From VANDALS TO VANGUARD: Vanguardism through a Neoinstitutional Lens: Case Study of the Sandinista National Liberation Front

Gabriel Martin Telleria

Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
In
Public Administration and Public Affairs

Dissertation Committee:

Larkin S. Dudley, Chair
Karen M. Hult
Laura S. Jensen
Sergio Ramírez Mercado
James F. Wolf

April 6, 2011
Blacksburg, Virginia

Keywords:
Vanguardism, Sandinistas, FSLN, politico-military organizations, institutionalization

Copyright 2011, Gabriel Martin Telleria
The Sandinista Revolution is arguably the most significant event in Nicaraguan history. Because of its historical importance and distinctive socio-cultural context, the Sandinista Revolution offers significant opportunities for scholarly inquiry. The literature on the Sandinista Revolution is substantial. However, little is known about the organization Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and how it evolved into the leader of the movement which sought to overthrow the 45-year Somoza dictatorship. In revolutionary literature, the concept of revolutionary vanguard or vanguard party is common. However, the notion of vanguardism as a process and what constitutes a vanguardist organization is yet to be explored. This study aims to provide such an investigation, through an examination of the insurrectional period (1974-1979) leading up to the Sandinista Revolutionary Victory in 1979. Grounded in Scott’s (2008) institutional framework, this study describes the evolution of the FSLN into the vanguard of the anti-Somoza movement, identifying relationships between institutional elements involved in the FSLN’s institutionalization process and progression into “leader” of the movement. Data from interviews, newspaper articles, and video documentaries were scrutinized in search of answers to the question: How do mechanisms, carriers, and agency as elements of institutions explain vanguardism in the case study of the FSLN? This research reveals critical mechanisms, carriers and agency in the vanguardism of the FSLN, and explains how these elements supported this process. In this sense, this research reveals distinctive characteristics in vanguardism as an institutional process, which differentiate vanguardism from other processes. This research presents an opportunity to learn about the FSLN—a vastly unique politico-military organization. Additionally, there is an opportunity to broaden our observational lens, taking a neoinstitutional approach, to illustrate new ways in which organizations evolve, change and adapt to their environments. Lastly, this study hopes to pave the way for future studies in organizational vanguardism.
DEDICATION

To my mother, wife, and daughter-

Mami, you have sacrificed so much for me. Thank you for teaching me right from wrong and for being there every time I needed you. I am what I am because of you.

Pipita, if I lived ten lifetimes, I would not be able to repay you for taking this journey with me. The road that has carried us here has been paved with tears and sacrifice but you have been there every step of the way, offering your loving hand. I love you dearly and share this achievement with you, as it is just as much yours as it is mine.

Alejandra Gabriela, mi gordita linda, when you are a little older, you will fully understand just how your love meant to me throughout this journey. You are the greatest joy in my life and the reason for all my endeavors.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I want to thank my Lord Jesus for giving me the opportunity to pursue this dream and seeing me through the tough times.

I want to thank my Committee Chair Dr. Larkin Dudley for guiding me through this journey. When I first arrived at CPAP, I could see that there was something very special about you. However, I never imagined the impact that you would have in my life. Thank you for being a teacher, mentor, and friend. I want to thank my Committee, Drs., Karen Hult, Laura Jensen, Sergio Ramírez, and James Wolf. Your contributions were instrumental in completing this dissertation and I was blessed to have you as my committee.

I would like to thank Bob Broyden for the opportunity you provided for me at CAFM. I would have not been able to finish this dissertation without your support. I also would like to thank Joe Belcher and the entire staff at CAFM for all your support and friendship. I will cherish this experience.

I want to thank Enrique Bolaños Geyer, Dr. Sergio Ramirez Mercado, Dr. Mauricio Solaún, and Dora Maria Tellez, for sharing your expertise and knowledge with me. I also want to thank each of the interviewees who participated in this study. Your contribution made this dissertation possible. I also want to thank Eduardo Enriquez for his invaluable assistance in collecting some of the data for this research.

I want to thank my colleagues, Kim Carlson, Adi Kusuma, Glen Orr, and Kathy Webb-Farley for your friendship. I also want to thank the faculty at CPAP, in particular, Dr. John Rohr for inspiring me. I want to thank friends and family for your encouragement, particularly my mother-in-law Augusta for your love and support these last five years. I also want to thank Miriam Rony and Dr. David Widder, for helping me “take my first steps” at Virginia Tech. Also, I want to thank Dr. John Randolph for believing in me.

I want to thank my parents Luis and Gloria, for a lifetime of sacrifice. I will never be able to thank you enough. I want to specially thank my mother Gloria for being my “assistant” throughout this process. Your efforts made this dissertation possible.

To Gloria, thank you for being a second mom, an inspiration, and for always looking out for me. To my twin brother Roberto, “Roc” we are one split up in two” so I share this achievement with you. It’s been a long road but you’ve been there every step of the way. To Luis, thank you for your help these last five years. To Jorge, thank you brother.
Last but certainly not least, I want to thank my wife Alejandra and daughter Alejandra Gabriela, I will never be able to thank you enough. I love you both very much.
# Table of Contents

**Prologue** .................................................................................................................. 1

**Chapter One: Introduction** ......................................................................................... 4
Statement of the Problem ................................................................................................. 5
Research questions and approach ................................................................................... 6
Significance ...................................................................................................................... 7
Organization .................................................................................................................... 8

**Chapter Two: Historical Context of the FSLN** .......................................................... 10
Overview of the Sandinista National Liberation Front .................................................... 10
Connections with the past: the influence of historic origins ......................................... 16  
  Plans for a canal through Nicaragua ............................................................................ 16
  Dollar Diplomacy and the Knox Letter incident ......................................................... 18
  The arrival of the Marines .......................................................................................... 20
  The founding of the Nicaraguan National Guard ....................................................... 22
  The appearance of Augusto C. Sandino ..................................................................... 22
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 26

**Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework** .................................................................. 27
The “New” Institutionalism ............................................................................................ 27
  The Three Pillars ....................................................................................................... 28
  Mechanisms .............................................................................................................. 30
  Carriers ...................................................................................................................... 32
  Agency ...................................................................................................................... 35
  The role of institutional elements in institutionalization ............................................. 38
Overview of vanguardism ............................................................................................... 41
  Vanguardism in the Latin American context ............................................................. 45
  What constitutes a vanguardist organization? ......................................................... 46
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 47

**Chapter Four: Empirical Investigation of Institutional Elements in the Vanguardism of the FSLN** .................................................................................................................. 48
Research questions ....................................................................................................... 48
Assumptions .................................................................................................................. 49
Process approach ......................................................................................................... 50
  Mechanisms as institutional elements ..................................................................... 51
  Carriers as institutional elements ............................................................................ 51
  Agency as an institutional element ........................................................................... 52
Research design .......................................................................................................... 54
Research strategy ........................................................................................................ 55
Research sample ......................................................................................................... 56
Interviews ..................................................................................................................... 57
  Selecting the interview pool ...................................................................................... 58
  Challenges of interview pool selection ................................................................... 60
| Description of interview questionnaire                  | 61 |
| Newspaper articles                                     | 61 |
| Publications obtained through *Lexis-Nexis*            | 62 |
| Publications obtained through a third-party            | 62 |
| Secondary qualitative data                             | 63 |
| Data collection                                         | 63 |
| Interviews                                             | 63 |
| Newspapers                                             | 65 |
| Video documentaries                                     | 65 |
| Historical documents                                   | 66 |
| Data analysis                                           | 67 |
| Analysis of newspaper articles                         | 68 |
| Description of the data                                | 70 |
| Evaluative dimension of the data                       | 71 |
| Analysis of interviews                                 | 71 |
| Analysis of secondary qualitative data                 | 73 |
| Limitations                                            | 74 |
| Conclusion                                             | 77 |

**CHAPTER FIVE: INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE VANGUARDISM OF THE FSLN**

- Critical mechanisms, carriers, and agency
  - Critical elements revealed in the newspaper articles data
  - Critical elements revealed in the interview data
  - Critical elements revealed in the secondary qualitative data
  - Agreement in the data with respect to critical elements

- Relationship of elements in the vanguardism of the FSLN
  - The duality of roles
  - The combined effects of elements
  - The integration of elements to differentiate the FSLN
  - The sequential progression of the elements

- Vanguardism as a process
  - The stages of vanguardism
    - Pre-insurrectional stage
    - Insurrectional stage
    - Accumulation of Strength stage
    - Consolidation of Forces stage
  - Vanguardism as a cultural-cognitive process
    - Mechanisms supporting vanguardism
    - Carriers supporting vanguardism
    - Elements of agency supporting vanguardism

- Relationships between vanguardism and institutionalization
  - The stages of vanguardism and institutionalization
  - Relationship between vanguardism and institutionalization
  - The centrality of legitimacy in the vanguardism process
  - The importance of legitimacy in the vanguardism process
  - The rise of a vanguardist organization
LIST OF CHARTS, FIGURES, AND TABLES

CHARTS
Chart 1: Timeline of insurrectional period ............................................................ 99
Chart 2: Trends in legitimacy with respect to the FSLN ........................................ 111
Chart 3: Trends in legitimacy with respect to Somoza and the National Guard ... 113
Chart 4: Trends in legitimacy with respect to the U.S. in the role of mediator .... 114

FIGURES
Figure 1: Theoretical framework ................................................................. 7
Figure 2: Scott’s three pillars of institutions .................................................. 30
Figure 3: Drivers ......................................................................................... 48
Figure 4: Guide for explaining the vanguardism of the FSLN ......................... 50
Figure 5: Triangulation of the data ............................................................ 57
Figure 6: Selection criteria for interview pool ............................................. 59
Figure 7: Description of interviewees ......................................................... 60
Figure 8: Time-frames of stages ............................................................... 69
Figure 9: Categorization breakdown of newspaper articles sample .............. 70
Figure 10: Source of newspaper articles .................................................... 70
Figure 11: Elements analyzed in the interview questionnaire ....................... 72
Figure 12: Description of secondary qualitative data .................................. 74
Figure 13: Differences of the FSLN from other actors .................................. 93
Figure 14: Organizational characteristics of the FSLN ................................. 95
Figure 15: Nature and purpose of communiqués ......................................... 96
Figure 16: The stages of the vanguardism process ..................................... 98
Figure 17: Critical themes from the Pre-insurrectional stage ....................... 100
Figure 18: Critical themes from the Insurrectional stage ............................ 101
Figure 19: Critical themes from the Accumulation of Strength stage ............ 102
Figure 20: Critical themes from the Consolidation of Forces stage ............... 103
Figure 21: Types of mechanisms supporting vanguardism ......................... 105
Figure 22: Types of carriers supporting vanguardism ................................ 106
Figure 23: Types of agency elements supporting vanguardism ................. 107
Figure 24: The process of institutionalization .......................................... 108
Figure 25: Relationships between vanguardism and institutionalization .... 110
Figure 26: Evaluative dimension with respect to the FSLN ......................... 110
Figure 27: Evaluative dimension with respect to Somoza and the National Guard 112
Figure 28: Evaluative dimension with respect to the U.S. in the role of mediator 113
Figure 29: Sandino’s legacy for the FSLN .................................................. 120
Figure 30: Support for Somoza and the National Guard ............................. 121

TABLES
Table 1: Critical elements revealed in the newspaper articles data ............... 80
Table 2: Critical elements revealed in the interview data ............................ 82
Table 3: Critical elements revealed in the secondary qualitative data ........... 84
Table 4: Elements considered critical in the rise of the FSLN ..................... 87
PROLOGUE

The Sandinista Revolution is arguably the most significant event in Nicaraguan history. The Revolution devastated Nicaraguan society in every aspect imaginable. As a result, the Sandinista Revolution presents significant opportunities for scholarly inquiry. Particularly intriguing is the insurrectional period that preceded the revolutionary victory in July of 1979. In the five years between 1974 and 1979, hostile sentiment towards the Somoza family’s forty-five year dynasty and the National Guard reached a high point, prompting the opposition to organize itself into a movement with one collective and unified goal--removing President Somoza Debayle from office. These five years proved to be one of the most turbulent and violent in Nicaragua’s history. But they are also among the most fascinating, for this writer in particular. The events and circumstances that so greatly affected the course of my homeland’s history left an indelible mark in my life and to this day, still intrigue me. I must confess that in the decision to write my dissertation on this particular topic, I owe my primary inspiration to my Grandfather, Carlos Alberto Telleria Orozco.

My grandfather was a founding member of the Guardia Nacional (National Guard). He, along with Anastasio Somoza Garcia, was among the first Nicaraguan-born officers of the Guard, which initially only featured American officers. He and Somoza Garcia had been schoolmates in Leon so they knew each other well. Fearing persecution from Conservatives, my grandfather decided to leave Nicaragua for the United States. With seven dollars he had earned working on the boat, he arrived in San Francisco in 1914. Soon, he joined the U.S. Merchant Marine and learned to speak English, which my father jokingly declares “was at the time like having a PhD.” With the military defeat of the Conservative Army by Liberal forces in 1926, my grandfather decided to return to Nicaragua. Aware that my grandfather had served in the
Merchant Marine and learned to speak English, Somoza Garcia, who had also learned to speak English while studying business administration in Philadelphia, recruited my grandfather to join the newly formed and U.S. trained National Guard.

As it would turn out, Somoza Garcia’s ability to communicate with the Marine officers earned him the rank of Commander in Chief of the National Guard. General Somoza Garcia chose my grandfather to be his Secretary and GNI, which stood for Guardia Nacional Uno, or First Commanding Officer just below General Somoza. From this point on, my grandfather enjoyed a long and distinguished military career. He retired with the rank of Colonel and held a number of administrative and diplomatic posts, including Military Attaché in Washington D.C., Consul General in San Francisco for the states of California, Oregon and Washington, and Ambassador to Panama as well as Guatemala. In fact, while serving as Ambassador in Panama in 1956, he had the unfortunate honor of greeting moribund General Somoza Garcia upon his arrival at the Gorgas Hospital in the U.S. Canal Zone in Panama, hours after Garcia was shot at a banquet in Leon, Nicaragua by Rigoberto López Pérez.

My grandfather’s illustrious career in service of the homeland, however, was seen in a much different light by the insurgent Sandinistas. As far as they were concerned, anyone who had been associated in any way with the Somoza family or had been a member of the National Guard was considered an enemy of the revolution and ought to be punished. Regrettably, our family found this out one May night in 1979. Returning from my grandfather’s house a few blocks away, my mother and father were assaulted by a Sandinista cell outside our home. My father was shot twice, and while he survived the attempt against his life, the incident left a life-long impression on me. Thirty years later, I’m still intrigued by the equally dramatic and terrifying events of this time. Why did it happen? Who was responsible? I realized that a good place to
start finding some answers to my questions was to study the organization which gave the revolution its name: The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Founded in 1961 as the Frente de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Front), the FSLN takes its name from Augusto Calderón Sandino, a nationalist rebel who fought against American intervention and occupation in Nicaragua during the 1920s and 30s. His fight against what he called Yankee Imperialism became a symbol of nationalism and anti-imperialism throughout Latin America. However, it wasn’t until 1960 that Carlos Fonseca Amador, co-founder of the National Liberation Front, convinced his fellow founders to adopt Sandino’s name. In 1979, the FSLN achieved the leadership of the movement which sought to overthrow the regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle which culminated in the Sandinista Revolution.

The question emerges of how the FSLN was able to capture the leadership of such movement which included stronger, more established, and better organized actors. The theories and propositions found in neoinstitutionalism, particularly the works of Meyer & Rowan (1977), Zucker (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and later Scott (2001, 2008) offer some insights. These neoinstitutional scholars represent the foundation of the neoinstitutional theoretical framework, based on the notion that formal organizational structure not only reflects technical demands and resource dependencies but is also shaped by institutional forces, including rational myths, knowledge legitimated through the educational system and by the professions, public opinion, and the law. The core idea that organizations are deeply embedded in social and political environments suggests that organizational practices and structures are often either reflections of or responses to rules, beliefs, and conventions built into the wider environment (Powell, 2007).
Statement of the problem

The first step required for this research study was delving into the existing literature. The foci were to find evidence of vanguardism as a process in and of itself, evidence of studies on the insurrectional period preceding the Sandinista revolutionary victory, and evidence of research on the FSLN as a politico-military organization, from an organizational standpoint. This search revealed a lack of study related to the insurrectional period preceding the Sandinista revolutionary victory, and the FSLN as a politico-military organization from an organizational standpoint—both surprising as well as inspiring results.

Although the literature exposes the idea of a political vanguard, and Lenin’s concept of the “Revolutionary Vanguard Party” is widely known, studies dedicated to vanguardism as a process are very sparse. For the most part, and in a very limited basis, vanguardism has been studied in the context of the Cuban Revolution, as a guiding framework for revolutionary movements around the world (see Guevara, 1967). An examination of the period that preceded the Sandinista revolutionary victory resulted in similar findings. There are numerous studies of the Revolution. However, few reflect on the dynamics of the insurrectional period. Numerous studies concentrate on the post-revolution period, which includes the war with the U.S.-backed Contras to the FSLN’s electoral defeat in 1990. However, a clear void exists regarding studies of the insurrectional period.

Most surprising, however, was the lack of research on the FSLN as a politico-military organization. By and large, the literature presents the FSLN as the “birth-child” of Sandino’s fight against American hegemony. Other studies emphasize the role of the Cuban Revolution as a major influence, and later, the former Soviet Union as its principal supporter. However, there
appears no study which focuses exclusively on the FSLN as an organization, from its conception to its progression as the *vanguard* of the movement.

This produces the question of why such a void existed in examining what many consider a distinctive politico-military organization, the centerpiece of a conflict that had been brewing for decades, and that in some way or another was a key issue in U.S. foreign policy during the twentieth century. Although it is idealistic to think that these voids will be completely filled with a single study, this research hopes to spark further work on this fascinating area, contributing to both scholarship on the Sandinista Revolution as well as the neoinstitutional literature. This study broadens our understanding of insurgent groups and insurrectional dynamics as they might relate to U.S. foreign policy and national security.

**Research questions and approach**

Through an examination of critical events during the insurrectional period, this study aims to provide a plausible explanation of the FSLN’s vanguardism from a neoinstitutional perspective. Taking mechanisms, carriers, and agency (see Scott, 2008) from the literature as drivers, the principal research question for this study is: **How do mechanisms, carriers, and agency, as elements of institutions, explain vanguardism in the case study of the FSLN?** From this fundamental question, the following secondary questions emerge:

1. What types of mechanisms, carriers, and agency, are identified as critical in the rise of the FSLN?
2. How are mechanisms, carriers, and agency, correlated/codependent in describing the vanguardism of the FSLN?
3. How can vanguardism as a process be described?
4. What relationships exist between vanguardism and institutionalization as described by neoinstitutionalism?
This study is grounded in Scott’s (2001; 2008) typology of institutional elements, “three pillars of institutions.” According to Scott (2008), institutions are made up of “regulative,” “normative,” and “cultural-cognitive” elements that “make up or support” institutions. Scott (2008) refers to these three types of elements as “pillars.” Each pillar is characterized by its own set of assumptions, mechanisms, carriers, and indicators that serve as theoretical boundaries which allow us to distinguish one “pillar” from the other (see Scott, 2008). Guided by Scott’s (2008) typology, this study examines the supporting roles of mechanisms, carriers, and agency associated with each of the three pillars, in the vanguardism of the FSLN. This theoretical framework portrayed in figure 1 provides the basis for this study.

**Figure 1: Theoretical framework**

![Theoretical framework diagram]

**Significance**

This research study is significant at various levels. From a scholarly perspective, the study presents an opportunity to expand the literature’s inspection of the role of institutional elements. A number of studies have looked at the relationship between social movement theory and institutional change (Scott, 2001). Others have focused more on the “mobilizing structures” and “the forms of organizations” and the structure of political opportunities and constraints.
confronting movements (Scott, 2001). Still others have looked at framing processes and “the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996:2 in Scott, 2001). However, the literature has not addressed vanguardism as a process of institutionalization. Understanding how institutional elements help explain vanguardism will improve our understanding of how organizations and inter-organizational dynamics serve as links in the vanguardism process.

Little attention has been given to this particular time period in Nicaraguan history. Although numerous studies of the Sandinista Revolution mention some of the critical events of the period as well as refer to influential groups, or organizations, no in-depth study exists of interrelational dynamics between actors and events as well as other critical factors at play. Accordingly, a study of the Sandinista National Liberation Front from an organization theoretical perspective seems to be missing from the literature. This study examines the organizational characteristics of the FSLN, which have been generally overlooked.

Organization

To understand the vanguardism of the FSLN, it is necessary to situate it in proper historical context. Following a brief introduction and statement of the problem in this chapter, Chapter Two offers a review of the two literary streams underlying this study. Following this review, Chapter Two concludes with a discussion of historical elements relevant to the vanguardism of the FSLN.

Chapter Three explores neoinstitutional theory as the framework chosen for this study, assessing the links between the “old” institutionalism and the “new.” Scott’s typology of the three pillars of institutions is introduced, with a brief explanation of each pillar, and an emphasis on the roles of mechanisms, carriers and agency as elements supporting institutions. Chapter
Three concludes with a review of how mechanisms, carriers and agency have been examined in the literature.

Chapter Four explains the empirical process by which I examine empirically the institutional elements supporting the vanguardism of the FSLN. The principal research question above, subsequent questions, and propositions are presented, along with a comprehensive description of the research design and methodology used in data collection and analysis. A brief review of competing hypotheses observed in the literature is also discussed in this chapter.

Chapter Five builds a set of the mechanisms, carriers, and agency that supported the vanguardism of the FSLN and describes the roles of each in the process. Data from newspaper articles, interviews, third-party interviews, video documentaries, and historical writings, are analyzed by theme. The research propositions, research findings in the chapter, and relationships among the elements, are discussed in this chapter, and the questions of this study are answered.

Chapter Six presents the major findings and offers implications for future study of vanguardism and its intersection with neoinstitutional theory, and concludes with a call for continued research into the roles of institutional elements in institutional processes involving specific organizations.
Chapter Two
Historical Context of the FSLN

Chapter Two begins by looking into the FSLN from many different angles and at varying stages in the history and evolution of the organization. The chapter ends by examining historical elements important in the vanguardism of the FSLN and the Sandinista revolution.

Overview of the Sandinista National Liberation Front

Much of what has been written about the FSLN has centered on Sandino and the ideology of Sandinismo (see Somoza, 1936; Sandino, 1927; Macaulay, 1979; Selser, 1981; Wheelock, 1979; Borge, 1984; 1993; and Fonseca, 1961; 1964; 1970; Navarro-Génie, 2002; Sheesley, 1991; Walker, 1991, 2003; Ramírez, 1974, 1990). Some scholars (see Nolan, 1984 and Troncoso, 1982) present the FSLN as a direct continuation of Sandino’s struggle. Others look at the FSLN from its foundation to insurrection, emphasizing the role of the Cuban Revolution as a major influence (see Martí-Puig, 2002).


One of the more complete studies of the FSLN is that of Perez (1991). He illustrates the struggle undergone by the FSLN in its attempt to define Sandinismo (see Perez, 1991). Perez (1991) analyzes the organizational development of the FSLN up to the time of the 1990 elections, as well as the political and ideological debate that emerged within the FSLN in the
wake of the electoral defeat suffered by the party in 1990. Perez’s analysis is grounded on the idea that “organizations are goal-oriented social systems.” Perez identifies two types of goals: “official” and “operative.” Official goals are “the general purposes of the organization as described in the organization’s charter or through public statements made by the organization’s officials” (Perez, 1991). On the other hand, operative goals are “the ends sought through the actual operating policies of the organization” (Perrow in Perez, 1991). Perez contends that political organizations such as the FSLN require both official and operative goals. Official goals “legitimize the general functions of the organization and provide a general sense of direction to its members” (Perez, 1991).

However, Perez (1991) argues that official goals are insufficient for an organization’s survival. The organization needs to “identify the concrete and specific objectives” (Perez, 1991) that will determine “the main course of organizational behavior” (Blumberg in Perez, 1991). Thus, the real test for a political organization, Perez (1991) contends, is “its ability to translate the general goals of its members into operational goals which can be implemented through a program of action capable of guiding them along the path from the present to the future.” And this process is “predicated upon the ability of the leaders to harmonize the members’ views of what constitutes the ultimate mission of the organization with a commonly accepted set of goals, supported by decisions and actions” (Perez, 1991).

Perez describes the FSLN as a political organization challenged by this endeavor. He observes that Marxism provided the ideological foundation for the FSLN, but contends that the FSLN has been unable to “translate its pure ideology into a practical ideology capable of synchronizing the political behavior of its members” (Perez, 1991). In his view, the FSLN as a political organization has been “marked by divisions” (Perez, 1991).
Perez (1991) explains that, beginning in 1975, the organization experienced disintegration into three separate factions referred to as “tendencies” (Nolan in Perez, 1991). Initially, the FSLN leadership favored a strategy of “accumulation of forces” in the mountains of Nicaragua as a necessary pre-condition for revolutionary victory against “American imperialism,” which was the “officially declared enemy of the revolution” (Perez, 1991). This strategy, pursued by what was known as the “proletarian” faction, was based on the assumption that the peasants rather than the working class constituted the “backbone” for the revolutionary movement (Perez, 1991). This strategy, which considered American imperialism the fundamental enemy, implied a “decades-long protracted war” to “wear-down” any non-socialist regime; dictatorial or democratic (see Nolan, 1984). As a result Perez (1991) notes, the possibility of the FSLN forming alliances with non-socialist organizations, governments, or sectors of society was greatly limited (see Humberto Ortega, 1990).

Perez (1991) briefly discusses the other two factions: Guerra Popular Prolongada (GPP) or “Popular Prolonged War” and the “Insurrectional,” also known as the Terceristas or “Third” Tendency. The GPP tendency was ideologically similar to the “Proletarian” tendency but advocated for a “popular” – rather than a “proletarian” driven revolutionary movement (Perez, 1991). This strategy called for a joint-effort between urban and rural forces (see Perez, 1991).

Perez describes the “third” or “Insurrectional” tendency as “proposing a strategy that would combine guerrilla war (both rural and urban) with the forging of a broad alliance with all forces opposed to Somoza” (Perez, 1991). Perez (1991) shows that the “third” tendency was the most effective of the three, not only in terms of building military strength, but also in its ability to forge effective political alliances against Somoza, both nationally as well as internationally.
Perez (1991) contends that the success of the ‘Third’ tendency increased the prestige of the FSLN and enabled the organization to reunite” (Perez, 1991).

Perez points out that many who analyze the FSLN seem to understate the impacts of the disintegration experienced by the FSLN in the 1970’s. He contends that particularly those studies with a Marxist-Leninist orientation tend to “overlook” or “dismiss” the relevance of these ideological differences. Thus, Perez adds, most histories of the FSLN, particularly those written by Nicaraguan intellectuals after the triumph have been “based on the assumption that the Sandinistas as a group and a (political) party, shared a common view of Nicaragua’s problems-social, political and economic, and were equally united on how best to resolve them” (Perez, 1991).

As far as the FSLN translating its pure ideology into a practical ideology capable of synchronizing the political behavior of its members, Perez (1991) claims that the party came to power with a common “pure” ideology but with a fragmented “practical” ideology. Perez argues that what is known as Sandinismo never constituted a set of coherent values or ideas capable of providing FSLN members with the necessary guidelines needed for purposeful action. In his view, “it was and still is a vague, contradictory and confusing set of nationalistic slogans and proverbs” (Perez, 1991).

The elements exposed in Perez (1991) are important because they expose important features of the organization’s beginnings and evolution—some of which will resurface later in the findings of this study. Another study by Cuzán and Heggen (1980) presents a tentative explanation of the 1979 Nicaraguan revolution using a “micro-political” model of political profit, governmental efficiency, and political stability applied to the data on the history of Somoza’s fall.
The Sandinista revolution is explained as the outcome of a loss of stability by a government that attempted to control a greater share of the resources of the nation than its capabilities to persuade and coerce the population (Cuzán and Heggen, 1980). Cuzán and Heggen explain that the Sandinista revolution was a direct consequence of the Somoza regime’s inability to sustain its legitimacy or increase it enough to offset the reduction in its perceived coercive capacity. The scholars illustrate how the legitimacy of the Somoza regime declined during the period between 1965 and 1977. Cuzán and Heggen show that in the wake of the 1972 earthquake, the legitimacy of the regime suffered significantly as a result of presumed profiteering by the government and the National Guard from relief supplies sent by the international community to aid the victims of the earthquake. This situation, together with an erosion of political and civil rights during the 1970s, cost the regime to lose its ‘constitutional legitimacy’ which ultimately led to its political instability.

Yet another work by Luciak (1990) offers a post-victory analysis of Sandinista (FSLN) grassroots movements. He describes the “dialectics” of the class alliance between workers and peasants as it materialized itself in the institutionalization of popular power in the rural grassroots movements. Luciak’s study shows the evolution of two grassroots movements, illustrating both successes as well as pitfalls in facilitating participation of their constituents in Nicaragua’s political economy.

A fourth analysis by Cué (2001) examines the organizational transformation of the FSLN in the 1990s, as a consequence of the new political and institutional context opened up in Nicaragua after the elections of 1990. Cué gives reasons why the FSLN transformed its organizational structure but not its leadership and shows the possibility of understanding the Sandinista party change as a result of the combination of both endogenous and exogenous factors (see Cué, 2001).
such as incorporating a new, less radical image of “reconciliation” and having to adapt to the new role as the opposition party.

