AGENCY OF CRISIS: THE CHAOS AND REORDERING OF PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY

Chad B. Newswander

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Dr. Rachel Holloway, Chair
Dr. John Tedesco
Dr. Beth Waggenspack

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ABSTRACT

Crisis situations have the power to restructure knowledge, norms, rules and discourse. The status quo can be changed, transformed, and revolutionized through shocks to a system. These events often lead to chaos and reordering. Deflecting blame, assigning praise and guilt, transcending the situation, and corrective actions are secondary concerns when an organization is trying to change its core identity and epistemic reality. These shocks to the system provide a momentary break in time in which new discursive spaces open and become available. In particular, crisis situations that become marked by high probability/high consequence events enable organizations to establish new meaning. In these moments, a Foucauldian framework that focuses on power as production is able to illuminate certain aspects about crisis situations and crisis response. This thesis delves into the process of how external shocks created opportunities for an organization like the Secret Service to mold a crisis moment through the production of knowledge and meaning. To examine how the Secret Service responded to these shocks, this thesis examines a series of case studies ranging from the attempted assassination of Roland Reagan to the Oklahoma City bombing. In these moments, the Secret Service relied on its ability to create authoritative meaning, discipline the president, and make declarative statements about potential threats and safety precautions. In its ability to formulate these concepts, the president becomes tied to the Secret Service’s apparatus of truth production. This allows the Secret Service to produce new meaning that disciplines presidential movement and action. Due to these conditions, the Service pivots on an unstable foundation, which allows it to reformulate and create new protective measures to protect the president in an ever changing environment.
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CHAPTER 1

SEEDS OF CHANGE

“Though it would be safer for a President to live in a cage, it would interfere with his business.” President Abraham Lincoln

“I would object on general principles that it is antagonistic to our traditions, to our habits of thought, and to our customs that the President should surround himself with a body of janizaries or a sort of Praetorian guard, and never go anywhere unless he is accompanied by men in uniform and men with sabers as is done by the monarchs of the continent of Europe.” Senator Stephen Mallory

Introduction

Crisis situations trigger drastic variations within any type of organization. These punctuations can cause significant harm and require organizations to respond in a manner that will clarify confusion by creating meaning. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the process of how shocks to the system enable organizations like the Secret Service to project, create, and form new discourse. In particular, it will explain how the Secret Service has structured and restructured presidential security as a result of crisis situations that forced it to re-conceptualize organizational and discursive practices. The implementation of protective services was radically altered due to these breaks in the status quo. The Secret Service was exposed to several crisis events that provided it the ability to reformulate the structure of presidential security. Situations ranging from the assassination of JFK to the Oklahoma City bombing and the 9/11 terrorist attacks created discursive and open spaces which allowed the Service to change how presidential security is operationalized. From these crisis situations, the Secret Service altered its practices of presidential security. This research examines the emergence of presidential security by showing how the Secret Service has helped shape the concept of presidential protection after a series of crisis situations in the early 1980s and the mid 1990s. In
particular, it will look at how a series of crisis episodes (he attempted assassination of President Reagan, the Beirut truck bombings and other terrorist related threats during Reagan’s administration, the multiple attacks on President Clinton, and the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City) served as a catalyst for emerging rationalities that allowed the Secret Service to break with past discourse and create new modes of productivity and rationalities.

In these nexuses of chaos produced by crisis situations, the Secret Service was able to transform the utterance of closing Pennsylvania Avenue to an authoritative declaration. The action by an administrative agency during a range of crisis situations provided the lens to understand a new age marked by terrorism. In fact, these crisis situations became marked by high probability/high consequence events that propelled the Secret Service to change the idea behind how the president should be protected, which in turn altered the power relations between the Secret Service and the president. As the increasingly likelihood of an attack on the president’s body became more probable, new concepts and constructs emerged to address these new conditions. The solution for the president was to seal himself off from the people. The president disciplined himself to the new ethos of the Secret Service. The probability of attacks by terrorist organizations allowed the Secret Service to implement radical measures to protect the First Family. This action, in turn, provided a new framework for how the United States would deal with terrorist threats: security would trump openness. This truth production grounded in Michel Foucault’s idea of productive and disciplinary power was filled with conflict, struggle, competing ideas of what should be done, but the declaration by the President of the United States, reinforced by a credible public study and the weight of the key
bureaucratic organizations, gave the concrete decision authoritative status. This thesis is the story of how the stigma of closing Pennsylvania Avenue became an authoritative act.  

**Problems of Protection and the Emergence of Protection as an Object of Study**

In fact, the story of the Secret Service centers on how this small agency in the federal government evolved into a truth production apparatus concerning presidential safety and movement. In using a genealogical/Foucauldian approach, the history of the Secret Service reveals how the Secret Service organized and changed the very idea of presidential security based on productive and disciplinary power. The nature of presidential policing in the 19th century was virtually non-existent, as the security of the Commander-in-Chief was not deemed a priority. Security measures related to the President were labeled as suspicious, monarchial, and foreign. In 1831, Gustave de Beaumont, companion of Alexis de Tocqueville, was amused by what he perceived as a lack of presidential luster. He wrote that President Jackson was “not a man of genius” and “occupies a palace that in Paris would be called a fine private residence” (Beaumont, 1996). Instead of being richly ornamented, the White House was simply decorated. This lack of a presidential spectacle was only compounded by the fact that the president had no security detail. There were no royal guards, body guards, or military personnel who ensured the safety of the president. Beaumont and Tocqueville thought it odd to see a chief magistrate of a nation in such a homely and unprotected condition. This attitude of the two Frenchman reflected an image of sovereigns that should be isolated, protected, and distant from the people they serve. In effect, the sovereign should not live, feel, think, or act as the people do. In contrast, representation in the American context (the anti-Federalist and Jeffersonian vision) consisted of rulers who were tied to the people. Representatives were expected to “mix with the people, think as they think, feel as they
feel” (Mason, 1970). Almost 200 years later Senator Grams evoked a similar sentiment. He remarked that “Kings live in park enclaves, as they say, while Presidents live along streets” (Congressional Record, 1996, April 29).

The thick culture that existed in 19th century America prevented this formation of extensive presidential protection due to the fear of a “Praetorian guard” residing in the heart of democracy. In particular, this modest manner of presidential living and lassiez faire attitude toward protection reflected the spirit of the age. It was an approach approved by Thomas Jefferson, who was “concerned about what his manner of living and entertaining would say about his political principles” (Seale, 1986, p. 90). Jefferson’s political principles sought to deflect aristocratic, elitist attitudes of the Federalists and reflect an openness and liberty that were associated with the common American. As the third person to hold the position, he sought to create a symbol of the presidency as an office that was accessible to the people. This symbol was the White House, or, as it came to be known, the “People’s House.” In Jefferson’s time and for generations afterward, people used the White House grounds for daily walks, picnics, fairs, and even public markets.

The accessibility of the White House and the lack of body guards posed a significant security threat to various presidents. President John Adams was confronted and threatened by a man who just strolled into the White House. President John Quincy Adams was also threatened by a court-martialed army sergeant. President Andrew Jackson survived an assassination attempt at the Capitol after Richard Lawrence’s two pistols misfired. President John Tyler was intimidated by an angry mob that burned an effigy of him outside the White House gates. His quasi-security problems continued
when an intoxicated painter threw several rocks at him while he was taking a walk on the White House lawns.

Despite these threats, there was very little done to protect the White House or the body of the president. President Jefferson built a stone wall around the White House. However, President Monroe replaced this wall with an iron face to ensure that all Americans could “look freely upon the ‘President’s house’” (Public Report of the White House Security Review, 1995). However, President Monroe did install new gates equipped with heavy locks and hired guards to protect the Executive Mansion. President Van Buren expanded this protective structure by hiring a day guard and night watchmen. It was not until the presidency of John Tyler that Congress authorized a permanent set of guards for the White House in 1842. President Tyler petitioned Congress for an auxiliary guard in response to the conditions in Europe. However, there was substantial opposition to even this minimal level of protection that would only serve to protect the building of the White House. Senator John Crittenden of Kentucky raised again the comparison to a Praetorian Guard. To avoid the hint of royalism and an overprotective and powerful warrior class, the “word ‘guard’ seldom appears, for the image of a closed-off, armed White House had disturbing implications” (Seale, 1986). In fact, the legislation delegated the authority to appoint these guards to the Mayor of Washington, not the president (Public Report of the White House Security Review, 1995). Although a minimal level of protection was provided to protect federal buildings like the Executive Mansion, the president himself was not protected.

In fact, a national or federal police with extensive investigatory skills did not even exist until the Treasury Department created the Secret Service division to handle the
fiscal crisis of counterfeit bills. There was no federal police force to protect federal buildings, enforce federal law, or protect political leaders. The national government relied extensively on local law enforcement with some help from federal officials.¹ In response to this counterfeiting crisis that threatened the stability of the economy, the Secret Service division was established within the Treasury Department in 1865 to manage this counterfeiting crisis. Although the creation and growth of this division was haphazard and sporadic, its mission would develop with the times (Johnson, 1995).

The mission to protect the body of the president did not emerge until a series of presidents lay dead. President Lincoln was assassinated in 1865 by John Wilkes Booth and President James Garfield was assassinated on July 2, 1881. The Secret Service, the only functioning federal police force, unilaterally decided to start protecting the body of the president in the summer of 1894, despite a lack of congressional approval. Through its various investigations, the Secret Service uncovered a plot in Colorado to assassinate the president. To avoid a crisis situation, the Secret Service without legislative authorization sent two agents to protect President Cleveland from cranks, Coxey’s Army, and anarchists. It was not until 1898 that a Congressional audit discovered that the Secret Service was diverting funds and agents to protect the president. Congressional wrath fell upon Chief William P. Hazen for exceeding his primary mission, and he was quickly demoted to field operative.

This initial attempt to secure the body of the president proved to be futile until President William McKinley followed a similar fate on September 14, 1901. After

¹ Custom agents, Internal Revenue services, and Postal Inspection Service had limited jurisdiction over criminal matters. Although the Federal marshals were the largest police force in the nation, they “were primarily officers of their courts, not detectives skilled in the pursuit of urban criminals (Johnson, 1995, p. xv).
President McKinley’s assassination, the Secret Service assumed unofficial responsibility to protect the chief executive officer until Congress could decide who should protect the president. In 1902, the Senate advocated for military protection while the House argued for the Secret Service. A stalemate ensued, and it was not until 1907 that Congress gave express permission to the Secret Service to protect the President of the United States. With this initial grant of authority, Congress delegated the Secret Service the power to study and implement protective procedures that would secure the President of the United States. Presidential protection finally became an object of study in the early 20th century. The method the Secret Service relied on was to use a small band of federal agents to encircle the president from danger while relying on local support to form outer circles of protection. This method of using massive local support with a small cadre of specialized units was designed to protect the body of the president from being harmed by a deranged crank. This strategy was geared more toward crowd control and an impressive number of body guards to deter an attack. It was based on a body defense strategy that solely thought of close-ranged attacks. In guarding the president at his residence, security was still minimalist in nature.

Protecting the body of the president has evolved and changed since that initial authorization of Congress. The Service would refine its study of president protection, especially after an attempted or successful assassination attempt. However, it was not until the early 1980’s that the Secret Service re-considered how the body of the president should be protected due to the increase probability of assassinations. The reverberations

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2 The aftermath of the John F. Kennedy’s assassination also caused significant changes in how the Secret Service protects the president. Training had to be re-thought due to the multiple mistakes by the Secret Service. These errors ranged from hangovers from the night before to the agents in Kennedy’s car who believed the gunshots they heard were backfires from the car.
of continued terrorist attacks in Beirut, New York City, and Oklahoma City in the 1980s and 1990s forced the Secret Service to examine past practices, challenge them, and introduce unorthodox solutions to mitigate the probabilities of an unorthodox attack on the White House. The primary presidential threat had evolved from a lone gunman who sought close distance to eliminate his target to massive truck bombs that would be stationed on the side of the road and detonated. This transformation from the possibility of an uncoordinated attack carried out by someone at close range who was mentally unstable, could not form long lasting relations, was unable to carry a full time job, and lived life as a loner, to the possibility of a coordinated and long-range attack carried out by groups with substantial resources with an ideology that justified death and destruction was a threat that the Secret Service had to address. With these scenarios becoming more likely, the Service was in a position to generate new power relations.

To do this, they introduced a series of utterances and statements in the 1980s after John Hinckley unloaded his revolver at President Reagan in a city that was deemed safe by the Secret Service, a 400-pound suicide truck blew up the U.S. Embassy killing 63 people, a truck carrying 12,000 pounds of explosives was blown up outside the Marine barracks in Beirut killing 242 Americans, a car bomb exploding in the U.S. Senate parking lots, to a viable rumor that a hit squad from the Middle East was coming to either assassinate the president or hit a major U.S. installation. Although most of these attacks did not challenge the Secret Service directly, they provided a picture of clarity about the potential threats that access and proximity posed for protecting the president. In response to these threats and the clarification about the dangers of anyone being close to the president, the Secret Service floated a host of ideas to ensure that the president would be
secure at home and on the road. The Secret Service studied plans of presidential protection and concluded that dump trucks full of sand should be positioned outside White House entrances, East Executive Avenue should be closed, massive concrete barriers should be built, and antiaircraft missiles should be placed on top of the White House. However, the most controversial and untenable position was to create a college “campus-like” environment around the White House by closing Pennsylvania Avenue. This utterance for many outside the Secret Service was reckless; it was a stigma. The public would not and could not endorse such an idea and this power play by the Service failed.

However, terrorist attacks continued into the 1990s. Again, most of these crisis moments only had an indirect connection to Washington D.C. and the protecting of the body of the president. These attacks at home and abroad created a substantial disruption in how the United States should respond to terror. In fact, this trend of increased securitization due to increased threats was not just contained to the Secret Service. The risk of terrorist events has reached such a high probability that the state has had to build an extensive security apparatus to prevent such attacks from occurring. The National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Department for Homeland Security, and the Central Intelligence Agency have been fully developed to decrease the odds of a terrorist attack from occurring on United States soil. To control dangerous subjects, state security/police agencies must use a range of practices to monitor and regulate deviant individuals and populations (anarchists, home-breed terrorists, Islamic fundamentalists). The gaze of the state and its accompanying effects (both internal and external) must constantly monitor both friends and enemies alike.
For the Secret Service, this meant that it had to securitize by challenging tradition, customs, and public symbols. This was mainly done by justifying the closing of Pennsylvania Avenue after the Oklahoma City bombing. The symbolic representation of placing barricades between the president and the people had significant consequences. The administrative practices of protection trumped the administrative practices of openness. The People’s House (or the very last vesture of this myth) was transformed into Fortress White House. This value of protection gradually spread from Pennsylvania Avenue to the gates at the Super Bowl as presidential security is now expanded to critical events where none were deemed necessary before. This change based on productive power transformed the traditional meaning of what it meant to be free in the American context. The 9/11 crisis would only accelerate and strengthen this meaning through new expansive methods of control.

The nature of policing in modern day America has reached a point where the government works around democratic and constitutional principles to preserve normality and order. To be proactive in this new age of terrorism, policing has expanded to encompass critical individuals and events where such protection had been deemed unnecessary before. As a result, the Secret Service, like many other police agencies, is seeking to expand, modernize, update, and scientize the concept of security. For the Secret Service, this expansion is critical, as no public person is safe in an open and free society due to the constant threat of danger.

This environment in which the Secret Service now operates stands in stark contrast to previous practices and rationalities for protecting the President of the United States. Jefferson was keenly aware that his manner of living said volumes about his
political principles (Seale, 1986). Many early 19th century presidents believed unquestionably that security should not encage the only nationally elected official in the Union. This is why Beaumont and Tocqueville saw a president unprotected. It was not that security did not matter; it did. They chose, however, to embrace different logics, practices, and values. Placing barricades between the president and the people was an act that many were unwilling to compromise their position. Hence, it took 117 years for Congress to finally grant proper legal authority to protect the President of the United States. To understand this development in securing the president, it is critical to look at how rationalities emerged from crisis situations in the past 25 years and allowed the Secret Service to gradually develop greater methods of control due to the increased likelihood of attacks on the president.

**Direction of Study**

To address how the Secret Service evolved and developed the capacity to make truth claims, this thesis explains and outlines a crisis framework that considers how organizations are able to dissociate themselves with past discourse and establish a new set of power relations that enables these organizations to generate new and productive discourse and norms. By using Foucault’s analytic of power relations, this thesis will demonstrate that crisis communication needs to consider how power relations often shape and are reshaped by organizations during and after a crisis. Most organizations rely on a historical/conservative model of crisis management that seeks to restore previous values and relationships. However, these models are often unrealistic and rely on the past to guide decision making in an environment that no longer recognizes these spaces.

To demonstrate the practicality of these ideas, this thesis explains how the Secret Service was able to reformulate its power relations and zones of influence in order to cut
ties to previous traditions and modes of legitimizing behavior. In addressing this process, this thesis will first outline the basic aspects to Foucauldian genealogy by examining how a stigma or an utterance becomes a statement. After examining Foucault’s methodology, it will then examine the current literature of crisis management and show how a Foucauldian approach that focuses on productive power and discipline can fill in missing aspects in the literature of crisis management. It will then apply these principles by looking at case studies that dealt with the attempted assassination of Reagan, the Beirut bombings and other terrorist related threats during Reagan’s administration, the multiple attacks on President Clinton, and the closing of Pennsylvania Avenue during Clinton’s administration. The Secret Service was able to redefine its roles and values in a nexus of confusion evidenced by these cases. This thesis concludes with some final expressions of the possibility for Foucauldian genealogy applications for explaining shifts in discursive content and its symbolic meaning.
CHAPTER TWO  

GENEALOGY OF THE BUBBLE

The day presidential candidate Barack Obama received a Secret Service detail, his wife commented that “protection underscored the notion that ‘we are moving to the next level’ of the presidential campaign” (Zeleny, 2007, May 4). In being placed under protection seven months before the first vote was cast for president, Senator Obama was the first presidential candidate to ever receive this type and this amount of protection so early in the process. In fact, most candidates “resist security protection until the last possible moment, saying it restricts movement and prevents them from campaigning directly with the people” (Zeleny, 2007, May 4). However, what is missed in this analysis is the link between the presidential spectacle and the Secret Service. While most candidates fail to recognize this point, Obama’s campaign asked for Secret Service protection so that he could move to the next level, which entails a perception of what it is like to be President. Not only was he the earliest candidate to receive protection from the Secret Service, but his detail grew larger with each victory. After his win in Iowa, the Secret Service increased his details to the extent that it “now rivals that of President Bush, with a dozen Secret Service agents wearing dark suits and earpieces leading bomb-sniffing dogs through event venues, sweeping all equipment brought by journalists and flanking the candidate as he plunges into crowds of supporters” (Curl, 2008, Jan 7).

