Realism and Hegemonic Moralism: Germany and the United States in the Build-Up to the Second Gulf War

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ABSTRACT

International Relations in modernity have undergone phases of nation-state struggle and, more recently, globalized conflict. Theorists have used the paradigms of idealism and realism to explain state actor motivations in such conflicts; yet in the early 21st century, the United States initiated regime change in Iraq with claims of necessity pertaining to morality and security that could not be adequately explained using either framework. This thesis postulates that a paradigm shift in International Relations, as described by John Vasquez via Thomas Kuhn, is occurring as evidenced by the conduct of United States foreign policy towards Iraq.

This new paradigmatic approach, which Edward Weisband has titled Hegemonic Moralism, is analyzed in this thesis, explicating the ontological assumptions and policy initiatives made by the United States administration in the lead-up to the Second Gulf War. Hegemonic Moralism clashes with the realist beliefs underpinning Germany’s foreign policy during the same time period: with the threat of Anglo-American neoliberal dominance in the Middle East a distinct possibility, Germany realigned its allies to forestall and de-legitimate looming U.S. regime change in Iraq. An analysis of realist theory and its assumptions of human and nation-state behaviour leads into an explication of the paradigm of US Hegemonic Moralism, comparing it with the realist behaviour exhibited by Germany. I suggest that descriptions of German sociopolitical discourse after the September 11 2001 attacks on the US and prior to the Second Gulf War convincingly show Germany’s social and political readiness to oppose the hegemonic neo-liberal Anglo-American paradigm.
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Chapter One
Realism and Hegemonic Moralism:
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Introduction

In the conduct of international foreign policy, the question of morality has received much debate. Several streams of thought form what can be broadly termed ‘paradigms,’ making fundamental assumptions about the nature of the international system and how foreign policy needs to be conducted. Within the boundaries of this thesis, the key assumption made by two such paradigms is the issue of ‘evil,’ or more specifically outright immoral actions – following parameters of morality outlined in western culture by Judeo-Christian reasoning – perpetrated by state and sub-state actors. Of particularly interest are two paradigms of international relations that are defined in this thesis as ‘realism’ and ‘hegemonic moralism,’ the former term a widely-recognized and accepted paradigm and the latter a descriptive construct described by Professor Dr. Edward Weisband in 2004. The sub-set of hegemonic moralism that requires interrogation is marked in US foreign policy at the dawn of the 21st century by US governmental policies underpinned by a number of assumptions self-described as neo-conservative in various bodies of literature.

Within the parameters of realist theory, the amount of ‘evil’ extant in the world will always remain constant; it is not within the powers of human society to change that eternal value. As this thesis will show, within the parameters of the paradigm of hegemonic moralism, foreign policy-makers and theorists believe that combating evil for the purposes of its reduction and possibly outright defeat is not only eminently possible but very much a moral imperative, driven by the purpose of civilizational survival. This paradigm is used to explain the actions of US foreign policy-makers in the build-up and conduct of the Second Gulf War in Iraq, starting in 2003. Its purpose was not to limit a
threat or to geostrategically balance power, but to conduct a civilizational struggle using moralist justification for a hegemonic presumption.

The term ‘hegemonic’ that uses moralist justifications in turn reflects the United States’ conviction regarding its pre-eminent role as a defender of western civilization in the eyes of the theorists and policy-makers promoting the paradigm. As chapter three of this thesis demonstrates, it is the belief of certain neo-conservative thinkers and policy-makers that the principles of western civilization that form the foundations of liberal democracy are undergoing a direct attack, both domestically from a populace lacking the determination to defend those values in the face of socio-cultural and political relativism, and from foreign threats seeking to undermine western civilization. It is therefore necessary to promote the values of liberal democracy and market-driven globalized economic conditions, enacting, promoting and defending a hegemonic approach that will retain US relevance in international relations and defend its civilizational achievements. The difference between a ‘hegemonic’ and a ‘unilateral’ approach lies in their operational distinctions: it is possible to act unilaterally, e.g. in foreign policy, without seeking to draw other nations or the entire international system into a paradigm that cannot co-exist with nations or systems opposing it. Therefore it is possible to follow realist theory without attempting to hegemonically reduce the amount of ‘evil’ in the world; the hegemonic aspect of hegemonic moralism is its belief in the possibility of complete success. Unilateralism, in contrast, merely describes a mode of operation, not a complete paradigmatic view of both the nature of the international system and the way in which foreign policy must be conducted.

The study of international relations in the 20th century has been marked by three distinct phases, identified by John A. Vasquez as the “idealist,” the “realist” and the “behavioral” methodologies of “international relations inquiry.” Vasquez postulates that the changes between each of those phases of inquiry represent the displacement of a dominant paradigm through discourse by another paradigm supplanting it. He applies Kuhn’s analysis of paradigm shifts to argue that “the realists attempted to move the field from a purely normative analysis to more empirical analysis [by] displacing idealism and
providing a paradigm that clearly specified a picture of international politics and a set of topics of inquiry that if properly researched would delineate the laws of international behavior.” These laws were largely based on discovering “the laws that govern human behavior [that] the idealists were not aware of [or] had a misconception of […]” In turn, behavioralists did not displace realism as much as operated “within the confines of the realist paradigm,” by asserting “that explanations should be stated in such a form as to be both falsifiable and testable.”

This thesis does not provide a rigid quantitative analysis of international relations, but it does operate under the assumption that the behavior of foreign policy actors and states is subject to empirical inquiry. The central theme of this hypothesis is the belief that the conflictual nature of post-Cold War international relations has resulted in an attempted paradigm shift akin to the post-WW1 attempts to implement idealism as policy. As “the idealists tested their ‘theories’ not in the laboratory but in the real world, by attempting to guide policy,” so do a few modern policy-makers engage in a similar shift of the paradigm of international politics, away from the realist paradigm that has dominated much of post-WW2 policy-making in its various forms. This attempted paradigm shift is implemented as a matter of policy in an immediate practical setting, being formulated, revised and then enacted in a manner similar to the post-WW1 implementation of idealist ideology.

As Vasquez presents Kuhn’s argument, “normal science begins to come to an end when an anomaly – ‘the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations’ – is unable to be removed by paradigm articulation.” If the anomaly persists, a crisis results if adapting the paradigm cannot explain (or solve) the problems sufficiently well: in those cases, “if the anomaly can be accounted for only by seeing the world in a new and different way (i.e. by the creation of a new paradigm), then the stage is set for a struggle between the adherents of the competing paradigms. If the struggle results in the displacement of the old paradigm and the dominance of the new paradigm, then this period is viewed with hindsight as a period of scientific discovery and revolution.” This process can be abrupt and violent or more gradual and continuous, yet “fundamental changes in thought” are only brought about by genuine “paradigm shifts.”

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Vasquez illustrates the linkages between those assumptions and theories (which in turn give rise to policy actions in politics) as a chain of causality: a paradigm is defined by “fundamental assumptions […] about the world,” which in turn explain “concepts,” that give rise to “propositions,” that are the basis of “theories.” In this thesis, I will illustrate how the very beginning of the 21st century has seen the clash of two competing paradigms, each with differing assumptions about the laws that govern human behaviour – and thus the world. This clash of assumptions has given rise to competing theories and competing policy-making that is remarkably confrontational: this is the stage of “struggle between adherents of competing paradigms,” taking place in the international system in the first decade of the twenty-first century, a struggle that is not unlike the clash of paradigms between the idealist utopian formulations following WW1 and the backlash following in the international system that was explained by realism. Yet this time realism is the paradigm that is under attack and that may be displaced; this analysis will investigate the paradigm of realism – the laws and assumptions that define it – and contrast them with the assumptions that underlie the new, competing paradigm. The conclusion will assess whether the two paradigms are compatible, or if the underlying assumptions are too different to be reconciled.

In chapter two, I will outline and define the key principles underlying realist theory, drawing parallels to modern international society and the 2001-2003 period: the paradigm of realism is thus articulated through the assumptions that it suggests are inviolable. I will first reference Thucydides and the Machiavelli-Hobbes assumptions of human nature and Isaiah Berlin’s critique of Machiavelli’s originality, leading to Morgenthau’s formulation of the principles of international politics. Concerning security, I will reference Mearsheimer’s claim that “when security is scarce, states become more concerned about relative gains than absolute gains”7, thereby introducing the criterion of relative advantages in comparison with hegemonic domination. This will continue into an elaboration of power and the necessity of maximizing power in comparison ‘with others’, i.e. the concept of balancing influence, based on Waltz’ assumption that “the first concern of states is not to maximize power.”8 A model of US and German security and their concerns of security and defense is given in the following chapters, heavily referencing
this section. Defense is commonly seen as the function of balancing power against threats; questions are raised whether the stability (and reduction in fluidity) of the international system is a means of balancing power against threats, and whether causing international instability is a desirable means of increasing domestic security.