Along similar lines, Kapcia (1994) provides an alternative to explain “what went wrong” with the Sandinista Revolution. His study exposes whether the Sandinista revolutionary victory was incidental, or whether other factors such as the “unraveling” of the Somocista system – due to its failure to adjust to internal and external changes – were responsible for the emergence of what Kapcia (1994) calls an “organic” guerilla movement. Kapcia exposes how the FSLN, “in the radicalization of 1978-1979”, became the sole opposition “pole” with the sole nationally credible “opposition project” (Kapcia, 1994). Kapcia argues that the insurrection was for the most part an “uncoordinated series of differently motivated rebellions among a heterogeneous range of social groups…” where the FSLN’s “skill” and “good fortune” lay in its “ability to develop links with these “different rebellions” and to “offer” itself as the acceptable “leader” and articulator (Kapcia, 1994).

Numerous books also have been written about the FSLN, including Black’s (1981), Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua; Cabezas’s (1985) Fire from the Mountain: the making of a Sandinista; and Nolan’s (1984) The Sandinista Ideology and Nicaraguan Revolution. Such studies provide great insight into the FSLN. Omar Cabezas’s volume, for example, is a memoir of his time in the student movement and later, the FSLN. He details his work creating a network of “the people” and later described what he went through to train and become a guerilla fighter. Each of these studies adds important insight to our understanding of the FSLN. Nevertheless, to fully understand the FSLN, it is necessary to probe into the past and study how the influences of history have helped shape the organization.
The following section looks into the past to show how the FSLN is linked to a wider historical frame. This section shows how the FSLN’s vanguardism was significantly influenced by a series of historical factors. Five factors from history are discussed here: the plans to build an inter-oceanic canal through Nicaragua; “Dollar” Diplomacy and the Knox Letter Incident; occupation by U.S. troops; the founding of the Nicaraguan National Guard; and the appearance of Augusto C. Sandino. As these factors are exposed, it is worth keeping some of the works discussed in the previous section in mind.

**Connections with the past: the influence of historic origins**

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the United States has been involved in Nicaraguan affairs. Epitomizing U.S. involvement in Nicaragua is the doctrine of *Manifest Destiny*. Manifest Destiny was a concept which heavily influenced the American expansionist policies of the nineteenth century. Few individuals were more inspired by this belief than the American William Walker. The mid-nineteenth-century filibuster\(^1\) William Walker, “restless” product of the Tennessee frontier, studied medicine and law in the United States and Europe before turning to journalism in New Orleans in 1849 (Woodward Jr., 1980). According to Woodward Jr., (1980), neither law nor business nor journalism satisfied him, however, and he soon became involved in filibustering schemes, first to Mexico and later to Central America.

*Plans for a canal through Nicaragua*

Walker is considered the man who planted the seed of American Imperialism in Nicaragua. Walker was inspired by American Entrepreneur Cornelius Vanderbilt who had proposed building an inter-oceanic canal through Nicaragua (Stiles, 2009). At the time, there was no inter-oceanic route joining the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans at the time, and the transcontinental railway had not

---

\(^1\) The term “Filibuster” was first used in the seventeenth century to refer to the pirates who plundered the Spanish colonies of the West Indies; it was synonymous with freebooter and reintroduced in the mid 19th century to describe American adventurers, mostly from Southern states, who sought to overthrow the governments of Central and South America (Scroggs, 1916).
been completed. Therefore, a major trade route between New York City and San Francisco ran through southern Nicaragua. Ships from New York would enter the San Juan River from the Atlantic and sail across Lake Nicaragua. People and goods would then be transported by stagecoach over a narrow strip of land near the city of Rivas, before reaching the Pacific and being shipped to San Francisco. The commercial exploitation of this route had been granted by Nicaragua to the Accessory Transit Company, which Vanderbilt controlled. According to Scroggs (1905), reports showed that in one year, 24,000 passengers traveled between the eastern states and California by way of Nicaragua.

In 1854, a civil war erupted in Nicaragua between the Conservatives of Granada and the Liberals of León. Liberal President Francisco Castellón sought military support from Walker, allowing him to bring mercenaries to Nicaragua. Walker and roughly sixty soldiers of fortune landed at the Nicaraguan Pacific port of Realejo on May 3, 1855. In October, Walker took the Conservative capital of Granada. He then negotiated the surrender of the Conservative Army, the disbanding of the Liberal Army, and the formation of a coalition government with himself as commander-in-chief of the Nicaraguan army. With the support of many Nicaraguans, Walker's coalition government eventually received recognition by the Franklin Pierce administration in Washington.

However, Walker soon became a cause for concern for other Central American leaders when he proclaimed himself President of Nicaragua in July 1856. Walker launched an Americanization program, declared English the official language and made significant changes to monetary and fiscal policies as a way to encourage American immigration. During his administration, Walker confiscated the estates of his Nicaraguan opponents and resold them to his American supporters. And true to his Confederate roots, Walker annulled the Nicaraguan
constitutional prohibition against slavery and declared Nicaragua a slave territory (see Stiles, 2009).

Walker’s actions angered Central American neighbors as well as the United States. The Pierce administration refused to recognize Walker's new government. The British government encouraged Costa Rican opposition to Walker and provided arms for insurgents. Walker also made a powerful enemy in "Commodore" Cornelius Vanderbilt. Vanderbilt’s enterprise, the Accessory Transit Company, had been granted exclusive rights to build an inter-oceanic canal across Nicaragua. Walker, however, took the charter away from Vanderbilt and gave it to one Vanderbilt’s business rivals. In retaliation, the Commodore sent agents to aid the Costa Ricans when they invaded Nicaragua again in November 1856.

Walker would hold out for a few months more but eventually surrendered to U.S. naval officers in 1857. He tried numerous times to return to Nicaragua and claim his presidential seat but his efforts would be unsuccessful. After an attempt to take the country via Honduras, he was captured by the British Navy who turned him over to Honduran authorities. He was convicted for piracy and executed on September 12, 1860 in Honduras (see Stiles, 2009).

Walker’s legacy is important to this study for two reasons. First, Walker is considered by many as having planted the seed of American imperialism in Nicaragua; and second, it brought the idea of constructing an interoceanic canal through Nicaragua to the forefront of U.S.-Nicaragua relations – an act considered by many Nicaraguans since then, as a blatant example of American imperialism.

*Dollar Diplomacy and the Knox Letter incident*

After the turn of the 19ty century, U.S. policy towards the region shifted. Under Theodore Roosevelt, the role of the United States in the western hemisphere was portrayed as an
“international police power” whose aim was securing American interests in the western hemisphere. This “new road,” which Roosevelt had defined in his 1904 Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, would eventually pass through Nicaragua. Roosevelt’s successor, William Howard Taft, and Secretary of State Philander Knox viewed “Dollar Diplomacy” as a way to improve diplomatic relations between the United States and Nicaragua.

However, mistrust between the United States and Nicaraguan President José Santos Zelaya doomed this opportunity. Even worse, Zelaya’s Liberal forces captured two American citizens serving with the opposition’s Conservative army and had them shot. Secretary of State Knox protested this action, urging that the United States sever diplomatic relations with the Zelaya government. In an excerpt from his now famous Knox Letter addressed to the Nicaraguan Chargé d’Affaires, dated December 1, 1909, Secretary of State Knox wrote:

“…it is notorious that President Zelaya has almost continuously kept Central America in tension or turmoil….It is equally a matter of common knowledge that under the regime of President Zelaya republican institutions have ceased in Nicaragua to exist except in name;…Two Americans who, this Government is now convinced were officers connected with the revolutionary forces, and therefore entitled to be dealt with according to the enlightened practice of civilized nations, have been killed by direct order of President Zelaya. Their execution is said to have been preceded by barbarous cruelties….In these circumstances, the President (Taft) no longer feels for the government of President Zelaya that respect and confidence which would make it appropriate hereafter to maintain with it regular diplomatic relations…the Government of the United States will temporarily withhold its demand for reparation, in the meanwhile taking such steps as deemed wise and proper to protect American interests” (New York Times, 1909).

The incident prompted the U.S. government to send troops to Nicaragua. Aided by American forces, the Conservative rebellion overthrew Zelaya’s government and named José Dolores Estrada President of Nicaragua. In 1913, President Woodrow Wilson appointed William Jennings Bryan Secretary of State. Bryan initiated a proposal that would give the United States
exclusive rights to build an inter-oceanic canal through Nicaragua. The treaty, which became known as the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, was not well received by many Nicaraguans who believed the United States was taking over the reins of the country, and thus was the cause of great anti-American sentiment. These feelings continued for the next ten years (see Cramer, 1929).

The Knox letter incident is important because it resulted in the landing of American soldiers in Nicaraguan territory for the first time – an act which Carlos Fonseca Amador, principal intellectual and co-founder of the FSLN would later condemn in his writings.

**The Arrival of the Marines**

With the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty serving as the backdrop, the U.S. thought that it needed the presence of the Marines to keep the peace between the Liberals and Conservatives. However, this enterprise was only partially successful. The Liberal forces resented the presence of the Marines, whom they felt were there to keep the Conservatives in power. In a desperate plea, Nicaraguan President Adolfo Díaz petitioned U.S. President Coolidge to send more Marines to defeat the Liberal forces. Coolidge however, chose diplomacy over guns and sent his own personal representative Henry L. Stimson to speak with Diaz and Liberal leaders. Stimson managed to forge an agreement between the Nicaraguan government and General José María Moncada’s Liberal forces. The agreement called for disarmament by both sides and a promise to allow the United States to supervise the 1928 elections. As part of the agreement, President Díaz would be allowed to finish his term and the Marines would remain in Nicaragua to maintain order (U.S. State Department, 1987).

Liberal José María Moncada won the 1928 elections and the U.S. immediately recognized Moncada’s Liberal government, even though it overwhelmingly favored the Conservatives. For the U.S., putting an end to the civil war was most important. However, to ensure against further
civil conflict, the U.S. would organize and train a non-political national guard (Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993). Content that the civil war had ended, the U.S. began to withdraw its Marines – whose place was to be taken by the Guard. Moncada agreed to these terms and asked his generals to sign a telegram accepting the terms by which they would agree to surrender their guns.

All but one of the generals signed the telegram. The holdout was Augusto C. Sandino, who objected to the fact that Adolfo Díaz would remain in the presidency until the 1928 elections (Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993). He called Moncada a “traitor” and entrenched himself with his troops in the northern mountainous region of Las Segovias (Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993). Sandino’s refusal to agree to the terms of surrender did not derail the U.S. and the Marines from continuing with the project of training a National Guard.

As isolationist sentiment grew in the United States in the 1920s, there was a widespread call for the removal of the Marines from Nicaragua. Still concerned with the volatile situation in the country, the U.S. decided that the only way it could successfully leave Nicaragua was to leave behind an armed force to maintain order after the Marines withdrew. As a result, the Nicaraguan Constabulary was formed in June 1925 as the last United States Marines withdrew in August.² However, it did not take long before fighting between the Liberals and Conservatives resumed. Fearing a full-scale civil war as had been the case after the Mexican Revolution, the U.S. sent the Marines back to Nicaragua in January of 1927.

Back in the U.S., however, public opinion was not in favor of the decision to send back the Marines. Considering these circumstances, the State Department and the White House decided that the most effective, practical and politically sound policy was to have the Marine officers of the Constabulary recruit and train an army comprised of Nicaraguans. In pursuit of such ends,

the Constabulary began training Nicaraguan Officers to lead, what would ultimately become, the Nicaraguan National Guard.

*The founding of the Nicaraguan National Guard*

Under the U.S.-championed peace treaty known as the *Pacto del Espino Negro* (which had ended the fighting between Liberals and Conservatives), a new, non-partisan army known as the Nicaraguan National Guard was created (USMC, 2010). The Guard was comprised of new recruits as well as former members of both the Liberal and Conservative forces. The Guard, which was trained by the U.S. Marines under the direction of Colonel Robert Y. Rhea, enlisted its first recruit in 1927. The early organization and duties of the guard were defined in executive orders by President Adolfo Díaz (Beede, 1994).

In the summer of 1927, the U.S. sent a proposal to President Díaz, asking for his special consideration that the 1,229 member Guard be the sole military and police body of the republic, subject only to the Nicaraguan president. Díaz agreed and weeks later, an agreement between the U.S. *Charge d’affaires*, Dana G. Munro and Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Carlos Cuadra Pasos, was signed. The original Guard featured exclusively U.S. Marine officers (Beede, 1994). The officers had the task of training and developing officers, who would eventually replace the Marines. The principal objective, however, was training and preparing Nicaraguan officers and new recruits in combating the guerilla activities of Augusto C. Sandino.

*The appearance of Augusto C. Sandino*

Under the *Pacto del Espino Negro* forged by Henry L. Stimson, Moncada’s Liberal forces agreed to turn in their arms (which included a $10 compensation for each soldier’s rifle) upon the condition that a nonpartisan military force would be established under United States supervision and that free and supervised elections would be held in 1928. Sandino was one of Moncada’s
generals but he refused to accept this accord and led a small band of followers into the northern hills of the region known as Las Segovias.

Augusto Calderón Sandino was the illegitimate son of Gregorio Sandino, a Liberal and local landowner, and a young “Indian” woman (see Lake, 1989 and Pezullo & Pezullo, 1993). There is little known about his childhood and early life. However, some argue that shortly after giving birth, Sandino’s mother “sank” into prostitution and that Sandino became obsessed with the parallel between his country’s plight and his mother turning to “streetwalking” in her misfortune (Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993).

In 1920, following an incident in which Sandino wounded a man, Sandino fled to Mexico where he worked in oil fields which ironically belonged to American oil companies. While in Mexico, he became interested in Freemasonry and eventually became a Freemason (see Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993). He also was inspired by the nationalism of the Mexican Revolution and in 1926, returned to Nicaragua to join the Liberal Revolution of 1926, against the U.S.-backed Conservative government. Some scholars propose that Sandino’s cause initially had nothing to do with “anti-Americanism” (see Pezullo & Pezullo (1993); Diederich (1989). The American dominance over Nicaraguan political affairs however, resulted in Sandino’s explicit rejection of American imperialism (Diederich, 1989).

Sandino was characterized as a “rebel” and a “bandit” in U.S. newspapers and among Marine troops (see Pezullo & Pezullo, 1993). The excerpt is from an article by Harold N. Denny, Staff Correspondent for the New York Times, dated January 4, 1928:

*The Marines holding Quilalí in the face of the main body of General Sandino’s bandit army spent their first peaceful day of the new year today consolidating their positions to strengthen them against further attack...the Marines are now*
Meanwhile the U.S. continued with its campaign to preserve constitutional order in Nicaragua. The U.S. realized, however, that this goal would not be achieved while Sandino was still at large. Therefore, the Marines, aided by the newly formed National Guard were left with the task of capturing Sandino. Capturing Sandino proved harder than the U.S. and the Marines expected, however. G.D. Hatfield, Commanding Officer of the U.S. Marines in Nicaragua, grew impatient, as evidenced in his final letter to Sandino:

_It does not seem possible that you remain deaf to reasonable proposals, and despite your insolvent replies to my suggestions in the past, I hereby offer you one more opportunity to surrender with honor.... Otherwise you will be proscribed and placed outside the law, hunted wherever you go and repudiated everywhere, awaiting an infamous death: not that of the soldier who falls in battle but that of a criminal who deserves to be shot in the back by his own followers.... In conclusion, I wish to inform you that Nicaragua has had its last revolution_ (from Selser, 1979).

Back in the United States, public opinion was against continued occupation. Consequently, the U.S. government sought a complete and swift withdrawal of the Marines. Washington still wanted the American presence drawn down, as the first seventy Marines were removed in mid-June, 1927 (Lake, 1989). However, July 16, 1927, Sandino and his army of five-hundred attacked the Marines and National Guard detachment at Ocotal. Sandino’s army was decimated in what many historians consider to be the first dive-bombing operation in history. The Marines bombed Sandino’s army with five De Havilland biplanes which carried out bombing runs. According to the Marines, the bombings claimed three-hundred of Sandino’s men and drove Sandino back into the hills of Las Segovias (see Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993; Lake, 1989; and Diederich, 1989). The Battle at Ocotal was the only major defeat that Sandino’s troops ever
suffered (Diederich, 1989). Although his army had been devastated, Sandino gained tremendous support from the peasantry and Nicaraguans in general. Many hailed Sandino as a hero not only in Nicaragua but for all Latin America (see Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993).

With the Marines gone, Sandino was persuaded by his cousin, Sofonias Salvatierra, who had been appointed Minister of Agriculture by President Sacasa, to leave the mountains of Las Segovias and come to Managua to talk with Sacasa. Sandino declared his Nicaraguan crusade for the liberation of Nicaragua over, and officially allowed his army to be disarmed on February 22, 1933 (Diederich, 1989). Sandino and Somoza “embraced” in what seemed to be a peaceful agreement to coexist (Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993). Scholars argue however, that Somoza saw Sandino as a “threat to all of his ambitions” (Diederich, 1989). Relations between the two quickly deteriorated. According to Diederich, he had more to fear from the National Guard over which he had no control, than from Sandino, but he was still afraid to give Sandino more arms (Diederich, 1989).

With tensions mounting, the president invited Sandino to Managua in hopes of resolving the crisis (Diederich, 1989; Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993). After a warm welcome by Somoza, President Sacasa hosted a farewell dinner in honor of Sandino at the Presidential Palace. After what seemed to be an agreement to end the crisis between the two generals, Sandino, accompanied by his father, Gregorio Sandino, his cousin, Sofonias Salvatierra, and two of his generals, Juan Pablo Umanzor and Francisco Estrada, left the Presidential Palace and headed to Managua (Diederich, 1989; Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993). While on their way, a National Guard patrol intercepted Sandino’s car and arrested all four men. Sandino and his two generals were taken to a nearby airfield and executed (Diederich, 1989; Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993; Lake, 1989).
The creation of the Nicaraguan National Guard and Sandino’s execution are vital to the vanguardism of the FSLN. The guard was considered by Nicaraguans as a mere instrument of American occupation that would serve to preserve U.S. interests in Nicaragua. Seven years after its founding, Sandino was executed at the hands of the National Guard. This series of events would later inspire Carlos Fonseca Amador and others, to organize the FSLN, to continue, what he and others believed to be, Sandino’s struggle against American aggression.

Summary

Keeping some of these ideas in mind is essential as this dissertation moves into the discussion of neoinstitutionalism as the theoretical framework for this study and the explanation of vanguardism. For example, it might be worth thinking about how organizations translate general goals into operational goals through a program of action. Or perhaps, as one thinks about the FSLN’s effort to achieve legitimacy, the idea that the Sandinista revolution was the outcome of a loss of stability by a government that attempted to control a greater share of the resources of the nation than its capabilities to persuade and coerce the population, should be considered.

On the other hand, it is also worth keeping in mind the incidence of historical factors in the evolution of the FSLN. Beginning with Walker in the mid nineteenth century and ending with the execution of Sandino in 1934, the importance of U.S. involvement in Nicaragua, with respect to the vanguardism of the FSLN, should be noted.

Such linkages help situate the FSLN within a wider historical frame and help substantiate the significance of historical elements in its vanguardism. These connections are noteworthy as one looks at how neoinstitutionalism explains institutionalization and the role played by mechanisms, carriers, and agency in the process.
CHAPTER THREE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life.... giving solidity to social systems across time and space.
A. Giddens

The review of the literature and historical elements discussed in Chapter Two provide the groundwork for understanding the FSLN and its position within a wider historical frame. Taking the discussion in Chapter Two as a backdrop, Chapter Three provides the theoretical framework for this study by incorporating elements of neoinstitutionalism with the concept of vanguardism. This chapter presents the institutional framework chosen, closing in on the process of institutionalization and the elements supporting this process, featuring the role of mechanisms, carriers and agency; followed by an explanation of vanguardism.

The “New” Institutionalism

The roots of neoinstitutionalism can be traced to the “old institutionalism” (see Selznick, 1949; 1957), which “emphasizes the ways in which action is structured and order made possible by shared systems of rules that both constrain the inclination and capacity of actors to optimize as well as privilege some groups whose interests are secured by prevailing rewards and sanctions” (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Durkheim (1950); Weber (1946, 1947), March and Simon (1958), Merton (1936), and Selznick (1948) see institutions as an end result of the transformation of an organization.

The neoinstitutional (or sociological stream) approach of Berger and Luckmann (1967), Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1991), and Scott (2001; 2008) among others, offers a perspective based on the cognitive rather than the evaluative-normative components of behavior. In the neoinstitutional framework, institutionalization is not only an end but also a means to an end. “Institutionalization is both a process as well as a property variable” (Zucker,
It refers to both the process occurring over time as well as to a set of social arrangements that has attained a certain state or property, social patterns that when chronically reproduced owe their survival to relatively self-activating social processes (Jepperson, 1991). Institutionalization in this view is fundamentally a cognitive process (see Zucker, 1983 in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Normative obligations enter into social life primarily as facts that actors must take into account (see Meyer and Rowan in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Rather than concrete organizations “eliciting affective commitment,” institutions are “macro-level abstractions, rationalized and impersonal prescriptions” (see Meyer and Rowan in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Neoinstitutionalism perceives institutions as “a social order that has attained a certain state or property, and institutionalization, as the process of such attainment (see Jepperson, 1991). The literature points to an array of institutional elements which help explain this process. At the heart of this explanation, one finds Scott’s (2008) typology, which he refers to as the “three pillars of institutions.”

The Three Pillars

The “three pillars of institutions” categorization of key elements proposed by Scott (2008) involves categorizing the “ingredients of institutions” (see Scott, 2008). This framework differentiates between regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements supporting institutions. The regulative pillar of institutions “recognizes the authority of certain organizations and governments to formally constrain and enable organizational behavior (Scott, 2003). Regulatory processes involve the capacity to establish rules, inspect others' conformity to them, and, as necessary, “manipulate sanctions” (Scott 1995). Sanctions might include threat, coercion, or inducement (see Scott, 1995; 2003; 2008). Under the regulative pillar, the institutional environment consists of values, beliefs, and laws, as well as the “informal and
diffuse rule systems that structure expectations and enforce mutual obligations between actors in an organizational field” (see Scott, 2008).

The normative pillar emphasizes normative rules that “introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life” (Scott, 2008). This conception underlines values and norms as elements constraining social behavior (see Hughes, 1958; March and Olsen, 1989; and Scott, 2008). Theorists embracing the normative conception emphasize the “stabilizing influence of social beliefs and norms that are both internalized and imposed by others” (see Scott, 2008). For such theorists, “shared norms and values” are regarded as the primary basis of a stable social order (see Parsons, 1937) and the “moral roots” of institutions (see Stinchcombe, 1997).

The cultural-cognitive stresses the “centrality” of cultural-cognitive elements of institutions (see Geertz, 1973; Douglas, 1982; Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; and Scott, 2008) and the “shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is made.” In this view, the environment plays a fundamental role. “In the cognitive paradigm, what a creature does is, in large part, a function of the creature’s internal representation of its environment” (D’Andrade, 1984). In this sense, the meanings attributed to objects or activities are shaped by symbols, words, signs, and gestures (Scott, 2008). Meanings “arise in interaction and are maintained and transformed as they are employed to make sense of the ongoing stream of happenings” Scott, 2008). Social roles are seen as “templates” or as following a “script” for action (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).

Institutions are embodied in individual experience by means of roles...the institution, with its assemblage of “programmed actions, is like the unwritten libretto of a drama. The realization of the drama depends upon the reiterated
performance of its prescribed roles by living actors (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).

Scott’s (2008) typology is one of the more practical illustrations of institutional elements found in the literature. Hoffman (1997,) sees the “three elements forming a continuum moving from the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally enforced to taken for granted.”

**Figure 2: Scott’s three pillars of institutions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE THREE PILLARS OF INSTITUTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REGULATIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of Compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of Legitimacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As one proceeds to analyze the individual elements constituting each pillar, the practicality of Scott’s pillars becomes more evident.

**Mechanisms**

Many consider mechanisms to be the “nuts and bolts” of social processes” (Elster, 1989). They are a “delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001). In their seminal work, *The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Cultural*
Rationality in Organizational Fields, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that organizations seek homogeneity in order to attain institutional legitimacy. Inspired by Hawley’s (1968) conception of isomorphism\(^1\), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) point to institutional rather than competitive isomorphism as an explanatory factor of how organizations adapt to change in their environment and ultimately survive.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest three isomorphism types: coercive; normative; and mimetic. Coercive isomorphism is the result of “both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which the organizations function” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Examples of such pressures include force, discipline, domination, persuasion, or collusion (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, and Lawrence and Winn, 2001) and often involve political pressures and the force of the state, providing regulatory oversight and control. Normative isomorphism, “stems primarily from professionalization”\(^2\) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In this sense organizational norms and rules regarding behavior, are defined and promulgated (see Perrow, 1974). Mimetic isomorphism on the other hand, is a response to uncertainty. March and Olsen (1976) argue that goal ambiguity and general environmental uncertainty drives organizations to “mimic” other organizations as a way to approach problems and environmental change (see Cyert and March, 1963; and Powell, 2007).

Whether coercive, normative, or mimetic, isomorphism plays a fundamental role in how organizations compete for, and ultimately gain institutional legitimacy (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Synonymous with social acceptability, credibility, or social fitness, legitimacy

---

\(^1\) Hawley (1968) describes isomorphism as a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions.

\(^2\) Larson (1977) and Collins (1979) interpret professionalization as the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work, to control the “production of producers”, and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy.
refers to the “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995); “evoking a second order of meaning” (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). In this sense, as Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue, “independent of their productive efficiency, organizations which exist in highly elaborated institutional environments and succeed in becoming isomorphic with these environments, gain the legitimacy and resources needed to survive.”

Apart from DiMaggio and Powell (1983), noteworthy illustrations look at mechanisms from a different perspective. For example, Lawrence and Winn (2001) draw attention to the temporal dynamics associated with institutional mechanisms. Drawing from the power literature, they suggest four types of institutional mechanisms—fluence, force, discipline, and domination—and examine how these institutional mechanisms affect the pace and stability of the institutionalization process (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Leblebici et al., 1991). Lawrence and Winn’s (2001) typology focuses on the idea that different institutions are supported by what Jepperson (1991) refers to as "repetitively activated, socially constructed, controls" that work to support the pattern of social practice over time.

**Carriers**

Institutional *carriers* are the “vehicles which convey cultural-cognitive elements of institutions: symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts” (Jepperson, 1991). Scott (2008) argues that carriers “are of fundamental importance in considering the ways in which institutions change, whether in convergent or divergent ways….they point to a set of fundamental mechanisms that allow us to account for how ideas move through space and time, and who or what is transporting them.”
Symbolic systems as carriers of institutional rules and beliefs emphasize the important role played by such mechanisms as interpretation, theorization, framing, and Bricolage (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001 in Scott, 2008). For ideas to move from place to place and time to time through the use of symbols, they must be encoded into some type of script that is then decoded by recipients who are necessarily embedded in different situations and possessed of differing agendas (Scott, 2008). One of the more common illustrations of symbolic systems as carriers is that provided by Harold A. Innis (1995), in which he studies the role of the media to “preserve and transmit” ideas. Innis (1995) and others (see Anderson, 1991) point to the capability of media to create “languages of power” and “create…modify…and translate” ideas. Similarly, Strang and Meyer (1994) explore the role of theorists as “carriers of ideas” (theorization) in diffusion, claiming that, if practices and structures are to diffuse, they must be theorized. This same line of reasoning is employed by Snow and colleagues (Snow et al. 1986) who incorporate Goffmann’s concept of “frame,” to suggest that “frames” act as carriers of meaning. Snow et al. (1986) argue that “frames are employed by disseminators to both hold and sharpen messages, and by recipients to capture and interpret (frame alignment).”

Relational systems highlight the interconnectedness among individuals, groups, and organizations (Scott, 2008). Strang and Meyer (1994) suggest that relational systems as carriers “assume social actors are independent entities that must be “connected by specific networks or communication links if diffusion is to occur.” In this sense, measures such as distance,

---

3 Interpretation is defined as the process whereby choices are imagined, evaluated, and contingently reconstructed by actors in ongoing dialogue with unfolding situations (see Emirbayer and Mische, 1998).

4 Theorization involves both the specification of the failings of existing norms and practices and the justification of new norms and practices in terms of moral or pragmatic considerations (see Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott 2002).

5 Framing emphasizes the way in which meaning is mediated by the use of varying cognitive frames (see Snow and Benford, 1992; Snow et al. 1986).

6 Bricolage is defined broadly as “making do by applying combinations of the resources at hand to new problems and opportunities” (Baker and Nelson, 2005).
centrality, clustering, density, structural equivalence, or centralization, have been studied to determine their impact on the dissemination of information within an organization and across an organizational field. For example, Davis and Greve (1997) compared the diffusion patterns of two governance innovations: “golden parachutes” or “poison pills,” as strategies accessible to U.S. corporations facing takeover during the 1980’s. Davis and Greve (1997) found that the two innovations were associated with different carriers (“golden parachutes” were associated with proximity as the carrier; “Poison Pills” were associated with board interlocks among firms, as carriers.) Other studies produced similar results, as seen in McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001). Their analysis of brokerage and mobilization as relational mechanisms that work as carriers to “link” together disconnected parties within an organizational field. Yet another study looks at intermediaries as carriers. For example, a study conducted by McDonough, Ventresca, and Outcalt (2000) examined the role played by high school counselors, private counselors, and college admissions officers, in “mediating the selection and flow of students” in higher education. Their research showed that the selection and flow of students was to some extent, a function of “differing roles, interests, and values” of the intermediaries.

A third type of carrier discussed in the literature is routines. Routines suggest a “schematic” as well as a “performance” aspect of ‘specific actions taken by specific people at specific times” (see Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Building on the work of March and Simon (1958), who introduced performance programs as a key ingredient in organizational stability, Nelson and Winter (1982), emphasize “organizational routines...tacit knowledge…and skills...” as carriers.