These measures, initiated by the Secret Service, not only ensure Obama’s safety, they reinforce and strengthen what it means to be presidential. The mantle of authority, trust, familiarity, and above all respectability is reinforced by the spectacle of security. Candidates without this type of protection and spectacle are left without this tinge of
presidential persona. Special Agent Venker noted that “protection meted out to
Presidential candidates looked like a team of school crossing guards next to the Roman
legion that shielded the man himself” (Rush, 1988, p. 109). This protective phalanx of
guard adds legitimacy and credibility to anyone who is surrounded with the power of the
state. Protection is not only approved, but also heralded.

A century ago this type of protection was not only deemed suspect, but also was
stigmatized by much of the citizenry. Protecting the president was deemed unacceptable
and un-American. Presidents did not ask for protection, but resisted it and fought against
it. Some like Theodore Roosevelt carried a revolver. Despite threats, President John
Adams did not need a security detail to handle unstable individuals. When confronted
and threatened by a man, President Adams sat him down, talked with him, and walked
him out. President John Quincy Adams was also threatened by a court-martialed army
sergeant, but he did not need soldiers to come to his rescue. After President Andrew
Jackson survived an assassination attempt at the Capitol, he did not surround himself with
a military guard. Despite easy accessibility to the White House, lack of presidential body
guards, and an increased fear from anarchists who were assassinating leaders in Europe,
neither presidents nor Congress embraced an idea of presidential security force. Even
after the assassinations of Lincoln and Cleveland, resistance to security was still the
norm. Protection did not grant legitimacy or respectability, but fear and weakness.

To examine how a stigma becomes credible or how an utterance becomes a
statement, this chapter will outline the methodological approach used for this thesis. In
particular, the methodology used in this study is a genealogical approach developed by
Foucault with a traditional case study examination of particular events. In combining
Foucault’s methodological orientation with a case study approach, this research considers how the Secret Service emerged from historically suspect origins and developed into a time-honored institution that protects the Commander-in-Chief. Creating these spaces of protection required that the Service continually develop rationalities and administrative techniques for how and why the president should be protected in a particular manner. The concept of protection is neither natural nor scientific, but it is a creation that fits into a broader discursive formation. To examine these methodological questions, this chapter will outline a genealogical and case study approach used to examine the research questions, describe case study artifact selection and analysis, and possible limitations.

Methodology

Genealogy

In the opening of *Discipline and Punish* (1995), Foucault juxtaposes two modes of rationalities in order to produce some level of discomfort and estrangement for the reader. He begins by describing in excruciating details the torture of Damiens in 1757 and then immediately illustrates a different penal system based on a series of time-tables that was constructed only eighty years after this public torture. One is marked by brutal and unforgettable scenes of a man being drawn and quartered, while another is striking because of its extensive and sanitary rules and time-tables. By contrasting a public execution to the methodical procedures of controlling a detainee, Foucault seeks to problematize the traditional notions of history. Rather than looking at history from a linear or progressive model, he looks at genealogies. This Darwinian/Nietzschean approach to history is based on the notion that events do not have a natural or transcendental telos. In effect, there is no ultimate purpose, which history is striving towards. Hegel and Marx were wrong to conclude that there was an end to history.
History is not embedded with a telos or ultimate end or does not have an origin that it can restore. The pure, the natural, and the original are categories that Foucault wishes to destabilize through his model of analysis. There are no external points that are assessable to ascertain original truth. Instead, history is the result of highly-contingent permutations that randomly form. Rationalities, subjects, and institutions develop in a certain time or space in reaction to various forces. The supposed natural or given category is challenged and shown to be a construct of a multitude of forces and power relations.

By examining permanently unstable constructs, Foucault is conducting a history of the present. His primary purpose is to take what is natural or reified and challenge these taken-for-granted concepts. This is accomplished by starting from a present problem and working backwards. By diagnosing a modern problem like sexuality, rehabilitation, madness, or even government, Foucault is able to trace the development of these ideas and show how they have been changed and codified in different ways. In one example, Foucault is able to describe how the modern state emerged from a sovereign model to one that captures “new liberal approaches to management” (Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006, p. 236). Foucault describes how Western governments evolved from a sovereign model of government based on law, to a police state that is founded on discipline, to the emergence of modern government or governmentality that relies on security.

In this analysis of governmentality, Foucault traces the development of government in the West not to better understand how the sovereign used laws, contracts, and his divine stature to rule, but to grasp how governmentality has come to shape all aspects of modern life. He uses the past to better understand the present. This process
allows Foucault to use history as an illustration tool of how society or government has developed certain problems. A history of the present is not a story of progress or decline but a story of differences: how society comes to organize itself is different than how society organized itself in the past. This discontinuity reveals several important insights. The unmasking of difference allows a critical dimension to be added to Foucault’s analysis. By using the past to understand the present, Foucault wants to show how these codified subjects are tangible and changeable. Thus, Foucault is “fascinated by the past for the sake of the present” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 44).

Foucault lays out the basic premises of his analytics of genealogy in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (Foucault, 1977). Genealogy is characterized by two key terms: descent and emergence. By rejecting the pursuit of origin (Ursprung), Foucault wishes to show how history develops alongside descent (Herkunft) and emergence (Entstehung). In the analysis of descent, genealogy is able to look at inheritance and heritage from a non-traditional perspective that does not expect to find continuity or stable traits. It expects to find differences among similar variables. Hence, Foucault argues that an analysis of descent enables the genealogist to discover “accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us” (Foucault, 1977, p. 146). The discovery of difference seeks to undermine and to challenge stable structures that appear natural. Not only is descent marked by differences among similarities, but it also examines how descent has impacted and embedded itself in the body. This type of examination shows how the subject “does not

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3 Foucault rejects the idea of origin because it refers back to a foundational, objective, and naturalistic view of history. Without foundational elements, history is the result of random and unpredictable turns.
recognize itself as emergent but takes itself as prior to the effects of discourse” (Prado, 1995, p. 36). By focusing on descent, the reveals how this supposed prior self is constructed through multiple differences.

While descent focuses on subtle and often undetectable change, emergence is focused on the “moment of arising” (Foucault, 1977, p. 148). In this analysis, the genealogist seeks to understand how struggles between various forces create new forms of knowledge. This productive mode of operation, however, does not have a telogoical foundation to it. Rather than reaching a pre-determined endpoint, “emergence is always produced through a particular stage of forces” (Foucault, 1977, p. 148-149). These local and new rationalities arise due to the merger of multiple and contingent permutations.

This struggle is often the tension between subjugated knowledges. For Foucault, there are two types of subjugated knowledges (Foucault, 2003). First, subjugated knowledge is a type of discourse that is grounded in erudite and historical claims that are masked. These bodies of knowledge are often hidden in functional systems. The modern prison was based on the hidden and buried work of Bentham’s Panopticon. It is essential to unearth these specialized and authoritative claims. Second, knowledge is often local and on the margins. In contrast to the other type of subjugated knowledge, these beliefs have not been deemed scientific or authoritative; these knowledge claims are non-commonsensical, particular, and left on the margins. Although these subjugated knowledges are separate, they are interrelated. In fact, genealogy is the “coupling together of scholarly erudition and local memories, which allows us to constitute a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in contemporary tactics” (Foucault, 2003, p. 8).
This notion of subjugated knowledge is closely aligned with other key concepts in Foucault’s earlier archeological works: statement, utterance, discursive formation, and rules of formation. In particular, a statement is a type of discourse that is considered legitimate, authoritative, or scientific in a given context. This speech is distinct and different due to its credibility and persuasive ability. In fact, statements consist of a “general set of rules that govern their objects” (Foucault, 1972, p. 115). In clarifying this, Dreyfus and Rainbow show how statements are serious speech acts. These “special speech acts” can only be serious “if one sets up the necessary validation procedures, community of experts, and so on” (1983, p. 48). In clarifying a serious speech act, they provide a pragmatic example to show the difference between an utterance and a statement. An example of a serious speech act is when the National Weather Service makes an authoritative declaration about whether it will rain or not. This stands in stark contrast to when a friend says that it looks like it will rain (Dreyfus and Rainbow, 1983). This is an example of an utterance, or a simple claim that it is not grounded or backed by authority, credibility, or a medium of truth. These everyday speech acts are ignored. After the attempted assassination on Ronald Reagan, several former agents came out and advocated for a 50 foot rule, which prohibited anyone from getting within this range of the president. This type of discourse was an utterance because it was not practical nor did it have the institutional backing of the Secret Service. No president would accept this degree of restriction nor could the Secret Service actually implement this rule in practice. This comment and others like it were not considered or taken seriously; only the statement is what matters to Foucault at this stage of his thinking (in a genealogical mode
of analysis, the utterance emerges and becomes more critical because of the dynamic tension between everyday and serious speech acts).

Statements are found in local discursive formations, which are a subset of a governing episteme. These subsets of an episteme range from biology to economics and from psychology to public administration. It is a discourse set that each particular area privileges and empowers. In effect, they are a “group of statements with an internal dynamic” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 55). In *Security, Territory, and Population*, Foucault (2007) shows how certain truth is selected and bracketed based in a particular context. For example, the plague in the 16th and 17th century is treated like a disciplinary problem and knowledge is based around how to divide and separate people from each other, while small pox in the 18th century is treated in a distinct and different manner. The overall goal now is not to create a disciplinary space that quarantines people, but the “problem of knowing” relates to how to halt epidemics (Foucault, 2007, p. 10). In a different context, statements made in public administration differ based on time and context. Administration has been marked by a series of changing statements and practices that range from government by gentlemen to government by spoils to government by the efficient to government by proxy (Kettl, 2002; Mosher, 1982). In each discursive period, certain statements are credible while others are excluded. Discursive formations during government by spoils privileged politics and patronage, while government by proxy favors efficiency and contracts.

Because of the centrality of these serious speech acts, Foucault argues that “one can define the general set of rules that govern the status of these statements, the way in which they are institutionalized, received, used, re-used, combined together” (Foucault,
These “rules of formation” clarify how an utterance is declared or deemed an authoritative statement. Foss, Foss, and Trapp argue that a number of rules “govern various aspects of the discursive formation” (1985, p. 196). The first category revolves around what can and cannot be talked. Reminiscent of the second face of power, there are underlying rules which determine acceptable discourse. In *History of Sexuality*, Foucault (1990) explains how childhood sexuality was a topic that was not addressed during the Victorian Age. It was “driven out, denied, reduced to silence” because “everyone knew, for example, that children had no sex, which was why they were forbidden to talk about it, why one closed one’s eyes and stopped one’s ears whenever they came to show evidence to the contrary” (1990, p. 4). In contrast to being reduced to silence, there are rules, which establish objects of study. In *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault is able to show which objects of study emerge throughout history. In the Middle Ages, madmen were an accepted part of society and not hidden away in asylums to be studied, but during the 17th and 18th century this changed. Madness, in particular hysteria, “joined the domain of mental diseases” (p. 137). As an object of fascination, hysteria and hypochondria were closely linked with women and were extensively studied to determine its source. For the Secret Service, the object of study related to presidential security arose when it was granted the power to protect the president in the early 20th century. However, the serious and scientific study of presidential attackers did not emerge until a series of assassination attempts in the 1960’s. Even after these incidents, it took another decade for the Secret Service to make serious connections with the mental health community over what methods would be appropriate in determining dangerousness. This object of study finally came to the forefront for the Secret Service in
the early 1980’s when it held a series of conferences about this subject. (Institute of Medicine, 1981, 1984).

In close relation to what objects are studied, the second category centers on who is allowed to make authoritative statements. In a contemporary context, these figures range from scientists to lawyers to doctors to generals. Through professional degrees, scientific objectivity, accrediting exams, experience, these groups or institutions have the ability to proclaim certain statements as valid and others as invalid. As the Catholic Church of old, these figures pronounce truth. It is generals on the ground who are allowed to speak concerning conditions in Iraq or scientists who are allowed to say whether the climate is changing or not. In examining who is allowed to speak, Foucault (1990) offers an interesting example of Pierre Riviere, who was arrested and examined for sexual delinquency. During his trial, it was the scientific experts who were heard from and allowed to testify about his condition, not the local pastor who heard his confessions. By privileging their status to speak and “getting to know Riviere, a group of experts were reinforcing a regime of truth production which legitimated their own existence” (Haugaard, 1997, p. 86). This stands in stark contrast to those who are silenced. In one example, Foucault shows how “Mendel spoke the truth,” but “science could not properly speak of him” because his models and categories did not fit their pre-conceived conceptions (1972, p. 224). In a more drastic example, Foucault shows how “the madman’s speech did not strictly exist.” In fact, “whatever a madman said, it was taken for mere noise” (1972, p. 217). In the small community of the Secret Service, the voices that had been neglected were that of researcher and scientist. Due to the action-oriented mission of the Service, these scientific figures were ignored or not even thought
about; research that would determine who was considered dangerous was too slow of a process for the fast paced life of agents. Thus, the Secret Service did not seriously study the concept of dangerousness until the Agency developed relations with the mental health community. After the Service decided to develop these relations with the mental health community, the Secret Service hierarchy established an in-house research division that would investigate the concept of dangerousness (Institute of Medicine, 1981). This emergence of a new voice allowed the Service to take protection in a different and radical direction.

The final category of rule formation centers on the form of discourse. Legal opinions are often dry and colorless; quantitative studies are filled with charts, numbers, and graphs; financial reports rely on simple equations to the tell the story behind a company’s profit margins. Behind the numbers and words lies the form or structure of discourse which establishes what is to be accepted. Foss et al. (1985) provide an example that “non-linear perspectives and ways of writing or speaking are generally not recognized as valid or appropriate; truth does not reside in statements produced from such approaches” (p. 197). Despite what is studied or who has said it, the structure of things is a necessary condition in establishing the rules of formation.

In summary, Foucault outlines three different rules of formation in establishing the merits of a statement: the object of study, who may speak, and the form of knowledge (Foss et al., 1985). In his genealogical mode of analysis, Foucault does not abandon these concepts but transposes these ideas into his framework of struggle, conflict, and war. Rather than just showing what is an object of study or who says it, Foucault is able to explain how a casual utterance becomes an authoritative statement. These ideas are
supplemented with the introduction of Foucault’s ideas of power. The emergence of ideas is based on the inversion of Clausewitz’s proposition: “politics is the continuation of war by other means” (Foucault, 2003, p. 15). These types of knowledge clash and produce random but highly rationalized forms of knowledge. Hence, emergence of knowledge is based on struggle within a realm of peace. In this condition of stability, ideas are discussed and truth is created within a regime of truth. Haugaard nicely summarizes this connection:

By truth production Foucault means the common rules which determine the seriousness of statements- what qualifies as a statement and what does not. This is as in archaeology. In genealogy this represents peace, but what is added to this is the hypothesis that the machinery of truth production is constituted out of conflict. In short, the shared regime of truth is actually the conflict of war transposed into a regime of truth” (1997, p. 68).

In particular, utterances can become statements through a process of conflict. For Harry Truman, the Secret Service was a nuisance when it came to his freedom of movement. He thought it was silly that he had to be accompanied on his morning walks or that he just could not leave the White House unaccompanied. The Secret Service’s lingo was more of an utterance than a statement; Truman did not take security too seriously. It was not until the attack at the Blair House that President Truman started to realize that these utterances by the Service were authoritative (Hunter & Bainbridge, 2005). After the attempt on his life, Truman was not only more subdued, but he listened and considered what the Service had to say as a statement, not as meaningless utterances that could be dismissed. Hence, it is a degree of controlled chaos with a degree of stability that allows for new ideas to emerge. With the introduction of power, Foucault is able to explain dynamic stability and change. This is critical for the Secret Service, because struggle
over meaning, especially during and after a crisis situation, allows the Agency the
capacity to produce new statements. The Service is able to float ideas and generate new
knowledge in this nexus of chaos and stability.

Case Studies

By examining emerging rationalities and differences in a variety of cases, this
research project is well-suited in examining the shifting power relations between the
president and his forms of protection. This can be accomplished by looking at a
collection of case studies (Stake, 1994). By relying on a range of case studies, Stake
argues that research “will lead to better understanding [and] perhaps better theorizing”
(1994, p. 237). The reliance on multiple sources of data allows research to develop and
more adequately refine ideas and theories. Case studies provide the researcher with the
ability to look at an issue in-depth and to be able to extract key explanatory and
descriptive data. This type of study provides “vividness and detail not typically present
in more analytic reporting formats” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 159). This is because
the case study approach “begins in idiography and is rooted in the traditional conception
of clinical study” (Eckstein, 1975, p. 132). By examining cases with an orientation
toward detail, the researcher is able to capture rich and nuanced phenomenon that a
nomothetic approach grounded in a quantitative mode of analysis would miss. The
inductive nature of case studies privileges the concrete and observable in order to
examine surface and deeper levels of meanings. In essence, they provide the researcher
with the ability to look at an issue in-depth and be able to extract key explanatory and
descriptive data.

In examining case studies, Yin (1981, 2003) notes that they can be used to
examine exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory questions. A case study is particularly
useful regarding explanatory issues that revolve around the “how” and “why” questions. A case study approach, according to Yin, is more equipped to deal with how and why questions “because such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence” (2003, p. 6). The linking over time is a critical aspect to the examination of the Secret Service and how it has evolved from a fledging bureaucracy that was merely concerned with surviving to a robust agency that protects the Chief Executive Officer.

