colors the analysis of Southern motivations. Allardice argues that that by looking at how Southern states supported (or did not support) military schools, a different picture emerges. The South’s egalitarian bias against higher education generally kept it from providing public money for private military schools, and often restricted funding for state-owned military academies. When combined with the anti-communitarian posture of the Southern states, these factors partially distance the South’s interest in military academies from Franklin’s *militant South* thesis.\(^{162}\)

An analysis of antebellum military academies in North Carolina shows that there was significant support for these schools prior to the sectional crisis’ boiling over into the Civil War, and that the interest was not limited to the plantation classes. Several academies were supported by families from the Carolina highlands where unionist sentiment was strong and slaves were relatively rare. Rather than promoting Southern

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militancy, the academies focused on the republican values of the Revolution and on postgraduate community service.\footnote{Ross, "To Prepare Our Sons," 3.}

The role of the militia, its prominence in the less-settled lands of the South and in its defense of the \textit{peculiar institution}, and its demonstrated military ineffectiveness also contributed to interest in military education. As sectional tensions increased in the late 1850’s, there was a growing understanding among professional soldiers that the militia system was ineffective—ratifying the opinion of senior officers from as early as the American Revolution. The militia officers were often political hacks, the men untrained, and the annual or semi-annual musters a social rather than a militarily educational occasion. Many of the pre-War Southern governors saw college-level military education as the solution to this problem and made moves to establish military academies in their states. Often, as in the case of schools in Virginia, Georgia, and Arkansas, the authorizing legislation provided specific requirements that graduates of these schools would have a role in the local militias and would act as their drillmasters.\footnote{McCullough, \textit{1776}; Allardice, "West Points of the Confederacy," 313. \textit{Peculiar institution} is the polite Southern euphemism for slavery.}

The romanticism of the South also contributed to its abiding interest in military education. What could be more stirring and chivalrous that stalwart young cadets in gray marching in perfect line, accoutrements and weapons gleaming, while their younger brothers gazed on enviously, and the young women stared in rapture? It was not just the World War II era that declared \textit{everyone loves a man in a uniform}. This is a longstanding artifact of American culture, and contributed to the attraction of military academies.

All of these factors in complex combination led to the creation of at least 95 military academies throughout the antebellum South. Arguably, the two most successful schools were the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and The Citadel of South Carolina. VMI in Lexington was established in 1839 to provide both military education and guards for the region’s arsenal and was organized from the start on the model of the U.S.M.A. by Claude Crozet of West Point. Its first superintendent, Col. Francis H. Smith, was a graduate of the Academy Class of 1833 and a professor at West Point for two years. VMI was successful as both a military institution and as a model for other academic
imitators. It provided 30 generals and 500 field officers to the Confederacy from among its 500 graduates and 1,200 matriculated students through mid-1861.¹⁶⁵

VMI’s admission standards required competence in basic mathematics and English, and its curriculum was focused on science, engineering, and modern languages rather than the classics studied by its neighbor, the University of Virginia in Charlottesville which focused on liberal arts. The West Point demerit system was applied at the school along with its strict system of minute-by-minute military discipline.

VMI shared the Academy’s focus on engineering. However, it had a stated goal that was significantly different from any part of West Point’s mission. It was structured to be a provider of teachers, first for the Virginia Commonwealth and then for other regional schools. Each county in Virginia was allocated two slots in the yearly entering class for “State” students who were allowed to attend VMI for free, but owed a two year teaching obligation to Virginia upon graduation. To ensure the success of these and other VMI students interested in being educators, its superintendent provided recommendations, offered advice to other states and private citizens’ groups on how to create a military academy, pointed out the best sources for uniforms and textbooks, and promoted techniques for lobbying state legislatures for academic funding.¹⁶⁶

The South Carolina Military Academy (The Citadel and The Arsenal) opened in Charleston and Columbia in 1842. Along with providing a military education to curb the undisciplined natures of South Carolina youth, it was responsible for supplying guards for the state arsenal. First year students received their training in Columbia at The Arsenal, and then transferred to Charleston for the next three years. Both the discipline and educational systems were similar to West Point’s and VMI’s.¹⁶⁷

As VMI and The Citadel began to produce graduates, these men looked for teaching positions at other, usually Southern military academies and promoted the creation of military education in many Southern states—often as a way of providing

¹⁶⁵ Barnard, Military Schools and Courses of Instruction, 825, 190; Reeves, Military Education in the United States, 188.
themselves with employment. This situation led to an explosion of military academies throughout the South. A partial list of Southern schools is shown in Table 2-7. 168

Table 2-7  Identified Southern Military Academies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Founded in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brandon State Military Institute</td>
<td>Brandon, Mississippi</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King’s Mountain Military Institute</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi Military Institute</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson College</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Polytechnic Institute</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowden College</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Florida Seminary</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quincy Military Academy</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas Military Academy</td>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas Military Academy</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Alabama</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Arsenal</td>
<td>Columbia, South Carolina</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina Military Institute</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemper Military School</td>
<td>Booneville, Missouri</td>
<td>1844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina Classical, Military, and Scientific Academy</td>
<td>Raleigh, North Carolina</td>
<td>1845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Raleigh Military Academy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky Military Institute</td>
<td>Frankfort, Kentucky</td>
<td>1847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia Military Institute</td>
<td>Marietta, Georgia</td>
<td>1851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewanee Military Academy</td>
<td>Sewanee, Tennessee</td>
<td>1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana State Seminary of Learning and Military Academy</td>
<td>Baton Rouge, Louisiana</td>
<td>1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Louisiana State University)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillsborough Military Academy</td>
<td>Hillsborough, North Carolina</td>
<td>1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaGrange Military Institute</td>
<td>LaGrange, Alabama</td>
<td>1860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glenville Military Institute</td>
<td>Glenville, Alabama</td>
<td>1860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marion Institute</td>
<td>Marion, Alabama</td>
<td>1842 (military in 1848)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bingham School</td>
<td>Asheville, North Carolina</td>
<td>1793 (military in 1864)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Hillsborough Military Academy of North Carolina was typical of the less well-known Southern schools. It was founded in 1859 on a combination of Partridge’s

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and Thayer’s philosophies—to provide both engineering and military tactical training for young men. Before the War, its cadets were admired for the precision of their drill and the smartness of their military bearing at militia assemblies and country fairs. Wartime brought a more important purpose; over 200 of its graduates, faculty, and older students joined the Confederate army, and its cadets served as drillmasters for militiamen and recruits.169

Like most military schools, Hillsborough initially relied on private funding but was chartered by the North Carolina legislature in 1860 as a public institution, leading to a large tax exemption and the status of a degree granting school. Not coincidentally, the school’s headmaster was appointed a colonel in the North Carolina militia and many of its faculty members were designated as officers. The state was preparing for the coming conflict.170

The curriculum at Hillsborough shown in Table 2-8 strongly resembled West Point’s with an emphasis on mathematics and social science:171

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Year</th>
<th>Courses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 1 – Fifth Year Students</td>
<td>Arithmetic, algebra, French, history, English grammar, geography, orthography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 2 – Fourth Year Students</td>
<td>Algebra, trigonometry, French, Latin, universal history, composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 3 – Third Year Students</td>
<td>Descriptive geometry, analytical geometry, surveying, French, Latin, rhetoric, history of English literature, landscape and human figure drawing, elocution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 4 – Second Year Students</td>
<td>Calculus, natural philosophy, chemistry, rhetoric, logic, moral philosophy, Latin, topographical drawing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5 – First Year Students</td>
<td>Agricultural chemistry, astronomy, geology, mineralogy, civil engineering, roads, railroads, field fortifications, philosophy, political economy, evidence of Christianity, Constitution of the U.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like many military schools in the South, Hillsborough attempted to reopen after the collapse of the Confederacy. A few schools such as VMI, The Citadel, and the

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169 Allardice, "West Points of the Confederacy."
170 Ross, "To Prepare Our Sons," 16.
University of Alabama were able to revive in spite of dispersed or dead faculty and students, ruined buildings and libraries, hostile Reconstruction legislatures, and the general financial collapse of the region. Hillsborough was not among them.

**SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY MOVEMENT**

Starting with one school at West Point, the military academy movement spread across the United States in a relatively short period of time and had a profound effect on education in this country. Not only did thousands of young men learn essentially a single system of drill and tactics that were uniformly applied during the Civil War, but the proliferation of academies also had an impact on the civilian development of the country.

The distribution of academies made a difference in the early success of Confederate arms during the War. A six-to-one preponderance of military institutions, coupled with at least a minimal predisposition towards militarism and a less urbanized environment, all contributed to a higher standard of leadership in the rebel armies that in the Union. Between 11,000 and 12,000 Southern military academy graduates and students served in the Confederate armies.\(^{172}\)

However, these schools were not the only reasons for superior early Confederate leadership. Grant notes that there were also structural characteristics of the Southern army that took better advantage of their officer pool:

Seeing these officers who had been educated for the profession of arms; both at school and in actual war, which is a far more efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the South possessed over the North at the beginning of the rebellion. They had from thirty to forty percent of the educated soldiers of the Nation. They had no standing army and, consequently, these trained soldiers had to find employment with the troops from their own States. In this way what there was of military education and training was distributed throughout their whole army. The whole loaf was leavened.\(^{173}\)

On the civilian side of the equation, the comparative importance of the academy movement was so great that the four cataclysmic years of war can almost be minimized as “the late unpleasantness” in the popular term of the post-War South. Before the advent of military academies, the United States had one system of higher education that wasictionary.
based on the classical, liberal arts model. There were few opportunities for young men to learn engineering and science—the two disciplines that could contribute most to the infrastructure of the slowly diminishing wilderness that was most of this country in the early 19th Century.

While learning Greek and Latin might arguably be useful and part of the education of a complete person, the classics were not the educational dynamos that made the United States a world power. Scientific and engineering education, which was almost wholly concentrated in the academies, was the mainspring for the industrial age in this country and changed the United States from an agrarian society to an industrial powerhouse. In an era where there were few other options for modern scientific training, the military academies filled a gap that civilian colleges and universities could not.

The matriculation statistics for U.S.C.T. officers at antebellum military academies are poorly documented at this time, although this may be an area for future research. Most of the academies were short-lived and left no records of any sort, so lists of students are sketchy and formal cross-references to Army service records appear to be non-existent. The few memoirs of U.S.C.T. officers rarely mention academic training at these institutions. Officers such as George Tate, however, somehow received thorough educations according to the standards of the day. Tate’s diaries for 1863 through 1865 are peppered with comments about books read such as Milton’s *Paradise Lost*, letters written to newspapers, articles read from journals, and voluminous correspondence with friends and family members. Perhaps Tate was the product of a common-school education or, more likely given his level of erudition, had attended a university prior to the War. However, it is reasonable to speculate that he and his officer compatriots of the U.S.C.T. were not products of the military academies, since we can hypothesize (based on the anecdotes of officers from Norwich and the high number of officers fielded by VMI) that those with prior military education would have already been commissioned in the white regiments; no more than 20 percent of the U.S.C.T. officers had already held commissions.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁴ Tate, Diary.
OTHER ROUTES FOR OFFICER PREPARATION

West Point and the academies were the most visible sources of military officers, but formal education was not the only route for officer preparation. Many of the leaders of Union regiments received tactical military training in militia companies, the Wide Awake marching clubs during the 1860 campaign, volunteer units from other wars, and the original three-months regiments called at the beginning of the Civil War.

Only 13 years before the Civil War, units in the Mexican War had been led by a combination of professional officers from West Point and volunteer officers who received temporary wartime commissions. Many served with the Union Army when War came in 1861. Unlike less experienced volunteer officers, these veterans had the advantage of having seen combat first hand and an understanding what it meant to lead troops against a determined enemy. State governors were usually happy to have Mexican War veterans apply for commissions, even those like Sam Grant who arrived in Illinois hat in hand and surrounded by rumors of civilian failure and drunkenness. The Blackhawk War, the Seminole War, and European military conflicts also produced a handful of officers with real battlefield experience.\(^{175}\)

Before the War, the militia system was meant to fill the role that the National Guard performs today—a reserve of trained troops who could be called up in time of emergency but are maintained by the States. In spite of America’s romantic attachment to the concept of the minuteman, the experience of the Revolutionary War and War of 1812 demonstrated serious flaws in the concept of untrained civilians briefly coming together for military service. Militia units were meant to correct this situation, but rarely rose about the level of casual soldiers who received little practical drill and enjoyed their yearly musters as social events, not rigorous training exercises. In 1860, for example, the Hamlin Guards of Bangor, Maine spent most of their drill time campaigning for Abraham Lincoln.\(^{176}\)

Many of the men who volunteered for the 1861’s three-month regiments came from the State militias. In the more intense training environment of Federal service and

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\(^{175}\) Grant, Memoirs, 84, 118. Sam Grant, of course, was General and President Ulysses S. Grant.

under the stress of actual combat, they often learned basic skills in drill and 
adadministration that they were able to apply in three-year and U.S.C.T. regiments later.\footnote{Perry, \textit{History of the Thirty-Eighth Regiment Indiana Volunteer Infantry: One of the Three Hundred Fighting Regiments of the Union Army}, 13-14.}

Finally, the presidential campaign of 1860 introduced some young Republican 
men to the rudiments of military drill. The Wide Awake marching clubs that were 
popular throughout the North had a distinctive uniform and, while unarmed, carried 
lanterns and marched in step. The organization “attracted the young and the poor, 
workingmen and mechanics, precisely the kind of men who had flocked to [the Know-
Nothing] lodges in 1854 and 1855” and the same men who would join the Army in the 
early waves of enlistment. The leap from Wide Awake to soldier was minimal, and Wide 
Awake commanders such as Reuben Mussey were first introduced to drill on civilian 

However, many volunteer officers came to their jobs as uneducated in both 
military and traditional subjects as Thomas Wright. His eulogy noted that:

\begin{quote}
His education stopped at the age of 12, something he always regretted as 
he had been in hopes of taking a college course. From the age of 12 until 
19 he was up at sunrise and working until sunset tilling the soil, in that 
period he had managed to save a little and again thought of his college 
course but at that moment the Civil War started. His patriotic feeling 
overcame his desire for further education and he joined the 42nd regiment 
of N.Y.\footnote{Thomas Wright, Wright Papers, Missouri Historical Society Civil War Collection (St. Louis: 1919). Notes from Wright’s Military Order of the Loyal Legion (MOLLUS) memorial service, June 1919.}
\end{quote}
Perhaps it was the staccato beating of a drum and the sight of brass buttons on blue coats in a contraband camp…the stirring voice of a Northern preacher in a church in Philadelphia…a broadside posted on a notice board in Boston, or the quiet urging of a Sea Islands teacher. It could have been as simple as a glimpse of Union soldiers marching by or as complex as the desire to free black brothers and sisters still in bondage in the South. A quick talking recruiter with a honeyed patriotic pitch, or the stirring sight of the National Colors in a breeze. For a multiplicity of reasons, tens of thousands of black men rallied to the Union between 1862 and 1865. Their direct contributions to the war effort were profound and their effect on the United States was far-reaching. In March 1863, Pvt. Horace Tooley of the 123rd New York Infantry clearly saw their importance to the fight to suppress secession and end slavery: "Perhaps the most important event that hastened the success of the Union cause was the decision to use the negroes as soldiers.” Considering the preparation of officers for the U.S.C.T. is less meaningful without first thinking about the soldiers they would lead.\footnote{Horace H. Tooley, Tooley Letters, Gladstone Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute (Carlisle, PA: 1863).}
Who were these black men, and what was the environment in which they served? Some came from Southern plantations, newly escaped from bondage with only their rags and hopes for freedom. Others left small farms and trades in the North. A few dropped out of the country’s best universities, or abandoned lives of wealth and privilege in New Orleans. Not every one was a hero, and some were simply interested in the promise of two filling meals a day, a suit of clothes, and $7 a month\footnote{The pay for black soldiers until June 15, 1863 was $10 per month with $3 withheld for clothing. White privates received $13 per month with no withholding.} than in revenge, lofty goals, or martial glory.\footnote{E. Merton Coulter, *The Civil War and Readjustment in Kentucky* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1926), 203-4. Racist presumptions about African-Americans lived on after the War and became part of the revisionist Lost Cause mythology. In discussing the enlistment of black Union troops in Kentucky, E. Merton Coulter, one of its apologists, admits that many Negroes showed a marked eagerness to volunteer, but goes on to imply that this was due largely to their child-like nature. A shining rifle and a uniform were irresistible but the novelty soon wore off.}

They served in that most important of Civil War army formations—the regiment. With few exceptions, black troops enlisted into their own units designated as U.S. Colored Troops and led by white officers. One area of confusion that arose as the War progressed was the difference between state-sponsored and U.S. regiments. Most of the black regiments raised during the War were composed of freed slaves and were mustered in or near areas that had formerly been part of the Confederacy. These regiments were either immediately designated as U.S.C.T. (e.g., the 62\textsuperscript{nd} U.S. Colored Infantry) or received a state or Corps d’Afrique designation that was later changed to a U.S.C.T. number (e.g., the 1\textsuperscript{st} South Carolina Volunteers became the 33\textsuperscript{rd} U.S.C.I.) A few regiments mustered in Northern states such as the 54\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts retained their state designation. Most of the black infantry regiments known as the U.S. Colored Infantry. Solidly abolitionist Northern states such as Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut started recruiting for the precursors of the U.S.C.T. after the War Department approved the formation of black units in May 1863. Ultimately, 138 U.S.C.I. regiments were formed; 25 regiments came from Northern states, 29 from the Border States (the District of Columbia, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri), and 84 from the Southern states in rebellion. Each regiment, including the 41\textsuperscript{st} and 100\textsuperscript{th}, in its own way and with its
individual story, advanced African-Americans’ journey towards equality and pulled the United States towards its future.\textsuperscript{183}

**MEN OF THE U.S.C.T.**

Black soldiers marched, fought, suffered, and died just as white men did, and they too were an army of young men. The average age of the private soldiers of the 41\textsuperscript{st} U.S.C.I. was 25.5 years, the median was 23, and the mode was 18. For the 100\textsuperscript{th}, the average age of 25.4, median of 24, and mode of 18 were nearly identical. In the 41\textsuperscript{st}, 62 percent were 25 or under; in the 100\textsuperscript{th}, 61 percent. However, there were substantial differences in the regiments. Table 3-1 shows the states of birth of the 41\textsuperscript{st} and the distribution of pre-enlistment occupations. Table 3-2 shows the same information for the 100\textsuperscript{th}; a few interesting patterns emerge. The 100\textsuperscript{th} was truly a Kentucky regiment with more than 85 percent of its soldiers born in the state. The 41\textsuperscript{st}, on the other hand, had only a tenuous connection with the state where it was formed, drawing more heavily from New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland before Pennsylvanians appear. Both regiments were built primarily from laborers and farmers, reflecting the low socioeconomic status of blacks at the time, but the 41\textsuperscript{st} had more diversity in occupation. Both regiments also contained a small number of blacks born in other countries. Review of the soldiers both within and outside the sample groups showed Canadians, West Indians, and Chileans. In most cases, these were seamen who chose to support the War effort on land. Over the course of the War, 1,355 officers and men served with the 41\textsuperscript{st}; 104 died and 132 deserted. In the 100\textsuperscript{th}, 1,403 served; 222 died and 30 deserted.\textsuperscript{184}


\textsuperscript{184} AGO, Regimental Books, 41st U.S.C.I; AGO, Regimental Books, 100th U.S.C.I. Mean, median, and mode age statistics for the 41\textsuperscript{st} are based on a 100 percent sample of the regiment, and for the 100\textsuperscript{th} on a 20 percent sample. Birth state and occupation sample sizes are 20 percent for the 41\textsuperscript{st} and 10 percent for the 100\textsuperscript{th}. The disparity in sample size reflects the greater homogeneity of the troops of the 100\textsuperscript{th}. 
Some black troops were not all uneducated, newly freed slaves. While the majority of blacks in the Army could not read or write, many black soldiers were literate and sometimes had common-school or college educations. Like white soldiers, they wrote to their friends and families, army and government officials, and to newspapers. However, because a smaller fraction of the U.S.C.T. were educated and did not have access to white publishing resources after the War, their voices are less frequently heard.
and their personal records are harder to find. This study has not identified any memoirs, personal letters, or diaries from the men of the 41st or 100th.

A few men of the U.S.C.T. did communicate with the public during the War. Many wrote letters to the editors of abolitionist newspapers such as the Christian Recorder of Philadelphia and the Weekly Anglo-African of New York City. The Christian Recorder was the official newspaper of the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church, founded in 1816 by black Methodist congregations who had rebelled against the discrimination of their white religious counterparts. The AME Church established the Christian Recorder in 1853 to communicate with its members and provide a forum for black writers. It published several letters each week from black soldiers. The Weekly Anglo-African was founded in 1859 for free blacks in the Northeast United States. While it printed primarily religious news, it was non-denominational and stridently abolitionist. This and other black publications urged Northern free blacks to enlist once the Emancipation Proclamation was promulgated.

The most striking characteristic that emerges from the words of the men of the U.S.C.T. is how much they resembled all the other Union soldiers of the time.

They were very much like other men. General Saxton, examining with some impatience a long list of questions from some philanthropic Commission at the North, respecting the traits and habits of the freedmen, had some staff-officer answer them all in two words, - 'Intensely human.'

Their concerns were much the same as those of their white fellow soldiers—when would the War be over, when would they be paid, did the high command know what it was doing, were the people at home supporting the troops? At the same time, they expressed both concern and hope for a future where they would be treated as full citizens and respected as men. Perhaps the greatest tragedy of the Civil War is their betrayal by their government in the subsequent years.

The health of the freedmen recruited for the U.S.C.T. was similar to that of white recruits. Dr. J. C. Elliott of the 100th U.S.C.I. rejected about one-fourth of the men recruited because of disability, although the standard War Department regulations

186 Ibid., x-xi.
187 Higginson, Army Life, 260.
allowed substantially greater physical deficiencies than modern practice (e.g., blindness in the left eye and difficulties in using the left hand were not disqualifiers.) In his post-War report of March 1866, J. H. Baxter, Chief Medical Officer of the Provost Marshal General’s Bureau, summarized the Army medical establishment’s view of the health of black recruits, noting that of 26 surgeons “five have given their opinion that the negro recruits and substitutes examined by them were physically a better class of men than the whites; nineteen that they were equal; two that they were inferior.”

Black soldiers came from all of the Southern and Border States, and from most of the North. The magnitude of their participation in the War effort was surprising (Table 3-1). While the number of men enlisting in the North and Border states is artificially inflated by recruits who had recently escaped from states further to the South, the statistics are still meaningful and impressive—nearly two-thirds of all Northern blacks of military age became soldiers, nearly half of those in Kentucky, a third of Tennessee, and a quarter of Louisiana. Overall as shown in Table 3-3, 18 percent of all eligible black men served in the United States in spite of the South’s control of most of its territory and black population up to the very end of the War.


### Table 3-3 U.S. Colored Troops by State of Enlistment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>4,969</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>105,820</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>24,052</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>96,532</td>
<td>24.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>17,869</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>104,768</td>
<td>17.1</td>
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<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>5,035</td>
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<td>79,058</td>
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<td>20,133</td>
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<td>62,787</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>44,064</td>
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<td>5,723</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>127,042</td>
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<td>All Southern states</td>
<td>93,346</td>
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<td>863,180</td>
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<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>3,369</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>23,703</td>
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<td>8,344</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Border states</td>
<td>44,134</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>123,429</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>All Northern states</strong></td>
<td>46,637</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>62,273</td>
<td>74.9</td>
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<td>Colorado Terr.</td>
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<td>184,117</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,048,882</td>
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By the War’s close, 2,751 black soldiers and 143 of their officers would be killed in combat—only 7.5 percent of the nearly 37,000 U.S.C.T. fatalities. Twenty percent of all the men who enlisted would die in the service of their country, and tens of thousands more would be wounded, become ill, or be disabled.\textsuperscript{190}

When black units were allowed into combat, their initial performance was akin to that of untried white regiments—they were unpredictable and would often run from their first encounter with the enemy. But, as with whites, veteran U.S.C.T. regiments were often formidable fighters. One key factor that contributed to their effectiveness was that they had a personal reason for fighting. Beyond the abstracts of flag and the Union, they battled to establish and keep their own freedom and that of their families.\textsuperscript{191}

For some, self-preservation was sufficient motivation. Most black troops knew that there was a strong probability that they would be murdered if captured or, perhaps worse, returned to slavery. The Confederate government had announced that any captured soldiers would be treated as runaway slaves rather than prisoners of war, and that any blacks captured bearing arms would be executed. This was not an idle threat—at Fort Pillow in 1864, Nathan Bedford Forrest executed black and white prisoners, and there were many less notorious but equally deadly occasions of battlefield executions of captured troops such as after the battle of Poison Spring, Arkansas in 1861. It was clear to the U.S.C.T. that surrender might mean death. Only Lincoln’s threat to execute Confederate prisoners on a one-for-one basis kept the South’s rage against the U.S.C.T. in check. Grant supported the black troops and Lincoln’s position in his response to Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s 1864 request for a prisoner exchange: “The Government is bound to secure to all persons received into her Armies the rights due to soldiers. This being denied by you in the persons of such men as have escaped from Southern Masters induces me to decline making the exchanges you ask.”\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{190} Fox, \textit{Regimental Losses}, 53.
The black soldiers took satisfaction in the likelihood that their white officers might be executed too. Col. Thomas W. Higginson of the 1st South Carolina Volunteers (33rd U.S.C.I.)—an abolitionist, radical minister, essayist, and friend of John Brown—understood the practical implications of Southern hostility for his officers and men: “It helped their esprit de corps immensely. With us, at least, there was to be no play-soldier” However, this concern may have been misplaced. Of the 281 out of 7,683 officers of the U.S.C.T. who died, only nine (3 percent and .1 percent of all U.S.C.T. officers) were killed under suspicious circumstances that indicate murder either by Confederate troops or civilians.193

Black men could strike a blow against slavery and demonstrate their worthiness to be citizens, but they needed encouragement. Leaders such as Frederick Douglass provided this for literate blacks of the North; Union soldiers, recruiters, teachers, and missionaries fulfilled the same role among the rarely literate freedmen of the South. In May 1863, the Federal government established the Bureau for Colored Troops to improve the recruiting, training, and leadership of black units. As the War ground to its close in the charnel house of the 1864-1865 Overland campaign and the devastation of Sherman’s March, black soldiers played important roles at Petersburg and Nashville. By 1865, virtually all of the military security on the Southern Atlantic coast was provided by black troops, freeing tens of thousands of white troops for field operations. Arguably, the availability of black soldiers for assignments in less active areas made the equivalent of Grant and Meade’s entire Army of the Potomac available for combat in 1865.194

THE TRAVAILS OF RECRUITING

I asked myself why these men, so strong, so capable, and so willing, should not be allowed to act a part in the great drama, and hasten its close?195

Stand in a quiet park on a humid, summer evening and listen carefully—you can almost hear the voices of a group of young black men in the midst of war.

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193 Higginson, Army Life, 251; Fox, Regimental Losses; James G. Hollandsworth, "The Execution of White Officers from Black Units by Confederate Forces During the Civil War," Louisiana History 35, no. 4 (1994): 476. The Official Army Register was the source of the data for Hollandsworth’s study.
194 Redkey, ed., A Grand Army of Black Men, 6. Foster’s relatively low rank was an indication of the slight importance that the War Department initially placed on the U.S.C.T.
They are dressed in rags and recently escaped from plantations to the South, gathered around a campfire in a freedmen’s refugee camp near Gallatin, Tennessee in May 1864. They talk of the same things that young men have always discussed—women, work, food—with the easy banter that comes from shared experience. But included in their conversation is another topic: should we don the Union’s blue and go for a soldier? The voices become softer and the men more thoughtful. Friends have died in the War or returned to the camp missing an arm or a leg, with no prospects of doing the manual labor that is their only way to make a living. Rumors that the Federal government will re-enslave its black soldiers after the War are made more believable by the $6 dollar per month difference between their salary and that of the white troops. Sleep is hard when such a decision is pending.

A white officer joins their circle and begins to speak of glory and duty and honor. He tells them of the revenge they can wreak on the slaveholders and their responsibility to their distant, still-enslaved families. He appeals to their pride as men and shows them the bounty that each will receive when they enlist. He talks about the fine regiment that is forming and how it will be the tool in God’s hand that will destroy the South and slavery forever. Finally, he tells them that he will return tomorrow with enlistment forms—they only have to make their “X”. The men listen intently, and the seemingly endless conversation continues as the recruiter leaves the circle of firelight. In the morning, twelve will enlist in the 100th U.S. Colored Infantry.

The common soldiers of the 41st and 100th U.S.C.I. appear to have left no records of their thoughts, and we can only speculate on what brought them to the colors. What we do know is that there were diverse paths that black men followed into the U.S.C.T. Stirring street rallies and strident abolitionist newspapers in Union cities filled the ranks of the early Northern black regiments. Virtually all of the units formed in the Southern and Border States were signed up by recruiters who were appointed by state governors, the prospective commanders of black companies or regiments, the Adjutant General, or the Bureau for Colored Troops. In early 1863, most of the recruiters represented states that were in the forefront of black enlistment. Recruiters, for example, from Massachusetts operated in Pennsylvania and Ohio, trying to fill the ranks of the 54th and 55th Massachusetts. The governors of these recruiting grounds were not pleased; with the expectation that they too would be forming black units in the near future, they resented having their most committed and idealistic (and often literate) recruits siphoned off by other states.

Early official recruiting activities in the Border or newly conquered states were often inept and abortive. In 1862, Maj. Gen. David Hunter began recruiting in
the South Carolina coastal islands after meeting with Abram Murchison, a dynamic black minister, and hearing of the newly freed slaves’ eagerness to fight. Hunter called a meeting of freedmen on Hilton Head Island to determine if they would be willing to join the army, and the initial response was encouraging. However, the War Department was not yet ready to accept black recruits and Hunter’s activities were repudiated—but Hunter’s desire to see blacks in Union uniform was undiminished.196

In the early years in Hunter’s District and throughout the conquered South, black recruiting efforts usually began benignly, but often ended in high-handed coercion and a de facto draft. Unfortunately for recruiters, the enticements of a life of freedom and concerns about the former slaves’ families made registration of potential soldiers difficult. To alleviate this problem, Hunter decided to order the collection and registration of all candidates capable of fighting. His adjutant informed Edward Pierce, a Treasury agent and representative of Northern benevolent organizations assisting escaped slaves, of Hunter’s command of May 11, 1862 that plantation owners would “send to Beaufort to-morrow morning every able-bodied negro between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, capable of bearing arms.” Pierce was appalled by the order and protested to Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase who handed the problem to Secretary of War Stanton. Hunter’s actions, which also included an emancipation degree affecting both freedmen and the slaves of loyal citizens, were rejected. Hunter eventually

was able to raise black units in South Carolina, but his approach was inflammatory to both the Union high command and local sentiments.\(^{197}\)

Heavy handed recruiting was not limited to the Carolina coast. In Louisiana in September 1862, a plantation supervisor complained that an officer “took away 23 of our best men, two carts, and 6 mules from Payne plantation. He was intoxicated. When we showed him our protection, he cursed all the men represented therein. He has not left a man able to work on the plantation.” With the slaves removed, the plantation could no longer able to function, and its absentee owner would soon protest to the military government.\(^{198}\)

Kentucky too had problems finding black volunteers. General Augustus L. Chetlain (Figure 3-3) began to seize slaves in December 1863 to increase the number of potential soldiers. Companies of white and black troops were ordered to bring in black men who appeared to be in good health and capable of combat, and the Government compensated the slaves’ masters up to $300 per man. Needless to say, this approach was unpopular with the conservative state government and some wealthy slave owners.\(^{199}\)

Mussey’s October 10, 1864 report to the Bureau for Colored Troops provides some of the best detail about recruiting operations in the Western theater and Kentucky’s mixed opposition and support for recruiting. He found that slaves were fleeing from across Kentucky to the Tennessee recruiting stations and that this was putting pressure on the governor of Kentucky to allow recruiting in his state, simply as a defensive measure.

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\(^{197}\) Westwood, "Generals David Hunter and Rufus Saxon and Black Soldiers," 169.
\(^{199}\) John D. Smith, "The Recruitment of Negro Soldiers in Kentucky, 1863-1865," *Register of the Kentucky Historical Society* 72, no. 4 (1974): 386. Augustus L. Chetlain (1824-1914) was another of the key officers who actively promoted the use of black soldiers by the Union. After a common-school education, he became a merchant in Galena, Illinois and was elected captain in an early regiment, and progressed through the ranks to colonel. Commanding at Corinth, Mississippi in 1862, he raised the first black regiment in the Western theater.
to retain the black enlistments as an offset against his white recruiting goals. The people of Kentucky who had strongly resisted recruiting, but: “By the time the 100th U.S. Colored Infantry was organized I had received numerous letters from loyal Kentuckians praying for the formation of colored regiments in their State.”

One of the major complications of recruiting in the Border States was that a person could be simultaneously “loyal” and a slaveholder. Formation of the 100th U.S.C.I. in Kentucky had been delayed because of the opposition from loyal slaveholders to emancipation and the enlistment of black troops. With the approach of the 1864 presidential election, Governor Thomas E. Bramlette asked Lincoln to suspend black recruiting since it was drawing slaves away from plantations, and privately prepared a proclamation calling for resistance to the Federal government if it continued to enroll slaves. While drawing back from an open rupture with Washington, Bramlette continued to push for a cessation of recruiting, and obtained a promise from Lincoln that any counties supplying their quota to the draft would not be targets for black recruiting. In addition, black Kentucky recruits would not be trained in the state. Kentucky was unable to fulfill its white draft quotas, so widespread enlistment of blacks began in April 1864, opening the way for the 100th’s creation in May. Because of the stipulation in the Emancipation Proclamation that it only applied to states in rebellion against the Union, an act of Congress in March 1865 was needed to free the wives and children of Kentucky’s black soldiers, including those of the 100th.

The pattern of recruiting difficulties was repeated in Missouri, the third major Border State. Governor Hamilton R. Gamble initially insisted that he approve recruiters for black units before they began their activities. When Maj. General John M. Schofield, commander of the Department of the Missouri, refused to honor Gamble’s order, the governor allowed the recruiting of blacks as long as they were not the slaves of loyal owners and if the units would not be designated as Missouri regiments. Thus, many of the men recruited in Missouri in 1863 were known as Arkansas Volunteers. However, the manpower pool of slaves of disloyal owners was soon exhausted, and the Army began

200 R. Mussey to C. Foster, October 10, 1864, Official Records, Series 3, 4:768.
to entice and draft bondsmen of loyal owners. Needless to say, this policy was unpopular with the slave owners of Missouri, but did result an influx of manpower into the U.S.C.T.\footnote{John W. Blassingame, "The Recruitment of Negro Troops in Missouri during the Civil War," \textit{Missouri Historical Review} 58, no. 3 (1964), 329.}

Slaveholder dissatisfaction with Government recruiting policies led Lincoln to suspend the enlistment of black troops in Missouri by late 1863 except with presidential approval. Slavery proponents in the state also resisted recruitment through guerilla activity, patrols to block enlistment of slaves, and outright intimidation and murder. Families of enlistees were kidnapped and sold in other states to discourage potential soldiers. The efforts of the slave holders were so successful that few Missouri blacks enlisted in Missouri regiments, although many of those recruited in Kansas, Illinois, and Iowa were actually escaped Missouri slaves.\footnote{Ibid.: 336.}

Tennessee and Alabama were a rich source of black troops and enthusiasm for service was strong, although commitment to patriotism could be tempered by economic considerations. In December 1863, an overseer wrote to his absentee plantation owner that “The order for the enlistment of the able bodied darkies in this state has produced a perfect stampede among them. The last one of my men left this day taking my most valuable mule which I do not expect to recover. There is scarcely a single man of them but what will leave before Christmas. I have conversed with Jack [a slave] on this subject and find that if I will pay him wages he will stay with me.”\footnote{T. Mitchell to J. Sweringen, December 1863, Sweringen Papers, Missouri Historical Society Civil War Collection (St. Louis).} A sea change was happening in the economic structure of the South that was irresistible and had a profound impact on both U.S.C.T. recruiting and the War as a whole.