The purpose of chapter three is to address the underlying motivations and ideological desires driving the second Gulf War, defining the assumptions underlying the paradigm of hegemonic moralism. A number of articles and writings by proponents of hegemonic moralism serve as an ideological explicator illuminating US ideology and foreign policy implementation. First-hand observations of US policy-makers are used from Plan of Attack and Bush at War and Against All Enemies. Additional material to be analyzed will be taken from official policy statements made by US government officials, e.g. presidential speeches, addresses to Congress, the United Nations, etc. Based on the definition of the paradigm of hegemonic moralism, it will be my goal to assess whether the planning of the war with Iraq was informed by realist principles, primarily the goal of security and balancing power. Where possible, I will search for indicators of hegemonic moralism rather than realpolitik dictating foreign policy.

My interest in chapter four is the realist assessment of Germany’s goals in 2000-2001, specifically the interplay between the Socialist-Green coalition’s inherent moral values and their desire to win re-election, coupled with the latent anti-militarism and anti-Americanism exploitable in German society. Concerning foreign policy, the German-French axis and its interest in shifting the balance of power away from the unipolar international system perceived to be heavily influenced by US interests provides an interesting angle, especially considering the French linguistic acrobatics that deem the US a ‘hyperpower’ and their particular interests (e.g. from Elf-Aquitaine/Total). Of some interest is the potential for German foreign policy to appear moralist, driven by moral concerns against military intervention and potential breaches of international law (‘Völkerrecht’ – translated as ‘peoples’ laws’ but more popularly ‘international law’), whereas it is in truth motivated by raison d’etat perhaps to an even greater degree than US policy. This merits a few historical references, for instance to Germany’s overly quick recognition of Serb independence in the early 1990s.
It is the intent of this thesis to demonstrate that foreign policy in the United States regarding the build-up of the Iraq war was not informed by realist principles, which are defined in the second chapter, whereas Germany’s foreign policy followed realism in defining its position in the international system. The United States sought to impose a hegemonic view of international affairs on the world, through a directed attempt at reshaping the Middle East starting with its arguably weakest aggressor against US interests, Iraq. The German state, faced with growing anti-American sentiment in its populace and alienated by an aggressive US approach that neglected to court German politicians and consider German interests, in turn acted in concord with realist principles, seeking to diplomatically counter-balance US interests. Relying on nationalist sentiment, Germany’s policy-makers succeeding at casting Germany’s opposition in moral terms, despite acting firmly in the realist tradition; in that regard, Germany’s policy-makers realized that the amount of evil in the world, in this case Iraq’s demonstrably oppressive and murderous regime, could not be swiftly reduced in the name of morality. Whilst keeping in mind the possible consequences of German involvement in Iraq, German policy-makers successfully fomented public anti-American sentiment, as demonstrated in chapter four, and succeeded in positioning themselves and the German state as the antithesis of hegemonic moralism.

The United States and Polarity after the Cold War

The end of the Cold War resulted in a global system that was alternately called unipolar - emphasizing the emergence of the United States as the world’s sole superpower - or anarchic - emphasizing the rise of many different nation-states and sub-state actors with varying and often conflicting agendas. The unipolar view was sometimes framed in what E.H. Carr would have termed utopian terms, which would more accurately be deemed idealistic views; assumptions were made that a global system ruled by international law and an international enforcement authority such as the UN would allow for peace and prosperity to conquer over nation-state conflict. At other times, the unipolar view expressed itself in the belief that a Pax Americana was
unavoidable and perhaps even desirable. Between 1991 and 2001, these contrasting opinions became alternatively proposed and opposed by US foreign policy-makers; the United States became embroiled in several combat operations, the most notable being in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia. Yet by 2001, the US had not fully assumed the mantle of complete hegemony. There was no Pax Americana and arguably no genuinely proactive interventionist US foreign policy that sought to identify and combat threats to the United States. Whereas alternating phases of openness and isolationism had marked US foreign policy history, the 1990s saw no clear direction and were marked by incoherency – or so the conservative thinkers whose ideology formed the core of the PNAC stated. Amongst the signatories of the PNAC were scholars such as Donald Kagan and Francis Fukuyama and politicians such as Dick Cheney, Lewis Libby, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. The Project for a New American Century’s stated principles included the “need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today [and to] challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values”, and the necessity of accepting “responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.” The letter sent to President Clinton in 1997 now seems like an intellectual manifesto for what would become more widely known as neo-conservative foreign policy agenda post-9/11. Yet there can be no Manifesto without a Kapital; the role of providing the historiography and roadmap for neo-conservatism is assumed by a number of publications in journals such as The National Interest and Commentary, as well as An End to Evil by David Frum and Richard Perle. This analysis will assess the assumptions and prescriptions defined by the principal scholars and publications supporting this new paradigm, the most notable amongst them being Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz. By analyzing this intellectual foundation, it will be possible to refine a statement of intent and party programme summarizing neo-conservative foreign policy ambitions. As chapter 3 shows, however, it would be incorrect to simply group all proponents of this paradigm shift together under the neo-conservative banner. A more thorough evaluation is provided that seeks to isolate the ‘laws’ of the paradigm without making assumptions about its proponents or their ambitions.
The foundation on which neo-conservative foreign policy thought appears to be based can be identified by three markers: firstly and foremostly there is an element of classical statist realism that can be traced back to Machiavelli and Hobbes. This type of realism identifies the state as the foremost actor in international society: it’s not a faceless terror that Frum et al seek to exterminate, it’s the state sponsors of terrorism, what they deem to be illegitimate rogue states and their autocratic regimes, that need to be overthrown and replaced with a more desirable model of statehood that fits the criteria defined by the paradigm. The second identifiable school of thought is the Hegelian ‘end of history’ backdrop that some states – notably Islamic autocracies – have shown remarkable resilience towards adopting. As neo-conservatism commonly expresses, where Fukuyama’s conflict-ending capitalist democracy will not triumph by itself, it may have to be helped along on the path to establishing a world system dominated by democratic capitalism, with bourgeois values and motivations supplanting the need for violent warfare. The third ideology that provides the modern expression of realist thought and the fuel for neo-conservative foreign policy ambitions is summed up by mainstream writings emphasizing the anarchic nature of international society such as Robert D. Kaplan’s *The Coming Anarchy* and *Warrior Politics*. International society and its inherently anarchic nature and resulting dangers (as 9/11 presumably demonstrated to them) cannot be treated in a laissez-faire manner that utilizes occasional peacekeeping missions. Instead, it is postulated that genuine security can only come from continuous interventionist-reformist action: such interventions would replace uncooperative regimes with US-friendly allies, popularly seen as puppet governments, where rogue states once plied their terrorist trade.

Considering the overtures of neo-conservatism and the stated aims and ambitions of such foreign policy ambitions, it may seem unsurprising to witness the US-led invasion and rebuilding of Iraq. It is my goal to investigate the assumptions and motivations underlying the second Gulf War through the prism of realist theory. The ideological foundations that are openly stated both by US foreign policy-makers and by the scholars providing their intellectual groundwork are the chief targets of my inquiry.
Having witnessed several individuals involved with US foreign policy repeat the claim of being ‘realists’ and having seen references to realist scholars being made, it remains to be seen whether the second Gulf War was started on the basis on realist principles, or whether another ideology altogether drove US policy-makers. The references made in several neo-conservative publications such as *An End to Evil* (as well as many other writings to be referenced) suggest that Fukuyama’s approach was taken to an illogical conclusion: the perceived stability and prosperity of capitalist democracies was seen as the holy grail of foreign policy. It became a moralist purpose in and of itself, seen as the means to permanently remove threats to the United States and to create a world system in which dangerous autocracies would never be a threat again. This attempted reshaping of the world system is what one can call *hegemonic moralism* – the attempt to impose a non-realist international system based on moral assumptions about the nature of man and the state. My analysis will seek to investigate to what extent the United States ignored the assumptions and lessons of realism and instead pursued a foreign policy that followed moralist principles. This is a step towards understanding whether there is a genuine clash of paradigms occurring, with realism’s assumptions being challenged and supplanted.