In explaining an explanatory case study, Yin (1981) uses the metaphor of a detective to describe how research should be conducted. A researcher must be able to ascertain the context and find clues to build a plausible interpretation of what happened. In order to do this, the detective must rely on little clues leading to big indicators to develop a picture. Hence, an explanatory case study consists of gathering relevant information to the case, an examination of alternatives leads, and a conclusion that reflects both the facts and consideration of alternative explanations. This method of analysis is similar to Foucault’s genealogical project of considering statements, utterances, and alternative voices that may have been excluded in the construction of a narrative.

**Case Study Selection**

For this research, a collection of case studies will consist of the attempted assassination of President Reagan, the Beirut truck bombings and other terrorist related threats during Reagan’s administration, the multiple attacks on President Clinton, and the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City. These case studies will provide precise information regarding how the Secret Service handles drastic shifts in presidential security. In these moments, the Service had to rethink its past practices and traditions and reformulate new
modes of protection. The Agency had to develop new security measures and apparatuses
to more effectively protect the president. This ranges from installing new protective
barricades around the White House to closing down America’s Main Street to ensure
protection. Through a genealogical mode of analysis, these case studies will show how
new practices are able to emerge from crisis situations. This allows for an in-depth
analysis, which exposes how protection is a constructed concept that emerges in a
haphazard manner during crisis events that produce uncertainty.

However, there is always a concern of selection bias in choosing case studies.
Because it is impossible to identify and examine a universe of cases regarding the Secret
Service, the issue of bias emerges in this research. This sampling problem is “the most
unique aspect of case study [research] in the social sciences” (Stake, p. 243). This
problem of selection bias is coupled by the low base rate problem. The examination of a
few case studies makes it difficult to generalize or make broad sweeping claims.
However, the most serious issues regarding selection bias is it “may bias the conclusions
one reaches” (Geddes, 1990, p. 149). From a quantitative perspective, it is difficult to
maintain the same level of reliability and validity. However, case studies are still “ideal
for digging into the details” (Geddes, 1990, p. 149). Despite these problems, Collier and
Mahoney argue that sampling is a concern, but it “is not the central issue in evaluating
such designs and that this perspective provides an inappropriate basis for completely
dismissing them” (1996, p. 90). What is more critical is “avoiding selection bias through
informed choices about research design” (1996, p. 89). This allows the researcher to be
more aware how they select and analyze findings.
The primary justification for choosing the cases used with this study was based on the need to focus on particular events in which presidential security has been problematized. This notion of problematization “is a technical term that suggests a particular way of analyzing an event or situation” (Collier, Lakoff, & Rainbow, 2004, p. 3). For Foucault, an area becomes problematic when something “must have happened to introduce uncertainty, a loss of familiarity; that loss, that uncertainty is the result of difficulties in our previous way of understanding, acting, relating” (1994, p. 598). In and during these moments of problematization (often caused by crisis), the status quo is questioned and challenged. This allows for bracketing and labeling of new and dramatic experiences, which may create a space of new meaning. In effect, these problematizations are an “ensemble of discursive and non-discursive practices that make something enter into the play of true and false” (Foucault, 1994, p. 670).

By interjecting uncertainty into stable conditions, new ideas, process, and techniques can be argued, developed, and debated. These interruptions provide actors, groups, or organizations the ability to participate in the creation of new discursive and non-discursive practices. In particular, Foucault argues that the direction and velocity of these problematizations often result in making something an “object of thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.)” (1994, p. 670). In the *Order of Things*, Foucault (1994) examines a series of emerging “objects of thought” ranging from resemblance in the Renaissance period to representation in the Classical period to man in the modern period. For more contemporary examples, Collier and Lakoff have shown how biosecurity, critical infrastructure, and distributed preparedness have become objects of study (2004, 2008, forthcoming). Due to the new
and modern challenges of terrorist attacks, energy crises, major technological accidents, and natural disasters, the state has had to control a wave of uncertainty and loss of familiarity in handling these security problems. In addressing these new configurations, the state has had to identify new threats, focus on vital targets, and create new strategies to handle these new problems. They did so by focusing on contingency planning, conducting vulnerability mapping and analysis, and developing emergency responses.

For this particular study, the main object of thought will center on and around presidential security. In selecting the cases, the primary determinant was whether something happened related to presidential security that introduced uncertainty or a loss of familiarity as a result of a crisis. The cases that were selected revolve around moments of uncertainty created by a dramatic event. The attempted assassination of Reagan, the Beirut bombings and other terrorist related threats during Reagan’s administration, the multiple attacks on President Clinton, and the closing of Pennsylvania Avenue were selected to study an in-depth manner because they all represent moments of uncertainty. This loss of familiarity is critical to these case studies because it allows the Secret Service the opportunity to reformulate the structure of presidential security. It is here where power is most productive: new constructs emerge to handle new problems. The web of relations that previously defined power, knowledge, and right conduct is altered and changed. Relationships between entities are undone, redefined, and relocated. The web is reconstructed, which shifts who has the ability to make truth and knowledge claims. Certain entities will lose status, while others will gain credibility and the ability to make political, administrative, and knowledge claims. In effect, this new arrangement allows for a “recodification of power relations” (Foucault, 1980, p. 123). In these moments of
recodification and emergence of new relations, an organization may be provided with the opportunity to make new knowledge claims. Situations that cause a punctuation have the potential to create discursive and open spaces, which have allowed the Secret Service to change how presidential security is operationalized. From these problematic situations, the Secret Service has altered its practices of presidential security.

**Data Collection**

In conducting this research, this project relied on historical material and documentation. Although the Secret Service has been an enigmatic agency, there is abundant material that revolves around the concept of presidential protection. These sources range from archival material, newspaper accounts, editorials, legislative debates, government reports, memoirs, and various Secret Service documents. These historical sources are “particularly useful in qualitative studies for establishing a baseline or background” (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 123). These historical documents provide the necessary information in understanding how attitudes and beliefs related to presidential security have changed over time. Most notably, these documents provide an in-depth analysis of what presidents, legislators, the press, and citizens said about how and why the president should be secured. In particular, there is an abundant amount of information produced on the Secret Service after an attack on the president. With each dramatic shift in presidential security, there are intense debates in the halls of government and the media about the meaning of presidential protection. After President John Tyler

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experienced threatening encounters from a mob and an intoxicated painter, he immediately asked Congress for a security detail that would protect the Executive Mansion. As a result of this petition and law, there exist historical records from newspaper accounts to archival material that explain this historical moment. This type of data collection is crucial for a genealogical mode of analysis. In order to understand and interpret the meaning of presidential security, it requires an extensive amount of historical material that recounts these events. In effect, Foucault states that genealogy “is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary” (1977, p. 139). It “requires patience and a knowledge of details and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material” (Foucault, 1977, p. 140). Historical shifts can only be understood by analyzing the source material that recounts the practices and reasoning behind presidential security.

**Data Analysis**

In analyzing data, Marshall and Rossman describe six steps that are similar to Yin’s detective based metaphor or Eckstein’s clinical approach. First, they focus on organizing the data, which requires an extensive amount of reading and re-reading to adequately understand the material. At this data gathering stage, it is critical for the researcher not only to take an extensive amount of notes to describe the material but to start to arrange and organize the information in preliminary categories. In reading Secret Service material, I focused on what Secret Service agents had to say, coupled with scholarly and historical information written about the history of the Agency. By relying on documents produced by agents, presidents, and outside observers, it allowed me to see a more nuanced version of the Secret Service. Second, Marshall and Rossman shift from organizing the data to generating concrete categories and themes. In this step, researchers must be able to identify recurrent themes, changes in concepts, and a broad
outline of the material. They describe these categories as “buckets or baskets into which segments of text are placed” (1999, p. 154). This stage in the research process is perhaps the most difficult because of the importance of establishing categories, which then frame the interpretation of events. In analyzing Secret Service material, I organized and used selected categories that illuminated ruptures of thought and changing power-relations. Hence, concepts created by Foucault played a key role in understanding and interpreting primary and secondary source material. These categories of uncertainty, productive power, problematizations, and discipline gave shape to my overall project and provided the necessary direction needed to understand how to shift through the various forms of data. These Foucauldian categories shaped how I looked at various events, practices, and concepts.

The third step is coding the material. Coding techniques range from using advanced qualitative software to abbreviations of keywords to creating timelines. However, it must be noted that the researcher must be willing to adapt and change categories based on new understandings. In coding the material, my focus was on key constructs from Foucault. Labeling events related to power, crisis, problematizations, discipline, resistance, truth production, and normalization allowed me to sort and code critical information. The fourth step is the initial testing of these categories. The researcher must be able to evaluate and critically analyze whether these constructs explain key research questions. In applying these categories, creating extensive outlines, tracing the history of events, and writing summaries allowed me to determine whether the categories were able to explain insights into the Secret Service. The fifth step revolves around the search for alternative explanations. To avoid being blinded by constructed
categories, the researcher must be willing to re-examine what he is seeing. In understanding the phenomena in a different light, I sought to re-read and apply different ideas to the framework of the Secret Service. This allowed me to see things differently and construct a richer picture of the Secret Service. The final step for Marshall and Rossman in analyzing data is to write the report, which again requires the researcher to interpret key variables. In each and every step, the researcher is an active participant that either helps or hinders the study.

In approaching the Secret Service, it was necessary to follow an analytic induction strategy that relied on case studies to determine the merit of my research questions (Stainback & Stainback, 1988). This approach ensured that data was carefully gathered, examined, and analyzed. Data analysis requires that the researcher be cognizant and aware of how to approach the material to ensure that it is examined in a thorough manner. My analysis of Secret Service material includes an organization of the source material, categories that shape and define my mode of analysis, and a search for potential and alternative explanations. In particular, I analyzed historical documents with special attention focused on how the Secret Service has created and reflected certain techniques, values, and norms. By looking at and analyzing the material in this way, I believe it provides a solid foundation for understanding how the Secret Service has implemented and changed the practices of presidential security. This type of analysis should produce a genealogical account of the Secret Service by focusing on alternative explanations. In order to examine the emergence of these rationalities, it is also important to examine a range of crisis management models that describe how change in organizations takes place. By examining what is missing in other crisis models and using...
Foucault’s analytic of power and critical constructs, crisis management and organizational theory are able to consider how the emergence of new power relations often shape organizations during and after a crisis.
CHAPTER THREE

PRODUCTIVE POWER OF CRISIS MOMENTS

Most organizations rely on a historical/conservative model of crisis management that seeks to restore previous values and relationships. However, these models are often unrealistic and rely on the past to guide decision making in an environment that no longer recognizes these spaces. In contrast to these models, crisis situations are opportunities that serve as a catalyst for breaking with the past and creating new modes of productivity and rationalities. This qualitative change is often the result of an organization facing an environment that is highly unstable and the probability of a crisis situation(s) is very likely. In these settings, organizations have the ability to project, create, and form new sets of discourse that fit with these new emerging relations. With the emergence of new conditions, they can restructure and rethink many of their basic assumptions after crisis episodes. However, the new concepts that emerge are often repressive and counter-intuitive to democratic norms. The concept of presidential security has not completely evolved in a clean and orderly process, but it is one that is often marked by crisis and haphazardness.

To demonstrate the relation between crisis management and power, this chapter will first offer a brief account of how scholars have viewed the history of the Secret Service from a linear perspective marked by continuities. By viewing the Secret Service from a strictly rational perspective, scholars have missed important theoretical and practical details of how the Secret Service has evolved. This chapter will then examine how the crisis management literature fails to look at how crises provide opportunities to break with past discourse. In particular, the previous researchers missed how crises
create spaces, which allow organizations to produce new meaning. Hence, crisis management needs to consider the role of productive power in its analysis. The emergence of new power relations and meaning is often the result of crisis moments. Because the Secret Service is an organization plagued by crisis situations, it has been able to cut ties to previous traditions and modes of legitimizing behavior of presidential protection, which has allowed it to reformulate presidential security as an object of study. For the Secret Service, the creation of new meaning or making an utterance into a statement is often due to the structuring forces of crisis situations which de-stabilize old patterns of thought and allow for the stabilization of new patterns.

**Secret Service**

A variety of perspectives shed light on the value of securing and protecting the Commander-in-Chief, ranging from former agents to government oversight committees to interested scholars who wish to examine this secretive agency. However, most of these perspectives describe and explain the history of the Service without pursuing a theoretical dimension to their analysis. These narratives tend to view the Secret Service from a narrow perspective that does not consider how crisis management theory, organizational theory, or critical theory could examine presidential protection. A great deal of the literature on the Secret Service is a series of autobiographies and memoirs.

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written by former agents who seek to describe a brief history of the organization and their experiences in protecting the President of the Untied States. They range from early 20th century accounts of the Secret Service to the late 20th century challenges and problems. Agents such as Starling (1956) protected presidents from Woodrow Wilson to Franklin Roosevelt, whereas McCarthy (1985) protected presidents from Lyndon Johnson to Ronald Reagan. These accounts often put a spotlight on the rigors of the job, personalities of the presidents that were protected, battles with the White House staff over security measures, various investigations, downtime, and a general history of the Secret Service. These accounts offer great source material in understanding the context, culture, and customs of agents through the Agency’s history. Agent accounts are often reflective and open but reluctant to reveal too much.

In contrast to these memoirs, there is also a considerable amount of information on the Secret Service from government sources, including two histories of the Secret Service written by the Agency, which tend to read like a public relations memo (USSS, 1975; Roberts, 1990). Despite these well-intentioned histories, government agencies, Congress, and the president have produced a series of documents after crisis situations that analyze, critique, and offer suggestions in how the Service could more effectively protect the President of the United States. These reports often come as the result of a failed or successful assassination on the president’s life. In these moments of crisis, the Secret Service is forced to be reflective, open to change, and willing to update their practices to conform to new threats.

The portion of the Secret Service literature that focuses on these changes is the work of Philip Melanson (1984; 2002) and Frederick Kaiser (1981; 1988), who have
produced the most authoritative accounts on the Secret Service. They have focused more on the historical side of the Secret Service by writing about the origins, development, and current status of the Secret Service. In particular, Melanson has focused on the Secret Service operating in this new age of terrorism, although his works do cover the history of the Secret Service from 1865 to post 9/11. His work seeks to draw out the relationship between politics and protection. Each president and his various staffs have had to deal with intrusive and over-protective agents, who wish to secure the president regardless of political considerations. Although Melanson has gathered valuable information on the history of the Service, Kaiser completed a more thorough analysis of the origins of the Secret Service in the late 19th century and early 20th century. Using an extensive amount of historical, government, and Secret Service sources, he constructs a plausible and persuasive historical account of how the Secret Service came to protect the President of the United States. He affirms Melanson’s contention that Secret Service practices are politicized (1988). By reaching back to the origin of presidential security as related to the Secret Service, he is able to identify how the duties of the Service were shaped and affected by political forces.

Kaiser also argues that the Service always operated in a “terrorist age.” In contrast to Melanson’s point that the late 20th Century Service had peculiar difficulties in adjusting to domestic and international terrorism, he argues that the Service always operated in this age. By expanding this terrorist framework to the beginning, agents have to deal with various enemies of the state: cranks, anarchists, confederates, abolitionists, anti-abolitionists, drunks, German saboteurs, Puerto Ricans, Russians, Islamic fundamentalists, and home-grown terrorists. However, this account of the Secret Service
as always being an age of terrorism seems to be a re-reading of Secret Service history after the attempt on President Reagan’s life. Although there have been times when the Service has had to confront and manage terrorist threats, it has rarely operated in a manner that considers the president always to be at risk from highly organized threats as Kaiser believes. This is a dubious claim that is not supported by how the Secret Service has protected the president in the past, especially in the first half of the 20th century. This is critical, because it is only recently that the Secret Service has been transformed due to terrorist acts that have caused a series of crisis episodes. Even from a broader perspective, the state has not historically acted like it was in a terrorist age. The emergence of high probability threats that seek to undermine Western societies is a new condition to which both the state and the Secret Service have been trying to adapt.

Working from a traditional historical analysis, Kaiser also identifies “intriguing continuities with and precedents for contemporary security efforts” (1988, p. 119). Early efforts to protect the president consisted of precautionary arrangements, surveillance of suspected enemies of the president, gathering intelligence, and investigating possible threats. These early precedents resemble modern-day security arrangements. However, Kaiser fails to identify any type of discontinuities and ruptures during the short history of protecting the president. His analysis is based on a linear and progressive model of presidential protection, without consideration of how extensively changes in power relations and rationalities impacted the notion of presidential protection. Although the historical data is well-grounded, there is a failure to recognize the broader implications of protecting the president. This framework reinforces the notion of gradual change in the
Secret Service, which has resulted in more proficient methods. However, it fails to look for ruptures that allow for a reordering of presidential securities.

In general, the body of literature on the Secret Service does not analyze ruptures, changing power relations, or how the practices of presidential security have created certain techniques of control and production. They often fail to consider the theoretical and practical implications of what it means to protect the president. Although they often recognize basic tensions between security and openness, they fail to explore, expand, or address these issues in length. The Secret Service is an organization of crisis. The Agency is constantly threatened and plagued by external forces that compel the Secret Service to change its concepts of presidential security. The history of protection is a slow and arduous process. It has not developed in a linear or rational way that can be reduced to a set of laws that prescribe how security should be operationalized. The Service is a contextually based organization that produces certain historical rationalities through its practices and ideas. The emergence of these rationalities is often unpredictable and haphazard.

Crisis Management

When faced with a crisis, organizations like the Secret Service try to create meaning within a context that is a drastic deviation from the previous status quo (Weick, 1988, 1993). These crisis punctuations can cause significant trauma and require organizations to make an immediate reply and to respond in a manner that will clarify confusion. There is no template, commonplace or generic framework for organizations to utilize. Each situation is unique and must be handled differently. Thus, managing the unexpected requires organizations to think and act differently by being preoccupied with failure, refusing to simplify, and being sensitive to operations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).
This allows organizations to refrain from making things too simplified and legible. Organizations like the Secret Service that operate in high risk environments must “create more complete and nuanced pictures” of their environments that allow them to better manage the unexpected (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 11). In effect, this enables organizations to handle crisis situations by seeking “to create a value climate that provides a favorable context within which to evaluate and act upon the environment” (Vibbert & Bostdorff, 1993, p. 105).