---

7 DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define organizational field as “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life; key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations that produce similar services or products.”
8 Brokerage defined as individuals who connect ideas between actors-i.e. the media or consultants (See Beuselinck, 2006).
9 Sheller (2001) describes mobilization in how social movements engage in both the literal motion of bodies and things through space and with the ‘virtual mobilities’ afforded by new information and communication technologies.
of information associated with activities, behaviors, operating procedures, and organizational systems” (see Winter, 1990). In this sense, routines act as “modes of acting and problem-solving” (Hanks, 1991).

Lastly, a fourth category is artifacts (tools, equipment, and technology). These act as carriers in that they are “adapted and modified by their users” (see Orlikowski, 1992). Artifacts “contain important material aspects...and embody cultural schemas” (see Sewell, 1992). Empirical studies (see Ciborra and Lanzarra, 1986; Bechky, 2003; Gosain, 2004; and Barley, 1986) illustrate the role played by artifacts in problem-solving across organizational boundaries, in the resolution of institutional misalignments caused by the introduction of new systems, and as carriers of “institutional logics.”

Agency

Along with mechanisms and carriers, a third element – agency – examines the contribution of individual actors in supporting the institutionalization process (see Christensen et al. 1997; Oliver, 1991). In particular, they support those processes associated with institutional creation and diffusion. From Scott (2008) one learns that “institutions do not emerge in a vacuum,” but rather “challenge, borrow from, and to varying degrees, displace prior institutions. Greif (in Scott, 2008) echoes Scott (2008), adding that “beliefs, norms, and organizations inherited from the past will constitute part of the initial conditions in the processes leading to new institutions” (see Greif in Scott, 2008). Suchman (1995) also suggests that the “impetus for institutional creation is the development, recognition, and naming of a recurrent problem to which no preexisting institution provides a satisfactory repertoire of responses.” In this sense, the conception that “nothing is as portable as ideas” (see Scott, 2008) and the roles of individual actors in conveying these ideas, as “profoundly political” – reflecting the relative power of
organized interests (see DiMaggio, 1988; Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Strang and Meyer, 1993), are inherent to this process.

DiMaggio and numerous others also point to the centrality of agency in the institutionalization process. Acting as “institutional entrepreneurs,” individuals “participate in the creation of new types of organizations or new industries…marshal new technologies, design new organization forms and routines, create new supply chains and markets, and gain cognitive, normative and regulative legitimacy” (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Fligstein, 1997; and Zilber, 2002).

Other scholars offer a different approach to agency, looking at institutional transformation in terms of ‘stages’ or ‘phases’ of development (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996, also see VandeVen & Hargrave, 2004). This type of approach is exemplified by Greenwood et al. (2002) who describe institutional change as consisting of a sequential process beginning with “jolts” or external crisis events that help to disturb the “socially-constructed field-level consensus by introducing new ideas and thus the possibility of change.” Such disruptions can lead to pre-institutionalization when local innovations are devised to solve localized issues (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). This is linked to theorization (Strang and Meyer, 1994) when these local solutions are “abstracted for adoption in response to the organizational failing” (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996).

In such cases, such events may prompt (or be prompted by) the introduction of new actors (Thornton, 2002; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999) who “bring different interpretative frameworks and social definitions of behavior that act to diminish consensus and unquestioning adherence to “taken-for-granted” practices” (Oliver 1992). As solutions are adopted and objectified, gaining some form of consensus as to their “pragmatic value” or “moral legitimacy” (Suchman, 1995), diffusion occurs. Kostova and Roth (2002) argue that adoption comprises “the development of
patterns of behavior and the development of symbolic properties attached to these behaviors at the adoption unit.”

A third approach addresses agency in a slightly different context. Fligstein (in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) focuses on the relationships between agency and institutional mechanisms in organizational change. In his case study: *The Structural Transformation of American Industry: An Institutional Account of the Causes of Diversification in the Largest Firms, 1919-1979*- Fligstein (in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) studies the role of agency in the context of what he refers to as “constraining institutional contexts.” He argues that because environments are “murky” and actors “boundedly rational”, actors “interpret their environments based on their interests and their position in any given organization.” Therefore, solutions require a construction of a problem and a course of action (cognition and perception) that is consistent with both the organization as well as the environment (see Fligstein, 1991).

A fourth approach examining the U.S. radio broadcasting industry between 1920 and 1965, points to the role of “marginal players” in institutional change (Leblebici et. al, 1991). They suggests that in some settings, organizational change involves innovations introduced by individuals who are not in “positions of power” (marginal members), adopted by individuals in so-called “positions of power” (leading members). Their study showed how new practices became institutionalized as they gradually acquired legitimacy (Leblebici et al. 1991).

A last approach explores situations in which actors either find their interests “suppressed” or lack the resources necessary to voice them or exert influence through “conventional modes.” In such situations, actors are forced to employ “unconventional approaches” (Clemens, 1993, 1997). Clemens describes such a case in her study of the women’s movement in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. Her research uncovered that women activists, driven
by the inability to vote and excluded from participating in the electoral process, “borrowed” from the tactics used by “disreputable lobbyists” and developed a “repertoire of collective action” (Clemens, 1993) which now is an institutionalized “model of organization” for interest groups and other organization types. In Clemens’s (1993) view, “models of organization are part of the cultural tool kit of any society and serve expressive or communicative as well as instrumental functions.” She adds that

…how an organization adopts a particular model of collective action shapes alliances with other groups and relations with political institutions at both cultural and institutional levels, models of organization and collective activity are central mechanisms in the transformation of political systems. Once organizational form is viewed as being simultaneously a statement of identity and constitutive of broader institutional fields, social movements appear as not only vehicles of preexisting interests and causes of specific political outcomes, but as critical sources of institutional change (Clemens, 1993).

The role of institutional elements in institutionalization

The literature also provides a number of studies of the roles of institutional elements in institutionalization. This section highlights scholarly examination of the differing roles played by institutional elements in institutionalization.

Finding studies on the role of mechanisms in institutionalization requires one to look no further than the seminal works of Tolbert and Zucker (1983) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Tolbert and Zucker (1983) analyze the relationship between regulative mechanisms in diffusion and institutionalization of change in formal organizational structure as seen through the rate of adoption of civil service reform by cities. They found that when civil service procedures were required by the state, the diffused rapidly and directly from the state to each city. Conversely, Tolbert and Zucker found that when the procedures are not “so legitimated,” they diffused
gradually, and the reasons driving adoption rates were linked to external factors of institutionalization rather than to internal factors of cities.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) analyze isomorphism as an institutionalization mechanism for attaining legitimacy. They highlight the role of *mimetic* isomorphism as a mechanism employed by organizations under conditions of uncertainty or in the presence of goal ambiguity. In these situations, DiMaggio and Powell propose that organizations try to “imitate” other organizations that seem to operate in a “safe way.”

The role of *agency* in institutionalization also has generated numerous studies. DiMaggio introduced the notion of institutional entrepreneurs as “agents who have an interest in specific institutional structures and who command resources which can be applied to influence institutionalized rules, either by committing those resources to the support of existing institutions, or by using them for the creation of new institutions” (DiMaggio, 1988 in Beckert, 2011). When applied to institutional organization theory, the role of institutional entrepreneurs as agents seeking to change institutional fields to enhance their own interests is exemplified (see Fligstein, 1997; Fligstein and McAdam, 1995; Kondra and Hinings, 1998).

Beckert (2011) studies the role of institutional entrepreneurs in strategic agency. He defines strategic agency as “the systematic attempt to reach conceived ends through the planned and purposeful application of means” (Beckert, 2011). Beckert argues that means can only be chosen rationally if actors can build expectations regarding those means. In this sense, Beckert proposes that strategic agency can only be expected if institutionalized structures prevail and thus reduce uncertainty for organizational actors.

Becket (2011) makes a second interesting point. He contends that a relationship exists between reducing the level of uncertainty in the environment and increases in actors’ challenges
of institutional rules. Thus, Beckert proposes that “as the uncertainty of the environment diminishes, the need for security, stability, and predictability from the persistence of institutionalized norms decreases and organizations grow more confident in their predictions about the acquisition of future resources and legitimacy” (Beckert, 2011).

DiMaggio (1991) supports Beckert’s proposition in his study of the development of American art museums as an organizational field. DiMaggio studied how the appearance of a field-wide organization and developing consensus about many aspects of museum form and function led to the emergence of social actors that formed an opposition movement to legitimize these new forms. In this case, a contradictory dynamic was observed as the legitimation of these new forms legitimizied the reform movement and at the same time produced delegitimizing criticism to existing museums.

Another key observation by Beckert (2011) is the role of “powerful” agents in legitimation. He acknowledges the importance of legitimacy as a crucial aspect of organizational success, and he realizes that the organization’s need for legitimacy results in environmental pressure over organizational actors to embrace forms regarded as appropriate or legitimate. However, Beckert contends that other structural features (power being one of them) make institutionalized properties resistant to change. Beckert proposes that power is an important stabilizing factor in processes of institutional change and is used by entrepreneurs to “destroy existing institutions or to substitute new arrangements for them.”

Other studies describe the roles of elements in institutionalization as being interrelated. Mair and Marti (2009) for example, highlight the interrelated role of mechanisms (bricolage) and agency (institutional entrepreneurs). They examine the activities of BRAC, a non-government organization in Bangladesh, in its effort to alleviate poverty and empower the poor; specifically
they look at how institutional entrepreneurs enable the poor and marginalized, to participate in market activities in developing countries. Mair and Marti (2009) examine how institutional entrepreneurs address institutional impediments by recombining older myths to create new myths serving new functions; an illustration of “bricolage.” Mair and Marti proposed that entrepreneurship can be understood as a form of bricolage (Fligstein, 2001) and the role of the institutional entrepreneurs as a *bricoleurs*. In this sense, Mair and Marti (2009) show how institutional entrepreneurs acting as *bricoleurs*, helped BRAC address some of the voids impeding people to participate in market based activities.

Such studies help us understand how mechanisms, carriers, and agency support institutionalization processes. The different roles identified can be analyzed or applied to the backdrop of vanguardism to examine their involvement in this process. First, though, it is necessary to explain vanguardism and define what constitutes a vanguardist organization.

**Overview of vanguardism**

The idea of a vanguard is essentially a 19th century concept used to describe “anyone exploring the path to a free society” (Graeber, 2001). The term *avant-garde*, literally meaning “advance guard” or “vanguard,” was used to describe radical or revolutionary newspapers in 19th century France. Marx (in Graeber, 2001) expanded the concept (although he did not actually use the term vanguard in his writings) by introducing the idea that the working class or *proletariat* was the true revolutionary class (Graeber, 2001).

The concept of the “revolutionary vanguard party” was first introduced in 1901 by Lenin in a pamphlet titled *What is to be done?* According to Lenin (1902), the capitalist system is incapable of maintaining systematic improvements in the standards of living of the world’s working people and preserving democratic rights. “Only the world working class can lead
humanity out of the historical stalemate of capitalism, via a world socialist revolution” (Lenin, 1902). To achieve this revolution, the vanguard fighters of the working class must be armed with a conscious strategy, a revolutionary program, and a revolutionary vanguard party (see Lenin, 1902).

The revolutionary party, based on the Leninist concept of the vanguard party and composed of the class conscious vanguard fighters of the working class, is the sole historical organ of revolutionary consciousness, according to Lenin. The Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 meant simultaneously the victory of the Leninist concept of the revolutionary vanguard party and the “smashing” defeat of the Menshevik theory of the broad “Marxist” party (see League for the Revolutionary Party, 1993). The Mensheviks held that the working class “spontaneously” develops towards revolutionary consciousness and that therefore the task of Marxists was to organize a party that would reflect this development. By relying on spontaneous militancy for the development of revolutionary consciousness, the Mensheviks delegated the historical tasks of the revolutionary vanguard onto the spontaneous historical process and inevitably built an opportunist party that eventually betrayed the socialist revolution.

By contrast, Lenin (1902), understanding that revolutionary consciousness did not develop “spontaneously” but had to be constantly fought for, set out to build a vanguard party capable of fighting for the Marxist program and transforming the revolutionary potential of spontaneous militancy into revolutionary consciousness (League for the Revolutionary Party, 1993).

Many contemporary socialists follow the ideas of Lenin (1902) and, in particular, his ideas on vanguard parties. They believe that the ultimate aim of such a party is revolution and seizure of power. Its short term aim is to gather into it all "class conscious" workers into an "efficient" and
"effective" party, alongside members of other classes who consider themselves revolutionary Marxists.

To Negri (1999), the idea of the “class-based” vanguard party emerges from the spontaneity of the proletarian struggle for liberation and “structures class autonomy and consciously plans its expressions” in the ideological materialization of revolutionary consciousness that is meant to sustain the resilience of vanguard organizational praxis…because it permanently goes beyond the material limits that the capitalist structure imposes on class movement….” Negri conceived that “harnessing” the constituent power of spontaneity and the emergence of political consciousness signifies a strategic determination on the part of the vanguard organization which reinterprets the critical developments of political consciousness in ideological terms….”

On the other hand, Mandel (1989) analyzes vanguardism in the context of class self-organization and the tradition of Leon Trotsky (see Trotsky, 1967). Trotsky’s ideology in the context of the Russian revolution is precise:

The dynamic of revolutionary events is directly determined by the rapid, intensive and passionate psychological conversion from the pre-revolutionary class structures ... the masses engage in revolution entirely without a finished plan for social transformation, but in experiencing the bitter sentiment of no longer being able to tolerate the old regime. It is only the leading sections of the class that possess a political programme which, nonetheless, needs to be to be verified by events and approved by the masses. The essential political process of a revolution is precisely located in the working class understanding the problems posed by the social crisis, and that they actively orientate themselves using the method of successive approximation ... It is only by the study of the political process of the masses that one may understand the role of parties and of leaders which we are too inclined to ignore. They constitute a non-autonomous, but very important, element in the process. Without a leading organization the energy of the masses will dissipate like steam from a broken cylinder. However, the movement doesn’t come from the cylinder, nor from the piston, but from the steam (Trotsky, 1967).

Carlos Fonseca Amador, founder and principal intellectual source for the FSLN, was significantly influenced by the Marxist tradition of Trotsky, and the idea that revolutionary
victory required a lead organization to guide the masses. Fonseca Amador, thought himself as the “piston” that would power the “cylinder” – which he considered the FSLN to be – that would eventually harness the “energy” produced by the “steam” – the masses, setting in motion the insurrectional process culminating in revolution.

Mandel (1989) points out a “necessity for dialectical interaction between the self-organization of the class—which is subject to considerable fluctuations—and a permanent vanguard party, whose size and influence are equally subject to the highs and lows of the general conjuncture,” but that is nevertheless more stable, can engage in continuous work and can therefore better resist the pressure brought by unfavorable forces. In such a setting Mandel argues (1989), the loss of such an asset, the organization and its cadres implanted in the class, could hinder the eventual success of the mass struggle. “Thus the existence of such a vanguard organization facilitates that success” (Mandel, 1989).

Others have a slightly different perspective. Barchiesi, Bohmke, Naidoo, and Veriava (2006) see vanguardism as “an organizational approach that holds that, even if material struggles and conflicts open up spaces of political possibilities, the definition of the ultimate meanings of such possibilities is not self-evident from the standpoint of subjectivity, and their elaboration requires a specialized layer of experts whose knowledge is not ordinarily accessible from the grassroots.”

Slaughter (1960) also discusses the concept of the vanguard party and its role in revolutionary crises.

…the actual organization in a revolutionary crisis, the rapid changes of tactics necessary, the planning of insurrection and the military operations…requires centralized authority and discipline of the highest order…and only a leadership developed over a long period will be capable of the task.

Slaughter suggests that the “vanguard party” is such “centralized” authority (Slaughter, 1960). He further explicates that the possibility of such (revolutionary) victory in such crises depends on
the “preparation of a leadership.” Slaughter argues that “the depth of the crises (revolutionary) arouses tremendous force, and therefore, the “great task” of the party, which Slaughter calls the “disciplined, trained units,” is to “give this force its maximum results…” (Slaughter, 1960).

Other scholars such as Maerhofer (2007) examine the theoretical structure of aesthetic and political vanguardism that materialized in the first half of the twentieth century, from 1917-1956. Focusing mostly on poetry and poetics, Maerhofer traces the historical development of aesthetic and political vanguardism, beginning with the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, and the ways in which that event resounded in the European avant-garde movements.

*Vanguardism in the Latin American context*

In a Latin American context, vanguardism for the most part has been studied in the context of the Cuban Revolution as a guiding framework for revolutionary movements around the world (see Guevara, 1963). According to Ché Guevara (1963), revolutionary struggle involved “two halves”: the people—still-sleeping mass that had to be mobilized, and its vanguard—the guerrillas, the motor force of the mobilization, the generator of revolutionary consciousness and militant enthusiasm. This vanguard was the “catalyzing agent” that created the subjective conditions necessary for victory.

In Guevara’s conception, the vanguard group is ideologically more advanced than the masses; the latter understands the new values but not sufficiently, while among the former there has been a qualitative change that enables them to make sacrifices in their capacity as an *advance guard*. The latter see only part of the picture and must be subject to incentives and “pressures of certain intensity.” This, Guevara argues, is the dictatorship of the proletariat operating not only on the defeated class but also on individuals of the victorious class. Hence, in Guevara’s view, revolution (as was the case in Cuba) is not the work of the working class, or even of the people,
but of a guerrilla vanguard that by a leap of faith elevates itself to a higher understanding of things. The people’s role is subordinate, passive unless and until they are prodded and urged by those in the vanguard. Guevara’s conception is critical to our understanding of vanguardism.

*What Constitutes a Vanguardist Organization?*

A vanguardist organization exhibits distinctive characteristics. It is capable of rapid change, necessary tactics, and the planning of insurrection and military operations, and it requires a centralized authority and discipline of the highest order and strong leadership developed over a long period of time (Slaughter, 1960). Generally, a vanguardist organization pursues revolutionary means rather than evolutionary means to achieve power and control of a movement. It serves to “train, discipline, and direct” the “undirected, untrained, and undisciplined masses (see Lenin, 1902). Often, a vanguardist organization is associated with a historically important individual (hero, legend, or martyr) or institutional entrepreneur – such as Carlos Fonseca for the FSLN.

In some cases, a vanguardist organization is the product of a dichotomous relationship with “the enemy” (individual, regime, government, political system) (see Perez, 1991). The “enemy” as a Marxist concept is a necessary precondition for revolutionary victory. In the Nicaraguan context, the enemy is “American imperialism.” The target of imperialism meant that the FSLN needed to “prepare for a decades-long” war against any non-socialist regime, dictatorial or democratic, that should come to power (Nolan, 1984). Jaime Wheelock (1978) added that the Somoza dictatorship should be identified, and targeted as the immediate “enemy of the revolution.”

The vanguardist organization seeks to legitimate itself by “destroying the incumbent government’s legitimacy” (see Anderson, 2006). It exhibits a high degree of “social fitness”
(support from the people) and is compatible with the dominant social class strata (the *masses*). Ultimately, the goal of a vanguardist organization is to gain power and control, usually political and or governmental power.

Lastly, the vanguardist organization is directly embedded in a greater cultural and historical frame (see Fonseca-Amador, 1974) that places the organization in a special and advantageous position relative to other organizations within the movement. Putting these elements together, a vanguardist organization might be defined as one that achieves power and control of a movement through revolutionary means involving the planning of insurrection through training, disciplining, and directing the masses and through the execution of necessary tactics by a centralized authority to gain political or governmental power.

**Summary**

Chapter Three’s presentation of neoinstitutionalism and vanguardism completes the theoretical framework chosen for this study. The Chapter honed in on institutionalization and the role of *mechanisms*, *carriers* and *agency* in this process and explained vanguardism and the conception of a vanguardist organization.

The theoretical foundations and definitions exposed in Chapter Three allow a connection to be made between vanguardism and the *mechanisms*, *carriers*, and *agency* that supported the rise of the FSLN into the vanguard of the opposition movement.

In Chapter Four, the discussion of the empirical investigation of the role of *mechanisms*, *carriers*, and *agency* in the vanguardism of the FSLN begins. The principal research question, supporting questions previously exposed in Chapter One, propositions derived from theoretical work, and the research design, are discussed.
CHAPTER FOUR
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE VANGUARDISM OF THE FSLN

“Different people supported differently the revolution and held different opinions of the desirability of FSLN rule...”
Mauricio Solaín

Careful study of the literature in Chapter Two and the exposition of elements of institutionalism and vanguardism in Chapter Three, help one better understand vanguardism and the rise of governance regimes. This chapter recalls the research questions exposed in Chapter One, describes the propositions and research design, and the process by which the data were collected and analyzed.

Research questions

Although this research broadly studies vanguardism under a neoinstitutional lens, greater focus reveals more precise relationships to be examined. Fundamentally, this study is concerned with identifying institutional elements that supported the vanguardism of the FSLN. The elements to be analyzed are mechanisms, carriers, and agency. Using Scott’s (2008) “three pillars” framework as a guide, relationships between the drivers and the research questions develop.

Figure 3: Drivers
From Scott’s (2008) framework, and recalling Chapter One, a fundamental question emerges:

**How do mechanisms, carriers, and agency as institutional elements explain the vanguardism of the FSLN?** The four secondary questions of this study exposed in Chapter One are:

1. *What types of mechanisms, carriers, and agency, are identified as critical in the rise of the FSLN?*
2. *How are mechanisms, carriers, and agency, related in describing the vanguardism of the FSLN?*
3. *How can vanguardism as a process be described?*
4. *What relationships exist between vanguardism and institutionalization?*

**Assumptions**

Several assumptions related to these questions were derived at the onset of this research study. I expected to find a varied set of mechanisms, carriers, and agency in describing the vanguardism of the FSLN. From my research, it became apparent very early in the research process that I would find multiple types of mechanisms at play. For example, I expected to find force as a fundamental mechanism, considering the FSLN’s guerilla-type characteristics.

Second, I suspected that carriers would be central in the vanguardism process of the FSLN. For instance, I expected to find the media as a carrier, to play a particularly important role in the vanguardism of the FSLN. This expectation was produced through preliminary research as well as personal knowledge of the events.

Third, I expected to find evidence of interconnections and codependency between the elements in describing the vanguardism process. The vanguardism process seems to build on itself in a way that suggests that elements describing the process are produced by prior elements in the process.
Lastly, I expected to find synergy between the vanguardism of the FSLN and institutionalization. My perception was formulated by my understanding of institutionalization, particularly the role of legitimacy in this process.

**Process approach**

The study follows a process theory approach similar to that described in Falleti and Lynch (2009). Falleti and Lynch stress the importance of “context” and how it affects not only correlation arguments, but also “mechanistic” ones as well. In a mechanistic argument, “causation resides not solely in the variables or attributes of the units of analysis but in mechanisms (Falleti and Lynch, 2009) and “causal effects depend on the interaction of specific mechanisms with aspects of the context within which these mechanisms operate” (Falleti and Lynch, 2009). These relational concepts explain the links between inputs and outputs, tell how things happen, how actors relate and come to believe what they do is drawn from past experiences, how policies and institutions endure or change, and how outcomes that are inefficient become hard to reverse (see Falleti and Lynch, 2009). Using Falleti and Lynch as a guide, the three drivers described above can be understood as elements helpful in tracing the vanguardism of the FSLN and the vanguardism process as the focus.

**Figure 4: Guide for explaining the vanguardism of the FSLN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drivers</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Carriers</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>regulatory</td>
<td>regulatory</td>
<td>regulatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>normative</td>
<td>normative</td>
<td>normative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cultural-cognitive</td>
<td>cultural-cognitive</td>
<td>cultural-cognitive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mechanisms as institutional elements

According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), institutions are built upon three types of mechanisms—coercive, mimetic, and normative, by which institutional effects diffuse through a field of organizations. Mechanisms “create” and “sustain” institutions (Scott, 2008). They are “a delimited class of events that alter relations among specific sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001).

Among the mechanisms, this study identified hereditary mechanisms (see Knudsen, 1995), interpretation, theorization, framing, and Bricolage (see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001). Examples of mechanisms include:

- Yankee Imperialism and American Hegemony
- Sandino and legacy of U.S. intervention
- Sandinismo redefined
- Dissemination and diffusion strategies in response to changes in environment
- Orthodoxy (revolutionary intellectualism)

The mechanisms identify varying forces or “motives” for why organizations adopt new structures or behave a certain way. In this study, I want to understand the motives and forces behind the FSLN’s adoption of new strategies and structures as part of its vanguardism process.

Carriers as institutional elements

As chapter three detailed, Jepperson (1991) identified four types of vehicles or “carriers” that convey cultural-cognitive elements of institutions: symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts. Scott (2008) argues that carriers “are of fundamental importance in considering the ways in which institutions change, whether in convergent or divergent ways….they point to a set of fundamental mechanisms that allow us to account for how ideas move through space and time, and who or what is transporting them.”
Symbols, artifacts or written/oral words inherent to the FSLN or relevant to the insurrectional period, were identified and analyzed to examine their relationships in the vanguardism process. Among the carriers this study identified were:

- Revolutionary techniques (insurrection; call to arms)
- The media (press communiqués)
- Terrorist tactics (Raids, assaults, hostage situations)
- Umbrella organizations—Movimiento Pueblo Unido (MPU) and Frente Patriótico Nicaragüense (FPN).

The carriers fall into one of the four classes of carriers according to Jepperson, (1991): *symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts*. In its simplest form, something is deemed a carrier if it “helps institutional elements move from place to place and time to time” Scott (2003). The types of carriers chosen for this study meet these criteria.

*Agency as an institutional element*

Institutions do not emerge in a vacuum. They always challenge, borrow from, and to varying degrees, displace prior institutions. As Greif points out in Scott (2008), “beliefs, norms, and organizations inherited from the past will constitute part of the initial conditions in the processes leading to new institutions.” Suchman (1995) in Scott (2008) suggests that the “impetus for institutional creation is the development, recognition, and naming of a recurrent problem to which no preexisting institution provides a satisfactory repertoire of responses.” Institutionalization as a process is profoundly political and reflects the relative power of organized interests and the actors that mobilize around them.

The study analyzed the processes by which ideas, ideologies, and beliefs are communicated (diffused) through the Sandinista movement. Some elements included:

- Liberation theology (Roman Catholic Church)
- Cuban role in re-unification of FSLN (Fidel Castro)
- Redefinition of Sandinismo by Carlos Fonseca Amador
- Recognition and naming of a recurrent problem by Carlos Fonseca Amador
- Group of Twelve’s role (legitimation)
- Role of Panama; Cuba; Venezuela; and Costa Rica

I also paid attention to “…shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and provide the frames that support social sense-making. The development of mutual awareness among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise is a key element” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The role of agency in the FSLN’s process of legitimation also was examined. Meyer and Rowan (1977) set forth the idea that “independent of their productive efficiency, organizations which exist in highly elaborated institutional environments and succeed in becoming isomorphic with these environments gain the legitimacy and resources needed to survive” (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Meyer and Rowan’s conception is particularly interesting when considering this study as the data will later reveal. The FSLN was able to gain legitimacy in spite of the fact that during its vanguardism, it employed tactics which normally might be considered criminal or terrorist, but in this case, were deemed necessary and justified.

Legitimacy has also been classified as synonymous with social acceptability and credibility—what some refer to as social fitness. Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as the “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” In the cultural-cognitive context, organizational legitimacy refers to the degree of cultural support for an organization (see Meyer and Scott, 1983).
Research design

The research design chosen is the single case study. Considering the distinctiveness of the time period, subject, scope and lens, the single-case design is appropriate (see Yin, 1994). In such a study, Yin explains that generalization of results is made to theory and not to populations.

This study fits Yin’s description. The unit of analysis is typically a system of action rather than an individual or group of individuals. Case studies tend to be selective, focusing on one or two issues that are fundamental to understanding the system being examined (Tellis, 1997). Case studies are multi-perspective analyses (Tellis, 1997). This means that the researcher considers not just the voice and perspective of the actors, but also of the relevant groups of actors and the interaction between them. Such is the case for this study.

Additionally, case study research is known as triangulated research (see Snow and Anderson in Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg, 1991). Triangulation in case studies can be done by using multiple sources of data (Yin, 1984). Stake (1995) notes that triangulation ensures accuracy and alternative explanations while Yin (1984) perceives it as a way to confirm the validity of the research process. Both concepts will be incorporated in this study and used to generate the evidence required to arrive at a plausible explanation of the vanguardism of the FSLN.

Lastly, case study questions are generally "how" and "why" type questions. The study's propositions sometimes derive from the "how" and "why" questions, and are helpful in focusing the study's goals (see Yin, 1994). This is particularly important in developing the criteria for interpreting the findings of this study.

As previously stated, the single-case study design is appropriate for this study. The single-case design is ideal for revelatory cases where an observer may have access to a phenomenon that was previously inaccessible (see Yin, 1994) which in some ways describes this study. The
lack of data available and difficulty in generating new data make studies such as this one difficult to undertake. This reason alone makes a revelatory case study ideal for my research.

**Research strategy**

Tellis (1997) suggests that in case studies, there must first be an analytic strategy that will lead to conclusions. Yin (1994) presents two strategies for this purpose: the first strategy is to rely on the theoretical propositions and then, analyze the evidence based on those propositions. The other strategy is to develop a case description, which would be a framework for organizing the case study. This study implements Yin’s (1994) first strategy which begins with theoretical propositions and then analyzes evidence based on those propositions.