**The German Role after the End of the Cold War**

Germany’s position in 1991 was much different from that of the United States yet ultimately similarly ambivalent. Newly reunified, Europe’s largest (and then richest) nation had to both assuage its neighbours’ fears of newly awakening foreign policy ambitions whilst reorienting itself in an ever-changing world order. For the previous four decades, Germany had been at the geographic center of the Cold War, the west benefiting from its alliance with the United States whilst the East existed as a military buffer zone and potential invasion springboard for the Soviet Union. With both the Soviet Union and the United States showing a lessening geo-strategic interest in Germany, one German foreign policy school of thought began to see Germany less as a part of a potential NATO shield and more of an integral piece of a centralized European Union foreign policy. Germany’s military role was – as German Basic Law specified – clearly defensive. It was barred from taking part in an active role in any sort of aggressive warfare and was only
able to provide assistance in a supporting role should conflict arise on NATO territory as part of NATO operations (this was conceptualized as a defensive measure to assist in the case of any Soviet-led attacks on NATO soil). With the threat of Soviet attacks evaporating, Germany’s military role began to be redefined throughout the 1990s; two major schools of thought dominated German politics throughout that period. The pacifist strain that had been dominant in German society post-WW2 once more began to dictate foreign policy discussions in the public realm and in policy-making circles: the deployment of support troops (to deliver humanitarian aid) in Cambodia and Somalia was much debated as the beginning of the slippery slope leading to world-wide troop deployments even outside of NATO territories.

Every step that saw Germany providing any sort of military assistance was seen as a breach of international law and international sovereignty, especially when German support troops were deployed to Bosnia in 1996 as part of the NATO-led peace-keeping mission and later aided in the NATO attacks on Serbia in 1999 and the US-led attack on Afghanistan in 2002. German troops currently remain in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. Yet Germany has no role in the second Gulf War and remains committed in its refusal to aid the United States during invasion, occupation, and rebuilding of Iraq. This seems puzzling: at face value, Germany’s assistance in the US-sponsored military actions in Somalia, Yugoslavia and Afghanistan went far beyond the boundaries of what was previously thought acceptable. The 9/11 attacks caused great consternation in German society which is now embroiled in a Kulturkampf, re-evaluating its commitment to multi-culturalism and tolerance of certain values of multi-culturalism that appear contradictory to the liberal-democratic foundations of the modern German state. The German refusal to become embroiled in the Iraqi situation (having provided some aid in the first Gulf War) removed it from the side of its former ally and caused considerable diplomatic havoc and transatlantic dispute.

The argument that Germany’s military capability is worthless in Iraq doesn’t stand up to closer scrutiny: between 1992 and 2004, Germany’s army has been structurally rebuilt to tackle exactly the type of interventionist task that was pursued in
Iraq. Starting in 1992, the German armed forces established a 50,000-strong ‘crisis reaction’ force (“Krisenreaktionskräfte“) which were later split and renamed to ‘deployment forces’ (“Einsatzkräfte“, for foreign deployment) and ‘main defense forces’ (“Hauptverteidigungskräfte“, for national defense). This dual force was then given an additional squadron, known as ‘support forces’ (“Unterstützungskräfte”), the total number of soldiers in those three divisions now numbering 150,000, more than half of Germany’s entire armed forces.\textsuperscript{21} In 2003, more than 9,000 German soldiers\textsuperscript{22} were deployed abroad, with the German armed forces budget allocated to such foreign missions ballooning from 178mil Euros to 1,5 billion Euros between 1998 and 2002 (despite almost desperate attempts to cut the German budget elsewhere to meet EU regulations). Germany’s forces were systematically re-focused on foreign intervention and support, with most of those reforms being pursued starting in the late 1990s; Germany now has the second-largest international troop deployment abroad, behind the US.\textsuperscript{23} As such, Germany’s steadfast refusal to become involved in the second Gulf War remains an intriguing proposition. I will investigate the 2002-2003 period in German politics that saw Germany’s refusal to become involved in Iraq after having aided in Afghanistan; the assumptions of realist theory regarding Germany’s position within the international system are the most crucial elements of my analysis.

**Realism in the Post-Cold War Era**

This analysis takes the view espoused by the realist scholar John Mearsheimer, who in 1990 wrote that “[w]e may, however, wake up one day lamenting the loss of the order that the Cold War gave to the anarchy of international relations.”\textsuperscript{24} Although Mearsheimer saw Europe as the likely source of war once more, he located one of the chief causes for war in the difficulty of maintaining deterrence in a multi-polar system: “The resolve of opposing states and also the size and strength of opposing coalitions are hard to calculate in this geometry of power, because the shape of the international order tends to remain in flux, owing to the tendency of coalitions to gain and lose partners.” The ability of even small states or sub-state actors to influence this geometry of power didn’t enter into Mearsheimer’s calculations as he presented a traditionally realist
scenario ruled by state actors. Yet the ‘states in anarchy’ situation, as Kenneth Waltz phrased it, remains at the core of the structural theory on which this critique is built. Both Germany and the United States orient their foreign policies on the ability to interact with, contain, and challenge other nation-states. It remains impossible to exist wholly outside of the nation-state system; state-sponsored organizations (for which we can use Waltz’ terminology as ‘units’) are more important than those groups that seek to forsake either intervention or aid from nation-states.

Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the United States and Germany saw themselves in opposition concerning the planning and outbreak of another conflict in Iraq – the Second Gulf War. This is the main focus of my interest, the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq by the United States and the steadfast refusal of Germany to be involved in either the invasion or the rebuilding and security of post-war Iraq. US foreign policy, especially considering the containment strategies of the Cold War, has traditionally been seen as being modeled after structural realist theories, constructing networks of alliances to either neutralize threats or to combat them. The various phases of US foreign policy throughout the 20th century were ostensibly modeled on power-political motivations: the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary sought to minimize the influence of potentially hostile powers in the Americas, the then-primary US sphere of influence. The Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Reagan Doctrines conceptualized minimizing and repelling any Communist threat as the United States’ primary aim of influencing other nations. Even the Nixon (and Reagan) Doctrine of indirectly sponsoring rebellion in countries that were considered to be ‘at threat’ was explicable in terms of structural realism. After the end of the Cold War it became impossible to discern any clear nation-state antagonism towards the United States that posed a genuine, overwhelming imminent threat to the extent that pre-WW2 Communism, Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union did. Minor inconveniences aside, the US didn’t find itself confronted by a clearly distinguishable enemy, or a clearly identifiable ideology to combat. The Clinton years were characterized by a lack of coherency simply because it was impossible to single out a continuous threat that deserved the undivided attention of US foreign policy ambitions. Alternatively, Fukuyama’s End of History proposition seemed tempting, almost all-too-
promising. Without the need for violent conflict, international relations could be reduced to trade agreement and similar levels of negotiation. By the 2000 US presidential elections, only 14% of voters mentioned US foreign policy or world affairs as a factor in their voting behaviour.

Germany found itself in a very similar position, although the roles were reversed: Germany’s role in the world was increasingly minor; its economic might was crippled by reunification and structural domestic problems. The European Union was a potential enabler of federal European power, but no common security policy and economic unification appeared possible, at least for the foreseeable future. The Berlin-Paris axis saw its role in the world greatly diminished, both economically and from the point of view of power politics. Simply put, there was little concern regarding Germany’s or France’s international ambitions by the late 1990s. By 2001, the ruling Socialist-Green coalition in Germany was faced with record-low opinion polls and it seemed almost certain that the conservative Christian Democrats would become the ruling party once more in the September-2002 elections. My analysis focuses on Germany’s foreign policy initiatives between 2001 and 2003; I believe that by applying the same realist criteria that I will use to examine US foreign policy behaviour I can provide an explication that illustrates how realism was a key factor in the behaviour of German policy-makers. To some, this may come as a surprise: Germany’s military behaviour post-WW2 has often been considered to be isolationist (similar to Japan), occasionally seeking to disband its armed forces and to rely on its allies for support and protection. Modern German culture is strongly pacifist and anti-authoritarian, seeing any state-driven hostile militarism as a return to the values of 1933 and National Socialism; quite often, any reference to the armed forces or interventionist warfare is derided as ‘fascist.’ Nonetheless, I will show that it is possible to assemble a body of evidence showing that Germany’s policy-makers followed the principles of realist theory scrupulously in the build-up to the Iraq war by openly and bluntly opposing the United States. It was in the interest of German policy-makers, at the time of the build-up to the war, to not only oppose the United States, but to seek to redress an imbalance of power in the international system by doing so.
Chapter Two

Foundations of the Realist Paradigm

Within the framework of this thesis, the principles of realism that require a greater level of interrogation are the assumptions realist theorists make of the international system, and specifically of the level of moral judgment that policy-makers follow in their decision-making. In comparing the United States’ and Germany’s actions in the build-up to the Second Gulf War, the relevant question is whether moral assumptions were made in pursuing that conflict, and whether those assumptions were congruent with the principles of realist theory. Of particular interest is the question whether US policy-makers perceived the war as a morally-tinged civilizational conflict against ‘evil,’ pursuing a hegemonic logic. As will be elaborated, realism postulates that the amount of ‘evil’ in the world can never be truly reduced, only managed and contained, whereas a more idealist perception of the international system may very well argue that a war on evil can be successful.