Responses to crisis situations are framed from a variety of perspectives. Crises can be viewed from social psychological (Weick, 1988), communication (Benoit, 1997), technological (Perrow, 1984), or leadership perspectives (Mitroff, 2004). From a more communication crisis perspective, the responses to crisis situations are framed from a variety of perspectives. According to Sellnow and Seeger, organization response can be interpreted through apologia, sensemaking, and chaos theory (2001).

However, most theoretical approaches, especially apologia and sensemaking, tend to view organizational history and crises as linear and rational. They privilege a “return to the normal” as the customary response to a crisis episode. In re-establishing the narrative by returning to traditionally accepted values, organizations can continue to grow and thrive. Although in many cases these models are appropriate and even preferable, they do not cover or explain all crisis situations, especially when conditions have emerged in which a return to the normal is no longer effective or desirable. By relying on past discourse to frame how an organization should respond, these frameworks also have failed to notice the role of power in facilitating minor and even radical change. These frameworks are fairly silent in how power may effect an organization during a crisis.
episode. In effect, current models that are rooted in conservative discourse to guide future action and the failure to recognize the role of power in facilitating qualitative change can’t adequately explain how the Secret Service has adopted new norms, discourse, and actions in relation to presidential security.

In fact, crisis situations allow for the emergence of new types of administration, policy, and discourse. A phenomenon that causes a drastic deviation from the status quo allows organizations the ability to create meaning within a time-bound space. These windows of opportunity are temporary and tend to close quickly. Crises trigger these variations within any type of system. These punctuations can cause significant harm and require organizations to make an immediate reply, responding in a manner that will clarify confusion and eliminate or mitigate any lingering or future effects of crises. Karl Weick defined crisis as “characterized by low probability/high consequence events that threaten the most fundamental goals of an organization” (Weick, 1988, p. 305). Even though the consequences of a crisis can be catastrophic for most organizations, organizations often fail to adequately plan for them due to the low probability of crises actually taking place (Nakamura, 2000). The failure to plan and to anticipate is partly due to the fact that most organizations handle these situations with a mode of thinking that is “primarily reactive” as organizations seek to address “crises only after they have happened” (Mitroff, 2004, p. 110). Instead of reacting to the unknown, Mitroff argues that organizations must take a more systematic view by examining what can be done before, during, and after a crisis (2004). This is critical, because crises will and do occur, even in highly complex systems that are designed to be nearly foolproof (Perrow, 1984). The events that crises tend to produce allow organizations the ability to re-open a
discursive space and shift its basic theoretical framework. Thus, organizations are often founded in, restored in, recreated in, and formed by crisis situations. Instead of these shocks being a threat to the system, they provide the organizations with the ability to change (Seeger & Ulmer, 2002).

However, most models of crisis communication do no consider these epistemic shifts. Organizational crises can be understood from a very conservative and restorative orientation (apologia) to one that deals with uncertainty and ambiguity (sensemaking) to one that starts to understand discontinuities and breaks with past values and discourse (chaos perspectives). Each of these models will be examined in how it deals with the emergence of new ideas and power relations.

Apologia-based crisis explanations (Benoit, 1995, 1997) rely heavily on the belief that they can take an active role in shaping, molding, and adapting to a crisis situation. They accomplish the designs of their rational intentions through a variety of strategies such as denial, bolstering, differentiation, corrective action, mortification, and transcendence (Benoit, 1995; Combs, 1995; Ware & Linkugel, 1973).

Organizations have turned to these rhetorical acts because they have recognized the utility of creating, shifting, locating, and assigning praise and blame. This allows an organization to purge guilt, to reconnect to the past, to repair an organization’s image, and to reestablish legitimacy. In particular, this strategy of renewal has been used by a host of organizations to restore their image (Blaney, Benoit, & Brazeal, 2002; Brinson & Beniot, 1999; Hearit, 1996). One method of praise is the discourse of renewal, in which organizations pledge to restore their lost identity (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002). In the situation of post 9/11 discourse, organizations often used rhetoric of growth by appealing
to a notion of renewal and regeneration. By being linked to the past, this allowed many organizations to achieve positive outcomes. Another method is to secure the original equilibrium by relying on techniques of mortification and bolstering. In addition to post-crisis communication, precrisis communication is also essential in maintaining a positive image after a crisis situation. This precrisis prevention, according to Ulmer, allows an organization to maintain its credibility and strong stakeholder relationships (2001). By having strong relations with key publics, it is easier for organizations to maintain their original identity and image because they are perceived as “doing the right thing” (Ulmer, 2001, p. 611). Sustaining these previous modes of discourse through assigning praise and blame is one of the ways organizations can progress or maintain their legitimacy after a crisis situation. By maintaining an origin point, these organizations are able to hypothetically show their stakeholders that they have returned to their traditional values.

In some crisis situations, this model is effective. Although Coombs and Schmidt argue that there are limits to image restoration theory, it does have tremendous ability to explain many crisis situations (2000). In particular, in 1973 the oil crisis raised Mobil’s level of consciousness to recognize that the corporation needed to identify with commonly held values. Mobil was confronted with an unpleasant crisis: they were faced with falling profits, government regulations, and a looming threat of corporate divestiture (Crable & Vibbert, 1983, p. 382). The oil business was perceived to be out of touch with American values as it failed to identify with their publics. This disconnect prevented the oil industry from framing issues that affected them and allowed external events to define their image, which crippled their attempts to improve business. However, Mobil fought back by identifying with commonly accepted values. Focusing on the “common sense of
the common people” allowed Mobil to “create certain strategic identifications” (Crable & Vibbert, 1983, p. 386). By 1981, Mobil had identified with American core values which brought record profits, wide public acceptance, and an increased public profile (Crable & Vibbert, 1983, p. 386).

Although these strategies work in some crisis situations, apologia fails to consider how changes in discourse, norms, and even power relations can fundamentally alter reality. By neglecting the view that social spaces can be fundamentally different after the status quo is punctuated, apologia misses important details. Techniques to reduce the impact of crises like mortification, bolstering, and shifting blame are inadequate in these situations. The environment has transformed to an extent that individuals and organizations are unable to return to the past, shift blame to another entity, or even be able to correct action based on previous normative models. In addition, apologia also does not consider the role of power, making it harder to understand how organizations can help shape and build new relations. It is assumed that organizations have the ability or capacity to respond to these events.

Like apologia, sensemaking argues for control and agency. In this approach, organizations in crisis situations must “make sense of an uncertain situation that initially makes no sense” (Weick, 1995, p. 9). Ambiguous information frequently prevents organizations from interpreting the situation appropriately. In fact, Weick argues that “safe inaction” often produces confusion instead of clarity (1988, p. 305). Safe inaction often reflects an organization’s refusal to enact new conditions by keeping their decisions safe, routine, and predictable. Hence, organizations rely on the past practices to understand novel circumstances, which often “produces confusion” in crisis situations.
(Weick, 1988, p. 305). In order to impose some order on the situation, organizations must be able to construct a reality where interpretation and understanding are possible. They do this through “dangerous action,” which is bold, innovative, and “produces meaning” (Weick, 1988, p. 305). Dangerous action, however, still relies on a retrospective process to create meaning; it adheres to past discourse and action to find a way to understanding a crisis situation. While such a response often produces understanding, it may also have the adverse effect of intensifying the crisis. This potential unintended consequence of enactment is a given in sensemaking because “our actions are always a little further along than is our understanding, which means we can intensify crisis” (Weick, 1988, p. 308).

Enactment enables situations, ideas, and even organizations to be “talked into existence” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 409). However, this existence is often questioned and challenged during moments of crisis by internal and external actors that want to change the status quo. This allows for bracketing and labeling of new and dramatic experiences, which permits the organizations to cope by creating new meaning. These interruptions provide organizations the ability to make sense of new environments and stimuli (Weick, 1995). Thus, the first set of actions during a crisis often sets the direction, velocity, and force of a particular crisis. To ensure that organizations enact a situation that will alleviate and not enhance the crisis, the concepts of commitment, capacity, and expectations must be considered in the sensemaking process. Depending on the situation, organizations may have the opportunity to create sense by enacting new modes of behavior, or they may have to comply with a new set of standards created by others. The use of this social psychological approach views organizations as forming or
being formed by crisis situations by applying the concepts of dangerous action, enactment, labeling, commitment, visibility, and blind spots. They can influence and/or be influenced by the environment.

However, this Weickian view of crisis response often relies too much on past action to create current and future sense. It does not consider that sense can be created apart from retrospective analysis. Weick seems to be imposing a linearity on the way people and organizations make sense. Selecting, bracketing, and interpreting the situation can emerge from sources other than the past experience and events. In particular, sensemaking does not consider how ideas, norms, and rules emerge apart from rational creation and intention. Retrospective analysis tends to privilege the past while neglecting how individuals and organizations use power to create sense. Weick fails to realize how power is deeply embedded in the notion of sensemaking at an individual, organizational, and social level. By not considering these power relations, his model is prevented from understanding the facilitative role of power in creating new nodes (Clegg, 1989a). Due to Weick’s stance on power (or lack of it), organizations are not empowered to create radical sense.

In contrast to apologia and sensemaking, chaos theory focuses on the long-term patterns of self-organization (Murphy, 1996; Seeger, 2002). Based on a concrete scientific model, chaos theory describes the process of stability, decline, and the reemergence of stability. In contrast to the more dominant frameworks, this theory does not glorify previous conditions, but recognizes the emergence of novel conditions after a period of decline. In many instances, the past cannot and should not be restored. The theory is able to describe how organizational crises relate to the environment, especially
from a historical standpoint. Forces of history that are outside organizational control often determine what an organization must do to survive. In a practical setting, chaos theory is skeptical of planning for routine procedures to implement in crisis situations. These plans “are often dangerously inaccurate” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2001, p. 159).

Although chaos theory is a novel and innovative concept that helps illuminate crisis situations, it removes too much consciousness, rationality, subjectivity, and agency from the scene. Without these conditions, organizations do not have the capacity or the force to respond to these anomalies in an adequate manner. They can’t predict or react to variations in the environment. Due to the blind chance element of chaos theory, organizations often have no control over conditions. Organizations are blindly selected by the environment to survive; they do not have the dispositional capacity to fix a drastic crisis episode or even mitigate everyday problems. Hence, organizations do not have episodic, disposition, or facilitative power (Clegg 1989a). Although this approach provides a partial view of how organizations should occasionally view their past, it is too limited in scope. It needs to address how organizations are able to respond and even create conditions.

In general, organizations can restructure or break with the past when they encounter an increased amount of risk. Weick (1988, 1995) argues that crises are marked by a condition of low probability; they are rare and often unpredictable. Under these circumstances of low probability events, organizations can seek to restore an original equilibrium. Nevertheless, these conditions of low probability do not exist in all situations. Some organizations exist in an environment characterized by high probability events that endanger the core mission of an organization. This shift from low to high
probability allows an organization to implement qualitative change, not incremental adjustments. In this setting, an organization is extremely vulnerable; it must respond in dramatic ways to curb or control these new risks. This creates a sense of urgency for organizations to immediately adjust to new conditions. Without an immediate response, an organization may not fit the reality of a new environment, which may threaten its existence. In essence, the likelihood of risk will often determine how an organization can deal with its own history and what it must do to survive.

Not only does the crisis literature retain an inherently conservative orientation, it also neglects the element of power during moments of crisis. In fact, power is rarely mentioned in crisis management frameworks. There are no models that take into account how power operates, changes, or influences events during these moments of change. Power is relegated to a position that is inconsequential to how an organization responds, when in fact power relations are often disrupted to such an extent that organizations have a greater range of possibilities and choices that did not previously exist. These conditions are only reinforced under a framework that considers some organizations to operate in a high risk/probability environment.

**Power Relations**

The range of options during and after a crisis situation in this high-risk environment allows organizations to reformulate many of the rules and postulates that confined and restricted their behavior due to changes in the structure of power relations. Crisis situations are opportunities that serve as a catalyst for breaking with the past and creating new modes of productivity and rationalities. This type of crisis produces two sets of conditions. First, it allows organizations to detach themselves with previous regimes of truth or legitimating discourse that specify what is and is not acceptable.
Organizations are able to wrench loose of the previous power relations that they were grounded in and avoid the rhetoric of apologia, renewal, and transcendence. Under these conditions, there is no returning to an origin point that tells an organization how they should respond. Second, a crisis may generate the emergence of a new set of relationships and conditions. Thus, organizations have the ability to produce discourse that fits with these new power relations. In response to these conditions, organizations can restructure and rethink many of their basic assumptions after crisis episodes. They are able to generate new discourse and take advantage of new power relations that allow them to separate themselves from previous and traditional modes of production and reproduction.

These crisis events rearrange the web of power relations to such an extent that they allow organizations to respond in a manner that previously would have been rejected or deemed illegitimate. In this condition, the web of relations that previously defined power, knowledge, and right conduct is altered and changed. Relationships between entities are undone, redefined, and relocated. The web is reconstructed, which shifts who has the ability to make truth and knowledge claims. Certain entities will lose status while others will gain credibility and the ability to make political, administrative, and knowledge claims. In effect, this new arrangement allows for a “recodification of power relations” (Foucault, 1980, p. 123). In these moments of recodification and emergence of new relations, an organization may be provided with the opportunity to make new knowledge claims.

In crisis situations, organizations must learn how to cope in these circumstances by trying to change and adapt to environmental conditions. The response to crises often
allows organizations to create more complex methods of control. Like Weber (1978), Foucault examines how institutions and organizations have developed more intricate and multifaceted techniques of discipline. In advancing the Weberian project, Foucault is able to identify and explain the increased rationalization in modern society and organizations. In fact, “he has isolated and identified the mechanisms of the power of rationalization with a finer grained analysis than Weber” (Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1983, p. 133). The expansion of these methods of control and influence can be directly tied to organizations (Abel, 2005; Burrell, 1988; Clegg, 1989a, 1989b, 2001; Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006; Scott, 1992). Like previous models of power (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970; Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 2004; Scott, 1992), Foucault is seeking to understand how compliance is secured. Although Foucault’s model falls more in line with Lukes’ notion that power is able to limit, control, and even shape the body and mind (he would reject Lukes’ stance on real interests, false consciousness, and his reliance on an objective criteria) and Parsons’ notion of power as productive, he pushes the envelop by examining how the mechanisms of power (e.g. Panoptic, confessional, examination) are able to partially constitute individuals and create meaning and knowledge. This project is at the core of what Hacking calls “making up people” (1988). In these localized settings, power in its “capillary form” is able to reach “into the very grain of individuals, touch their bodies, and inserts itself into their very actions and attitudes” (Foucault, 1980, p. 39). Hence, power is linked to the creation of meaning and knowledge, which then has the capacity to discipline and shape body and mind.

Securing the president through the use of body guards, surveillance, investigations, and policing can be understood through Foucault’s constructs on power
Foucault applies his analytics to the study of how power is exercised in a historically contingent context. In these local and micro-settings, power relations produce practices, rationalities, modes of action, and forms of control. Among these different facets and dimensions of power, Foucault conceives of two types of power: disciplinary and productive. Disciplinary methods of control regulate and restrain individuals through a variety of techniques. The deviant and abnormal behavior becomes normalized through these external power relations in organizations. In particular, surveillance is able to operate through institutions as an instrument of control by using disciplinary techniques that focus on the individual. The gaze is able to regulate behavior and normalize individuals through Jeremy Bentham’s innovative method of control. The Panopticon is an architectural design that controls prisoners (or subjects) through the use of surveillance (Foucault, 1995). This disciplinary apparatus establishes a set of power relations in which a prisoner is watched and monitored from a central location. This constant and anonymous form of discipline eventually transforms the watched into “his own guardian” (Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1983, p. 189), because he is aware that his actions are being monitored.

As disciplinary power focuses on external limits that gradually impose internal constraint, productive power also focuses on the internal regulations and rules which people impose on themselves. Rather than trying to control people through temporal, spatial, or hierarchal relations, power is also productive as it creates subjects. In his study of sexuality (1990), Foucault finds that it is not repression, but productivity that defines how an individual sees him or herself. This innovative aspect of power is neither negative nor coercive as it seeks to create conditions where people regulate their own
thoughts and actions. Power is not something that restrains subjects; it is something that produces knowledge, practices, and subjects through the practices of normalizations. Instead of being destructive, power is able to generate new modes of thought and action to which people tie themselves. Not only do people discipline themselves; this form of power “categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity” (Foucault, 1983, p. 212). The type of discourse that produces this type of power is often associated with expert knowledge. Due to this close connection between power, knowledge, and right, Foucault is able to argue that institutions/organizations are often vehicles that generate standard and taken for granted knowledge. They have the capacity to produce new regimes of truth.

The ability to generate a new normal or a new standard of conduct emerges powerfully in crisis situations. In these settings, the punctuations of the status quo allow an organization to re-think many of its basic standard operating procedures. Power relations have altered to such an extent that organizations develop innovative methods of control and production. The previous fit between structure, mission, and environment may have collapsed. Hence, this proposed research recognizes “that crisis may create opportunities” (Seeger & Ulmer, 2002, p. 128). The questioning of a previous framework and its replacement is a viable strategy for organizations to pursue. In other words, “crisis removes the assumption of the status quo and creates opportunity for radical change and readjustment” (Sellnow & Seeger, 2001). However, the discourse of readjustment must be abandoned under this framework. Some crises create a new discursive space, which provides the opportunity for new rationalities to emerge due to a shift from low to high probability. This allows the Secret Service to exercise a greater
degree of control, which reduces presidential vulnerability in this terrorist age. The Secret Service must use its disciplinary gaze in order to protect the body of the president. The president, like the military private, the student, or prisoner, is subject to the effects of this peculiar power relation.