The data were interpreted employing a strategy similar to "pattern-matching" (Campbell, 1975). This type of logic compares an empirical pattern with a predicted one. Internal validity is enhanced when the patterns coincide. If the case study is an explanatory one, the patterns may be related to the dependent or independent variables. If it is a descriptive study, the predicted pattern must be defined prior to data collection. Yin (1994) recommended using rival explanations as pattern-matching when there are independent variables involved. This requires the development of rival theoretical propositions, but the overall concern remains the degree to which a pattern matches the predicted one. Campbell (1975) considers this a useful technique for linking data to the propositions. Campbell (1975) asserted that pattern-matching is a situation where several pieces of information from the same case may be related to some theoretical proposition. This study searches for patterns in the data, but is not so much concerned with “how many times” an element appeared but rather the context in which it appeared; and, whether the element was present across the data.
In the case of the newspaper articles, each article was screened by this researcher and the content was scanned in order to reveal critical themes. To illustrate with an example, one article published shortly after the 1972 earthquake in Managua, described how Nicaraguan civil society was growing weary of General Somoza Debayle’s “handling” of humanitarian aid for earthquake victims. In the case of the interview data, responses from all respondents were analyzed against each other to identify patterns in the data and recurring elements, such as actors, events, relationships, or characteristics. In the case of secondary qualitative data, narrative from third party interviews in video documentaries was analyzed to reveal recurring events, actors, relationships, or characteristics, describing the insurrectional period and the rise of the FSLN as the vanguard of the movement. Hence, the general objective was to identify recurring themes.

**Research sample**

Data for this study are mainly qualitative, originating from three sources: *elite* interviews, newspaper articles, and secondary qualitative data. Data source triangulation was used in collecting and interpreting the data (see Denzin, 1978). Denzin argued that more than one method of data analysis should be used in the validation process to ensure that the variance reflected that of the trait and not of the method. Thus, the convergence or agreement between two methods "... enhances our belief that the results are valid and not a methodological artifact" (Bouchard, 1976).

This kind of triangulation is labeled by Denzin (1978) as the "between (or across) methods" type, and represents the most popular use of triangulation. This kind of triangulation method is employed in my study. It is largely a vehicle for cross validation when two or more distinct methods are found to be congruent and yield comparable data (see Jick, 1979). In organizational theory studies, this would involve the use of multiple methods to examine the same dimension of
a research problem (see Jick, 1979). Evidence from three different data sources “converges” to “corroborate the same fact or phenomenon” (Yin, 2003). Once again, I employ data source triangulation for my study.

**Figure 5: Triangulation of the data**

Data triangulation also is useful in addressing potential problems related to construct validity. As Yin (2003) points out, “multiple sources of the evidence essentially provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon.” Not surprisingly, an analysis of case study methods performed by COSMOS (1973) found that those case studies that used multiple sources of evidence were rated higher in quality, compared to those that relied on one single source of information.

**Interviews**

One of the most important sources of case study information is the interview (Yin, 2003). The type of interview method selected for this study was an open-ended-questions-semi-structured interview. According to Sampson (1972), a semi-structured approach to in-depth
interviews allows the researcher to cover a specific list of topic areas, with the time allocated to each topic area being left to the discretion of the interviewer. The open structure ensures that unexpected facts or attitudes can be easily explored (Sampson, 1972). If one needs to probe for information and to give respondents maximum flexibility in structuring their responses, the open ended questions are appropriate (see Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). Another consideration for using an open-ended approach was my desire to “maximize” response validity (see Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). Open-ended questions provide a greater opportunity for respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). And as Aberbach and Rockman (2002) suggest, this “increases the validity of the responses…” In some situations, as Yin points out, one may even ask a respondent to propose his or her own insights into certain occurrences and may use such propositions as the basis for further inquiry. The respondent can also suggest other persons for one to interview, as well as other sources of evidence.

Generally speaking, interviews are an essential source of case study evidence because most case studies are about human affairs (Yin, 2003). Those individuals who are most-informed about such affairs or who can provide important insights into a situation are the ones who need to “report” or “interpret” these affairs (see Yin, 2003).

Selecting the interview pool

Selecting interview respondents is critical in case study research (see Yin, 2003). In a case study, respondents are selected on the basis of what they might know to help the investigator “fill in the pieces of a puzzle” or “confirm the proper alignment” of pieces already in place (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). Sometimes, as Yin (2003) points out, the selection process is “straightforward” since the pool of potential interview candidates may be limited or already
known from the onset. At other times however, there may be many qualified candidates. Here, purposive sampling (see Patton, 1990) method was used in the selection of the interview pool. 9 criteria were established. The purpose was to involve individuals with first-hand experience in the events, either from having been protagonists in the events of the time period or been in some way exposed to them. In this case, meeting at least one of the following criteria was required for selection:

Figure 6: Selection criteria for interviewee pool

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Influential member of the FSLN directly involved in the events of the insurrectional period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of Twelve Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somoza Government Official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of the Catholic Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of the National Reconstruction Junta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government Official directly involved in events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business sector representative (COSEP-COSIP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert in area of study (i.e. historians; scholars; journalists)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant effort was made to ensure that all (or most) of the criteria were represented in the interview pool. The interview pool included members of the FSLN, the Nicaraguan National Guard, the Somoza government officials, the Group of Twelve, National Reconstruction Junta, as well as U.S. government officials, Nicaraguan citizens, and scholars.

A pool of sixteen (16) potential interview candidates was identified. I sent out request letters to these potential interview candidates. Out of sixteen candidates contacted, ten agreed to participate. All criteria were represented in the interview pool, with the exception of the “Nicaraguan Catholic Church representative.” Several prominent Church officials were invited
to participate. One agreed to participate in the interview process; however his interview responses were never received. The rest of the invited church officials declined participation.

Challenges of interview pool selection

This study featured an elite pool of interviewees; among them were former heads of state, Somoza government officials, high-ranking officers of the extinct National Guard, and influential and historically prominent figures of the FSLN. Although in general, individuals are more open about sharing their knowledge and experiences from the past, generating such data still poses a great challenge. If not for my first-hand knowledge of Nicaraguan society and the help of family and friends (in other words, knowing where to look and who to ask), interviewing such elite individuals would have been impossible.

Nevertheless, those individuals who agreed to participate did so in a very cooperative and professional manner, evidenced by the quick turnaround and quality of their responses. Conversely, of the ones who opted not to participate, a few pointed to personal and/or ideological reasons for doing so, while others did not respond at all. As expected, some were very anxious to “tell their story,” while others were a bit more hesitant. It is important to clarify that although only ten individuals were interviewed, several of them had multiple associations. For example, one individual might have been a member of the FSLN and “Group of Twelve” or part of the National Reconstruction Junta as well as the “Group of Twelve”.

Figure 7: Description of interviewees
Interviewing “political elites” are adequate for this type of research study, as exposed in Davies (2001) and Lilleker (2003). Lilleker (2003) argued that such interviews provide valuable insights into the political process, helping to compensate for the lack of information in official published documents or contemporary media accounts. However, getting access to such individuals can be a challenge as Yin (2003) explains: “For interviewing key persons, you must cater to the interviewee’s schedule and availability…the nature of the interview is much more open-ended, and an interviewee may not necessarily cooperate fully in answering the questions…” Also, Yin reminds us that when interviewing such “types”, “…you are intruding into the world of the subject being studied, rather than the reverse…as a result, the researcher’s behavior-and not that of the subject or respondent-is the one likely to be constrained.”

Description of interview questionnaire

The interview questionnaire consisted of fifteen questions consisting of mostly open-ended questions with a few semi-structured questions (see Appendix A). For example, one question from the interview questionnaire asked respondents to assess the importance of revolutionary influences. In this case, respondents were provided with a chart featuring prominent revolutionary intellectuals, and were asked to categorize each as being either “not important,” “somewhat important,” “important,” or “very important.” In similar fashion, respondents were also asked to assess the “importance” of events or “relationships.” The same scale was used for these question types. The questionnaire was provided in both English and Spanish and respondents were given the option to choose their language of preference.

Newspaper articles

A total of 322 articles were identified through Lexis-Nexis provided through Virginia Tech’s Library system, and via a third-party (for articles from Nicaraguan publications LaPrensa and
Novedades). Articles from Lexis-Nexis were identified by searching for articles containing one of the following keywords: FSLN, Sandinista, and Somoza. The time period collected included publications from the period 1930-1980, to include articles from the time of Augusto C. Sandino to the Sandinista revolutionary victory in 1979.

Publications obtained through Lexis-Nexis

Most of the publications in the Lexis-Nexis data originated from major world newspapers, though articles from magazines and other media outlets were also present. Among the more notable publications were the New York Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Washington Post, the Miami Herald, Time, Newsweek, the Globe and Mail (Canada), and the BBC (Britain).

Publications obtained through a third-party

Articles from Nicaraguan newspapers LaPrensa and Novedades were obtained through a third-party. LaPrensa is Nicaragua’s most popular newspaper and the only publication from the 1970’s that is still around today. It is also considered by Nicaraguans as the only publication with credibility. But its historical record is only available in paper format and can be accessed only on site at the newspaper’s historical warehouse in Managua. Obtaining newspaper articles from the 1960’s and 1970’s was by no means a simple task.

The other Nicaraguan newspaper, Novedades, presented an even greater challenge. Novedades was considered the newspaper of the Somoza government. Its installations were confiscated by the insurgent Sandinistas who destroyed most of the archives. Novedades’s installations were later used to print Barricada (Barricade), which became the official publication of the Sandinista government. Recently, a collection containing some of Novedades’s publications from the insurrectional period surfaced, and some articles are now
available at the Roberto Incer Barquero Library, at the Central Bank of Nicaragua. However, as is the case with LaPrensa, accessing these data is logistically complicated.

Secondary qualitative data

The third source of data for this study derived from video documentaries, a third-party interview, and historical documents. A series of documentaries produced during the 1980’s were identified via YouTube. The documentaries were identified using the following keyword search: Sandinista revolution and revolución Sandinista. These documentaries were produced by the Nicaraguan Ministry of Culture during the Sandinista years. One, however, was produced by a private media group in 2004, in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution. These documentaries feature commentary from the protagonists of the events of the insurrectional period, several of whom also were part of the interview pool for this study.

The documentary data as well as data obtained from books and historical documents are essential for data triangulation and further enhance the validity of the study. As noted in Patton (1990) and Yin (2003), “In case study research, the use of multiple data sources…enhances data credibility (Patton, 1990; Yin, 2003)….Each data source is one piece of the “puzzle,” with each piece contributing to the researcher’s understanding of the whole phenomenon….This convergence adds strength to the findings as the various strands of data are braided together to promote a greater understanding of the case.”

Data collection

Interviews

Purposive sampling methodology was employed in determining potential interview candidates. A population of sixteen “potential” respondents was determined based on the selection criteria discussed earlier. A solicitation letter was sent via e-mail to each interview
candidate. The letter included a brief description of the study and a description of the interview process. The letter also emphasized anonymity and confidentiality issues associated with the interview process. Candidates were informed that if they decided to participate, they had the option to choose whether or not to remain anonymous. Additionally, they were told that the data from interviews would be processed and interpreted aggregately, and that individuals would not be quoted. Upon receiving a reply “accepting” participation, the interview questionnaire was sent back to the interviewee. Interviewees were given two months in which to respond to the questionnaire, though most took less than a month to respond. The interviews were sent between February and April 2010. With the exception of one response which came back in July, interview responses were received between March and May 2010.

Of the ten interviews, nine were conducted via email and one was conducted in person. In the case of the email interviews, it is impossible to decipher details, such as how long it took respondents to complete the interview, or even who completed the questionnaire. However, it seems plausible to assume, given the detail of responses, that the questionnaires were completed by the individuals themselves, at the respondent’s home or in some type of office setting.

As far as the duration time to complete the interview questionnaire, I can only make an approximation based on the duration of the in-person interview and my own “best guess.” Pairing the number of questions with the length and depth of some of the responses, I would estimate between one and three hours to complete.

In the case of the in-person interview, the interview took place in Providence, Rhode Island, where the respondent was attending a function at Brown University. The interview took place in the lobby of the hotel where the interviewee was staying. After a friendly exchange, I continued with the interview, which took about one and a half hours to complete. The in-person interview
involved the exact questions found in the interview questionnaire, and followed the same order. The respondent was asked whether it was “ok” to audio-record the responses and the respondent had no objections to this. I then proceeded in audio-recording the responses of this interview considering that audio recordings provide the best way to capture all that is said during an interview (see Warren 2002). After the interview, I transcribed the data from recordings to the questionnaire.

Newspapers

Data from newspaper articles were collected in two ways. Articles from major world publications were collected using Lexis-Nexis. Articles from the two Nicaraguan publications, LaPrensa and Novedades, were collected by a third-party at LaPrensa’s headquarters in Managua, Nicaragua. This third-party was instructed to find articles “related to” or “associated with” the themes described above. This third-party researcher identified forty-three articles. The articles were scanned, transferred into PDF format, and saved onto a disk, all under the supervision of Eduardo Enriquez, Director of Editing for LaPrensa. Between Lexis-Nexis, LaPrensa, and Novedades, a total of 322 articles were collected.

Video documentaries

I collected the data from the video documentaries employing a combination of content and narrative analysis (see Spradley, 1980; Lofland and Lofland, 1995). The content of “speech” was analyzed to identify “themes” emerging from the narrative; what actors talked about the most; and whether themes related to each other. Narrative analysis was used to study the narratives of influential individuals who were interviewed in the documentary. The narratives of Somoza government officials, members of the FSLN, and representatives of the Church, were
analyzed among others. The narrative from Church officials is particularly important, given the absence of Church representatives in the interview pool.

Several of the individuals featured in the documentaries also were interviewed for this study. For these individuals, one is able to compare narrative from the documentaries with interview responses.

The documentaries also help establish “consistency” of the observations across time and space. The documentaries date back as far as 1967 and cover the entire insurrectional period. One documentary source is particularly useful in this regard – produced in 2004 by a private media group – it commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution. Several of the individuals featured in this documentary are also featured in documentaries from the 1960s and 1970s, giving a rare opportunity to compare their “stories” through time.

Historical documents

Lastly, I gathered data from historical documents and books via the Virginia Tech library system. Mainly, I was searching for books written about Sandino, the FSLN, the Sandinista revolution, or about any one of the three Somozas. Data were collected in order to find supporting evidence through third-party interviews, particularly involving individuals who might have played significant roles in the events but were not included in the interview pool. Books containing letters, excerpts, and writings of Sandino were collected. Along with these, historical documents such as the FSLN’s Historical Programme as well as Carlos Fonseca’s letters and manifestos also were collected. Comparing these data with the information from narratives, documentaries, newspaper articles, and interview responses, helped establish consistency of the data over time.
Data analysis

Qualitative research relies on inductive reasoning processes to interpret and structure the meanings that can be derived from data (Thorne, 2010). In this sense, inductive reasoning uses the data to generate ideas (hypothesis generating), whereas deductive reasoning begins with the idea and uses the data to confirm or negate the idea (hypothesis testing). Qualitative research often takes the position that an interpretive understanding is only possible by way of uncovering or deconstructing the meanings of a phenomenon (Thorne, 2010). Thus, a distinction between explaining how something operates (explanation) and why it operates in the manner that it does (interpretation) may be a more effective way to distinguish quantitative from qualitative analytic processes involved in any particular study.

In this research, I followed an inductive reasoning approach to generate rather than test hypotheses. Hence, my objective is to describe and interpret a process rather than to establish causal and theoretical explanations of phenomena.

Many qualitative analytic strategies rely on a general approach called “constant comparative analysis” (Thorne, 2010). Originally developed for use in the grounded theory methodology (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which itself evolved out of the sociological theory of symbolic interactionism, this strategy involves taking one piece of data (one interview, one statement, one theme) and comparing it with all others that may be similar or different in order to develop conceptualizations of the possible relations between various pieces of data (Thorne, 2010). As Thorne (2010) explains, comparing the accounts of two different people who had a similar experience, a researcher might pose analytical questions like: why is this different from that? Or how are these two related?
Following the advice of Thorne (2010) “constant comparative analysis” was chosen to analyze the data from the interviews and newspaper articles. Thorne notes that this methodology is appropriate for this type of research since my purpose was to generate knowledge about common patterns and themes within human experience. On the other hand, “narrative analysis” was chosen for analyzing the data from the documentaries. Again illustrated by Thorne (2010), “speech forms are not the experiences themselves, but a socially and culturally constructed device for creating shared understandings about them…Narrative analysis is a strategy that recognizes the extent to which the stories we tell provide insights about our lived experiences”.

Analysis of newspaper articles

The population under study included articles from the time period 1930-1980, collected through Lexis-Nexis containing any one of the following keywords: Nicaragua; Sandinista National Liberation Front or Somoza; and articles collected by a third-party researcher for articles from Nicaraguan publications, also form the same time period. The population of newspaper articles was broken down chronologically into four stages: Stage I: articles dated before December 27, 1974; Stage II: articles dated between December 27, 1974 and January 9, 1978; Stage III: articles dated between January 10, 1978 and August 21, 1978; and Stage IV: articles dated between August 22, 1978 and July 19, 1979. The stages were designed to reflect the sequential progression of events or “happenings” identified in the literature, which was reaffirmed by the interviews. This sequence produced mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive “time-frames” which yielded chronological categories for breaking down the data.
Articles were put into categories based on the date of publication. The first category included all publications published prior to December 27, 1974, coinciding with the FSLN’s raid on Chema Castillo’s house, which the data suggest as a critical event or “happening.” The second category included all publications published between December 27, 1974 and January 10, 1978, the latter coinciding with the murder of LaPrensa Editor Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, also a critical event. In the third category were articles published between January 10, 1978 and August 22, 1978, the date of the FSLN’s assault on the National Palace. The final category included publications published between August 22, 1978 and July 20, 1979, the end of the revolution.

Initially, an equal number of articles from each of the four categories was to be selected. However, due to the disparity in the number of articles identified for each category, a quota sampling methodology was employed (see O’Donnell et al., 1976). O’Donnell et al. (1976) tell us that quota sampling techniques may help reduce some of the problems associated with measuring low incidence behaviors and related phenomena.

A two-stage hybrid methodology featuring stratified and systematic sampling was used. First, the total population of 322 articles collected from Lexis-Nexis and via the third-party researcher, was sub-categorized using the time frames associated with each stage. Then, articles were
placed in chronological order and employing systematic sampling,\(^1\) every other article was selected. This process yielded a sample of one-hundred and sixty-two articles (162).

**Figure 9: Categorization breakdown of newspaper articles sample**

![Figure 9](image)

**Description of the data**

The source of the publication was identified as either Nicaraguan (*LaPrensa* or *Novedades*), U.S. for publications from the United States, and “world” for all other publications. The location of the event or “happening” being discussed was noted and a brief description of the event covered in the article was generated.

**Figure 10: Source of newspaper articles**

![Figure 10](image)

This analysis revealed a widespread representation of data sources with respect to the media publications. Of the 35 articles contained in the sample for Stage I, 23% derived from Nicaraguan publications, 77% from U.S. publications, and none from non-U.S. international

---

\(^1\) Systematic sampling is conducted by taking every \(Kth\) item in a population after the first item is selected at random from the first \(k\) items (Pepe, 2010).
publications. In Stage II, 44% of the publications derived from Nicaraguan sources, while 56% were from U.S. publications. Stage III featured 56% of the publications from Nicaragua, 31% from the U.S., and 13% from non-U.S. international publications. Lastly for Stage IV, 21% derived from Nicaraguan publications, 44% from U.S. publications, and 35% from non-U.S. international publications.

This representation revealed an important trend in the source of publications which is interesting to note. In the latter stages of the crisis, the percentage of publications from U.S. and non-U.S. international sources increased significantly, in relation to the percentage of Nicaraguan publications, a fact which points to the “internationalization” of the process during the latter stages of the crisis.

Evaluative dimension of the data

In addition, the “evaluative dimension” of each article was determined. I examined the content of the articles to determine whether the article was “favorable,” “neutral,” “critical,” or “hostile,” with respect to the FSLN, Somoza and the National Guard, and the U.S. This was done by identifying keywords or phrases (such as “tyrant” or “imperialist”) that would reveal a favorable, neutral or critical tone. The purpose of such analysis was to gain insight on legitimacy as a key element in the vanguardism of the FSLN.

Analysis of interviews

Data from interviews were analyzed using a two-step coding approach. Thorne (2010) explains that with any interview data, there is a need for systematic examination as opposed to simply looking for confirmation of initial ideas….A two-step approach to analyzing data from the interviews that consists of examining the interview notes for themes and concepts, and then devising a coding procedure for key themes and concepts, is often advocated.
Following the advice of Thorne (2010) I first read through each of the interview transcripts, highlighting particularly interesting comments. Once I had read over the interview transcripts, I used constant comparative analysis, in which each question was taken separately and the answers to a particular question were compared with others’ responses to that same question. The interview questions were designed to enhance the evidence observed in the newspaper articles by providing more illustrative evidence related to the themes identified in the newspaper article data.

**Figure 11: Elements analyzed in the interview questionnaire**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difference of FSLN (from other actors)</th>
<th>organizational (or other) characteristics of the FSLN</th>
<th>significant “events” or “happenings” of the insurrection</th>
<th>U.S. policy-Nicaragua 1920-1940</th>
<th>Sandino’s Legacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary intellectualism</td>
<td>Support for Somoza Government</td>
<td>FSLN Communiques (reason and purpose)</td>
<td>Kupia-Kumi pact</td>
<td>1972 Earthquake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedro J. Chamorro’s assassination</td>
<td>U.S. role as mediator</td>
<td>creation of umbrella organizations-MPU and FPN</td>
<td>Cuba’s role</td>
<td>Venezuela’s role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama’s role</td>
<td>Costa Rica’s role</td>
<td>Dominant actors</td>
<td>Legitimizing agents</td>
<td>Cultural support (desirability) with respect to the FSLN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviewees were asked to compare the FSLN to other key actors within the opposition movement in order to identify distinctive characteristics of the FSLN that might differentiate the organization from other key actors. This was done in order to identify possible relationships between distinctive characteristics of the FSLN and its vanguardism. Next, interviewees were asked to name and describe events which they considered significant. Later on in the interview, respondents were asked to assess the importance of the events identified in the literature and
newspaper data. Related to this set of questioning, the nature and purpose of FSLN communiqués related to some of these events were also analyzed.

Respondents were asked to describe the policy of the United States vis-à-vis Nicaragua during the 1920s and 1930s, the period in which the U.S. Marines occupied Nicaragua, and during which time confrontations between the Marines and Sandino occurred, the Nicaraguan National Guard was created, and Sandino executed. Recalling Chapter Two, the literature suggests an important link between the vanguardism of the FSLN and key events in Nicaraguan history. Therefore, generating evidence to substantiate these initial claims was necessary. Along these lines, respondents were asked to describe the importance of Sandino’s legacy to the FSLN.

The intellectual foundations of the FSLN were also assessed. Interviewees were asked to assess the influence of prominent revolutionary intellectuals with respect to the FSLN, including Marx, Lenin, Mao, Sandino and Ché Guevara.

Lastly, opposition to the Somoza regime and/or National Guard was calculated. In this sense, respondents were asked to assess support (or lack thereof) of the Somoza regime, including the National Guard. Here, this evidence would serve to substantiate the claims from the literature that there was an overwhelming discontent with the Somoza regime, and furthermore, that this discontent would play an important role in how the FSLN achieved legitimacy.

**Analysis of secondary qualitative data**

Secondary qualitative data were examined by performing analysis similar to that with the interview data. Documentary data were analyzed by employing “narrative analysis.” Once again, as illustrated by Thorne (2010), “…Narrative analysis is a strategy that recognizes the extent to which the stories we tell provide insights about our lived experiences.” “Speech” from documentaries and third party interviews was compared with interview responses as a way of
“confirming” the reliability of the data. Historical documents and other manuscripts were analyzed using “content analysis.” In this sense, speeches, manifestos, and original works of Sandino and Carlos Fonseca Amador were analyzed in search of recurring themes, phrases, or words that were found in the interview and newspaper articles data.

**Figure 12: Description of secondary qualitative data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical Documents</th>
<th>Third-party Interview</th>
<th>Video Documentaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Letters and writings by A.C. Sandino;</td>
<td>• Interview by Martha Harnecker with Jaime Wheelock, Commander of the Revolution and member of the Sandinista Directorate, 1986.</td>
<td>• Guerra de Nicaragua 1979-Youtube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communication between Sandino and the U.S. Marines;</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Patria Libre o Morir-Youtube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Letters and writings by Carlos Fonseca Amador.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Declaraciones del Presidente Anastacio Somoza-1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Letters from U.S. Government officials.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• 25 aniversario de la Revolucion Sandinista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• List of assaults and subversive activities by the FSLN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Historic Programme-FSLN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• FSLN press communiques</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Limitations**

Several limitations associated with this research endeavor must be noted. The qualitative approach taken for this study is appropriate given the degree of complexity and distinctiveness of the case. This approach featured three different data sources. Reliability and validity concerns are always present, particularly with elite interviews as a data source (see Berry, 2002).

A great deal of care was taken in selecting the candidates for the interview pool. However, given limitations of time, space, resources, or others beyond my control, it is possible that persons who might have provided alternative answers were left out. In this sense, the limited interview sample (n=10) might be considered “unrepresentative” (see Richards, 1996). However, as Richards reminds, “unrepresentative sampling is not often an issue in elite interviewing, where it is so, it may be due to problems of access….Sometimes it is simply not
possible to obtain a representative sample, because certain individuals or categories of individuals (possibly those with something to lose from being interviewed) refuse a request for an interview.”

Associated with this concern is the threat associated with the reliability of the interviewee. This often results from failures in the interviewee’s memory. “The older the witness, and the further from the events they are, the less reliable the information” (Richards, 1996). In similar fashion, there is risk associated with “selective memory”, individuals remember “what they want” and “how they want” to remember things. Or perhaps, they do not want to be “seen under a poor light” or “have an axe to grind” (Richards, 1996). Such a threat might be especially true with interviews involving ex-politicians as Seldon (in Richards 1996) suggests. “…ex-politicians often encounter pathological difficulties in distinguishing the truth, so set have their minds become by long experience of partisan thought” (Seldon, 1988).

There is also the risk that those who chose not to participate, did so because of fear that they might be singled out as belonging to a particular group, or as having been involved in a particular action or event. In an email conversation with one of the interviewees, it was pointed out to me that some individuals associated with the Somoza government, particularly former members of the National Guard, would be reluctant to participate in the study because of fear of persecution or harassment by the current FSLN-ruled government. One wonders whether the pool of interviewees would have been different if the FSLN was not currently in power. Notwithstanding, this is a threat associated with all research, and it is especially true with studies involving “elite systems” (see Aberbach and Rockman, 2002).

Reliability and validity are also concerns with newspaper article and documentary data. According to Joppe (2000), “The extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate
representation of the total population under study is referred to as reliability and if the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology, then the research instrument is considered to be reliable.” Following Joppe (2000), a great deal of care was taken to ensure that the newspaper sample created accurately represented the population under study. On the other hand, both newspaper articles and documentary data are historical data produced at the time of the events. Such data types exemplify one important attribute and that is stability over time. And as Golafshani (2003) explains, “a high degree of stability indicates a high degree of reliability”.

In another aspect, interpretation bias also is a threat that needs to be addressed. As the sole researcher, I am left to interpret the data. It is possible that another interviewer or researcher might interpret the responses differently. This which Kirk and Miller (1986) refer to as “synchronic reliability,” is inherent in qualitative research.

The process of data collection raises additional validity concerns. From Berry (2002), one understands that interviewees have no obligation to tell the truth. With one exception, interviews were conducted online, via an “interview questionnaire.” In this sense, the interviewee was assured strict confidentiality with regards to participation and responses. Also, every effort was made regarding the wording and structure of the questionnaire, to avoid “leading questions” or showing favoritism or disdain of any kind towards a particular person, group, organization, or state. In the case of the one interview conducted in person, the interviewee was asked the same questions as those found in the questionnaire in the same sequence. Once again, the interviewee was assured strict confidentiality, though the interviewee expressed his indifference to his identity being revealed.

Other limitations stemmed from my inexperience with formulating the questions for the interview questionnaire. To alleviate some of these concerns, I conducted a “pilot” interview
with my father (himself a Somoza government official), who proved extremely helpful in determining appropriateness, clarity, and purpose of the questions. In some cases, my father offered suggestions for alternative or additional questions.

Perhaps of greatest concern is the issue of construct validity and being able to effectively tap the relationships between the drivers and the vanguardism of the FSLN through the interview questions. Without the existence of a previously conducted research study as a guide, I was unable to compare my questions with previously tested questions, leaving me with no other option than to devise my own set of questions based on my personal knowledge and the relationships identified in the literature.

Lastly, the nature of this type of case study poses a limitation, as far as the generalizability of the findings is concerned. As Johnson (2002) noted, research of this nature cannot be generalized easily to broader populations. However, Yin (1989) proposes that analytical generalizability is possible. This study involves a distinctive organization in a particular historical setting and point in time. While the results of this research may not be generalizable beyond the scope of this case, generalizations about relationships, types of institutional elements describing vanguardism, and temporal dynamics associated with this phenomenon might be extended beyond the borders of this research.

Certainly, there are limitations and validity concerns with any study. However, every measure available has been taken to ensure that these limitations do not diminish the validity of the results of this study.

Conclusion

This chapter provides a systematic description of the data collection and analysis processes and furthermore, it sets the stage for the analysis of the findings presented in Chapter Five. The
conceptualization of the drivers and description of research design laid the groundwork necessary in examining the relationships between the themes identified in the three data sources. These data offer rich evidence of events, actors, relationships, and characteristics, considered “critical” in the rise of the FSLN.

The next chapter exposes the critical mechanisms, carriers, and agency that supported the rise of the FSLN as vanguard of the anti-Somoza movement, explaining how these elements relate to one another in describing the vanguardism process.
“We were dealing with a clandestine politico-military organization, comprised of a small group of men and women with a great deal of discipline focused on achieving the revolutionary objectives of the organization....”