The paradigm of realism is based on a number of assumptions that are both moral and logical in nature; some those assumptions are about human nature, some are derived from logical arguments. Despite Hans Morgenthau’s eloquent statement of some principles of international relations in Politics Among Nations, those assumptions are not immediately obvious and internally consistent. A simple definition is difficult not only because of the varied interpretations and schools of thought but also due to sometimes conflicting theories based on those interpretations.

To assess whether Germany and the United States adhered to the realist paradigm by following the assumptions underlying it, I will investigate the growth of realist theory after World War II, placing great emphasis on the definition of those assumptions made by the realists that shaped what is now often referred to as ‘classical’ realism. Edward Hallett Carr and Hans Morgenthau’s writings will be the principal foundations of the realist paradigms: I will use their elaborations to crystallize the principles of classical
realism to be used in assessing US and German foreign policy behaviour. Neither Morgenthau nor Carr operated in an intellectual vacuum; they stood on the shoulders of giants – Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, whose writings shaped the realm of thought in which all modern realist critiques are firmly situated. The pitfall of over-generalization looms large when referring to the maxims defined by realism, yet structural realism - often referred to as neorealism - and the classical realism that emphasizes human vices and the abyssal selfishness of human nature both postulate the existence of a set of unchanging criteria by which international interaction ought to be examined. I will extract the assumptions defined by both classical and structural realists – unless they are contradictory – in order to derive the aforementioned principles of realism; those principles will inform my analysis of the foreign policy behaviour of the United States and Germany in the build-up to the Second Gulf War. Furthermore, I will compare the paradigm of realism with the competing world view to be defined as hegemonic moralism in chapter four.

There is a systemic bias inherent in defining a set of fixed determinants – in this case the principles of realism – against which a number of variables (in the form of foreign policy data) is to be tested. This would be akin to mimicking a quantitative analysis: the adherence (or lack thereof) to the principles of realism would be my hypothesis, the data from real-world events such as the Second Gulf War would be the variables to be tested, and the experimental testing would be performed against the constituent principles of the equations derived from realist theory. I do not believe that this is possible, especially with such a short period of analysis and the Iraqi conflict still ongoing. The amount of data and the uncertainty of continued adherence to ideology in foreign policy-making in both Germany and the United States are fluctuating too wildly to allow for a sufficiently-controlled environment. Similarly, there is the danger that the analyst is defining criteria of analysis based on an outcome that is apparent before such tests are even run: criteria are picked to fit the data that is obvious due to real-life events. A number of assumptions are also made that cannot be investigated more closely; state actors, unless otherwise defined, are assumed to be rational actors, or as Hans Morgenthau declared, states “act, as they must, in view of their interests as they see them.”

Although this statement is an
apparent truism, the implication is that the undeclared goal of every state actor (and presumably of its policy-makers) is the prosperity and survival of that state.

The broad criteria defined by realism will thus form the basis of an epistemology informing the analysis of US and German foreign policy behaviour. This can best be described as an exercise in sociological hermeneutics: what were the historical and cultural constrains under which the US and Germany operated between late 2001 and early 2003? How did they influence the intellectual basis on which policy-making decisions were made? To which extent does the ideological synthesis that led to those state actor decisions follow the epistemology of realism that we will establish in this chapter? The type of epistemology that forms such a foundation of thought must invariably be empiricist, as a product of human knowledge and experience: experiences lead to deductive reasoning of success and failure. The chief concern is then with the correspondence between enacting and pursuing foreign policies (the facts, in terms of the correspondence theory of truth) and the existence of truth as described by them. The truth statement rejects any relativist aspect of theory, i.e. empirical deduction can be applied to construct the theory. The challenge is to establish the existence of truth on the basis of factual existence – the linkage of the empiricist epistemology of realist theory with the performance of foreign policy initiatives concerning Iraq in the United States and Germany. As Isaiah Berlin remarks about one of the earliest realist theorists (and indeed practitioners), “I shall not readily believe you if you tell me that for Thucydides (or even for some Sumerian scribe) no fundamental distinction existed between relatively ‘hard’ facts and relatively ‘disputable’ interpretations.” The same level of validity between the truth of foreign policy initiatives and actions and the facts of the motivations (and accompanying propaganda) underlying them applies to this analysis, as well. Hans Morgenthau famously wrote that the theory of international politics “must be judged not by some preconceived abstract principle or concept unrelated to reality,” a credo that is vital to attaining the purpose of this analysis: as Max Weber wrote, “Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the “images of the world” created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving.”

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The image of the world perceived and acted upon by the two countries in question may be in conflict with the statements of truth (axiomatic as they may be) defined by realist theory. It is only through the factual deconstruction of those statements of truth and by the empirical comparison of policy with truth that an analysis can succeed. This deconstruction must consist of establishing the assumptions made in forming the ideology informing the decision-making, and then deducing what the intended achievement of that policy implementation was meant to be.

**Human Vice and Realism**

Stephen Krasner, in analyzing the nature of the Westphalian system and international sovereignty, remarks that “[i]n the international system norms, including those associated with Westphalian sovereignty and international legal sovereignty, have always been characterized by organized hypocrisy. Norms and actions have been decoupled. Logics of consequences have trumped logics of appropriateness.” He appropriately concludes that “Rulers, seeking to maintain their own position and promote the interests of their constituents, can choose among competing principles and, if they command adequate resources, engage in coercion or imposition.” This conclusion suggests that it is necessary to hypocritically ignore supposed international norms and laws – such as any country’s supposed sovereignty and the legitimacy of its government: this hypocrisy is seen by Krasner as necessary if one accepts the key assumption made by classical realism: the Hobbesian nature of man and the inextricable linkage of his desires and behaviour to his vices. The understanding of human nature as essentially selfish is the principal cornerstone of what Jack Donnelly calls ‘biological’ realism, or more appropriately the modern school of classical realism. The question remains how ignoring sovereignty and international law is directly linked to human nature. Classical realism attempts to provide the paradigm in which this linkage can be explained.

The intellectual thread of classical realism can be traced back to Thucydides account of the Peloponnesian War, directly exhibited in the Melian Dialogues. By Kaplan’s account, “The Peloponnesian War is the first work to introduce a comprehensive pragmatism into political discourse. Its lessons have been elaborated upon by such writers as Hobbes, Hamilton, Clausewitz, and, in our own era, Hans Morgenthau,
George F. Kennan, and Henry Kissinger. Yet ‘pragmatism’ is perhaps too simplistic a description of the underlying beliefs of human nature displayed by Thucydides. By his account, “human behaviour is guided by fear (phobos), self-interest (kerdos), and honor (doxa). These aspects of human nature cause war and instability, accounting for anthropinon, the ‘human condition.’ The human condition, in turn, leads to political crises: when physis (pure instinct) triumphs over nomoi (laws), politics fails and is replaced by anarchy.”

This basic assumption of instinctual desire for power driven by a fear for survival – for arguably self-interest is a product of fear, and honor a contributing factor to self-interest – is summarized by the Athenian speech to the Melians, stating that “since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer as they must.”

The ‘pagan ethos’ invoked by Kaplan relies on the realization that the human condition is shaped by the realization that resources are scarce: this fuels a basic fear for survival of the individual and his most immediate culture. At the time of Thucydides, this was the city-state, although tribal warfare naturally existed elsewhere. The rise of nations and the simultaneous fissures caused by modernity have sharpened the focus of this fearful struggle for resources; where once Athenians informed Melians of their powerlessness, superior hegemons now lecture those within their sphere of influence. As an example, the People’s Republic of China can forbid any outside intervention in matters of what they consider internal Chinese matters and area of sovereignty, although they may ignore any claims of sovereignty in their own border skirmishes at will. Similarly, once the United States’ administration had decided to invade Iraq, international law and issues of sovereignty became irrelevant as no power existed to stop what was rapidly becoming a fait accompli.

The Athenian self-interest and desire for security is not unlike the modern nation-states’ self-interest and drive for internal security and prosperity. Kaplan’s conclusion that “because Melos is weak, it can be treated unfairly” is questionable: the assumption of ‘fairness’ is based on the axiomatic ideal of shared power, security and prosperity. There is nothing ‘unfair’ about exploiting a position of superiority to favour one’s people; this is the inherent duty and focus of any leader following the realist ethos. In a modern
analysis, John Mearsheimer agrees that “although the level of fear varies across time and space, it can never be reduced to a trivial level.”

Critiques of this principle realism have sought to employ examples that allegedly illustrate the post-realist (and post-conflict) nature of democratic discourse between states, not fuelled by such fears: Jack Donnelly argues that “it simply is not true that in some relations the level [of security concerns driven by fear] cannot be trivial. Consider, for example, the United States and Canada.” This sort of argument is endist: it assumes to have experienced the end of a certain period of history, or even of conflict-driven history itself. It discards the notion that states are concerned by security first and foremost because human nature is chiefly driven by a desire for survival. It is akin to the beliefs of some men at the end of the 19th century who believed that there were no future inventions to be made, as they had experienced everything there was to see, so much progress had been made. History disproved Donnelly’s statement only a few years after it was written, as in early 2005 the United States and Canada experienced a diplomatic crisis over security concerns in which the US refused to acknowledge Canadian sovereignty over its own airspace.