In addition to this notion of structural realignment, subjectivity and agency must also play a role. Individuals are more than passive receptors of environmental conditions. According to Foucault, individuals do have the disposition to resist domineering power relations. Although resistance was a key feature in his later works (Foucault 1990b), he did not place much emphasis on these concepts. Bevir argues for a revised Foucauldian framework that allows for agency (Bevir, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2002). Unpredictable, accidental, and emergent conditions are still a vital factor. In addition, the structure of power relations still constrains action. Organizations are not completely free from background conditions. However, a degree of agency reveals how “different people adopt different beliefs and perform different actions against the background of the same social structures” (Bevir, 1999, p. 358). Organizations do have the ability to partially shape their environments. Even though organizations are tied to new and emerging forms of rationalities and power relations, they must still be given some latitude in their ability to control and shape their social background. Agency and subjectivity are factors in granting organizations the capacity to willfully produce new knowledge and shape relations in certain situations. Thus, organizations are able to undo the past and to move to a new set of relations by establishing new constructs that allow them to understand and partially control a new environment. This facilitative power empowers organizations with the ability to create and produce new rules and discourse. This momentary
condition in time is perhaps the only occasion where organizations are partially free to
design, create, and implement new discourse. For the Secret Service, this opportunity
emerged in a series of crisis events in the 1980s and 1990s.
CHAPTER FOUR

AGENCY OF CRISIS

In constructing protective screens and barricades, the Secret Service is able shield the president from outside threats while managing presidential movement and action inside the bubble. To keep the president from the unknown and unpredictable situations, the Secret Service employs a range of power-based techniques to ensure that the president is protected in a secure manner. The Service must rely on its ability to create authoritative meaning, discipline the president, and make declarative statements about potential threats and safety precautions. In its ability to formulate these concepts, the president becomes tied to the Secret Service’s apparatus of truth production. The Foucauldian concepts of discipline and power/knowledge inform key aspects of close protection. These concepts fit in nicely with a crisis framework that does not rely on the past to guide future decisions. In particular, it shows how Foucault is able to illuminate what is missing in a great deal of approaches to crises. Rather than seeking to restore or renew origin stories, a Foucauldian-based approach to crisis looks at what emerges through the process of production. New logics and modes of discipline gradually emerge and impose new restrictions and create new movements. Power is linked to production, meaning, discipline, and political decisions. In this circular medium of exchange, power evolves and changes in crisis moments. This is critical for organizations like the Secret Service who operate in highly unpredictable spaces. Due to these conditions, the Service pivots on an unstable foundation, which allows it to reformulate and create new protective measures to protect the president in an ever changing environment.
This stance is critical for government agencies who are often founded in and formed by crisis. The Secret Service was established in the 1860s to protect what “the U.S. system may value even more than the lives of its political leaders—money” (Melanson, 2002, p. 3). Counterfeit bills threatened the stability of the economy. In response to this crisis, the Secret Service division was established within the Treasury Department in 1865 to manage this counterfeiting crisis. The Secret Service’s other primary mission did not emerge until two presidents lay dead. President James Garfield was assassinated on July 2, 1881 and President William McKinley met a similar fate on September, 14 1901. Neither president was given official protection by the Congress. Six years after President McKinley’s assassination, the Secret Service assumed unofficial responsibility to protect the president. With this grant of authority, the Service had to examine presidential security as an object of study. The analysis of protective measures would ensure that the Secret Service could protect the president from crisis and unpredictable moments.

However, protecting the president in the early 20th century was meager at best. There was no serious attempt to actually protect the president from an organized and coordinated attack. The most common and recurrent strategy was to use a small professional force of federal agents backed up by massive support from local police and sheriffs departments. It was merely a poorly designed body defense strategy that pivoted around a large number of threatening body guards. In guarding the president at the White House, security was not much better. When Agent Starling (1956) reported for work the first time in 1914, he encountered virtually no security at the White House grounds, gates, or entryways to the executive offices. The first guard or agent he encountered was...
in the office lobby. When he accompanied President Wilson on his walks around Washington, only three agents were required to keep guard. This rule was designed to ensure that Wilson had adequate protection for these were “considered dangerous days when anything is apt to happen at any moment” (Starling, 1956, p. 58). However, the application of the rule was flimsy at best; Wilson found himself occasionally with just one agent accompanying him on his walks. The rule of three had not changed by President Coolidge’s administration in the 1920s; he was accompanied by three agents on his walks around the White House lawns and in Washington D.C (Coolidge walks in rain, 1926). President Herbert Hoover continued the tradition of a New Year’s reception at the White House during the Great Depression where he greeted thousands of citizens annually. In 1932, he shook 6,429 hands with little security to search and examine people for possible weapons (Herrick, 1932). This symbolic and annual event reflected the idea of the White House as being the People’s House and the president as being the people’s representative. In general, access to the president and the White House centered on a notion of proximity. It was essential that the People’s House and the president’s body be open to public contact and inspection.

However, White House security was soon to take on a more serious edge as the United States entered World War II. Under the guise of resisting presidential security, President Roosevelt created the first vestures of Fortress White House (Seale, 1986). He closed down the West and East Executive Avenues, allowed the military police to stand guard around the White House, built a series of sentry boxes inside and outside the White House fence, closed the White House grounds that had been open to the public, canceled the custom of allowing callers to drop off their cards at the north door, blackout curtains
were put up, windows and skylights were painted black, the White House guard was increased, and sentries with machine guns were placed on top of the White House and surrounding buildings. The War Time White House was cloaked in secrecy and inaccessibility. However, after the war many of these measures were immediately abandoned, but some elements of Fortress White House remained. In particular, the grounds to the White House were never opened to the public again. The first significant barrier to the president and people was institutionalized. The next barrier that was institutionalized was the permanent closure of West Executive Avenue after the attempted assassination on President Truman in 1950. The vestures of a presidential compound started to gradually emerge.

In the next 30 years, the White House became increasingly isolated from the people as the study and experience of presidential security demanded that the president be shielded from unknown threats. Due to security concerns, “it is more difficult than before for a President to expose himself to the people” (Oberdorfer, 1970). The danger of exposure was marked by a series of crisis situations for the Service. The assassination of John F. Kennedy, the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, and the attempted assassinations of Gerald Ford and George Wallace respectively shaped, exposed, and changed the Secret Service. Each of these crisis situations unveiled failures in Agency culture, personnel, tactics, and even the law. As an object of study, the Service failed to examine all of the possible threats and avenues for protection. In response to these threats, the Secret Service detail and White House Guard quadrupled in size, the Secret Service built stronger fences, required identification to enter to the grounds, and proposed a no demonstration zone around the White House (Oberdorfer, 1970; Coates & Maclean,
One of the few measures that the Secret Service did not press was the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue. In fact, the Service realized that closure of this symbol would represent something that even it was not willing to do. After a man was able to crash his car through a gate leading directly to the White House, a Secret Service spokesperson mentioned the closing of Pennsylvania Avenue, but immediately said that, “I guess we could close down Pennsylvania Avenue, but that would be like a police state.” He continued. “We could put a bubble over the White House, but our society wouldn’t tolerate such a thing” (Hunter, 1974). Even at these late stages of constructing a fortress that surrounds the White House, the closure of America’s main street was still a mere utterance.

However, a range of incidents between the presidencies of Reagan and Clinton caused this unthinkable utterance of sealing the president from the people in the 1970s to become an authoritative declaration made jointly by the President of the United States and the Secret Service in the 1990s. This chapter will delve into the process of how external shocks created opportunities for a public organization to mold a crisis moment through the production of knowledge and meaning. To examine how the Secret Service responded to these shocks, this chapter will examine presidential security during Reagan and Clinton’s administration. It will start by examining the attack on Ronald Reagan at the Washington, D.C. Hilton, which disclosed myriad problems that forced the Service to reevaluate its methods. Confronted with the same threat, it continued to be foiled by lone gunmen. Indirect crisis events such as the 1983 Beirut bombings and the potential hit squad sent from Iran to assassinate Reagan raised the issue of whether the People’s House be sealed from the people’s gaze. The chapter will then examine how a series of
White House attacks and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing created the context, which allowed the Secret Service to create and structure a new mode of protection.

Reagan’s Administration

The Reagan Attempt

On March 30, 1981, John W. Hinckley provided a moment in time that problematized the concept of presidential security. In this two second act, security would lose its sense of familiarity, routine would be questioned, and uncertainty would reign. Hinckley fired six shots from his .22 caliber revolver outside the Hilton Hotel in Washington D.C. Two seconds later, police officer Thomas Delahanty, Special Agent Tim McCarthy, Press Secretary James Brady, and President Ronald Reagan were all wounded. For the first time since John F. Kennedy, the President of the United States was successfully targeted and attacked by an unknown assailant. In this fleeting span of time, the public would see a heroic agency in action. With no hesitation, Special Agent McCarthy made himself into a shield while Special Agent Jerry Parr shoved the president in his limousine. In a 10 second span, the public witnessed the men and women of the Secret Service successfully protecting and transporting the president away from any further danger. However, the image of heroism masked critical mistakes made by the Secret Service.

The Management Review on the Performance of the U.S. Department of the Treasury revealed the minute by minute breakdown of the events, successes, and failures on March 30, 1981 (Management Review, 1981). President Reagan left the White House at 1:50 p.m. to give a 20 minute speech at the Hilton Hotel in Washington D.C. and planned to return by 2:30 p.m. This 40 minute trip exposed the weakness, strength, and limitation of presidential security. Before his arrival, the Secret Service had coordinated
the motorcade routes with local police, traffic control, and the U.S. Park Police. They conducted an advance check of the Hilton Hotel earlier that morning was conducted which determined places of vulnerability. Agents were assigned to guard hallways, rooms, and corners that posed potential threats. The Technical Security Division ran sweeps looking for any explosive devices and a counter-sniper team was positioned outside the hotel. In addition to these security measures, the Secret Service established two check-points to examine identification, bags, and any other suspicious items. Anyone gaining entrance to the main ballroom was carefully searched and monitored. Outside the hotel, the Service set up a rope line which would created a 35-40 feet distance between the limousine and the VIP entrance. This perimeter properly protected those that were included in its zone of protection.

The president arrived at the Hilton Hotel around 1:50 p.m. with approximately seven press members and 10 spectators at the rope line. He safely made his way from the limousine to the VIP Hilton entrance in which he briefly met with union leaders in the “holding room.” He was then escorted to the ballroom where he gave a 20 minute speech that lasted until 2:20 p.m. In the meantime, the president’s motorcade, according to procedure, had to be readjusted so that it was parked at an angle facing T Street. As the president left the Hilton, the agents took up their strategic security positions by surrounding the presidential limousine and surveying the crowd which had grown to about 200 people. As the limo door was opened for the president, he turned and waived to the crowd. The president was now only 15-20 feet from the crowded due to the changed position of the motorcade. The zone of protection was drastically smaller. As the president responded to the crowd, John W. Hinckley emerged from the rope line and
emptied his .22 caliber handgun in a mere two seconds. Agents responded by pushing
the president into the limousine, spreading their arms and legs to shield the president, and
subdued Hinckley in a matter of seconds.

The planning, implementation, and reaction to the Hilton tragedy were flawed
from the beginning to the end. The Secret Service was in “routine mode” during the
Hilton trip (Management Review, 1981, p. 7). They had made the trip once every two
weeks and “had developed a standard drill for Hilton visits” (Management Review, 1981,
p. 7). In the process of planning, the Secret Service devoted less attention to detail and
did not comply completely with standard operating procedures. The Service considered
the capitol a safe zone. This logic of viewing Washington (and the White House) as a
space of relative protection was engrained with the Service since its founding. This false
sense of security allowed the Secret Service to guard the president with minimal
protection. Even though the Secret Service took steps to make the White House a
compound, it still had not achieved that level of security. East Executive Avenue was
still open to the public, Pennsylvania Avenue was a vital commuter street in the city, and
there were no concrete and visible barriers (except the fence) that separated the White
House from the people. Washington was presumed to be a secluded and safe city from
terrorist attacks.

Due to this general attitude of not looking at Washington as an object of analysis,
there were no procedures designed to protect the president inside Washington. The
procedures used the day of the shooting were designed to protect the president “for
environments outside Washington, D.C., and do not take account of the fact that trips in
the capital have become routine (Management Review, 1981, p. 49). However, these
procedures are designed in order to “govern advance preparations for the trips in the Washington D.C. area” (Management Review, 1981, p. 49). With this knowledge, the Service acted in a routine manner that failed to follow security procedures and guidelines that were standard operating procedures outside of the city. In fact, the Management Report added that “there is some evidence that the routine nature of advances and heavy protective work load in the Washington area has resulted in agents devoting less attention to detail than is commonly the case in other locations” (1981, p. 49). Washington has a home turf status coupled with the heavy workload led agents to not consider Washington to be a place that should be treated in the same manner as other cities in the United States.

In particular, the most apparent and glaring errors were the failure of the Service to provide for adequate protection outside the Hilton Hotel. Again, the city of Washington was considered a safe zone. Inside the confines of a secured Hilton Hotel, the president was fully protected. The zone of protection was thoroughly established. However, the Service failed to provide for identical security measures outside the hotel. The rope line was the only protective means that the Service constructed to protect the president. The Agency had no idea of who was in the public zone and what they were carrying. If the Service declared the rope line a “press area,” agents would have searched, identified, and tracked the various individuals within that zone. Within this secured area, Hinckley would have never been able to get within 20 feet of the president. The other notable blunder was the failure to provide the necessary security at George Washington Hospital. The inability of the Secret Service to take precautionary steps after the crisis situation could have been disastrous if this attempt had been a conspiracy rather
than a mentally disturbed assassin with a simple plan. These and other errors were uncovered days and months after this shock to the system. The failings of the Secret Service were noticeable, identifiable, and apparent. For the most part, the hindsight that this situation produced should have been created/discovered much earlier.

*The Aftermath: Utterances and Statements*

The heroism by the Secret Service on March 30th partially masked the mistakes of procedure and agent action. Those associated with the Hilton incident were showered with praise. During a subcommittee hearing, senators gave Special Agent Parr a standing ovation. After the committee hearing, Senator James Abdnor remarked “I’ve got to have a picture with him” (Reid, 1981). The media was an essential vehicle in expressing admiration towards the men and women involved with the assassination attempt. There was no doubt that “agents performed heroically and probably saved Reagan’s life” (Canon, 1981). In fact, President Reagan even remarked that “I’ve got to apologize to that guy [Jerry Parr]” for accusing him of breaking Reagan’s ribs (A President’s Apology, 1981). Although Special Agent Parr received a great deal of attention, the media made sure to highlight that it was Special Agent McCarthy who “stepped into the line of fire, stopping with his own body a bullet that might have hit Reagan” (Gest, 1981). In addition to McCarthy, the media also honed in on Police Officer Thomas Delahanty who was also “being treated like a hero while recovering from a wound left by a bullet meant for President Reagan” (Lewis, 1981). He was hit in the neck. He was the “first non-New York police officer” to receive “an award for valor from the New York City police department” (Lewis, 1981). A *Washington Post* article remarked that these three individuals should serve as a reminder “the next time someone starts in with the predictable blanket indictment of public employees, simply remind him of three names he
should recognize: Jerry Parr, Timothy McCarthy and Thomas Delahanty” (Shields, 1981). In addition to the media praise, Congress passed a joint resolution commending Parr, McCarthy, and Delahanty for “their unselfish courage and patriotism during the recent attempt on the life of the President of the United States” (Resolution to Commend, 1981). In essence, the attempted assassination “was a blood-and-guts take of good luck” (Reid, 1981).

Although the praise of these individuals moderately masked Secret Service failure on that Monday afternoon, issues were immediately raised by varying political, citizen, and administrative entities related to the study of presidential protection, which allowed the Secret Service to create a limited amount of new meaning related to presidential security. Productive power was significantly curbed due to these conditions. Some of these concerns were directly related to how the Secret Service operated while others were tangential in nature. They ranged from blaming on the Secret Service for allowing Hinckley to get so close to the president, allowing politics to trump security, and permitting the FBI to not disclose all of its information to the Secret Service (Cannon, 1981). Other responses involved calls for gun control, increased intelligence capacity for both the Secret Service and FBI, and evaluation of the public’s access to the president (Knickerbocker, 1981). This nexus of confusion did not yield one dominant story after the assassination attempt except for the heroism of the Secret Service. Although these outlets did criticize the Secret Service, they simultaneously heaped praise on them (Gest, 1981).

Immediately after the attack, Secret Service Director H. Stuart Knight expressed his concerns about the inability of the FBI to gather intelligence. He “complained that
the ‘pendulum has sung too far’ with recent curbs on whom the FBI may watch and what information can be passed along to the Secret Service” (Knickerbocker, 1981). He targeted the Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts as a key impediment for intelligence failures. In response to Director Knight, FBI Director William Webster cautioned “against overreaction to last week’s presidential assassination attempt by relaxing controls on the domestic gathering and dissemination of intelligence on Americans” (Knickerbocker, 1981). The exchanges between the two directors centered on whose opinion mattered more and whose power relations would be able to create new knowledge claims that revolved around the issue of intelligence. In addition, it also brought back into question the relationship between the Secret Service and the FBI. The FBI knew about Hinckley, just as it knew about Lee Harvey Oswald. In both cases, the FBI did not share the information it had with the Secret Service (Presidential Protection, 1981).