Sandinista Commander

The neoinstitutional literature suggests that institutional mechanisms, carriers, and agency, play a central role in institutionalization. The evidence uncovered in this study substantiates this premise. Through a triangulation process and analysis of the data, relationships between the drivers – mechanisms, carriers, and agency, and dependent variable – the vanguardism of the FSLN, are exposed to answer the main question: **How do mechanisms, carriers, and agency, as institutional elements, explain the vanguardism of the FSLN?**

Findings recurring frequently within one data source or which occur across data sources were deemed “critical” in the rise of the FSLN and used as evidence. This “evidence” was analyzed to determine relationships between neoinstitutional mechanisms, carriers, and agency, and the vanguardism process of the FSLN.

**Critical mechanisms, carriers, and agency**

Recalling the questions of this study, the first question asked: **What types of mechanisms, carriers, and agency, were identified as critical in the rise of the FSLN?**

**Critical elements revealed in the newspaper article data**

Events, actors, relationships, and characteristics recurring frequently in the data were determined to be “critical” in the rise of the FSLN. See Appendix B for a list of more than thirty elements in the newspaper articles. Those, on which most agreement was reached, the “critical” mechanisms, carriers and agency revealed in the newspaper article data, are seen in Table 1:
Recalling Chapter Three, *mechanisms* are a “delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001). *Carriers* are the “vehicles which convey cultural-cognitive elements of institutions: symbolic systems; relational systems; routines; and artifacts (Jepperson, 1991). Lastly, *agency* examines the contribution of individual actors in supporting the institutionalization process (see Christensen et al, 1997 and Oliver, 1991).

Among the critical elements revealed in the newspaper data, mechanisms of force illustrated by the raid on Chema Castillo’s house, and the assault on the National Palace are worth highlighting because they exposed the weakness of the regime and in conjunction with manifestos (which explained the motives behind each operation), introduced the FSLN into the

---

**Table 1: Critical elements revealed in the newspaper articles data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Elements in the Newspaper Article Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mechanisms</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coercive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Raid on Chema Castillo’s house as mechanism of force;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assault on National Palace as mechanism of force;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- September insurrection (mechanism of force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- National Strike (influence and force mechanism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normative</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Interpretation and Framing: of Sandino's struggle; the Kupia-Kumi pact; 1972 earthquake; 1974 elections; Pedro J. Chamorro’s assassination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Carriers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Symbolic Systems</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sandino and his legacy as a historical frame (carrier of meaning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- U.S.-policy 1920-1940 as a cultural and historical frame;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relational Systems</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The MPU as a network of communication and mobilization (carrier of ideas; important in diffusion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Nicaraguan moderates split (influence mechanism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relationship between Somoza and the Carter Administration (delegitimation of regime)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Routines</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Christmas party raid and assault on National Palace as organizational routines as carriers (modes of acting and problem solving as carriers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agency</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Entrepreneurs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Carlos Fonseca Amador as institutional entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intermediaries</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cuba, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama’s role as Intermediaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fidel Castro’s influence in re-unifying the FSLN’s three tendencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Group of Twelve in gaining cognitive, normative and regulative legitimacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
Nicaraguan political scene and helped internationalize the crisis. These also exemplified the organization’s ability to tie its operational objectives with its ideological goals.

Other elements worth noting here form Table 1 are the use of framing and interpretation mechanisms by the FSLN, illustrated by the organization’s response to the Kupia-Kumi pact, 1972 earthquake, 1974 elections, and Pedro J. Chamorro’s assassination. The FSLN’s responses to these events were instrumental in de-legitimizing the Somoza regime.

Critical elements revealed in the interview data

The critical elements exposed through the interview data were derived from the identification of recurring critical events, actors, relationships, and characteristics. Among these, three elements are particularly worth discussing.

First, the influences of the Cuban revolution and the revolutionary intellectualism of Ché Guevara as mimetic mechanisms were instrumental in the FSLN’s organization. Guevara’s concept of the “guerilla focus” and the “armed struggle” as a model for organization, served as “scripts” for the FSLN to follow as it organized and developed into the vanguard.

Second, the implementation of communiqués as carriers of ideas, objectives, and information were instrumental in the rise of the FSLN because they helped expose and denounce the so-called crimes of the regime, and served as instruments of political analysis, publicity, and as a way to rouse the population to take up arms against the regime (“call to action”).

Third, the role of the Movimiento del Pueblo Unido (MPU) which acted as a communication network was particularly important in mobilization as popular alliances produced through the MPU helped consolidate support for the “armed struggle.” The “critical” mechanisms, carriers and agency revealed in the interview data are described in Table 2:
Table 2: Critical elements revealed in the interview data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Carriers</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>Carlos Fonseca Amador’s role in theorization and diffusion; Sandino and his legacy as a historical frame (carrier of meaning; symbol; link to Somoza Garcia; martyrdom; nationalized the cause)</td>
<td>Institutional Entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>U.S.-policy 1920-1940 as a cultural and historical frame (carrier of meaning and historical context)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mimetic</td>
<td>Generalized opposition to the regime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routines</td>
<td>Routine Systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Critical elements revealed in the secondary qualitative data**

The secondary qualitative data revealed a third set of elements considered critical in the rise of the FSLN. From these data, the dual role played by Carlos Fonseca Amador as both a carrier (as theorist) and as agency (as institutional entrepreneur) is highlighted. Also, it is worth
noting the importance of the Group of Twelve, Roman Catholic Church, and international coalition of Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica, in the role of intermediaries (agency). These proved to be instrumental in the FSLN’s attainment of legitimacy, both nationally as well as internationally.

A third element worth mentioning from this data set is Fidel Castro's influential role in re-unifying the FSLN's three tendencies (illustration of intermediary element of agency). Towards the end of 1978, Castro requested to meet with Sandinista leaders of the three factions in Havana. According to the data, Castro called upon the Sandinista leaders to encourage a reunification of the three factions (Prolonged Popular War, Proletarian, and Insurrectional (also known as the third tendency) because he believed that unification was vital, and some would even argue, necessary in the revolutionary process which the FSLN was involved in.

Yet a fourth important element from this data set exposes the important role of the “popular” church in combat (linking Christianity with the struggle for liberation). The term “popular” church was used to describe a new revolutionary role for Christianity whose main objective was the liberation of the masses and the oppressed (later became known as “theology of liberation”). The data revealed Catholic priests (see Appendix D) engaging in religious activity (Including Mass) while in a combat setting, which the data also suggest was important because it gave the revolutionary struggle a “crusade-like” persona. Table 3 lists the critical elements identified in the secondary qualitative data derived from the identification of recurring critical events, actors, relationships, and characteristics.
Table 3: Critical elements revealed in the secondary qualitative data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Carriers</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Raid on Chema Castillo’s house as mechanism of force;</td>
<td>-Communique in preserving and transmitting ideas; creating language of power; creating; modifying; and translating ideas.</td>
<td>-Carlos Fonseca Amador as institutional entrepreneur in the creation and diffusion of beliefs and norms (development, recognition, and naming of a recurrent problem to which no preexisting institution provides a satisfactory repertoire of responses);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Assault on National Palace as mechanism of force;</td>
<td>-Carlos Fonseca Amador’s role in theorization and diffusion;</td>
<td>-Intermediaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Physical fights with the National Guard as mechanism of force;</td>
<td>-Sandino and his legacy as a historical frame (carrier of meaning; symbol; link to Somoza Garcia; martyrdom; nationalized the cause)</td>
<td>-Cuba, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama’s role as Intermediaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Somoza’s widespread repression in 1975 (mechanism of force)</td>
<td>-U.S.-policy 1920-1940 as a cultural and historical frame (carrier of meaning and historical context)</td>
<td>-Fidel Castro’s influence in re-unifying the FSLN’s three tendencies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-September insurrection (mechanism of force)</td>
<td>-Generalized opposition to the regime</td>
<td>-The Group of Twelve in gaining cognitive, normative and regulative legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-The battle at Pancasán in 1967 (signaled first confrontation of FSLN with National Guard)</td>
<td>-Relational Systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Military assault on National Guard’s garrison in October of 1977 - transformed the struggle to a national stage (mechanism of force)</td>
<td>-The MPU as a network of communication and mobilization (popular alliances; helped consolidate support for the “armed struggle” as the solution</td>
<td>-The Catholic Church in role of legitimizing agent for the FSLN and de-legitimizing agent for the regime; role as mediator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>-Division (unification) of FSLN into three tendencies (Exposed dominance of the insurrectional tendency)</td>
<td>-The popular church’s role in combat (linking Christianity with the struggle for liberation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Interpretation and Framing: of Sandino’s struggle; the Kupia-Kumi pact (last hope for the traditional opposition); 1972 earthquake (exposed regime’s corruption and abuse of power); 1974 elections (continuismo); assassination of Pedro J. Chamorro (match that ignited the fire); murder of ABC’s Bill Stewart by National Guard</td>
<td>-FSLN student movement formed in 1968 (linked with the armed student movement of the FSLN)</td>
<td>-U.S. role as mediator (Somocism without Somoza (viewed as the preferred U.S. policy; U.S.-led plebiscite fails)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mimetic</td>
<td>-Creation of a National Guard-special forces unit (EEBI)</td>
<td>-Marginal Players</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Mimetic isomorphism from the Cuban Revolution (script to follow); Che Guevara’s revolutionary influence (“focalism” and the guerrilla armed struggle model of organization)</td>
<td>-Routine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-The Christmas party raid and assault on National Palace as organizational routines as carriers (modes of acting and problem solving)</td>
<td>-Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN): exposed the activism of business community and orchestrated work stoppages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Communique (carriers of ideas, objectives, and information; exposure; denouncement; political analysis; publicity; and “call to action”.</td>
<td>-The Independent Liberal Party (PLI) as moral reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shared by: Chapter Five: Institutional Elements in the Vanguardism of the FSLN
**Agreement in the data with respect to critical elements**

The triangulation of the “critical” elements shows substantial agreement in the data about elements deemed to be critical in the rise of the FSLN. The evidence exposes agreement of the data with respect to events, actors, relationships, and characteristics considered “critical” in the rise of the FSLN (see Table 4).

Among the events considered critical in the rise of the FSLN, there appeared to be substantial agreement that the *Kupia-Kumi* pact – the FSLN’s response to the *Kupia-Kumi* pact, denouncing the legitimacy of the traditional opposition (particularly the Conservative Party), describes an interpretation mechanism, the raid on Chema Castillo’s house (mechanism of force that signaled the beginning of the insurrectional stage), the disintegration of the FSLN into three *factions* which later resulted in the rise of the “third” tendency (*Terceristas*) as the one chosen by the FSLN (and influenced by Fidel Castro) to lead the revolution, the assassination of Pedro J. Chamorro (response to by FSLN illustrates interpretation mechanism) as the event that convinced the opposition that Somoza needed to be removed at all costs, and the assault at the National Palace (a mechanism of force) in exposing the weakness of the regime.

Among the actors considered critical in the rise of the FSLN, there is agreement in the data that Carlos Fonseca Amador was a vital element in the vanguardism of the FSLN, through his dual role in theorization (carrier), and as an institutional entrepreneur (agency). The data finds substantial agreement suggesting that Fonseca Amador’s ability to link Sandino’s struggle of the 1930s with the insurrection of the 1970s was vital in differentiating the FSLN from other actors of the movement and furthermore, linked the FSLN with a broader historical and cultural frame.
Similarly, the data reveal considerable agreement with respect to critical relationships in the rise of the FSLN. In this regard, the role of the Group of Twelve as a legitimizing agent is emphasized.

There is ample evidence to suggest that the creation of the FSLN was instrumental in gaining legitimacy because it afforded the FSLN a more “moderate” or perhaps, less “radical” image, which many Nicaraguans still found disconcerting. Along similar lines, there is agreement in the data that the assistance from Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica were also instrumental in this regard, particularly as the FSLN tried to gain the support of the Organization of American States and the Carter Administration.

Lastly, the data shows considerable agreement with respect to characteristics considered critical in the rise of the FSLN. Among them, the FSLN’s characteristic of an instrument of “armed struggle” is considered a fundamental element in the vanguardism of the FSLN. The data agreed that the FSLN’s capacity to “lead the physical fights” on the streets and countryside, proved vital to its gaining the support from the population, particularly the peasantry. This characteristic was also important because it distinguished the FSLN as the only actor that was “willing to risk all” for the cause. The data suggested that this perception, held particularly by peasants and workers, (whom the data suggested regarded FSLN as having the interest of the people in mind, as opposed to other actors who were seen as bourgeoisie capitalists) was instrumental in the rise of the FSLN as the vanguard of the movement. Agreement among the data is revealed in Table 4 below.
Table 4: Elements considered critical in the rise of the FSLN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EVENTS OR &quot;HAPPENINGS&quot;</th>
<th>ACTORS</th>
<th>RELATIONSHIPS</th>
<th>CHARACTERISTICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Kupia-Kumi Pact (normative interpretation mechanism)</td>
<td>-Sandino (historical framing mechanism; interpretation; symbolic carrier (&quot;planted the seed of sandinismo in Nicaragua))</td>
<td>-Relationship with Panama: Important logically and in the role of legitimizing agent (intermediary-Agency)</td>
<td>-Instrument of armed struggle (mimetic mechanism) linking the FSLN with the revolutionary strategies observed in the Cuban revolution; Guevara’s concept of armed guerilla struggle as a &quot;Script to follow&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Raid on Chema Castillo’s house (coercive mechanism of force)</td>
<td>-Carlos Fonseca Amador (theorist-symbolic systems carrier in diffusion and theorization; as agency in role of institutional entrepreneur in diffusion and theorization)</td>
<td>-Relationship with Cuba: Important as principal inspiration through the Cuban revolution and the intellectual influence of Ernesto Che Guevara (focalism and the armed guerrilla struggle-mimetic isomorphism mechanism)</td>
<td>-Historical link to the past (U.S. occupation and Sandino): normative interpretation and framing mechanisms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Assasination of Pedro J. Chamorro (reaction to a normative interpretation mechanism)</td>
<td>-Pedro J. Chamorro (reacting to his assassination illustrates a normative mechanism)</td>
<td>-Relationship with Costa Rica: Important logically and as in the role of legitimizing agent (intermediary-Agency)</td>
<td>-Politico-military organization (linked with coercive elements of force and domination): ability to conduct physical fights on the streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Assault on the National Palace (coercive mechanism of force)</td>
<td>-The group of Twelve (legitimizing agent-Agency element)</td>
<td>-Relationship with Venezuela: Important financially and in the role of legitimizing agent (particularly the role of Carlos A. Perez-President of Venezuela in &quot;selling&quot; the FSLN to President Carter); (intermediary-Agency)</td>
<td>-Clandestineness (linked with Somoza’s widespread oppression in 1975 (mechanisms of force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Murder of Bill Stewart (reaction to interpretation mechanism)</td>
<td>-The U.S. in mediator role (relational systems carrier)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Mostly comprised of young individuals (linked to relational systems carriers (the FSLN student movement))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Moderates split (influence mechanism)</td>
<td>-The Catholic Church (legitimizing agent for the FSLN; role as mediator-Agency)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Participation of workers students, peasants and petit bourgeoisie: linked to relational systems carriers (MPU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-National strike (mechanism of force and influence)</td>
<td>-The National Guard (historical framing and interpretation mechanisms)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Employment of Communiques strategy as carriers of ideas, objectives, and information; exposure; denunciation; political analysis; publicity; and “call to action” (routines as carriers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-U.S. mediation fails (relational systems carrier)</td>
<td>Somoza as products of U.S. imperialism (link to Somoza G. and Sandino’s execution; also source of de facto legitimacy for FSLN, produced by his own loss of legitimacy-Agency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Division of FSLN into three tendencies (relational systems carrier)</td>
<td>Relationship with Panama: Important logically and in the role of legitimizing agent (intermediary-Agency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Repression by Somoza in 1975 (mechanism of force)</td>
<td>Relationship with Costa Rica: Important logically and as in the role of legitimizing agent (intermediary-Agency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-September insurrection (mechanism of force)</td>
<td>Relationship with Venezuela: Important financially and in the role of legitimizing agent (particularly the role of Carlos A. Perez-President of Venezuela in &quot;selling&quot; the FSLN to President Carter); (intermediary-Agency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Organization of MPU (relational systems carrier)</td>
<td>Relationship with Panama: Important logically and in the role of legitimizing agent (intermediary-Agency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Unification of FSLN’s three tendencies (relational systems carrier)</td>
<td>Relationship with Costa Rica: Important logically and as in the role of legitimizing agent (intermediary-Agency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Managua earthquake (reaction to framing mechanism)</td>
<td>Relationship with Panama: Important logically and in the role of legitimizing agent (intermediary-Agency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1974 elections (reaction to interpretation and framing mechanism)</td>
<td>Relationship with Costa Rica: Important logically and as in the role of legitimizing agent (intermediary-Agency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The relationships observed between the “critical” elements in the rise of the FSLN (as Table 4 shows), and neoinstitutional mechanisms, carriers, and agency, provided the evidence necessary to answer question one.

**Relationship of elements in the vanguardism of the FSLN**

The next question asked: *How mechanisms, carriers, and agency were related in describing the vanguardism of the FSLN?* Some of the ways mechanisms, carriers, and agency were related in describing the vanguardism of the FSLN were illustrated by the duality of the roles played by elements, the combined effects produced by the elements, the interaction of elements to distinguish the FSLN, and the sequential progression of the elements.

*The duality of roles*

The findings revealed that mechanisms, carriers, and agency played multiple roles in supporting the rise of the FSLN, in particular, elements involving agency. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) arose out of the Nicaraguan people’s need to have a “vanguard organization” capable of taking political power through direct struggle against its enemies. The vanguardism of the FSLN was explained as a process involving planning, organization, and the employment of tactics necessary for insurrection, according to the data presented. This process required a centralized authority to train, discipline, and direct, the undirected, untrained, and undisciplined masses (see Lenin, 1902). In this sense, Carlos Fonseca Amador (in the role of Institutional Entrepreneur) was fundamental. Carlos Fonseca Amador played an equally important role, however, as a *carrier* in theorization and framing (observed in Fonseca Amador’s linking of the FSLN’s struggle of the 1960s and 1970s with Sandino’s struggle of the 1930s).

Sandino’s struggle against American aggression and Yankee-imperialism and eventually his execution, elevated him to a status of “hero-martyr.” The FSLN’s adoption of Sandino as a
symbol of nationalism and anti-imperialism (which Fonseca Amador inspired) linked the organization with the past, particularly with Sandino’s seven-year war against the Marines and U.S. occupation. The adoption of Sandino by Carlos Fonseca Amador (his role in theorization and framing) afforded the FSLN a distinctively Nicaraguan persona, which eventually permitted the FSLN to fuse together all the different sectors of society as one unified Sandinista opposition (conversation with Jaime Wheelock, 1986).

Furthermore, Fonseca Amador was instrumental in interpreting and diffusing the idea that the Somoza dictatorship and Yankee imperialism represented the “enemy” in the Marxist conception, as the data suggest. The FSLN, as is presumably the case with vanguardist organizations, generally is the product of a dichotomous relationship with “the enemy” (individual, regime, government, political system) (see Perez, 1991), a concept that the Marxist tradition sees as a precondition for revolution.

By identifying “the enemy” (see interview with Jaime Wheelock, 1986) and establishing a link with the past, the FSLN was able to embed itself into a broader cultural and historical frame. Carlos Fonseca Amador’s role in theorization was instrumental in this respect (see Fonseca Amador, 1974). In doing so, the FSLN achieved a unique and advantageous position relative to other organizations within the movement.

The combined effects of elements

A second way in which mechanisms, carriers, and agency were related in explaining the vanguardism of the FSLN had to do with the combined effects of elements. In particular, the combined effects produced by the elements in legitimation.

The FSLN sought to legitimate itself by “destroying the incumbent government’s legitimacy” (see Anderson, 2006). The way the FSLN achieved this objective was through interpretation and
framing mechanisms which it employed to “make sense” of the events that were taking place in Nicaragua at the time. Several critical events illustrate this:

The *Kupia-Kumi* Pact in 1971 in which Conservative leader Agüero and Somoza Debayle agreed to a series of constitutional amendments, that allowed Somoza Debayle to seek a second consecutive term (previously unconstitutional) and ultimately win the 1974 elections. The FSLN, mainly through the work of Carlos Fonseca, exposed this event as clear evidence of a void in Nicaragua regarding a real opposition to Somoza. Fonseca Amador denounced this event in his writings (see Appendix D) and exposed to the population, the need for a new alternative, which he later explained, could only be found in an organization like the FSLN.

Fonseca Amador’s interpretation of the *Kupia Kumi* pact produced an even greater effect in the vanguardism of the FSLN, when tied together with another mechanism – framing – which Fonseca Amador used to place the *Kupia-Kumi* pact within a greater cultural and historical frame. Through the implementation of framing, Fonseca Amador was able to convince the population (as exposed through his manifestos and letters condemning the Somoza regime) that the traditional opposition was also to blame for Somoza and in fact only represented the interests of the rich – who Fonseca Amador referred to as the *bourgeoisie*.

In similar fashion, the FSLN, once again through manifestos and writings by Fonseca Amador, exposed the veracity of the regime, accusing Somoza of appropriating relief aid for the victims of the earthquake which destroyed much of the capital in 1972. Here, Fonseca Amador’s role illustrates an interpretation mechanism but the significance of this event comes from Fonseca Amador’s use of the media to diffuse these ideas throughout the population, illustrating here the combined effects of mechanisms in the vanguardism of the FSLN.
Furthermore, even though the FSLN exhibited a high degree of “social fitness” (support from the people) and was compatible with the dominant social class strata (the masses), the FSLN recognized the importance of gaining the support of the private sector, the church (Roman Catholic), as well as international support, particularly the U.S. In this pursuit, the FSLN sought to gain legitimacy by adopting a legitimizing agent (which became known as the Group of Twelve) which was a group composed of twelve prominent members of Nicaraguan society, who were highly respected inside Nicaragua as well as internationally (interview with Jaime Wheelock, 1986). The data supported the view that the participation of the Group of Twelve in the Broad Opposition front (FAO) legitimized the FSLN nationally and internationally.

Along with the creation of the Group of Twelve, the FSLN formed coalitions with moderates and other groups that opposed the regime, and was able to obtain international endorsement from Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. Hence, the role of this international coalition, acting as intermediaries, helped the FSLN gain the support of the international community and perhaps most important, convince the Carter administration that it could be “trusted” as a viable candidate, once Somoza was removed.

Along these same lines, the Carter administration shift in policy (human rights) vis-à-vis the Somoza regime was paramount in the vanguardism of the FSLN. The Carter Administration grew increasing concerned with alleged human rights violations by the National Guard (particularly following the 1974 raid to Chema Castillo’s house by the FSLN), which had a detrimental effect on the legitimacy of the FSLN and in Somoza’s ability to conserve the support of his “friends” in Congress but particularly from President Carter (illustrates a relational systems carrier).
Arguably the most significant element in this regard was the FSLN’s response to Pedro J. Chamorro’s assassination in 1978. The FSLN accused Somoza for Chamorro’s murder and used the event as a rallying cry to solidify its position within the opposition movement, and garner the support of groups and individuals which prior to Chamorro’s assassination, were still undecided about whether to “close ranks” with the FSLN as the last option to overthrow the dictatorship. Chamorro was highly respected across much of Nicaraguan society and viewed by many Nicaraguans as the singular “voice” of opposition to the regime. His murder was considered by many as the catalyst that set into motion the final stages of the insurrection (see Appendices, B, C and D).

Lastly, the murder of ABC News Correspondent Bill Stewart at the hands of the National Guard in June 1979, which was filmed live by Stewart’s ABC news crew, aired on all networks on prime time, back in the U.S. The FSLN (intermediaries and marginal players such as Catholic priests who supported the FSLN) capitalized on this event by condemning the act in letters addressed to the Organization of American States, interpreting the act as a blatant disrespect for human rights in Nicaragua (see Appendix D).

This condemnation was mainly directed to President Carter. The FSLN saw an opportunity to convince President Carter that the Somoza regime represented a political liability to his administration, given the administration’s position regarding human rights violations. The FSLN’s response to the Stewart assassination illustrates an interpretation mechanism.

*The integration of elements to differentiate the FSLN*

A third way in which mechanisms, carriers, and agency were related in explaining the vanguardism of the FSLN was in the way the elements were integrated to differentiate the FSLN from the other actors of the movement. There is considerable agreement in the data (see
Appendices, B, C and D) to suggest that the FSLN’s distinctive organizational characteristics proved critical in its vanguardism process. For example, the interviews exposed significant organizational differences in the FSLN, in contrast with other actors in the opposition. Most notably, the findings revealed that the politico-military capacity of the FSLN, as described through its incorporation of Ché Guevara’s concept of the “armed struggle” and its capacity to lead and organize the physical fights on the streets against the National Guard, proved vital in the FSLN’s vanguardism. Figure 13 illustrates these elements:

Figure 13: Differences of the FSLN from other actors

The interview findings also revealed unique organizational characteristics of the FSLN that were instrumental in its vanguardism. Among these, the clandestine nature of the organization
proved to be a critical element in the organization’s survival. Following the Chema Castillo raid in December of 1974, Somoza Debayle “tightened his grip” in his attempt to bring to justice, any person or group responsible for the raid that resulted in the killing of Dr. Chema Castillo, a close friend of Somoza Debayle’s. As a result, the FSLN was obligated to conduct its planning and organization during most of the insurrection, clandestinely. In fact, the death of Carlos Fonseca Amador during an ambush by the National Guard came as a bit of a surprise to many Nicaraguans, given the FSLN’s ability to remain undetected, particularly Fonseca Amador who himself had eluded capture for years.

Another element of note is the FSLN’s “mystic.” Inspired by the legacy of Sandino and later the Cuban revolution, the FSLN (primarily through the writings of Carlos Fonseca Amador) was able to infuse in its members a sense of discipline built on the heroism and valor of Sandino and Ché, calling upon its members to endure great sacrifices and if necessary, die for the cause. The findings expose the important role played in this regard, by the youth and student movements, as well as the workers, peasants, and the petit bourgeoisie\(^1\). Figure 14 exposes these elements:

\(^1\) In a Marxist sense, \textit{petit bourgeoisie} refers to a class that lies between the working class and the capitalists.
Yet another element that is worth mentioning here is the important role of communiqués used by the FSLN. These communiqués, that illustrate the use of media as a relational systems carrier, were implemented exclusively by the FSLN as a way to communicate with the people and diffuse ideas across the movement. The communiqués were either aired via radio through the FSLN’s clandestine radio network (Radio Sandino) or published in Nicaraguan newspapers. Also, the FSLN combined the implementation of communiqués with tactical military operations (or terrorist-type such as the case with the 1974 raid to Chema Castillo’s house and the 1978 assault on the National Palace), in such a way that the tactical operations would act as mechanisms of force to pressure the Somoza regime to publish these communiqués in the government’s official newspapers or have them air on the government’s radio network. Figure 15 below shows the nature and purpose of the FSLN communiqués as exposed through the interview responses:
The sequential progression of the elements

A fourth way in which mechanisms, carriers, and agency were related in explaining the vanguardism of the FSLN is in the sequential progression of the elements in the vanguardism process. The data showed that the vanguardism of the FSLN is explained as a sequential process in which elements appear to “build” on each other. This sequential progression of the elements is a vital characteristic describing the process because it highlights the importance of the chronology of the events. For example, the data exposes the importance of the Kupia-Kumi pact
in 1971 and the earthquake in 1972 (responses to these illustrate interpretation mechanisms) in
the vanguardism process. Both events took place before the raid on Chema Castillo’s house in
1974. As part of the operation and demands placed on the Somoza Government, the FSLN asked
that a communiqué be published in newspapers and broadcast by radio, introducing the FSLN to
the population and explaining its historic program and purpose. In these communiqués, the
FSLN condemned Agüero for his pact with Somoza and accused Somoza of misappropriating
relief aid that was destined for the victims of the earthquake.

More evidence of a sequential relationship is observed as one analyzes the assassination of
Pedro J. Chamorro in January 1978. This event is perhaps the most significant event of the
insurrectional period for reasons already discussed. However, in terms of the progression of the
events, the assassination of Pedro J. Chamorro set off a series of events that would prove vital to
the rise of the FSLN. One event in particular is what became known as the September
insurrection.

Even though many insurrections were taking place throughout Nicaragua, September 1978 is
considered vital because it was accompanied by a national strike led by the Supreme Council for
the Private Enterprise (COSEP, formerly known as COSIP) who had been reluctant to support
the FSLN because they considered the group too radical. The September insurrection helped to
convince the COSEP that the FSLN was the only viable option to overthrow the regime.

**Vanguardism as a process**

Having explained how mechanisms, carriers, and agency were related in explaining the
vanguardism of the FSLN, question three focused on: *How can vanguardism as a process be
described?*
Vanguardism as a process is described as a cultural cognitive process occurring in stages, and in which the environment plays a critical role. The data revealed a predominance of cultural-cognitive elements in the vanguardism of the FSLN as is explained below. The data also showed the environment playing a significant role in shaping the processes and guiding the progression of events – both of which are evidenced in the description of the stages of the process explained below.

*The stages of vanguardism*

The evidence suggested that vanguardism as a process can be described in stages. In the case of the vanguardism of the FSLN, the process occurred in stages. The data revealed four stages: a *pre-insurrectional* stage, an *insurrectional* stage, an *accumulation of strength* stage, and a *consolidation of forces* stage.

