Title page for ETD etd-04082009-041449
|Type of Document
||Incorvia, Joseph H.
||An evaluation of defense contracting based on transaction cost theory
||Master of Arts
|Mackay, Robert J.
|Furbush, S. Dean
|Meiselman, David I.
|Date of Defense
This study investigates the use of the transaction
cost paradigm, as a framework, for evaluating defense
contracts and exploring problems related to defense
contracting. The study shows that defense contracting is
beleaguered with bounded rationality and uncertainty
problems, and furthermore, that bounded rationality and
uncertainty can lead to opportunistic behavior within
defense contracting. The study shows, in particular that
adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold-up problems exist
within defense contracting.
Based on the results of this study the transaction
cost paradigm can be used as a framework for evaluating
defense contracts and related problems. The results also
indicate that hold-up problems and moral hazard problems
may be minimized by using proper contracts or acquisition
strategies. Based on the case study in Chapter III there
does not appear to be a contractual solution to adverse
|| Approximate Download Time
| 28.8 Modem
|| 56K Modem
|| ISDN (64 Kb)
|| ISDN (128 Kb)
|| Higher-speed Access
next to an author's name indicates that all
files or directories associated with their ETD
are accessible from the Virginia Tech campus network only.
If you have questions or technical
problems, please Contact DLA.