The self-referential nature of duty proscribed by realism (and indeed by Thucydides and Machiavelli) is not immediately apparent. This has perhaps been the single greatest cause for misunderstanding the underlying principles of realism, culminating in the vilification of Machiavelli’s writing as the “‘murderous Machiavel’ of the famous four-hundred-odd references in Elizabethan literature” and idealistic rebuttals in Prussia such as Frederick the Great’s response, L’Antimachiavel. The perhaps most fascinating and most modern critique of The Prince is penned by none other than Leo Strauss, the intellectual forefather of the very branch of neo-conservatism largely responsible for US foreign policy-making between 2001 and 2003. What crimes did Niccolò Machiavelli commit to deserve such idealistic verbal condemnations? Surely the “[a]bsence of Christian psychology and theology – sin, grace, redemption, salvation” is not sufficient, as Berlin finds. Even the more “noteworthy” absence of references to an “ideal order” or “Platonic or Aristotelian” ideologies isn’t a genuine concern. His references to faith and religion are only relevant as long as they provide a spiritual strengthening for more efficient leadership and success. The “modern flavour” of
Machiavelli, so Berlin, comes from the “freedom from […] relics of the traditional metaphysics of history,” a freedom to have man and the state (or at his time, the principality) at the focus of the morality driving the actions of their leaders. Machiavellian \textit{virtù} is not seamlessly what Hobbes dubbed human \textit{virtues}. 'Virtue' unmodified is a morally neutral term in post-Aristotelian philosophy and Hobbes follows that practice, e.g. in Leviathan, ch. 8. Even when he speaks specifically of moral virtues, he equates them to his “laws of nature,” which can be justified by calculations of rational self-interest. Virtues aren't the opposite of passions in any sense for Hobbes - and the intellectual virtues are precisely non-moral. Being pretty, clever and rich are all virtues (although not all intellectual ones) in the sense in which Hobbes is using the word.

Machiavelli saw \textit{virtù} as the “knowledge and will […] on part of the leader” to perform actions that benefit the populace, unrestrained by the phantasms of metaphysics and religion: he “believed that what men – at any rate superior men – sought was the fulfillment and the glory that come from the creation and maintenance by common endeavour of a strong and well-governed social whole. […] Men need rulers because they require someone to order human groups governed by diverse interests and bring them security, stability, above all protection against enemies […] unless there is a firm hand at the help, the ship of State will founder. Human society will collapse into chaos and squalor unless a competent specialist directs it […]” With the threat of chaos, driven by human vice, it is unquestionable that the “egoistic passions at the core of human nature often can be repressed only by force, and at times only by ferocious cruelty.” As a result of the mutual recognition that such egoistic passions drive states’ decision-making, Donnelly argues that the ensuing leadership behaviour results in a “world [where] power and security must be paramount concerns.” This is in contrast to moral or idealist concerns, where an actor would temporarily or permanently sacrifice power or security to pursue unrelated goals. An example of such leadership behaviour is the US refusal to ratify the International Criminal Court’s statutes, which was seen by some observers as a danger to US servicemen, thereby endangering freedom of action and security of the US.
Yet even the pragmatic realization that strong leadership is required to shape chaos into order and to direct a society is not specifically new and unusual for his time and would not prompt a promoter of *Staatsräson* like Frederick the Great to denounce Machiavelli in so passionately. Machiavelli’s concern is different, directed at what Hobbes later distinguished as virtues and vices, a “differentiation between two incompatible ideals of life.” The Christian ideals are perceived as genuinely good and charitable; yet attaining them is incompatible with the virtù of leadership, their necessary exploitation and pursuit. “To choose to lead a Christian life is to condemn oneself to political impotence: to being used and crushed by powerful, ambitious, clever, unscrupulous men; if one wishes to build a glorious community like those of Athens or Rome at their best, then one must abandon Christian education and substitute one better suited to the purpose.” Berlin suggests that Machiavelli is unlike Hobbes in that he does not redefine Christian virtues to be weaknesses or vices; nonetheless Hobbes clear-minded separation of Christian virtues from human vices suggests a similar realization that a purely virtuous leadership would be doomed by the vices of human nature, and society. In the same manner Machiavelli believes that “Christians […] are bound to be defeated by […] realists”

This defines the choice between the two moralities – either the pursuit of Christian virtue, or the recognition that Christian virtue is incompatible with the pursuit of power and security, and the resulting pursuit of Machiavellian virtù. Having made the necessary choice between those two moralities, the question remains what the fundamental end point of the non-Christian morality should be. The fantasies of sin and salvation that are inherent in Christian dogma provide the finality and purpose for the Christian faith. The pagan ethos espoused for leadership and civic duty by Machiavelli has its moral point of purpose elsewhere. The moral imperative is for the good of the natural gathering of human beings in societies, the Greek *polis*, for the good of “a society in which men fight and are ready to die for (public) ends which they pursue for their own sakes. They are choosing not a realm of means (called politics) as opposed to a realm of ends (called morals), but opt for a rival (Roman or classical) morality, an alternative realm of ends.” The moral choice is one for the public good of the *polis*, or the tribe, the city, the principality or ultimately in modernity the nation. His values are “not
instrumental but moral and ultimate\textsuperscript{54} - the essence of the Machiavellian argument is the pursuit of leadership for the good of one’s people as the greatest moral purpose. The existence and invincibility of human vices not only necessitate this ultimate moral purpose but they make it a categorical imperative for any leader whose duty is to his people.

The application of Machiavellian virtù – the dominant morality of the realist leader – becomes relevant to the foreign policy context discussed here due to the ostensible need to defend those very human virtues that stand in direct moral opposition to the purpose of leadership. Kaplan describes that idealistic perception of international relations as a causal-moral relationship: “[b]ecause human rights are a self-evident good, we believe that by promoting them we are being virtuous.”\textsuperscript{55} As western civilizations have largely adopted either a Judeo-Christian belief of moral good, or a secular humanist descendant thereof which promotes the same virtues described by Hobbes, the public and cultural perception of morality bleeds through into policy-making. This is the question that will have to be asked, whether the world-view and ideology of foreign policy is shaped by a Christian or a pagan approach to morality, whether there is a struggle between two opposing moral systems, since “virtue is the opposite of righteousness.”\textsuperscript{56} If we pursue the initial maxim postulated by Thucydides, that fear is the most fundamental motivator of men, we can continue the intellectual thread to Thomas Hobbes’ description of fear as “the basis of all morality.”\textsuperscript{57} The necessity of overcoming this fear creates submission to the Leviathan wielding exclusive force, or into “‘concord’ with each other”\textsuperscript{58} with each other for the purpose of survival, becoming “sociable.”\textsuperscript{59} The Leviathan is the default state of order, of monopolized authority and violence; without its existence, chaos reigns, driven by the “passions of men” that will otherwise not “conform to the dictates of reason, and justice without constraint”\textsuperscript{60} as Alexander Hamilton wrote, invoking Hobbes.

The summation of the principle of self-interest is expressed by Max Weber, resuming the earlier quotation that “[i]nterests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men.”\textsuperscript{61} This directly results in Hans Morgenthau’s first principle
of political realism, the product of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes via Weber: “politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.” This is continued logically in the second principle, stating that “the concept of interest [is] defined in terms of power [thereby] guard[ing] against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences.” What Morgenthau is expressing is that motives and preference, as well as their expression in the form of propaganda or simply party programmes or declarations, is immaterial to the immutable nature of man and the immutable nature of the resulting relationships of power. This analysis is concerned with motives and ideology, although it could be argued that they are fundamentally irrelevant in the empirical construction of the principles of realism: moral desires and their religious underpinnings do not become invalidated by such an examination – they are merely relegated to being the subject of the examination rather than the examiner. In realism, foreign policy cannot be seen through the lens of moralism, as Morgenthau’s fifth principle of political realism argues: “Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.” There has been an unfortunate yet popular tendency to confuse this realization with a belief in moral relativism, resulting in vitriolic condemnations especially from observers who advocate a strong moral stance in foreign policy. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Morgenthau’s principle is merely a restatement of the same realizations articulated by Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes: the moral validity of leadership dedicated to the polis, the patria, is incompatible with other “moral laws that govern the universe.” The universe of Machiavelli is fixed; it is the city-state and its people. As Morgenthau continues, “[R]eal man is a composite of “economic man,” “political man,” “moral man,” “religious man,” etc. […] A man who was nothing but moral man would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence.” On the most basic level, the analyst’s concern is thus with the extent to which “the men” that represent the governmental bodies shaping foreign policy in Germany and the United States were representative of Morgenthau’s “real man.”