*Figure 16: The Stages of the vanguardism process*

*As the data showed.*

There was general agreement across the data that the December 1974 raid on Chema Castillo’s house marked the beginning of the insurrectional period, as it marked the introduction of the FSLN into the mainstream of Nicaraguan political affairs and propelled the organization and the cause onto the international stage. Consequently, the events taking place prior to December 1974 can be described as part of the pre-insurrectional stage. Most notably, U.S. occupation between 1913-1933, the creation of the Nicaraguan National Guard in 1927, Sandino’s *fight* with the Marines in the 1930s, Sandino’s execution in 1934, the founding of the
FSLN in 1961, the *Kupia-Kumi* pact in 1971, the earthquake in 1972 and the presidential elections in 1974. The chart below shows how the events occurred over time.

**Chart 1: Timeline of Insurrectional Period**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>FSLN splits into three factions (tendencies): Proletarian; Prolonged Popular War; and Insurrectional tendency</td>
<td>Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, UDEL founder and chief editor of <em>La Prensa</em> is assassinated.</td>
<td>A mediation process led by the OAS collapses when President Somozas refuses to hold a national plebiscite and insist on staying in power until 1981.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>The FSLN establishes the National Patriotic Front (Frente Patriótico Nacional - FPN) which includes The Twelve (Los Doce) the Independent Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Independiente - PLI) the Popular Social Christian Party (Partido Popular Social Cristiano - PPSC).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>The Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democrático Nicaragüense - MDN) is established.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Constitutional reforms allow General Somoza to seek reelection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>MDN joins UDEL, the Conservative Party, and The Twelve (Los Doce) to form the Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio de Oposición - FAO).</td>
<td></td>
<td>The National Reconstruction Junta (Junta de Reconstrucción Nacional), a provisional Nicaraguan government in exile consisting of five members is organized in Costa Rica. This is known as the “Puntarenas Pact”.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>UDEL published a Programme for Democratization of Nicaragua. The “Group of Twelve” (Grupo de Los Doce) composed of representatives from different sectors of society, is formed.</td>
<td></td>
<td>FSLN establishes the United People’s Movement (Movimiento Del Pueblo Unido - MPU)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>President Somoza resigns and leaves the country, handing over power to Francisco Maimo Ureña, who was to transfer the government to the National Reconstruction Junta. FSLN appropriates the victory as the Sandinista Revolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FSLN commandeers the National Palace/ holds almost 2,000 government officials and members of Congress hostage for two days.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Anastasio Somoza Debayle wins the presidential election by a 20-1 vote, igniting claims of fraud.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jimmy Carter is elected President of the United States. Carlos Fonseca Amador-Founder of the FSLN is killed during a confrontation with the National Guard.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Twelve (Los Doce) withdraws from FAO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>FSLN commandeers a Christmas party at “Chema Castillo’s house” Democratic Union for Freedom (Unión Democrática de Liberación - UDEL) is founded by Pedro J. Chamorro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FSLN is strengthened when Cuban mediation led to an agreement among the three FSLN factions for a united Sandinista front.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These events, however, can be understood as occurring in stages.

Pre-insurrectional stage

The pre-insurrectional stage was characterized by a recognizable void of an insurrectional movement or organization capable of leading such a movement (see Fonseca Amador in Zimmerman, 2000). During the pre-insurrectional stage, preconditions for insurrection (symbolic systems) such as historical influences, events or “happenings,” or important changes to the environment, help expose “symptoms” of a bigger problem. The data reveals that at this stage, “planning” for insurrection (mimetic isomorphism) becomes critical and the role of institutional entrepreneurs is fundamental.

The newspaper articles revealed critical themes in each of the four stages of the insurrectional process. From the pre-insurrectional stage, the data exposed two primary themes: the Sandino affair (communication and confrontation with U.S. Marine forces in Nicaragua during the 1920s and 1930s), and the Kupia Kumi Pact signed by Conservative Leader Agüero with General Somoza Debayle in 1971. From these primary themes, sub-themes emerged as figure 17 illustrates:

Figure 17: Critical themes from the Pre-insurrectional stage
Insurrectional stage

The insurrectional stage was characterized by the implementation of “revolutionary means” to create the catalysts for insurrection. This stage involves the execution of “tactics” (including violent or terrorist-type) deemed “vital” to set the insurrection into motion. This stage is generally characterized by clandestineness as the vanguardist organization is now known and exposed to retaliation and sanctioning. The data exposed that during this stage, the role of institutional entrepreneurs (in theorization, interpretation and framing) continued to be fundamental (See Carlos Fonseca Amador in Zimmerman, 2000) while the roles of mechanisms (force mechanisms) and carriers (media and routines as carriers) were heightened. Figure 18 exposes critical themes from the newspaper articles to illustrate the importance of “tactics” as catalysts for insurrection (mechanisms of force) in the insurrectional stage:

Figure 18: Critical themes from the Insurrectional stage
Accumulation of strength stage

The accumulation of strength stage was characterized by processes that involved “training”, “directing”, and “disciplining” the masses (recall Slaughter, 1960). This stage was characterized by a shift from clandestineness to greater exposition. During this stage, the quest for legitimacy (legitimation) was fundamental and thus highlights the importance of the role of intermediaries (i.e. the Group of Twelve) and marginal players acting as legitimizing agents for the organization. At this point, the organization began to gain power and control of the movement. Figure 19 exposes critical themes from the Accumulation of Strength stage as the newspaper articles data revealed:

Figure 19: Critical themes from the Accumulation of Strength stage
Chapter Five: Institutional Elements in the Vanguardism of the FSLN

Consolidation of forces stage

The final stage in the vanguardism process was the consolidation of forces stage. This stage was characterized by widespread acceptance and support for the organization. In this stage, the organization achieved legitimacy and was recognized as the vanguard of the movement. At this stage, the organization consolidated power and achieved total control of the movement. The data as highlighted in Figure 20, concurs that the role of intermediaries and marginal players continued to be important (but more so in terms of consolidating strength rather than gaining legitimacy) in this stage while mechanisms (force, influence) and carriers (relational systems, routines) played more central roles.

Figure 20: Critical themes from the Consolidation of Forces stage:
Vanguardism as a cultural-cognitive process

Recalling the definition formulated in Chapter Three, a vanguardist organization might be defined as one that achieves power and control of a movement through revolutionary means involving the planning of insurrection through training, disciplining, and directing the masses, and the implementation of necessary tactics by a centralized authority, to gain political or governmental power.

The data revealed that the elements which supported the vanguardism of the FSLN were predominantly cultural-cognitive rather than normative or regulative. This claim is substantiated by the overwhelming evidence showing the centrality of agency in the process as well as the importance of cultural and historical elements.

Among the critical elements revealed through the data are mimetic isomorphism (as illustrated by the relationship of the FSLN with the Cuban revolution and Ché), interpretation, theorization, and framing (Carlos Fonseca Amador’s dual role as theorist and institutional entrepreneur). These were identified as fundamental in the vanguardism process.

Although it is likely that the process involved at least some normative or regulative elements, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the process was mainly supported by cultural-cognitive elements. For example, one might expect to find rules and procedures as being important for the FSLN internally, particularly as the organization dealt with persecution from the regime. As the data revealed, the FSLN was forced to operate clandestinely for most of the insurrectional period and therefore, it is plausible to expect that to remain undetected, FSLN members probably were expected to follow strict rules or procedures (as instructed by their leaders) for conducting meetings and organizing events, among other activities.
Mechanisms supporting vanguardism

The data revealed three types of mechanisms in the vanguardism of the FSLN: coercive, normative and, mimetic mechanisms (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). For example the mechanism of force (coercive) was observed throughout the insurrectional period and thus, was considered vital in the vanguardism process. Influence, interpretation and framing are normative mechanisms observed in the process, while mimetic isomorphism and theorization illustrate mimetic mechanisms. Figure 21 illustrates these three types of mechanisms supporting vanguardism:

Figure 21: Types of mechanisms supporting vanguardism

Carriers supporting vanguardism

Similarly, the data revealed that the vanguardism of the FSLN was supported by relational systems, symbolic systems and routines as carriers (see Scott, 2003; 2008). The symbolic systems carriers supporting this process are the media, theorists as carriers, cultural frames and historical frames (See Scott, 2003; 2008). The relational systems carriers supporting this process are networks of communication and mobilization (See Scott, 2003; 2008). Lastly the routines as carriers supporting this process are organizational routines (See Scott, 2003; 2008). The FSLN’s implementation of violent-armed-terrorist-type operations such as the raid on Chema Castillo’s house and the assault on the National Palace, illustrate the use of routines as carriers, particularly
in the way that communiqués were used as routines to be followed as integral elements in these operations.

**Figure 22: Types of carriers supporting vanguardism**

![Types of Carriers Supporting Vanguardism](image)

*As illustrated by the data.

**Elements of agency supporting vanguardism**

Lastly, the data showed that the vanguardism of the FSLN was supported by three types of agents: institutional entrepreneurs, intermediaries, and marginal players (See Scott, 2008). The principal actors which supported the vanguardism process were Carlos Fonseca Amador, whose dual role as both theorist (relational systems carrier) and institutional entrepreneur (agency) is of paramount importance to the vanguardism of the FSLN.

Other key actors were the respective heads of Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica. The roles of these individuals acting as intermediaries were instrumental, helping the FSLN obtain international support (legitimacy). In this sense, the Group of Twelve, also in the role of intermediary, was critical as it helped the FSLN to form alliances with moderate groups who opposed the regime. The Group of Twelve also afforded the FSLN a less radical image, which later helped the organization obtain to gain the acceptance of the Catholic Church and the business sector.

A third agency type – marginal players – is illustrated through the participation of groups such as the *Movimiento Democrático Nicaragüense* (Nicaraguan Democratic Movement) which
exposed the activism of the business community and orchestrated work stoppages, and the
Independent Liberal Party (PLI) which represented a moral reference for the FSLN (recall Table
2). Figure 23 shows these three types of agency elements supporting vanguardism.

**Figure 23: Types of agency elements supporting vanguardism**

![Diagram]

*as illustrated by the data.

**Relationships between vanguardism and institutionalization**

The fourth and final question asked: *What relationships exist between vanguardism and
institutionalization?* The data revealed two fundamental relationships between vanguardism and
institutionalization. First, the data revealed a relationship between the stages of vanguardism and
the stages of institutionalization. Second, the data revealed a relationship through the central role
which legitimacy plays in both processes.

*The stages of vanguardism and institutionalization*

A relationship was observed between the stages of vanguardism and the stages of
institutionalization (See Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). Tolbert and Zucker (1996) describe
institutionalization in stages. According to Tolbert and Zucker (1996), organizations undergo
four stages as they institutionalize: an innovation stage; a habitualization stage; an
objectification stage; and lastly a sedimentation stage.

The innovation stage involves innovation and advancement of ideas, solutions, and practices
by actors, in response to changes in political, technological or market conditions (see Tolbert and
Zucker, 1996). The organization is created but is only recognized as a formal organization by its members.

The next stage is the *habitualization* stage. In this stage, actors “scan” the environment in search of solutions. Viable solutions becomes more broadly accepted and habituated in interaction within and between organizations (See Scott, 2008), giving way to formal “theorization” (Strang and Meyer, 1993). In the *Innovation* stage, the organization is first recognized by actors outside the organization (Lawrence and Winn, 2001).

The third stage of institutionalization is the *objectification* stage. In the *objectification* stage, the organization is “widely diffused and accepted” (Lawrence and Winn, 2001). *Objectification* involves “the development of some degree of social consensus among organizational decision-makers concerning the value of structure, and the increasing adoption by organizations on the basis of that consensus” (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996 in Scott, 2008).

The final stage is the *Sedimentation* stage. In this stage, the organization is broadly accepted within a field (Leblebici et al; Meyer and Rowan; Stinchcombe; Zucker; in Lawrence and Winn, 2001). This stage is known as the phase of “saturation and complete legitimation” (Lawrence and Winn, 2001). In this final stage, “innovation spreads to virtually all of the relevant population of potential adopters” (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996 in Scott, 2008).

**Figure 24: The process of institutionalization**
Relationship between vanguardism and institutionalization

In the vanguardism process, the pre-insurrectional stage is associated with the innovation stage described by Tolbert and Zucker (1996). During this period, all three elements play a fundamental role: agency (Institutional Entrepreneurs) in institutional creation, theorization and diffusion; mechanisms (Mimetic Isomorphism, Frames and Theorization); and carriers (Symbolic Systems).

The insurrectional stage in the vanguardism process is associated with the habitualization stage of institutionalization. This period features mechanisms of force and influence (Coercive mechanisms), a continued role of agency in theorization, framing (Institutional Entrepreneurs), and a new role of agency (Intermediaries) in legitimation. Carriers play a lesser role during this stage.

The accumulation of strength stage in the vanguardism process is associated with the objectification stage of institutionalization. The roles of carriers (Symbolic Systems and Routines) and agency (Intermediaries and Marginal Players) are fundamental during this stage. A lesser role is played by mechanisms.

Lastly, the consolidation of forces stage in the vanguardism process is associated with the sedimentation stage of institutionalization. This stage features mechanisms (Coercive mechanisms-force, domination) and agency (Intermediaries and Marginal Players) in leading roles. The role of carriers (relational systems) is lesser in this final stage.
The centrality of legitimacy in the vanguardism process

The second relationship revealed in the data shows legitimacy as a fundamental element in both processes. The findings reveal a centrality of legitimacy in the vanguardism process which coincides with the neo-institutionalist theory’s conception that legitimacy is a central ingredient in organizational institutionalism (See Suchman, 1995; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008).

To illustrate this proposition, legitimacy was analyzed in the vanguardism of the FSLN. The findings reveal a strong association between the vanguardism of the FSLN and legitimacy. In order to assess “dimension of support”, newspaper articles were evaluated in order to determine “degree of social support” for or “desirability” with respect to three principal actors of the insurrectional period: the FSLN; Somoza and the National Guard (considered one combined actor) and the United States. With respect to the FSLN, the data yielded the following results:

Figure 26: Evaluative dimension with respect to the FSLN

*as illustrated by the data.
The data revealed zero (0) articles related to the FSLN in Stage I. For Stage II, 1 article was identified as *favorable* while eleven (11) were identified as *neutral* and three (3) as *critical*. Stage III revealed two (2) articles identified as *favorable*; three (3) as *neutral*; and one (1) as *critical*. Lastly in Stage IV, twenty-three (23) articles were identified as *favorable*; twenty-nine (29) as *neutral*; and three (3) as *critical*. Zero (0) articles were identified as *abrasive* with respect to the FSLN in any of the stages.

These findings suggest that legitimation as a process occurred gradually. However, based on the data, it becomes apparent that by Stage IV of the process, support for FSLN was very high, which in turn, suggests that legitimation most likely occurred during Stage III of the vanguardism process as Chart 2 illustrates:

**Chart 2: Trends in legitimacy with respect to the FSLN**

![Chart 2: Trends in legitimacy with respect to the FSLN](image)

With respect to Somoza and the National Guard, the data yielded the following results:
Stage I featured fourteen (14) articles identified as neutral with respect to Somoza and the National Guard; five (5) considered critical and six (6) deemed abrasive. Stage II featured one (1) article as favorable; nine (9) as neutral; six (6) as critical; and seven (7) as abrasive. Stage III identified fifteen articles (15) of which six (6) were deemed critical and nine (9) cataloged as abrasive with respect to Somoza and the National Guard. Lastly, stage IV showed a significant increase in both the number of articles identified as well as the number of articles considered “critical” or “abrasive”. Twenty-one (21) articles were categorized as being neutral. Twenty-one (21) were considered critical and sixteen (16) categorized as abrasive. Zero (0) articles were identified as favorable with respect to Somoza and the National Guard in Stage IV.

Here, the data reveals a consistent trend in the number of “critical” or “abrasive” articles about Somoza or the National Guard. These findings expose a gradual loss of legitimacy on the part of the regime, culminating in Stage IV, which shows an overwhelming rejection of Somoza and the Guard, as Chart 3 illustrates:
With respect to the United States in the role of mediator, the findings revealed:

**Figure 28: Evaluative dimension with respect to the U.S. in the role of mediator**

The evaluative dimension with respect to the United States was also analyzed. Stage I featured four (4) articles deemed *favorable* and two (2) considered *neutral*. Zero (0) articles were identified as either *critical* or *abrasive* in Stage I. For Stage two, one (1) article was identified as *favorable*, three (3) as *neutral*, two (2) as *critical*, and zero (0) as *abrasive*. Stage III identified only five (5) articles considered as *neutral* with respect to the U.S. Stage IV marked a significant change in the trend. Zero (0) articles were identified as *favorable*; twenty (20) articles were identified as *neutral*; two (2) as *critical*; and ten (10) as *abrasive*. 
These findings support the theory that the loss of legitimacy with respect to the U.S. is more a reflection of what many Nicaraguans perceived as incapacity by the United States to mediate a viable solution to the crisis. These findings are consistent with other data which explains how in the later stages of the insurrectional period, the U.S. was unsuccessful in forging an agreement between Somoza and the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) – which at the time was leading the movement. Many Nicaraguans believed that the U.S. was attempting to preserve the Nicaraguan political system (what the opposition referred to as Somocism without Somoza) which the U.S. perceived as important in preserving its political and economic interests in Nicaragua and Central America. Chart 4 illustrates these findings:

**Chart 4: Trends in legitimacy with respect to the U.S. in the role of mediator**

\[chart\]

The importance of legitimacy in the vanguardism process

These findings illustrate the mounting role of legitimacy in the vanguardism process, particularly in the later stages of the process. These findings showed that “legitimation” is a priority in the Accumulation of Strength stage, such that the legitimation efforts “bear fruit” in Consolidation of Strength stage, the final stage in the vanguardism process.
The results show an upward trend in the number of “favorable” articles with respect to the FSLN, suggesting an upward trend in the legitimacy of the FSLN. Conversely, the results show an upward trend in the number of “critical” or “abrasive” articles with respect to Somoza or the National Guard, suggesting a downward trend in the legitimacy of this combined actor. Lastly, the results show “neutrality” with respect to the United States during the first three stages. However in Stage Four, the evidence reveals a significant increase in the number of “abrasive” articles, suggesting a downward trend in legitimacy with respect to the United States.

These findings in general are consistent with the expectations of this research and with the literature. Maurer, 1971; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, and Walker and Zelditch, 1993; (in Deephouse and Suchman, 2008), ascertain that legitimation (and de-legitimation) is a process by which the legitimacy of the subject changes over time. Johnson (in Deephouse and Suchman, 2008) reminds that subjects of legitimation are almost innumerable and often include “an act, a rule, a procedure, a routine, a distribution, a position, a group or team, a group’s status structure, teamwork, a system of positions, an authority structure, an organization, organizational symbols, an organization’s form, practices, services, programs, a regime, a system of power, or a system of inequality.”

The findings suggest that the legitimacy of the FSLN increased over time as the organization became more organized and embedded in the organizational field. The creation of the Group of Twelve and the quasi-coalition of Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama, served as “legitimizing agents” in the latter stages of the vanguardism process. These elements, combined with a palpable abhorrence for Somoza and the National Guard, helped the FSLN gather national as well as international support-isolating the Somoza regime politically and financially.
Suchman (1995) reminds us that organizations “sometimes” gain legitimacy by “manipulating” rather than by conforming to (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) environments. The findings also suggest that the FSLN gained legitimacy by manipulating its environment. The FSLN “capitalized” on the assassination of Pedro J. Chamorro in January of 1978 and the murder of ABC correspondent Bill Stewart at the hands of the National Guard in June of 1979. The assassination of Pedro J. Chamorro “resulted in a broad refusal to talk and negotiate at all with the president, intensified the regime crisis, and dramatically shrank the acceptability of continuing Somoza’s rule” (Solaún, 2005).

The filmed murder of Bill Stewart in June of 1979 produced similar results. The murder was shown extensively in prime time so that the American people could see for themselves, the alleged brutality and disregard for human rights on the part of one of the United States oldest and most stanch allies. As U.S. Ambassador Solaún described, “…a stage of “truly wanton”, anarchic government violence developed…Rather than intimidate, the government repression produced greater outrage” (Solaún, 2005).

The murder of Bill Stewart came in light of an already growing discontent and disillusionment regarding the U.S.’s role as mediator. The findings might be interpreted as a loss of credibility and confidence of the part of the opposition and the Nicaraguan people in general, that the U.S. could mediate a viable solution to the crisis. As pointed out by COSEP leader Alfonso Robelo in Solaún (2005), “a wave of anti-American sentiment was developing because the United States was not acting decisively to solve the crisis.”

Adding to this growing sentiment, the Group of Twelve, which performed the role of “legitimizing agent” on behalf of the FSLN, withdrew from the FAO and mediation efforts led
by the United States in late 1978. This action further deteriorated the ability of the U.S. to achieve a viable solution and further discredited U.S. efforts (See Solaún, 2005).

The international community also lost confidence in the U.S. In June of 1979, the U.S. Secretary of State appeared before the OAS to propose the establishment of a transitional government, which would be a clear break from the past. That same day, the U.S. had proposed a resolution that would create a special delegation of the OAS that would work to constitute the Government of National Reconstruction, command an international military force to “pacify” Nicaragua and channel humanitarian assistance. The U.S. proposal was resoundingly defeated (received zero votes in favor) and the OAS chose an alternative course of action (See Solaún, 2005). The stance taken by the OAS in some ways, showed a lack of trust on the part of the international community with regards to a U.S. mediated solution. More importantly however, it exposed the lack of support on the part of the OAS to support a solution that excluded the FSLN – a position that resulted in greater legitimacy towards the FSLN from the international community.

The rise of a vanguardist organization

Recalling Chapter Three, a vanguardist organization exhibits distinctive characteristics. It is capable of rapid change, necessary tactics, the planning of insurrection and military operations requiring a centralized authority and discipline of the highest order and strong leadership developed over a long period of time (Slaughter, 1960).

A vanguardist organization implements revolutionary means rather than evolutionary means to achieve power and control of a movement (Slaughter, 1960). The vanguardist organization serves to “train, discipline, and direct” the “undirected, untrained, and undisciplined masses (see Lenin, 1902), and is generally associated with a historically important individual such as a hero
or martyr, and is often the product of a dichotomous relationship with “the enemy” (See Perez, 1991) in a Marxist context.

The vanguardist organization seeks to legitimate itself by “destroying the incumbent government’s legitimacy” (See Anderson, 2006) and exhibits a high degree of “social fitness” (support from the people) and compatibility with the dominant social class. The vanguardist organization’s ultimate goal is to gain power and control (usually political or governmental), and is directly embedded in a greater cultural and historical frame (See Fonseca-Amador, 1974) which places the organization in a unique and advantageous position relative to other organizations.

The evidence from the data suggests that the FSLN met all of these criteria. Looking back at the data, the FSLN was supported by a “formidable” platform featuring support from the masses and military force (high degree of social fitness) as revealed in the data.

The FSLN’s clandestine nature illustrates the FSLN’s organizational capacity under constraint (persecution from Somoza and the National Guard) to employ necessary tactics in the planning of insurrection and military operations. This was a necessary condition required to protect the leadership cadres, the organized elements, and ensure the logistics of acquiring arms from the exterior (from interview with Jaime Wheelock, 1986).

The FSLN, defined through its programmatic of the armed struggle, and its politics of alliances, did not “plant” a fight against the bourgeoisie or the landowners, but rather against the existing regime and its political head – the dictatorship (from Interview with Wheelock, 1986). The FSLN understood that the fundamental contradiction was U.S. domination; at the same time however, saw that locally, its expression was the dictatorship, and considered the Somoza regime the immediate enemy (exposes the dichotomous relationship with the “enemy”).
The FSLN was characterized by a centralized authority and discipline of the highest order with strong leadership developed over a long period of time (Slaughter, 1960). The data characterizes the FSLN as having a high degree of discipline and “mystic”. As one interview respondent describes:

The FSLN was a politico-military organization, operating in clandestine fashion, which counted with a small cadre of men and women with great discipline, with respect to achieving the revolutionary objectives of the organization.

The FSLN implemented revolutionary rather than evolutionary means to achieve power and control of a movement. The concept of “armed struggle”, the organization and leadership in conducting the physical fights on the streets, and the willingness to “risk life for the cause,” illustrate the implementation of revolutionary means to achieve power and control of the movement.

The FSLN served to “train, discipline, and direct” the “undirected, untrained, and undisciplined masses (see Lenin, 1902). The data reveals that Carlos Fonseca played a key role in organizing the day-to-day work of the FSLN, recruiting to its ranks, expanding its political influence, and planning its military operations (Zimmermann, 2000).

The FSLN is directly linked with a historically important individual, hero or martyr. Contributions 1 and 3 from Sandino’s legacy illustrate the importance of Sandino in this regard: Sandino as symbol of nationalism and anti-imperialism throughout Latin America: his determination and will to fight U.S. occupation became a symbol of nationalism and anti-imperialism throughout Latin America. Sandino as “Hero-martyr” of the FSLN: Sandino’s execution is also significant because it turned Sandino into a “hero-martyr.” Future generations of both admirers and critics continue to write about his life as well as his death (see Selser, 1978). Figure 29 also exposes the importance of Sandino’s legacy in the vanguardism of the FSLN, as evidenced from the interviews:
The FSLN sought to legitimate itself by destroying the legitimacy of the Somoza regime. The data agreed that the FSLN capitalized on significant events prior to and during the insurrection to delegitimize the Somoza regime (see Appendices, B and C). In particular, the data revealed how the FSLN exposed the National Guard as a “parallel apparatus of corruption,” exposed the inability of the traditional opposition to mount any real and legitimate opposition to the regime as evidenced by the *Kupia-Kumi* pact (which amended the constitutional allowing Somoza D. to seek reelection) and the 1974 electoral process. The data revealed how the FSLN exposed abuses of power by the National Guard and the greed of the regime by accusing the regime of appropriating relief for earthquake victims, and convinced the opposition (by blaming Somoza for the assassination of Pedro J. Chamorro) that Somoza “needed be removed at all costs.”
The de-legitimation of the Somoza regime exposed by the data served to legitimize the FSLN. The FSLN was successful in accumulating social fitness (See Anderson, 2006) and compatibility with the dominant social class through the implementation of communiqués. Figure 30 reveals interview respondents’ description of “opposition to Somoza” and Somocismo, in terms of its importance to the vanguardism of the FSLN. The respondents yielded the following evaluations of support for Somoza during the insurrectional period:

**Figure 30: Support for Somoza and the National Guard**

The FSLN’s implementation of communiqués served in this purpose as identified in the interviews (See Appendix C). Communiqués were used to “communicate with the masses, denounce the dictatorship, introduce the FSLN and its objectives to the world and convince the population that no other alternative capable of removing the dictatorship existed. The FSLN realized that only through an armed struggle in the name of the entire Nicaraguan nation would the objectives be achieved. Through the implementation of communiqués, the historically marginalized sectors of society would eventually gain conscience of the need to take up arms against the oppressive regime.

The FSLN was directly embedded in a greater cultural and historical frame (See Fonseca-Amador, 1974) which placed the organization in a unique and advantageous position relative to other organizations. The data revealed (see Fonseca Amador, 1974) a void in Nicaragua with
respect to the existence of a vanguardist organization. Fonseca Amador (1974) believed that the FSLN was the instrument capable of filling the void. In Fonseca Amador’s view, the FSLN “provided an instrument of struggle, to re-knit continuity with the past, to pick up a historical thread dropped in the 1930s” (Zimmermann, 2000).

The findings also suggest that the vanguardism of the FSLN illustrates the organization’s institutionalization process. This proposition is supported by the relationships observed between vanguardism and institutionalization.

Lastly, the findings suggest a central and direct association between legitimacy and the vanguardism process. The findings revealed that the legitimation of the FSLN together with the loss of legitimacy (de-legitimation) by the Somoza regime contributed significantly to its vanguardism. A case could be made that both were necessary ingredients in the process.

**Summary of the Chapter**

This chapter has examined the four questions of this study. These findings produced important observations about how mechanisms, carriers, and agency explain vanguardism.

First, the attribute of force was found to be fundamental in describing the vanguardism of the FSLN. The events or happenings identified as “critical” in the rise of the FSLN emphasized the incidence of mechanisms of force (as evidenced by the Raid on Chema Castillo’s house, the assault on the National Palace, the National Strike, Somoza’s oppression in 1975, and the September Insurrection) in the process.

Second, the role of agency was shown to be fundamental in the rise of the FSLN. The findings reveal that the vanguardism of the FSLN is characterized by multiple roles of agency, among them intermediaries as “legitimizing agents” (i.e. the Group of Twelve, Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica); the Catholic Church in a dual role as mediator and as intermediary; and the
fundamental role of Carlos Fonseca Amador as an institutional entrepreneur (involved in theorization, interpretation, and framing) and as a carrier in diffusing ideas, symbolic elements, and historical facts about Sandino, the importance of the Cuban revolution for Latin America and Nicaragua in particular, the historical implications of U.S. involvement in Nicaragua, the denouncement of the Somoza regime, and the role that the FSLN was to play in Nicaragua’s liberation, which the population, particularly the masses, had not been exposed to before.

Yet a third observation is that the FSLN was the only actor in the opposition movement that fit the profile of a “vanguardist organization.” The FSLN’s “clandestine” politico-military structure, ability to organize and lead the “physical fights” on the streets, characteristic of an “instrument of armed struggle”, and its direct link to the past, particularly in regards to Sandino and U.S. occupation, differentiated the FSLN from the other actors in the movement-helping to eventually project the FSLN into a “lead” role and vanguard for the movement.