The Tennessee recruiting well ran dry in 1864. Mussey suggested that, contrary to the Civil War practice in all but a few states, the creation of new regiments be suspended and that only recruiting for replacements to existing regiments be allowed. The result was a flow of new recruits into existing regiments, resulting in relief for units decimated by disease and, more rarely, combat.\footnote{R. Mussey to C. Foster, October 10, 1864, \textit{Official Records, Series 3}, 4:770.}
Most recruiting was part of a concerted but chaotic campaign by the states to enlist black soldiers in 1863. State recruiters came from all walks of life and widely divergent motivations. For example, George L. Stearns, selected by Governor John A. Andrew to recruit for Massachusetts, was a radical abolitionist and religious idealist committed to the destruction of slavery and the advancement of the black race—John Brown possibly carried a pistol given to him by Stearns on his Harpers Ferry raid. In contrast, other recruiters appointed by the state governments had a deservedly underhanded reputation since they worked on commission and had access to the bounty money that the states offered. The combination of minimal supervision, unsophisticated recruits, and large amounts of money were too much of an enticement for many of these men—bounties were frequently unpaid or underpaid, and it was not uncommon for a group of recruits, with bounties prepaid to the recruiter but not passed on to the recruits, to arrive at their camp short a man or ten. Stearns, on the other hand, had a well-deserved reputation both for honesty and irascibility, coupled with intolerance of sleazy dealings.

As with so many aspects of the Civil War, politics and military considerations frequently combined in raising black troops. Recruiters (including company-level officers) were appointed by the governors of Northern states who were keen to reserve the enlistments of their black populations for their own state draft quotas. Governor David Tod of Ohio, for example, appointed John Langston and O.S.B. Wall as recruiters for the 127th Ohio in June 1863 to stem the flow of free Ohio blacks who were attempting to join the Massachusetts units.206

While many recruiters were enticed by the opportunities for profit and graft, others took the job from ideological principle or religious commitment. James T. Ayers enlisted in the 129th Illinois Infantry in 1862 at the age of 57 and served with that regiment until December 1863. He was assigned as a recruiter of blacks and held that position until he resigned from the task in October 1864 and returned to his unit. Ayers approach was effective; by calling mass meetings, traveling to rural areas, and appealing to the patriotic, religious, and economic scruples of slaves and freedmen, he was able to help fill the Union Army’s insatiable appetite for men. Beneath the surface of even the

most committed abolitionist, however, often lurked feelings of resentment and racism. Ayers expressed his frustration in 1864 with his job and his charges: “I feel now much inclined to go to Nashville and throw up my papers and Resign as I am hartily sick of Coaxing niggers to be Soldiers Any more. They are so trifleing and mean they don’t Deserve to be free.” In spite of these sentiments, Ayers left the 129th Illinois at the end of the War, took a commission as chaplain with the 104th U.S.C.I., and died in service with the 104th in September 1865.207

Citizens’ committees were an essential part of recruiting efforts in urban areas and could be leveraged to both advertise the regiments under formation and financially assist the effort. George Stearns described the practices to be used by the St. Louis committee supporting his efforts to raise the first two Massachusetts black regiments:

A good Committee even if they do little work always gives respectability to an enterprise like this. Therefore always have a Committee to back up and encourage your working man. If the town is large enough appoint two or more paid agents. These Committees should consist of three (3) or more men of influence taking care to include all the church, political and other distinctive dimensions that may exist in the community and a chairman should be designated and a written authorization be given him … Each Committee should be authorized to pay agents or workers two dollars a head for all recruits raised and a liberal supply of posters and documents be furnished.208

The Philadelphia Supervisory Committee on Colored Enlistments was one of the best examples of how a citizens’ group could impact recruiting efforts. The Philadelphia business and religious communities were frequently approached by the Supervisory Committee for funding, “influence, and sympathy.” With a formation cost of $25,000 per unit exclusive of bounties paid, and since the Pennsylvania black regiments did not receive State financial support, the Committee continually sought money to expand its operations. They also appealed to white self-interest by pointing out that the formation of black regiments would offset the draft calls on the State and further the cause of the Union: “Since volunteering can no longer fill the ranks of our armies, and recourse to

208 G. Stearns to L. Eaton, April 3, 1863, Lucien Eaton Papers 1863-1864, Missouri Historical Society Civil War Collection (St. Louis).
conscription becomes necessary, unreasoning prejudice only can be blind to the fact that every colored recruit acts as an unpurchased substitute for a white man.”209

It was not only the white business and moral establishment who could help with recruiting. Stearns also advised his contacts that “when you go into a town seek out the colored men and also such white men as are most interested in your work…have the most influential men appointed as a committee, taking care that one of these shall be an active [black] man, if possible, one who will enlist.”210 The Philadelphia Supervisory Committee took this advice to heart and contacted Pennsylvania African-Americans through letters, announcements, and speeches. Their goal appeared to be to strike every chord that might resonate with black recruits:

Old prejudice declared that you could not fight. Your brethren in Louisiana and Mississippi, though degraded by ages of servitude, have gloriously replied to that taunt … Prejudice still sneeringly asserts that you will not leave your homes to fight for the flag of the white man. It is for you to repel that taunt, and to show yourselves worthy to call that flag likewise your own … The world will look with interest upon the mighty experiment in which we are engaged, in which a down trodden race is invited to prove its manhood.211

In Nashville, Mussey took a dim view of recruiters and their manipulation of the substitute system that allowed draftees to pay other men to take their place in the Army. Many Northerners arranged for substitute brokers to find black candidates to fulfill their duty. Combined with the corrupting state bounties, the effect on the Army and the reputation of recruiters was wholly negative, according to Mussey: “I believe desertions to have been induced by the system. I know that the honor of several officers has been compromised by it. Of the agents were men who cared nothing for the negro, had no interest in colored troops, and were only interested in making money for themselves, for very few of the many dollars of the bounties ever found their way into the recruits’ pockets; the agents fattened upon them.”212

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209 Supervisory Committee on Colored Enlistments, Request for Support for Enlistment, Hubbard Collection, Ohio Historical Society (Columbus: 1863).
210 G. Stearns to L. Eaton, May 1, 1863, Lucien Eaton Papers 1863-1864, Missouri Historical Society Civil War Collection (St. Louis).
211 Supervisory Committee on Colored Enlistments, Request for Support for Enlistment, Hubbard Collection.
212 R. Mussey to C. Foster, October 10, 1864, Official Records, Series 3, 4:769.
The War Department attempted to exercise a greater measure of control over enlistments and recruiters when it requested Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas (Figure 3-4) to take charge of recruiting activities in the Western theater in 1863. Thomas, an abrasive and arrogant man not welcome in Washington where he was detested by Secretary of War Stanton, was an inspired recruiter who was able to describe the issues of the War and the importance of enlisting in terms that uneducated freedmen could understand. He also brought a sense of purpose and uniformity to the previously chaotic recruiting efforts in the West, while removing his unwelcome presence from the Capitol.213

Thomas’ primary goal was to recruit black troops and organize them into regiments. He successfully convinced white officers and noncoms that service with the U.S.C.T. was an admirable way to fulfill their obligations to the country, and was known for his rousing speeches both to potential black recruits and prospective officers. Thomas was the intellectual force behind the creation of the Bureau for Colored Troops and laid out the policies that regularized black enlistment, along with the creation of field offices and examination boards.

Writing to Secretary Stanton in September 1864, Thomas described his peripatetic activities during the previous year. His ability to select officers and cut through state bureaucracies brought energy and effectiveness to the recruiting process, enlisting “in Kentucky to this date 14,000 colored men, including 1,000 Kentucky negroes recruited at Evansville, for which Kentucky is to receive credit, and 900 sent to Gallatin, Tenn. We now average from 100 to 200 recruits a day, by the end of October the whole number will be 20,000.” The U.S.C.T. was not limited to infantry units; Thomas was also gathering cavalry that “will make one of the very best regiments in the service. I have given it to Colonel Brisbin, who has been most active in its organization. The other cavalry regiment

213 Meier, "Lorenzo Thomas and the Recruitment of Blacks in the Mississippi Valley, 1863-1865,” 249.
I will give to Colonel Wade.” Note the direct appointment of officers by Thomas; this practice is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.  

Retaining his role as Adjutant General of the Army, Thomas was not subordinate to the Bureau, but was a frequent correspondent of Maj. Charles W. Foster, the Bureau’s chief. Thomas continued to focus on recruiting, with 48 infantry regiments created in 1863 and 27 in 1864. He estimated that over 77,000 troops were recruited in the Mississippi Valley under his direction.

To bring more structure to recruiting, the Bureau for Colored Troops inducted George Stearns as a major and appointed him Commissioner for Organization of U.S. Colored Troops in the Mississippi Valley in 1863. He attempted to bring order to the gaggle of captains and lieutenants who had been appointed as recruiters and to bring their activities under control. His young assistant, Capt. Reuben D. Mussey, was a great help, particularly since Stearns was often at odds with the War Department, and Mussey’s diplomatic talents were substantial. Between the two of them, they were for the most part able to make it harder for recruiters to engage in shady practices such as skimming bounties, and to ensure that troops who the recruiters claimed enlisted actually showed up at their regimental assembly points. When Stearns’ inability to work with Secretary Stanton finally boiled over into his resignation, Mussey took on the role of Commissioner and filled it until Lincoln’s assassination in 1865.

The official correspondence of Stearns and Mussey shows that the largest responsibilities of the Commissioner were administrative: arranging for recruiters to travel within their area of operations, adjudicating claims of recruit-snatching among recruiters, approving bounty and travel vouchers, counting recruits, and constituting and overseeing the operations of the examination boards. The Commissioner also defined the process of selection and induction, calling for recruiting parties to be sent rendezvous points and making sure that each man was examined by a surgeon before the enlistment.

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214 L. Thomas to E. Stanton, September 19, 1864, Official Records, Series 3, 4:733. Note that Brisbin was a graduate of the Free Military School (see Chapter Six).
papers were filled out. When everything was complete, the recruit could be entered onto the Muster In Rolls.216

Recruiting mostly occurred at assembly points such as Camp Nelson in Kentucky, Camp Stanton in Maryland; New Berne, North Carolina; Vicksburg, Mississippi; Nashville, Tennessee; Camp Casey in Alexandria, Virginia; Fort Monroe in Tidewater; and Camp William Penn near Philadelphia. They became magnets for black men who wanted to be soldiers, and for the women and children who had escaped slavery with them. Camp Nelson was one of the most popular with over 121 buildings, large barracks, a school, hospital, and mess hall. The placement of the camp points out one of the key concerns addressed by the refugee centers: security. Earlier locations in Kentucky such as Camp Dick Robinson were vulnerable to attack by Confederate guerillas and regular troops since they had no natural defenses. Camp Nelson, on the other hand, was located in the bend of the Kentucky River with high cliffs on three sides and a fortified narrow neck of land on the fourth. As the Union’s initial reason for creating the camps was for them to be supply and induction centers for white units, the Army was anxious to protect them from rebel depredations. The security of the centers drew frightened black refugees, and made them fertile grounds for recruiting activities. In May 1863, Capt. Laurens W. Walcott of the 52nd Illinois Volunteers observed a buzz of activity at a freedmen’s camp near Corinth in Northern Mississippi, particularly among the officers designated as recruiters for the regiment-to-be: “There is a regiment of negroes forming here, numbering already over 700 strong. The officers that are to be are as busy as bees, collecting not honey but darkies to fill their ranks. The soldiers almost without exception favor the idea of raising black troops.”217

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216 USACC, Letters Sent by the Commissioner, Department of the Cumberland, Mar. 1864-Feb. 1865, RG 393-E.1141; USACC, Letters Sent by the Mustering Officer for U.S. Colored Troops, Oct 1963-Jan 1866, RG 393-E.1019; USACC, Records of Capt. R. D. Mussey, 19th U.S. Infantry, Mustering Officer, Nashville, Relating to the Organization of Colored Troops, and of Maj. George L. Stearns, Committee on the Organization of Colored Troops, Dept. of the Cumberland, 1863-64, RG 393-E.1149; USACC, Special Orders Issued by the Commissioner, Dept. of the Cumberland, Jul. 1864-May 1865, RG 393-E.1146; R. Mussey to C. Foster, November 25, 1863, USACC, Letters Sent, RG 393-E.1141; AGO, Regimental Books, 100th U.S.C.T. The nature of the work of recruiting left Mussey vulnerable to unsubstantiated charges of corruption in 1865, but his public and private correspondence makes the charge of financial malfeasance unbelievable. No official action was taken against him.

When a black man enlisted, the next step was a visit with an Army surgeon to certify that he was fit for duty. The recruiting officer was expected to be present at the examination, although this was not always for the protection of unqualified candidates. Rather, it was often an opportunity for the recruiting officer to explain why a candidate who was not completely healthy should be allowed into the Army. Orders from the Adjutant General indicate that the practice of hiring private physicians to perform physicals was widespread, and General Thomas attempted to prohibit this since the possibilities of bribes and payoffs were greater in the civilian establishment.²¹８

The paperwork associated with recruiting was burdensome. Every transaction was recorded in triplicate with a copy sent to the War Department’s Second Auditor with the recruiter’s monthly accounts, another to his superintendent with his monthly return, and a third to the depot at the time the recruits are sent there. When a soldier reenlisted, yet another copy of the enlistment form was sent to regimental headquarters for filing.²¹⁹

Mussey believed that the combination of General Sherman’s opposition to black troops, poor transportation, a lack of qualified recruits, and the bounty and substitute systems all contributed to a decline in black recruiting in 1864. The Federal and State governments were also feeling the financial pinch of the process that had evolved; the recruiting costs of over $100 million are shown in Table 3-3. Combined with the bounty system, the costs of recruiting were exorbitantly expensive. In 2005 dollars, the total of $104,566,316 would be almost $124 billion.²²⁰

²¹⁹ Ibid., 2:918.
Table 3-3  Cost of Recruiting and Bounties (1865 dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Funds for collecting, drilling, and organizing volunteers</th>
<th>Funds to pay advanced bounty</th>
<th>Funds for enrollment, draft, and procurement of substitutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1862</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1863</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1864</td>
<td>10,700,000</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1865</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$40,700,000</td>
<td>$37,500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To October 1863</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,518,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To October 1864</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15,188,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To December 1865</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>659,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$26,366,316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bounties particularly were blamed for the decline in the number and quality of Union troops, so much so that Congress eventually passed an ineffectual law requiring that volunteers be credited to their place of residence rather than their place of enlistment so that bounty seekers could not “shop” for higher bounties from state to state. The Adjutant General’s post-War report on the bounty system indicted both the system and the men who abused it. “Locality fraud” where a man would enlist in one town, desert, and then enlist in another, was rampant. There was a general, and seemingly accurate perception that men who would only enlist because of a bounty were also less than trustworthy in other ways. The report noted that “under these circumstances the business of recruiting assumed a mercenary character.”

In spite of the difficulties and corruption, recruiters delivered a substantial portion of the Union’s 187,000 black troops. The Army grudgingly welcomed them into its establishment and attempted to turn them into soldiers. Pvt. H. H. Tooley’s assessment in 1864 was “Let them fight for their own freedom. At least help as it will benefit them more than it will us if they once get them to know what they are fighting for and interested in the cause. They will be good soldiers.”

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221 “An Act to further regulate and provide for the enrolling and calling out the National Forces, and for other purposes,” Congressional Record, 38th Congress, 1st Session, Ch. 237, http://www.yale.edu/glc/archive/963.htm (accessed 9/13/2005); J. B. Fry to E. Stanton, March 17, 1866, Official Records, Series 3, 5:674.

222 Tooley, March 23, 1863, Tooley Letters.
MUSTERING THE 41ST AND 100TH U.S.C.I.

As the white manpower pool declined and resistance to the draft stiffened, more and more blacks were taken into the army—and then drafted when even their enthusiasm for the suppression of the South was insufficient to provide enough bodies for the great killing machine of 1864-1865. Once men were recruited, they began a process that culminated in their muster into service—the process of officially recording the names and demographic information of the members of a regiment and swearing them into the Army.

As the prerequisite for active duty, the Adjutant General’s office took the military education of the new soldiers seriously in their instructions to recruiters in 1864: “The instruction of the recruits will commence at the rendezvous from the moment of enlistment. The general superintendent will see that all recruiting officers give particular attention to this subject.” The new recruits would soon find themselves undergoing intense, repetitive training that would turn them into a close knit, well-drill fighting unit.223

The War Department kept close tabs on how musters were conducted since this was the process used to associate new recruits with regiments. Without an accurate accounting of men as they joined their companies, battalions, and regiments, the entire bureaucratic system of the Army would collapse. The implications of failure in the bureaucracy were severe: men might not be fed or clothed, pay would not arrive, generals would not know how to aggregated regiments into brigades, the mail system would operate even worse than it usually did, and units in battle might find themselves without ammunition.

The Adjutant General’s Office consisted of commissaries and bureaus that were responsible for the logistics of the Army, and the muster rolls were governed by the Commissary of Musters who operated under War Department Circular 52. As he frequently did, E.D. Townsend, Lorenzo Thomas’ assistant adjutant general, emphasized that record keeping was paramount, demanding that “Commissaries of musters and chief mustering officers throughout the United States will take especial pains to see that rolls from all officers making musters under them are promptly examined, corrected, and

forwarded, and the four copies disposed of as directed by the Mustering Regulations, except that the copy for the adjutant-general of each State will be sent through the acting assistant provost-marshal-general for that State, for his use in verifying the report of credits.” Bureaucracy was the cornerstone of the Army.224

Mustering was a burden on the Regular Army officers since only they could act as Commissaries of Musters. Along with having the knowledge of what the War Department regulations demanded, their commissions as permanent officers allowed them to fill this role—and pulled them away from combat assignments in many cases. This is one of the reasons that, for example, so few of the U.S.M.A. Class of 1856 actually served as infantry officers. Of the 49 graduates (less 10 who joined the South), seven of the 11 originally commissioned into the Infantry served in non-combat billets under the Adjutant General, and were often used as mustering officers. Five more were directly commissioned as Commissaries or Quartermasters. The men who should have been in front of the troops providing professional leadership were often placed in rear echelon roles.225

Between 1864 and 1865, 1,355 men were on the muster rolls of the 41st U.S.C.I. and 1,403 to the 100th. Muster reports provide an incomplete but organizationally useful picture of the regiments’ activities. Records of the first battalion of the 41st show that it was rarely involved in combat. In the closing campaigns in Virginia, one enlisted man was wounded at Hatcher’s Run, two more and an officer at Fort Burnham, and eight soldiers and one officer at Petersburg. Over the course of the War, four officers resigned, one died in combat, and one died of disease. The 100th engaged in one large fight—the battle of Nashville in 1864—where it lost ten enlisted men killed and 41 men and four officers wounded. Six of its officers resigned, one was transferred, one was discharged, one died of disease, and one was dismissed from the Service. The muster rolls provide the raw material for understanding the human strength of the regiments, but tell little about the morale of the troops, their combat effectiveness, or their efficiency.226

225 Cullum, Biographical Register.
226 National Park Service, Civil War Soldiers and Sailors System, www.itd.nps.gov/cwss/ (accessed 6/28/2005). Because the 41st U.S.C.I. was consolidated into one battalion of four companies while on provost duty in Edinburg, TX after the War, the records of the regiment are incomplete and only represent
“THEY CERTAINLY TAKE WONDERFULLY TO THE DRILL.”

Even before mustering, and continuing long after, was drill. To prepare a regiment for the field, it was important to concentrate on the skills that would let the men fight effectively and keep them alive. However, the amount of training needed just for survival was immense, and only constant repetition and attention to detail by the officers could ensure that the soldiers were properly prepared. It was not enough that the men could march and fire their weapons. They also had to be familiar with the details of camp life that would minimize disease, the administrative procedures that would provide food and equipment, and the basics of entrenchment and construction. In this environment, Higginson understood his officers’ role as teachers and disciplinarians: “I naturally viewed the new recruits rather as subjects for discipline rather than philanthropy.”

The effectiveness of training in black regiments was dependent on a number of factors. First, the officers needed to be motivated to do a good job, and this was not always the case. Next, as in white regiments, drill and training were at the mercy of field operations. The U.S.C.T., however, had an additional impediment in that they were more frequently detailed to act as manual laborers, cutting into their in-camp training time. Drill was hard, time-consuming work, and there were no shortcuts whether in camp or on the drill field. Even simple maneuvers required hours of instruction and were exhausting for both the troops and the officers.

Officers existed for two reasons: to prepare their infantrymen to fight effectively and to lead them in battle. A regiment that had either inherited a trained officer or created one itself still needed to translate the officer’s knowledge into skilled troops. In an elite regiment such as the 54th Massachusetts, the daily schedule began with reveille at 0530 when it formed for roll call. In a fighting regiment, rather than a de facto labor battalion, it was rare for a soldier to be absent. The regiment’s colonel insisted on Regular Army discipline and expected to see the soldiers standing at attention while in ranks. After roll calls, the men cleaned their barracks and dressed for breakfast which was prepared at 0700. They had thirty minutes to eat, and then either reported to sick call

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228 Ibid., 43-44.
Drill began at 0800 and took at least five hours per day. When the weather was not too bad, the soldiers would be taken on long route marches. Two more meals and inspections consumed the rest of the day. The effort needed to maintain such a schedule day-in and day-out was immense. In Higginson’s 1st South Carolina/33rd U.S.C.I., “it really costs unceasing labor to keep a regiment in perfect condition and ready for service. The work is made up of minute and endless details.”

Housekeeping was another unending chore. Soldiers had to maintain their uniforms along with “buttons, shoe-strings, hooks and eyes, company letter, regimental number, rifle, bayonet, bayonet-scabbard, cap-pouch, cartridge-box, cartridge-belt, cartridge-box belt-plate, gun-sling, canteen, haversack, knapsack, packed according to rule, forty cartridges, forty percussion caps…” It was not enough that they were clean; each must be “polished to the highest brightness or blackness as the case may be, and moreover hung or slung or tied or carried in precisely the correct manner.”

Even a regiment such as the 100th U.S.C.I, relegated to railroad guard duty in a backwater of the War, kept up a continuous schedule of drill to polish its skills. On a typical day in 1864, the regiment would spend 5.5 hours in drill and training. As in white regiments, infantry drill was based on one of several different drill manuals that were popular at the time. Scott, Cooper, Baxter, Hardee, and Morris had all produced guides before or at the beginning of the War. In a misguided attempt to simplify training in black regiments, General Silas Casey created a new, “simplified” manual specifically for the U.S.C.T. This was a mistake on several levels. First, his presumption was that it would be easier for the soldiers to read—in a period before literacy education had provided even rudimentary reading skills for most of the men. Second, and far more important, black regiments were sometimes brigaded with white regiments, and it was essential that they all use exactly the same drill, or disaster was nearly certain. Casey’s manual was used by many of the black regiments, but there is no indication that it fully superseded the more traditional books.

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There were no shortcuts to excellence in drill whether in camp or on the drill field. Even simple maneuvers required hours of instruction and were exhausting for both the troops and the officers. Enthusiasm and motivation were important—intellectual brilliance was not. Higginson noted that “To learn the drill, one does not want a set of college professors; one wants a squad of eager, active pliant school-boys; and the more childlike those pupils are the better.” His soldiers, and those in other black regiments where they were treated with respect, responded to drill with deep attention and interest.233

The black troops absorbed their training more quickly than their white officers had expected. As the pressure to recruit black troops increased on the Lincoln Administration, abolitionist newspapers were vocal about the skills of the black soldiers already under arms, claiming that they were better natural soldiers than white recruits and with a tendency to be steadier under fire.234

Some officers called on racist stereotypes to explain their troops’ excellence in drill, speculating that is was connected to the former slaves’ love of music or their natural status as order-takers. Letters from black soldiers and the opinions of less prejudiced officers indicate that they were successful because they paid more attention, took more pride in their drill, and understood the importance of their learning better than did white soldiers. Higginson simply commented that his soldiers were good students who “learn less laboriously than whites that ‘double, double, toil and trouble,’ which is the elementary vexation of the drill-master, - that they more rarely mistake their left for their right, - and are more grave and sedate while under instruction.”235

The experience of white volunteers early in the War pointed out the importance of providing musketry training for the black soldiers. This was even more critical for the U.S.C.T. in that slaves were rarely allowed access to firearms and free blacks were often prohibited from owning guns in the South. Many recruits had never touched a rifle before joining up, and turning them into competent riflemen required the same attention

233 Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 104; Higginson, Army Life, 10; Redkey, ed., A Grand Army of Black Men.
and care that was placed on drill. With greater frequency that contemporary white regiments, the U.S.C.T. worked on target practice. Holidays were no impediment to constant learning; the 1st South Carolina spent the day after Christmas in 1862 improving its marksmanship.\footnote{Redkey, ed., \textit{A Grand Army of Black Men}, 13; Higginson, \textit{Army Life}, 35; Trudeau, \textit{Like Men of War}, 232.}

When the military business of the day was done and the black soldiers had time to relax, they often chose instead to continue their education both in literacy and in the military arts. Higginson described an home-like evening of both recreation and continued study at which “some of the fires the men are cleaning their guns or rehearsing their drill, - beside others, smoking in silence their very scanty supply of the beloved tobacco, - beside others, telling stories and shouting with laughter over the broadest mimicry, in which they excel, and in which the officers come in for a full share.” With the demanding training schedule for new troops, it is surprising to find that they had not simply fallen into exhausted sleep, but the former slaves had begun to adjust to military life and become proficient soldiers.\footnote{Higginson, \textit{Army Life}, 24.}

Sometimes the educational activities would be more formal. One of the very few black officers in the Union army, William H. Johnson of the 2nd Connecticut Infantry, described a compact that he swore with other black members of his regiment:

\begin{quote}

The proscribed Americans (and there are many), attached to this regiment have since their encampment here, formed themselves into a defensive association. They propose to cultivate a correct knowledge of the manual of arms and military evolutions, with a view to self-protection. The association is based upon the principles of military discipline, morality, and literature; and they hope by a strict observance of the rules and regulations they have adopted, to do credit to their people, and honor to themselves.\footnote{Redkey, ed., \textit{A Grand Army of Black Men: Letters from African-American Soldiers in the Union Army, 1861-1865}, 8.}
\end{quote}

Clearly, Johnson was atypical of virtually all black Civil War soldiers—he was literate and an officer. However, he puts words to the dedication to learning that was shared by his less articulate brothers in arms.

Advanced tactical training in the modern sense was uncommon. When drill was finally perfected and literacy classes underway, black soldiers had the same lack of
opportunities for tactically realistic or innovative military education as white troops. However, in preparing the battle of the Crater, the second greatest blunder of Burnside’s military career, a minor historical controversy exists over specialized training provided to the U.S.C.T. who were originally tasked with attacking the Petersburg defenses after the explosion of the great mine in 1864. The men of the 4th Division were reported to have received assault training that was meant to maximize the possibility of a decisive breakthrough, but with the incompetent that characterized much of Burnside’s approach to leadership: “Implementation of Ferrero’s scheme trickled down the chain of command.” One colonel recalled that “beginning in early July (1864), his men were ‘daily drilled from two to three hours with a special view of making the assault when the mine should be exploded.’” Another remembered that his men “drilled certain movements to be executed in going and occupying the crest.”

Lt. Col. Thomas Wright had a different recollection that did not include preparation or intelligent tactical control, only last minute notification. “Later we were informed [that a mine was being placed] and that our Division of colored soldiers were to charge after the mine was fired. Finally on the night of July 29th we were marched to a point close to our breastworks to wait for the firing of the mine.”

Unfortunately, the troops who at least had a sense of their mission were replaced at the last moment by an untrained white division that was unaware of its mission and the magnitude of the explosion. They proceeded to charge directly into the crater and the attack was a fiasco. As it became clear to all direct observers that the attack had failed, the black troops were then sent into the maelstrom by divisional officers who were not in view of the fighting and by higher commanders who should not have been exercising tactical control. According to Col. Thomas, “The mine was exploded about 6 A.M. We waited and waited for orders until about 8 o’clock when Gen. Grant with staff rode up to our columns and seemed surprised to see us there and directed us to go in … There


240 Wright, Wright Papers. Handwritten notes for MOLLUS records.
seemed to be no order or system."241 Although the execution in this action was reprehensible, the preparatory training for at least some of the soldiers was a tactical idea that would be adopted by the Army over the next 75 years.

In a more formal context, but ineffectively, the Free Military School (see Chapter Six) attempted to create a training center for black noncommissioned officers to supplement its remedial education for white officer candidates. An Auxiliary School was opened in March 1864 and 21 black students were enrolled. However, this program was never more than an adjunct to the training of white officers.242

In its approach to discipline, the U.S.C.T. did differ from white units. The men’s past experience as slaves and the continuing discrimination that they faced gave black soldiers a point of view that did not fit easily within the common disciplinary standards of the time. Excellent and effective U.S.C.T. regiments were subject to strict discipline, but usually not to the level of the Regular units—consistent with the early volunteer white regiments. At the other end of the spectrum, some regiments were led by martinets who enforced discipline savagely and without respect for troops, or by officers who invoked no discipline at all. However, even poorly led regiments were introduced to the least common denominator of discipline, the Articles of War.243

There had been a significant change in discipline between that encountered by white volunteer regiments early in the War and the experience of the late-forming units. The white 15th New Jersey Volunteers, formed in July 1862 found that the idealistic early recruits responded to a light touch: “The offenses were never serious. The severest punishment inflicted was that of standing on the head of a barrel, with overcoat and knapsack on, for hours, and with nothing to eat. The most stubborn subjects were submissive enough when let down from their position, and professed themselves ready for any duty.”244

By the last two years of the War, the introduction of high bounties and the draft had forced the Army’s white regiments to use draconian techniques to make skulkers and idlers do their duty. These included floggings and, in extreme cases, executions.

241 Ibid.
243 Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 111.
In black regiments, the meaning, practice, and implications of discipline were different from in white units. Their past experience as slaves gave black men a different perspective on punishment and power. Generally, an appeal to the pride of the black soldiers was more effective than Regular army brutality. Higginson found that, even in the case of desertion, “Severe penalties would be wasted on these people, accustomed as they have been to the most violent passions on the part of white men; but a mild inexorableness tells on them, just as it does on any other children … They have a great deal of pride as soldiers, and a very little of severity goes a great way, if it be firm and consistent.”

Instead of draconian measures, light punishments that were rigidly administered with absolute fairness were more effective than beatings or humiliation. The best officers understood the importance of making freedmen feel as far from the plantation as possible. Pride and sense of duty were the most effective tools, and officers who understood this were able to create both strict discipline and self-respect.

**LITERACY EDUCATION FOR FREEDMEN AND THE U.S.C.T.**

With the formal enlistment of black troops in 1863, the War Department encountered serious problems with the efficient administration of the U.S.C.T. regiments. Officers in the Union Army lived amidst mountains of paperwork—all of it handwritten—and an officer who could not read and write was unable to perform the largest portion of his duties. The War Department never believed that blacks were capable of being officers; along with racism, the major problem was education. Military management demanded literacy, and black soldiers were mostly illiterate. Of the nearly 4,000,000 slaves in the southern states at the time of the War, Franklin projected that between 1.5 and 2 percent, or about 60,000 to 80,000, were literate. W.E.B. DuBois speculated that 5 percent or more of slaves were literate in 1860. Both soldiers and civilians attempted to address this problem for the hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children like those shown in Figure 3-6.

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245 Higginson, *Army Life*, 252.
Generals Ulysses S. Grant, Benjamin F. Butler, Nathaniel Banks made early efforts to meet the educational needs of blacks. As the Union armies moved through Confederate territory, thousands of escaped slaves like the group at right soon formed an entourage trailing the invading Federal armies. Although it tried to avoid the responsibility, the North began to realize that it was faced with an unexpected duty and an opportunity—to protect the freedmen and to enlist them against their former masters.²⁴⁷

Following in the footsteps of a few Union leaders with abolitionist or pragmatist philosophies, the Federal government and private organizations began to understand the complexity and importance of their role. The Contraband Relief Society of St. Louis saw the problem clearly:

These Contrabands are in great need of supplies of clothing, food, bedding and household utensils. Of course they are without money. Many of them are so destitute of clothing as to suffer exceedingly from inclement weather and exposure. Disease prevails fearfully among them. The able bodied men are employed by the Government, and aside from this, can generally provide for themselves. The women and children, the aged and infirm, chiefly, need aid.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁸ Contraband Relief Society Circular Letter, Missouri Historical Society Civil War Collection (St. Louis: 1863).
Grudgingly and haltingly, social services became available to the freedmen, and literacy education was one of the most important and far-reaching.\footnote{Blassingame, "Union Army as an Educational Institution for Negroes," 152.}

New York and Massachusetts sent teachers to the Atlantic Sea Islands in 1862 to instruct the freedmen in a system of free labor and literacy education. This was not a wholly altruistic effort. The Federal government desperately needed cotton both as a source of revenue and as a political sedative for the British textile mills, and the Sea Islands were the source of the best cotton in the South. Simultaneously, the freed slaves needed the basics of reading and writing. While the Sea Islands efforts were disorganized and relatively ineffective, they did provide a model for literacy education that was imitated many times and in many places behind the Union lines.\footnote{McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 546, 548; Armstrong, “Union Chaplains and the Education of the Freedmen.”}

In the West at the end of 1862, Grant made the first organized effort to assist the freedmen in the Department of the Tennessee. While not an abolitionist, Grant had a pragmatic understanding of the role that the freedmen could play in his military campaigns, and the friction that they would create if they were not productively engaged. His appointment of Chaplain and later Col. John Eaton as Superintendent of Negro Affairs was an attempt to encourage agricultural production by the freedmen and to provide basic literacy education. Grant recognized the importance of competence over good intentions, and selected a man who had the managerial and organizational capabilities needed to see the job through. Eaton entered into a long and productive career culminating as the U.S. Commissioner of Education.\footnote{Blassingame, "Union Army as an Educational Institution for Negroes," 153; Grant, Memoirs, 225-226; Geoffrey Perret, Ulysses S. Grant: Soldier and President (New York: Random House, 1997), 246.}

All Negro affairs in the Department of the Tennessee were placed under Eaton, and he was instructed to both find useful employment for the freedmen and to prepare them for their new lives. Anticipating Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs by 91 years, Eaton understood that his first challenge was to provide the material necessities of life, to find employment for the men, to protect them from the casual racism of the Union army, and shield them from the fury of their former owners. Grant helped by making quarters, rations, classrooms, and transportation available whenever it was militarily feasible. In spite of Grant’s support and good intentions, Eaton’s efforts were constantly hampered...
by a shortage of funds until the creation of the Freedmen’s Bureau in 1863, and marginally better after that.\textsuperscript{252}

Eaton was highly unpopular with the rebel landowners of Tennessee who resisted his requests for classroom space and supplies. In a sign that the North’s tolerance with slavery was waning and that his patient was eroding, Grant authorized Eaton to confiscate rebel homes and property to support the black schools. With adequate resources at hand, Eaton divided the Department into academic districts, found teachers, created curriculums, and standardized textbooks. In his role as social reformer, he charged a nominal tuition fee to encourage self-sufficiency. His task was monumental—during 1863 Eaton provided aid to nearly 114,000 of the 770,000 blacks in his Department, including many current and future soldiers. By the end of the War, over 100 of his teachers had worked with more than 6,000 students in 74 schools.\textsuperscript{253}

Benjamin Butler established a Department of Negro Affairs in the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. Once again, the emphasis was on practical education combined with basic literacy skills. The curriculum included reading and writing, but also prepared freedmen for cottage trades such as weaving, shoe making, carpentry, barrel making, and spinning wheel construction.\textsuperscript{254}

The most extensive freedmen educational program was created in the Department of the Gulf by Nathaniel Banks. Banks authorized a Board of Education that established schools, selected and trained teachers, created combined practical and literacy curricula, provided books, and built a base of economic support using rebel landowners. As in the rest of the South, there was serious opposition to Banks’ schools including refusals to provide classroom space, kidnapping of teachers, and terror attacks on the freedmen students. Banks took advantage of an ironic characteristic of the South—that while the white Southerners were willing to send almost every white man to fight the Yankee invaders, they were extraordinarily reluctant to make their slaves or former slaves available to the Confederate war effort. Faced with the risk of losing their laborers if they did not support education, the landowners provided the resources needed to keep the


\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.: 114; Blassingame, "Union Army as an Educational Institution for Negroes," 153.