While some wanted increases in security measures, other groups called for gun control. There had been six assassination attempts since John F. Kennedy and all of them were related to handguns. Protecting and “safeguarding of President has needless built-in difficulty” (Lyons, 1981). Most notably, “there are millions of handguns” (Lyons, 1981). Even FBI Director Webster recognized the problem with handguns, but tried to tone down the rhetoric by saying “We’ve got an awful lot of guns in this country, and that doesn’t make anybody’s job any easier”. However, this was “not the best time to provide good solutions to this tough problem” (Knickerbocker, 1981). The gun control debate like so many other instances was just mere noise and utterance.
Although some issues were not directly related to the attack, the events on March 30 did prompt “a hard look at the Secret Service” (Gest, 1981). The Service immediately called for an internal investigation to determine how it conducted itself during this crisis situation. The Service had to examine how it handled pre-security clearance, the crisis, and the protection of the president at George Washington hospital. In essence, “observers empowered with 20/20 vision hindsight wanted to know why” (Lyons, 1981). However, the most troubling mask employed during the immediate crisis situation was hopelessness. Commentator after commentator cited J. Edgar Hoover’s declarative statement he made after the John F. Kennedy assassination: “absolute security is neither practical nor possible. An approach to complete security would require the President to operate in some sort of vacuum, isolated from the general public and behind impregnable barriers” (Lyons, 1981). Since the Dallas episode, assassinations were a commonplace event in the American political landscape. From Martin Luther King to Governor George Wallace, no public person was deemed safe. The lesson learned from the Reagan situation was “nothing” (Shapiro, 1981). In fact, the “ultimate horror of Ronald Reagan being shot” is that “there’s nothing left to say. We’ve said it all a half a dozen times since 1963” (Shapiro, 1981). This lack of anger particularly disturbed columnist Judy Mann. She remarked, “Maybe this time if enough people stay angry, something can be done while there are still millions of Americans who remember when this was not the American way” (1981). With this sentiment in mind, “what is both reassuring and horrifying about the shootings at the Hilton is how ordinary it all seems” (Shapiro, 1981).

With no anger or resentment, the attempted assassination of President Reagan was a news story for three weeks and then vanished. After April 12, the *Washington Post’s*
next story on the events of that day appeared on May 11. During his two week stay in
the hospital, the president carried out his duties, even signing a bill into law. The
assassination attempt was apparently coming to a close for the press and the people.
However, the Secret Service and Congress still needed to resolve the issues that this saga
brought to the surface. The Secret Service released its management report in August,
while Congress held two committee hearings in September. Neither received much press
in the Washington or New York papers. However, the Secret Service’s management
report and these two committee hearings revealed attempts to restructure meaning at the
assassination attempt.

*The Management Review* revealed how the Secret Service conducted itself during
the events on March 30. In addition to the details of that day, the Secret Service
suggested and recommended changes for agency operations. Some of these
recommendations were a drastic deviation from the status quo while other suggestions
were safe, obvious, and clear. The most obvious recommendation the Service made was
to rectify its lack of policy concerning “overmanning the president” after a crisis
situation. Instead of providing minimal or standard protection after an attack, the Service
needs to “establish procedures for substantially and rapidly increasing security around the

The most notable and bold recommendation the Secret Service made was
intelligence reform. Intelligence is viewed as the “ultimate shield” of protection. In
particular, the amount of intelligence information is critical. For the Secret Service, “the
FBI is the most importance source of Secret Service intelligence on potential domestic
threats to the President, and has a significant impact on the ability of the Service to fulfill
its mission” (Management Review, 1981, p. 29). However, the Privacy Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and the Domestic Security Guidelines of 1976 had prevented the Secret Service and in particular the FBI from gathering intelligence. According to a GAO report that the Secret Service cited, the Domestic Security Guidelines caused a decrease of domestic intelligence investigations from 9,814 to 642 in the years between 1975 and 1977. The ultimate question “is whether the Secret Service can adequately perform its mission without a regular flow of information about the intentions of individuals or groups who may be a threat” (Management Review 1981, p. 34). To better process the information, the Service also called for an attempt to “identify indicia of ‘dangerousness’” (36). The Service failed to “follow advice” that was provided in 1969 to develop a scientific method of investigations (Management Review 1981, p. 36). The Service finally realized that it needed to develop a scientific profile that used statistical analysis to identify potential threats.

In addition to the call for “overmanning” the president and developing an “ultimate shield” through intelligence gathering capabilities, the Service also focused on how to shield the president from access and proximity in the Washington D.C. area. In particular, “the Secret Service should commit whatever time and resources are required to develop detailed procedures for the conduct of advances in Washington D.C.” (Management Review, 1981, p. 51). This was apparently a non-issue that was not addressed or considered an object worth studying. However, this problematized moment of uncertainty created enough loss of familiarity for the Secret Service to realize that the national capitol region was fraught with danger.
A month after the release of the Treasury Management report, the Committee on the Judiciary in the House held a hearing concerning a new bill that addressed Zones of Protection, which fit nicely with the Treasury’s focus on access and proximity to the president. These zones of protection are established around the protected “in order to establish a perimeter through which only authorized personnel are permitted to enter” (Zones of Protection, 1981, p. 5). This protective sphere necessarily excludes and includes certain individuals from access to the president which provides a healthy perimeter between the known and unknown. The Treasury report recommended that the Secret Service and the White House staff “develop a single document, on which both groups can agree, in which they detail the balance that is to be struck among the security, scheduling, and public exposure requirements of the President” (1981, pg. 51). Under these guidelines, the Secret Service needs to restrict presidential access but still be open to political considerations. In addition to clarifying presidential proximity, the Hinckley situation provided the Secret Service with the opportunity to clarify, expand, and solidify its protective and productive power through the proposal of expanding the zone of protection to all the individuals who the Secret Service protects. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Robert McBrien flatly stated the need to use this event to force change, “The March 30 assassination attempt against President Reagan of course only adds to the impetus and the desirability of improving in any way we can the protective situation” (Zones of Protection 1981, p. 5). At the time, the law only provided that the president could be protected by these zones. In these presidential perimeters, agents have the power to remove anyone from these zones and charge them with a federal offense. If the protectee is not the president, the Secret Service had no jurisdiction over those who
violated its perimeters. Thus, McBrien pleaded that “we need clarity now” (Zones of Protection, 1981, p. 8). It was essential for McBrien to convey that the Service needed the power to “carry out its protective mission by excluding people from an area that in the circumstances of that particular case the Service has determined is necessary” (Zones of Protection, 1981 p. 10). Although this issue does not deal directly with presidential security, this new bill would apply the same protections that the president receives to anyone who is covered by the Secret Service. The quality of presidential security was being dramatically expanded due to the Hinckley situation.

A week later, the Committee on Governmental Affairs addressed a host of issues concerning presidential protection. They ranged from establishing a presidential protection commission, reevaluating the protection of past presidents and their families, and reevaluating the standards of protection. Chairman Senator Will Roth laid out the agenda:

The attack on President Reagan again rekindled many questions that were raised after earlier assaults. Should the President confine public appearances to secure locations? Is this a desirable practice in a democracy? Does the Secret Service have or use adequate manpower in protecting the President? Can the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the Service be enhanced? Is there adequate liaison between the Secret Service, FBI, and other concerned agencies?

Although these questions do not have quick or even solvable solutions, Senator Roth was clearly alarmed of the “record of assassinations and attempted assassinations” in the past 20 years (Presidential Protection, 1981, p. 23). However, he expressed that “in a free society there cannot be 100 percent security for any individual” (Presidential Protection, 1981, p. 1).
In order to provide for better protection, Senator Arlen Specter, who was involved with the Warren Commission, pushed strongly for the creation of a commission after he “observed that very little was in the offering by way of strengthening Presidential protection” (Presidential Protection, 1981, p. 2). To help current presidents understand the importance of presidential protection, this committee would potentially include past presidents, the majority and minority leader of the Senate, speaker of the House, and Secretary of the Treasury. He argued that “there is a tendency to forget the importance of Presidential protection” (Presidential Protection, 1981, p. 3). This commission would help bring this issue in the foreground by defining the general nature of domestic and foreign threats to the president, ensure the Secret Service had enough resources to do its primary task, and would ensure that the “White House staff members would take due account of considerations of safety and heed precautionary advice from the Secret Service” (Presidential Protection 1981, p. 23). The committee would continually look at presidential protection as an object of analysis. However, there was not a great deal of enthusiasm from senators or the Secret Service concerning the commission. Director Knight was clear on this manner before the Senate. He remarked that the Secret Service does not need “another body or commission or committee to do essentially what we are doing” (Presidential Protection, 1981, p. 34).

This committee would enable presidential security to continue to be in the foreground, which allowed the Service more opportunities to tie itself to productive power. In particular, it would address the viability of implementing standardized presidential security. Presidential protection is determined by two factors: the “level of manpower that is available to the Secret Service” and “the need to reach a practical
accommodation” between security and politics (Management Review, 1981). These two criteria do not provide for optimal or even effective protection. To rectify these loose standards, former Secret Service Agent Charles Vance called for “a “fifty foot ‘buffer zone’” (Presidential Protection, 1981, p. 47). Senator Specter also asked, “Why was the 50-foot rule not observed on March 30th?” (Presidential Protection, 1981, p. 15). The logic behind this 50 foot rule consisted of “the distance from which a person with a handgun would be unlikely to be able to get to the President” (Presidential Protection, 1981, p. 15). This zone of protection would be large enough to avoid any close-range attack on the president. Director Knight dismissed the idea of a 50-foot rule by remarking, “Take the situation of the President attending a Super Bowl game or a rally at Madison Square Garden” (Presidential Protection, 1981, p. 37). The president would have to be 50 feet from the public at any of those events. A free society cannot tolerate its leader being confined from the people. This is why the Secret Service “procedures do not include such matters as how far from the President crowds should be” (Treasury Report 1981, 41). In response to this argument over the 50 foot rule, Senator Roth aptly said, “There is no way, it seems to me, in a democracy, you can give complete protection” (Presidential Protection, 1981, p. 37). In contrast to Senator Specter’s desire to move this issue in the foreground, most of the issues were already stagnant.

**The Process of Readjustment**

The issues raised by the attempted assassination on President Reagan’s life were multiple and varied. However, very few of these issues gained enough traction for any real any utterances to become authoritative statements. Productive power was stifled. The 50 foot zone of protection, the creation of a commission to help administer the presidential protection, increased gun control laws, and the immediate revamping of the
Levi guidelines all failed to materialize. These failures were masked by the heroism of the Secret Service and the repetitive and seemingly permanent nature of assassination attempts in the American context. Although the press was critical, they were also very positive. The media’s concentration on the positive elements of the Secret Service overwhelmed the negative aspects. The problems that were exposed were immediately masked by the heroism of the Secret Service and the seemingly permanent condition of political assassinations. These two images actually hurt the Service’s ability to reformulate itself. This organizational paradox could not be resolved. The Secret Service did such a fine job that they were unable to convince anyone of the need for increased intelligence. There was no need to curb civil liberties for a problem that the Secret Service effectively handled, but could not solve through additional intelligence. In order for a real shift to occur, the Secret Service needed to fail. Senator Specter pointed this fact out. He candidly said that “when a president is spared, as, fortunately, President Reagan was on March 30, the event is important but it tends to recede from our minds” (Presidential Protection, 1981, p. 4).

However, after the crisis, politicians, administrators, and the press had pointed out the failings of the Secret Service. There were minor and correctable mistakes such as inadequate communication, no possession of the president’s medical records, failure to increase protection on either the president or vice president after the attack, faulty decision making in a routine situation, the inability to provide for protection outside the Hilton, and failure to secure George Washington Hospital for hours after the attack. The Management Report verified all of these problems and offered recommendations to prevent them from recurring. These solutions were considered, declared authoritative,
and implemented. Other slight readjustments were made in response to March 30. The Secret Service was granted additional authority and obligations. Congress made changes to the Zones of Protection through additional statutes. The Secret Service was granted new authority to establish zones of protection for other people than the president. It was a federal crime for anyone refusing to leave or enter these moving zones of protection. The Service also placed a higher premium on scientizing presidential security through the use of profiling techniques, statistical tools, and intelligence gathering capabilities. These minor modifications, although important, did not challenge the current structure of presidential protection.

*Extending the Fortress: Beirut Bombings and Muslim Hit Squads*

Although not all of the protective measures were declared legitimate, the most pressing issues raised by the attempted assassination would soon receive further consideration. The question of the public’s access to the president and the dangers in Washington would soon no longer be mere utterances. Action would have to be taken to limit direct proximity to the presidential body and the White House grounds needed to be fortified, and intelligence laws had to be relaxed in order to detect, monitor, and arrest threats to the president. Although the 50 foot zone was never a practical suggestion, the notion of restricting presidential proximity to crowds was a critical issue that remained with the Secret Service, and the dangers of an attack in Washington D.C. only grew exponentially with new innovative terrorist attacks that were emerging globally. It would take another crisis event to produce enough force to make these utterances materialize, which would allow the Secret Service to tap into the core of productive power.

The reverberations of the terrorist attacks in Beirut, Lebanon, in the 1980s put the Secret Service on alert. On April 18, 1983, a 400-pound suicide truck blew up the U.S.
Embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people. Six months later, a truck carrying 12,000 pounds of explosives was blown up outside the Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 242 Americans. Although these attacks did not challenge the Secret Service directly, they did provide a great deal of clarity about the potential dangers about an open and accessible Pennsylvania Avenue posed to the president. Fear began to grow when threats started to emerge that there could be terrorist attacks on United States soil instead of in a far off place in the Middle East. Less than a month after the barracks attack in Lebanon, a small car bomb exploded outside the U.S. Senate. Intelligence agencies started to report that there could be attacks on major U.S. buildings. In particular, intelligence picked up a viable bomb threat targeted at the State Department. One anonymous state department official noted that, “after the bombing of the Marine headquarters in Beirut, and more recently the bomb explosion in the Capitol, we have to take any anonymous threat seriously” (Gaily, 1983). It was later reported that a Thanksgiving attack directed at the White House or a major U.S. installation had been planned by Iranian Shiites that would be similar in scope to the Marine barracks bombing (Coates and Maclean, 1983).

In response to these threats, the Secret Service parked seven dump trucks filled with sand outside each entrance to protect the White House. These Park Service trucks were strategically placed to force cars to maneuver slowly around these parked barricades. Other dump trucks were stationed outside the Treasury and State Departments to prevent any car from ramming these buildings with explosives. The viability of an actual terrorist attack in Washington had reached levels that forced the Secret Service to act. White House spokesperson Larry Speakers said that these security precautions “were not a result of a specific threat against the White House,” but consisted
of the Secret Service’s “normal review of security measures” (Gaily, 1983). These normal review of security measures also included tighter screening of vehicles, bomb sniffing dogs, forcing White House employees to leave their keys in the cars as they were searched, and having more armed guards on top of the White House. Two weeks later, the Service replaced these trucks with Jersey Barriers to protect the White House from truck bombings (Shribman, 1983). These highway dividers/barriers are similar to the purpose of the dump truck in that they are meant to ensure that a car has to maneuver slowly around these barricades to reach its destination. Although this safe action by the Secret Service represented a low level of commitment that did not produce much meaning, it was key step in using a crisis moment to expand security measures around the White House. The only comment the Service had about these permanent changes in the White House landscape was that “the barriers are being put there for the same reason the truck were there—for security reasons” (Shribman, 1983). Beyond that, the White House confirmed that the Secret Service now had access to antiaircraft missiles. These shoulder-fired types would be placed on top of the White House or the Old Executive Offices building and would be under the direct control of the Secret Service. In response to these increased security measures, the Chicago Tribune noted that “the once fairly open White House is not yet a fortress, but there is no question Reagan’s activities are being curtailed severely by increasing security needs” (Missiles reported at White House, 1983).

The needs of the Secret Service only grew as it requested the Park Service to close East Executive Avenue permanently, which had been originally constructed “during the administration of Ulysses S. Grant in the 1870s to accommodate the public for visits
to the White House (Bredemeier, 1984). The closing of a significant artery to DC traffic and a key street that connected the people and the president was temporary closed three months after these series of threats against the White House. Large iron fences were erected at both ends of the street that connected the downtown area to many Washingtonians. These fences ensured that no vehicle could gain access to this street. With the West Executive Avenue being sealed after the attempted assassination on Truman and the East Executive Avenue being closed after bomb threats, the only major connection to the White House was Pennsylvania Avenue.

Finally, the impact of these crises allowed the Secret Service to start advocating for a more secure White House by closing down Pennsylvania Avenue: the last vesture of the People’s House. The Service started to ponder closing Pennsylvania Avenue during its major White House revisions in 1983 and 1984. In fact, “the Reagan administration asked famed architect Carl Warnecke to draw up plans for a securer Pennsylvania Avenue” (Melanson, 2002, p. 143). Although Secret Service Director John Simpson said that the plan was in its early stages and would take years to be implemented, the plan was to create a college “campus-like” atmosphere around the White House (Seaberry, 1985). With the closure of East and West Executive avenues along with Pennsylvania Avenue, the White House would be become a compound built around the idea of security. For this to materialize, the Service had to produce authoritative statements that would be binding. However, the proposal came under immediate attack from members of Congress, D.C. city officials, and Washingtonians (Engelberg, 1985). The editorial for the *Washington Post* commented on the proposal:

> WE HAVE ONLY one reservation about the Secret Service's proposal to close off Pennsylvania Avenue to traffic from 15th to 17th streets as a way to
increase security for the president and to create a “campus-like” atmosphere around the White House. It doesn't go nearly far enough. Certainly it's appropriate that the White House—as a unique educational institution for expanding the fortress mentality—be in the safest possible setting. But why stop with the closing off of the "Grand Avenue"? If it's safety first here, you need more than just a quick-barricade job around the president's house. To heck with a Band-aid approach—we're talking big security. Better to seal off the entire District of Columbia at the borders, allowing no civilian vehicular traffic at all. Any pedestrians choosing to set foot inside the boundaries should be required to produce official "walking papers" or a student I.D., color-coded to prevent unauthorized ventures into areas off limits. Rivers, of course, would need heavy patrolling (Editorial, 1985).

Tom Wicker of the *New York Times* also picked up on this satirical tone and asked “Why not sandbag the President’s house itself? Or build a 20-foot concrete wall around it” (1985). Even FBI Director William Webster declared his skepticism about the proposal to close down Pennsylvania Avenue. He noted that “sometimes excessive security actually invites trouble” (Evans, 1985). In the end, the proposal was dropped by the Secret Service; its time had not come. For many, the mere utterance of closing down America’s Main Street was not only foolish but un-democratic and Anti-American, as it violated the tradition of the People’s House.