Against the policies of power, the pure “political man” that understands Machiavelli’s maxims, one often finds a revolt of moral revulsion: “the very threat of a world where powers reigns not only supreme, but without rival, engenders that revolt
against power which is as universal as the aspiration for power itself.” 65 Power and the pursuit and application thereof breed resentment, either because of the pure envy or due to considerations driven by Judeo-Christian morals. The foremost means of concealing such an adherence to realism is to invoke “ideologies for the concealment of their aims. What is actually aspiration for power, then, appears to be something different, something that is in harmony with the demands of reason, morality, and justice. The substance, of which the ideologies of international politics are but the reflection, is to be found in the normative orders of morality, mores, and law.” 66

There is some difficulty in cleanly separating cause and effect when inquiring whether policies are following moral principles, or whether they are merely articulating moral principles (as Machiavelli suggested) to mask realist concerns. This is a key indicator of true realism in the vein of classical and modern realist philosophers. It is the question whether policies are merely concealed by ideology and rhetoric masking the genuine desire for power and security, or whether the ideologies are themselves shifting from being propaganda to becoming the cause and motivator for foreign policy themselves. This distinction matters during the principal analysis of the roots of the German and US ideology driving their foreign policies: it becomes necessary to evaluate how, in the case of Germany, policy-makers attempt to position a nation in the global struggle for power. Post-WW2 Germany has been an unwavering ally of the United States, partly due to the menace emanating from the Soviet Union and partly due to the US occupation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Post-Cold War Germany’s re-evaluation of its role in the international system may have been marked by moralist debate, but it was also concerned with the influence it can exert for economic and security purposes. It then becomes necessary to determine to what extent realist concerns or moralism influenced Germany’s foreign policy-makers’ views towards the Second Gulf War, separating cause and effect. The same applies to US foreign policy, tracing US policy traditions and initiatives and assessing to what extent the Second Gulf War fit the realist paradigm.
Anarchy, Sovereignty, Structure and Realism

The international system that exists at the beginning of the 21st century is considerably different from that of any previous period of modernity. Although human nature and desires may remain unchanging, the balances and flows of power are not; yet the fundamentals of the flows of power are constant. What we are faced with is paradoxical: although the arrangement and flow of power and its balance is different, the typology of power, the study of types of power and their implementation in diplomacy and statecraft, relies on the same assumptions of state actors that were valid at the time of Thucydides, that remained valid during Machiavelli’s period, and that have seen no genuine change despite the professions of those who believe in the strength of the Westphalian system.

Based on the assumptions of constant competition due to resource scarcity and human nature, and in the absence of an ultimate supra-national power enacting international law, it is arguable that the default state of the international system is anarchy. In its most basic form this refers to a state of competition between autonomous or semi-autonomous units, such as the socio-cultural entities that formed tribes, city-states, feudal kingdoms and, in modernity, nations – thereby defining the “inter-national” aspect of competition. The nature of competition is inherent, as already discussed, due to the economic constraints mankind is subject to: this self-interest of groups “will push states towards a power politics of self-interested conflict, irrespective of their preferences.”67 On the base level of resolving these disputes, arising due to resource scarcity and the absence of some sort of divine allocation thereof, there is no self-evident means of settlement without conflict. This causes the constant struggle that characterizes the international system – anarchy in the absence of a sole power encompassing all states and wielding absolute authority and power. Idealism, specifically in its institutional form, is a reaction against this state of anarchy.

Kenneth Waltz describes the results of anarchic states competing and creating a politics of balancing each other’s power as derived from the fear of existence and survival driving the governmental actors of those states. He abstracts states into “units,”
stripping them of all identifying characteristics in order to “abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities.”

Their motivation, which Donnelly argues are more than “background noise” is stated as “assume[d as] seek[ing] to ensure their survival” by Waltz, admitting that this is a “radical simplification.” This is challenged by Donnelly, arguing that some states – noting moralists and imperialists – do not merely wish to survive; balance-of-power politics are also driven by the perception that “survival [is] perceived to be at stake [and] those whose survival is at stake will not risk it for other values or interests.” These are rational assumptions that fortify the realist view of balance-of-power politics. Unless survival is threatened, or unless survival is perceived not to be threatened by a particular choice of policy or initiative, states will prefer the stability of jointly balanced power, either in a bi-polar or a multi-polar international system. This is inherent in the state system that exists without a higher ordering power; in the absence of such authority, since “the most basic motive driving the states is survival [they] want to maintain their sovereignty.”

In the realist view of the international system in which all actors are concerned primarily with the survival, represented by the integrity of their territory and law in the form of sovereignty, the primary enemy of the system is a force that seeks to destabilize or change the system to an extent where the primary assumptions of its actors do not apply anymore. Such a shock to the system would be genuinely revolutionary as it would reshape the entire ontology of interaction. Since states are in constant competition, whether economic, military or cultural, their strength and capability is enmeshed in a multi-lateral network of constant comparison. The anarchic nature of the international system defines power – success and failure – in terms of comparative gains and losses. The Sino-Indian war resulted in a re-evaluation of Indian strength and a gain of comparative Chinese strength in the face of the almost effortless victory by Chinese forces that defined the territorial boundaries of China. The relative Indian gains in the original conflict over Kashmiri independence demonstrated a comparative loss of Pakistani power, both in military and territorial terms. The continued naval build-up of China which will result in a genuine “blue water” navy with dominant submarine forces represents a comparative loss of projected US military power. If a shift of power occurs
that threatens the balance of power through which the system of sovereignty and security is maintained, the only logical reaction from states concerned with their survival is an attempt at counter-balancing the imbalance that has appeared. Such an imbalance often occurs as a result of what Randall Schweller has termed “underbalance,” describing how “none of the great powers except Britain consistently balanced against Napoleonic France,” how “Britain watched passively in splendid isolation as the North defeated the South in the American Civil War and as Prussia defeated Austria in 1866, and then France in 1871, establishing German hegemony over Europe,” and how “during the 1930s, none of the great powers balanced with any sense of urgency against Nazi Germany.” Schweller continues to argue that “In a continuation of this pattern, no peer competitor has yet emerged more than a decade after the end of US-Soviet bipolarity to balance against the United States. Contrary to realist predictions, unipolarity has not provoked global alarm to restore a balance of power.”

As this analysis will argue in the chapter on German foreign policy, the claim that unipolarity has not provoked a reaction to restore a balance of power is not entirely true: the realist underpinnings of the international system have in fact reacted to US unipolarity, albeit nearly fifteen years after the genuine threat of the Cold War had passed in the late 1980s.

Illustrating this reaction to perceived imbalances, Waltz uses the example of a multi-polar system that may benefit from comparative gains. This system of comparative gains is described by giving the example of one unit that stands to gain disproportionately from a mutual gain that benefits several units: “states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided [since] one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other.”

When examining foreign policy initiatives, the realist perspective (which informs the policies of decision makers concerned with security and prosperity) will focus on the views taken by other units – other state actors. If their perception of a particular actor is negative, meaning that that they “feel insecure” as they may perceive that actor’s gain to be so disproportionate as to “damage or destroy” them, they may seek to redress that balance by preventing a single actor from gaining a disproportionate advantage that may unbalance a multi-polar system. To ignore this principle of realism is to ignore the desires
and actions of other states, unless absolute power (of an absolute hegemon) can be 
mustered which has not yet surfaced in modernity. Without overwhelming strength and 
the ability and will to continuously apply and maintain such singular hegemony, the 
insecurity and rebalancing of the system will cause the downfall of the actor attempting 
to benefit from those disproportionate gains in a multi-polar system.

Although the international system at the dawn of the 21st century is often 
considered to be unipolar, as the United States is the only nation with the ability to fully 
project its power abroad, the system remains multi-polar. The influence of the PRC in 
East Asia prevents the United States from dominating security in that sphere and fully 
securing Taiwan or threatening North Korea, for instance, and the European Union 
remains a considerable economic and political opponent. It can thus be argued that in the 
current international system, if realist concerns are taken into account by most actors, ‘re-
balancing’ efforts will take place if a significant and threatening imbalance is detected.

In 1990, John Mearsheimer remarked that post-WW2, “the rough equality in 
military power between [the US and USSR] and the appearance of nuclear weapons, 
which vastly expanded the violence of war [made] deterrence far more robust.” 80 This 
statement contains a number of important realizations about the anarchic nature of the 
international system: primarily, the fact that absolute gains were a sheer impossibility in a 
system that possessed the capability of absolute destruction of both polar forces. 
Secondly, Mearsheimer emphasizes that the bipolar system provided few vectors of 
instability or attack: the only conceivable relative gain was by weakening the other power 
or its allies. Thirdly, peace through deterrence was comparatively simple, as only one 
genuine threat to security had to be considered, without having to worry about the usual 
intricate involvements of alliances, buck-passing, 81 treachery, and shifting allegiances.