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid.: 154.
schools operating. By the War’s end, Banks’ department had provided 95 schools for over 11,000 students.\textsuperscript{255}

Literacy was equally important on the military front. With the enlistment of black troops in 1863, the War Department encountered serious problems with the efficient administration of the individual U.S.C.T. regiments. Civil War armies ran on paperwork, and without literate troops the burden of this labor rested with the officers. The War Department’s February 1862 list of a six month supply of forms for a regiment highlights the importance of literacy in the administration of the unit:\textsuperscript{256}

1 Guard Report Book  
1 Consolidated Morning Report Book  
10 Company Morning Report Books  
100 Consolidated Morning Reports  
2 Lists of Rolls, Returns, etc. to be made out by the Company Commander  
6 Field and Staff Muster Rolls  
6 Muster Rolls of Hospital  
18 Muster and Pay rolls, Hospital  
60 Company Muster Rolls  
180 Company Muster and Pay Rolls  
12 Regimental Returns  
60 Company Monthly Returns  
20 Returns of Men joined Company  
6 Quarterly Regimental Returns of Deceased Soldiers  
30 Quarterly Company Returns of Deceased Soldiers  
2 Annual Returns of Casualties  
40 Descriptive Lists  
100 Non-Commissioned Officer's Warrants

Units raised in the North had an advantage over regiments from the Border States because of the greater incidence of reading and writing skills among the men. Training an enlisted man to do paperwork spread the load, gave responsibility for critical jobs to

\textsuperscript{255} Blassingame, "Union Army as an Educational Institution for Negroes," 154. As the former Speaker of the House of Representatives and governor of Massachusetts, Banks was the quintessential “political general.” He was also known as “Commissary Banks” by the rebels since he was an excellent source of captured supplies. He was embarrassed by Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley and was ineffectual in the Red River campaign. Fortunately, following this debacle, he was not employed again as a field commander.

black men, and let the soldiers feel that they were making an important contribution to their regiment. Illiterate troops did not have the option of sharing in these benefits.\textsuperscript{257}

Nearly all of the former slaves were unschooled and incapable of performing the mountain of clerical duties of non-commissioned officers. An officer of the U.S.C.T. often found himself with three times the clerical workload of his counterpart in a white regiment. The initial response to this problem was disastrous for morale; white sergeants and corporals were brought into some black regiments to offset the clerical and training workload. This move was unpopular with the black troops since it blocked the only path that they had to military advancement. Over time, the practice was abandoned and replaced with a concerted effort to teach literacy skills to the soldiers, and to connect the attainment of those skills to the potential for advancement in rank.\textsuperscript{258}

At the center of these literacy efforts were abolitionist officers such as Robert Gould Shaw, the commander of the 54\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry and hero of Fort Wagner, or more obscure leaders such as Second Lt. Morris Hall of the 44\textsuperscript{th} U.S.C.I. who discovered that “of the 86 men mustered in…only 9 could read and write and 23 knew their letters.” His response was quick and effective as he “at once sent home for primers, spelling and reading books and writing material.” By the time his company was mustered out of service after the War, “not one remained … who could not read and write and spell…as they went on duty you would see a book tucked under the belt, and as soon as a tour of duty was through they would spread a poncho or blanket on the ground and fill the time full of study, trying as far as possible to learn by themselves.”\textsuperscript{259}

Capt. J. H. Meteer of the 14\textsuperscript{th} U.S.C.I. observed a similar commitment to education among the troops of his regiment while in camp in Chattanooga. His men were “very anxious to learn to read, write &c. My head company cook, a man of 33 years, warped and stiffened by labor and abuse, was in tonight to take his first lesson in the Alphabet. He is very anxious to learn and I think will succeed. The Orderly Sergeant is anxious to get to studying Algebra and Philosophy….” Meteer continued supporting the education of his troops throughout the War and took a personal interest in the success of his men’s quest for literacy. When he asked one of the forty sergeants and corporals

\textsuperscript{257} Glatthaar, \textit{Forged in Battle}, 101.  
\textsuperscript{258} Blassingame, "Union Army as an Educational Institution for Negroes," 155.  
\textsuperscript{259} Hall Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan.
from his regiment who were taking lessons from a surgeon’s wife how his studies were proceeding, the response was: “… ‘I done got it’ he said. He was sitting talking to some other boys and thought I meant he should be studying. He got his book and he had ‘done got it’ pretty well. It delights them very much to pick up the 2nd Reader and read off without any trouble.”

Officers who understood the significance of literacy among the troops were popular in the U.S.C.T. and were more effective commanders. Higginson’s troops were intensely committed to education: “Their love of the spelling-book is perfectly inexhaustible, - they stumbling on by themselves, or the blind leading the blind, with the same pathetic patience which they carry into everything. The chaplain is getting up a schoolhouse, where he will soon teach them as regularly as he can. But the alphabet must always be a very incidental business in camp.”

Love of learning was not limited to Higginson’s regiment. Along with the 33rd, the 2nd, 7th, 35th, 55th, 62nd, 65th, 67th, 73rd, 76th, 78th, 83rd, 88th, 89th, and 128th U.S.C.I. regiments all left records of schools conducted by their chaplains, officers, or hired teachers. Nor was education limited to the freedmen’s regiments. Free blacks from the North and New Orleans also participated in learning. Although the rate of literacy among free blacks was much higher than among the former slaves, there was still much to learn, particularly in practical camp skills such as bricklaying and blacksmithing.

Officers and regimental chaplains were the primary source of instruction among the U.S.C.T. Many army chaplains expressed concern for the ability of freedmen to survive in the post-slavery world, and believed that education was essential if they were to transform themselves from slaves to citizens. Most chaplains worked voluntarily with the goal of helping the freedmen to get an education, become economically stable, and achieve social equality. As chaplains took on the role of teachers, they were often impressed by their students. James B. Rogers, chaplain of the 14th Wisconsin Infantry, described capabilities of the freedmen: “Although some learn faster than others, yet all show that they are susceptible of instruction and mental improvement. I believe that their

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260 J.H. Meteer to C. Mills, January 26, 1864, August 8, 1864, Caleb Mills Collection.
capacities for education are equal to those of white children, and their thirst for learning rather greater.”

Church organizations, educational societies from the large cities, the American Missionary Association, and the Christian Commission also provided teachers and facilities for the black troops. Well-meaning civilians also helped. Frances Beecher Perkins, the wife of Col. James Beecher who commanded the 35th U.S.C.I., first adopted her husband’s lack of enthusiasm for the capabilities of his black troops. Col. Beecher’s initial skepticism about his men was soon replaced with an appreciation of their soldierly qualities: “I am amazed at the promptitude of these men to learn military drill. In spite of my hard work, I am becoming something of an enthusiast. I wish doubtful people at home could see my three weeks regiment. There is an amount of muscle in it of which few in the service can boast.”

His wife translated that appreciation of military skill into a commitment to literacy education for the enlisted men of the regiment. Since the unit was raised from former slaves along the Atlantic coast, few could even write their own names on their muster sheets when they joined the service.

My mornings were spent teaching the men of our regiment to read and write, and it became my pleasant duty and habit, wherever our moving tents were pitched, there to set up our school. Sometimes the chaplain assisted, and sometimes the officers; and the result was that when the men came to be mustered out [in 1866] each one of them could proudly sign his name to the payroll in a good legible hand…Whenever they had a spare moment, out would come a spelling-book or a primer or a Testament, and you would often see a group of heads around one book.

The curricula created for the soldiers were generally similar to those in common-school education. Reading, writing, and basic mathematics were at the core of their efforts. However, vocational subjects such as sewing, cobbling, and bricklaying, or more advanced topics like grammar, history, and geography might also be included. The Bible was an important teaching tool since most of the soldiers were very religious, were familiar with its stories so that it could act as a primary reader, and had the book readily

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262 James B. Rogers, War Pictures. Experiences and Observations of a Chaplain in the U.S. Army in the War of the Southern Rebellion (Chicago: 1863), 131
264 Ibid., 536.
available. Chaplains would often combine religious instruction with literacy education.

Working with a population that had not had much or often any experience with education, Army teachers used a system of rewards and encouragements to create a passion for learning among the troops. These crossed the boundary between literacy and military topics. For example, cleanliness and sobriety were rewarded by furloughs and passes. At the same time, the teachers would point out that promotions would only go to the literate, and leave passes were more likely for those who attended school. These efforts were effective. By the end of the War, the government estimated that approximately 20,000 black soldiers, or around eleven percent of the U.S.C.T., had reached a level of literacy where they could read intelligently, and that almost all black regiments had made improvements in basic education.

Black soldiers were committed to studying in the traditional sense, but would also study in an entirely different way. The goal of these studies was not the understanding of reading, writing, or military affairs. Rather, it was an exploration of the soldiers’ group identity and their lives in the Army. Col. Henry G. Thomas of the 29th U.S.C.I. described the joy of the soldiers of his regiment when they heard that they were to lead an assault, and how they studied their disappointing displacement by white troops before the attack on the Petersburg crater:

They waited, like Quakers, for the spirit to move; when the spirit moved, one of their singers would uplift a mighty voice, like a bard of old, in a wild sort of chant. If he did not strike a sympathetic chord in his hearers,...he would sing it again and again, altering sometimes the words, more often the music. If his changes met general acceptance, one voice after another would chime in; a rough harmony of three parts would add itself; the other groups would join them, and the sound would become the song of the command....

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266 Blassingame, "Union Army as an Educational Institution for Negroes," 157-59.
267 Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox; McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom; Thomas, "The Colored Troops at Petersburg," 4:563. Black regiments that had received at least some rudimentary tactical training for the assault on the Confederate lines after the detonation of the Petersburg mine were replaced at the last minute by white troops under a drunken and cowardly commander. The rationale behind this change and the level of training received by the U.S.C.I. units is unclear, but the result was a leadership disaster and one of the worst scenes of carnage among black troops during the War when the U.S.C.I. regiments were sent into the fight after the white units had bungled the attack. Col. Henry G. Thomas provides one of the few descriptions of preparation for the assault: “They believed us infallible. We had drilled certain movements, to be executed in gaining and occupying the crest. It is an axiom in military art that there are
For officers who recognized the talents of their black troops, there was an opportunity to invest in their education and reap significant returns. They actively looked for black soldiers who had a commitment to learning and had demonstrated leadership skills. The officers first taught these men basic literacy, and then trained them to act as noncommissioned officers—which called for administrative, supervisory, tactical, and logistical skills. Literacy could lead to promotion in the non-commissioned ranks and increased status in the regiment, as Sgt. Richard Brutin earned in the 2nd U.S.C.I.

Sergeant Rich’d Brutin of Co. C this Regt. having been fully recommended is hereby appointed Quartermaster Sergeant in the 2nd U.S.C.I. This promotion is made for the following reasons because of his faithful attention to duties, activity, intelligence, diligent application to studies, persevering industry in endeavoring to acquire for himself an education. When Seg’t Brutin originally joined the Regt, he was unable to read or write his own name, but by close application to his studies he has since learned to read, and to write a good hand, and has thus qualified himself for the position to which he is now promoted. The Col. hopes that others in the Reg’t will emulate his example, not only in preparing themselves for promotion in the Regiment, but also for a life of usefulness here after, when they shall no longer be soldiers but become citizens of the United States.268

Officers who placed their confidence in men committed to learning and literacy were rarely disappointed, and they magnified the in-camp and battlefield capabilities of their units.269

RACISM AND MARGINAL ACCEPTANCE

...a neggrow regt arrived heare satturd ay morning they are a fine body of men for darkies being large men they have ben in service some three months & are under reasonably discipline & well drilled. But the uniform & musket and what ever els that is necessary to make solders of them will not take the niggar out of them some of there actions show conclusively that they are not greatly improved over the babbone...270
Capt. Ralph Buckley of the 197th Pennsylvania Volunteers spoke for many of his fellow officers and soldiers in 1864, articulating their hatred for black soldiers. It is impossible to discuss the U.S.C.T. without considering the racism that was strong in the Union armies. Prejudice was endemic in the United States, and black soldiers lived with it in every aspect of their army and private lives. The first black enlistees were turned away with scorn, and black units were only raised once it became apparent that the War was going to be longer and bloodier than anyone had expected. Opposition to black soldiers remained strong, as voiced by A. J. McGarrah in an Indiana regiment: “I understand that Abe Lincoln is going to arm the negroes and put them into the field. I think if that is done the negroes will have the fighting to do alone for I don’t believe there is many white men that will fight with the negro.” Regardless, as the white manpower pool declined and resistance to the draft stiffened, more and more blacks were taken into the Army—and then conscripted when even their enthusiasm for the suppression of the South was insufficient to provide enough bodies for the great killing machine of 1864-65.271

Capt. Albert Rogall, an expatriate Polish nobleman and Cincinnati art teacher, was a company commander of the 27th U.S.C.I. and eventually the commander of the 118th U.S.C.I. which he led from the Wilderness campaign through the siege of Petersburg. He shared his ill-tempered sentiments with his diary: “Punished seven men for foraging, meanest depredations were committed, but here in this war everything is right. All niggers are thieves. Poor rebel wives and widows, the cruel consequences of a war, make me feel sorry.” June 1864 brought a note that “Our colored division is an unnecessary expense to the government.” By January 1865, he had reached the conclusion that “Nigger troops a perfect bore with no exceptions.”272

Buckley, McGarrah, and Rogall were not exceptions; they represented a strong undercurrent of racism within the Army. Black soldiers were taunted by their fellow white troops, were paid less than white soldiers, and received the shabbiest equipment when they were allocated equipment at all. They were placed in labor battalions rather


than combat units, and were the troops most likely to receive the assignment of guarding rail lines, bridges, and wagon trains where they were at the mercy of guerillas. Upon creation of the U.S.C.T., black officers from the Corps d’Afrique regiments were forced to resign, as were the handful of other black officers scattered throughout the Army. Over time, however, white troops began to give grudging acceptance and respect to some of the black units, although racism was still a nearly insurmountable fact of life for blacks when the War ended. By 1864, black units sometimes found a friendlier welcome than the early regiments received:

The 14th ‘Unwashed Americans’ [U.S.C.I.] arrived here last evening by rail from Nashville. As we were the first colored troops to have visited this place we created more excitement than so many monkeys and elephants. All the way from Stevenson here we were cheered by thousands of soldiers who are camped along the road … Old soldiers are almost universally in favor of the enterprise of arming negroes. Citizens, of course, are very bitter against them.  

The use and treatment of black troops was inconsistent depending on the Union commanders. William T. Sherman virtually refused to employ them. Other commanders such as Benjamin Butler welcomed them and placed them in combat. Unfortunately, there was a strong relationship among the acceptance and willingness to use U.S.C.T. in combat, the political genesis of Northern generals, and military incompetence. Those such as Butler, Banks, and McClernand who entered the service from a political background were often ardent abolitionists, delighted to use the U.S.C.T., and almost uniformly inept as leaders. The conservative professionals like Sherman were, in general, more competent but far more reluctant to place blacks in combat until late in the War.

Even staunch abolitionists such as Thomas Wentworth Higginson had to overcome racial presumptions that masked the individuality of his troops as he took command of a black regiment in 1862:

As one grows more acquainted with the men, their individualities emerge; and I find, first their faces, then their characters, to be as distinct as those of whites. It is very interesting the desire they show to do their duty, and to improve as soldiers; they evidently think about it, an see the importance of the thing; they say to me that we white men cannot stay and be their

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273 J.H. Meteer to C. Mills, August 8, 1864, Caleb Mills Collection.
leaders always that they must learn to depend on themselves, or else relapse into their former condition. 274

The indistinguishable black faces of his regiment became men to him over time, and he helped them to become soldiers.

Still, racism endured. Black soldiers received the worst supplies and facilities, as if the 1861 logistical problems described by Fitz-John Porter had not been resolved by 1864. Like Porter, black regiments still found that “the absence of arms, ammunition, and equipments of all kinds could not have been worse had it been premeditated … no arms whatever or equipments, even for cooking purposes.” For example, the 1st Michigan Colored Infantry (later the 102nd U.S.C.I.) was mustered in Detroit in February 1864. Recruiting efforts were slowed by the poor treatment of the regiment’s first recruits. Its barracks at Camp Ward were “unfit for human habitation…there is not a barn or pig-sty in the whole city of Detroit that is not better fitted for human habitation.” 275

Similarly, the 112th U.S.C.I. was formed in Arkansas in May 1864 and found that its camp was on rocky ground with no good water supply. The black troops were not provided with supply wagons, received the worst medical attention, and had poorer rations, equipment, and weapons than white units. On top of material disadvantages, the

274 Higginson, Army Life, 31.
black troops were assigned jobs that were more difficult, dangerous, and time-consuming
that their white counterparts. Many U.S.C.T. units served as rear guards, construction
details, sentinels in guerilla-infested areas, and labor battalions. Excavating trenches,
burying corpses, driving wagons, loading and unloading, digging latrines—these tasks
were relegated to the U.S.C.T. whenever possible, and each cut into the time needed to
drill for combat proficiency or to learn the military arts. An officer of the 112th described
the impact of constant construction and housekeeping duties: “all the instruction received
three months ago is forgotten and the Regiment is almost foreign to drill…being on
fatigue duty nearly every day has made it impossible to instruct them in the manual of
arms.” While an important part of the war effort, labor was destructive to the soldiers’
morale. Front line U.S.C.T. combat units rarely had a problem with desertion or
insubordination, while there were constant desertions in regiments used as manual
laborers.276

Personal animosity towards blacks often surfaced. Sgt. Edward King Wightman
of the 3rd New York Volunteer Infantry told his family of a typical racist incident that
occurred during the siege of Charleston, SC in 1863:

Among them were a number of Zouaves. Now if there is any one thing
the 9th Regiment agree on as a principle, it is that niggers were born to be
abused, and “licking a nigger” they count the climax of a drunken spree.
As luck would have it our [company] contraband Aaron made himself so
forward laughing at their eccentric performance that he attracted their
attention, and a couple of them, highly incensed, scaled the boxes on
which he was perched and assaulted him with bayonets…unluckily for the
poor darkie a dozen Zouaves below were yelling and like hungry sharks
waited to seize him. They jumped on him and kicked him until he as
nearly dead and the rascal who held the bayonet struck him a blow across
the face which laid open his thick lips with a gash half an inch in breadth,
breaking off a couple of teeth besides…I took poor Aaron to the hospital
steward and together we managed to sew up his countenance…He is now
nearly well, but heaving a huge sigh whenever his drubbing is referred
to.277

from Little Rock of Capt. James M. Bolwer, 112th United States Colored Troops," 236. Regimental
histories by Dyer of black units show a consistent pattern of manual labor and guard duties with few
examples of combat employment.
277 Edward G. Longacre, "'It Will Be Many a Day before Charleston Falls': Letters of a Union Sergeant on
That hatred carried over into the relations between officers and men. James Fitts recalled the actions of his commanders when they first encountered black troops: “While we remained at Hilton Head our officers held themselves fastidiously aloof from all conviction as to the negro’s capacity for a soldier, hugging their prejudice, and refusing to recognize or salute him.”

It was not only the black troops who were frustrated and angered by racism. Their white advocates encountered similar prejudices. General Edward A. Wild, operating in eastern North Carolina with a brigade of black regiments in December 1863, found that his fellow Union officers would often hinder his military operations and recruiting activities. Conflicts arose over the admission of freedmen—a rich source of recruits—into the Union lines, and tempers nearly erupted into open warfare between black and white Union troops over the possession of a Confederate prisoner. Wild was fighting an uphill battle with officers such as Massachusetts Capt. William Walker, whose point of view was manifestly at odds with the objective reality of the situation of black soldiers, believed that “the ‘nigger’ in this dept. is supreme & it is policy for those who desire to bask in the smiles of official favor to be its very devout worshipers…The attempt to mix [the black] up with white soldiers & people is productive of mischief, they are very arrogant & insolent presuming altogether too much on their social position.”

Some more senior officers were equally callous. Brigadier General August Kautz, who displaced Wild upon his demotion from command of the First Division in the Army of the James, wrote about his black soldiers that “I shall feel less regret over the slain than if my troops were white…If I must fall myself I should prefer to die with my own [race].”

Politics often lurked behind the issues of racism and black advancement. Lincoln and his Administration had to balance the needs of the country against the regional interests of the Border States, and were often in conflict with loyal slaveholders who did not want to lose their workforce to army recruiters. By late 1864, new regulations were

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written that prohibited the recruitment of any blacks in Tennessee. All new black soldiers had to come from the newly conquered areas of Georgia and the Carolinas as Sherman moved on Atlanta and the sea coast. Similarly, Kentucky attempted to prevent black recruiting in 1864.281

The soldiers’ pride was sorely tested when Congress decided to pay black soldiers less than their white counterparts. Several regiments refused to fight unless they received equal pay, and there were severe punishments including executions for soldiers who were deemed mutinous. These problems most often occurred in the regiments where the officers had misjudged the characteristics of their soldiers. Even among Higginson’s men, however, there was resistance to injustice, “they seemed to make it a matter of honor to do their part even if the Government proved a defaulter; but one third of them, including the best men in the regiment, quietly refused to take a dollar’s pay, at the reduced price.” Congress eventually relented, but the black soldiers had learned an important and distressing lesson about where they stood with the national government and the Army.282

In one important area, racism remained triumphant. The War Department never believed that blacks were capable of being officers, although several of the early regiments had been served by brave and successful black leaders who were demoted to non-commissioned status when the U.S.C.T. designation was applied to their units or dismissed from the Army.283

Eventually, the racist presumptions about black military incompetence were thoroughly disproved. Black regiments fought bravely at Port Hudson, Milliken’s Bend, and most famously at Fort Wagner. Black units, including the 41st and 100th, played important roles at Petersburg and Nashville. By the War’s end, virtually all of the military security on the Southern Atlantic coast was provided by black troops.284

282 Higginson, Army Life, 3.
283 Redkey, ed., A Grand Army of Black Men, 250. The Corps d’Afrique, a group of black regiments formed in Louisiana and the West early in the War, were often officered by African-Americans. When Banks replaced Butler as commander of the Department of the South and the regiments were consolidated as U.S.C.T., the officers were removed.
284 Higginson, Army Life, 31.
Over time and with much spilled blood, the black troops began to win the respect of some white soldiers, but sometimes what passed for respect was pragmatism. Cyrus Boyd, a white diarist from the 15th Iowa Infantry offered that “there are some fools in our Army who think it would be a disgrace to allow a colored man to dig a trench or help us fight against his rebellious master. I should like to see all such idiots put in the front and in the ditches. If an African will stand between me and a rebel bullet he is welcome to the honor and the bullet too.” Others, such as Sherman, never accommodated themselves to the use of the U.S.C.T. throughout the War in spite of Lincoln’s personal requests. However, progress was possible and racism was occasionally overcome. Commanders like Higginson recognized both their military responsibilities to the men of their regiments and the need to help those men prepare for their free, post-War lives. They set high standards of personal leadership and strove night and day to look after their men, to train them as soldiers, to teach them to read and write, and to introduce them to the white world.285

While moving on Saltville, Virginia in late 1864, the 6th U.S.C.I. was greeted with the all too common reception of black soldiers headed for their first battle: “On the march the colored soldiers, as well as their white officers, were made the subject of much ridicule and insulting remarks by the white troops.” After a sharp battle at the Confederacy’s strategic salt works, Col. James S. Brisbin of the 6th described a different reception: “Of this fight, I can only say that the men could not have behaved more bravely. I have seen white troops fight in twenty-seven battles and I never saw any fight better…On the return of the forces those who had scoffed at the colored troops on the march out were silent.”286

In this context, the strong adherence to discipline and exemplary behavior of black soldiers is all the more extraordinary. Maj. Edelmiro Mayer of the Argentine Army, who served with the Union expressed the feeling shared by many commanders of


black troops—that they would be stalwart in battle and model soldiers. Experience on
the battlefield proved him right.\footnote{Emilio, \textit{A Brave Black Regiment}, 67-104.}

The opinion of an enemy may be even more telling than that of a friend. W.J. Estill, writing to his brother as the Confederacy’s hopes faded in 1865, expressed the mood of his friends in the rebel army: “the majority of the soldiers want them put in and I came to the conclusion it would be best for us when I got a peep at the enemy’s breastworks, and [the] thought of having to charge them someday soon brought the harkening motion to have some body in front of us. Some of the men think that would be putting them on an equality with us but – as for myself if no other term but absolute submission is offered to us I am willing to fight by the side of the blackest Negro in all Christendom and shoot round for round with him until we can get better terms to make peace than those offered by Lincoln”—an ironic but meaningful commentary on the value of black soldiers.\footnote{W.J. Estill, February 11, 1865, Container 3, Item 289, Gladstone Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript Collection.}
CHAPTER FOUR PROVIDING THE OFFICERS

With a firmly entrenched but narrowly based vision of military education, and troops who had the potential to become as good as any others in the Union Army, the problem became how to find officers for the units. Service with the U.S.C.T. was never a popular option for most of the men who were already officers, but became a route for soldiers of lesser rank to obtain a commission. The underlying educational philosophy of West Point continued to assert itself in the activities of the Adjutant General and the Bureau for Colored Troops as they sought commanders for the black regiments coming into being.

SEARCHING FOR EFFECTIVE OFFICERS

The first step in building effective black regiments was to find or train effective officers. As described in Chapter Two, officers for white regiments came from a wide variety of sources, but those destined for the U.S.C.T. were usually limited to the small number of active duty volunteer officers who wanted to serve in black units and enlisted soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and civilians who sought a commission through political patronage, acting as a recruiter, or examination.

Finding officers became a major problem once large scale recruiting of the U.S.C.T. began in 1863 (Table 4-1.) The demand for qualified officers quickly exceeded both the supply and the inclination of those who already held commissions, and new sources were needed. Peak unit formation between mid-1863 and mid-1864 placed a severe burden on officer preparation and selection.  

AGO, Applications for Commissions; Dyer, Compendium. Analysis shows that only 5 percent of the candidates for examination were officers prior to application. See Appendix I.
### Table 4-1 Pattern of Formation of U.S.C.I. Regiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Year of Formation</th>
<th>Formed During the Year</th>
<th>Formed During First Half of the Year</th>
<th>Formed During Second Half of the Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Active U.S.C.I. Regiments</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to complete organization</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S.C.I. Regiments</td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The formation of units was hampered by the inability of the War Department to find competent officers who wanted to be leaders in black regiments. Examination boards were established by the Bureau for Colored Troops and 1,051 applicants were scrutinized by Washington’s Casey Board alone. In 1863 and early 1864, only 560, or 53 percent, passed the Casey’s board. Initially, the Cincinnati board had a pass rate of 50 percent, and the other boards’ pass rates were similar. With 138 black infantry regiments created between 1863 and 1865 and 75 of those formed in 1863, the demand for officers far exceeded the supply.²⁹⁰

A typical new regiment formed with the standard complement of commissions required 35 combat officers leaving a minimum shortfall of at least 67 board-examined officers over this period, and an actual shortfall measured in the hundreds to account for attrition. The army tried to provide a higher number of officers to the U.S.C.T. regiments as they often did not have literate noncommissioned officers to perform many important and unavoidable administrative duties. In some early black regiments, the number of officers was sometimes double the standard complement.²⁹¹

Table 4-2 extrapolates estimated appointments to provide 41 appointments to each regiment as it was formed, and these numbers are probably understated. The estimates in

²⁹⁰ AGO, Lists of Persons Who Have Passed Examining Boards, 1863-65, RG 94-E.38; Dyer, Compendium.
²⁹¹ Fox, Regimental Losses, 5; Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 106. Regiments required a colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, adjutant, quartermaster, ten company commanders, and 20 company lieutenants at an absolute minimum. This list does not take into account aids, supernumerary officers, or officers in “warrant” positions such as surgeons or chaplains. The actual officer requirements for a new U.S.C.T. regiment often approached 45 to 60. The excess officers in the Department of the Gulf partially accounted for Banks’ purge of black officers, and is reflected in the Bureau guidance about assignment of officers only after a unit is already in formation.
Table 4-2 do not include replacements for officers lost due to combat, disease, resignation, dismissal, or reassignment. 292

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual Year of U.S.C.I. Formation</th>
<th>Officers Required During the Year</th>
<th>Needed During First Half of the Year</th>
<th>Needed During Second Half of the Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>3,075</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>2,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>2,009</td>
<td>1,517</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minimum officers required for mustering regiments</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,658</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,658</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,658</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extrapolating from the experience of the 100th U.S.C.I. which lost 10 of its 50 officers for all reasons over the course of the War and the first battalion of the 41st which lost six, a minimum replacement rate of 25 percent would call for an additional 1,415 officers for a total of 7,073—approaching the nearly 7,700 officers on the rolls of the U.S.C.T. 293

For many prospective officers, the path to a U.S.C.T. commission led through one of the Bureau for Colored Troops’ examination boards, which are discussed in detail in Chapter Five. To prepare for a board appearance, most officer candidates applied the military and administrative skills that they had learned while serving with their white units, or supplemented practical experience with individual study of Casey’s *Infantry Tactics* or one of the other popular drill manuals.

Only one opportunity for formal academic and practical preparation prior to examination appears to have existed. In 1863, the Free Military School for Applicants for the Command of Colored Troops was opened in Philadelphia to prepare white officers to command black troops. There were two assumptions underlying the school—that freed blacks were not capable of commanding themselves, and that their experience as slaves called for officers who were particularly intelligent, empathic, and unprejudiced.

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292 Dyer, *Compendium*. Computed based on regimental formation statistics; see Appendix B. The nominal number of officers projected per regiment is 41. This count does not include any needs for replacement officers due to sickness, combat casualties, removal for incompetence, resignation, or desertion. “Standard” regiments required a colonel, lieutenant colonel, adjutant, 10 company commanders, and 20 company lieutenants at an absolute minimum (33 line officers, plus 2 surgeons.) Aides, supernumerary officers, or officers in “warrant” positions such as surgeons are not included. The actual officer requirements for a new U.S.C.T. regiment may often have approached 50 to 60—this study uses a very conservative estimate. 293 Minimum since neither the 41st nor the 100th suffered large casualties either from combat or disease.
The examination failure rate of officer candidates was also a factor in creating the school. While 47 percent did not pass examination by Casey’s board, many of those men had had significant combat experience, and the War Department believed that they could be used as officers after a short course on tactics and military regulations. Between 1863 and March 1864, 422 officer candidates attended the school and War Department records of the examination boards show that officer candidates recommended by the Philadelphia Supervisory Committee, the sponsor of the Free Military School, had a examination approval and commissioning rate of 63 percent, more than twice that of soldiers with no recommendation stated (30 percent) and nearly three times that of those recommended by sources other than the Supervisory Committee (21 percent.)

Brig. Gen. James C. Rice created a school within his brigade in late 1863 to prepare officers seeking commissions with the U.S.C.T. but little is known of how he approached the problems of preparation, but his actions appeared to be effective. The 44th New York Infantry, Rice’s former regiment and part of his brigade, contributed 25 officers to the U.S.C.T.—1.4 percent of this regiment compared to the rate of 0.3 percent for the average Union unit.


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294 AGO, Applications for Commissions; Wilson, "Webster and the Free Military School," 120-03, 11. Analysis of a 10 percent random sample of officer applications showed that a minimum of 80 percent had prior military experience and that five percent had previously been officers. Of the 20 percent who applied as civilians, some unknown proportion had previously been in the Army and had left for health or other reasons. See Appendix I for analysis. The commissioning rate is an important indicator of the quality of the candidate since many applicants passed the boards’ examinations but never received a commission after scrutiny by the Bureau for Colored Troops.

Nashville, Tennessee area that was to be based on the Free Military School but for men already holding commissions in his regiment. Classes were to meet once or twice per week and were to be taught by the local military experts in important topics. Officers would be encouraged to create study groups to prepare themselves for future recitations and to firmly cement their grasp of the information provided. Unfortunately, there is no indication that Mussey had time to put this school into operation before the War ended.296

The new black troops, often fresh from the abuses of white men, had to have knowledgeable officers that they could believe in. Most troops had little reason to give this trust to the white race. They were surrounded by prejudice and disbelief in their fighting qualities, so black soldiers understood how important it was that they receive proper training and perform well. At the same time, white officers had to win the confidence of the men; it would not be given freely. As the successful commander of the 1st South Carolina Infantry, Higginson too understood that “the first essential for an officer of colored troops is to gain their confidence. But it is equally true, though many persons do not appreciate it, that the admirable methods and proprieties of the regular army are equally available for all troops, and that the sublimest philanthropist, if he does not appreciate this, is unfit to command them.”297

Over time, much like their soldiers, the officers learned their jobs. Many became excellent battlefield commanders, and could rise to the high standards of attention to detail and commitment that colonels such as Higginson expected:

It needs an artist’s eye to make a perfect-drillmaster. Yet the small points are not merely a matter of punctilio; for, the more perfectly a battalion is drilled on the parade-ground, the more quietly it can be handled in action. Moreover, the great need of uniformity is this: that, in the field, soldiers of different companies, and even of different regiments, are liable to intermingled, and a diversity of orders may throw everything into confusion. Confusion means Bull Run.298

OFFICER SELECTION PRACTICES

Officer selection in volunteer regiments at the beginning of the Civil War was often informal. While U.S.M.A. graduates were assigned to a specific branch and

296 C. Foster to J.C. Rice, November 24, 1863, AGO, NIMS; USACC, Letters Sent by the Commissioner; R. Mussey to C.P. Brown, October 24, 1864, Ibid.
297 Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment, 107; Higginson, Army Life, 53.
298 Higginson, Army Life, 45-46.
Regular unit by the War Department, most volunteer regiments were commanded by men who self-selected for command by recruiting their own units, were chosen by politicians or citizen committees, or were elected to their rank.

A look at early white regiments shows a consistent pattern for officer selection. When veterans of the Mexican War or West Point graduates who had resigned from the Army were available, they were frequently selected for command positions. Perhaps the best known example of this pattern is U.S. Grant who was appointed colonel of the 21st Illinois Volunteer Infantry, but he was far from the only officer among the veterans who served.

Patronage from politicians and service as a recruiter were direct routes to command. Early in the War, state governors raised companies and regiments by giving friends, political cronies, and contributors the opportunity to enlist soldiers for a unit. If the recruiter was successful, he took on a military rank commensurate with his ability to bring in troops (e.g., a commission as a lieutenant for a platoon, a captain for a company, or a colonel for an entire regiment.) While this practice occasionally produced some outstanding soldiers, most of the volunteer officers had to climb a steep learning curve to rise to the standards necessary for effective field operations. In contrast, aside from West Point and the academies, the only systematic attempt to make sure that officers were fit for command prior to commissioning occurred within the U.S.C.T.

Examples from a few volunteer regiments formed in 1861 and 1862 provide an important point of comparison to the U.S.C.T. Capt. Robert Litzinger experienced one of the most common paths to command in the early white regiments. A veteran of the Mexican War and well-known publisher in western Pennsylvania, he called a town meeting in Ebensburg to protest the shelling of Fort Sumter and to form a militia company in 1861. Eighty recruits joined his Cambria Guards, and their first act was to elect Litzinger as their captain. First and second lieutenants were also selected. With a full complement of officers and men, Litzinger contacted Andrew Curtin, the state governor, and requested a place in one of the regiments that were forming—and was
rejected since the units were oversubscribed. Eventually, his company was merged into the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves regiment.299

Thomas Roseberry of St. Francisville, Missouri followed a more direct path to command. Also a veteran leader of volunteers from the Mexican War, Roseberry was directly commissioned by a citizen committee as a captain in the Missouri home guards in 1861 after he tore down a rebel flag from a local courthouse. His company later became part of the 21st Missouri Infantry and he retained his captain’s bars.300

The 111th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry was formed in 1861 by Matthew Schlaudecker, a militia general from Erie, Pennsylvania. He had received military training in his native Bavaria and had previously raised three companies of three-month militia. Schlaudecker appointed recruiting officers to fill the regiment, and selected his own second-in-command and senior staff officers. The remaining officers were selected from the enlisted and non-commissioned ranks.301

The Union Committee of New Haven, Connecticut chose the officers for the 15th Connecticut Volunteer Infantry as the unit was being planned in 1862. Col. Dexter Wright, previously appointed by the state governor as Lt. Colonel of the 14th Connecticut Volunteers, was given command of the regiment. Captains were selected by the Committee and given responsibility for recruiting their own companies; successful recruiters retained their rank.302

In contrast, Governor Charles Olden of New Jersey called for the creation of regiments from his State in July 1862, and the 15th New Jersey Volunteers was formed. “Patriotic citizens of the Northern counties” selected Samuel Fowler for either Lt. Colonel or Colonel at the discretion of the governor. With Olden’s nod, Col. Fowler then chose his staff and recruiting officers. When a company was successfully formed, the recruiting officer, either a captain or first lieutenant, became its commander. Of the ten

company second lieutenants, six were selected by Fowler from non-commissioned officers, privates, and hospital stewards currently serving in other New Jersey regiments.303

Similarly, Governor William Buckingham ordered the creation of the 7th Connecticut Volunteer Infantry in August 1861 to replace the early three-month state regiments formed under the first Federal call for troops. He selected two officers from those regiments, Alfred Terry and Joseph Hawley, as colonel and captain respectively. Hawley began recruiting for the regiment with the expectation that he would receive command of a company after fulfilling his duties. Regional diversity was important; no two of the first lieutenants chosen by the governor came from the same town, and the same pattern was repeated among the second lieutenants.304

The process for electing officers followed standard rules in many regiments. For example, the records of the early Ohio militia and volunteer regiments show a consistent process of developing a roll of voters, nomination of candidates for officer positions, and attestation by an appointed group of election officials. The results were certified as in the following example:

303 Alanson A. Haines, *History of the Fifteenth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers* (New York: Jenkins & Thomas, 1883), 8, 10. While the patriotic citizens are not identified in this regimental history, generally they were politically influential businessmen, church leaders, and abolitionists.