Chapter Six provides implications from this study and offers recommendations for future research.
CHAPTER SIX
MAJOR FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

“It is said that insurrection has to be directed like science and like art. Our Vanguard, the Sandinista Front achieved both.”
Jaime Wheelock

Fundamentally, this study was concerned with explaining the vanguardism of the FSLN under a neoinstitutional lens, by identifying the mechanisms, carriers, and agency that supported this process. Taking data from newspaper articles, interviews, and secondary qualitative data sources, important conclusions can be drawn from the findings as to how mechanisms, carriers, and agency explain the vanguardism of the FSLN. The principal research question asked: **How do mechanisms, carriers, and agency as institutional elements, explain the vanguardism of the FSLN?** In answering this question, four secondary questions were addressed:

**What types of mechanisms, carriers, and agency, are identified as critical in the rise of the FSLN?**

Relationships between critical events, actors, relationships, and characteristics, and mechanisms, carriers, and agency as institutional elements were found. Among the findings, the predominance of mechanisms of force, critical role of carriers in diffusion and theorization, primary role of agency, the centrality of legitimacy and the recognition of the FSLN as the “vanguard” of the movement are important conclusions worth noting.

**How are mechanisms, carriers, and agency, related in describing the vanguardism of the FSLN?**

In describing how mechanisms, carriers, and agency were related in explaining the vanguardism of the FSLN, this study showed mechanisms and carriers were related in the duality of the roles played by the elements supporting the process, the combined effects produced by the elements, the integration of elements to differentiate the FSLN, and the sequential progression of the elements, observed.
How can vanguardism as a process be described?

In describing vanguardism as a process, this study describes vanguardism as a process involving four stages: a pre-insurrectional stage; an insurrectional stage; an accumulation of strength stage; and a consolidation of forces stage, supported by coercive, normative, and mimetic mechanisms, symbolic systems, relational systems, and routines as carriers, and institutional entrepreneurs, intermediaries, and marginal players as agency types.

What relationships exist between vanguardism and institutionalization?

In identifying the relationships between vanguardism and Institutionalization, this study revealed a link between the stages of vanguardism and the stages of institutionalization described in neoinstitutionalism, as well as in the observed centrality of legitimacy in both processes.

Conclusions

In summary, one of the most important findings of this study suggests that the vanguardism of the FSLN is explained predominantly as a cultural-cognitive process. Agency plays a leading role in the process, particularly in theorization (institutional entrepreneurs) and legitimation (intermediaries). My initial expectation was that agency would play a secondary role to mechanisms. This expectation was built on observations such as those found in Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983). In such studies, the centrality of mechanisms is stressed and their role emphasized. Yet, the findings of this study are not completely inconsistent with the literature. Some studies suggest a more central and influential role of agency in institutional processes (See DiMaggio, Powell, in Scott, 2008; Giddens, 1984). These studies suggest that individuals have a more dominant role in processes involving innovation, strategic action, and institutional change (See Christensen et al. 1997; Oliver 1991 in Scott, 2008). In this case, the findings are consistent with DiMaggio and Powell, in Scott (2008), and Giddens, (1984). The vanguardism of the FSLN exposed the centrality of elements of agency,
highlighted by the dual role of Carlos Fonseca Amador as carrier in diffusion, and as institutional entrepreneur in interpretation and framing, and the roles of Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, and the Group of Twelve, as intermediaries in legitimacy. Perhaps these results are driven by the dominance of ideology in the vanguardism process but nevertheless, it reiterates the importance of agency in processes involving cultural change.

However, not to be overlooked in the vanguardism of the FSLN is the role of mechanisms and carriers. In particular, the historical frame of Sandino, the mimetic inspiration of the Cuban revolution, and the theorization of Carlos Fonseca Amador are fundamental.

Similarly, the centrality of legitimacy in the vanguardism process needs to be noted. The findings showed that the attainment of legitimacy proved to be a critical element in the vanguardism of the FSLN.

These elements explain how the FSLN was able to achieve political power, legitimacy, and leadership of the movement that would eventually overthrow the Somoza regime and change the course of Nicaragua’s history.

**The importance of the neoinstitutional lens**

One aspect of this dissertation that needs to be discussed is the importance of having chosen the neoinstitutional lens for this study. Drawing on the insights of early scholars such as Weber (1968), organizations were recognized to be “rationalized” systems—sets of roles and associated activities laid out to reflect means-ends relationships oriented to the pursuit of specified goals (Scott, 2004). However, early scholars neglected the processes through which organizations become institutions. The work of such scholars as DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Berger and Luckmann (1967), Giddens (1979; 1984), Jepperson (1991, 2002), Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Scott (1995; 2001; 2003; 2008) describe organizational institutionalization by examining the
“nuts and bolts” of institutionalization, placing greater emphasis on the cultural-cognitive elements supporting the process.

Through my research, I wanted to find the “nuts and bolts” of the Sandinista Revolution – the pieces that made up the puzzle, so to speak. It was not sufficient to examine the process historically. What I sought was a framework that would allow me to make inferences about the events, actors, relationships, and characteristics in explaining the rise of the FSLN. The neoinstitutional framework proved a “good fit.” This framework allowed me to make clear connections between events, actors, relationships, and characteristics and institutional mechanisms, carriers, and agency as explained in neoinstitutional literature. As such, this framework provided a base for making connections between vanguardism as a process, and institutionalization.

**Implications for public administration**

There are implications from this research for scholars and practitioners alike. From a scholarly perspective, three important contributions are noted:

The first contribution is a study highlighting vanguardism in the context of organizations and as a process of institutionalization and a comprehensive definition of a vanguardist organization. Understanding vanguardism in the context of organizations and as a process of institutionalization enlightens both the vanguardism literature and the neoinstitutional literature. Having constructed a definition of a vanguardist organization helps recognize vanguardist organizations in the literature which can lead to future studies of organizations in this context.

Second, an examination of the insurrectional period and the FSLN, from an organizational perspective is important. Aside from this research study, the literature has overlooked the insurrectional period of the Sandinista revolution. And, while studies of the FSLN are abundant,
little has been said about how the organization came to be, organized, and evolved into the vanguard of the opposition movement.

A third contribution is discovering and explaining an intersection between neoinstitutional theory and the study of revolutionary organizations. There is also no study which explains the vanguardism of the FSLN as an institutional process under a neoinstitutional lens. This study opens the door to more possibilities for research by providing an empirical and theoretical framework for future scholars to follow.

From a practice perspective, these findings might be particularly useful in matters of foreign policy and national security. There is much to be gained from improving our understanding of revolutionary organizations. As long as there are governments, there will be organizations seeking to overthrow them. Such a scenario emphasizes the importance of understanding why such organizations come to be the historical and cultural forces that shape them, and who the dominant actors are. These are all valuable tools to have for foreign policy officials and policy makers in general.

**Recommendations for future research**

One of the reasons for undertaking this study was to call attention to the insurrectional period of the Sandinista revolution. This objective has been achieved. However, much work remains. The dynamics of the insurrectional period are analyzed, however only from the perspective of how they relate to the vanguardism of the FSLN. It might be worth studying the issue from another perspective, for instance, it might be worth looking at the event of the Nicaraguan revolution from the perspective of the United States in the role of mediator.

A study by Anthony Lake (1989) exposes Washington’s reaction to the Nicaraguan crisis during 1978 and 1979. Lake explains that he chose to pursue this study first, because it was an
intrinsically important event, but also because understanding it can help us think clearly about
the subsequent tragedy in Nicaragua and the role of the United States there. Drawing from the
work of Lake (1989), we as scholars can learn from such historical events: the relationship
between U.S. foreign policy goals and U.S. power, the relationships between U.S. domestic
policy and foreign policy, the sources of revolutionary movements and revolutionary
organizations, and the importance of understanding history so that we avoid the pitfalls of the
past.

In some ways, this study uncovers a policy failure on the part of the United States in
negotiating an end to the crisis. The internal clashes observed within the executive branch, and
with the National Security Council (see Lake, 1989), the Central Intelligence Agency, the State
Department, and the U.S. Embassy, produced incongruity with respect to how the crisis should
be approached and ultimately ended the hope of replacing the Somoza regime with a moderate
government (see Solaún, 2005; Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993). Further study of these dynamics will
improve our understanding of the events and provide us with knowledge of how to best approach
similar future situations.

Research needs to continue to focus on expanding the study of institutions as frameworks for
social action. Scott (2008) explains the study of institutions as providing a way of “examining
the complex interdependence of nonrational and rational elements that together comprise a social
situation.” Scott (2008) points to “values, beliefs and interests along with information, habits,
and feelings as critical ingredients of social behavior.” As suggested by Scott (2008), there is
undoubtedly interdependence between the rational and the nonrational. This often is the case
with institutional phenomena such as that described in this research, and more times than not,
nonrational elements overshadow rational ones.
This research should serve as a catalyst for more extensive study of institutional processes as they relate to the organizational field. The concept of organizational field (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 2001) is that organizations exist within a recognized environment; and within the environment, organizations are encapsulated in an organization set. This set includes exchange partners, customers, competitors, intermediary actors, regulators, and funding agents (see Scott, 2008).

The scope of this study is at the organizational level not the field level. Nevertheless, the findings illustrate the centrality of environmental elements – relationships with other organizations, competing organizations, intermediaries, and funding agents in the vanguardism process and thus, emphasize the importance of the organizational field. For example, in some ways, this study showed how the FSLN “competed” with other actors for the leadership of the movement, distinguishing itself from other actors by linking the struggle of the 1970s with Sandino’s struggle of the 1930s, and presenting itself as the only actor willing and able to lead the physical fights on the streets against the National Guard.

Furthermore, the findings also showed that Costa Rica, Cuba, Panama, and Venezuela played important roles as intermediaries for the FSLN, and also suggest that part of this support may have been used to finance some of the FSLN’s operations or to purchase ammunitions, weapons and other such necessities. A closer look at the role of funding agents in vanguardism and like processes might be useful.

More study of vanguardism as an institutional process is needed. One of the contributions of this study is that it defines vanguardism in the context of organizations and the characteristics that make up a vanguardist organization. These findings should inspire more study of organizations like the FSLN.
REFERENCES


Cushing, Pamela (2003). ‘Shaping the Moral Imagination of Caregivers: Disability, Difference & Inequality in L'Arche,’ Queen's University.


Jones, Adam (2002). ‘Beyond the Barricades: Nicaragua and the Struggle for the


Martí-Puig, Salvador (2002). ‘Sobre la emergencia e impacto de los movimientos indígenas en las arenas políticas de América Latina: algunas claves interpretativas desde lo local y lo global,’ Centro de Relaciones Internacionales y Cooperación Internacional, Universidad de Salamanca, Barcelona.


APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. How would you describe the FSLN’s role within the opposition movement during the insurrectional period?

2. What characteristics or attributes about the FSLN would you consider most significant with respect to the opposition movement?

3. How was the FSLN different from other actors within the movement?

4. Which events during the insurrectional period (1974-1979) had the most significant effect on the movement, both in terms of its organization, as well as in terms of the course the movement undertook? (Please list)

   a) Why are these events significant?

5. How would you describe the United States (U.S. policy) in Nicaraguan history during the time period of 1920-1940?

6. What effect did Sandino’s legacy (legend) have (if any) on the FSLN’s role and positioning within the opposition movement?

7. How important do you think the following theories were to establishing the FSLN?

   (Please mark one with an X)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marx</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mao</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandino</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ché</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Please add any comments you have about the effect of these theories on the FSLN

8. How would you assess the opposition to Somocismo in terms of its importance to the FSLN?

9. The FSLN used radio/press communiqués tactics to “communicate with the people”. What do you think were the nature and purpose of these communiqués, particularly in reference to the following critical events:

A) Raid on Dr. José Maria “Chema” Castillo’s house?
B) Assault on the National Palace in 1978?
C) Assassination of Pedro J. Chamorro?
D) Other?

10. Please assess the importance of the following events and relationships below to the development of the FSLN and why you think so:

(Please mark one with an X)

a) The Kupia-Kumi pact between General A. Somoza D. and Fernando Agüero:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Why?

b) The 1972 earthquake:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Why?

c) The 1974 elections:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Why?
d) Pedro J. Chamorro's assassination:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>SOMewhat IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Why?

e) U.S. involvement in the negotiation process between Somoza and the opposition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>SOMewhat IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Why?

f) Umbrella organizations such as Movimiento Pueblo Unido and Frente Patriótico Nicaragiense:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>SOMewhat IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Why?

g) The relationships among the FSLN and Cuba:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>SOMewhat IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Why?

h) The relationships among the FSLN and Venezuela:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>SOMewhat IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Why?

i) The relationships among the FSLN and Panama:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>SOMewhat IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Why?
j) The relationships among the FSLN and Costa Rica:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>SOMewhat IMPORTANT</th>
<th>IMPORTANT</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Why?

11. In your estimation, what people, groups, or organizations were considered “dominant” within the opposition movement? (please list)

a) In your estimation, what makes these actors “dominant”?

12. Were there coalitions among people, groups, or organizations within the movement taking place? Yes or No?

a) If YES, which ones? (please list)

b) How did these affect the movement? (If at all)

13. How would you assess the degree of agreement regarding the FSLN-sponsored activities and justifications, from other people, groups, or organizations within the movement?

14. What factors (individuals, events, strategies) were most influential in SECURING A “degree of agreement” regarding FSLN-sponsored activities?

15. How would you assess cultural support and desirability of the FSLN?

a) What factors had the most impact on this?
Stage I: Primary Themes

The analysis of the newspapers described in Chapter Four revealed primary and secondary themes in each of the four stages of the insurrectional process. As noted in Chapter Four, the sequential progression of events or happenings observed in the literature and reaffirmed by the interviews revealed four stages: Stage I featured articles dated before December 27, 1974; Stage II featured articles dated between December 27, 1974 and January 9, 1978; Stage III featured articles dated between January 10, 1978 and August 21, 1978; and Stage IV featured articles dated between August 22, 1978 and July 19, 1979. Articles were categorized chronologically according to stage. The themes and relationships between themes found for each of the categories identify the existence of “critical” mechanisms in the article data.

Stage I exposed two primary themes: the Sandino affair and his communications and confrontations with U.S. Marine forces in Nicaragua during the 1920’s and 1930’s; and the Kupia Kumi Pact signed by Conservative Leader Agüero with General Somoza Debayle, which occurred in 1971.

Primary Themes Identified in Stage I:

Stage I: Secondary Themes

The following secondary themes were identified for Stage I (articles dated before December 27, 1974), the following themes emerge:
Secondary Themes Identified for Stage I

Stage II: Primary Themes

Stage II exposed three primary themes: the Christmas party raid on Somoza Government Official José Maria Castillo’s house, carried out by the FSLN in December of 1974; death of FSLN founder and principal intellectual source, Carlos Fonseca Amador; and return of the rebels.

Primary Themes Identified in Stage II:

Stage II: Secondary Themes

For Stage II (articles dated between December 27, 1974 and January 10, 1978), the following sub-themes emerged:
Stage III: Primary Themes

Stage III revealed three themes as well: the first theme revealed was the assassination of LaPrensa’s Chief Editor Pedro Joaquín Chamorro; the second, Los Doce (The Group of Twelve), and the third, Somoza has “trappings of power.”
Primary Themes Identified in Stage III:

Stage III: Secondary Themes

The following secondary themes were identified for Stage III.

Secondary Themes Identified for Stage III
Stage IV: Primary Themes

Lastly, Stage IV revealed six broad themes: the FSLN’s raid on the National Palace; the split between Nicaraguan political moderates, vis-à-vis the course of the opposition movement; a marked shift in U.S. policy regarding Nicaragua; a national strike in protest of the Somoza regime; the September insurrection; and the introduction of the National Reconstruction Junta.

Primary Themes Identified in Stage IV:

Stage IV: Secondary Themes

The following secondary themes were identified for stage IV:
Secondary Themes Identified for Stage IV

- National Palace Raid
  - "leftists vow to kill hostages"
  - Dissatisfaction with Somoza widespread
  - "Death to Somocism"
  - Nicaragua's "newest folk heroes"
  - middle/upper classes joining opposition
  - Somoza's grip threatened
  - Panama welcomes commando

- Moderates split
  - Somoza: "Venezuela seeks bloodbath"
  - Somoza's Human Rights Record (Carter)
  - Somoza "vows to stay till 1981"

- Shift in U.S. Policy
  - Peaceful solution?
  - Somoza-FAO negotiations
  - U.S. seeks "framework for mediation"
  - U.S. mediation near collapse

- National Strike
  - National support for FSLN growing;
  - U.S. views "Insurgents as serious contenders for power"
  - U.S. Ambassador recalled by Washington
  - Regime "out of money"

- September Insurrection
  - Anti-Somoza march in Panama
  - Nicaragua in caos
  - OAS "grave violations"

- The End Game
  - Sandinistas disclaim Marxism
  - Somoza has "lost the confidence of the people"
  - Nicaragua in chaos
  - FSLN: most decisive factor in Nicaragua's future
  - FAO refuses to accept plebiscite
  - FAO does not represent the FSLN
  - "Vanguard of entire nation against Somocism and U.S. imperialism"
APPENDIX C
FINDINGS FROM THE INTERVIEWS

The findings from the interview data are derived through an analysis of the following elements from the literature. These elements were derived from the answers to the interview questions in Appendix A.

Elements Analyzed in the Interviews

Each element was addressed through the questions provided in the interview-questionnaire. The following results were generated from this process:

_Difference of the FSLN from Other Actors_

Interviewees were asked to explain how the FSLN was different from other actors within the movement. With respect to the differences of the FSLN relative to other actors in the opposition movement, respondents identified the following characteristics:
Differences of the FSLN from Other Actors

Interviewees were asked to describe characteristics or attributes about the FSLN considered most significant. With respect to organizational characteristics of the FSLN, respondents identified the following characteristics:

Organizational Characteristics of the FSLN

- politico-military capacity
- The "armed struggle"
- Recognized and respected leadership
- Completely isolated from dictatorship
- historical trajectory
- ability to mobilize resources
- conceived in a sociological vision with moral and ethical values
- ability to lead and organize the physical fights on the streets against the government
- active at the grassroots level
- willingness to risk life for the cause
- ability to project to the population idea of uninterested heroes (Saint-like)
Organizational Characteristics of the FSLN

Significant events or “happenings” of the insurrection

Interviewees were asked to describe which events during the insurrectional period had the most significant effect on the movement, both in terms of its organization, as well as in terms of the course taken by the movement. The following events were identified by respondents as having a significant effect on the movement:
Significant Events or “Happenings” of the Insurrectional Period

Significant events or "happenings" of the insurrection

- Raid on Chema Castillo’s house
- Division of FSLN into three tendencies
- Repression by Somoza in 1975 “clean-up operations”
- Assasination of Pedro J. Chamorro
- Assault on National Palace
- September insurrection
- The formation of the Group of Twelve
- The murder of ABC Correspondant Bill Stewart
- Organization of MPU
- OAS meeting in 1979
- Unification of FSLN’s three tendencies

U.S. policy towards Nicaragua

Interviewees were asked to describe the United States policy in Nicaraguan history during the time period 1920-1940. Respondents described U.S. policy towards Nicaragua in 1920-1940 as:

U.S. Policy towards Nicaragua 1920-1940

- “totally disrespectful”
- Interventionist
- Occupationist
- Myopic
Sandino’s Legacy

Respondents were asked to describe the effect of Sandino’s legacy (if any) on the FSLN’s role and positioning within the opposition movement. Respondents provided the following revelations about Sandino’s legacy with respect to the FSLN:

**Sandino’s Legacy towards the FSLN**

- afforded the organization a “Nicaraguan persona”
- International prestige
- A symbol for the insurrection
- A link to General Somoza Garcia
- Martyrdom and Saint-like status
- Provided the "seed" for Sandinismo
- A symbol of Nicaraguan dignity
- Source for nationalist thought and action against U.S. intervention
- Source for the construction of the Sandinista identity
- gave meaning to the cause; put it in proper historical context
- Nationalized the cause, made it profoundly Nicaraguan

**Revolutionary Intellectualism**

Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of influential revolutionary influences with respect to the FSLN. The importance of Marx; Lenin; Mao; Sandino; and Guevara (*Ché*) were assessed. Respondents evaluated each influence and assessed its importance to the FSLN. The following assessments were offered:
Importance of Revolutionary Influences

Support for Somoza government

Respondents were asked to describe the opposition to Somoza and *Somocismo* in terms of its importance to the FSLN. The respondents yielded the following evaluations of support for Somoza during the insurrectional period:

**Support for Somoza Government**

*FSLN communiqués (nature and purpose)*

Respondents were asked to describe the nature and purpose of radio and press communiqués used by the FSLN. With respect to the nature and purpose of communiqués used by the FSLN in conjunction with (or reaction to) critical events, the following reasons and purposes were given:
Importance of “critical” events or “happenings” of the insurrectional period

Respondents were asked to assess the importance of “critical” events or “happenings” of the insurrectional period. The critical events or happenings measured were: the *Kupia-Kumi* pact forged between General A. Somoza D. and Conservative leader Fernando Agüero; the 1972
Managua earthquake; 1974 elections; assassination of Pedro J. Chamorro; U.S taking the lead in the negotiations between Somoza and the opposition; and creation of umbrella organizations-MPU and FPN. With respect to these “critical events” or “happenings”, respondents offered the following reasons. In assessing the importance of the Kupia-Kumi pact, respondents offered the following reasons:

**Importance of the Kupia-Kumi Pact**

- Caused "repulsion" towards Somoza
- Generated discontent vis-a-vis the traditional opposition and political system
- Exposed lack of trust of traditional politicians
- Exposed traditional opposition as "clients" of Somocismo
- Eliminated Dr. Aguero as the last viable and credible option to defeat Somoza in an electoral process.

In assessing the importance of the 1972 earthquake, respondents noted that the earthquake:

**Importance of the 1972 Earthquake in Managua**

- Exposed corruption and mis-management of relief funds by regime
- Promoted unfair competition from pro-Somoza empresarios
- Eroded the alliance between traditional economic groups and the dictatorship

In assessing the importance of the 1974 elections, respondents indicated that the electoral process of 1974 was significant because of the following reasons:
Importance of 1974 Elections

In assessing the importance of Dr. Pedro J. Chamorro’s assassination, respondents indicated that Dr. Chamorro’s assassination was significant because:

**Importance of Assassination of Dr. Pedro J. Chamorro**

In assessing the importance the United States taking a leading role in negotiating a solution to the crisis, respondents indicated that the U.S.’s role was important because:
Importance of U.S. Leading Negotiations between Somoza and the Opposition

In assessing the importance of umbrella organizations—Movimiento Pueblo Unido (MPU) and Frente Patriótico Nicaragüense (FPN)—respondents exposed that these organizations:

Importance of Umbrella Organizations-MPU and FPN

FSLN Relationships with Foreign Governments

Respondents were asked to assess the importance of the relationships between the FSLN and influential governments. In this sense, the roles of Cuba, Costa Rica, Panama, and Venezuela were assessed. Respondents were asked to classify the relationship as either: not important; somewhat important; important; or very important. Respondents were also asked to explain why each relationship was important. In assessing the importance of the relationships forged during
the insurrection between the FSLN and the foreign governments of Costa Rica, Cuba, Panama, and Venezuela, respondents offered the following assessment:

**FSLN Relationships with Foreign Governments**

**Dominant Actors**

Respondents were asked to identify persons or organizations considered “dominant” inside the opposition movement and explain why these individuals or organizations were considered “dominant.” In recognizing “dominant” actors inside the opposition movement, respondents identified the following actors:
Dominant Actors inside the movement

Respondents were asked to identify coalitions within the movement. In identifying coalitions inside the movement, the following coalitions were identified:
Coalitions inside the Movement

Influential elements in securing agreement regarding FSLN-sponsored Activities

Respondents were asked to assess the level of agreement regarding the FSLN-sponsored activities (including violent or terrorist-type operations). The following elements (persons, events, strategies, or other) were described by respondents as being most influential in “securing” agreement regarding FSLN-sponsored activities:
Influential Elements in Securing Agreement with FSLN-sponsored Activities

- U.S. mediation failure
- "unification" of FSLN-Fidel Castro
- Carlos Andres Perez (Venezuela)
- Omar Torrijos (Panama)
- Formation of the Group of Twelve
- Increased National and international media coverage
- Pedro J. Chamorro's assassination
- Jimmy Carter's human rights policy
- The Church's denunciation of the regime
- COSEP (COSIP) led by Alfonso Robelo
- Murder of ABC's Bill Stewart
APPENDIX D
FINDINGS FROM SECONDARY QUALITATIVE DATA

The third piece in the triangulation process featured secondary qualitative data. This data source included historical documents and publications; narrative from an interview conducted by a third-party, and narrative of influential individuals in the video documentaries. The following results were generated from this process:

Findings from historical documents

The analysis of historical document revealed the following themes. Further scrutiny of the data exposed substantiation of several of these themes as well as relationships between the themes.

Themes Identified from Historical Documents

The Legacy of Sandino

The findings expose important contributions about the legacy of Augusto C. Sandino.

Contribution #1: Sandino a symbol of nationalism and anti-imperialism throughout Latin America.

- Sandino did not defeat the U.S. Marines, nor should he be credited for the exodus of the Marines from Nicaragua (see Diederich, 1989; and Pezullo and Pezullo, 1993). However
his determination and will to fight U.S. occupation became a symbol of nationalism and anti-imperialism throughout Latin America:

“The death of Sandino, hero and symbol of Latin American resentment against what they call “The Colossus of the North,” sent a pang of sorrow and dismay from the Rio Grande to the Horn.”

- Sandino considered the surrender (to the United States) a treasonous act, as noted in Selser, (1978):

  “That’s how Moncada surrendered his arms. I realized that he (Moncada) betrayed the interests of the revolution, since that is how Dr. Sacasa declared it. I also realized with much sorrow, that the ideals of the people of Nicaragua were being dishonored. It became impossible for me to be indifferent to the attitude of the traitor”

- Sandino’s campaign against American occupation, which he (Sandino) refers to as Yankee imperialism, began with his refusal to accept the terms of the U.S. inspired Espino Negro Pact (see Selser, 1978).

**Contribution #2: A legacy of anti-American sentiment in Nicaragua**

- Sandino (in Selser, 1978) expresses his disdain for the United States and the Pact of the Espino Negro: According to Selser (1978), after Sandino’s refusal to surrender his arms, he published a manifesto in which he expressed his antagonism towards U.S. intervention. The manifesto read:

  “Seeing that the United States of North America, lacking any rights except that with which brute force endows it, would deprive us of our country and of our Liberty, I’ve accepted its unjust challenge, leaving to history, the responsibility of my actions. To remain inactive or indifferent, like most of my fellow citizens, would be to subject myself to this vulgar multitude of parricide merchants”

- Sandino reaffirmed his contempt for American intervention: “…throughout his speech, he (Sandino) would refer to the Americans as “el gringo”, stating that “his cause was the cause of America; the cause of all oppressed people” (Cesar Falcon in Selser, 1978).

- Sandino directly denounced American Intervention in Nicaragua. This denunciation came in a manifesto addressed to all the Latin American leaders of State. Sandino accuses the United States of trying to turn Nicaragua into “another one of Uncle Samuel’s colonies” (Selser, 1978). Further, Sandino accuses the United States of trying to alienate the Latin American nations, by building an inter-oceanic canal through Nicaragua (see Selser, 1978). Sandino also criticizes the “cold indifference” shown by the Latin

---

1 Time, March 5, 1934.
2 Original version in Spanish, translated by author.
American governments towards his *Army for the Defense of National Sovereignty* (see Selser, 1978).

- Sandino points out the loss of sovereignty of six Latin American Republics to the United States, and which, as Sandino argues, “have now become colonies of Yankee Imperialism”, which Sandino considers the “most brutal enemy that threatens the liberty and survival of the Latin American people,” (see Selser, 1978).

- There is also evidence of Sandino’s contempt for the U.S. in excerpts, manifestos, and songs taken from hundreds of documents and public statements made by Sandino; as well as testimony from those who were present. According to Selser (1978), Sandino aspired to one fundamental goal: “to throw the North Americans out of Nicaragua”. According to Selser (1978), the United States made numerous attempts to convey Sandino to bring his rebellion to an end through diplomatic means. However, Sandino’s scorn for the United States and Yankee imperialism had reached a point which eliminated any possibility of such a treaty. An excerpt from one of Sandino’s manifestos illustrates Sandino’s sentiment:

  “Geography has put the blond beast at one end of Latin America...The Yankees are our people’s worst enemy...when they (U.S.) speak of the Monroe Doctrine, they say “America for Americans”...but they interpret it as “America for the Yankees”...well, to save their blond souls from continuing in error, I propose this: “North America for the Yankees; Latin America for the Indo-Latin,” (A.C. Sandino in Selser, 1978).

- Sandino’s contempt is evident in his expressions about U.S. government officials, which often turned into personal attacks: In one manifesto, his language takes a tone of violent accusation against U.S. President Hoover:

  “Like a rabid but impotent, beast, Herbert Clark Hoover, the Yankee President, hurls abuse at the head of the army that is liberating Nicaragua. He and Stimson are the modern assassins, as were Coolidge and Kellogg before them....”

- Evidence that Sandino’s impertinence towards the United States was also shared by some of his countrymen. There was growing concern among different circles within Nicaraguan society, which felt the U.S.’s stronghold on Nicaraguan affairs would continue even after the marines had left. One group particularly concerned were the students, who expressed their anxiety in a declaration to President Elect Sacasa:

  “General Augusto C. Sandino in the mountains is the decency, the honor, and the dignity of our nation. He does not pursue wealth and privileges, nor aspire to public offices, nor seek sinecures in his struggle. General Sandino is not a bandolero (bandoleer). Sandino’s road is the road of victory or death. In any case, it is the road of glory. He preferred to maintain our Constitution out under the sky in the forest, while Sacasa’s
soldiers sold themselves to the will of the Yanqui for ten pesos per man” (Selser, 1978).

Contribution #3: Sandino as “Hero-martyr” of the FSLN

- Sandino’s execution is also significant because it turned Sandino into a “hero-martyr” for future generations; and prompted both admirers and critics to write about his life as well as his death. This is evident in Selser (1978) who portrays Sandino as “the hero of the Segovia Mountains”.