**Clinton’s Administration**

However, this utterance that was barely speakable in the 1980’s was granted authoritative status in the mid 1990s. It would take a series of international and domestic terrorist attacks in the 1980’s and 1990’s to create a new discursive and open space which allowed for a possible change in how presidential security was operationalized at the White House. Each shock to the system gradually changed the web of power relations that existed between the President, Congress, city officials, and the Secret Service in relation to the security importance of Pennsylvania Avenue. These power relations were being slightly altered, which allowed the Service more opportunities in pursuing a
security state around the White House. Agents were able to voice, express, and even act out their security measures due to these shifts. This underlying change in conditions started to erode and weaken previous beliefs and traditions about presidential protection and the symbol of the White House as being the “People’s House.” The importance of the past was withering away with each successive crisis situation as the Service gained increased ability to use productive power. These series of events finally allowed the Secret Service to close down America’s Main Street: Pennsylvania Avenue. To demonstrate how a series of crisis moments was able to achieve this, this section will seek to explain how the Secret Service was able to reformulate its power relations and zones of influence in order to cut ties to previous traditions and modes of legitimizing behavior. In this particular case study, the Secret Service was able to redefine its roles and values in a nexus of confusion created by a series of crisis events that threatened the body of the president between 1994 and 1995. Through these attacks on the White House, attempted assassination attacks, and a serious domestic terrorist attack, the Service was able to disconnect with past discourse and build a new framework of presidential protection that relied on security and fortification. Hence, the Service was able to “recodify” how the president should be protected in the 21st century.

_The Emergence of a Security State_

There would be additional terrorist attacks in the early 1990s, but nothing approaching a crisis event that would change U.S. policy concerning how the president should be protected. The closest events that approached this level of crisis were the attempted assassination on George H.W. Bush in Kuwait by Iraqi nationals and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing that killed six people and wounded 1,000. In response to the plot to kill Bush, the White House declared that it “was a direct attack on the United
States” and responded with a cruise missile targeted at a major intelligence operation in Baghdad (Jehl, 1993). While the United States was facing international terrorism across the Atlantic, it was also encountering a host of terrorism issues in the homeland, especially in New York City. Alongside the World Trade Center bombing, there were reports about threats targeted at the Lincoln Tunnel and the United Nations in New York City. With these domestic terrorist threats and attacks, Jehl noted that the United States is just slowly awakening to terrorism here and that the “United States still finds it cleaner to contend with trouble outside its borders than within” (1993). With the perceived and actual threats of truck bombings, bombing plots, and other assassination attempts, the Secret Service did not try to link these events with presidential security. The Service was quiet and did not seek to re-establish its claim about the importance of sealing off Pennsylvania Avenue.

However, in 1994 the Secret Service would change its tactics because its security measures were directly tested and threatened by a series of attacks and assassination attempts at the White House that ranged from a plane attack, a man shooting a SKS semiautomatic rifle at the White House on Pennsylvania Avenue, and another man spraying the White House with gunfire. This series of bizarre incidents started on September 12, 1994 when Frank Corder flew his small plane into the White House in September; the plane crashed under the Clinton’s bedroom window. Immediately after this incident, the Treasury Department, with coordination from the Secret Service, was to conduct a comprehensive investigation concerning White House security. This one event served as the catalyst for the Secret Service to reexamine presidential protection an object of study; this investigation would serve to scrutinize its methods and tactics to determine
what could be done to prevent a host of attacks that could be aimed at the White House. One of the main objectives, according to Under Secretary Noble of the Treasury Department, was “to see whether the procedures that are currently in place are adequate, and to see whether there needs to be any modification as it relates to the procedures currently in place” (Press Briefing, 1994, October 30). However, the Treasury Review was also asked to examine how “to keep the White House open and assessable to the American people without jeopardizing valid security concerns” (Public Report of the White House Security Review, 1995). By asking questions of how to increase security and maintain levels of openness, the Service would need to figure out how to mitigate or preserve traditional values about the White House, but yet re-update security to face a potential terrorist attack.

Six weeks later, White House security was breached once again. Francisco Duran fired 20 to 30 rounds at the White House with a semi-automatic rifle. Before he could unload another clip at the White House, he was subdued by three civilians. In total, 11 rounds hit the White House, and one penetrated the Press Briefing Room in the West Wing. Immediately after this, the Secret Service advocated for the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue for security concerns. Special Agent Griffin adamantly stated that it “would be an enhancement to security at the White House if Pennsylvania Avenue was closed” (Press Briefing, 1994, October 29). However, Leon Panetta, chief of staff to President Clinton, was more measured in his response concerning presidential security at the White House. He said, “You walk a fine balance here; you try to, obviously, provide the greatest security possible for the President of the United States. But at the same time, you also want to provide access for people of this country to the White House. So it's that
kind of balance that's involved here” (Press Briefing, 1994, October 29). In trying to
determine this line between security and openness, President Clinton’s administration
was adamant that the president would not be sealed off from the people. Panetta said that
they would not close down Pennsylvania Avenue because “they did not want to project
the image of the president being inaccessible to the people” (Labaton, 1994). In fact, it
was widely reported that “Mr. Clinton clearly chafes at life inside the White House
bubble” (Pear, 1994). It was clear that Clinton wanted to preserve, conserve, and
enhance the historical precedence of the White House as being open, assessable, and
close to the people.

In fact, President Clinton immediately challenged the closed nature of the bubble
when he entered the White House in 1993. He chaffed against the overbearing nature of
his security detail and sought to relax these standards so he could achieve close distance
to the people. For him, the cocoon was too tight and the Secret Service needed to be
controlled. He was “determined to have in the White House some measure of the
freedom and privacy he enjoyed in Little Rock” and had “begun a systematic effort to
push the edges of ‘the bubble’” (Kelly, 1992). He sought to remove agents that had been
stationed in his living quarters. After the 1981 assassination attempt on President
Reagan, the Service was able to gain imitate and private access to the 2nd and 3rd floors of
the White House. Presidential living spaces had to be protected like the Oval Office or
Air Force One. President Clinton balked at these measures and first removed the agents
to a 2nd floor command center and finally to the 1st floor to guard the residence’s
entrances. For the Secret Service, “this was war” as the “agency doesn’t want to
surrender any of its expanded authority” (Clift & Thomas, 1993). Tension became so
tight between the agents and the president that stories were leaked to the press corps about fights between the First Couple. In particular, agents allegedly released a story about Hillary cussing out Bill and throwing either a lamp or a Bible at him. Although the details were fuzzy about the so-called lamp-throwing incident, the story leaked by the Secret Serviced confirmed the image of a couple that had only married out of political expediency and made Hillary look like a “lamp-throwing Delilah, emasculating her weak husband” (Rich, 1993).

The White House finally tracked down the leak of the sources to the Secret Service and gave a stern warning: “if the Secret Service doesn’t back off and button up, another federal agency will be found to protect the first family” (Clift & Thomas, 1993). In response to the measures implemented by President Clinton to loosen the bubble around him, Jody Powell, press secretary to Jimmy Carter, noted that he “can expand the envelope a little, but the practicalities of the matter make it very difficult to sustain that” (Kelly, 1992). In fact, any president, at first, resists the intrusive nature of the security bubble. According to Director Lewis Merletti of the Secret Service during the Clinton years, presidents tend “to view Secret Service personnel as an obstacle to their privacy and a barrier between them and the American people” (1988). However, presidents come to learn through a “natural educational process” how “essential proximity is” (Merletti, 1998).

Despite Clinton’s initial desire to fight the security bubble that imprisoned him, he still had to contend with actual attacks targeted at the White House and him. The tension between security and openness once again had almost reached its boiling point six weeks later. This event was only compounded by four additional incidents that
concerned White House security in December. The most significant event occurred on December 17, when an individual fired four shots at the White House with a 9mm handgun. Two shots landed such short of the Executive Residence and one penetrated the State Floor Dining Room. With each incident revolving around presidential safety, the Secret Service’s position of increasing security measures at the White House started to gain more and more momentum. Relations between the Office of the President and the Secret Service started to shift considerably. A president who allegedly would not allow the Secret Service on the second floor of the White House to guard his privacy would soon would be confronted with an American disaster that indirectly affected his own security.

**Initial Reaction to the Proposal**

Due to the increased pressure to close down Pennsylvania Avenue, numerous individuals came forward to denounce such a proposal. Harold Gray, the president of the association of the Oldest Inhabitants of the District of Columbia, wrote that “there must be better ways to secure the safety of our chief executive.” He went on to note that the White House “was a symbol of democracy that the people could stroll on the lawn or eat their lunch in the president’s front yard” (Gray, 1994). Richard Lewis, professor of architecture, commented that “closing down Pennsylvania Avenue, while doing little to improve security, would go a long way toward distancing the White House and its occupants from the American People” (Lewis, 1994). To complement these concerns, White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta was very forthright in how he viewed the Executive Mansion. He argued that “you don’t want to turn the White House of the Untied States of America into a fortress” (Malone, 1995).
White House officials were clearly aware of the implications of closing down Pennsylvania Avenue. Months after these attacks, it was leaked that the Treasury Report would recommend that the Secret Service close down America’s Main Street in order to protect the President of the United States in an adequate manner. However, the White House responded immediately that President Clinton would not favor such a decision. George Stephanopoulos said that “I don’t think he’d like to do that” (Malone, 1995).

Oklahoma City Bombing

When Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols exploded a truck bomb outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, worldviews began to change. The most devastating terrorist attack on U.S. soil had been perpetrated by home-grown terrorists. The deaths of 168 people created a shift in how the United States would respond to terror. Like the truck bombs in Beirut, the Oklahoma attacked altered the relations between the president and the Secret Service. The threat of an actual truck bomb had finally reached the homeland.

In response to the attack, President Clinton immediately asked Congress to pass the Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995 and called for more legislation to grant agencies like the FBI “more power to crack these terrorist networks, both domestic and foreign” (1995, April 23). In particular, Clinton wanted to grant federal law enforcement authorities the ability to track, monitor, and infiltrate organizations, examine computer communications and transactions, and be able to deport legal aliens on the basis of secret evidence and information that links them to terrorism (Editorial, 1995, April 25).

Another question directly tied to investigating groups was whether the Levi guidelines “imposed in 1976 to safeguard civil liberties and eased in 1983 to give the FBI more flexibility, should be relaxed more” (Goshko, 1995). Although the FBI Director Louis
Freeh said that the agency did not need these guidelines relaxed, members of Congress and the White House Staff argued that this relaxation would allow federal agents to infiltrate terrorist organizations at a very deep level (Editorial, 1995, April 30). In addition to these measures, “the most dangerous is a plan to revise the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits involvement of military forces in domestic law enforcement” argued The New York Times (Editorial, 1995, April 30). The Director of Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard took these attacks as a way for President Clinton to deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism. Graham Allison argued that there is an “immediate threat to our security at home” and “more deadly acts are surely yet to come” (1995). In order to “combat this clear and present danger…nuclear terrorism should be topic number one” (Allison, 1995).

Although President Clinton did not zero in on nuclear terrorism, he did focus on the changing nature of political violence in the United States right after the attack. Clinton argued that “we’ve always had a fair amount of violence,” but “organized, systematic, political violence that leads to large numbers of deaths have not been very much in evidence in American history except for time to time” (Wallace, 1995). This lack of domestic terrorism that routinely plagues Britain, France, and Spain had finally arrived in the United States. Clinton went on to mention that the United States is “still kind of a frontier nation” (Wallace, 1995), but the advent of domestic terrorism and the increase of international terrorism eliminates this American ethos of exceptionalism. Political violence that is coordinated, organized, and well-funded will supersede and destroy America’s frontier ethic.
Linking Oklahoma City and Presidential Security

With this stark realization of actual threats on American soil, the Secret Service started to immediately link the Oklahoma City bombing with presidential security. By having a main thoroughfare so close to the White House, it posed unfathomable dangers for the president. Any terrorist organization could drive right up to the fence, park a truck, and detonate an explosive device that could either destroy or severely damage the White House. America’s Main Street, under these conditions, was seen as a threat to the president. In responding to this concern, President Clinton said right after the attacks, “I hope that ways can be found to make the front of the White House secure without doing that, because millions of Americans go by Pennsylvania Avenue every year and see the White House and the overwhelming number of them are law abiding, good, American citizens, and I hope they won't have to do that” (Wallace, 1995). Clearly, President Clinton was concerned about the perceived trade-off between security and openness, but he was aware of the mounting pressure within the Secret Service to take every measure possible to protect the Executive Mansion. The president in this crisis moment had to choose to conserve and enhance historical precedence or to break with the past and enter this new age of terrorism by declaring the People’s House closed.

The main document that legitimated the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue was the Public Report of the White House Security Review (1995). The review was compiled and written by a variety of security experts inside and outside of the government. This report would a major source of productive power as it would legitimate the Service’s claim that new measures had to be taken to protect the president. They consulted foreign governments to find out their security precautions and discovered that there is “significantly greater public access to the White House than to other residences of the
chief executives aboard” (Public Report, 1995). The United States is the only country that always public tours while the chief executive is in residence. The report would continue to play up this theme of access and proximity. In fact, the report argued that the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue actually “significantly enhances the public's access to their White House.” The report continued. “This concept ensures that pedestrians may enter and enjoy the White House and its grounds, and feel that distinctively American closeness to those in high office. At the same time, the proposal significantly reduces the security risk posed to the White House, its residents, employees, and visitors by vehicles carrying explosives” (Public Report, 1995). By placing barricades between Madison Place and 17th Street, the Secret Service was finally able to shut down Pennsylvania Avenue with an argument that it advocated almost 10 years previous. The implementation of a “campus-like” atmosphere actually enhances the feel of the People’s House by eliminating potential threats and distractions. By creating a serene space from East to West Executive Avenues and from Lafayette Park to the North Grounds, the White House has created a safe zone with gardens and flowers.

This beautification argument is only enhanced by the overwhelming idea that “there was no viable alternative that ensured the safety of the President and First Family, White House employees, and visitors from explosive-laden vehicles” (Public Report, 1995). This line of thinking is similar to President Clinton’s mutually reinforcing ideas about security, discipline, and liberties. The White House is still free to access, but security has disciplined these rights to ensure the safety and protection of the people and their representatives. Under this framework, there is no substitute for disciplining rights and liberties. Although the report responded to the attacks on the White House in 1994,
the report’s overall conclusions were dictated by the events surrounding Oklahoma City. The primary justification for the closure was not a plane flying into the White House or rogue crank shooting up the White House, but a bomb-laden truck. With this justification, the Secret Service was able to make an authoritative and credible claim to presidential security.

Despite these claims, there was an outcry not to close down Pennsylvania Avenue for security purposes. New Gingrich (R-GA) adamantly stated, “Keep it open.” (Thomas & Harris, 1995). Ken Wringle wrote an editorial questioning whether the Secret Service, the Treasury Department, and others were exploiting fear for increased security measure. He asked the poignant question of “are the times more fearful, or are we?” (1995). There have been presidential attacks since the founding generation. In fact, conditions concerning assassinations in the 19th century were often more precarious and dangerous than now. In addition to these outcries, Shaffer accused the Secret Service of using the media frenzy over the Oklahoma City bombing “to create a bigger institutional empire with less accountability and more control over our lives” (1995). He succinctly described the process of productive power. Shaffer went on to jokingly propose the alternative of “moving the president and the family to Camp David…[where] suicide pilots would have trouble getting through the Catoctin forest, no trucks could get near the place, and a metal detector at the gate could screen out the shooters. Our president should be about as safe there as anywhere. And isn’t safety the point?” (1995).

Despite these protests, thirty-one days after the explosion, the “People’s House” was finally sealed from the people’s gaze and replaced with “Fortress White House.” The Secret Service, with the permission of President Clinton, closed down Pennsylvania
Avenue. The Oklahoma City crisis was the final impetus in breaking with history, tradition, and past values. However, there were many attempts by many individuals to convince the President to reopen America’s Main Street and to reconnect the White House to its origin story. The editorial for the Washington Post said “Our democratic society can give no more. Closing off symbols of our openness must be fully justified and not done, despite the risks, without public notice or discussion” (Editorial, 1995, May 22). Former NSA advisor Bret Scowcroft called it a “great victory for the terrorists” (Weyrich, 1995). The Buffalo News said, “So now they have made the White House a splendid bunker, a presidential hideaway more befitting of Saddam Hussein of Iraq or Libya’s Moammar Khadafy—one of those dictators who fear their people and the world” (Rowan, 1995). The bunker mentality that had partially existed in D.C. since the riots and protests in the 1960’s and 1970’s finally came to fruition. The past would be sealed off and a new logic of security would prevail. The president had to be, needed to be, and wanted to be sealed off in order to be protected from external threats.

Reformulation of Presidential Security

However, the call for not turning the People’s House into Fortress White House fell on deaf ears. In his radio announcement, Clinton used many of the same points made by Public Report of the White House Security Review. In particular, he noted his “reluctance to accept any decisions that might inconvenience the people,” but “the strong support voice of the expert panel” concluded that it was no longer safe to the president or the people to have America’s Main Street remain open (Clinton, 1995, May 20a).

Although Pennsylvania Avenue was closed, President Clinton noted that this did not restrict the freedom of the people to have direct access to the White House. People were free to visit, protest, and take pictures in front of the White House. However, these new
measures would now enable the people be “more secure in all these activities because it will be less likely that you could become an innocent victim of those who would do violence against symbols of our Democracy.” This is critical because of the “changing nature and scope of the threat of terrorist actions.” The President tied himself to the logic and ethos of the Service related to White House protection. Being disciplined and following these new security measures is the route to safety and order.