Poll book of an election held for First Lieutenant of Marion Company No. 2 OVM [Ohio Volunteer Militia] held at Marion on the 23rd day of April 1861 by order of E Peters. R Wilson & H A True acting as judges, W E Scofield as Clerk of Said Election & were duly qualified as such before.

[Roll of all members of the company]

Tally sheet
Name of persons voted for for the office of First Lieutenant of Marion Company No. 2 O.V.M. and number of votes cast for each.

William P Hatch (49 marks)
B R Durfer (17 marks)
Nicholas Gerolaman (10 marks)

We do hereby certify that William P. Hatch had forty-nine votes. B.R. Durfer had seventeen votes and Nicholas Gerolaman had ten votes for First Lieutenant, and that this state of the poll was publicly declared at the close of the aforesaid tally and count.

Attested W.E. Scofield clerk

In contrast, there were three paths to officer selection among the U.S.C.T. regiments. First, in the 70 regiments raised by Adjutant General Thomas, officers were chosen by boards formed from divisional officers and often operating without clear direction or rules for selection. Since these boards might and frequently did contain friends or commanders of the applicants, they were open to charges of favoritism and frivolity, as in the charges of inconsistency leveled at the Stevenson, Alabama board by Mussey. Second, black regiments that began as state organizations were provided with officers through processes more similar to the white regiments than the standards set by the Bureau for Colored Troops. The 1st Illinois Regiment (Colored) was suffering from a

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305 Adjutant General of Ohio, Election Returns for Officers, Ohio Historical Society (Columbus: 1861-1862).
306 R.D. Mussey to C.W. Foster, February 8, 1865, USACC, Letters Sent by the Commissioner.
lack of company officers in January 1864, and Governor Richard Yates appealed to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton (Figure 4-2) for the power to make appointments. While Stanton rejected this request since only the President could appoint U.S.C.T. officers, he did ask for the governor’s recommendations and promised that suitable candidates would receive commissions. The 127th Ohio Volunteer Infantry (Colored) was formed by Governor David Tod in the summer of 1863 and languished without officers while the War Department decided whether or not it would accept black troops. When the Department made up its mind, the governor appointed G.W. Shurtleff as its lieutenant-colonel based on his experience as an officer in the 7th Ohio Volunteer Infantry. The subordinate officers were also appointed by the governor. However, the regiment’s colonel, James W. Conine, was selected by the War Department after the Governor’s first choice received poorer scores from an examination board. Finally, arguably the most effective process was used by the impartial Bureau for Colored Troops examination boards.307

Selected by politicians, elected by their subordinates-to-be, self-promoted by recruiting, or trained in the military arts, the Union officers of the Civil War shared, for the most part, remarkable similarities. They were usually brave to an extent nearly incomprehensible to the modern eye. At the same time, they were almost always amateurs, and discovered quickly that dilettantes on the battlefield were soon dead. Study, practice, and preparation of all sorts were absolute necessities for these men, and particularly for those who would lead the untested black soldiers into battle.

CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S.C.T. OFFICER PREPARATION

U.S.C.T. officer preparation did not spring into existence without prior background or antecedents. Philosophically and practically, it was shaped by the West Point and Regular Army experience. The formal educational practices, selection processes, and scope of knowledge that prepared officers for the white regiments were also inputs into the policies of the Bureau for Colored Troops. This was inevitable given that the officers making and implementing those policies were products of the white military system.

This aspect of the Civil War represents both a divergence from the underlying philosophy and practice of military education that had characterized the antebellum period and the retention of many of its characteristics as implemented at West Point. In fourteen key areas of practice, the U.S.M.A. was usually the baseline to which other military education providers looked when they envisioned their own activities. Even more, Regular Army officers could be counted on to attempt to translate their West Point educational experiences into the volunteer or U.S.C.T. regiments. In looking at the practice of education in the Union Army, it is important to remember that there was a great deal of variability from regiment to regiment, but that there were also practices that were highly consistent across the span of the War and in most of the regiments. The most important variable in these practices was the quality of the field grade officers and their desire to have a strong, ‘fighting’ regiment.

- **Curriculum.** West Point’s curriculum focused for the most part on engineering and mathematics with little interest in strategy and tactics. Training in drill and military administration was more implicit than explicit. Faced with the realities of Wartime life in the field, regimental training was nearly the opposite. Most educational exercises focused on tactics and drill. The Free Military School occupied a space between the Academy and the regiments with most of its focus being on the various tactical Schools but offering some practice in mathematics but little or none in science and engineering.

- **Pedagogic Technique.** West Point, the regiments, and the Free Military School all aligned on how material was presented. Recitations were typically a staple of educational practice in all three venues, and the professors at West Point, the
commanding officers of regiments, and the instructors at the Free Military School tended to be equally demanding in the search for perfection among their students.

- **Pedagogic Authority.** Authority rested solely with the instructor in all three cases. Students were neither encouraged nor expected to think for themselves. Rather, the instructor was the sole source of information and interpreter of the curriculum.

- **Practical tactical training.** West Point did not value practical training outside of the three summer camps that each cadet attended. Within the regiments, most training was extremely practical, even to the point of translating recitations into *walk-throughs* of tactical concepts where officers or non-coms with staves and ropes took the place of files of soldiers. The Free Military School took advantage of practical training at Camp William Penn, but the prospective officers were more often in the role of instructors of actual black troops than of traditional learners themselves. This portion of their training may have contributed to their high success rate in front of the examination boards.

- **Study groups.** Study groups and self-study were strongly encouraged in all three venues. Mussey particularly saw this as a helpful aspect of learning.

- **Physical Location.** West Point was a traditional *brick and mortar* school once the War Department began providing funds for dormitory and classrooms. Regimental training occurred mostly under canvas or the sky. The Free Military School used temporary quarters in Philadelphia supplemented by Camp William Penn’s drill field.

- **Self-Direction.** West Point actively discouraged self-direction in learning and expected the cadets to learn the curriculum as it was presented and without question. Regimental education and the program at the Free Military School had many of the characteristics of West Point, but did admit one key self-directed component—the students were almost always self-selected at the Free Military School. In the regiments, however, participation in learning was usually at the command of a more senior officer, even if a student had a desire for learning that did not require coercion from a superior.
• **Discipline.** West Point’s discipline was simultaneously harsh and weak. While cadets were held to very high standards of deportment and performance, transgressions which merited dismissal were often forgiven within a day or two after a cadet was expelled. At the Free Military School, discipline was less forgiving. Any failure to perform as demanded by the instructors led to dismissal. Within the regiments, standard military discipline applied, which meant that students were rarely dismissed from their role as officers, but would be roundly abused by both their superiors and peers if they did not show competence or satisfy their preceptor.

• **Selection Criteria.** Young applicants to the Academy were usually selected by their parents for a military career, and were appointed through connections and political patronage. Regimental training was usually at the command of superior officers. Only the Free Military School allowed for self-selection in application, followed by a review of the application by the Supervisory Committee.

• **Prior Practical Experience.** West Point neither demanded nor expected prior experience. Within the regiments and at the Free Military School, prior experience was appreciated and often led to lessened training workloads.

• **Examination Process.** There was no serious examination of capacity to be an officer prior to admittance to West Point, but cadets were frequently examined during their tenure. Even so, there was nothing equivalent to the divisional or Bureau for Colored Troops’ examination boards. About half of officers in black regiments faced those boards. Like West Point, the Free Military School frequently tested its students with both theoretical and practical examinations.

• **Post-Graduation Appointment.** West Point selected the branch of service for each of its graduating cadets. In both the regiments and the Free Military School, the branch of service was already determined. An officer servicing in an infantry regiment was likely to stay in the infantry (the reality behind the taunt “Whoever saw a dead cavalryman?” led some men to change branches; cavalry officers did use the U.S.C.T. to transfer to more active service.)
Faculty. West Point was served by a small, permanent, full-time faculty, as was the Free Military School. Regimental instructors were typically senior or field grade officers with more experience than their students.

Duration of Studies. At West Point, a cadet spent four (or five) years in full time education, with one summer off for a home visit. Regimental training was of indefinite duration with more time spent on learning while in camp and little during combat. The Free Military School’s course of instruction generally lasted from four to six weeks.\(^{308}\)

Although deviations from the West Point system existed, it appears that the preference of the Army was for educational and preparation activities to be as close to the U.S.M.A. norm as possible.

Each of the key decision makers in the orbit of the Bureau for Colored Troops had participated in the educational and selection practices described in this chapter. Brig. (later Maj.) Gen. Lorenzo Thomas, the principal War Department recruiter of blacks, was an 1823 graduate of West Point. Silas Casey, president of the most important of the examination boards, was U.S.M.A Class of 1826. George Stearns, Commissioner for Organization of the U.S. Colored Troops, was appointed to the rank of major by Adjutant General Thomas. Reuben Mussey, Stearn’s assistant and successor as Commissioner, was in Washington when the South rebelled, and formed a company of home guards to protect the city until Union regiments could enter the Capital. These efforts and his political influence led to a Regular Army commission in the 19\(^{th}\) U.S. Infantry as a captain.

It is not surprising that, similar to the white Volunteer forces, the training and drill practices of the U.S.C.T. reflected the Regular Army experience of West Point. Similarly, officer appointments had the flavor of the U.S.M.A. even though few of the officer candidates had the academic preparation that Academy cadets were expected to bring to the school. Chapter Five’s discussion of the officer examination boards and appointment practices reveals a system steeped in West Point’s philosophy if not in its specific engineering area of focus.

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RE-CREATION

May 4, 1864 – This was his fourth attempt at examination after being turned away at the door every day since Friday past. Hole in the frockcoat, mended. Light blue trim, ragged but serviceable. Brogans, blacked. Sky blue trousers, patched. Vest, clean. Forage cap, brushed. Face shaved. Fresh shirt. Nine buttons shined. Sergeant’s chevrons sewn … Mind swirling with the details of the School of the Company, the candidate stands outside the grimy building at 212 F Street in Washington. Inside waits the greatest challenge of his career, more daunting than Hooker’s debacle at Chancellorsville—the Casey examination board. He had never talked to a general before. Now he was going to spend an hour standing in front of Silas Casey, author of Tactics. Not just standing, but answering—if he could remember, if he could avoid being tongue-tied, if he didn’t lose his head—questions about almost anything. They might start with company maneuvers. What are the three commands telling the company’s rear rank to fire? When the company is halted and in line of battle, how do you make it march by the right flank? In column of platoon and marching, how do you go into a left line of battle? In column, how do you break files to the rear and cause them to re-enter into line? How is this different for two, four, or six files? How do you relieve a sentinel? How do you take a company from two ranks into a single rank? If that weren’t bad enough, they might move onto to mathematics or geography, American history or foreign languages, or the Greek and Roman classics.

It was a pleasant day in Washington, but he was still sweating as if it were the middle of July. The young candidate, 25 years old, had served with the 72th New York Volunteers and risen to the rank of sergeant. When he reenlisted last year, many of his old friends had gone home, and he found himself among strangers in the 120th New York.

He had a powerfully good recommendation from Col. Leonard in his pocket, but it was not a talisman against questions about military administration. You’ve been sent on recruiting duty and have found enough negroes for a company. What reports do you need to send to your commanders and the Adjutant General? How many copies? With a feeling of dread, he entered the building hoping for a 1st Lieutenancy…and emerged angry and despairing several hours later as a 2nd Lieutenant in the 41st U.S.C.I. having achieved a 2nd class score.

Lt. George Tate, unlike his fellow officers of the 41st and 100th U.S.C.I., left thoughts and records of his service with the Union Army between 1863 and 1865. We can only speculate about what was passing through his mind before and during his board appearance, but the writings of other officer candidates support the account above—fictional only in what Sgt. Tate was thinking and feeling.309 After more than three

309 AGO, Applications for Commissions; AGO, Appointments to Colored Units, RG 94-E.370; Henry Crosby, Diary, 1864, Collection of John Bozeman, Falls Church, VA (1863-1865); Tate, Diary.
months in an Army hospital with an unnamed illness, Tate was notified on April 24, 1864 that “my application to Maj. C.W. Foster is answered by permission to appear before the board.” Six days later he was in Washington where he was turned away for examination that day. His friend Bailey “goes in and passes the Board but is thrown out by the doctor.” On May 2 and 3, he arrived for the examination but was put off again: “I go to the reading room and spend a few hours. I wander around the city and satisfy myself as to many things about city life that I never knew before.” Finally, on May 4, he is allowed to stand for the examination.  

Although he was successful in his pursuit of a commission, Tate was not happy with the outcome since he was in search of a higher rank. His review of his board performance was a disgruntled “I am examined and pass for a 2nd Lieut. Consider it a failure forever. A dark picture.” While he did not describe the questions asked by the board, his later comments on the board’s president indicate that he had a rough time and recalled the experience bitterly: “Common sense has been dismissed from the service and Gen. Casey has been promoted. Any man guilty of intelligence shall suffer death or such other punishment as a colonel shall direct. Any degree of intellectual development, especially in an officer, will be construed as prejudicial to good order and military discipline. If any soldier is unfortunate enough to have any reasoning power, he must keep the matter secret or subject himself to the contempt of his commanding officer.”

Oliver Norton, a bugler with the 83rd Pennsylvania, encountered similar frustrations in his attempt to appear before the examination board, but with happier results. He first became interested in a U.S.C.T. commission in May 1863 and solicited a recommendation from Galusha A. Grow, Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives. When Grow responded that fall, Norton applied to Maj. Foster and was assigned an early October examination date. Norton, like Tate, found that the board was behind schedule and spent almost four weeks in Washington before his examination on October 28. In conversations with fellow examinees living at the U.S. Sanitary Commission, he was surprised to find how poorly prepared he was, and spent much of his time studying: “None are commissioned who are not qualified to hold the same rank

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310 Tate, April 24, May 1-3, 1864, Diary.
311 Ibid., May 4, 1864, Tate’s underline; Ibid., January 9, 1865.
in the regular army, and I begin to feel very small indeed. A man is required to show, first, a thorough knowledge of Casey’s tactics (and the examination is very severe in this), then a good knowledge of geography and history, arithmetic, algebra and geometry. Then the ‘Army Regulations,’ ‘Articles of War,’ muster and pay rolls, etc., etc.” In the first rush of candidates, the Washington board was highly selective; Norton observed two lieutenant colonels and many other line officers who were rejected as second lieutenants. He found it difficult to prepare: “I am studying all I can, but cannot fix my mind to study as I once could. Two years and half in the army vetoes that.”

In spite of his misgivings, Norton’s preparations must have been effective. In his forty-five minute examination, he missed only two questions and passed as a First Class 1st Lieutenant. He was surprised at the duration of his exam since many candidates only spent ten or fifteen minutes with the board, and it was unusual for an exam to last over half an hour. While some of his friends were chagrined that he had not been appointed as a captain, Norton was pleased with the results: “It is no boy’s play to satisfy that board.” On November 19, 1863 he was assigned to the 8th U.S.C.I. and was “half ‘luny’ with delight.”

Lieutenants Tate and Norton participated in an activity that was endured by thousands of prospective officers for the U.S.C.T. and was often as difficult for the board’s other examinees. The boards for prospective officers were initially established by Special Order 97 in March 1863, and local boards were formed at the command of Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas in cities including New Orleans; Nashville; Davenport, Iowa; and Stevenson, Alabama. After its creation in May 1863, the Bureau for Colored Troops under Maj. Charles W. Foster became the administrative body for the officer candidate selection process. General Orders No. 143 stipulated that “Boards will be convened at such posts as may be decided upon by the War Department to examine applicants for commissions to command colored troops, who, on application to the Adjutant General, may receive authority to present themselves to the board for examination.” The Bureau’s boards were created in Washington, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and eventually Richmond.

Foster brought an unusual breadth of military experience to his role at the Bureau having risen from private to major over the course of the War. While thousands of officers joined the Army from civilian life, he followed a different pattern, having served an enlisted man and non-commissioned officer in a Regular Army infantry regiment and an artillery battery from 1846 to 1856.314

The first Bureau-sanctioned board met in Washington under the leadership of General Silas Casey operating under the rules of General Orders No. 144. The first months of operation were busy; by the end of October 1863, the Bureau’s boards had authorized 1,534 applicants to appear, examined 918, and approved 517—of whom 323 had been assigned to U.S.C.T. regiments. Because of educational or physical deficiencies, 401 were rejected. Casey’s Washington board, the Cincinnati board of Col. Henry Van Rensselaer, and the St. Louise board of Col. Daniel Huston were the most active. The judgment of the Bureau on the boards’ performance was complimentary but also reflected some defensiveness in the face of criticism of elitism: “It is possible that some meritorious candidates have been rejected by the boards, but the examinations have without doubt been conducted impartially and have resulted in giving to this branch of the service a class of efficient and well-instructed officers.”315

Both official and ad hoc review boards worked throughout the South and border regions, with different standards and widely different reputations for rigor. Those that met in Washington, Cincinnati, and St. Louis operated with more central control than the boards in Stevenson, Alabama; Chattanooga; or Nashville. By War’s end, the Bureau’s boards had reviewed at least 9,000 candidates with a pass rate of about 53 percent. However, only about 25 percent of the original candidates appear in the Adjutant General’s records as U.S.C.T. officers because of additional screening by the Bureau for

Colored Troops. Thus, 9,000 examinees became approximately 5,000 approved candidates, of whom about 2,500 (plus 225 receiving assignments later) were given commissions; but there were nearly 7,800 U.S.C.T. officers. Where did the other 5,000 come from? Two additional sources accounted for the remaining two-thirds of the U.S.C.T. officer corps: direct appointments by the Federal government and State governors, and commissions approved by divisional boards authorized by Adjutant General Thomas during the first months of the black regiments’ formation. The focus of this chapter is primarily on the officers who passed through the Bureau’s process since Thomas’ boards left few records, and direct appointments were idiosyncratic to the applicants and appointers.316

The Adjutant General’s office created rough guidelines for the knowledge expected of officers in different command roles. A lieutenant, for example, needed to be familiar with the Schools of the Soldier and of the Company—basic platoon and company drill—along with being literate. A captain had to master the regimental drill of the School of the Battalion. Higher ranking officers had to demonstrate knowledge of the School of the Brigade. In all cases, candidates had to know Army regulations in detail.317

Maj. General Silas Casey was the power behind the examination boards, and personally led the Washington City board consisting of two colonels, a lieutenant colonel, a surgeon, and one lieutenant. They would meet frequently—often daily—to review applicants. Officer candidates such as Sgt. Tate would have had at least a general sense of the odds of receiving a commission since nearly half of the applicants were winnowed out before they even had the opportunity to appear before a board. Tepid recommendations, “the good of the Service,” inability to reach the site of a sitting board, poor timing, field operations, reconsideration of the application, a commanding officer’s refusal to allow participation, sickness, and death or wounding in battle all contributed to the pre-board attrition rate. Only a quarter of the applicants could expect to become an officer or advance in rank. Table 5-1 shows the results from applications processed by the Nashville examination board, the primary source for the 100th U.S.C.I., during the peak

316 Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle*, 52; AGO, Appointments to Colored Units; AGO, Persons Who Have Passed Examining Boards. Based on a random sample of one percent (n=250) of approved candidates who did not have regimental appointments listed, 9 percent of those who passed the board but were not assigned did eventually serve as officers with the U.S.C.T.

317 Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle*, 48; Webster, Free Military School Prospectus, 4-5.
years of U.S.C.T. expansion. Note that the pass rate for those who actually appeared before the Nashville board was higher than for the Washington board at the time, but that a bare half of the passed candidates eventually received an appointment to the U.S.C.T.\textsuperscript{318}

Table 5-1  Applicants seeking examination by the Nashville Board, 1863 and 1864

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1863</th>
<th>1864</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% of Sitting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applicants</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actually examined</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>371</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passed</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not sit for exam</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The men who appeared before the examination boards came from a wide variety of backgrounds. A random sample of 163 candidates appearing before the Cincinnati examination board in 1863 and 1864 (Table 5-2) shows the distribution of pre-War occupations of the applicants.\textsuperscript{319}

Table 5-2  Applicants for Commissions in the U.S.C.T. Cincinnati Board, 1863-1864, Occupations Prior to War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>Mechanic/Machinist</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>Book Keeper</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>All other</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Carriage Maker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Druggist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Dentist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ferrier</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Jeweler</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Painter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanic/Machinist</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Miller</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Photographer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book Keeper</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Shoemaker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Physician</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Salesman</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Artist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Seaman</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Stone Cutter</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacksmith</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cooper</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Telegraph Oper.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Watchmaker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{318} Webster, Free Military School Prospectus; USACC, Proceedings of Nashville Examination Board.

\textsuperscript{319} AGO, Proceedings of Examining Board, Cincinnati. Random sample of 163 candidates appearing before the Cincinnati Board in 1863 and 1864.
It is no surprise that at least 31.3 percent of the applicants came from occupations that required literacy (clerk, teacher, book keeper, and student), but it is reasonable to assume that, given the requirements of an officer’s administrative duties, virtually all of the other 68.7 percent of the applicants had received at least a common-school education.

A man might decide to submit an application for many reasons. When the early U.S.C.T. regiments were forming, they attracted officers with strong abolitionist sentiment such as Thomas W. Higginson of the 33rd U.S.C.I. and Robert G. Shaw of the 54th Massachusetts. But candidates rarely had just one motivation. The same men might want to serve the country in a more significant capacity, have the perquisites of higher rank, and see the War end more quickly through their own efforts. Some, trapped in military backwaters or desk jobs, might simply want adventure. Personal friendships could be the source of application—there are many examples of groups of soldiers from the same regiment appearing before an examination board on the same day. Later in the War, the lure of enhanced status and pay drew enlisted men and non-commissioned officers to seek a commission—although many of these men shared the motivations of the early officer candidates too. A need for personal redemption after a leadership mistake or cowardice in a white regiment may have been a factor in a few cases, and men who have been mustered out of the Army because of severe wounds would sometimes seek a U.S.C.T. commission rather than serve in the Invalid Corps, later known as the Veterans Reserve Corps.\footnote{AGO, Persons Who Have Passed Examining Boards.}

**ESTABLISHING THE EXAMINATION BOARDS**

Holding an officer candidate examination board was consistent with Army practice in many other areas. Examination and review boards were standard for the Signal Corps, quartermasters, surgeons, officers raising veteran volunteer companies, draft dodgers, engineers, and businessmen attempting to sell cotton. After the Union’s initial Wartime disasters, boards were created by General George B. McClellan for the “purification of officers” in white regiments so that “officers found to be incompetent will be rejected, and the vacancies thus occasioned will be filled by the appointment of such persons as may have passed the examination before the Board.” The intent of the McClellan boards was not to replace the volunteer’s right of election, but to provide the
Army with veto power over the appointment of incompetents. His object was “to prevent mere politicians and incompetent or cowardly officers from holding the places of better men.” Between the normal selection practices and the Army boards, McClellan hoped to find men who “on the field will not blanch at the foe, but who will inspire their command with their own daring, at the same time their prudence will prevent recklessness and any unnecessary loss of life or limb.”

To establish an examination board, General Orders No. 143 was often personalized for each military Department by the Adjutant General’s office. For example, Gen. Gillmore of the Department of the South was “authorized to appoint a Board for the examination of white persons to officer the regiments and companies raised by him, and to make provisional appointment of the persons passed by said Board, and appointed by him, reporting their names to this Department for its approval, and if approved, such persons will be commissioned by the President, as in other cases of colored troops.”

The Bureau for Colored Troops attempted to be the governing body for the officer candidate selection process, but was often at the mercy of local preferences and egos. Bureau chief Foster laid out the circumstances under which a board could be convened and generally acted as the final authority over the rulings of the boards. Local commanders would occasionally create impromptu examination boards for a number of reasons and with varying success. However, the modern concept of highly centralized control of the military emanating from the Pentagon was not part of the Civil War practice of administration, and sometimes-casual local initiatives and practices were the rule rather than the exception.

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322 Official Records, Series 3, 3:1:1183, December 22, 1863,
The boards could also be ignored. In a directive from the War Department on October 21, 1863, Edwin Stanton, the Secretary of War, commanded George Stearns and Andrew Johnson, Tennessee’s military governor (Figure 5-1), that “you are authorized to appoint any persons who you may deem suitable for Raising, Organizing and Commanding Colored Troops in the State of Tennessee, whether such persons have passed Examination of the Board or not, and upon your designating such persons to the proper Bureau at Washington, proper commissions will be made out.”

Mussey, reporting to Foster in 1864, described the regional independence of the Western commands and their approach to examination boards. When they arrived in Nashville earlier in the year, he and Stearns had discovered boards operating in Stevenson, Alabama and Chattanooga along with the Nashville board that had been authorized by Maj. Gen. Rosecrans. Mussey moved to maintain some oversight at his home base so that “this Board, though not definitely under my orders, has reported weekly to me the results of its examinations, and persons desiring to appear before it make application to this office.”

The Bureau accepted local variances in Board regulations and procedures as long as they were roughly within the Bureau’s guidelines. Maj. Gen. E. Canby of the Department of the Gulf laid out his requirements for the Board that would operate in his

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323 AGO, Records of Capt. R. D. Mussey. While still a U.S. senator from Tennessee, Johnson served as the military governor of his state and was Maj. Stearns’ superior officer. The relationship between Stearns and Mussey on one hand, and Johnson on the other was often tempestuous due to Johnson’s conservative tendencies and his desire to maintain support from former slaveholders. Stearns and Johnson could not work together. However, Mussey and Johnson developed a level of trust leading to Johnson’s request that Mussey become his military secretary after Lincoln’s assassination.

area in 1864. Boards would sit every day except Sunday from 9 to 5. They would be responsible for weekly reports that included a suggested rank and the comparative position of the candidate within the group examined. Rejections would be final and without recourse to other authorities. Finally, loyalty to the United States and trustworthiness were required.325

Boards were convened with a pro-forma announcement such as Mussey’s Special Order 23. The recipients—Col. Hull, Maj. Grosskopff, and Capt. O’Neil—had to add board duties to their other activities as they began their session at 10 AM on Saturday, February 4, 1864. It is easy to forget the difficulties involved in coordinating bureaucratic activities in the days before ubiquitous electronic and telephonic communication.326

For example, bringing the Nashville board into operation created some confusion, and on occasion, the right hand did not appear to know what the left hand was doing as when Mussey wrote to Capt. F. Bates Dictman, one of the Adjutant General’s assistants:

Captain, I have just received a telegram from Maj. C. W. Foster inquiring whether there is a board in Nashville for examination of candidates for appointment to Colored Troops & if so by what order convened and who are the members? Can you give me the No. of Order detailing them and their names by the bearer, and greatly obliged, R.D. Mussey, Capt.

Capt. Dictman responded the next day that:

Capt, The Board was organized by Special Order No. 53 – August 22nd/63
Hdr. Dist. of the Cumb’d., Maj. Gen’l. Comd’g…Excuse the delay in furnishing this information, but I had to send to the Board for it there being no record of District orders at these Headqtr.327

In spite of occasional confusion, the boards went about their business in an effective and professional way. Before they conducted an examination, however, the candidate had to navigate a sometimes byzantine Army application process.

CANDIDATE APPLICATION

The first step in the candidate selection process was often a letter written to Maj. Foster of the Bureau for Colored Troops or to Mussey, the Commissioner for

327 Ibid. R. Mussey to R. Dictman, November 27, 1863; F. Dictman to R. Mussey, November 28, 1863, Ibid. The Board consisted of Col. Lum, 10th Michigan; Lt. Col. Crane, 85th Indiana; and Maj. Dutton, 105th Illinois.
Organization. General Orders No. 143 shows that Adjutant General Thomas could also be the recipient of the application, but they were usually directed to officers of lower rank within the Adjutant General’s office.

Application letters almost always contained endorsements from superiors in the applicant’s chain of command, public groups such as the Philadelphia Supervisory Committee, or from political figures. Applicants were rarely refused at the first official step, although many may have been strongly discouraged by their commanding officers prior to applying, or may have found that they did not receive sufficiently positive recommendations to make acceptance likely. Analysis of all applicants to the Commissioner for Organization’s office in Nashville in during eight months of 1864 shows a “pass to board for examination” rate of greater than 95 percent.\textsuperscript{328}

There were other routes for application. Joseph Scroggs who was eventually commissioned into the 5\textsuperscript{th} U.S.C.I. successfully applied to the governor of Ohio on October 19, 1863. His diary gives a good sense of how the application process worked. Having gathered the recommendations of his colonel and lieutenant colonel, Scroggs wrote to Governor David Tod and asked for permission to appear before a board even though “it is not a popular branch of the service now, but what is the difference, when I am conscious of doing right, and serving my country.”\textsuperscript{329}

Table 5-3 shows the distribution of rank or status at time of application within the Department of the Cumberland with a comparison to a broader random sample drawn from all Departments across 1863 and 1864. Between March and October 1864, the Commissioner for Organization (Mussey) received 480 requests for consideration and passed over 95 percent to the Nashville examination board. The pattern of applicants changed dramatically over these eight months. Eighty-two percent came from enlisted soldiers and non-commissioned officers, with 74 percent coming from the same ranks for all applicants to all boards. Nearly all of the non-commissioned officer applications came during the first half of this period (March-June 1864) while more than 70 percent of the privates’ applications were in the second half (July-October 1864.) The U.S.C.T. first

\textsuperscript{328} AGO, Applications for Commissions. USACC, Register of Applicants for Commissions in the U. S. Colored Troops, Dept. of the Cumberland and Tennessee, 1864, RG 393-E.1148. The Dept. of the Cumberland records contain 480 applications in total.

\textsuperscript{329} J. Scroggs to Sister, October 19, 1863, Scroggs Papers.
drew in current officers who were interested, then non-commissioned officers until that pool was exhausted, and finally privates. However, since the ranks assigned by the boards were also declining over time (a sort of inverse grade inflation), the impact of using less skilled privates, compared to sergeants and corporals, was minimal. Generally, the ranks of applicants were similar across all of the boards. However, the percentage of civilians applying across all Departments was substantially higher than in the Department of the Cumberland (20.1 percent versus 2.7 percent). Local variations in application patterns are as yet unexplained but may represent Mussey’s strict supervision of the board and the intake of qualified applicants.  

Table 5-3  Rank at Time of Application
Department of the Cumberland, March-October 1864 compared to Random Sample, All Departments, 1863-1864

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank or Status</th>
<th>Dept. of Cumberland</th>
<th>Random Sample, All Departments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None Stated</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk, bandsman, or hospital</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>steward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regardless of Department, all but a handful were promptly recommended to a board for examination, and usually within a day or two. The rare disapprovals were almost always the result of personal intervention by Thomas, Mussey, Foster, or some well-connected politician. The most commonly stated reason for rejection of an application was that the applicant was seeking a commission with a regiment in a state other than his own, and he was typically remanded to his home state to seek a recommendation from it. Occasionally, a potential candidate would be rejected due to opposition from the commander of the applicant’s unit and, most often, this took the form

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330 AGO, Applications for Commissions.
of strong disagreement with the policy of recruiting blacks. In the Department of the Cumberland, due to the touchy political situation in Tennessee brought on by the phrasing of the Emancipation Proclamation and the hostility that many Union officers showed toward blacks in the military, Mussey was respectful of the commanders’ wishes and refused protested applications.  

Conversely, unit commanders occasionally took advantage of the need for U.S.C.T. officers and pushed poor subordinates out of their regiment via the recommendation process. Brig. Gen. John Hawkins, the only West Point graduate known to have served as the commander of a unit consisting entirely of the U.S.C.T. (and that in a senior command role above the regimental level), was frustrated by the dumping of useless officers to his division and complained to a friend that “some cases that have come to my knowledge that recommendations were made by them in order to get rid of a bad or disagreeable man. These characters I am having moved out as fast as possible and I want others to replace them.”

Civilian applications that passed through Mussey’s office usually had little to distinguish them, but occasionally the political environment that was so important in the wartime era found its way into an application. Arthur Reed, for example, applied for a U.S.C.T. colonelcy with the backing of Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks, former speaker of the House of Representatives; Oliver P. Morton, governor of Indiana; and David Tod, governor of Ohio. Not surprisingly, his application was accepted and passed to the review board.

Sgt. Herrmann Heinz was a more typical applicant who began his quest for a commission with a letter to his colonel on January 15, 1864:

I would most respectfully apply for permission to appear before the honorable Board of Examination now in Session at St. Louis in order to receive a position in one of the colored Regiments now in the course of Organization.

331 USACC, Letters Sent by the Commissioner; USACC, Applicants for Commissions, Dept. of the Cumberland. Reasons for rejection were almost never documented. Letters from Mussey to rejected applicants appear rarely.
332 J. Hawkins to C. Mills, November 12, 1863, Caleb Mills Collection.
333 USACC, Applicants for Commissions, Dept. of the Cumberland. The NPS Soldiers and Sailors System shows a record for Arthur F. Reed who served as a Lt. Col. with the 40th U.S.C.I.; he may have been this applicant.
334 USACC, Applications for Commissions in Colored Units.
When motivated, the Army’s bureaucracy could respond quickly. With the recommendation of his commanding officer, Heinz received a reply by form letter from the War Department on January 30, 1864 granting him the privilege of paying his own way to St. Louis to appear before Col. Daniel Huston’s board and threatening him with sanctions if he did not return to his unit immediately: “Any failure to comply with these directions will subject you to trial for ‘absence without leave,’ besides forfeiting your chances for appointment.”

Resistance to a candidate’s desire for examination could be intense. The politics of slavery in the Border States and the complexities of applying the Emancipation Proclamation selectively led to pressure on the Bureau for Colored Troops and the Commissioner for Organization. In his rejection of Mussey’s request to bring officer candidates to Nashville from outside of his Department, Maj. Foster of the Bureau chided him, noting that “no reason is seen why the Colored troops being organized in Tennessee cannot be provided with officers selected from among the troops serving in the Departments of the Ohio and Tennessee.” Underlying Foster’s refusal were the troubled politics of the 1864 presidential election on one hand along with the complicated relationship between the Commissioner for Organization and current military governor, senator, and future vice president Andrew Johnson on the other.

PREPARING FOR THE EXAMINATION

Scant records exist describing individual preparations for the examination. However, Sgt. Tate, at least, did some preliminary reading in preparation for his board appearance with a single mention of studying Casey’s Tactics prior to the examination. John Marsh encouraged a young friend to continue preparing: “I am pleased to hear that you have received a commission [with a white regiment]. In relation to getting a still higher one in a colored regiment it will do you no harm to try. If you study the Tactics & Regulations and then come before Genl. Casey’s board and even fail in getting what you desire, the knowledge you may have acquired in the effort will not be lost.” Marsh

335 Ibid.
336 C. Foster to R. Mussey, March 2, 1864, USACC, Records of R.D. Mussey; Paul H. Bergeron et al., eds., The Papers of Andrew Johnson, 11 vols., vol. 7 (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1986).
included a copy of a pamphlet, probably Webster’s Free Military School prospectus, in his letter to “assist you in forming an opinion as to the requirements of the Board.”

While most preparation took the form of informal self-study or small group preparation with fellow candidates, there was one instance of the creation of a formal educational institution whose specific goal was to improve the performance of candidates in front of the examination board—the Free Military School for Applicants for Commands of Colored Troops. Other preparation programs, such as the one created by Brig. Gen. James C. Rice of the Army of the Potomac, were local rather than national or regional in scope. Both the Free Military School and what little is known about Rice’s contributions are discussed in Chapter Six.

EXAMINATION SCOPE

Candidates appearing before a board would often have had a broad sense of the kinds of knowledge expected of applicants seeking command roles from word of mouth, the Free Military School prospectus, or publicity within their regiments or brigades. A lieutenant, for example, needed to be familiar with the Schools of the Soldier and of the Company—basic platoon and company drill—along with being literate. A captain had to master the School of the Company and the regimental drill of the School of the Battalion. Higher ranking officers had to demonstrate knowledge of the School of the Brigade. In all cases, candidates had to know Army regulations in detail.

The duration of candidate examinations ranged from as little as 30 minutes to as many as two and a half hours, although some officer candidates described the experience as feeling like four to five hours. The higher the rank sought, the longer the time spent with the board but the higher the likelihood of success in gaining approval for some command position. On the other hand, the boards were selective; only half of the men who were already officers and were reviewed by the Washington board before December 1863 were awarded ranks that were equal to or higher than their current rank.