Sandino: Hero or butcher?

Other findings suggest a contradictory legacy left by Augusto C. Sandino. Anastasio Somoza Garcia, who eventually was named Commander in Chief of the Nicaraguan National Guard, held Sandino under a much different light.

- Somoza Garcia’s book *El Verdadero Sandino, o el Calvario de las Segovias (The Real Sandino, or Torment of the Segovias)*, is, according to Nicaraguan historian writer Francisco Mendieta (1976) a “methodic and orderly presentation of the true personality of Sandino.”


- Mendieta (1976) argues that Sandino’s acts of torture and butchery performed against enemy soldiers evidenced his sadism and brutal nature. “Freedom is not conquered with flowers, but with bullets, which is why we’ve had to resort to the *Cortes de chaleco, de combo y blumers.*”

- Mendieta (1976) also argues that Sandino’s true inspiration was not that of a “patriotic liberator” but rather, an “ambitious” *conquistador* who sought to create his own personal and independent country in the Segovias region (see Mendieta, 1976 in Somoza Garcia, 1936).

- Somoza Garcia (1936) describes Sandino as a traitorous rebel-outlaw whose refusal to surrender his arms along with the rest of Moncada’s Generals was driven by jealousy and personal desire for power (see Somoza Garcia, 1936).

---

3 Assassination method performed by Sandino and his men. Corte de Chaleco (vest cut) involved decapitation, dismemberment of both arms, and a final cut across the abdomen along the line of the “Vest”; Corte de Cumbo (skull cut) involved tying up the victim to a tree and slicing the skull in half; and Corte de Blumers (bloomer cut) involved cutting off both extremities as well as hands. Source: A.C. Sandino in Somoza Garcia, 1936.
Somoza Garcia (1936) makes a very important claim regarding Sandino’s “acceptance” of the terms of the pact, which according to Selser (1978), Sandino had fervently refused. In the letter from Sandino to General Moncada dated May 9, 1927, Sandino writes:

“...I will delegate my rights so that you (Moncada) handle the proceedings as you see fit. And please make the results known to me at Jinotega, where I will be waiting with my men...and though I’ve been unable to be there, I assure you that once I’ve gathered all my men, I’ll collect all the arms” (A.C. Sandino in Somoza Garcia, 1936).

Somoza Garcia (1936) writes that upon seeing that Sandino was not “keeping with his word”, General Moncada sent Sandino a letter, urging him to obey the military chain of command and keep his promise to adhere to the conditions set forth in the Espino Negro pact. Moncada wrote:

“You may recall that everything was resolved by all of the Generals of the Army, in a free and spontaneous manner, and which you yourself, agreed to in your last letter to me....I urge you once again to act for the good of Nicaragua and of Liberalism, and upon hearing your father, resolve to meet with me personally” (José María Moncada in Somoza Garcia, 1936).4

U.S. Policy 1920-1940

The findings expose the importance of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Nicaragua between 1920-1940 (period which encapsulates U.S. Marine occupation; the appearance of Sandino; the creation of the National Guard under the Pact of the Espino Negro; and Sandino’s execution).

- Sandino was the only member of General Moncada’s “high command” who refused to accept the terms of surrender offered by the United States under the Pacto del Espino Negro (from Somoza Garcia, 1936).

- Sandino addressed the U.S Marine Commander in Jinotega explaining his position with respect to the U.S. sponsored Pact of the Espino Negro. Sandino urged the Marine Commander that the United States assume military command of the country temporarily, until free and supervised elections (by the United States) took place:

“...the acceptance of General Moncada does not ensure peace and tranquility for the country...the presence of Mr. Adolfo (Díaz), who enjoys the support of a congressional majority, will continue to pose a threat to the Liberal Party and is bound to end in civil war...so if the United States,

4 Original version in Spanish, translated to English by author.
in good faith, has intervened in our country, we propose the following condition; to lay down our arms that the United States assume military governing power, until supervised presidential elections are held....upon your acceptance of this proposal, my men and I manifest that we shall surrender our weapons and ask no money in return” (A.C. Sandino in Somoza Garcia, 1936).

- Somoza Garcia (1936) suggests that Sandino may not have been necessarily against American intervention, but rather, the manner in which the Americans chose to intervene.

National Guard: product of U.S. intervention

The findings expose the importance of the creation of the Nicaraguan National Guard (by the United States).

- Sandino saw the U.S.-created National Guard as his “principal obstacle in his subversive plan” (Reyes in Somoza Garcia, 1936).
- Somoza Garcia (1936) exposes Sandino’s discontent regarding the constitutionality of the National Guard, in a letter to one of his Generals, Francisco Estrada:

  “The situation in Nicaragua is the following: The National Guard is the enemy of the government and of ourselves, because it is an institution that goes against the laws and the Constitution of the Republic; product of an agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties, with the auspices of the north American intervention; this Guard, tacitly considers itself superior to the government and therein lies the reasons why they sometimes fail to obey the orders from the President” (A.C. Sandino in Somoza Garcia, 1936).

“Imitating” the Cuban Revolution

The findings expose the importance of the Cuban revolution as a source of inspiration and guidance for the FSLN. Tomás Borge, founding member of the FSLN who later became one of the nine members of the Sandinista National Directorate, and others, described the influences of the Cuban revolution on the evolution of the FSLN:

- “Nicaragua’s apparent imperviousness was rent asunder by the Cuban Revolution. The struggle in the Sierra Maestra influenced Nicaraguan political life. From that point on, the Nicaraguan rebellion nurtured itself on Lenin, Ché, Ho Chi Minh and other revolutionaries (Borge, 1989).
Borge (1989) illustrates, the intellectual foundations of the FSLN are undeniably revolutionary; at the heart of the matter, the Cuban Revolution. Though Borge (1989) mentions other inspirational sources such as Ho Chi Minh, the FSLN’s intellectual roots are deeply imbedded in the Cuban Revolution and the ideas of Ernesto Ché Guevara.

Borge (1989) recalls, “the truth is that from its beginning, in the FSLN, there was an excessive identification with the armed experience of Cuba and with time, the FSLN translated into a mechanical reproduction of what had occurred there (Cuba).”

Borge (1989) also describes Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro as a Sandino-type figure: “…we saw in Fidel, the resurrection of Sandino, the answer to our doubts, the justification of our dreams.

Omar Cabezas (1982) in his best seller, Fire from the Mountain, glorifies the Cuban Revolution and in particular, the ideology of Argentinean revolutionary figure Ernesto Ché Guevara, claiming: “We have to be like Ché…be like Ché…be like Ché.” In many ways, Cuba became a “Mecca” in which the fears of revolutionary youth, who wanted to pursue the “Cuban way”, were overcome (Puig, 2002).

Puig (2002) also makes a point that is particularly important in the context of this study. He argues that from the “Cuban experience” arose a process of “mimesis”, reaching a point of symmetry in some cases…we could argue that the Cuban Revolution, aside from “agitating” and “mobilizing” the radical youth of the subcontinent, produced a huge impact in the mythical and symbolic world of the radical left...(Puig, 2002).

Gonzalez (1984) affirms Puig’s commentary arguing that the Cuban Revolution produced the idea or “myth” of revolutionary victory by way of an armed fight, and while it did not alter reality, it did alter our perception of it, as well as the ways to elaborate collective alternatives for its transformation. Other writers follow the same idea of the Cuban Revolution as an “example,” however, their view is derived from a moral standpoint, as Wickham-Crowley (1992) proposes: “…from the mouths of Fidel Castro and Ernesto Ché Guevara, propagated the idea that “making revolution” was the “imperative moral” of every revolutionary.

An enduring impact of the Cuban Revolution is the revolution’s introduction and promotion of “Marxism” in the western hemisphere and the concept of the “guerrilla focus” proposed by Ernesto Ché Guevara.

Puig (2002) writes: “Cuba became entrenched in the task of promoting Marxism under a new perspective where the subjective elements and volunteers played an important role; this new perspective was classified at the time as New Marxism or tropical Marxism by Marxists.”
According to Ché, the conditions needed for revolutionary action were nonexistent in Latin America (Guevara in Moreno, 1971).

Ché acknowledged the Marxist idea that the objective conditions capable of activating conflict are proportioned by centuries of hunger and repression (Guevara in Moreno, 1971).

Ché (Guevara in Moreno, 1971) argued that what was missing in Latin America were the subjective conditions; the conscience that there was a “real” possibility of defeating the “State” by way of an armed conflict” (Guevara in Moreno, 1971).

Guevara (in Moreno, 1971) introduces a key element in revolutionary literature; one which he calls the “guerrilla focus” or foco guerrillero.

The guerrilla focus, according to Guevara (in Moreno, 1971) calls for an immediate mobilization and entrenchment of persons “into the mountains” (Guevara, 1967).

According to Guevara and Débray (1966), “a small group of decided men, without fear of dying, and with the support of the people, can defeat an army.”

Guevara (in Moreno, 1971) exposes that the political actor who is needed to carry out such “praxis” is the vanguard, whom upon we confer an almost providential or mythical dimension.”

Guevara (in Moreno 1971) writes:

“we were dealing with the best spirits, the best minds, those morally and ideologically superior, capable of acting and fighting for their ideals, we were dealing with the activating minority...the role of the focus was to threaten the legitimacy and the monopoly of the governmental power, transforming itself in the center of the opposition to the regime”...we were trying to create an action-reaction spiral, which in the long run, would yield only one option-exile or the guerrilla (Guevara in Moreno, 1971).

Guevara’s (in Moreno, 1971) construction is known in the literature as focalism. Its premise is that a group of small, fast-moving paramilitary groups can provide a focus (in Spanish, foco) for popular disapproval against an incumbent regime, and thereby lead a general insurrection.

This doctrine, set into motion by the Cuban Revolution, had a significant impact among intellectuals and student groups across Latin America during the 1960’s and 1970’s, spawning many guerrilla groups across the continent, including the FSLN (Puig, 2002).
Carlos Fonseca Amador: Architect of FSLN:

The findings expose the importance of Carlos Fonseca Amador in the rise of the FSLN.

- Carlos Fonseca Amador was the central ideological and strategic leader of the revolutionary movement in Nicaragua (Zimmermann, 2000).

- The writings that defined the political ideology of the FSLN-programmatic documents, historical and social analyses, key speeches and manifestos—were almost without exception, his work” (Zimmerman, 2000).

- Carlos Fonseca also played a key role in organizing the day-to-day work of the FSLN, recruiting to its ranks, expanding its political influence, and planning its military operations (Zimmermann, 2000).

- Carlos Fonseca was the FSLN leader who most epitomized the radical and popular character of the revolution (Zimmermann, 2000).

- In our quest to understand Fonseca’s ideology and his contribution to the FSLN and the Nicaraguan revolutionary movement, we draw upon two dominant influences: The writings and actions of Ernesto “Ché” Guevara, and the long tradition of resistance and courage on the part of the Nicaraguan workers and peasants, exemplified specially by the anti-imperialist, Augusto C. Sandino (Zimmermann, 2000).

- “Carlos Fonseca followed in the footsteps of two individuals above all others, Ché Guevara and Augusto Cesar Sandino” (Zimmerman, 2000).

- Carlos Fonseca’s contribution lies in the intertwining of two themes: the fight for national liberation against U.S. imperialism and the struggle for socialist revolution. According to Zimmerman,

- “(Fonseca’s) vision of a Sandinista Popular Revolution included both military victory over the U.S. backed Somoza dictatorship and a social transformation to end the exploitation of Nicaraguan workers and peasants (Zimmerman, 2000).

- Fonseca’s goal was to build a movement that was deeply rooted in the material reality of Nicaragua and its rebel traditions symbolized by Sandino, while looking to Cuba—and the Russian Revolution before that—for inspiration and a sense of what was possible (Zimmermann, 2000).

- Fonseca (in Zimmerman, 2000) writes:

  “It is not our job to discover the universal laws that lead to the transformation of a capitalist society into a society of free men and women; our modest role is to apply these laws, which have already been
discovered, to the conditions of our own country” (Fonseca in Zimmermann, 2000).

- Fonseca was the architect of the FSLN and responsible for positioning the FSLN as the kind of collective leadership (what Guevarra calls the “vanguard”) that could take power at the head of a popular uprising (see Zimmermann, 2000).

- Fonseca (in Zimmerman, 2000) writes:

  “One of the themes of my work is that this experienced and committed leadership-this “vanguard” in the language of the time, was a necessary ingredient to the success of the Nicaraguan revolution” (Zimmermann, 2000).

- In his attempt to create an ideology for the FSLN and redefine Sandinismo, Fonseca (in Zimmerman, 2000) builds on four key concepts; anti-Americanism stemming from a century of Yankee imperialism; Sandino; the Cuban people’s struggle; and the rise of the revolutionary armed organization (Fonseca, 1969).

- In his article titled “Zero Hour” (Hora Zero), Fonseca makes reference to the Monroe Doctrine and what he calls “aggressive policy of the United States (Fonseca, 1969). He condemns the United States for “Yankee acts of aggression” starting in the 1950’s, mentioning among others, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty5, the bombardment of San Juan del Norte by a U.S. Navy vessel, the filibuster William Walker, the Knox Note,6 and twenty years of Marine occupation.

- Fonseca also makes reference Sandino’s refusal to adhere to the terms of the U.S. sponsored Pact of the Espino Negro, which he (Fonseca) considers the culprit for what he calls the “American reactionary force–the National Guard.”


- Fonseca (1969) continues to condemn the United States for what he calls “plundering Nicaragua’s natural riches” and making Nicaragua a “base for aggression against other Latin American peoples” (Fonseca, 1969).

- Fonseca (1969) provides a list of events which he considers evidence to support this claim:

---

5 Treaty between the United States and Great Britain, giving both nations the right to build an inter-oceanic canal through Nicaragua.
6 Note written by U.S. Secretary of State Philander C. Knox which states that the U.S. has the right to intervene in Nicaraguan internal affairs.
1961. The mercenary invasion that is defeated by revolutionary Cuba at the Bay of Pigs leaves from Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua. 1965. National Guard troops form part of the foreign forces that, led by U.S. Marines, occupy the territory of the Dominican Republic. 1965. In the same year, counterrevolutionaries captured in Cuba state that they left from training camps in Nicaraguan territory. 1966. René Schick, nominal president of Nicaragua, states while traveling to the United States that Nicaraguan territory can be used as a base for forces aimed against Cuba. 1967. Anastasio Somoza Debayle makes known his decision to send members of the National Guard to take part in the aggression against Vietnam (Fonseca, 1969).

- Next to his deep contempt for alleged American aggression, Fonseca’s study of Sandino helped to define his ideological position.

- During his time in Cuba, Fonseca began to study Sandino more seriously. As an adolescent, Fonseca’s only exposure to Sandino had been Anastasio Somoza’s book *The Truth about Sandino: the Ordeal of the Sevogias* (see Somoza, 1936). Somoza presented Sandino as a murderous bandit, terrorist, and communist.

- With the growing excitement of the Cuban revolution, Fonseca discovered Gregorio Selser’s biographic representation of Sandino, first published in Buenos Aires in 1957, titled: *Sandino: General of Free Men*; Selser’s book is considered by scholars as the source of Fonseca’s formation of Sandino as a “path” (see Selser, 1979) to be followed. Prior to the Cuban revolutionary victory, Sandino was totally absent from Fonseca’s writings and speeches, as Zimmermann notes:

  *If Carlos Fonseca in early 1956 were already well-informed about Sandino, already saw him as a “path” to be followed, surely this would have found expression in his writings and political activities...the entire library of eighty books and pamphlets confiscated from Fonseca by the National Guard in September 1956, contained not a word about Sandino* (Zimmerman, 2000).

- Conversely, following the revolutionary victory in Cuba, Sandino is not only present but featured in his work (see Zimmermann, 2000).

The importance of this “pre-post” observation extends much farther than chronology however. Whilst it evidences the significance of the Cuban revolution and the impact it had on Fonseca, it also shows a marked change in direction in Fonseca’s ideology, particularly the relationship
between Marxism and national liberation as these applied in the Nicaraguan case (see Zimmermann, 2000).

- Before 1960, Fonseca was “eulogizing” Stalin (see Zimmermann, 2000). By 1960, Stalin’s Marxism is replaced with Sandino’s anti-imperialism and Guevara’s guerrilla-led revolutionary ideas (see Zimmermann, 2000). The victory in Cuba convinced Fonseca that a socialist revolution was also possible in his own country, which drove him to study his country’s history much in greater depth, including the figure of Sandino.

- In his pursuit to understand Sandino, Fonseca found that Sandino was already an important figure for Latin American revolutionaries.

- In the 1940’s, a battalion which included Fidel Castro, seeking to overthrow Dominican Dictator Rafael Trujillo was named after Sandino. Castro and Ché Guevara studied Sandino’s guerrilla war experiences during their time in the Sierra Maestra, preceding their revolutionary victory (see Zimmermann, 2000).

- The Cuban revolution had its own hero-martyr, José Martí, who was killed while fighting Spanish colonialism in 1895, ironically, the year Sandino was born.

- In essence, Sandino played the same role in the ideology of the FSLN, as Martí had for the July 26 movement in Cuba (see Zimmermann, 2000).

In the years preceding the Cuban victory, Castro, Guevara and other revolutionaries “resurrected” Martí as a revolutionary anti-imperialist fighter, overlaying the image of poet, teacher, and spiritual “apostle,” that had prevailed during the first half of the twentieth century (see Zimmermann, 2000). Fonseca followed suit, with his own propagation of Sandino and Martí as two men “bound together by indestructible ties” (see Fonseca in Zimmermann, 2000).

- Fonseca stated while speaking in Havana in 1974:

  “The thought and action of José Martí and Augusto Cesar Sandino point out to us a path of common struggle (Fonseca in Zimmermann, 2000).”

- In 1960, Fonseca published a manifesto called 23 July 1960, to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the so-called student massacre in Leon, in 1959. The manifesto condemned the “democratic farce” of the Somoza government and U.S. imperialism, addressed the need for a radical social revolution, called for revolutionary land reform, and praised the Cuban revolution and Sandino (see Zimmermann, 2000).
Fonseca’s manifesto represents a marked change in ideology. Taking the Cuban revolution and Sandino as his examples, a break from traditional Marxism towards anti-imperialism and the idea of revolution led by an armed organization begins to take shape (see Zimmermann, 2000).

Fonseca claimed that there was a “palpable absence in Nicaragua of any instrument of struggle endowed with a scientific method with which the proletariat could fortify itself for its lack of carrying out a social transformation” (Zimmermann, 2000).

Fonseca believed that the FSLN was the instrument capable of filling that void. In his view, the FSLN “provided an instrument of struggle, to re-knit continuity with the past, to pick up a historical thread dropped in the 1930’s” (Zimmermann, 2000).

Findings from narratives of influential individuals in video documentaries

Narratives of Somoza government officials (at the time of the insurrection); FSLN combatants; FSLN leaders; Catholic Church representatives; members of the Group of Twelve; members of the National Reconstruction Junta; prominent business sector representatives; and were discovered in the video documentaries. The following themes emerged from these narratives:
The video documentaries also featured excerpts from interviews, speeches, presentations, and press conferences of influential individuals. The following themes emerged from these sources:
Themes Revealed From Narratives of Influential Individuals in the Video Documentaries

Findings from third-party interview

The findings are from an interview with Jaime Wheelock, Commander of the Revolution and one of the nine members of the Sandinista Directorate. The interview exposes significant characteristics during the different stages of the FSLN’s development as it matured into a politico-military organization-in proper economic, social, and historical context. The interview was conducted by Martha Harnecker in September of 1986. The following observations were found:

When asked to describe U.S. policy vis-à-vis Nicaragua, Wheelock describes U.S. policy as

- “...a “vicious” dictatorship-expression of economic and political dominance on the part of the United States.
- The mode of control by the U.S. was through the implantation on the part of Yanqui intervention, of the dictatorship with an army trained directly by that country (U.S.)

---

- *Somocism* was a structure of politico-military power implanted by north-American intervention.

- The “fight” was not a questioning of the exploiting capitalist classes, rather a national inconformity with the existence of a dictatorship imposed by the United States. There was a great sense of “anti-Yankeeism.” This feeling could be felt by a doctor; an engineer; a student; a peasant; a worker; even the bourgeoisie.

Wheelock was asked to describe the historical evolution of the FSLN. In doing so, he mentioned the Kupia-Kumi Pact as an important element and offered the following illustration:

- The *bourgeoisie* opposition was in general weak and foolish; “pressuring” Somocism. Somocism and the opposition had established a scheme of pacts and coalitions from the time of the murder of Sandino up to 1979.

- In 1971, the Dictator (Somoza) called a meeting with Agüero (*Kupia Kumi* Pact ensued); a National junta (triumvirate) was formed. Somoza as Director of the National Guard, another liberal and one conservative (chosen by Agüero).

When asked to assess the general feeling of the population and the international community regarding the regime, Wheelock responded:

- In the mid-seventies, the dictatorship began to enter into a crisis due to its inability to contain the revolutionary popular movement.

- …a new administration took power in the United States, who intended to place respect for human rights as a condition for support. The Somocista dictatorship, favorite “daughter” of fifty years of north-American foreign policy, becomes an element of “embarrassment” and “contradiction” for the United States.

When asked to assess the role of the United States in its attempt to mediate a solution to the crisis, Wheelock responded:

- The opposition, previously weak and “timid”, begins to “calculate” the possibility of articulating a new alternative with the *Yanquis*, capable of assuring continuity of the system (U.S. sponsored plebiscite)

- The greatest influence from the U.S. was its attitude with respect to the dictatorship. The search for a viable substitution to *Somocism* by the United States was “capital.”
It is worth noting that President Carter sent Somoza a hand-written letter which recognized significant progress with respect to human rights. Somoza published this letter in Novedades as proof of the U.S. support. The publication was a signaling mechanism intended to show the economic groups and private sector; the bourgeoisie in general; and the National Guard; that he “continued to be man of the U.S. government.”

The U.S. however made it clear to Somoza and everybody else that Somoza was no longer “their man” and another project needed to be organized.

When asked to describe the FSLN relative to other organizations which made up the opposition movement, Wheelock exposed the following differences:

- A determining factor was the accumulation of forces, the conformation of one solid block of popular force, counting on a politico-military vanguard, acting coherently in all directions; with a political and economic project, and at the same time and different from all others, presented (to the bourgeoisie) a popular alternative of national unity.

- The FSLN did not present itself as a “liquidator” of the traditional economic groups, rather as an “integrator” of all the bourgeoisie sectors willing to participate in the national reconstruction, affording opportunities to small producers.

- The FSLN realized that only through an armed struggle in the name of the entire Nicaraguan nation would the objectives be achieved; the historically marginalized sectors of society would eventually gain conscience of the need to take up arms against the oppressive regime.

When asked to assess cultural support for the FSLN during the insurrectional period, Wheelock provided the following assessment:

- Many impresarios, starting in 1974, and particularly in 78 and 79, began to incorporate themselves in the “project”, though not publicly. However, the bourgeoisie and the financial “clans” were hoping for a project of “Somocism without Somoza.”

- Toward the “end” (of the crisis), a differentiation was noted between the financial “oligarchy” and the middle-class bourgeoisie. The financial oligarchy were left without an alternative; the foundations of Somocism were “shaking” while the revolution grew stronger and with more international support. In this context, the impresarios began to seek “organic contact” with the FSLN. At this point, the Superior Council for Private Enterprise (COSEP) began to link itself with FSLN structures.

- The advance of the revolution promoted the affluent classes working within the financial bourgeoisie to channel themselves in favor of the revolution and become “vanguardized” by the FSLN.
When asked about characteristics of the FSLN as an organization, Wheelock made the following revelations:

- The affluent sectors supported the FSLN in part because of its “practical” superiority.
- It (FSLN) was supported by a “formidable” platform featuring support from the masses and military force.
- The FSLN’s clandestine nature was a necessary condition required to protect the leadership cadres; the organized elements; ensure the logistics of acquiring arms from the exterior.
- From its conformation, the FSLN, defined through its programmatic of the armed struggle, and its politics of alliances, did not “plant” a fight against the bourgeoisie or the landowners, but rather against the existing regime and its political head-the dictatorship.
- The FSLN understood that the fundamental contradiction was U.S. domination; at the same time however, saw that locally, its expression was the dictatorship; and considered the Somoza regime the immediate enemy.

When asked to identify dominant actors within the opposition movement, Wheelock identified the Catholic Church. Wheelock illustrated his answer by exposing that:

- The ecclesiastic hierarchy assumed a bourgeoisie position, defending the option of “Somocism without Somoza” in order to salvage the existing order which had served the Church well.
- The Church was “with Somoza” when Somoza was able to preserve order. Almost all the archbishops were “Somocistas”, including Obando y Bravo (Cardinal). However, when the dictator becomes an “obstacle” to preserve order, the bourgeoisie and the Church look for a way out. The Church becomes anti-Somoza but only as a way to preserve the bourgeoisie order.

When asked to identify and describe significant events of the insurrection, Wheelock identified the following events:

1. The battle at *Pancasan* in 1967
   - Signaled the first time the FSLN confronted the dictatorship militarily; transforming itself in a “real armed threat”. The FSLN is overwhelmingly defeated at Pancasan. However, the battle signals a greater “maturity” by the organization. It marked the
real beginning of the projection of the FSLN as the only alternative of the people against the dictatorship.

2. The FSLN Student movement

- In 1968, the movement begins to gain ground on the right-winged-Social-Christians; the students embraced the revolutionary ideas proposed by the FSLN and saw the possibility of furthering the armed student movement steered by the FSLN.

- The strikes led by the student movement of the FSLN, allowed the FSLN to gain support from the working classes.

3. The raid on Chema Castillo’s house

- Produced an enormous national and international “echo.” This event also marked the end of the stage of “silent accumulation of forces.”

- After this event, our action (FSLN) against Somoza and the mature messages of the FSLN opened up international sympathy without precedent.

- The operation (Chema Castillo) manifested the weakness and inconsistency of the dictatorship.

4. The military assault on the National Guard’s Garrison at San Carlos in October of 1977.

- The operation was unsuccessful militarily however it transformed the struggle into a national stage.

5. The fractioning of the FSLN in 1977 into three factions;

- Prolonged Popular War (GPP) faction;
- Insurrectional faction (*Terceristas*);
- Proletarian faction (TP).

6. The reunification of the three factions of the FSLN (in 1979)

- The triumph of the revolution was produced by the convergence (of the three tendencies) at the highest point of the struggle and participation of the masses.…


When asked to assess the importance of the Cuban revolution, Wheelock offered the following conclusions:
From the beginning, we were inspired by the Cuban revolution; first as example and then as hope.

For many years, the unconditional support of Cuban revolutionaries was indispensable. When we (FSLN) were persecuted and tortured, Cuba was at the “front of the line” as far as support was concerned.

Cuba’s moral and material support from the Cuban government and Castro himself was vital to our struggle.

When asked to assess the importance of international support (for the FSLN), Wheelock highlighted the participation of the following Latin American nations:

- After 1974, along with the international current of solidarity, we (FSLN) counted with the support from heads of State, such as Omar Torrijos (Panama), José Figueres (Costa Rica), José López Portillo (Mexico), Carlos Andrés Pérez (Venezuela), Rodrigo Carazo (Costa Rica), Hernán Siles Suazo (Bolivia), Juan Bosch (Dominican Republic); among the Latin-Americans.

When asked to identify the intellectual influences of the FSLN, Wheelock identified Carlos Fonseca Amador as the primary intellectual influence of the FSLN.

- Carlos Fonseca has the historical merit of having understood that in order to defeat the Somoza dictatorship, a comprehensive and all-inclusive effort “forged” by militant revolutionaries, was needed to produce the “indispensable” conditions for achieving the objective.

- Carlos (Fonseca) understood the value that a guerrilla experience could have even if it resulted in temporary defeats.

- He (Fonseca) had the conviction that in order to produce victory through struggle and build an adequate politico-military apparatus, it was necessary to “transit through a series of phases” among them the initial constitution of a small group; then an armed struggle where the posterity of the vanguard would be tested, and finally the penetration and organization of the popular sectors to arrive finally, in a popular insurrection.

- Fonseca believed that each Sandinista militant needed to be an “organizer of organizers” in the early stage where the vanguard was still small.

- Fonseca saw that in the union between the vanguard and the masses, the conditions for an accelerated and growing popular uprising, eventually ending in a generalized insurrection of the masses against the dictatorship, would be unleashed.
- Carlos (Fonseca) envisioned the FSLN as having been “born” looking for insurrection rather military victory; it was not about one army defeating another.

When asked to describe the role of umbrella organizations in the opposition movement, Wheelock identified three organizations:

- **Movimiento Pueblo Unido (MPU);**
- **Frente Patriótico Nicaragüense (FPN);**
- **Frente Amplio de Oposición (FAO).**

According to Wheelock, the Movimiento Pueblo Unido (MPU) served two functions:

- Guaranteed the coordination of popular mobilizations;
- The “cornerstone” of the political alliances of the popular sectors.

However, Wheelock pointed out that “in and of itself, it was unable to organize a national alliance.” Wheelock also added that the existence of the FSLN in the opposition movement was significant in that without it, the MPU would have allowed “a way out” for the bourgeoisie. According to Wheelock, the FAO:

- Represented the “hope of the Yanquis”
- The participation of the FSLN’s Third tendency (Insurrectional) in the FAO helped “neutralize” the Yanquis and at the same time, the bourgeoisie.
- The FAO helped “disarm” politically, the idea of Somocism without Somoza,
- The FAO weakened Somoza and helped the Yanquis consider the FSLN for the first time, as their political counterpart.
- The withdrawal of the Third tendency (Insurrectional) from the FAO helped to forge an alliance with the MPU, resulting in the National Patriotic Front (FPN) as the broader alliance.