These realizations can be abstracted into general statements on flows of power 
and their distribution: the highest level of stability and thus relative security can be 
attained by reducing the number of units (which can be formed through uniform alliances 
that are highly unlikely to shift, e.g. in the anglosphere). Disturbances to the flows of 
power create imbalances, introducing uncertainties into an equation of stability. Occam’s 
Razor applies to this sort of equation: the less competing units (i.e. the less equally valid
variables), the higher the certainty regarding the outcome of the equation. Uncertainty in the international system destabilizes and introduces variances in the balance of power and units’ belief in their own security and thus survival. As Mearsheimer explains, “the fundamental assumption dealing with motives says that states merely aim to survive, which is a defensive goal.”82 A state operating aggressively without being assured of its absolute power – as earlier explained – must therefore be considered to be acting in violation of this basic realist assumption.

Principles of the Realist Paradigm

Having discussed a number of assumptions, what is left is to crystallize the principles of realism that form the assumptions of the realist paradigm. German and US foreign policy initiatives must be observed in light of those assumptions; they shall forge the looking glass through which the behaviour of the United States and Germany will be observed. This is complicated in part by the competing realist accounts of international relations, which force any account into providing a philosophical account, rather than a scientific test-bed, as Gilpin notes by saying that “realism, like liberalism and Marxism, is essentially a philosophical position; it is not a scientific theory.”83

The foremost assumption which is most readily agreed upon is the pursuit of self-interest84, driven by fears of survival, which shape the actions of individuals and state actors concerned above all with security and the integrity of their state’s sovereignty.

The second assumption is the universal nature of these concerns, which result in conflicting spheres of interest in a system of competing states – the international arena. This posits states as the principal actor in an anarchic system, seeking to maximize their ability to affect competing states.

The existence of the anarchic system of profit-maximizing states produces the third law, postulating that the international system recognizes the utility of relative gains through states maximizing their power and thereby making relative progress over their competitors. These relative gains can express themselves as absolute gains in the long terms – for instance as permanent redrawing of borders – or through weakening an opponent and thereby gaining a relative advantage. These gains are recognized as being
desirable by all states who thereby engage in simultaneous competition. In the context of self-interest, relative gains usually mean enhanced security and increased prosperity without presenting a sufficient threat to warrant opposing alliances forming. An example would be the rapid industrialization and militarization of Japan pre-WW2, with Japanese gains being significant enough to warrant sanctions and embargoes from its most powerful competitor in the pacific sphere of influence. Similarly, the Iraqi invasion was sufficiently unbalancing in the Middle East to result in unlikely anti-Iraqi alliances.

Failure to engage in such comparative competition most likely results in a competitor exploiting this for his gain, such as when an appeal to an institution is lodged that has no power to enact forceful retribution – the lessons of the League of Nation, expressed by Machiavelli – and quoted by Carr – as men being “kept honest by restraint.” Success is the defining factor shaping judgment of historical action, for as Carr suggests, “[n]othing succeeds like success […] if the American War of Independence had ended in disaster, the Founding Fathers of the United States would be briefly recorded as a gang of turbulent and unscrupulous fanatics […] and the doctrine of the survival of the fittest proves that the survivor was, in fact, the fittest to survive.” Waltz would rephrase this as “success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state.” Since the threat of a singular hegemon disrupting the international system threatens all security concerns, it stands to reason that such an imbalance (or ‘underbalance’) will be corrected. Any state seeking to engage in more than relative gains thus has to be aware of the forthcoming attempts to redress this imbalance.

Finally, the question of morality enters the realist imagination as a function of politics as “politics are not (as the utopians pretend) a function of ethics, but ethics of politics.” Although this is not a law of realism per se, it remains an important consideration and warning not to confuse two opposed systems of morality.
Chapter Three

The Paradigm of Hegemonic Moralism and the Second Gulf War

“So thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the Athenians that nothing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was possible and that what was impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The reason for this was their general extraordinary success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes.”

- Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, IV: 65

The foundation of the Second Gulf War was arguably not the first conflict in the Persian Gulf more than a decade prior: the Second Gulf War was a war of both power politics and ideology which rested on a number of key assumptions. This chapter explores those assumptions in depth, for the break with US foreign policy tradition exhibited in the Second Gulf War cannot be overstated. The dismay uttered by many former insiders of presidential cabinets, historians and foreign policy observers alike had both ideological and historicist causes: some were almost instinctively repelled by what they considered an openly offensive display of ideology and militarism, others were simply alienated by the ostensibly uncompromising and unwavering attitude shown by the Bush administration. Yet despite the varying causes for opposition to the war in Iraq and the declared goal of regime change, one unifying theme emerged which will inform the analysis provided in this chapter: the ideology and stated purpose of the Bush doctrine – which was pursued with a determination and zeal demonstrating that it was more than mere rhetoric – appeared to be wholly alien to US foreign policy-making since the Second World War, and probably going back prior to the 1930s as well.
The Bush doctrine, as it was stated, restated, presented and then pursued, was executed in a manner that surprised and then confounded many observers. It had an element of originality that seemed to alienate them, either on an ideological or a historical level. This analysis explores the philosophy of what I have termed hegemonic moralism, the manner in which it was devised, developed and presented, and its execution as the ideological basis of the Second Gulf War. The extents to which realism and hegemonic moralism are compatible are further elucidated, especially in view of the principles of realism isolated and discussed in the previous chapter of this essay. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the paradigm that led to the theoretical foundation of the Bush Doctrine. By assessing the assumptions of that paradigm, I will be able to determine if it is compatible with the assumptions of the realist paradigm, or whether the extant incompatibilities represent a clash of paradigms, signaling an attempted paradigm shift.

It would be a questionable oversimplification to merely posit that there is a movement referred to as neoconservatism, and that neoconservatives are the principal force behind post-2000 US foreign policy that caused the US invasion and regime change in Iraq. The philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of international society that are proposed by neoconservative ideology are not uniform. There is an observable tendency both in the popular media and in some scholarly discourse to equate all of neoconservatism with the Bush doctrine: this is sometimes seen as an aggressive pursuit of foreign policy goals, including military regime change, often reaching the conclusion that this is a road to imperialism. The discussions of imperial hubris, American Empire, and the many related topics all perceive US foreign policy ambition as culminating in an international system with the United States as the sole wielder of military authority, ruling over a dependent network of client states. Since the start of the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent Second Gulf War, the public discourse dissatisfied with US foreign policy has often painted the Bush doctrine as the ultimately imperialist ambitions of neoconservative ideology. This level of discourse would cloud the insights this analysis is seeking to provide. Any examination of hegemonic moralism and neoconservatism must directly address the philosophical foundation that defines the paradigm; this is preferable to ascribing meaning to secondary and tertiary sources and commentaries that interpret
and re-interpret those philosophical positions themselves. It is thus necessary to investigate the assumptions that underlie what I am terming hegemonic moralism, part of which is popularly (but incorrectly) termed neoconservatism: this will lead to a deduction of the principles of hegemonic moralism, similar to the deduction of the principles of realism in chapter two.

**Morality in the Paradigm of Hegemonic Moralism**

When some editorials disparage the positions of “realists” who are in denial of the necessity of the war in Iraq, it becomes unavoidable that those realist positions – and the principles on which they rest – are examined through the lens of neoconservative ideals. This essay, having provided a reduction of realist principles, will now do the same for the neoconservative principles that form the core of hegemonic moralism. As an empirical study of the hermeneutics underlying the two epistemologies of realism and hegemonic moralism, there may be near-perfect, some, little, or no overlap in fundamental assumptions and value judgments on which those paradigms are constructed. There is no value judgment – in terms of Judeo-Christian good – attached to such a study, meaning that neither of those two paradigms is inherently morally superior, although they may certainly make such a claim themselves. Having already established that the core beliefs of realism demand behaviour intrinsically alien to Christian morality, the only concern of this study is compatibility of the two epistemologies - or paradigms - in question.

Much of the foreign policy articulation of hegemonic moralism has been spearheaded by politicians whose ideology is described as neoconservative. Yet the earliest conception of neoconservative ideology was not related to foreign policy: as Nathan Glazer shows, “the themes that were shortly to be dubbed ‘neoconservative’ emerged\(^9\) in the 1960s and early 70s. Those themes of early neoconservative thought were concerned with domestic policy, the move towards “shaping a better and more harmonious society” which was “more dependant on a fund of traditional orientations, ‘values,’ or, if you will, ‘virtues.’” Those virtues were cultural markers that were based
“the religious conceptions which undergird a society.” Yet by the start of the 21st century, the self-same conceptions have come to be applies to spreading virtues and societal values as a method of foreign policy-making. It is important to trace the development and the perception of those virtues and values and their origin in theory.