337 Tate, April 19, 1864, Diary; John F. Marsh to unknown, March 28, 1864, Gladstone Collection, Container 3, Item 240, Library of Congress Manuscript Collection.
338 Blassingame, "Selection of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of Negro Troops."; Webster, Free Military School Prospectus; Wilson, "Webster and the Free Military School."
339 Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 48; Webster, Free Military School Prospectus, 4-5;
340 Ibid., 12. Of four colonels reviewed in Washington, two were rejected completely and two were accepted with the rank of major. A lieutenant colonel was approved as a 1st lieutenant, and 35 hopeful 1st
The examination questions were meant to be practical; tactics, regulations, and history formed the core of the inquiry. However, the influence of traditional education was strong, and the Boards often attempted to determine if the candidate was familiar with the basics of the era’s liberal education including the literary classics, ancient languages, and the writings of Greek and Roman historians. The absurdity of such questions did not escape President Lincoln who reminded Secretary of War Stanton that “I personally wish Jacob R. Freese, of New Jersey, to be appointed a Colonel for a colored regiment - and this regardless of whether he can tell the exact shade of Julius Caesar’s hair.”

In the Department of Gulf, the scope of examination was clearly defined, while in other Departments it was left to the whims of its board. Junior officer candidates were expected to show proficiency in “reading, writing, arithmetic, and geography.” They needed to understand the Army Regulations, Articles of War, and the tactics of “the manual of arms, bayonet exercise, school of the company, battalion, and skirmishers, the duties of guards, sentinels, pickets, and vedettes.” They also had to understand how to enlist and discharge soldiers. For ranks above captain, the candidates have to be familiar with “the different kinds and calibers of small-arms used in the service, the Constitution, and Articles of War, and the practice of courts-martial.” They were expected to know the maneuvers of regiments, brigades and divisions. Administration was important as always; the candidates would be examined on “a general knowledge of the interior economy or management of regiments, and of the duties of adjutant, quartermaster, comissary, and ordnance officer.”

The types of questions varied widely from board to board. Some focused almost exclusively on tactics and military regulations using simple and direct questions that probed the knowledge of the candidate but did not require integrative depth or analysis. Administrative details were important—the boards often asked about how to conduct Muster for Pay, or maintain Muster Rolls, Descriptive Lists, and Company Books. Others asked candidates to read a selection and then write a passage from dictation.

lieutenants produced 15 failures, two colonels, four majors, four captains, five 1st lieutenants, and five 2nd lieutenants. See Appendix I for an analysis of the acceptance rates for this board.

341 A. Lincoln to E. Stanton, August 22, 1863, Basler, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, VII:11. No record of a Jacob Freese in a black regiment appears in the NPS Soldiers and Sailors System.

Occasionally, a board would grill a candidate on general knowledge about geography or mathematics, with the seeming intent of establishing that he had a liberal education. The boards emphasized their impartiality and Thomas Webster asserted that “every candidate stands upon his merits—the most obscure corporal or private stands an equal chance with the most favored and influential citizen.”

The experience of George Hughes, a private in the 4th Wisconsin Cavalry, highlights the selectivity of the review boards. He appeared before the New Orleans divisional board in January 1864 to be tested on drill, tactics, writing, mathematics, and geography under the rules cited above. Hughes was the only one of six applicants approved for a commission that week. However, selectivity did not guarantee the successful candidate’s personal satisfaction. After inspecting his future regimental home, the 15th U.S.C.I. (Engineers), he accepted an appointment as lieutenant and served in the Department of the Gulf for the remainder of the War. Hughes was frustrated, as were many in the U.S.C.T., by the lack of front line employment—most of his regiment’s time was spent on guard duty and engineering projects. Even during the Red River campaign in Louisiana, the 15th mostly built bridges and fortifications for the fighting units. Redesignated as the 99th U.S.C.I. in 1865, its engineering duties continued and it had one of its few tastes of battle during the move on Tallahassee in the last days of the War. Hughes would have preferred more combat and less digging.

Mussey attempted to set basic standards for the Nashville examining board and to avoid both irrelevant topics and overly sympathetic coaching of the candidate. He laid out the areas that he considered important, particularly focusing on practical skills demonstrated on the drill field and in camp. Examinations should not be too short, too long, or too detailed. Only a few questions should be needed to establish the candidate’s base of knowledge, and the role of the board should not be to instruct the candidate but rather to examine him. Accuracy was important along with precision: “If in examining, the candidate answers with absolute correctness this question: ‘Being at ‘Support Arms’ to come to ‘Shoulder Arms’ what are the commands and what the execution,’ it is more than reasonable to suppose that he understands the manual of the pieces.”

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343 Webster, Free Military School Prospectus, 3-4; Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 50.
344 Hughes, n.d., Diary, 64.
knowledge was established, a practical demonstration of squad maneuver, a successful physical exam, and basic knowledge of camp hygiene were sufficient for board approval.345

Scoring systems were inconsistent from one board to the next. While the boards’ reports to the Bureau for Colored Troops were generally in the same format, their basis of evaluation could be arbitrary, causing Mussey no end of frustration; the Stevenson board was “too hasty in its examinations, and arrived sometimes at very singular conclusions. In one instance, an Officer – then a Captain – was examined and was recommended for Major of the 1st Class. He was afterwards informed by the Board that he would have passed as Colonel had he been taller!” However, the Stevenson board also had a reputation for both rigor and selectivity with an acceptance rate of no more than 33 percent during its first months of operation. Within the major boards, scoring appears to be consistent with the categories of knowledge sought by the Bureau and ratings are similarly regular.346

Unsuccessful candidates were returned to the ranks or to civilian status. Appeals were not allowed although candidates sometimes felt that they had been treated unfairly. In the case of black officers from the Corp d’Afrique driven from the service by Banks’ New Orleans board in 1863, this feeling was not misplaced. There was also a perception that the board examinations were too severe and that they favored those who already had college educations. While the Free Military School’s prospectus derided this idea, the characteristics of the examinations indicate that the popular fear of the boards was not misplaced. Joseph Scroggs received the full scrutiny of the Cincinnati board:

I went before the “Board of Examiners” today, and was examined as to my fitness to receive a commission in the U.S. Inft African Descent. The examination was very rigid lasting two hours. Tactics, Regulations, Geography, Arithmetic, Political History, & General Information, were the principle subjects on which I was examined … It is an honor to pass a successful examination before such a Board, and no disgrace to fail. Which will I?347

345 R. Mussey to Barnard, Innes, Grosskopff, November 3, 1864, USACC, Endorsements.
346 R. Mussey to C. Foster, February 8, 1865, USACC, Letters Sent by the Commissioner; AGO, NIMS; AGO, Proceedings of St. Louis Examining Boards; Dudley T. Cornish, The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1966), 207; USACC, Proceedings of Nashville Examination Board.
347 Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 54; Webster, Free Military School Prospectus; Scroggs, October 31, 1863, Scroggs Papers.
REPORTS CREATED FOR EACH CANDIDATE

Upon completion of the examination, the boards had two choices: approval for a commission with the U.S.C.T. or rejection. The results were documented via a more or less weekly report sent to the Bureau for Colored Troops. It began with a summary of the Board’s activities and a description of the process used. The report header pages are relatively consistent with only minor variations in wording across all of the examination boards, and reflect guidance from the Bureau that they should contain the date of the board, the names of the board members, and the basis for assigning scores.

Military Examining Board, Nashville, Nov. 21st 1863
A.A.Genl. Department of the Cumberland.
Enclosed we send you the report of the proceedings of this Board for the week ending at this date Nov 21st 1863 together with an “Abstract” of rules adopted for the grading of Applicants examined and recommended.

Abstract

The Board determined that the relative Excellence & Merit of Officers examined and Recommended shall be shown by the Numbers 1-2-3-4&5 which numbers denote the proficiency and standing seriation from No. 1 to No. 5 upon the topics and subjects upon which they are examined – and that the numbers 1-2-3-4-5-6 etc. in regular Order shall designate the relative standing of each Officer recommended to the grade to which he is recommended.348

On March 26, 1864, the Nashville Board sent a report from its previous week’s meeting in Rooms, Military Examining Board to the Bureau for ratification. Two prospective officers who ultimately received appointments in the 100th U.S.C.I. appeared before the board that consisted of Col. William L. Stoughton of the 11th Michigan Infantry, Maj. E. Grosskopff of the 7th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery, and most likely one or two additional officers who were not mentioned in the report to the Bureau. They examined 13 candidates, rejecting five and approving eight (Table 5-4). After examination, Lot Wright and Amos Williams were assigned to the 100th as a company commander (captain) and company 1st Lieutenant respectively.349

348 USACC, Proceedings of the Boards of Examination.
349 Ibid.
### Table 5-4 Candidates for Commission, Nashville Board, Week of March 21, 1864

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/21</td>
<td>Renzin Kile</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>102 IL Vol Inf</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Passed 2(^{nd}) LT</td>
<td>2(^{nd}) class #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/21</td>
<td>John Watson</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>102 IL Vol Inf</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Passed 2(^{nd}) LT</td>
<td>1(^{st}) class #2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/21</td>
<td>Jacob Barger</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>6(^{th}) OH Lt Batt.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Passed 2(^{nd}) LT</td>
<td>2(^{nd}) class #1 LA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/22</td>
<td>William Walker</td>
<td>Pvt</td>
<td>7(^{th}) KY Cav</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/22</td>
<td>Henry Wyatt</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>7(^{th}) KY Cav</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/22</td>
<td>James Moss</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>85(^{th}) IN Inf</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Passed 1(^{st}) LT</td>
<td>2(^{nd}) class #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/23</td>
<td>Lot Wright</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>79(^{th}) OH Vol Inf</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Passed Captain</td>
<td>2(^{nd}) class #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/23</td>
<td>Amos Williams</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>79(^{th}) OH Vol Inf</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Passed 1(^{st}) LT</td>
<td>1(^{st}) class, no #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/23</td>
<td>Charles Merritt</td>
<td>Cpl</td>
<td>79(^{th}) OH Vol Inf</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Passed 2(^{nd}) LT</td>
<td>2(^{nd}) class #2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/24</td>
<td>Jacob Meyer</td>
<td>Pvt</td>
<td>37(^{th}) IN Vol Inf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Passed 2(^{nd}) LT</td>
<td>1(^{st}) class #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/24</td>
<td>Jacob Floyd</td>
<td>Pvt</td>
<td>17(^{th}) IN Vol Inf</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/26</td>
<td>Orlando DeVereaux</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td>22(^{nd}) MI Inf</td>
<td>Unk</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/26</td>
<td>Gurden Baird</td>
<td>Pvt</td>
<td>22(^{nd}) MI Inf</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note the pattern of multiple applicants from the same regiment appearing before the board. This is often repeated for other dates and other boards. Much like Sgt. George Tate who joined his friend ‘Bailey’ for a board appearance in 1864, friends would encourage each other to take a chance or try something new. The consistency of results within regimental sources is interesting and may reflect both well and poorly prepared candidates working to prepare for a commission, with the expected Darwinian outcome of the strong candidates passing and the weak failing. This phenomenon may also represent the quality of the home regiments, the quality of their officers, the recent load of field operations, or many other factors. The 102\(^{nd}\) Illinois Infantry, with two successful candidates before the March 21, 1864 board, was actively engaged in combat for much of its career and particularly leading up to the Atlanta campaign; the 79\(^{th}\) Ohio Infantry (two successful candidates) saw little combat but was almost constantly on the march in Tennessee prior to March 1864. At the same time, the 7\(^{th}\) Kentucky Cavalry (two rejected candidates) was mostly on railroad guard duty and the 22\(^{nd}\) Michigan Infantry (two rejected candidates) was often employed as an engineering battalion building bridges. Officers from the combat and mobile regiments fared better in this small sample than those who were static. This is a ripe area for future research.\(^{350}\)

March 21, 1864’s proportion of acceptances and rejections was consistent with other weeks. In a random sample of weekly reports (Table 5-5).\(^{351}\)

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\(^{350}\) Dyer, *Compendium*; Tate, April 30, 1864, Diary.

\(^{351}\) USACC, Proceedings of Nashville Examination Board.
Table 5-5  Acceptance and Rejection Rates, Nashville Board, 1863-1864

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Accepted</th>
<th>Accepted %</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>Rejected %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 3, 1863</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 17, 1863</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 7, 1863</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 28, 1863</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 19, 1863</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12, 1864</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 21, 1864</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7, 1864</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17, 1864</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The week of March 21, the Board met on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Saturday leaving no indication of the duration of the daily sessions or the length of each examination. Assuming a maximum work-day of nine hours (given the other necessary duties of a typical Union officer serving on a board, this is possibly overstated), the time spent examining and deliberating on each candidate would likely not exceed three hours. The likely time spent per candidate was probably less since both Col. Stoughton and Maj. Grosskopff had other significant duties.

A report such as the one shown below for Washington Gardner of the 100th U.S.C.I. was created for each individual. When the candidate was selected by the board, the report provided detailed information about their performance, as for Washington Gardner below who also served with the 100th U.S.C.I. When a candidate was rejected, their examination failure was simply noted as “rejected for any position within the U.S. Colored Troops.” Failing grades were not recorded since there was no recourse to or appeal of the Board’s decision.
Nashville, April 18th, 1864

The board then proceeded to examine Washington W. Gardner – 1st Sergeant Co. C 1st Batt. 13th U.S. Infty. Aged 24 years a resident of West Union, Iowa. The examination being concluded the Board find said Gardner fitted for the position of First Lieutenant Infty. U.S.C. Troops 1st class and grade him as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School of the Soldier</th>
<th>No. 1 ½</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“ “ Company</td>
<td>“ 2 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“ “ Battalion</td>
<td>“ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolutions of Brigade</td>
<td>“ -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“ Regulations</td>
<td>“ 2 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“ Discipline</td>
<td>“ 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical, Mental, &amp; Moral Fitness</td>
<td>“ 2 ½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>“ 2 ½</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First Class - First Lieutenant

And the Board recommend said Gardner for the position of First Lieutenant to stand as No. 1 in the list of First Class First Lieutenants of Infty.

Wm. L. Stoughton, Col. 11th Mich. Infty. President
E. Grosskopff, Major, U.S.C. Heavy Artillery, Secty.352

With the Board behind them, candidates waited a short time, often no more than a few days, for the results. They might be informed by the Bureau directly, the Commissioner for Organization, the president of the Board, a superior officer, or a more indirect channel. Mussey’s office was quick to notify Nashville candidates such as Corp. George Ackles of the 18th Michigan that he was “appointed 2nd Lieut. U.S. Colored Infantry having passed a favorable examination for that grade.” Unlike the Bureau for Colored Troops which did not pay for transportation for candidates, Mussey directed that the Quartermaster provide Ackles with transportation to report to Gen. Lorenzo Thomas.353

Political influence was not a guarantee of a successful examination outcome. Capt. Lewis McCoy who was chosen by Governor Tod of Ohio as colonel of the 5th U.S.C.I. had a poor score in military tactics and was not fully qualified in any of the

352 Ibid.
353 R. Mussey to G.W. Ackles, July 10, 1864, Special Order 83, USACC, Special Orders Issued,
examination areas. His results were only good enough to allow him to keep his present rank of captain, and he declined to serve the regiment in that capacity.354

A jubilant applicant, Joseph Scroggs, heard about his successful appearance on September 6, 1863 through a well-connected political friend on the governor’s staff that he was “recommended by the ‘Board of Examiners’ for a First Lieutenancy in the U.S. Inf A.D. Good!” By November 23, Scroggs had received his appointment and was ready to join the regiment. Of course, the easiest path to a commission was to avoid the Boards entirely like 2nd Lt. Levi Neville of the 125th U.S.C.I. On March 9, 1865 he received a commission because of his work as recruiter. No examination was needed. Similarly, Thomas Wright of the 31st U.S.C.I. resigned his volunteer commission with the 42nd N.Y. Infantry to serve his black unit without the pain of an examination.355

**POST-BOARD PLACEMENT**

A successful examination did not guarantee placement with a U.S.C.T. regiment; the Bureau for Colored Troops had become the arbiter for the assignment of commissions by mid 1864, and officers would only be assigned when there was a position available in

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354 Washington, "Eagles on Their Buttons: The Fifth Regiment, United States Colored Troops in the American Civil War".

355 Scroggs, September 6 and 23, 1863, Scroggs Papers; Levi Neville Diary, 1865, Levi Neville Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute (Carlisle, PA); T. Wright, Wright Papers, personal notes, 28.
a black regiment. In Nashville in 1864, Mussey found himself with an excess of officers approved by the Board but not attached to a U.S.C.T. regiment. At the same time, he paradoxically had a shortage of officers available. The three colonels, two lieutenant colonels, nine majors, 20 quartermasters, 39 first lieutenants, and 63 second lieutenants who had been approved unfortunately did not fill his needs for 16 captains.356

Maj. Foster set the policy for officer placement, tying the formation of company-level units to the appointment of officers. Captains were the key to unit creation and officer appointments. If a captain successfully recruited a company, there were slots for his subordinate officers. When there were enough companies for a battalion (four companies) or a regiment, then the senior officers could be attached. In practice, the colonel or lieutenant colonel of a regiment was often selected before or simultaneously with the captain-recruiters, and managed the process of regimental creation.357

However, the shortage of captains was so perennial and severe that Foster sometimes asked applicants who had passed the board for a higher rank to accept a captaincy, or receive no appointment at all. Foster suggested to candidate Levi Graybill that his employment at the rank of major following a board recommendation was “exceedingly indefinite. I am, however, directed to inform you, that should you signify your willingness to accept a Captaincy, you can be appointed at an early day.”358

Analysis of the approval statistics from the Cincinnati examination board between July 18, 1863 and February 13, 1864 highlight the problem of distribution of rank assignments. In this period, the board approved officers for the ranks shown in Table 5-6.359

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357 C. Foster to Governor Richard Yates, September 25, 1863, Ibid., 3:838.
358 C. Foster to L. Graybill, December 30, 1863, AGO, Letters Sent, Colored Troops Division, RG 94-E.352. The NPS Soldiers and Sailors System shows a Levi Graybill who served as a captain with the 22nd U.S.C.I. and may have been this candidate.
Table 5-6   Candidate Approvals and Rank Assigned
Cincinnati Examination Board, July 18, 1863 to February 13, 1864

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board Result</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Sufficient For</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No assignment</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenant</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>2 regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>3 regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>3 regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6 regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4 regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1 regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>163</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with most board results, particularly in 1863, the assignments were top heavy with field grade officers and bottom heavy with lieutenants who could not be employed until the captains raised the troops.

Assignment to a black regiment could also be withdrawn because of a candidate’s failure to appear at his posting. In circumstances where an already-commissioned officer was awarded an equal or lesser rank by an examination board, it was common for the officer to be unavailable for assignment, and rarely transferred from his white regiment.\(^{360}\)

**TRAINING WITHIN THE REGIMENTS**

Receiving a commission was simply the first hurdle to becoming an effective officer. Black soldiers’ confidence came from the knowledge that their officers would not throw their lives away through stupidity and incompetence. However, many U.S.C.T. officers knew little or nothing of their military duties, and numerous units instituted mandatory classes for them. When an officer was appointed to a U.S.C.I. regiment, his training continued in much the same way as any other officer in the Union Army, but there was substantial variation in the training practices of all regiments, white or black. Those with efficient regimental commanders continuously drilled and practiced tactical evolutions. Those with inefficient or absentee leaders often did not or were so halfhearted in their training that it was worthless.

\(^{360}\) Cornish, *The Sable Arm*, 211.
In the black units, training suffered from the tendency of the Army to assign U.S.C.I. units as labor battalions, leaving little time or inclination for preparation for battle. Without the prospect of combat, it was difficult to maintain an interest in the drudgery of drill. For months on end, black troops would dig ditches, graves, canals, and latrines rather than prepare for battle. The frustration that this produced among the soldiers was mirrored in their officers.\footnote{Gold, "Frustrated Glory," 105; Hughes, Diary.}

Both the 41st and 100th made an effort to continue officer education throughout the lives of the regiments. Unfortunately, other than orders requiring attendance at daily training sessions for officers, there do not appear to be any records of the material covered, the officers’ approach to the material, or the ways that the training was translated into development for the troops. Lt. George Tate left the sole apparent record of officer training in the 41st in 1865: “This is the first evening for Officers’ lessons but as it [is] optional for us to attend I don’t go.” His lack of interest in additional education was consistent both with the timing of the class (after the War was over and the 41st was redeployed to the Mexican border) and his negative attitude toward the military, higher authority, and ‘the rules’ as expressed throughout his diaries. His non-attendance may not have been the norm among his fellow officers.\footnote{Tate, July 31, 1865, Diary; AGO, Regimental Books, 41st U.S.C.I.; AGO, Regimental Books, 100th U.S.C.I.}

I speculate that, to some extent, the 41st and 100th followed the practices of other well-led regiments. The 54th Massachusetts Infantry, an outstanding black regiment, created an officers’ school as it was being formed in April 1863, and continued frequent lessons for them until the regiment began its field service in June. The focus of this school was on drill, tactics, and the customs of the service (i.e., military courtesies and
The education of non-commissioned officers was not forgotten in the 54th Massachusetts. Corporals and sergeants received daily instruction on drill and tactics from a senior captain, with no excuses accepted for absences.363

The experience of the 1st South Carolina (33rd U.S.C.I.) was similar. Higginson notes that “The best regiments in the Department are represented among my captains and lieutenants, and very well represented too; yet it has cost much labor to bring them to any uniformity in their drill.” Officers’ classes usually met three to five times per week, and were separated into sessions for company grade officers to focus on the School of the Company and field officers to learn the School of the Battalion. To turn theory into practice, the night’s lessons were sometimes followed by daytime rehearsals where noncoms and officers, organized into skeleton units with men holding strings or poles across the space normally occupied by privates, practiced the drill of the platoon, company or battalion. To accomplish these maneuvers, officers were expected to learn the tactics manual that was prevalent in the regiment, often Casey’s Tactics, and classes resembled the West Point recitation model.364

Preparing effective officers was often a rushed activity. Regiments, and particularly black regiments that were raised in the middle of the War, were under different pressures than those of the original volunteers of 1861 and 1862. Officers did not have the luxury of time to teach regimental duties and tactical formations. Three randomly selected early white regiments demonstrate the problems of time pressure. The 7th New York Infantry was mustered in April 1861, fought two small skirmishes in June and July of that year, and then was not involved in significant combat until May 1862. The 44th Ohio Infantry was organized in September 1861, and was first in a minor action in April, 1862. The 14th West Virginia Infantry was mustered in August 1862, and first saw combat in April 1863. During the time between mustering and combat, these and

363 Ibid.; Duncan, ed., Blue Eyed Child of Fortune: The Civil War Letters of Colonel Robert Gould Shaw; Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment, 23. Throughout the contemporaneous documents, the term school is mostly used in an informal sense. A regimental school would consist of a periodic gathering of officers to discuss tactics and administrative duties. The term does not imply a building, a regular course of studies, or any firm curriculum.

364 Higginson, Army Life, 45; Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 107; Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank, 50.
most other regiments were undergoing continuous drill. For the three regiments, it occurred over an average period of nine months of training.\footnote{Dyer, Compendium, 1407, 1517, 1665.}

Compare the experience of the early white regiments to those of the U.S.C.T. units which were mustered later in the War. The 41st U.S.C.I. began formation in late September 1864, and was ordered to join the Army of the James at the end of October, two months before its recruiting was complete. It was committed to combat within a week of joining the Army. The 100th U.S.C.I. was formed in June 1864 and first saw combat in early September. The experiences of other regiments were similar. The randomly selected 43rd U.S.C.I. was organized in March 1864 and was part of the Wilderness campaign in May 1864. The 116th U.S.C.I. was formed in June 1864 and was in combat against Nathan Bedford Forrest in September 1864. Pre-combat training was limited to three to four months at best.\footnote{Ibid., 1730-39. A direct statistical analysis of the time span between the mustering of U.S.C.I. regiments and their first commitment to combat is skewed because of the re-designation of black regiments that occurred in 1864. Many regiments which appeared to be formed in 1864 were actually existing freedmen or free black regiments that had been created before the U.S.C.T. designation was applied. Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, and South Carolina (Dyer, 1979, p. 1723-1740) had all provided black regiments under their states’ names or as Corps d’Afrique, and these became “new” U.S. Colored Infantry regiments that were often better trained and equipped than those that were newly raised and inexperienced.}

To prepare a regiment for the field, it was important for officers to concentrate on the skills that would let the men fight effectively and keep them alive. White regiment or black, basic competencies in drill were absolutely necessary. John Boyle of the 111th Pennsylvania Reserves described the path to soldierly competence. An enlisted man had to know the details of standing without weapons, marching with his fellow soldiers, and conforming to company and battalion movement. He must “conquer all the facings, flankings, and wheelings, and all the subtleties of direction an distance, and all the cadence of quick and double time, until the line of which he was an infinitesimal part could advance, oblique, or retire, at any speed without a bend or gap.” With his musket, he had to be so skilled in the manual of arms so that “along the entire regimental line the perpendicular of the ‘present,’ the slant of the ‘right shoulder,’ the angle of the ‘trail,’ and the thud of the ‘order’” was perfectly simultaneous.\footnote{Boyle, Soldiers True, 16.}
The amount of expertise needed for survival was immense, and only constant repetition and attention to detail by the officers could ensure that the soldiers were properly trained. It was not enough that they could march and fire their weapons. They also had to be familiar with the details of camp life that would minimize disease, the administrative procedures that would provide food and equipment, and the basics of entrenchment and construction.368

The effectiveness of training was measured by performance in combat, and the path to combat efficiency was through drill. Success on the battlefield could win the respect of fellow soldiers and of the War Department in Washington. As they practiced their formations and learned to handle their weapons, the black troops also learned self-respect and confidence—two characteristics that were not part of their experience as slaves and field workers.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOARDS AND TRAINING

Comparing the officer of the black regiments to those of the early white volunteer regiments, the U.S.C.T. boards, on the whole, produced better commanders than the volunteers’ system of elections. The boards were also an honest attempt to provide committed and prepared leadership for the black troops. The pattern of employment of the U.S.C.T. regiments makes it difficult to objectively compare performance between the white and black regiments’ officers (e.g., in Fox’s analysis of “300 Fighting Regiments,” only three black units appear – the 8th and 79th U.S.C.I. and the 54th Massachusetts), and makes occasional claims of superiority questionable. However, claims of equality are more than justified. One measure of an officer’s effectiveness is how many of the men of his unit survived. On average, casualty rates from disease and combat—two measures arguably connected to officer performance—are roughly similar comparing black and white regiments across the span of the War (Table 5-7).369

368 Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 100.
369 Fox, Regimental Losses, 122-423, 467-522.
Table 5-7 - Comparative Casualties, White and black Regiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Infantry Regiments</th>
<th>U.S.C.I. Regiments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combat Deaths</td>
<td>Deaths by Disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Enlisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIAN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disparities in combat and non-combat deaths between white and black units reflect the differences in how the units were used. In a random sample (my compilation) of white infantry regiments (n=61) and black infantry regiments (n=25), there were strong similarities in casualty rates after adjusting for the greater participation in combat for white regiments and the higher likelihood of assignment to an unhealthy climate for black regiments, poorer food and equipment, and more exhausting manual labor. The Gulf Coast’s endemic malaria, yellow fever, and other diseases affected both blacks and whites, but a proportionally greater number of black units served in that environment. There is nothing that suggests a variance between the capabilities or courage of the officers in black and white regiments.
CHAPTER SIX   EDUCATIONAL INNOVATIONS IN OFFICER PREPARATION

The Civil War’s potential for innovation in officer education was large but mostly unrealized. In contrast to the technological advances that characterized it, 1861 to 1865 remained a period of conservative thought in military educational theory and practice. While the common school movement was thriving in the civilian educational environment (through the actions of, among others, Caleb Mills whose correspondence and Henry Barnard whose book on military education both appear in this study), no indications of creative military practice appeared to reach the operational level. With the exception of the Free Military School, officer preparation activities were based on the models established by West Point, the civilian academies, self-study traditions, and schooling within the regiments.370

As a baseline against which to compare the U.S.C.T., the variance in pursuit of officer education in white regiments was large. A regiment with a senior officer dedicated to the perfection of drill would conduct frequent training sessions for both the troops and the officers, including tutorials during non-duty hours. A more lackadaisical commander, of which there were many, would hold perfunctory drill sessions but demand little else of his officers. There was no commonality of practice, although the commanding general could set the tone for his brigade, division or corps. For example, the Army of the Potomac was generally believed to be better drilled and trained than the Western armies—a legacy of McClellan and the Army’s later commanders. Regimental records, including those of the 41st and 100th, demonstrate the organic training activities that occurred in many regiments and companies, without describing in detail how the training was carried out.371

Sgt. George Tate was an example of an officer candidate preparing for examination. Two weeks before his appearance before the Casey board and knowing that


his application to travel to Washington had been approved, he continued his normal ritual of evening reading, but with a purpose: “I am relieved from guard. Study the tactics some and write a letter to Charles.” Tate’s diaries demonstrate how busy non-commissioned officers were with frequent drills, forms to fill in, picket duty, and fatigues. In his case, preparation for the board was left to the last minute and he could only depend on his own efforts to ready himself. Throughout the Union Army, like Tate, officers depended on self-study to prepare themselves for basic command activities and to seek higher rank. The surprisingly large number of surviving copies of the various versions of the Schools of the Soldier and the more advanced Schools suggest that many officers had these books in their possession and used them.372

Along with regimental education and self-study, there were attempts to develop formal training programs at the local level. Brig. Gen. James C. Rice, commander of the Army of the Potomac’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Division, created a school within his unit to instruct potential officer candidates about the topics needed to pass the board’s examination. An 1854 Yale graduate who had been a teacher and editor before the War, Rice was familiar with the requirements of moving from civilian life to officer status. After a difficult start as the lieutenant colonel of the 44\textsuperscript{th} New York, he built a reputation for inspired leadership—demonstrated in his role as brigade commander of the Union left at Gettysburg during the defense of Little Round Top. Foster recognized that Rice had established a school in his brigade to instruct U.S.C.T. officer candidates, and appreciated Rice’s contribution to the Bureau for Colored Troops’ efforts. He tried to shape the curriculum to be most effective by calling for theoretical education along with practical instruction, and assured Rice that the Bureau would automatically permit candidates to sit for examination if they had Rice’s approval. Sadly, field operations in the spring of 1864 and Rice’s death during the battle of Spotsylvania only four and a half months after corresponding with Foster cut short his educational efforts.373

Mussey was aware of the Free Military School and thought to follow in its footsteps by creating a similar, although less formal institution for officers in the

372 Tate, April 19, 1864, Diary.
373 Nash, History of the Forty-fourth Regiment New York Volunteer Infantry. C. Foster to J.C. Rice, November 24, 1863, AGO, NIMS. Rice replaced Col. Strong Vincent as brigade commander when Vincent was mortally wounded at Gettysburg.
Nashville area. Corresponding with a recruiter near the end of 1864, he laid out his plans for his own training school with a focus on U.S.C.T. officers who had already received commissions. He planned to use “gentlemen of ability in their branch of service” as instructors and to meet once or twice per week in a format open to any officer who wanted to attend. Calling on both the model of West Point and of contemporaneous medical schools, Mussey planned to gather students into study groups or “quizzes.” Unfortunately, I have been unable to find a record of any actual activities of this school in personal memoirs, letters, or official documents. I speculate that the combined pressures of Hood’s Nashville campaign beginning only one week after Mussey’s letter to Brown, his responsibilities as the commander-of-record of the 100th U.S.C.I., and the immanent end of the War derailed his plans for the school and it was never implemented. His vision for the school, however, is remarkably in tune with modern adult education theory with a focus on personal initiative and self-direction among the students, provision of expert resources, cooperative learning, and a Socratic dialogue.374

Classroom studies were not the only source of education. Some officers chose to prepare themselves with methods more rigorous than reading a book or practicing with friends. Henry Bates, a student at Wabash College in Indiana, recognized the importance of practical experience in the field and the value it would have if he received a commission. During the call-up of Ohio “One Hundred Day men” in 1864, Bates decided to forego an appearance before the Cincinnati examination board and enlist for a short term as a private to gain experience. His goal was to develop some military competence before taking on a commission; “To accept a Lieutenancy before making such an effort I feel would be doing myself an injustice.”375

While many prospective officers chose to follow the path of self-education—if not in as an extreme manner as Mr. Bates—an important part of the board-certified officer corps took advantage of a key innovation that appeared in the unlikely Quaker stronghold of Philadelphia.

374 R. Mussey to T. Webster, December 6, 1864, USACC, Letters Sent by the Commissioner; R. Mussey to Capt. C.P. Brown, October 24, 1864, Ibid.
375 H. Bates to C. Mills, May 8, 1864, Caleb Mills Collection. “100 Day men” refers to Indiana troops recruited to take the place of veterans serving in non-combat roles during the Atlanta campaign. Over 7,500 short-term troops were enlisted.
THE FREE MILITARY SCHOOL FOR APPLICANTS FOR COMMANDS OF COLORED TROOPS

Philadelphia’s Free Military School was both revolutionary in its own right, and also as a precursor for the modern institution of Officer Candidate Schools. In its short period of operation from December 1863 to September 1864, the Free Military School produced 484 officers who served with the U.S.C.T. The 47 percent failure rate of soldiers appearing before the Bureau for Colored Troops’ examination boards with solid prior combat experience but poor preparation for officer status led to an innovation that became a model, whether recognized or not, for Army educational practice over the subsequent century.

The school assumed that its students were combat veterans, but Thomas Webster, one of its founders, noted that “A large number of successful applicants [before the Washington Board] have had no such experience.” For those both with and without field experience who had failed the examination, there was a growing belief among Union supporters and commanders that that many of the men who had not passed could be effective as officers after a short course on tactics and military regulations.376

The Free Military School was an outgrowth of the general recruiting activities in Philadelphia that brought blacks into the Union army. The city had been a center of abolitionist sentiment since the early days of the Republic, and became a leader in the movement to recruit blacks. George Stearns, a recruiting agent for black troops, convinced members of the Philadelphia Union League to sponsor three black regiments in 1863, and in support of this effort, Webster, a prominent local businessman, became the spokesperson and leader for the Philadelphia Supervisory Committee for Enlistment of Colored Troops. Soon, black soldiers were being trained at Camp William Penn outside of the city and the Committee was searching for other ways to assist the war effort.

Events were moving swiftly and coalescing to highlight the need for the school. At the same time that the Committee was engaged in recruitment, black soldiers were flooding into the Union armies as increasingly large areas of the slave states fell under

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376 Wilson, "Webster and the Free Military School," 119; Ibid., 101-103; Webster, Free Military School Prospectus, 4; Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 53.
federal control. High casualties among officers in white regiments placed pressure on their ability to organically refresh their own leadership. The War Department had unequivocally decided to use white officers for black regiments, and found itself with a problem that had few clear cut solutions—how to supply sufficient trained officers who would not create a political and public relations nightmare for the Administration by allowing blacks to be slaughtered through ignorance, incompetence, or malice. There was a justifiable concern that “these troops have no knowledge of arms, and no acquaintance with the duties of the soldier, and unless well officered the whole experiment will prove worse than a failure.” In other words, a superior level of military competence than was commonly available in new white regiments was needed for commanders of the U.S.C.T., and the available officers were insufficient for the task. In combination, these trends led to the creation of the officer review boards, and indirectly to the creation of the Free Military School.377

General Silas Casey, commander of the Washington examination board, was unhappy with the high failure rate of applicants for command. As a Regular Army officer assigned to the Infantry after graduating near the bottom of his West Point class in 1826 and with 36 years of Army experience, Casey understood both the quality of the men the boards were rejecting and the reasons for their failures: insufficient knowledge of tactical maneuver, Army regulations, and administrative detail. He corresponded with Webster and the Supervisory Committee in late 1863, and the result was the formation of the Free Military School as a tuition-free educational center for remedial and preparatory officer training. Along with the goal of higher officer quality, the school was also meant to keep fools, the vainglorious, bullies, and patronage seekers out of the black regiments—a problem that had surfaced in the

377 Webster, Free Military School Prospectus, 5.
formation of Tennessee U.S.C.T. regiments and was endemic in the white Union regiments early in the War.  

Webster, the Supervisory Committee, the Philadelphia Union League, General Casey, Secretary of War Stanton, and the War Department all shared both commonalities of interest and similar views on the employment of black soldiers. While each wanted to see as many blacks in uniform as possible, all also believed that the men would only be effective if they were led by competent whites. In this context, the Free Military School was even more important since it had the potential both to fill the gap in the officer corps, and to fill it with men who were committed to the use of blacks in combat.