To reaffirm and strengthen these arguments, President Clinton justified the closure on a number of fronts in speech he gave following his decision. First, he remarked that in this new age of terrorism that our society is “vulnerable to the forces of organized destruction” (Clinton, 1995, May 20b). Although he could have offered Oklahoma City as an example, he used the terrorist attacks on Japanese subways to show the extent and danger that any community faces from organized threats. Second, he argued that technology only exacerbates the threats and dangers from these possible organized groups. Attacks range from nerve gas to truck bombings to using airplanes as possible weapons. There is no way to be secure in an open and technologically advanced society. In fact, “technology changes the opportunity for organized destruction” and “we have to respond to that” (Clinton, 1995, May 20b). Third, these security measures enhance freedom; they do not detract from it. Like metal detectors at airports, he argued, they serve a vital function in preserving freedom and liberty. According to this logic, Clinton argued, “It is a way of preserving our freedom -- by changing to meet the changing realities that technology and time give for the expression of organized destruction. And we should view it in that way” (Clinton, 1995, May 20b). In essence, organized threats coupled with technology force societies to choose security first and
liberty later. Not only is security a precondition for liberty, but it is also privileged over freedom. In response to these dangerous implications, President Clinton warned that we must “minimize the fear that can seep into a society” (Clinton, 1995, May 20b).

Although President Clinton alludes to it, fear is a necessity for enhancing security. Past discourse based on openness must be replaced with a new set of knowledge and rules that justifies a bunker mentality existence.

Although President Clinton said that he “reluctantly” approved the decision of the Secretary of Treasury to close down Pennsylvania Avenue, he also spoke about “how we would get into the 21st century” (Clinton, 1995, May 20b). This response by the President of the United States and the Secret Service in a crisis situation provided the foundation for how elected leaders and citizens would come to view this “new age of terror.” The Hobbesian state of nature that is marked by fear, brutality, war, struggle, and self-preservation has re-emerged. In this age, the threat is everywhere and nowhere. Anyone at anytime are potential threats to the established order. The only way to escape this condition is through a strong Leviathan-based state that reminds people of this fear so that it can take it away and replace it with safety and order. By intervening in almost all aspects of life, the state provides a new type of security through productive power.

Terror must be confronted and challenged by first accepting this fear and then mitigating it through the disciplining of rights and liberties. In order to channel this fear through discipline, the people’s elected representative who symbolizes openness and liberty must be sealed off from the people. As noted by Melanson, this bunker mentality unveils that “with the ever increasing dangers of the modern world, the Secret Service’s mission to provide the president and his family with the highest level of protection that is consistent
with democratic principles grows harder” (2002, p. 140). This set of events and responses provided a new framework for how the United States would deal with terrorist threats: security would trump openness. The consequences of this action can be “seen as projecting an image of fortification and security that is both undesirable and inappropriate for a nation whose defining characteristic is its open and democratic society” (Hoffman, Chalk, Liston, & Brannan, 2002, p. iv). This clarification manifested through novel action by the Secret Service and President Bill Clinton would have a tremendous impact on how the George W. Bush administration would handle a future crisis episode.

President Clinton would further the advancement of meaning through two important actions that directly affected the Secret Service. First, he issued Presidential Decision Directive 62 on May 22, 1998. The premise behind this directive was that if the United States enemies chose to attack, they “will be more likely to resort to terror instead of conventional military assault” (White House Fact Sheet, 1998). To implement this policy, the directive established an Office of the National Coordinator for Security and Protection at National Special Security Events led by the Secret Service. The National Coordinator was to achieve a “new level of integration in the fight against terrorism” (White House Fact Sheet, 1998). The president would designate major events like the Super Bowl, the Olympics, State of the Union addresses, and other events he deemed important as National Special Security Events. This action reinforced and expanded the symbolic meaning behind the decision to close the White House. The quality of presidential security would now be expanded to critical events where none had been deemed necessary before. The intrusive nature of national police powers was gradually expanding as manifested through the arm of the Secret Service.
The second action was signing the President Threat Protection Act into law on January 24, 2000 (Presidential Threat Protection Act, 2000). This act reinforced and expanded key elements of the Secret Service. The legislation allowed the president to classify National Special Security Events in which the Secret Service would be the lead agency in coordinating protection. In effect, this legislation established a new unit within the Secret Service. It would be responsible for coordinating, planning, and working with other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in providing protection for these special security events. In addition to this new division, the Secret Service also was ordered to develop a National Threat Assessment Center. Its main purpose was prevention. The Secret Service was given the responsibility to gather research and intelligence to conduct threat assessment and in turn to share this information with other agencies. The doctrine of prevention started to gain more credibility. In fact, the Secret Service was to train others in the art and science of threat assessment and prevention.

**Conclusion**

The Secret Service has formed and been formed by crisis situations in the past 30 years as it has been throughout its existence. These crisis events allow the Secret Service, the president, and other figures the opportunity to create and expand meaning through action that separates the present from the past. This is the essence of productive power. After the Oklahoma City bombing as well as the Beirut bombings, the Secret Service was the lead agency in advocating the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue for presidential protection. The idea at first was not taken as an authoritative statement. Although the venerable James Baker first presented the idea to Congress, it still was not given much credibility due to its radical nature. The symbolic representation of placing
barricades between the president and the people had too many significant consequences. This particular utterance did not fit the current perceptions of reality in the United States in the 1980s. Despite the continued growth of international terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s, the people were not ready for such a proposal. For the next decade, the idea of a White House compound would have to struggle and fight for authority. Following a series of crisis situations, the Secret Service was given the space and opportunity to exploit radical change and reinforce its basic statement about the importance of closing down Pennsylvania Avenue. In doing so, it sent the message that protection trumps openness, as the People’s House was transformed into Fortress White House. Discursive action transformed the traditional meaning of what it meant to be free in the American context.
CHAPTER FIVE

STRUCTURING FORCES OF CRISIS SITUATIONS

Destructuring the past and restructuring the future is possible for organizations. In these situations, a crisis is an opportunity. Deflecting blame, assigning praise and guilt, transcending the situation, and corrective actions are secondary concerns when an organization is trying to change its core identity and epistemic reality. These shocks to the system provide a momentary break in time in which new discursive spaces open and become available. In these moments, a Foucauldian framework that focuses on power as production is able to illuminate certain aspects about crisis situations and crisis response. In these spaces, organizations are creators. They have the potential capacity to create, produce, and transform the meaning of a crisis for a particular organization. Radical, qualitative, and revolutionary change is possible during these crisis moments because organizational norms, rules, and procedures are challenged. Innovative rules, procedures, and structures are then built to satisfy this new mode of thinking. The reordering of organizational life provides for new opportunities.

The study of the Secret Service revealed that crisis situations grant organizations the power to restructure knowledge, norms, rules and discourse. The status quo can be changed, transformed, and revolutionized through shocks to a system. These events often lead to chaos and reordering. Due to the drastic nature of qualitative change, organizations are often unable to return, restore, or preserve their previous traditions and modes of legitimizing behavior. In some cases, the ability to transcend and connect to previous values has been altered to such an extent that it is no longer feasible to try to conserve these values. This type of disruption calls for new modes of discourse, rules,
and norms that justify new conditions. The point of this type of crisis response is not to return, but to create totally new discursive formations with a new logic of functioning. This mode of change allows organizations the capacity to transform its rules and roles by reconstructing its zones of influence and power.

Although this type of change is unpredictable and infrequent, organizations must consider and understand how shifts in discourse and norms caused by punctuations in the status quo can fundamentally alter the way they operate on a daily basis. Organizations do have the ability to project, create, and form new discourse, sets of laws, and innovative structures that allow them to break free from previous and traditional modes of production and reproduction. Organizations can restructure the future after crisis episodes. In effect, organizations are able to wrench loose of the previous relations they were grounded in and replace them with a new set of relations. In these situations, organizations must produce certainty out of uncertainty. By breaking from the past, these organizations must consider how new knowledge constructs caused by breaks in the equilibrium frequently allow the organization to reinterpret the situation. In order to impose some order on the situation, organizations must be able to construct a reality where certain conditions are made possible.

However, these conscious attempts at change often fail for a variety reasons: some crisis do not produce the adequate force for the dominant structure to be questioned, micro-interactions free from the rational action shape the situation, outside forces are able to define, shape, and push the agenda, or the institutional environment rejects the new framework. After the Reagan crisis, no restructuring occurred because of dynamics outside the control of the Secret Service. Masks of heroism and the incapacity
of anyone to do anything about assassinations prevented the Secret Service from making the radical changes it proposed immediately after the attempted assassination. The call for intelligence reform, expansion of the police state, and a reevaluation of politics and freedom were either ignored or rejected. However, there were apparent and glaring errors. The Service failed to provide for adequate protection in the capital area. Inside the confines of a secured Hilton Hotel, the president was fully protected. The zone of protection was thoroughly established. But, the Service failed to provide for identical security measures outside the hotel. The rope line was the only protective means that the Service constructed to protect the president. In that public zone, it had no idea of who was there and what they were carrying. If the Service declared the rope line a “press area,” agents would have searched, identified, and tracked the various individuals within that zone. Within this secured area, Hinckley would have never been able to get within 20 feet of the president. The other notable blunder was the failure to provide the necessary security at George Washington Hospital. The inability of the Secret Service to take precautionary steps after the crisis situation could have been disastrous if this attempt had been a conspiracy rather than a mentally disturbed assassin with a simple plan. These and other errors were uncovered days and months after this shock to the system. Melanson notes:

“Inadequate communication, failure to have a hospital security plan and the president’s medical records at the ready, a lapse by several agents who stayed at the crime scene instead of accompanying the president away from the site—these numbered only a few of the mistakes that the Secret Service had made on March 30, 1981. The agency had almost lost a president for the second time.”

The failings of the Secret Service were noticeable, identifiable, and apparent. Despite these failures, the Service was unable to expand the concept of presidential security.
Incremental and quantitative change based on the successes and failings of Agency action during this crisis event provided for degrees of change. The general sentiment was that the president cannot be fully protected in a free and open society and the Secret Service can only provide a limited amount of protection. No restructuring needed to occur, because the current framework adequately explained the dangers that the president faced. Intelligence reform, standards of security, gun control laws, and the tension between openness and security were brushed to the side.

However, the debate concerning the seemingly opposed values of security and openness resurfaced almost immediately after the attempted assassination attack. The terrorist attacks in Beirut, Lebanon, the rumored Iranian hit squad sent to kill President Reagan, a car bomb exploding in the Senate, and a general atmosphere of terror began to surround Washington D.C. In this context, tangential issues that emerged during the attack on Reagan were quickly ignored and new issues emerged. The Secret Service began to utter proposals that would fortify the White House and seal the president from the people by closing Pennsylvania Avenue. Presidential security required agents to carry anti-aircraft missiles, install concrete barriers to prevent anyone from having a direct access to the White House streets, and close down East Executive Avenue.

In this context, Secret Service was able to respond with bold action accompanied by productive and disciplinary power; it would no longer rely on sand-laden trucks to protect the president from terrorist attacks. Instead of these safe and harmless actions, the Service equipped agents with rocket propelled grenades and the power to build cement barricades. The first vestures of Fortress White House began to emerge as the Secret Service started to generate new ideas to protect the president, which the president
accepted. He tied himself to the beginnings of Fortress White House. The next step was to create a “campus-like” atmosphere around Washington. The fruition of this college-like atmosphere required the Service to close Pennsylvania Avenue. This particular utterance was not only backed up by the Secret Service, but by the Treasury Department. Secretary James Baker presented the proposal to Congress himself in an attempt to create new meaning. Despite his authoritative status, the “campus-like” atmosphere was perceived as a threat to the ideals of liberty and openness. Media accounts from the *Washington Post* (Editorial, 1985) satirically commented that these measures don’t “go nearly far enough” and the *New York Times* suggested building a “20-foot concrete wall around” the White House (Wicker, 1985). Representative Michael D. Barnes in his protest against the proposed measure recounted a story of how his father-in-law was able to drive under the portico of the White House to avoid a soaking from the rain. While he was there, he left his business card and was invited to a White House reception a week later. He lamented “the passing of the time when a President like Truman could take a morning walk through the city” (Engelberg, 1985). City Council Chairman David Clarke was a bit more harsh as he said the Secret Service is “making a palace out of the place” (Seaberry, 1985). Despite its advances, the Service was unable to produce a new understanding of presidential protection. The Chief Executive Officer was still safe in his place of residence. Restructuring failed as the Secret Service was unable to tap into productive power.

It would take an event with a bolder set of actions immediately following a crisis to produce enough force to guide the direction of restructuring. These events started to unfold as terrorists started to use innovative methods to implement their tactics. With the
use of truck bombs, the Secret Service could no longer rely on previous traditions to protect the president. The Service started to take bolder action with the stationing dump trucks outside White House entrances, the building of concrete barriers, closing down East Executive Avenue, and floating the idea of creating a “campus-like” atmosphere around the president. Although the later statement was a mere utterance, the other declarations were taken seriously and accepted. There needed to be a reformulation of standards related to protecting the Chief Executive Officer. The office could no longer be protected by merely using a body defense strategy; the scope and breadth of protection had to be extended. In order for these protective constructs to materialize, the Secret Service needed to make their claims fit in a broader context that could be accepted by the president. It needed to discipline the president by producing a new set of meanings that he could accept. The reliance on disciplinary power coupled with productive power would allow the Secret Service to control White House protection.

Ten years after its first proposal of closing down Pennsylvania Avenue, the Secret Service was in a position once again to push its agenda. The big moment resulted in a series of minor incursions ranging from a plan attack to a man unloaded a clip of bullets at the White House. Although these attacks had no connection to each other, the Secret Service used this as an opportunity to petition the Treasury Department to reexamine its protective measures around the White House. The study of presidential security through an authoritative investigation could be used as the justification to close Pennsylvania Avenue. The Service would rely on the experts of others to reinforce its claim that America’s Main Street posed too much of a threat to the president. With expert testimony and advice, the Service could use this authoritative report to propel its plan of
expanding presidential security by shutting down key parts around the White House.

Although none of these attacks had any direct connection to the street, the Secret Service could and did argue that it stood as a risk. Without this direct link, the White House was still extremely hesitant to close down the street. Clinton’s advisors from Panetta to Meyers to Stephanopoulos and even to President Clinton himself told the press and the public that Pennsylvania Avenue would not be closed. His press sector Dee Dee Myers noted that Clinton “does not want the American people cut off from what is one of the most significant symbols of democracy” (Pear, 1994). From the rhetoric inside the White House, it seemed the report would not be declared authoritative.

However, the Oklahoma City Bombing changed the context of the debate. What was mere foolishness before was now considered legitimate. The president was truly at risk from a truck bomb. In effect, the probability became too high. The president was too vulnerable to attacks. The random attacks from madmen were replaced with potential coordinated attacks by ideological groups. Due to the high probability and high consequences of a terrorist attack, the Service was granted additional authority to make meaning. For the Service, power became productive as it established new measures to protect the president. Despite protests from the public, politicians, the media, and city officials, the Secret Service’s proposal was now accepted and backed up by the Office of the President and the security report. With this declarative approval from the Chief Executive and a group of outside experts, America’s Main Street was finally sealed from the public. The logic behind this position rested in a declaration by the Secret Service Director Lewis Merletti (1995) related to the principles of presidential protection. He argued that how the Secret Service protects the President of the United States requires
that agents have the power to secure the president in public and private spaces. In contrast to other countries who rely more on a “counter-offensive” approach or a “overwhelm the attacker” strategy, the Secret Service relies on the cover and evacuate method that is based on the principles of access and proximity. The security bubble must not only be up 365 days a year and 24 hours a day, but the agents must have direct access to control to the president. Close protection worked in the past, but it needs to be updated to include a defense of the president that involves long-range attacks like a truck bomb. A body defense strategy had to be supplemented with a new strategy that addresses this age of terrorism.

With the overwhelming acknowledgment of international and domestic terrorism and likelihood of future threats, President Clinton presented the argument about how to reconcile security with civil liberties. In this process of justification, he was tying himself to the ethos of the Secret Service; he was disciplining himself. There was no question that things had to change. He maintained that “I don’t think we have to give up our liberties, but I do think we have to have more discipline and we have to be willing to see serious threats to our liberties properly investigated” (1995, April 23). In seeking to balance security with liberties, Clinton put forward the basic premise that the two are not mutually inclusive. Americans can maintain freedom speech, the right to bear arms, freedom of association, but the exercises of these freedoms need to be more disciplined. He argued that “we’ll have freedom of movement, but we may have to have some discipline in doing it so we can go after people who want to destroy our very way of life” (1995, April 23). The coupling of advanced technology and organized destruction from terrorist organizations require the state to take unprecedented action. Rights, liberties,
and the American way of life can continue, but they need to be disciplined to fit into the reality of possible terrorist attack from groups inside and outside the United States.

In examining this reordering, there were several limitations to this study that must be noted. First, the nature of Secret Service precluded my ability to gather the amount of material I would prefer. Because of the highly sensitive and classified information related to protecting the president, there is no exact way to determine how the Secret Service protects the president or how these practices have changed over time. However, there was plenty of data related to protecting President Reagan and Clinton. Although I was not able to find all of the necessary information, there was enough to make approximate conclusions concerning presidential security. Second, theories, concepts, and analytics tend to explain any type of phenomenon by simplifying it. As a result, conceptual categories capture and miss important details about the complexity of real life variables. In my case, I did not capture all or even the majority of important details about the history of the Secret Service during the Reagan and Clinton years. However, I was able to understand various power relations, different practices, and how events have shaped the concept of presidential security.

Despite these limitations, the environment in which the Secret Service now operates was created by a series of actions following crisis events. Organizations are able to shape events just as they have the ability to illuminate the path through the changing of power relations. They have the capacity to produce meaning in and through crisis situations. This nexus of creation is a condition that some organizations experience during crisis events. During these moments, cautious, protected, and minor actions do not provide the necessary meaning that must be established after a crisis. Instead, crisis
situations need to be handled with innovative action, even though these bold actions might amplify the crisis. In the case of Pennsylvania Avenue, ambiguity and confusion were clarified through strong presidential and Secret Service action with the support of a federal report. These actors brought and created meaning to a situation that desperately needed to be defined and constructed. In particular, this context provided the Secret Service with the ability to grow and solidify its federal police power. In this new framework, security is enacted, selected, and retained while openness is deemed less essential. The power of the Secret Service has become more ontologically real as it has created a “campus-like” feel around the White House.
REFERENCES


Resolution to commend Agents McCarthy and Parr and Officer Delahanty for their unselfish courage and patriotism during the recent attempt on the life of the President of the United States, H.R. 123, 97d Cong. (1981).