The experience of troops from the 154th New York Volunteer Infantry provides an example of the process used to select students for the Free Military School. In response to a directive from the War Department in 1864, the 154th's Col. Patrick Jones issued a regimental order convening a board of three officers to examine the “capacity, character and conduct of such Enlisted men of this Regiment as may present themselves for examination with a view to entering the Free Military School.” There was some interest, but the response was not overwhelming. Candidates had to weigh their relatively comfortable regimental life and camaraderie against the inducements offered by a commission with the U.S.C.T.—the prestige of being an officer and better pay. For abolitionists in the 154th, service in a black regiment could be a way of demonstrating their commitment to freedom and of striking a blow against slavery. However, only a few soldiers of the 154th chose to pursue this course.

The Supervisory Committee was deeply engaged throughout the process of application, acceptance, recommendation, and placement. After approval by their regiment, students applied in writing to the chief preceptor of the school and by taking an admission test. An eleven man subcommittee of the Supervisory Committee reviewed applicants for admission, and recommended the candidates who completed the Free Military School program to the Washington Examining Board. Unlike the modern OCS, graduates of the Free Military School could receive commissions at ranks higher than

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378 Cullum, *Biographical Register*; Wilson, "Webster and the Free Military School," 103; USACC, Letters Sent by the Commissioner.
379 Wilson, "Webster and the Free Military School," 104-05.
second lieutenant, and the committee’s comments on candidates helped to establish the rank that would be offered by the Bureau. The committee also helped candidates to get early examination dates with the Washington board and found opportunities for them to gain practical experience in drilling black troops at Camp Penn while they were waiting for examination.381

Once selected for the Free Military School, students found that it differed from traditional military academies in many ways. First and foremost, it was a “remedial” school. It was not meant to provide a comprehensive education or shape the mindset of its students. Rather, the Free Military School focused on filling deficiencies in the students’ skill that would keep them from passing the examination. There was no intent or interest in teaching subjects that were not directly related to the successful passage of the exam. Its curriculum was completed in a few weeks, and its student body consisted almost exclusively of men with prior military experience. In many respects, the school resembled the intensive preparatory courses that some modern candidates for medical or law school attend.

The addition of practical tactical exercises allowed the students to demonstrate their skills and achieve an understanding of how the complicated formations and maneuvers of a 19th Century army translated when the vagaries of individuals and the unpredictability of terrain were introduced. Free Military School students would often travel to Camp Penn to try out the tactics that they learned in the classroom, and to develop a better understanding of their future black subordinates.

A look at the March 1864 class provides some useful demographic information. Most applicants had prior military experience and a median age of 22-23 years. The remedial aspects of the school were not appropriate for men who were already officers; only two percent of the student body had prior commissions, while 38 percent were privates and 22 percent were non-commissioned officers. Nearly half of the students were from Pennsylvania.382

382 Wilson, "Webster and the Free Military School," 112. The large Pennsylvania contingent reflected the misnomer of “Free” in the school’s name. While the tuition was free, room and board were not. Pennsylvania students and particularly those from Philadelphia had an advantage in that they could live
Other states did contribute students, but usually with a similar demographic profile. Only one enlisted man of the 154th New York passed his regimental examination, attended the Free Military School, and accepted a commission with the U.S.C.T. Ariel Wellman was a 28-year-old mechanic who had joined the army in 1862 and served in the Atlanta campaign. He left the regiment after receiving a wound in May 1864, passed the regimental examination, attended the Free Military School in Philadelphia, and joined the 42nd U.S.C.I. as a first lieutenant in August. He was promoted to captain in September 1865 and left the service in January 1866. His unit performed guard and garrison duty during his entire tenure. Wellman’s personal statistics demonstrate the characteristics of most Free Military School candidates—an older student from the enlisted ranks with real combat experience.

Webster specifically avoided modeling the Free Military School on the West Point curriculum. Since the U.S. Military Academy was primarily an engineering school with little emphasis on military tactics and army regulations, West Point had a completely different focus and little relevance to the needs of the officer candidates. Instead, the questions asked by Casey’s examination board were the basis for the course work. Knowing that its graduates would usually be quizzed on tactics, military regulations, and the basics of arithmetic and geography, these became the focus of instruction.

Ten faculty and staff supported the school: the chief preceptor, two assistant professors, two part-time professors, four students filling administrative posts, and a librarian covering infantry tactics and Army regulations, mathematics, geography, and history. The tactical portion of the curriculum followed the general organization of the primary drill manuals of the time with the most typical tactical instructions coming from Casey’s simplified drill manual. Students were evaluated and assigned to one of three groups in the school that followed a standard progression beginning with the School of the Soldier for the lowest group, to the School of the Company for more advanced students, and culminating with the School of the Battalion (i.e., regiment) for the highest

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students. A few exceptional candidates also received private tutoring on the School of the Brigade. The program of studies maps to the organization of all of the standard drill manuals of the time, whose shared commonalities were so strong as to make one manual nearly indistinguishable from another.385

The school’s purpose was military, not moral. It did not attempt to change the basic prejudices of the officer candidates, although it did insist that its students be in favor of the enlistment and use of black troops. While its curriculum was directed specifically at the questions of the Examination Board, a course on ethics was added in an attempt to weed out sadists and overt racists.

In one respect, the Free Military School greatly resembled West Point. The daily schedule was highly regimented and extraordinarily demanding (Table 6-1). Six and a half hours of programmed time were extended by meals, study, individual practice, and the administrative and personal requirements of Army life.386

Table 6-1 – Free Military School Daily Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time (Monday through Saturday)</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 A.M. to 10:30 A.M.</td>
<td>Tactical instruction in the appropriate School (of the Soldier, Company, or Battalion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:45 A.M. to Noon</td>
<td>Battalion drill for the entire school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noon to 12:30 P.M.</td>
<td>Dress parade and pronunciation of general orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 P.M. to 2:30 P.M.</td>
<td>Tactical instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:30 P.M. to 5 P.M.</td>
<td>Battalion drill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evening</td>
<td>Occasional special instruction in mathematics and study periods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Students were expected to “toe the line” while undergoing the strictest military discipline. Unlike the frequent tempering of justice with mercy at West Point, any transgressions of laziness or insubordination were punished by summary dismissal. Untalented students who had a positive attitude were given ten days to learn the material, and then privately encouraged to leave on their own. Most students attended the school for a period of from two weeks to a month. If a candidate was unable to master the

385 Webster, Free Military School Prospectus, 10; Wilson, "Webster and the Free Military School," 108. I have reviewed each of the common drill manuals of the period and found that, even to the careful reader, there are few differences in commands given, standard tactical maneuvers, or responsibilities described.

386 Ibid.: 110.
required command skills within that time, he was generally dropped from the school and returned to either civilian life or his prior rank and regiment.\textsuperscript{387}

The Free Military School was immediately popular with potential candidates, including at least four officers of the 100\textsuperscript{th} and 13 of the 41\textsuperscript{st} who applied for admission to the institution between April and August 1864. When Webster announced the school in the press, he received over 350 applications in the first two weeks, and 75 were admitted to the first class. By April 1864, 1,125 applications had been received. Table 6-2 shows the distribution of applications for the school between April 20 and August 29, 1864. As the year progresses, there is a substantial decrease in the rate of applications, tapering off in the fall as the formation of black regiments was similarly declining.\textsuperscript{388}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Applicants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April '64</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May '64</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June '64</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July '64</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August '64</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-2  Free Military School Applications for Admission Received, April-August 1864

Note the consistent decline in the number of applicants, reflecting both the decreasing rate of U.S.C.T. unit creation and the shifting sense of approaching victory. Table 6-3 described the distribution of rank at time of application and shows the popularity of school among privates and, to a lesser extent, non-commissioned officers. Over 90 percent of applicants came from the enlisted ranks of the Army. These statistics match and intensify a similar pattern among all applicants for commissions during the same time period and across all geographical areas. They also reflect the basic education

\textsuperscript{387} Joseph Ellis and Robert Morris, School for Soldiers: West Point and the Profession of Arms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974). West Point cadets would often transgress against the rules, be dismissed from the academy, and be reinstated before they were able to leave for home. Students at the Free Military School did not have this leeway.

aspects of the school; except in rare cases, officers either did not need the services offered or were too proud to seek them.\textsuperscript{389}

Table 6-3  Rank at Time of Application

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>FREQ</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Steward</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-4 shows the pre-military service employment in the cases where it was noted. The mix of occupations is a snapshot of life in America at the time of the War. The lack of assembly line workers, fast food waiters, computer operators, and government workers hint at a very different economic society than ours. As expected, nearly half of the applicants had been farmers, reflecting a demographic characteristic that would soon begin to decline. Clerks and teachers, both professions requiring literacy, represent another quarter of the total. The requirement of literacy for officers would make a commission attainable to men of these backgrounds, and increase the attractiveness of the Free Military School for those without prior military service.\textsuperscript{390}

\textsuperscript{389} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{390} Applications to Enter the Free Military School for Candidates for Command of Colored Troops.
Table 6-4  Pre-enlistment Employment of Applicants by Frequency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>FREQ</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>FREQ</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th>FREQ</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>Butler</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Confectioner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>Cabinet Maker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Dentist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Editor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Lumberman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Gardener</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Miller</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Harness Maker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Music Teacher</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Hatter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painter</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>Photographer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Joiner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>Salesman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Mason</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoemaker</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Tanner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Mechanic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriage Maker</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Tinner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Paper Maker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blacksmith</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Watchmaker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Preacher</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druggist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Artist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Saddler</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Baker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Spinner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Bookkeeper</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Stone Cutter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldier</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Surveyor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Bricklayer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Tinsmith</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigar Maker</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Broker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Victular</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooper</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Coachmaker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Wagon Maker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brick Maker</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both the tough admission standards and the half-hearted support of the War Department combined to depress the admission rate. While many candidates were rejected because of poor prior academic preparation, a large number of seasoned non-commissioned officers were unable to attend because their units would not allow them furloughs until General Orders No. 125 was published in 1864.391

Webster and the Supervisory Committee were frustrated by the War Department’s willingness to directly commission officers that the Committee believed to be substandard—a difference of opinion with the activities of the state governors, Lorenzo Thomas, and the departmental/divisional boards. Its suggestion that all officers who would command in the U.S.C.T. be required to pass a Bureau examination board, bypassing the continuing problem of political patronage in officer appointment, was ignored by the War Department until the week that commissioning of officers for the U.S.C.T. was halted.392

392 Binder, "Pennsylvania Negro Regiments in the Civil War," 403.
The Free Military School was a successful developer of officers during its year of operation, although it was tainted by a minor sex scandal in 1864. Webster objected to the presence of prostitutes at Camp William Penn where the Free Military School students frequently trained, and attempted to have all women banned from the camp. He and Louis Wagner, the camp commandant and a fellow member of the Supervisory Committee, came into conflict over this issue and Webster lost the argument. Webster also always had difficulty with the War Department’s policy of not consistently providing officer candidates. Between December 1863 and September 1864, 484 graduates passed the Casey board’s examination with a success rate of over 96 percent. The School’s students performed well in front of the examination board, but the school was closed at the end of 1864 due to lack of funds and declining interest as the formation of black regiments dropped from 53 in the second half of 1863, to 37 in the first half of 1864, and only 12 in the second half of that year.393

A short-lived offspring of the Free Military School, the United States Military School, soon opened in Philadelphia with the same purpose but charged tuition. John Taggart retained his role as chief preceptor and followed the same basic curriculum as its predecessor. However, with the War drawing to a close, students were difficult to find and funds were short. The U.S. Military School was never a successful venture and had no impact on the war effort.394

Significance of the Free Military School

The Free Military School, and the U.S. Military School to a much lesser extent, achieved its primary goal—to produce qualified officers in large numbers for the U.S.C.T. who had skills and knowledge substantially better suited to the questions asked by the examination boards than candidates who prepared in other ways. It was an important part of the mix of solutions that were crafted by the War Department and public-spirited citizens to meet the needs for capable commanders.

In some respects, the Free Military School was an unexpectedly forward-looking innovation that pointed toward the modern officer candidate schools that have become a normal adjunct to traditional military education. In concept and in contrast to the United

393 Dyer, Compendium.
States and Western European standard modern practice, it bears a strong similarity to the officer training programs used by the Israeli Defense Force and the Vietnamese Army today. In those programs, all candidates are required to have prior experience in the enlisted ranks, are generally older than the graduates of academies such as the U.S.M.A. or Sandhurst in the United Kingdom, and are expected to be familiar with army life before attending classes. Rather than selecting teenagers for a liberal, degree-bearing education that does not focus on the mechanics of tactics, the conceptual offsprings of the Free Military School educate soldiers who are arguably more mature in a military sense, and have a better understanding of the exigencies of military life. The Army officer candidate schools share these characteristics.  

Simultaneously, the school was an atavism. Its approach to education was highly regimented and demanded perfect conformance by the student rather than individual intellectual development or growth. Officer candidates were expected to simply absorb the information provided by their preceptors, and were actively discouraged from demonstrating creativity. Thomas Wilson suggests that, relative to modern educational theory and particularly adult education theory, the Free Military School was not a school at all, but rather, a factory. It acted an offshoot of the training that occurred on the drill field, transformed into an assembly line to produce officers. By creating an environment of strict military discipline with no distractions, students could be drilled in the textbook answers required by the examination boards, who fulfilled the role of quality control inspectors.  

It also was a bulwark against progressive ideas about equality between blacks and whites. From its core premise that black soldiers needed white officers, its outlook was consistently racist. Although it expressed that racism in what could construed as a positive and paternalistic form (i.e., the creation of the best possible white officers for black troops), it was racism nonetheless. The subordination of the Negro in military units was not limited to unequal pay scales, poorer equipment than whites, and reluctance to assign black units to frontline positions—it was built into the entire army system from the top, and ratified by the practices of the Free Military School. Henry Gooding, an

educated black soldier and prolific letter writer, expressed the frustration of many blacks over their exclusion from command positions in the U.S.C.T. and more broadly from American society. He ironically mocks the Supervisory Committee for setting up a school for whites without considering the possibility that there may be black soldiers who were also qualified for command. Gooding makes an impassioned plea for racial justice and fairness that was doomed to be ignored. \textsuperscript{397}

Glancing over the advertisements in a daily, my eye caught the following: "Young men having a fair common-school education and physically sound, and especially privates and noncommissioned officers in the army, who desire to command colored troops, are invited to become students of this [Free Military] school." A school to prepare young men to command colored troops! Not to be ironical, some of the young men who can consistently go to this school may want a few hints as to the best mode to command themselves. It may be the Supervisory Committee never dreamed that there might be some colored young men who, by virtue of enlisting and serving in the ranks till promoted through the different grades to Orderly Sergeants, were just as capable of being entrusted with the command of colored troops as those who know nothing of the dispositions or feelings of such troops. Perhaps the copperheads will say, "Why, bless me, are the Negroes beginning to show a penchant for promotions already!" Well, why should they not? Is it a crime for a man to aspire to something higher, providing he is capable and has a claim to do so? Can the nation expect to see the black man show the same ardor and enthusiasm fighting the battles of the Republic, when their claim to justice and fair play is persistently ignored or purposely lost sight of? \textsuperscript{398}

The direct impact of the Free Military School on the performance of the Union armies was inconclusive—except as a contributor to the overall effectiveness of the U.S.C.T. officers. First, many of the black regiments officered by the school’s graduates were employed in subordinate and security roles rather than as front line troops. Their combat capabilities were not conclusively established. Second, the small size of the school and the low number of graduates relative to the entire U.S.C.T. officer corps never allowed the quality of the school’s program to become apparent. The 138 U.S. Colored infantry regiments needed approximately 5,500 officers upon creation, and consumed another 2,200 accounting for casualties, illness, and other separations from the service. The Free Military School was able to supply less than 10 percent of the total required to

\textsuperscript{397} Nalty, \textit{Strength for the Fight}, 46.

lead the black units. However, the success of officer candidate programs in the future indicates that the concept of the Free Military School was an innovation whose real value was to be proved in the next century, and whose educational shortcomings would be repeated.\footnote{Dyer, \textit{Compendium}.}
CHAPTER SEVEN SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS

The American Civil War led to a radical, if temporary, transformation in the U.S. Army’s process for the selection and training of officers—but only for the white officers who served in the U.S.C.T. regiments. However, these practices were embodied in a system that would be familiar to today’s Army officers. Overtly political and casual processes of the antebellum and early Civil War periods were often replaced by formal examinations and centralized review of results. The subsequent century saw the ascendancy of the U.S. Colored Troops’ approach to officer preparation over the antebellum volunteer model.

This study uses, to the greatest extent possible, the experiences of the officers of two regiments, the 41st U.S. Colored Infantry from the East and the 100th U.S.C.I. from the West, to illustrate how leaders for black units were chosen, prepared, examined, commissioned, and continued their military education, and fills gaps in the historical record with accounts of officers from other regiments. It focuses on the collective experiences of the officers, along with the contextual environment of antebellum education, slavery, racism, tactics, and bureaucracy in which they served.

The study’s questions for research were chosen to illuminate the broad context of pre-War military education, the formation and management of black regiments, the specific processes surrounding officer selection, and innovations that supported those processes. It fills an important but overlooked niche in the broad area of Army education and in the specific environment of the U.S. Colored Troops. First, until relatively recently, the U.S.C.T. were a nearly invisible part of the Union force structure. While the film Glory made the movie-viewing public aware that there was at least one black regiment (and in its closing credits mentioned that 187,000 black men served the Union), many histories and particularly those from the late 1800s to the mid-20th Century, leave the contributions of blacks unmentioned. Clifford Dowdey’s Lee’s Last Campaign, for example, completely ignores the fact that black soldiers were a key part of the Army of the Potomac and had an important role during the pursuit of Lee after the fall of
Petersburg. If black participation in the War has been forgotten, even more so is the entire process of officer selection and preparation. However, it is this process that pointed to the future of Army officer selection.400

The education of the modern Army officer corps begins in one of three venues: the U.S. Military Academy, university Reserve Officer Training Corps programs (ROTC), and Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). It is the last of these three that bears the closest resemblance to the preparation and examination approaches used by the Bureau for Colored Troops, although West Point and ROTC have also been transformed from their highly academic and theoretical precursors into institutions with many of the practical and tactical characteristics of U.S.C.T. officer preparation.

Sources for this study fall into the categories of primary resources, reference works, and secondary sources. The most useful primary sources came from a combination of holdings of the National Archives, the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, the 1888 Adjutant General’s report on The Negro in the Military Service of the United States, and the relatively rare diaries and letters of officers of the U.S.C.T. From the group of nearly 100 officers serving in the 41st or 100th U.S.C.I., only 2nd Lt. George Tate appears to have left a diary. Even Brevet Brigadier General Reuben D. Mussey, the most historically prominent character in the two regiments, left virtually no personal recollections of his Wartime service, although Dartmouth College has an extensive collection of his post-War correspondence.

Reference works such as Cullum’s Bibliographic Register, Dornbusch’s Military Bibliography, Dyer’s Compendium, Fox’s Regimental Losses, and the War Department’s Official Army Register provide the deepest sources of detailed information about the Union Army as a whole. There are many secondary sources about the Civil War but few stand out. However, authors such as Joseph Glatthaar, Dudley Cornish, John Blassingame, and James McPherson were critical in setting the context.401

In the remainder of this chapter, I have stated each of the research questions and provided a summary of the findings and insights that emerged from the research. A

401 Cullum, Biographical Register; C. E. Dornbusch, Military Bibliography of the Civil War; Dyer, Compendium; Fox, Regimental Losses; U.S. War Department, Official Army Register.
picture of confused beginnings, redundant bureaucracy, individual effort, and ultimate success emerges.

**QUESTION 1**

Within the context of the examination of officer candidates for the U.S.C.I., what educational structures were created to ensure a flow of qualified officers to the U.S.C.I. both prior to examination boards and after assignment to a regiment? What were the environments that shaped these structures?

The study showed that the concept of creating an educational structure was a misnomer if we are searching for intentional activity focused on building a specific program of education. Little conscious creation took place, with only four examples found of attempts to do so. However, educational structures did arise organically from longstanding practices that had been in place in the Regular Army environment before the War, and were adapted to a new situation without any discernable reflection on alternatives or suitability. The net result was a system of mostly informal education that, although highly decentralized and often chaotic, contributed successfully to the development of qualified officers. The underlying educational philosophies of that informal system arose out of existing formal concepts of what officer education meant.

One of the most powerful insights emerging from the study is the centrality and importance of bureaucracy to the overall officer preparation effort. I often felt that the term red tape must have been invented to describe life in the Union Army. The entire organization sat upon a mountain of paperwork; and officer preparation was not exempt from the demands of the War Department for reports, approvals, passes, instructions, and a multitude of other documents that allowed the Army to grind forward. Combined with an understanding of the importance of antebellum bureaucracy was the often disorganized, simultaneous emergence of multiple wartime bureaucracies to resolve problems that the Army had not previously encountered (e.g., how to deal with runaway slaves or provide officers for black units.) The educational activities that came into being attempted to support a bureaucratic process of officer selection that was in flux, with several competing visions of how it should operate and who was in charge.
A discussion of officer preparation has to take into account that officers were prepared (where the term means a range of activities from no preparation at all to attendance at a relatively formal and highly effective school that specifically taught the topics needed to pass a difficult examination), examined, appointed, and commissioned through several different channels. Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas had the ability to directly appoint officers into command roles in black units, and did so frequently. He also set up ad hoc examination boards that operated under extremely loose or non-existent guidelines. Political figures, especially governors, could recommend candidates for command and Thomas would generally approve their suggestions without comment. They could also create a de facto officer by giving a man the right to raise a black unit. The Bureau for Colored Troops, operating as part of the Adjutant General’s office, created a much more formal structure to examine and commission officers, and attempted to rein in the independent recruiters. However, Thomas retained his authority to circumvent his own Bureau. At no time during the War was any one of the competing bureaucracies fully in control of the officer creation process. Figure 7-1 shows the overlapping responsibilities among the entities that were creating officers.

**Figure 7-1  Officer Selection and Appointment for black Units**

Thomas could appoint officers personally or pass them through the Bureau for Colored Troops’ process. He could create ad hoc examination boards or use the formal boards of
the Bureau. State governors could circumvent the process entirely or feed candidates into the activities of either Thomas or the Bureau. The overlapping lines of authority and responsibility frequently caused friction among Thomas, the Bureau, and the States.

Within this swirl of so many attempts to exercise authority, preparation for the command of black regiments in the Civil War usually, but not always, followed a multi-faceted series of steps that included pre-application education and experience, application, examination, selection or rejection, commissioning, assignment, and post-assignment training. The preparatory experiences of the officers from the 41st and 100th U.S.C.I. were representative of those of nearly 7,700 U.S.C.T. officers commissioned during the War, and fell into three categories prior to applications for a commission: formal or informal education in literacy and basic skills including common school up to university courses; knowledge gained about military life from formal training in an academic setting, informal education, or camp experience; and practical experience with drill and combat. We have little information about these commissioned officers. The surviving records show pre-War occupations for a handful, and only one percent from these two regiments were definitely university graduates; but given the bureaucratic and administrative requirements of the Union Army, it is reasonable to assume and reliable evidence points to the conclusion that virtually all had at least basic educations in literacy and arithmetic, and that many were educated at a higher level.

To understand officer education just prior to and during the Civil War and to place the 41st and 100th’s officer preparation regimens in context, it is helpful to look at the roots of military education in the United States, particularly in the sixty year antebellum period that preceded the War.

The officers’ preparation activities arose out of well-established pre-War practices of military education and training. Potential officers were expected to develop individual proficiencies in drill, military administration and tactics, and the requirements of life in camp and on the battlefield. Individual training was anchored by a series of “schools”—official and unofficial instruction manuals published by several different officers over the preceding 20 years. Drill manuals by Scott, Hardee, Morris, Cooper, Gilham, Reynolds, Casey, and the War Department were readily available and frequently consulted by many Regular and amateur officers. Each manual laid out the School of the Soldier, School of
the Company, School of the Battalion, evolutions of the Brigade and Division, and School of the Corps d’Armée. Every individual was expected to know the School of the Soldier: how to stand at attention, march, and load, fire, and maintain a musket. Captains and lieutenants studied the School of the Company, which instructed them on how to maneuver their unit of 100 men. Colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors learned the School of the Battalion, which applied to a regiment of 1,000 men. Finally, colonels and general officers had to know how to maneuver brigades, divisions, and corps.402

An officer needed rudimentary tactical skills that included the building of impromptu fortifications, map reading, and an appreciation for the effects of combined arms. Much of his duties were administrative as he enforced camp hygiene and produced seemingly endless reports, requisitions, passes, vouchers, and appreciations. However, knowledge was only part of the skills demanded of officers; the Civil War era also presupposed an extraordinary degree of courage as the prerequisite of an effective officer.

Early wartime tactics required troops to move about the battlefield in compact, orderly, linear formations as if on a parade ground. Reaching a state of professionalism in drill with the large armies of the Civil War was difficult. Regiments often marched to war with little drill or training, and sometimes with weapons that they had not yet fired. Remedying this situation called for discipline, unrelenting drill, and study.

Prior to the War, the options for formal education of prospective officers were limited. Men could attend the U.S. Military Academy and receive a Regular Army commission. Alternatively, there were a handful of military schools whose focus was not preparation for a commission but rather the development of the skills of citizenship coupled with a liberal education and a military lifestyle. The graduates of all these institutions, with the arrival of the War, became the pool from which the Union Army was able to draw many able commanders.

The U.S. Military Academy was the keystone for pre-War military education, both within its walls and throughout the entire country. One of the insights arising from this study is the close relationship between, on one hand, West Point’s curriculum and pedagogical technique and, on the other, the practice of formal and informal

military education in schools, public institutions such as the State militias, and Army units. This relationship set the tone and expectations for both formal and informal military education throughout the country.

West Point elevated a few limited aphorisms to directing principles that governed how its graduates operated and saw the world. *March in step. Follow orders, no matter what. Respect all lawful authority. Stay in line. Brace up. Find a solution now. There is a textbook answer to every problem.* Many of these are useful dictates for military officers and all have their place both in the barracks and on the battlefield, but are not the sum total of knowledge about military strategy, tactics, or leadership. West Point offered a primarily scientific curriculum based on French concepts and philosophies of education. Whether consciously or unconsciously, it asserted the superiority of the academic curriculum over strategy, and the importance of science over tactics and leadership. This resulted in a scientific culture that emphasized rationalism and obedience over intuition or impulsiveness.

For those familiar with the modern system of military education that balances science and tactics with the liberal arts, the antebellum curriculum at the Academy is something of a conundrum. It was a military school in which pursuit of most distinctly military subjects was actively discouraged. Cadets learned to be soldiers by practice, not by classroom study. They were introduced to the School of the Soldier as they arrived at the Academy and practiced its most basic maneuvers as they moved between classes, crossed the grounds, or performed the simplest of tasks. West Point cadets learned to march, and march well, by continuous drill. They also learned a philosophy of drill that they carried with them into the War—that individuality was the enemy, that drill would allow an officer to keep control of his troops even in savage battlefield conditions, and that drill could never be too perfect. Table 7-1 summarizes the major educational characteristics of West Point in comparison to the practices that were applied in the black (and white) regiments and at the Free Military School during the War.
### Table 7-1 Comparison of West Point Practices to Regimental and Free Military School Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas for Comparison</th>
<th>U.S.M.A. Practices</th>
<th>Regimental Training Compared to West Point</th>
<th>The Free Military School Compared to West Point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td>Strong focus on engineering and mathematics with small doses of strategic and tactical training.</td>
<td>Education was focused on tactical and administrative topics without much reference to or interest in scientific subjects.</td>
<td>Education was focused on tactical and administrative topics without much reference to or interest in scientific subjects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogic Technique</td>
<td>Recitations consistent with West Point were used in both informal regimental training activities and at the Free Military School.</td>
<td>Similar to West Point, with variability regiment by regiment.</td>
<td>Similar to West Point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogic Authority</td>
<td>Pedagogic authority rested solely with the instructor and students were not encouraged to offer opinions or demonstrate self-direction.</td>
<td>Fully consistent with West Point with variability among regiments.</td>
<td>Fully consistent with West Point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical Tactical Training</td>
<td>Practical experience was not highly valued. The West Point summer camp tactical training practices were nearly identical to those used at Camp William Penn for prospective officers.</td>
<td>Much of the training took the form of practical exercises.</td>
<td>U.S.C.T. officers were in the instructor, not the cadet role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study Groups</td>
<td>Study groups were encouraged by the U.S.M.A. system.</td>
<td>The West Point use of study groups was repeated in many regimental study sessions, and was a feature of Mussey’s plans for his school.</td>
<td>Study groups were used sporadically at the Free Military School.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venue</td>
<td>West Point was a traditional “brick and mortar” school.</td>
<td>Regimental training was always outside the bounds of a particular physical campus.</td>
<td>The Free Military School had an impromptu physical campus with Camp William Penn used as a site for hands-on drill practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Direction</td>
<td>West Point did not encourage or approve of self-direction. Cadets were expected to learn the curriculum without question.</td>
<td>Self-direction as reflected in self-study was a key component of many regimental programs.</td>
<td>Self-direction as reflected in self-study was a key component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline</td>
<td>Demerits were assigned for a multitude of violations and could result in dismissal. However, cadets were often readmitted upon request.</td>
<td>Standard regimental discipline and military courtesy applied.</td>
<td>Deviations from the rules were punished by immediate dismissal from the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection Criteria</td>
<td>Application was through patronage and congressional appointment generated most cadets.</td>
<td>Within most regiments, officers were commanded to attend training. Specific preparatory education for</td>
<td>Self-selected application was made to the Supervisory Committee and selection was based</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
West Point was not the only source for an academic military education before the War, although it cast its shadow over more than 111 private and state military academies that arose in the antebellum United States—at least 96 in the South and 15 in the North. These schools played a key role for both sides in the War, and provided an important source of drillmasters, instructors, and officers for their armies. Due to their genesis as philosophical outgrowths of West Point, they helped to create a common training paradigm and also perpetuated many of the psychological and philosophical negatives that were inherent in the U.S.M.A. The curriculum at most of the academies strongly resembled that of West Point, and their process of recitation-based education was also similar.

Formal education was not the only type of officer preparation. Many of the leaders of Union regiments received tactical military training as volunteers in units from other wars, militia companies, the original three-months regiments called at the beginning of the Civil War, or the Wide Awake marching clubs during the 1860 campaign. However, many other volunteer officers came to their jobs uneducated in both military and traditional subjects.
Early in the War, aspiring officers were selected for command roles regardless of their prior preparation or military education. In the volunteer regiments, prior education was often informal, minimal, or non-existent; the concept of “preparation” often meant little more than a hurried and desperate read of Scott or Casey’s *Tactics* while on the drill field. While U.S.M.A. graduates were assigned to a specific branch and Regular unit by the War Department, officers in many white volunteer regiments were men who self-selected for command by recruiting their own units, were chosen by politicians or citizen committees, or were elected to their rank. There were no examination boards nor was there a formal application process beyond writing a letter to a local politician with some clout with the War Department.

In contrast, the process was often, but not always, far more formal among the U.S. Colored Troops’ regiments that followed three paths to officer selection. The first and arguably most effective was the process used by the impartial Bureau for Colored Troops examination boards that were applied to the 86 U.S.C.T. regiments created under the auspices of the Bureau. Second, in the 70 regiments raised by Adjutant General Thomas, officers were appointed by Thomas himself or were chosen by boards formed from divisional officers, often operating without clear direction or rules for selection. Finally, the few black regiments that began as state organizations were provided with officers through political appointment or, later, Bureau for Colored Troops examination.

U.S.C.T. officer preparation did not spring into existence without prior background or antecedents. The formal educational practices, selection processes, and scope of knowledge that prepared officers for the white regiments shaped the policies of the Adjutant General and the Bureau for Colored Troops. This was inevitable given that the officers making and implementing those policies were products of the white military system. Each of the key decision makers in the orbit of the Bureau had participated in antebellum educational systems and early-War selection practices. But the existing processes evolved into more rigorous and formal procedures among the black regiments.

Receiving a commission was simply the first hurdle to becoming an effective officer. Black soldiers’ confidence arose from the knowledge that their officers would not throw their lives away through stupidity and incompetence. However, many U.S.C.T. officers knew little or nothing of their military duties, and most units instituted mandatory
classes for them. When an officer was appointed to a U.S.C.I. regiment, his training continued in much the same way as any other officer in the Union Army. However, there was substantial variation in the training practices of all regiments, white or black. Those with efficient regimental commanders continuously drilled and practiced tactical evolutions. Those with inefficient or absentee leaders often did not or were so halfhearted in their training that it was worthless.

Both the 41st and 100th made an effort to continue officer education throughout the lives of the regiments. Unfortunately, other than orders requiring attendance at daily training sessions for officers, there do not appear to be any records of the material covered, the officers’ retention of the material, or the ways that the training was translated into development for the troops. We can speculate that, to some extent, the 41st and 100th followed the practices of other well-led regiments.403

In the 33rd U.S.C.I., for example, officers’ classes usually met three to five times per week, and were separated into sessions for company grade officers to focus on the School of the Company and field officers to learn the School of the Battalion. To turn theory into practice, the night’s lessons were sometimes followed by daytime rehearsals where noncoms and officers, organized into skeleton units with men holding strings or poles across the space normally occupied by privates, practiced the drill of the platoon, company or battalion. To accomplish these maneuvers, officers were expected to learn the tactics manual that was prevalent in the regiment, usually Casey’s *Infantry Tactics*, and classes resembled the West Point recitation model.404

Once large scale recruiting of the U.S.C.T. began in 1863, finding officers for these troops became a major problem. The demand for qualified officers quickly exceeded both the supply and the inclination of those who already held commissions, and new sources needed to be developed. In spite of political patronage and direct appointments by Gen. Thomas, the path to a U.S.C.T. commission for many prospective officers led through one of the Bureau for Colored Troops’ examination boards. To prepare for a board appearance, most officer candidates drew upon the military and

administrative skills that they had learned while serving with their white units, or supplemented practical learning by studying Casey’s *Infantry Tactics.*

A man might decide to submit an application to become an officer for many reasons. When the early U.S.C.T. regiments were forming, they attracted officers with strong abolitionist sentiment such as Thomas W. Higginson and Robert G. Shaw. But there was rarely just one motivation. The same men might want to serve the country in a more significant capacity, want to receive the perquisites of higher rank, and believed that the War would end more quickly through their own efforts. Some, trapped in military backwaters or desk jobs, might simply want adventure. Personal friendships could be the source of application—there are many examples of groups of soldiers from the same regiment appearing before an examination board on the same day. Later in the War, the lure of enhanced status and pay drew enlisted men and non-commissioned officers to seek a commission—although many of these men shared the motivations of the early officer candidates too. A need for personal redemption after a leadership mistake or cowardice in a white regiment may have been a factor in a few cases, and men who had been mustered out of the Army because of severe wounds would sometimes seek a U.S.C.T. commission rather than serve in the Volunteer Reserve Corps. Over time, much like their soldiers, the officers learned their jobs. Many became excellent battlefield commanders, and could rise to the high standards of attention to detail and commitment that their colonels usually expected.

**QUESTION 2**

*How did the black regiments of the Civil War come into being, what social and military impediments did they face, and how were their officers selected and assigned to command positions?*

With few exceptions, black troops enlisted into their own units designated as U.S. Colored Troops and led by white officers. Most of these were infantry regiments known as U.S. Colored Infantry. Each regiment, in its own way and with its individual story, advanced the cause of African-Americans and pulled the United States towards its future.

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405 AGO, Applications for Commissions.
406 AGO, Persons Who Have Passed Examining Boards.
as a more egalitarian society. This study highlights how important the U.S.C.T were to the Union war effort in spite of their relatively low participation in combat, and the evolutionarily different process employed to provide officers for the black regiments.

Black soldiers marched, fought, suffered, and died just as white men did, and they too were an army of young men. The average age of the private soldiers of the 41st U.S.C.I. was 25.5 years, the median was 23, and the mode was 18. For the 100th, the average age of 25.4, median of 24, and mode of 18 are nearly identical. In the 41st, 62 percent were 25 or under; in the 100th, 61 percent. The 100th was a Kentucky regiment with more than 85 percent of its soldiers born in the state. The 41st, on the other hand, has only a tenuous connection with Pennsylvania where it was formed, drawing more heavily from New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland (60 percent of the total troops) before Pennsylvanians appears (12 percent). Both regiments were built primarily from laborers and farmers, reflecting the low socioeconomic status of blacks at the time, but the 41st had more diversity in occupation.

There were many paths that black men followed into the U.S.C.T. Stirring street rallies and strident newspapers in Union cities filled the ranks of the early Northern black regiments. Virtually all of the units formed in the Southern and Border States were signed up by recruiters who were appointed by state governors, citizens’ groups, the designated commanders of black regiments, the Adjutant General, or the Bureau for Colored Troops. The 41st was recruited by the Philadelphia Supervisory Committee of the Union League, while the 100th was assembled by recruiters appointed by the Commissioner for Organization as part of the Bureau for Colored Troops. As with the examination board formation process, the Army’s approach to recruiting highlights the difficulties encountered by the War Department in both articulating and enforcing centralized authority in its day-to-day operations. The Union’s Civil War environment was an interesting combination of intense bureaucracy and the inability to force conformance to that bureaucracy.

Along with army officers who were pursuing personal missions to recruit blacks, some states conducted a concerted but chaotic campaign to enlist black soldiers in 1863. State recruiters came from all walks of life and widely divergent motivations. Recruiters appointed by the state governments had a deservedly underhanded reputation since they
worked on commission and had access to the bounty money that the states offered. The combination of minimal supervision, unsophisticated recruits, and large amounts of money were too much of an enticement for many of these men—bounties were frequently unpaid or underpaid, and it was not uncommon for a group of recruits, with bounties prepaid to the recruiter but not passed on to the recruits, to arrive at their camp short of men—having fraudulently claimed bounties and fees for another man or two.

The War Department attempted to exercise a greater measure of control over enlistments and recruiters when it requested the Army’s Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas to take charge of recruiting activities in the West in 1863. Thomas’ primary goal was to recruit black troops and organize them into regiments. He was adept at convincing white officers and noncoms that service with the U.S.C.T. was an admirable way to fulfill their obligations to the country, and he was known for his rousing speeches both to potential black recruits and prospective officers. Thomas was the driving force behind the creation of the Bureau for Colored Troops and laid out the policies that regularized black enlistment, created field offices, and authorized examination boards.

Recruiting mostly occurred at assembly points such as Camp Nelson in Kentucky, Camp Stanton in Maryland; New Berne, North Carolina; Vicksburg, Mississippi; Nashville, Tennessee; Camp Casey in Alexandria, Virginia; Fort Monroe in Tidewater, Virginia; and Camp William Penn near Philadelphia. These sites became magnets for black men who wanted to be soldiers—and for the women and children who had escaped slavery with them. In spite of difficulties and corruption, recruiters delivered a substantial portion of the Union’s 187,000 black troops. The Army grudgingly welcomed them into its establishment and attempted to turn them into soldiers.

Once men were recruited, they began a process that culminated in their muster into service—the process of officially recording the names and demographic information of the members of a regiment and swearing them into the Army. The War Department kept close tabs on how musters were conducted since this was the process used to associate new recruits with regiments. Without an accurate accounting of men as they joined their companies, battalions, and regiments, the entire bureaucratic system of the Army would collapse. The implications of failure in the bureaucracy were severe: men might not be fed or clothed, pay would not arrive, generals would not know how to
aggregated regiments into brigades, the mail system would operate even more poorly than it usually did, and units in battle might find themselves without ammunition.

Between 1864 and 1865, 1,355 men were on the muster rolls of the 41st U.S.C.I. and 1,403 on the 100th’s. Muster reports provide a picture of the regiments’ activities; for example, records of the first battalion of the 41st show that it was rarely involved in combat. In the closing campaigns in Virginia, one enlisted man was wounded at Hatcher’s Run, two more and an officer at Fort Burnham, and eight soldiers and one officer at Petersburg. Over the course of the War, four officers resigned, one died in combat, and one died of disease. The 100th engaged in one large fight—the battle of Nashville in 1864 where it lost ten enlisted men killed and 41 men and four officers wounded. Six of its officers resigned, one was transferred, one was discharged, one died of disease, and one was dismissed from the Army.407

The majority of a soldier’s time when not on campaign, and most black units were rarely in the field, was spent either in fatigue duty (e.g., digging entrenchments, gathering wood, burying the dead) or in perfecting military drill. Drill was hard, time-consuming work, and there were no shortcuts whether in camp or on the drill field. Even simple maneuvers required hours of instruction and were exhausting for both the troops and the officers. The effectiveness of training in black regiments was dependent on a number of factors. First, the officers needed to be motivated to do a good job, and this was not always the case. Next, as in white regiments, drill and training were at the mercy of field operations. The U.S.C.T., however, had an additional impediment in that its men were more frequently detailed to act as manual laborers, cutting into their in-camp training time. **My study highlighted the extraordinary amount of time needed to perfect infantry drill, the implications of diverting black soldiers from that drill by assigning them as manual laborers or guards, and the impact of those assignments both on combat readiness and, possibly, mortality from disease.**

Even a regiment such as the 100th U.S.C.I, relegated to railroad guard duty in a backwater of the War, kept up a continuous schedule of drill to polish its skills. On a typical day in 1864, the regiment would spend 5.5 hours in drill and training. Even

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simple maneuvers required hours of instruction and were exhausting for both the troops and the officers. Enthusiasm and motivation were important—intellectual brilliance was not. The docility and willingness to follow orders of black men recently escaped from the plantation convinced many officers that they were perfect candidates for the enlisted ranks. In black regiments where the men were treated with respect, they responded to drill with deep attention and interest.408

In its approach to discipline, the U.S.C.T. differed from white units. The soldier’s past experience as slaves and the continuing discrimination that they faced gave them a point of view that did not fit easily within the common disciplinary standards of the time. Accustomed to be treated badly, they were more likely to respond to punishment with passive aggression rather than behavior change. Excellent and effective U.S.C.T. regiments were subject to strict discipline, but usually not to the level of the Regular units, much like the 1861 volunteer white regiments. At the other end of the spectrum, even poorly led regiments were introduced to the least common denominator of discipline, the Articles of War. Generally, an appeal to the pride of the black soldiers was much more effective than Regular army brutality.409

When the military business of the day was done and the black soldiers had time to relax, they often chose instead to continue their education both in literacy and in the military arts, with good reason. Commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the Union Army lived amidst mountains of paperwork, all of it handwritten, and an officer who could not read and write was unable to perform the largest portion of his duties. In undertaking this study, I expected to focus on traditional military operations, but found that most key activities—preparation, examination, recruiting, drill—took place off the battlefield, performed by men armed most often with pens, not weapons. Literacy was the most important tool at the disposal of the people discussed in the study. Perhaps the pen is truly mightier than the sword. Military management demanded literacy, and black soldiers were mostly illiterate; both soldiers and civilians attempted to address this problem. Early efforts by Northern missionaries and aid societies, a concerted attempt to provide education in the West by

408 AGO, Regimental Books, 100th U.S.C.I.
409 Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 111.
Col. John Eaton operating under Grant, and extensive freedmen educational programs in the Department of the Gulf by Nathaniel Banks all made substantial inroads on black illiteracy. By the War’s end, for example, Banks’ department had provided 95 schools for over 11,000 students.\footnote{Blassingame, "Union Army as an Educational Institution for Negroes," 152-3; Franklin, \textit{From Freedom to Slavery}, 202; Genovese, \textit{The Political Economy of Slavery}, 563; Blassingame, "Union Army as an Educational Institution for Negroes," 154.}

Since Civil War armies ran on paperwork, without literate troops the burden of this labor rested with the officers. Those who understood the significance of literacy among the troops were popular with the U.S.C.T. and were more effective commanders. The curricula created for the soldiers were generally similar to those in primary education. Reading, writing, and basic mathematics were at the core of their efforts. By the end of the War, the government estimated that approximately 20,000 black soldiers, or around eleven percent of the U.S.C.T., had reached a level of literacy where they could read intelligently and that almost all black regiments had made improvements in basic education.\footnote{Ibid.: 157-59.}

Prejudice was endemic in the United States, and black soldiers lived with it in every aspect of their army and private lives. Black soldiers were taunted by their fellow white troops, were paid less than white soldiers, and received the shabbiest equipment when they were finally allocated equipment. They were placed in labor battalions rather than combat units and were the troops most likely to receive the assignment of guarding rail lines, bridges, and wagon trains. But, over time, white troops began to give grudging acceptance and respect to some of the black units, although racism was still a nearly insurmountable fact of life for African-Americans when the War ended.

Eventually, the racist presumptions about black military incompetence were thoroughly disproved. Black regiments fought bravely at Port Hudson, Milliken’s Bend, Olustee, Petersburg, and most famously at Fort Wagner. By the War’s end, virtually all of the military security on the Southern Atlantic coast was provided by black troops. Over time and with much spilled blood, the black troops won the respect of some white soldiers, but sometimes what passed for respect was simply pragmatic acceptance.
Officer selection and assignment were discussed in the response to the previous question.

**QUESTION 3**
What public and private entities contributed to officer training for the U.S.C.I.?

A multitude of public entities and only two known private entities, the Free Military School and the U.S. Military School, assisted with officer training. However, it is important to understand that most officers were training to reach a goal, but that goal was more closely related to satisfying a bureaucratic process than actually getting ready to command black troops. Much training occurred, but its intent was less about knowledge of how to be a leader and more about being able to answer an examination board’s questions. To assess the training of applicants, it is critical to understand the details of the application and approval process and the examination boards that contributed to them.

Boards for prospective officers were initially established by Adjutant General Thomas in March 1863. After its creation in May 1863, the Bureau for Colored Troops became the primary but not exclusive governing body for the officer candidate selection process. The first Bureau-sanctioned board met in Washington under the leadership of General Silas Casey and was the precursor of additional boards that later operated in Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Richmond after the fall of that city in 1865. By War’s end, the Bureau’s boards had reviewed at least 9,000 candidates with a pass rate of about 53 percent. However, only about 25 percent of these candidates became U.S.C.T. officers because of additional screening by the Bureau for Colored Troops. Thus, 9,000 examinees became approximately 5,000 approved candidates, of whom about 2,500 were given commissions. But there were nearly 7,800 U.S.C.T. officers; where did the other 5,000 come from? Two sources accounted for the remaining two-thirds of the U.S.C.T. officer corps—direct appointments and commissioning by the Federal government and State governors, and commissions approved by divisional boards authorized by Adjutant General Thomas during the first months of the black regiments’ formation. Table 7-2
shows the mix of board and non-board appointment activities over the course of the War after black recruiting was allowed.\textsuperscript{412}

Table 7-2 Summary of Officer Appointments – All Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureau Boards (through Oct ‘63)</th>
<th>1863 Average</th>
<th>1864 Average</th>
<th>1863-1865 Total</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized to appear</td>
<td>1,534</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeared before boards</td>
<td>918</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved by boards</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received commissions</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Washington Board (‘63 - early ‘64)</th>
<th>1863 Average</th>
<th>1864 Average</th>
<th>1863-1865 Total</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appeared before boards</td>
<td>1,051</td>
<td></td>
<td>Partial overlap with Bureau boards through October ‘63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved by boards</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Military School graduates appointed by the Board</td>
<td>484</td>
<td></td>
<td>In operation December 1863 - September 1864</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nashville Board</th>
<th>1863 Average</th>
<th>1864 Average</th>
<th>1863-1865 Total</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applications received</td>
<td>480</td>
<td></td>
<td>For the period March through October, 1864</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeared before boards</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>359 approved between August 1863 and October 1, 1864</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved by boards</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>116 27%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>69 59%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not sit for the exam</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>204 296%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Boards - Divisional and Bureau</th>
<th>1863 Average</th>
<th>1864 Average</th>
<th>1863-1865 Total</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Examined</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>Approx.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved by boards</td>
<td>4,770</td>
<td>Approx.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received commissions (initially)</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>Approx.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received commissions (unrecorded)</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>Approx.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Board Sources</th>
<th>1863 Average</th>
<th>1864 Average</th>
<th>1863-1865 Total</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Board Sources</td>
<td>5,206</td>
<td>Approx.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total U.S.C.T. Officers</th>
<th>1863 Average</th>
<th>1864 Average</th>
<th>1863-1865 Total</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S.C.T. Officers</td>
<td>7,683</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{412} AGO, NIMS; AGO, Proceedings of St. Louis Examining Boards; Munden and Beers, \textit{The Union: A Guide to Federal Archives Relating to the Civil War}, 262-63; USACC, Proceedings of Nashville Examination Board; AGO, Appointments to Colored Units. AGO, Persons Who Have Passed Examining Boards.
The sparse information in Table 7-2 highlights the difficulty in finding records that are segmented by time periods and cover the entire course of the War. In many cases, the only information available was from aggregations compiled after the War.

The Army had a long history of creating boards for ruling on both personnel competence and knotty issues. The Bureau for Colored Troops attempted to be the governing body for the officer candidate selection process, but was always at the mercy of local preferences and egos. Bureau chief Maj. Charles W. Foster laid out the circumstances under which a board could be convened and generally acted as the final authority over the rulings of the boards via a series of orders that came from the Bureau and adapted to the military Departments. Local commanders would occasionally create impromptu examination boards for a number of reasons and with varying success. However, the modern concept of highly centralized control of the military emanating from the Pentagon was not part of the Civil War practice of administration, and sometimes-casual, local initiatives and practices were the rule rather than the exception.

The first step in the candidate selection process was often a letter written to the Bureau for Colored Troops or to the Commissioner for Organization. General Orders No. 143 shows that Adjutant General Thomas could also be the recipient of the application, but it was usually directed to an officer of lower rank. Application letters almost always contained endorsements from superiors in the applicant’s chain of command or from political figures. Applicants were rarely refused at the first official step, although many may have been strongly discouraged by their commanding officers prior to applying, or may have found that they did not receive sufficiently positive recommendations to make acceptance likely.413

Between March and October 1864, the Department of the Cumberland received 480 requests for consideration, and Mussey, Commissioner for Organization, approved over 95 percent. The pattern of applications changed dramatically over these eight months. Eighty-two percent from that Department came from enlisted soldiers and non-commissioned officers, with 74 percent reported as privates, corporals, and sergeants in the random sample of the entire Union Army. Nearly all of the non-commissioned

413 General Orders No. 143, May 22, 1863, AGO, Applications for Commission.
applications came during the first half of this period (March-June 1864) while more than 70 percent of the privates’ applications were in the second half (July-October 1864.)\textsuperscript{414}

Regardless of geographic Department, all but a handful of applicants were promptly (usually within a day or two) recommended to a board for examination. The rare disapprovals were almost always the result of personal intervention by Mussey, Thomas, Foster, or a well-connected politician. The most commonly stated reason for rejection of an application was that the applicant was seeking a commission with a regiment in a state other than his own (disrupting the state’s ability to claim the applicants’ service against its required Federal contributions to the War), and he was typically remanded to his home state to seek a recommendation from it. Occasionally, a potential candidate would be rejected due to opposition from the commander of the applicant’s unit and, most often, this took the form of strong disagreement with the policy of forming blacks units under any circumstances. Unit commanders might also take advantage of the need for U.S.C.T. officers and push poor subordinates out of their regiment via the recommendation process.

Officer candidates knew that they would be tested on the appropriate School for the rank they were seeking and prepared accordingly. Most candidates’ preparation, to the extent it occurred at all, appears to have taken the form of informal self-study or small group preparation with fellow candidates. There are few mentions of these activities in existing diaries and letters, and none found in any official records or reports for the 41\textsuperscript{st} and 100\textsuperscript{th}. However, there were at least two instances of the creation of a private, formal educational institution whose specific goal was to improve the performance of candidates in front of the examination board—the Free Military School for Applicants for Commands of Colored Troops of Philadelphia and its offspring, the U.S. Military School. Other preparation programs, such as the one created by Brig. Gen. J.C. Rice of the Army of the Potomac, or another envisioned but not created by Mussey, were local rather than national or regional in scope.\textsuperscript{415}

The duration of candidate examinations ranged from as little as 30 minutes to as many as two and a half hours, although many officer candidates described the experience

\textsuperscript{414} AGO, Applications for Commissions; USACC, Applicants for Commissions.
\textsuperscript{415} USACC, Letters Sent by the Commissioner; Webster, Free Military School Prospectus.
as feeling like four to five hours. The higher the rank sought, the longer the time spent with the board, but the higher the likelihood of success in gaining approval for some command position. The examination questions were meant to be practical—tactics, regulations, and history formed the core of the inquiry. However, the influence of traditional education was strong, and the boards often attempted to determine if the candidate was familiar with the basics of the era’s liberal education including the literary classics, ancient languages, and the writings of Greek and Roman historians.\footnote{Glatthaar, \textit{Forged in Battle}, 49; Webster, \textit{Free Military School Prospectus}, 12.}

Unsuccessful candidates were returned to the ranks or to civilian status. Appeals were not allowed although candidates sometimes felt that they had been treated unfairly. In the case of black officers from the Corp d’Afrique driven from the service by Gen. Nathaniel Banks’ New Orleans board in 1863, this emotion was not misplaced since virtually all black officers were removed from their units. There was also a perception that the board examinations were too severe and that they favored those who already had college educations.

Upon completion of the examination, the boards had two choices: approval for a commission with the U.S.C.T. or rejection. The results were documented via a more or less weekly report sent to the Bureau for Colored Troops. A statement was created for each individual. When the candidate was selected by the board, the report provided detailed information about his performance. When a candidate was rejected, his examination failure was simply noted as “rejected for any position within the U.S. Colored Troops.” Failing grades were not recorded since there was no recourse to or appeal of the Board’s decision. When the Board was behind them, candidates waited a short time, often no more than a few days, for the results. They might be informed by the Bureau directly, the Commissioner for Organization, the president of the Board, a superior officer, or a more indirect channel.

A successful examination did not guarantee placement in a U.S.C.T. regiment. The Bureau for Colored Troops was the final arbiter for the assignment of commissions, and officers would be assigned only when there was a position available. Captains were the key to regiment creation and additional officer appointments (both more senior and more junior), and were the premium products of the examination boards since regiments
were built up around newly formed companies. In 1863 and early 1864, the boards would often approve a disproportionate number of more senior officers, leading to the inability to find positions for them because of the shortage of captains. Later, a glut of 2nd Lieutenants was the problem, again leading to a lack of postings for approved candidates.

How well did the entire process of education, examination, and commissioning work? In his memoirs, General Casey asserted that the U.S.C.T. boards, and by extension the entire system, produced better officers than the method of election used in the white volunteer regiments, and were an honest attempt to provide better leadership for the black troops. An objective look at officer performance neither confirms nor denies this opinion, which certainly could have been self-serving. This topic remains an area for potential future research. The pattern of employment of the U.S.C.T. regiments makes it difficult to compare performance between the white and black establishment and makes claims of superiority questionable. However, claims of equality are more than justified. One measure of officer effectiveness is how many of the men of the unit survived. On average, casualty rates from disease and desertion rates—two measures arguably connected to officer performance—are roughly similar comparing black and white regiments across the span of the War.

**QUESTION 4**

What evidence is available of any unique or innovative (i.e., unusual or out of the mainstream) educational practices developed by the senior commanders of the 41st and 100th, or their supporters? How were these innovations implemented within the U.S.C.I.?

The Union Army’s potential for innovation in officer education was large but not necessarily realized. In contrast to the technological advances that characterized this time period, 1861 to 1865 remained a period of conservative thought in educational theory and practice. With the exception of the Free Military School which was established specifically to train officers to lead black troops, officer preparation activities appear to have been exclusively based on models already established by West Point, the civilian academies, self-study traditions, and schooling within the regiments. **Neither the 41st’s**
nor the 100th’s commanders developed unique educational practices on their own, but both regiments benefited from external innovations (specifically the Free Military School) that affected their officer corps by way of the Bureau for Colored Troops and private educational efforts.

The variance in pursuit of officer education in infantry regiments was large. A regiment with a senior officer dedicated to the perfection of drill would conduct frequent training sessions for both the troops and the officers, including tutorials during non-duty hours. A more lackadaisical commander, of which there were many, would hold perfunctory drill sessions but demand little else of his officers. There was no commonality of practice, although the commanding general could set the tone for his brigade, division or corps. For example, the Army of the Potomac was generally believed to be better drilled and trained than the Western armies—a legacy of McClellan and the Army’s later commanders. Regimental records, including those of the 41st and 100th, mandate the organic training activities that occurred in many regiments and companies, without describing how the training was carried out in detail.417

There were attempts to create formal training programs at the local level. Brig. Gen. James C. Rice, commander of the Army of the Potomac’s white 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division, created an informal school within his brigade to instruct potential officer candidates about the topics needed to pass the board’s examination. An 1854 Yale graduate who had been a teacher and editor before the War, Rice had a reputation for inspired leadership—culminating in his role as brigade commander of the Union left flank at Gettysburg during the defense of Little Round Top. The Bureau for Colored Troops was aware of Rice’s efforts to promote officer preparation and encouraged his activities. Sadly, field operations in the spring of 1864 and Rice’s death during the battle of Spotsylvania cut short his educational efforts.

Mussey was aware of the Free Military School and thought to follow in its footsteps by creating a similar, although less formal institution for officers in the Nashville area, base of the 100th and of many other U.S.C.T. units. Unfortunately, I have been unable to find a record of any actual activities of this school in personal memoirs,

letters, or official documents. I speculate that the combined pressures of Hood’s Nashville campaign beginning only one week after Mussey’s letter to Brown, his responsibilities as the commander-of-record of the 100th U.S.C.I., and the immanent end of the War derailed his plans for the school and it was never implemented. His vision for the school, however, is remarkably in tune with modern adult education theory with a focus on personal initiative and self-direction among the students, provision of expert resources, cooperative learning, and a Socratic dialogue.418

Some officers chose to prepare themselves with methods more rigorous than reading a book or practicing with friends. For example, Henry Bates, a young civilian student at Wabash College in Indiana, recognized the importance of practical experience in the field and the value it would have if he received a commission, and actively sought a position in the equivalent of a short-enlistment militia unit to prepare him for an officer’s role.

Opportunities for formal, pre-commissioning education were limited to the Free Military School and its successor, the U.S. Military School. The Free Military School achieved its primary goal—to produce qualified officers for the U.S.C.T. who had skills and knowledge substantially better suited to the questions asked by the examination boards than candidates who prepared in other ways. It was an important part of the mix of solutions that were crafted by the War Department and public-spirited citizens to meet the needs for capable commanders.

In some respects, the Free Military School was an unexpectedly forward-looking innovation that pointed toward the modern officer candidate schools that have become a normal adjunct to traditional military education. In concept and in contrast to the United States and Western European standard modern practice, it bears an extraordinary similarity to the officer training programs used by the Israeli Defense Force and the Vietnamese Army today. In those programs, all candidates are required to have prior experience in the enlisted ranks, are generally older than the graduates of academies such as the U.S.M.A. or Sandhurst in the United Kingdom, and are expected to be familiar with army life before attending classes. Rather than selecting teenagers for a liberal, degree-bearing education that does not focus on the mechanics of strategy and tactics,

418 R. Mussey to T. Webster, December 6, 1864, USACC, Letters Sent by the Commissioner.
conceptual offsprings of the Free Military School educate soldiers who are arguably more mature in a military sense and have a better understanding of the exigencies of military life.\footnote{vanCreveld, \textit{The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance}, 2.}

Simultaneously, the school was deeply conservative. Its approach to education was highly regimented and demanded perfect conformance by the student rather than individual intellectual development or growth. Officer candidates were expected to simply absorb the information provided by their preceptors, and were actively discouraged from demonstrating creativity.\footnote{Wilson, "Webster and the Free Military School," 120.}

It also was a bulwark against progressive ideas about equality between blacks and whites. From its core premise that black soldiers needed white officers, it was consistently racist in outlook. Although it expressed that racism in what could be construed as a positive and paternalistic form (i.e., the creation of the best possible white officers for black troops), it was racism nonetheless. The subordination of the African-American in military units was not limited to unequal pay scales, poorer equipment than whites, and reluctance to assign black units to frontline positions—it was built into the entire army system from the top, and ratified by the practices of the Free Military School.\footnote{Nalty, \textit{Strength for the Fight}, 46.}

The direct impact of the Free Military School on the performance of the Union armies was inconclusive—except as a contributor to the overall effectiveness of the U.S.C.T. officers. First, many of the black regiments officered by the school’s graduates were employed in subordinate and security roles rather than as front line troops. Their combat capabilities were not conclusively established. Second, the small size of the school and the low number of graduates never allowed the quality of the school’s program to become apparent. The 138 U.S. Colored infantry regiments needed approximately 5,500 officers upon creation, and nearly 50 percent more to account for casualties, illness, and other separations from the service. The Free Military School was able to supply far less than 10 percent of the total required to sustain the black units. However, the success of future officer candidate programs indicates that the concept of
the Free Military School was an innovation whose real value was to be proved in the following century.\footnote{Dyer, \textit{Compendium}.} 

The 100th to some extent and especially the 41st had contingents of officers who had participated in the Free Military School. Twenty-eight of the 41st’s officers and five of the 100th’s were recommended by the Philadelphia Supervisory Committee, the sponsor of the Free Military School. Twelve officers from the 41st and three from the 100th applied to the school between April and August 1864. Their participation in the Free Military School was clearly effective in their individual cases since all received commissions with the U.S.C.I.

**OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

The study uncovered many opportunities for future research. Some examples are discussed below.

Running in parallel with the newly developed approach for preparing and selecting white officers for the U.S.C.T. pioneered at the Free Military School, the preparation for black non-commissioned officers should be well-documented, but is not—for many of the same reasons that finding information about white U.S.C.I. officers and regiments was difficult (i.e., a nearly total lack of unit and personal memoirs about the black organizations.) Minimal research has been done about the Free Military School’s auxiliary program for training black sergeants but no full scale study has been completed, nor has there been a review of regimental practices for non-commissioned promotion, or informal and formal preparation.

In seeking promotion, the transition from illiterate private soldiers to non-commissioned officers in the U.S.C.T. is another area of interest. This study shows that achievement of literacy was one of the paths to higher rank, but it is unclear how often that path was used, who used it, and how the potential non-commissioned officers were assisted by established programs, white officers and chaplains, and fellow blacks.

Throughout this study, I have been hindered by an inability to establish an objective measure of officer performance between the white and black regiments. Is such a measure possible, and how could one be created? What are the critical factors that
would demonstrate effective personal performance, particularly given the differences in employment between white and black regiments? I have started an analysis of all Union general officers from West Point, comparing their class rank to their overall battlefield performance. This study is ongoing.

In addition, I am currently conducting a study of 88 commanders of U.S.C.I. regiments with the intent of comparing their pre-command profile with that of their subordinate officers (i.e., had they been officers prior to assuming command, did they have prior experience with their regiment or any other U.S.C.T. unit, and did they participate in a formal selection process via the Adjutant General or Bureau for Colored Troops?)

Is there a relationship between casualty rates and literacy among private soldiers in Civil War regiments? I speculate that, the higher the rate of literacy, the more likely that a regiment would be used in combat. This will require detailed analysis of both white and black units.

What is the relationship between the civil practice of common-school education and the literacy education that took place in the U.S.C.T.? Did the Freedmen’s Bureau draw on civilian pedagogical practice, or were new methods of adult education developed for the freed slaves?

In 1887-1888, the War Department undertook a major study of the role of the Negro in the military service of the United States (NIMS.) Given the racism of the time, why was this study done, who directed it, and how did it take place? A review of the documents in NIMS does not appear to contain racial or ideological biases, but a closer look at the genesis of the study and the men who performed it would be informative.

The connection between the education of freedmen and the recruiting of black soldiers is unclear but intriguing. Were the freedmen’s schools a Wartime form of today’s radical Islamic madrasas—less educational institutions and more centers for indoctrination, propaganda, and radicalization? Or were they primarily educational?

The racism of the Civil War era is repulsive from the vantage of the 21st Century, particularly in its refusal to allow black officers to command the U.S.C.T. Eventually this problem was rectified in the 20th Century. What educational practices and promotion
processes were used to facilitate the transition from an all-white officer corps to integrated leadership after World War II?

The ingratitude of the United States to the U.S.C.T. after the War is unforgivable. What happened to the men and officers of the U.S.C.I. units once they were mustered out of service? Was Mussey’s continued interest in African-Americans an anomaly? How did white officers reconcile their experiences with their troops with the racism of the times?

Col. John Eaton was a key figure in the promotion of black welfare. What was his relationship to the Bureau for Colored Troops, and how did his activities with the Freedmen’s Bureau and education of blacks coordinate or supplement the Bureau’s recruiting program?

Coverage of the U.S.C.T. in Wartime newspapers is surprisingly positive. What was the relationship between the political agendas of those newspapers and support for black troops? Was there a change in their point of view over the course of the War? How did they portray African-Americans once the War was over?

Did the U.S.C.T. veterans become invisible, in Ralph Ellison’s phrase, in the post-War years? Military Order of the Loyal Legion (MOLLUS) and Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) records make reference to black soldiers and achievements on the battlefield. When did the U.S.C.T. disappear from the history books of the 20th Century?

This study indicates that there is a strong relationship between Civil War and modern officer education, and that the examination processes used for the U.S.C.T. eventually became institutionalized in Army practice. How and when did this happen? Was there any overt acknowledgement and understanding of the contribution of the U.S.C.T. to Army practice? There is also an implied and perhaps strong relationship between U.S.C.T. officer preparation and officer candidate schools. How did the OCS come into being? Were any of the founders of the OCS programs in either the Marine Corps or the Army products of the U.S.C.T. programs or aware of them as precursors?

Finally, the conflicts between Andrew Johnson and George L. Stearns during Johnson’s tenure as military governor of Tennessee point to a potential relationship to his future difficulties with Congress while President. As an indicator of his innate
conservatism about race, were the seeds of attempted impeachment sown in Nashville in 1863 and 1864?

This list could go on for even more pages. One of the joys of Civil War scholarship is that, in spite of the immense amount of work done already, there are always opportunities to dig deeper and develop new insights.

CONCLUSION

This study has been an exciting but sometimes frustrating journey through the most important period of 19th Century American history. When I began it, I expected to find deep deposits of unmined information about the 41st’s and 100th’s officers and their educations. Instead, I discovered just how voiceless nearly all these men were—minor players on an ephemeral landscape who vanished after their moments of military “glory.” They lived their lives before the War, joined their regiments, and resubmerged into the new and transformed United States that grew out of the conflict. They were not the journal and letter writers of the white regiments, nor the authors of memoirs that filled the bookshelves of the turn of the century. In the end, for most, we know their names (although even those are sometimes incorrect), their prior military units, a few details about their appearances before the examination boards, and the orders that governed their continuing military education. The lack of information about them precludes much meaningful statistical analysis and makes telling a definitive story impossible.423

At the same time, what did emerge was a richly detailed picture of a highly complex, evolving bureaucratic process for officer examination and appointment. As much as the individual was faceless, the process was visible. The Adjutant General’s office, the examination boards, political maneuvering, recruiting, and the Bureau for Colored Troops all took on organizational lives that eclipsed the individuals of the regiments. One is left with a sense of a millstone grinding slowly but exceedingly small—a bureaucracy where every detail of every procedural variant was closely monitored, leaving no ‘i’ undotted or ‘t’ uncrossed.

Finally, there are the men who were not faceless: Mussey, Stearns, Webster, Thomas, Foster—the people who, under the stresses of political resistance and a national

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423 The National Park Service Soldiers and Sailors System names Mussey as “Musson;” shows Willis Brooks, an enlisted man of the 100th, as an officer; and lists one man as both “Collahan” and “Callahan.”
emergency from which the outcome looks inevitable only from our vantage point, created a wholly new way of selecting officers. They were able to draw upon the past practices of the Army and American military education to develop meaningful institutions that, in an environment presenting obstacles and scorn that are difficult for us to imagine, were at least as successful as those that emerged in mainstream military society. Even more, without overt reference to prevailing educational theory, they were able to envision a model consistent with a more egalitarian and pragmatic future—practical preparation, less reliance on the classics, and an attempt to match education to the actual needs of the student. Their efforts became part of the Army’s wartime learning that surfaced a decade later in substantive reforms and, in the next century, in its officer candidate schools.
APPENDIX A - U.S.C.I. REGIMENTS

Number of U.S.C.I. units formed by state and time period

| Year | AL | AR | CT | DC | GA | IA | IL | KS | KY | LA | MA | MD | MI | MO | MS | NC | NY | OH | PA | SC | TN | VA | TOTAL |
|------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----|------|
| 1862 |     |     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 2   |      |
| 1863 | 1  | 1  | 1  |    |    |    |    | 1  | 7  | 2  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 11  | 22   |
|      | 3  | 2  |    |    |    | 1  | 1  | 1  | 22 |    | 2  | 3  | 2  | 1  |    |    |    | 1  | 3  |    |    | 53   |
| 1864 | 2  | 3  | 1  |    |    |    | 1  | 5  | 2  | 2  | 1  | 3  | 2  | 3  | 1  |    | 5  | 2  | 1  | 37   |
|      | 2  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 7  | 1  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 12   |
| 1865 | 1  |    | 2  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 4  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    | 12   |
| TOTAL| 7  | 6  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 1  | 2  | 16 | 33 | 2  | 7  | 1  | 5  | 7  | 4  | 3  | 2  | 11  | 15  | 4    | 138  |

Casualties

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Short histories of the 41st and 100th U.S.C.I. are quoted below directly from Dyer’s *Compendium*:

41st U.S. COLORED INFANTRY
Organized at Camp William Penn, Philadelphia, Pa., September 30 to December 7, 1864. Ordered to join Army of the James, in Virginia October 18, 1864. Attached to 1st Brigade, 3rd Division, 10th Corps, to December, 1864. 2nd Brigade, 3rd Division, 25th Corps, to January, 1865. 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, 25th Corps, January, 1865. 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division, 25th Corps, and Dept. of Texas, to December, 1865.

100th U.S. COLORED INFANTRY

427 Ibid., 1737-38.
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APPENDIX C – SHORT BIOGRAPHY OF REUBEN DELAVAN MUSSEY

The Civil War regiments of U.S. Colored Troops came into being through the passionate efforts of a small group of men associated with the Union Army and the Bureau for Colored Troops. Dedicated officers and civilian abolitionists such as General Lorenzo Thomas, Maj. Charles W. Foster, Maj. George L. Stearns, Thomas Webster, and Capt. Reuben D. Mussey were the driving force behind the black units that had such an important impact on the War’s outcome. Of these, Mussey is perhaps the least known but may be the man who had the greatest impact on the formation of the U.S.C.T.

Reuben Delavan Mussey was born in Hanover NH in 1833, the son of the best known medical educator in the United States at that time, and was an 1854 graduate of Dartmouth College. He became a schoolteacher and newspaper correspondent in Boston and Cincinnati, working for the Cincinnati Gazette before the War. The presidential contest of 1860 brought him into the Republican Party, and he served the Lincoln campaign as Capt. General of the Cincinnati Wide-Awakes and as an active public speaker. Mussey was in Washington when the South rebelled, and helped to form a company of home guards to protect the city after Fort Sumter fell and before Union regiments could enter the Capital. These efforts led to a Regular Army commission and a series of recruiting assignments in Ohio for the Union Army’s XXIth Corps which he served as Commissary of Musters.428

Upon joining the army in 1861 soon after the South’s secession, he was made a captain in the 19th U.S. Infantry and, as “the first officer of the regular army to volunteer to raise colored troops,” became the assistant to Maj. George L. Stearns, Commissioner for Organization of U.S. Colored Troops. Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas credits Mussey with being the creator of the concept of the U.S. Colored Troops in 1862, suggesting that black regiments be sponsored by the U.S. Government rather than by the

428 Bergeron et al., eds., Johnson Papers; Reid, Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen, Generals, and Soldiers.
states. Mussey took over the position of Commissioner when Stearns resigned in February 1864.  

He was promoted to Col. in June 1864 and served as commander of the 100th U.S. Colored Infantry—although most of the day-to-day management of the regiment was left to his deputies, Lt. Col. Henry Stone and Maj. Collin Ford. His unit, the first black regiment recruited in Kentucky, began organization in May 1864 and was ready for service in June. It saw little large scale combat except during Hood’s invasion of Tennessee when Sherman’s march to the sea opened the upper South to incursion, and that under the leadership of Ford. Most of its service was spent on guard duty for the Nashville & Northwestern Railroad, with several small skirmishes at the end of 1864. Its security activities continued until December 1865 when the regiment was mustered out. Throughout, Mussey continued to support the creation of black units from his Nashville office.

Mussey was protective of the honor and prerogatives of his troops. When invited to attend a formal Nashville Independence Day party at which other colonels would parade their white regiments, but at which the 100th was not welcome to march, he made his feelings clear to the parade’s chairman:

Your committee has seen fit to omit them (the 100th U.S.C.I.) from its invitation to parade...As these troops are orderly, present a good appearance, and are, considering their opportunities, well drilled, your conduct in omitting them and inviting me, who am nothing but by virtue of my connection with them, either is studiously insulting or betrays a lamentably limited experience of honorable sensibilities. I cannot, sir, accept...The Declaration of Independence, whose formal adoption makes the Fourth of July sacred affirms. 

\[all\ men\ are\ created\ equal\]

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429 Henry A. Hazen and S. Lewis B. Speare, eds., *A History of the Class of 1854 in Dartmouth College* (Boston: Alfred Mudge & Son, 1898); Charles E. Heller, "In Advance of Fate: A Biography of George Luther Stearns, 1809-1867" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Massachusetts, 1985); Reid, *Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen, Generals, and Soldiers*. George Luther Stearns (1809-1867) was a successful New England businessman who moved from intellectual to violent opposition of slavery after the Compromise of 1850. Moved to radical action, he became the chief financial backer for John Brown’s raid. When the War began, he helped to recruit the black 54th and 55th Massachusetts regiments, and was asked by Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to recruit blacks for the Union army. Assisted by Mussey, he was most productive in Tennessee, where he also organized hospitals and schools for the contrabands. Stearns found himself in conflict with Stanton, another strong personality, over the authority of the Commissioner for Organization versus the Department commander and resigned in early 1864.

430 AGO, Regimental Books, 100th U.S.C.I.; Dyer, *Compendium*. During 1864, virtually every General Order in the 100th U.S.C.I. was signed by Lt. Col. Stone or Maj. Ford who were in camp with the regiment while Mussey, pursuing his duties in Nashville, was a commander-in-absentia.
you, sir, and your committee learn this fundamental truth…your ‘celebrations of our National anniversary’ are mocking farces, insults to the illustrious dead, and blasphemy…”

Mussey’s main focus during the War was recruitment of soldiers for the U.S.C.T., coordination of the Nashville examination board for prospective white officers of black regiments, and preparation of officers for command. He provided a sense of his purpose and proposed practices in an October 1864 letter:

Persons before passing this Board will be examined as to their practical ability to command by having an opportunity to drill men at Camp Foster, or at Maj. Grosskopff’s Camp and their physical qualifications for their position will be investigated by the Surgeon, who will also see what knowledge they have of Camp Hygiene…I have for some time thought of establishing a School here for Officers of Colored Troops somewhat similar to that at Philadelphia – though differing in this, that that applied to Candidates and this should apply to Commissioned Officers. I have at last resolved to make a beginning. I have secured the cooperation of two or three gentlemen of ability in their branch of service, and propose to have given at my Office once or twice a week lectures on military matters of importance. The first lecture will be given this week, and will be open to such as choose to attend. I have also recommended to the Officers of organization here the formation of “quizzes” of five or six officers on the plan of the “quizzes” in medical classes where the topic designated is discussed by questions upon it and about it, asked by the various members of each other. My suggestion has met with approval.

As the son of a prominent physician and medical educator, Mussey was able to envision a fusion of medical school techniques with army training practices.

At the end of the War, Mussey was promoted to Brevet Brigadier General of Volunteers and Brevet Col. of the U.S. Army. He remained in the army for a year after the collapse of the Confederacy. Since he was in Washington at the time of Lincoln’s assassination and because of his past association with then-Vice President Johnson, he was asked to become the new President’s military secretary.

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432 R. Mussey to C. P. Brown, October 24 1864; USACC, Letters Sent by the Commissioner. It is unclear whether Mussey had the opportunity to implement these ideas because of the pressures of field operations during Hood’s advance on Nashville at the end of 1864.

433 Union Army officers during the Civil War could hold multiple ranks simultaneously. For example, Mussey’s permanent rank in the Regular Army was captain, while his brevet rank was colonel. When he took a commission with a Volunteer unit, his volunteer permanent rank was colonel and he was promoted to brevet brigadier general. Thus, upon cessation of hostilities and with a decrease in the size of the Army, officers would revert to their permanent rank, with volunteer officers being terminated and Regular officers
The correspondence between Mussey and Johnson shows a close, friendly, and trusting relationship that arose during their mutual wartime labors in Tennessee and were continued when both came to Washington. After his resignation from the army in December, 1865, Mussey built a thriving law practice in Washington DC, where he died in 1892.434

Mussey’s communications, by modern standards, were formal and florid, but consistent with that of his educated contemporaries. He had an intense sense of the importance of his mission, and was unflinchingly committed to the protection of former slaves and the decent treatment and use of black soldiers:

I regard and have regarded the organization of colored troops as a very important social, humanitarian, as well as military measure, and as a providential means of fitting the race freed by this war for their liberty. I have endeavored to impress this view upon the officers appointed to these organizations and upon the men themselves, showing them that their recognition as men would follow the soldier, and I have now, after a year's labor in this department, more hope and more faith, than ever in the capability of the negro to make a good soldier and a good citizen.435

Given his religious and social background, it is not surprising that he was a fervent abolitionist, and frequently corresponded with others who were equally dedicated to the advancement of blacks. He often received exhortations and complaints from other abolition-minded officers of the Department that supported his dedication to the blacks’ cause:436

I am pleased to learn that Colored Troops are to be used as indicated in your letter & to know that the Governor will furnish every facility for the mental and moral development of these hitherto despised & oppressed men. It has been my fear that there would not be proper care in the selection of officers over them [U.S.C.T.], but am gratified to feel assured that the work is in good and true hands. I have been grieved to see men who have ever been the enemies of these unfortunate people making application to command them…With the muscular power of the full

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436 Given the intense abolitionist sentiment of Maj. George L. Stearns, his immediate superior, it is difficult to imagine Mussey’s ability to do his job without similar convictions. Stearns was part of the Massachusetts abolitionist group that had financially backed John Brown’s abortive rebellion.
grown man they come to us with feeble mental power & the great work of preparing them for the discharge of their new duties and levitating them above the prejudices of class, will require great firmness—patience—and moral courage. The men who aid in doing this will become benefactors, good, noble, & true.\textsuperscript{437}

Snippets of Mussey’s private character peek through his official communications. He was both intensely patriotic and religious. Writing to the men of his command in Nashville, he celebrated the first official Thanksgiving holiday by noting:

Tomorrow the 24\textsuperscript{th} day of November having been designated by the President of the United States as a day of national Thanksgiving and Prayer will be observed as a holiday by the Officers and Enlisted men reporting to these Head Quarters who are earnestly requested both publicly and privately to give thanks to the Giver of all victory for the signal success with which during the past year He has crowned our Efforts to suppress the Rebellion and for the unanimity with which the people of the United States have declared their determination to sustain the principles of Nationality and Freedom for which we contend. And while we join in this ascription of praise let us who are engaged in the works of Arming and Educating the blacks, specially thank God for the success attending our efforts; let us remember with devout gratitude the gallant behavior in the field and the soldierly bearing in Camp of the Colored Troops. Let us be thankful that during the past year Equal Justice has been awarded to Colored Soldiers and let us hope that the unchristian prejudice against colored men and soldiers that has so long existed and is now so fast dying may before another National Thanksgiving wholly cease.\textsuperscript{438}

Mussey was not exempt from the conflict that swirled around his superior, Maj. George L. Stearns, who had extremely difficult relations with both the War Department and Governor Andrew Johnson. A man of little tolerance for slights to his honor or impediments to his mission, Mussey would privately show his impatience with those who stood in his way—a characteristic that he shared with Stearns. In an unusual turnabout of their relationship, Stearns, writing to Mussey in 1864, counsels:

Your report of Dec. 24\textsuperscript{th} is at hand. I understand the animus of the endorsements. Somebody at Headquarters is jealous of our work and wants to block it. It will answer my purpose at Washington which is to put all the Commands of Colored Troops on a firm basis. I can do this if it will not cause too much jealousy in the Department Commanders. At any

\textsuperscript{437} B. F. Sheets to R. Mussey, February 20, 1864, USACC, Records of R. D. Mussey.  
\textsuperscript{438} R.D. Mussey, November 23, 1864, Special Order No. 175, USACC, Letters Received by the Commissioner.
rate I shall try and you shall know the result. Therefore Possess your soul in Patience… 439

Mussey was able to navigate the political environment of the wartime West better than Stearns, and survived the War Department infighting to become an effective Commissioner.

As he was preparing to leave Federal service, Mussey discovered that there was an unaccounted-for deficiency of nearly $30,000 in the funds that he dispersed in his roles as Stearns’ assistant and as Commissioner for the Organization of Colored Troops during the War. A review of the chaotic flood of wartime disbursement requests he received shows how easily valid expenditures could be unreported. Mussey was deeply worried about the charges against him, and approached President Johnson for help:

May I crave your indulgence for a few moments to read to you this which I could hardly trust myself to speak? … You know very well dear Sir how I did my work at Nashville; you know very well my way of life and I believe, I may say, you know me well enough to know that I am not dishonest…I have felt for you so keenly when others whom you loved and trusted abused that love and trust; your honor has been dearer to me than my own. Pardon me this confession. I have loved you with an affection which few men ever feel for each other… 440

The Treasury Department initiated an investigation of Mussey in early 1866 but there is no indication of any resolution or punitive action. 441

Much like many of the abolitionist community during the War, he was well connected to several of the significant political figures of the day. Mussey felt comfortable writing directly to Abraham Lincoln to congratulate him on his reelection in 1864, and sent a note to radical abolitionist Salmon P. Chase when he was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court near the end of that year.

It is equal to a military victory, your appointment to the Supreme Bench. For it means that the legal battle against Treason and Slavery is ended – the case is closed, and there are to be no further arguments. It shows too that Mr. Lincoln is in sympathy with the spirit of those who supported him at the last election and your appointment, coupled with his message, sets

439 G.L. Stearns to R. Mussey, January 1, 1864, Records of R. D. Mussey, USACC.
441 Ibid.
the Nation right as an opponent forever of Human Bondage…All of the friends of Liberty and Nationality here rejoice with me.442

In contrast, Mussey had serious differences of opinion with Johnson’s weak reconstruction policies and his treatment of former slaves. Writing to a friend and Ohio newspaper editor, he described the rift that was growing between him and the President:

I feel that Johnson and I must differ on points where there should be unison between a President and his confidential secretary. And I think furthermore that the President wants me to leave…Things don’t look right to me at the South. What I would do is not what is being done by or towards the Southern leaders.443

These objections to Johnson’s policies did not keep him from flattery. In requesting separation from the army, he writes to President Johnson that:

In your recent message you have achieved a great triumph. May I now ask you to crown this success with an act of kindness to one, who, whatever your decision will not cease to pray for your personal and political welfare and success?444

Nor was he beneath engaging in political infighting when he felt the cause was just. Mussey conducted a vendetta, justifiably to the modern eye, against General Lovell H. Rousseau who had allowed slave owners in the Nashville area to retrieve escaped slaves and set aside sentences given under martial law to whites who abused blacks. Mussey maneuvered with then-Governor Johnson to have himself sent to Washington to give testimony against Rousseau:

Would it be proper do you think and Expedient for you to send a Despatch to the Secretary of War—like this—I wish very much to Send Col Mussey to Washington on important business. Please telegraph permission for him to go…445

As late as 1883, Mussey was still advocating for his black troops. Invited to speak at a reunion of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland in Cincinnati, Mussey wrote that:

442 USACC, Letters Sent by the Commissioner.
444 Bergeron et al., eds., Johnson Papers, 493.
445 Ibid.
At present, it runs in my mind that it would not be inappropriate to say something about the “Colored Troops” of the Army of the Cumberland who, proverbially fought nobly.\textsuperscript{446}

Mussey was married twice. His first wife, Lucinda Sparo Barrett, died in 1870. In 1871, he married Ellen Spencer who became his business partner and inherited his law practice upon his death.\textsuperscript{447} His two marriages produced two daughters and two sons. A man of strong Christian conviction and deep love for his family, he may also have “had an eye for the ladies,” in the polite term of his era, or at least a strong appreciation for female company. After soliciting a position at the Treasury Department for a young woman of his acquaintance, Mussey received a negative response from Secretary of the Treasury McCullough:

Besides, my dear General, it would not be safe for you to have her come to Washington. You have, I am aware, a weakness for interesting women. It is neither a virtue nor a fault with you; it came to you in the course of nature; but it must not be unnecessarily tried. As one of the Constitutional advisors of the President, I feel a deep interest in the reputation and welfare of his Military Secretary, and I do not intent to put irresistible temptations before him if I can help it! … Pardon me, General, if in this instance I do not oblige you.\textsuperscript{448}

Regardless, his relationship with his second wife was reported to be close, both within their family and in their business dealings. Mussey was an admirable example of an educated man of his era, and turned his considerable talents to effective public service and the preeminent social cause of his day—the care and advancement of the former slaves. Periodic and prolonged episodes of ill health did not prevent him from establishing a prominent Washington, DC law practice, including service as the first legal

\textsuperscript{446} R. Mussey to H. M. Cist, January 5, 1883, Collection of the Cincinnati Historical Society; Cist, \textit{History of the Army of the Cumberland}. As pointed out by Anne Shepherd from the Cincinnati Historical Society, Cist had recently published works that would lead to his history of the Army of the Cumberland and had left out any mention of the U.S.C.T.


\textsuperscript{448} Hugh McCullough, Secretary of the Treasury, to R. Mussey, September 14, 1865, Mussey Collection, Dartmouth College Library.
counsel for Clara Barton’s National Society of the Red Cross.\textsuperscript{449} Upon his death in 1892, his wife described his Renaissance qualities:

General Mussey was a rare scholar; he loved not only the highways but the by-ways of knowledge…he seems more and more as a rare example of a man noble and generous in all his impulses; of a transparent honesty of purpose, of rare intellectual attainments…\textsuperscript{450}

\textsuperscript{449} Rottier, "Ellen Spencer Mussey and the Washington College of Law."

\textsuperscript{450} Hazen and Speare, eds., \textit{A History of the Class of 1854 in Dartmouth College}, 51.
APPENDIX D – SHORT BIOGRAPHY OF LLEWELLYN F. HASKELL

Llewellyn Frost Haskell was born in Belleville, NJ on October 8, 1842. He joined the 14th New York Militia as a private at the start of the War. Later, he was commissioned into the 5th Missouri Infantry. After a stint in the 27th Missouri Infantry and serving as aide-de-camp to Brigadier Generals Alexander Asboth and Henry Price, Haskell applied for a commission with the U.S. Colored Troops, passed his examination (probably with the St. Louis board) on September 14, 1863, rose to become a Lt. Colonel in the 7th U.S. Colored Infantry.451

Haskell was appointed colonel of the 41st U.S.C.I. upon its creation in September, 1864. He served with the regiment for the remainder of the War and was promoted to Brevet Brigadier General in March, 1865 for “gallant and meritorious services.” His rare correspondence reveals a polite and meticulous man who was committed to the excellence of his troops and to high standards of performance, particularly from his officers:

Major Elbry C. Ford… was assigned to my regt as its major…A careful examination of this officer’s qualifications both in matters of drill and discipline has satisfied me of his unfittedness for the position to which he has been appointed…My Regt is entirely new, and not yet wholly organized sent into the field immediately from the recruiting station without drill. It has hither to been so situated as to make drill impossible to give it such drill as it peremptorily needs at this time – therefore such being the condition of the regiment the good of the service demands that its field officers especially should be most thoroughly and perfectly fitted for their place – for while we are obliged to make this a school for the soldiers we ought not be compelled to make it a school for the officers as well. These conditions the Major in my opinion does not at present fill…I have therefore the honor to request that the appointment of Maj. Ford be revoked…452

In an army characterized by its youth, Haskell was an extraordinarily young regimental commander. At the end of the War, he was only 23 years old. At some point after the War, he became a mining engineer and moved to California where he died in 1929.

451 AGO, Persons Who Have Passed Examining Boards; Hunt and Brown, Brevet Brigadier Generals in Blue.
452 L. Haskell to W. Burrows, January 4, 1865, AGO, Regimental Books, Correspondence, 41st U.S.C.I.
APPENDIX E – TARDY GEORGE

TARDY GEORGE
By George Henry Boker
(1823-1890)

What are you waiting for, George, I pray? --
To scour your cross-belts with fresh pipe-clay?
To burnish your buttons, to brighten your guns;
Or wait you for May-day and warm Spring suns?
Are you blowing your fingers because they are cold,
Or catching your breath ere you take a hold?
Is the mud knee-deep in valley and gorge?
What are you waiting for, tardy George?

Want you a thousand more cannon made,
To add to the thousand now arrayed?
Want you more men, more money to pay?
Are not two millions enough per day?
Wait you for gold and credit to go,
Before we shall see your martial show;
Till Treasury Notes will not pay to forge?
What are you waiting for, tardy George?

Are you waiting for your hair to turn,
Your heart to soften, your bowels to yearn
A little more towards "our Southern friends,"
As at home and abroad they word their ends?
"Our Southern friends!" whom you hold so dear
That you do no harm and give no fear,
As you tenderly take them by the gorge?
What are you waiting for, tardy George?

Now that you've marshaled your whole command,
Planned what you would, and changed what you planned;
Practiced with shot and practiced with shell,
Know to a hair where every one fell,
Made signs by day and signals by night;
Was it all done to keep out of a fight?
Is the whole matter too heavy a charge?
What are you waiting for, tardy George?

Shall we have more speeches, more reviews?
Or are you waiting to hear the news;
To hold up your hands in mute surprise
When France and England shall "recognize"?
Are you too grand to fight traitors small?
Must you have a Nation to cope withal?
Well, hammer the anvil and blow the forge;
You'll soon have a dozen, tardy George!

Suppose for a moment, George, my friend --
Just for a moment -- you condescend
To use the means that are in your hands,
The eager muskets, and guns, and brands;
Take one bold step on the Southern sod,
And leave the issue to watchful God!
For now the Nation raises its gorge,
Waiting and watching you, tardy George!

I should not much wonder, George, my boy,
If Stanton get in his head a toy,
And some fine morning, ere you are out,
He send you all "to the right about" --
You and Jomini, and all the crew
Who think that war is nothing to do
But drill, and cipher, and hammer, and forge --
What are you waiting for, tardy George?

453 Boker, Tardy George.
APPENDIX F - ANTEBELLUM WEST POINT
GRADUATING CLASSES

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Descriptive Statistics 1850-1861

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454 Cullum, Biographical Register.
455 Descriptive statistics for the class of 1859 are skewed by the temporary shift from a four year to a five year program.
### APPENDIX G – GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF WEST POINT ATTENDEES 1812-1872

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<th>Adjusted Enrolled (Enrolled less Still at USMA)</th>
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456 Barnard, *Military Schools and Courses of Instruction.*
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<td>51</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>35.71</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At large</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>2,054</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>3,891</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX H – PENNSYLVANIA LITERARY, SCIENTIFIC, AND MILITARY INSTITUTE PROSPECTUS

THE PENNSYLVANIA LITERARY, SCIENTIFIC, AND MILITARY INSTITUTE
At Bristol, Bucks County, Pennsylvania

The Institution is located on the banks of the Delaware river, two miles from Bristol and seventeen from Philadelphia, with which city there is a daily communication by steamboat and railroad. The situation is one of the most healthy and pleasant in the United States, easy of access from every section of the Union, and surrounded by a rich and beautiful agricultural country.

The sons of those parents who may have conscientious scruples relative to bearing arms, will be excused from attending the military duties, if their parents specially request it.

Captain Partridge would respectfully inform the public that the above mentioned Institution is now opened for the reception of students, and in successful operation under his direction and superintendence, in the spacious edifice known by the name of Bristol College, near Bristol, Bucks county, Pennsylvania. The course of education will be extensive, and well calculated to prepare young men for the correct and efficient discharge of the various duties of life, whether occupying public or private, civil or military stations. The following branches of literature, science and instruction will be embraced in the course of education, viz: -- The Latin, Greek, French, Spanish, and English languages, Arithmetic, Construction and use of Logarithms, Algebra, Geometry, Planometry, Stereometry, Trigonometry, Conic Sections, Surveying, both Theoretical and Practical, Mensuration of Heights and Distances, Civil and Military Engineering, Topographical Drawing, Mechanics, Hydraulics, Pneumatics, Optics, Electricity, Magnetism, Elements of Chemistry, Astronomy, Geography, History, Ethics, Rhetoric, Logic, Laws of Nations, Natural and Political Law, Mental Philosophy, Permanent and Field Fortifications, Artillery, the attack and defence of fortified places, Contrametation, Tactics, both Ancient and Modern, practical and Military instruction, embracing the Schools of the Soldier, Company and Battalion, - also, the turning off, mounting and relieving Guards and Sentinels, - the Constitution of the United States, and the Science of Government generally; Political Economy, the use of the Barometer, with its application to measuring the Altitudes of Mountains and other Eminences; Ornamental Penmanship, Music and Fencing. The Military Exercises will be attended to at those hours of the day which are usually passed by students in idleness, or useless amusements, for which they will constitute a healthful and pleasing substitute. They do not interfere in the least with regular study, but, on contrary, by inducing habits of order and regularity, and promoting vigorous health, they aid essentially mental improvement. The regular expenses for the Academic year, of forty-eight (48) weeks, will be as follows, viz: For tuition in any or all of the regular branches of instruction, and board, $154.00 For fuel, lights, use of arms, and accoutrements, 6.00 Amount per annum, $160.00

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457 Partridge, Prospectus of the Pennsylvania Literary, Scientific, and Military Institute.
Washing is not included in the above, as many parents and guardians may wish to regulate it themselves. Arrangements, however, will be made to have the washing done either at or in the vicinity of the institution, on the most reasonable terms, for all those who wish to have it so done. Arrangements will also be made for furnishing, on reasonable terms, at the institution, books, stationery, uniform clothing, and all other necessary articles, to all those students whose parents and guardians may wish to have them furnished. Each student will be required to be furnished, on joining the institution, with a single mattress and pillow, with the necessary bedding, two chairs, a medium sized table, with drawer, or a writing desk, with a small book case at the back, four napkins, a pitcher and two tumblers, &c; sleeping berths will be provided at the institution at a very moderate price: they will cost but little. All the furniture to be simple and cheap. Tables and desks, made of pine and varnished, will answer every purpose.

QUALIFICATIONS FOR ADMISSION
Candidates for admission must be of unexceptional moral character, - be able to read and spell the English language correctly, - write a fair legible hand – understand well the ground rules of arithmetic, and also the elements of English grammar. As a general rule, none will be admitted under eleven years of age.

TERMS OF PAYMENT
The Quarterly bills for the regular expenses (amounting to forty dollars for 12 weeks) must be paid in advance. The bills for articles furnished at the Institution, may be paid in advance, or at the expiration of the quarter, at the option of the parent or guardian; the bills of all banks current, at par, in Philadelphia, and also drafts on Philadelphia, Baltimore, New York, and Boston, will be received in payment of all bills.

VACATIONS
There will be one annual vacation, which will commence on the first Monday of September, and continue 4 weeks.

SCIENTIFIC AND MILITARY LECTURES
Capt. Partridge will deliver an annual course of Lectures at the Institution, on the several branches of Military Science, on Political Economy, the Constitution of the United States, the Science of Government, &c. &c., which will be free for all the members of the Institution. To those who are not members, but may wish to attend the course, the following charges will be made, viz:
To each General and Field Officer of Volunteers and Militia, combined with practical instruction, (if desired) - $4.00
To each Company Officer do. do. – 3.00
To each non-commissioned Officer and Private – 2.00
To gentlemen not connected with the Military – 5.00

EXTRA BRANCHES
The French and Spanish Languages, Music, Fencing, and Ornamental Penmanship, will be considered extra branches, for which those who attend to them, will be charged for each branch to which he attends, $4 per quarter.
A reasonable deduction will be made when students attend for two or more successive quarters to the same branch, and also when they attend to two or more at the same time. Students who have attended four quarters to any of the extra branches will be charged, should they attend longer, $2 per quarter for the same.

EXAMINATIONS
There will be two public examinations each year. The last to be during the week preceding vacation.

TIMES OF ADMISSION
The best time for joining the Institution, will be at the expiration of the vacation. Students will, however, be admitted at any time of the year.

DRESS
The students will be required to wear a neat, but plain uniform dress – the same that was formerly worn at Middletown, and is now worn at the Norwich University. The price of the coat will vary from $10 to $14, according to the quality. Blue vests and pantaloons for winter, and white for summer. The whole dress is less expensive than that worn by students generally.

PROMISCUOUS REGULATIONS
1st. The students will be styled Cadets.
2nd. Each Cadet who does not wish to complete the full course of instruction, can attend to such branches only as will best qualify him for any particular occupation or profession he may intend to pursue.
3rd. Each Cadet will be allowed to progress in his studies as rapidly as possible, consistent with a thorough understanding of the same. By this a good student will be enabled to save much time and expense in the acquirement of any given amount of knowledge.
4th. The discipline will be strict, but correct – in principle, military – in practice, parental.
5th. Good morals, a strict regard for the great principles of religion, and a patriotic attachment to our free institutions, will be strongly and constantly inculcated into the minds of the Cadets.
6th. The Instruction in every department will be thorough and practical. The Cadets will be frequently taken out on practical scientific, as well as military excursions, which will conduce equally to health and improvement.
7th. Habits of industry and economy will be strongly urged and enforced upon all. No unnecessary expenditures will be permitted.
8th. The Institution will be conducted on broad and liberal principles, and all the members, from whatever section they may come, will enjoy equal advantages and equal privileges.

A. PARTRIDGE

Bristol, Bucks County, Penn. Sept. 14, 1842.
Capt. Partridge will receive students for $200 per annum for forty-eight weeks, which will include all charges for tuition in regular branches, including the Modern Languages, Board, use of Bedding and of Furniture for rooms, of Class Books and Stationery, and for lights and fuel. It will be optional with parents and guardians to enter their sons and wards under either of the preceding conditions.

N.B. Students who complete the course of instruction at the Institute, will be entitled to receive their Diplomas from the Norwich University, at Norwich, Vermont.

Capt. P. will also include in the above the necessary uniform coats and caps for $230 per annum.

Note: The source and storage of this document is interesting. It exists in the Sweringen Family Papers Collection at the Missouri Historical Society, but as a by-product of a letter rather than as a catalogued item. A Civil War-era letter from Sweringen was written on the back of the Academy’s 1842 prospectus, and is the catalogued holding.
APPENDIX I - WASHINGTON REVIEW BOARD
ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION RATES BY EXISTING
RANK
Prior to December 26, 1863\textsuperscript{458}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Existing Rank</th>
<th>Examined</th>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Lt. Co.</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>1st Lt.</th>
<th>2nd Lt.</th>
<th>Rejected</th>
<th>% Accepted</th>
<th>% Rejected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenant</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>222</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen *</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* According to Cornish (\textit{The Sable Arm}), applicants designated as “Citizen” had often served the Army prior to application. Statistical proof of this claim is not available.

\textsuperscript{458} Webster, Free Military School Prospectus, 12.
APPENDIX J – EXAMINATION BOARD APPROVALS

10 Percent Random Sample of Applicants to Bureau for Colored Troops Boards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Rank at Application</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above Captain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosp Steward, Bandsman</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstated</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended By</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia Supervisory Committee</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Assigned by BCT</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No rank assigned</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examination Score</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No score</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Class</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Class</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Class</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[459\] AGO, Lists of Persons Who Have Passed Examining Boards.
APPENDIX K – CIVIL WAR TIMELINE

**1861**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Lower South secedes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12</td>
<td>South fires on Ft. Sumter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Upper South secedes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15</td>
<td>Lincoln calls for 75,000 three-month militia – 91,816 respond⁴⁶⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 19</td>
<td>Blockade of Southern ports imposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 3</td>
<td>Lincoln calls for 500,000 men – 700,680 enlist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 21</td>
<td>First Battle of Bull Run – Union defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6</td>
<td>First Confiscation Act allows removal of slaves from disloyal masters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1862**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 6-16</td>
<td>Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson – Union victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 6-7</td>
<td>Battle of Shiloh – Union victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 25</td>
<td>Capture of New Orleans by Union Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-July</td>
<td>Peninsula Campaign and Seven Day’s Battle – Union strategic defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9</td>
<td>Maj. General David Hunter orders emancipation of slaves on South Carolina Sea Islands; repudiated by President Lincoln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 17</td>
<td>Second Confiscation Act allows for confiscation of slaves of persons engaged in or sympathetic to the rebellion. The Militia Act allows the freed slaves to be armed to suppress rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 29-30</td>
<td>Second Battle of Bull Run – Union defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 17</td>
<td>Battle of Antietam – Union strategic victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 27</td>
<td>Recruitment of first Louisiana Native Guard regiments begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13</td>
<td>Battle of Fredericksburg – Union defeat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1863**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1</td>
<td>Emancipation Proclamation issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 26</td>
<td>Secretary of War Stanton authorizes Massachusetts to recruit black soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 31</td>
<td>1st South Carolina (33rd U.S.C.I.) mustered into service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1</td>
<td>AGO Special Order 97 establishing the Washington Examination Board for white applicants to command positions in black regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 3</td>
<td>Draft Act passed by Congress, applying to both white and black draftees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 25</td>
<td>General Lorenzo Thomas sent to the Mississippi Valley to recruit black soldiers. Has authority to appoint officers to new regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>1st Kansas Volunteers (79th U.S.C.I.) mustered into service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1</td>
<td>Thomas’ first regiment, 1st Arkansas Volunteers (46th U.S.C.I.) mustered into service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1-4</td>
<td>Battle of Chancellorsville – Union defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May – July</td>
<td>Vicksburg Campaign – Union victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22</td>
<td>AGO General Orders No. 143 establishes the Bureau for Colored Troops within the Adjutant General’s Office. Maj. Charles W. Foster appointed as Chief of the Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27</td>
<td>Ohio requests permission to raise black regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 17</td>
<td>Maj. George L. Stearns appointed as Commissioner for the Organization of Colored Troops in Middle and East Tennessee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 22</td>
<td>54th and 55th Massachusetts complete organization and are mustered into service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 4</td>
<td>Fall of Vicksburg – Union victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1-3</td>
<td>Battle of Gettysburg – Union victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13-16</td>
<td>New York City draft riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 19-20</td>
<td>Battle of Chickamauga – Union defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 17 (and February 1, 1864)</td>
<td>Government calls for 500,000 men (an aggregate between the two dates) – 368,389 enlist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 23-25</td>
<td>Battle of Chattanooga – Union victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 26</td>
<td>Free Military School opens in Philadelphia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴⁶⁰ Pfisterer, *Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States*, 3-11. All “call” and enlistment numbers shown in this table are from Pfisterer.
1864

February 9  Stearns replaced by Capt. Reuben D. Mussey as Commission for Organization
February 24  Conscriptive Act passed by Congress, provides for enrollment of all black men of
military age and forced compensation of slave owners in loyal states
March 14  Government calls for 200,000 men – 292,193 enlist
March 29  General Orders No. 125 issued allowing soldiers to take furloughs to attend the Free
Military School
April 12  Fort Pillow massacre of black troops
May 3 to June 1  100th U.S.C.I. organized in Kentucky
May 5-6  Battle of the Wilderness – Union strategic victory
May 8-12  Battle of Spotsylvania – Union strategic victory
June 1-3  Battle of Cold Harbor – Union defeat
June 15  Siege of Petersburg begins
June 15  Congress grants equal pay of $13 per month to the U.S.C.T.
June to December  100th U.S.C.I. on guard duty for Nashville and Northwestern R.R., TN
July 6  Law authorizing black recruiting in rebel states passed
July 18  Government calls for 500,000 men but reduced by credits for prior over-enlistments –
386,461 enlist
July 24  Attack on Washington – Union victory
September 2  Atlanta Campaign – Union victory when Atlanta falls
September 4  100th U.S.C.I. skirmish on N.&N.W.R.R., TN
September 15  Free Military School closes
September 30 to
December 7  41st U.S.C.I. organized at Camp William Penn, Pennsylvania
October 13  41st U.S.C.I. ordered to join Army of the James
October 29 to December 31  41st U.S.C.I. in trenches near Richmond, VA
November 4-5  100th U.S.C.I. action at Johnsonville, TN
November - December  March to the Sea – Union victory
December 16  100th U.S.C.I. action at Overton Hill, TN
December 17-28  100th U.S.C.I. pursuit of Hood to Tennessee River
December 19  Government calls for 500,000 men (reduced due to decreased needs) – 212,212 enlist

1865

January 1  41st U.S.C.I. on picket duty at Fort Burnham, VA
January 16 to December  100th U.S.C.I. resumes N.&N.W.R.R. guard duty
March 3  Congressional Act frees the families of slaves who enlisted in the Union Army
March 27  All officer appointments for the U.S.C.T. are made exclusively by the War Department
after examination
March 27  41st U.S.C.I. transferred to Army of the Potomac
March 29  41st U.S.C.I. skirmish at Hatcher’s Run, VA
April 2  41st U.S.C.I. engaged near Petersburg, VA
April 2  Richmond falls to the Union
April 9  41st U.S.C.I. pursuit of Army of Northern Virginia to Appomattox Court House, VA;
skirmish
April 9  Lee surrenders
April 14  Lincoln assassinated
April 29  Recruitment and formation of U.S.C.T. units ends
April  Total Union enlistments 1861 to April, 1865 – 2,320,272
May 10  Jefferson Davis captured
May 25  41st U.S.C.I. assigned to guard and provost duty Edinburg, TX
May 26  Surrender of Kirby Smith - last major Confederate unit
July 15  Last U.S.C.T. unit mustered into service
November 10  41st U.S.C.I. mustered out in Brownsville, TX
December 14  41st U.S.C.I. disbanded and paid in Philadelphia, PA
December 18  Thirteenth Amendment outlawing slavery is ratified
December 26  100th U.S.C.I. mustered out
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VITA

Paul D. Renard
prenard@vt.edu

Independent Consultant 2005-Present
Acts as a strategy consultant for large and medium government contractors with a specialty in creative technical solutions and architectures that combine the best features of private industry with the strengths of the public sector. Frequent guest speaker at the National Defense University.

Pivotal Insight LLC 2004-2005
Consultant and Executive Vice President
Created a government-focused research and consulting firm specializing in the identification of public and private sector best practices in the strategy, acquisition, program management, and HR domains. Has provided functional and solutions architecture leadership on diverse international and domestic security-related marketing efforts.

Stratford University, Falls Church, VA
Dean, School of Information Systems 2002-2004
Redesigned the information systems curriculum for Stratford University to take into account significant changes in the technology marketplace. Improved student retention and raised the quality of the academic programs. Added course offerings and sub-concentrations in eight new areas, recruited faculty, and managed the transition to the new curriculum. Developed and implemented the University’s first Information Systems bachelors degree, and created four more bachelors of science degree programs.

American Management Systems, Fairfax, VA 1979-2002
In a 23-year career at AMS with the last decade as a vice president, held a variety of key senior positions that positively affected the company’s success, image, relationship with its employees, and reputation among its clients.

Homeland Security Practice 2002
Founded the AMS Department of Defense Homeland Security (HLS) practice. Interfaced with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and other policy think tanks to help frame and define the HLS strategic dimensions. Along with former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger, was the keynote speaker at the College of William & Mary's symposium investigating the relationship between global trade and national security. Featured speaker at University of Maryland's conference on "Information, Intelligence, and The War on Terror"

DOD Program Manager 1998 - 2002
Managed the AMS Department of Defense Standard Procurement System (SPS), the company's largest individual program.
**Strategic Planner** 1997-1998
Working directly for AMS's CEO, devised the corporate strategy to enter the ERP integration market and led the company's initiative to develop relationships with the major ERP software providers.

**Telecommunications CAO and GM** 1993-1998
Directed over 2,300 staff, and was responsible for operations and facilities in seven countries. Managed strategic planning, recruiting, and staff development/promotion departments.

**Operational Systems Responsibility Center and Client Training** 1979-1989
Managed mid-size (10 to 30 persons) custom systems work and all ongoing support involving computing facilities for the Systems Integration-East business unit. Supervised a group of project managers who supported the operational requirements of AMS clients such as the U.S. General Accounting Office, the Interstate Commerce Commission, Marsh & McLennan, and the Baker & Taylor companies. Founded AMS's external training program. Developed a series of over forty courses that addressed the training needs of clients. Administered the design and development of curriculum, and was the primary instructor in courses concerning data base management systems. Managed the AMS Training Center staff.

**Prior to 1979 and AMS**, was Training Director for First Data Corporation and built a federally-focused training practice for users of data base management systems.

**Education**
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Ph.D. in Human Development, 2006
Marymount University, MBA, 1992
St. Mary's University, MA coursework, Theology, 1973
College of William & Mary, BA, History, 1972

**Affiliations**
Member of the William & Mary Business School's Business Partners Board of Directors
Board member, Stratford University School of Information Systems Advisory Board
Member, Association of the U.S. Army
Member, National Defense Industrial Association
Member, Company of Military Historians

**Publications and Reviews**
*Surviving the Requirements Morass*, Pivotal Insight Research Report, September 2004