One of the earliest references made by those who identify themselves with the neoconservative movement is to the 19th century poet and critic Matthew Arnold, whose poetry bridged the gap between romanticism and modernity, often painting a bleak picture of the modern world that lay ahead. The invocation of the romanticist Arnold is set in stark contrast to the neoconservative condemnation of the values of modernity that he feared. The overthrow of the traditional forms of authority and popular morals as a result of the Enlightenment gave rise, as some neoconservative thinkers have argued, to an ever-increasing nihilism inherent in western society that weakens the very fabric of civilization. The first and most important assumption of hegemonic moralism is a synthesis that claims a universalist moral authority, a “transcendent moral structure by Judeo-Christianity” that is under attack and that must be vigorously defended both in terms of domestic policy and in terms of aggressive foreign policy initiatives. This synthesis is derived from the thesis of enlightenment and the values of liberal-bourgeois society and the anti-thesis of modernity and the appearance of moral relativism. This is a complex argument that merits an in-depth explication: I will provide three concepts of neoconservative ideology that illustrate the development of this synthesis.

The first core assumption is based on the deterioration of universal religious faith as the cornerstone of public morality. This deterioration is suggested as being the result of the rise of liberal-bourgeois society and its dominant influence on the public sphere. As Irving Kristol argued in 1973, “[m]odern, liberal, secular society is based on the revolutionary premise that there is no superior, authoritative information available about the good life or the true nature of human happiness, that this information is implicit only in individual preferences, and that therefore the individual has to be free to develop and express the preferences.” The result is manifold: “bourgeois-liberal society” is by definition “a secular society, one in which religion is mainly a private affair” and therefore this “disestablishment of religion […] would gradually lead to a diminution of
religious faith and a growing skepticism about the traditional consolations of religion.” As a consequence, the “vast majority of the people” whose lives were traditionally led in poverty and frustration now do not have the “consolations of religion” anymore and can only make “demands for material compensation.” What Kristol is suggesting is that religion was a traditional means for the impoverished masses of accepting a “stoical resignation” of their fate. The disenfranchised masses are kept docile through the application of the authoritarian element and fear inherent in some Judeo-Christian systems of belief; they understand that suffering is an inescapable feature of existence and do not rebel against their place in society.

In addition, the “disestablishment of religion as a publicly sanctioned mythos” has led to an “inability of liberal society ever to come up with a convincing and generally accepted theory of political obligation.” Although secular nationalism has provided such a rationale, Irving believes that “the spirit of nationalism can be utterly contemptuous of bourgeois properties, and utterly subversive of the bourgeois order itself.” In a more populist articulation of this belief 30 years after Kristol’s essay, Frum and Perle condemn the “1970s cynicism that sneered from the back of the classroom at the joined and volunteer – and [we have to] reacquire our admiration for the citizen who does his or her part.” Returning to Kristol, this means that without a sense of religious faith and political obligation, “an enormous problem” is thus created for “bourgeois society. This is the problem of publicly establishing an acceptable set of rules of distributive justice.”

The problem does not arise so long as the bourgeois ethos is closely linked to what we call the Puritan or Protestant ethos, which prescribes a connection between personal merit – as represented by such bourgeois virtues as honesty, sobriety, diligence, and thrift – and worldly success.” This combination of the Hobbesian virtues of man and the Weberian Protestant working ethic becomes lost when a competing definition of this “distributive justice” is accepted, which says that “under capitalism, whatever is, is just […]” The result is that as “the connection between the Protestant ethic and liberal-bourgeois society has withered away, the egalitarian temper has grown ever more powerful.” Kristol believes that as a result of losing the link between hard work and public virtue and material benefits, society has degenerated and many believe in an
inherent right to material goods: “social critics have been warning us that bourgeois society was living off the accumulated moral capital of traditional religion and traditional moral philosophy, and that once this capital was depleted, bourgeois society would find its legitimacy ever more questionable.”\textsuperscript{102} The end product is a “spiritual vacuum at the center of our free and capitalist society” which some forces – such as the New Left in the early 1970s – were “rushing to fill.”\textsuperscript{103}

What is this “spiritual vacuum” that Kristol refers to? More than a century before Kristol, Matthew Arnold wrote of much the same subject in \textit{Dover Beach}:

\begin{center}
\textbf{The Sea of Faith} \\
\textit{Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore} \\
\textit{Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furl'd.} \\
But now I only hear \\
\textit{Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,} \\
Retreating, to the breath \\
\textit{Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear} \\
And naked shingles of the world.\textsuperscript{104}
\end{center}

It is no coincidence that Arnold’s writing is cited more than once by neoconservative writers – he invokes the pre-modernist fear of the disappearance of religion and faith in public discourse and society, the frequently-discussed\textsuperscript{105} “sea of faith.” This “retreating” of universalist religion from the public realm heralds the arrival of the “night-wind,” or in Kristol’s formulation, a force that is “nihilistic in its insistence that, under capitalism, the individual must be free to create his own morality.”\textsuperscript{106} Arnold’s perception of the Victorian age reflected similar beliefs, condemning the materialism and self-interest that threatened to overwhelm society. The reading of \textit{Dover Beach} in \textit{Fahrenheit 451} is a typical symbol of the rudderlessness and emptiness of modern society, cast adrift without the anchoring values of religion.

Without formulating normative statements, however, the critique of the degenerating effects of capitalism in modernity would lack genuine effect. Those constructive statements are most notably continued in the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century: the concepts of religious virtues and values as fundamental building blocks of society are found in the
writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, often quoted\textsuperscript{107} as a spiritual forefather to modern neoconservatives: “Religious ideas and traditions […] are the ultimate sources of the moral standards from which political principles are derived. In any case both the foundation and the pinnacle of any cultural structure are religious […]”\textsuperscript{108} It is part of this belief in the importance of religious values that maintains that the decline of religious expression in the public realm and the enforcement of the separation of church and state in the United States is unconstitutional and distorted by the judiciary. The adherents of this school of thought maintain that “the Founders thought that religion should play a significant role in the lives of the citizenry and that Judeo-Christian morality is the basis upon which public debate should be conducted. Thus, while church can – and must – be separated from state, religion must never be separated from politics.”\textsuperscript{109} This “lack of religious faith on the part of the cultural elite is reinforced by its contempt for people who have religious faith”\textsuperscript{110} as the “discrepancy between a militantly secular state and an incorrigibly religious people has contributed to a lack of confidence in the nation’s social institutions” since “every society, and a democratically society more than others, requires legitimization, […] the belief that it is morally justified.” The separation of church in state in turn created “a sense of confusion fueling an institutional insecurity.”\textsuperscript{111} This belief in the constitutional correctness of their ideology results in a normative prescription of how policy ought to be conducted: “The neoconservatives have no interest whatever in defending the order of things as they are, founded on hierarchy, tradition, and a pessimistic view of human nature.”\textsuperscript{112}

The second core assumption in support of the universalist moral authority of hegemonic moralism is that the pervasiveness of this anti-religious sentiment pervasive in the ruling elites amounts to a type of nihilism. This nihilism refuses to accept universalist values as a given and instead allows a dangerous level of cultural, social and moral relativism to creep into the public sphere, both in domestic and in foreign policy. In the international realm, this relativism has to be fought, lest it succeeds in becoming dominant enough to threaten and destroy the United States and its allies.

Norman Podhoretz argues that the rise of this nihilism first became visible and pervasive during the 1960s in the United States, with its adherents engaging in animosity
towards “private property and the middle class.” This view finds its clear articulation early in the works of Lionel Trilling, who suggests the “moral relativism of the liberal persuasion” fails “to give life meaning” and that “only this meaning […] ensures the validity of law.” Podhoretz, himself a protégé of Trillings, in his position as Commentary editor helped defend the values he considered under attack during the late 1960s by the New Left and the burgeoning radicalism of students and intellectuals. According to this belief, the New Left was “castigating American’s civil religion – democracy and the belief in progress through established institutions and pathways.”

As Leo Strauss postulated, the increasing nihilism of modern society, of modernity itself, gave rise to a rejection of the moral values and the virtue that must be at the base of democracies, and a rejection of European values, which are ‘reason’ and ‘civilization.’

The rejection of universalism borne out of the Enlightenment resulted in an abandonment of beliefs in universal political truths, since there was no religious-moral fulcrum around which the political sphere could center. Without such a fixed morality, Strauss argued the result would be a “degradation of man” as the pursuit of a Lockean doctrine “denies the importance of virtue and nobility; because it teaches that the self-interested pursuit of wealth can replace virtue; because Locke makes man, and not man's end, the ground of moral obligation; and, finally, because in Locke's degrading vision, life becomes ‘the joyless quest for joy.”

Alan Bloom took note how the abandonment of this fixed determinant for morality and ‘good’ had resulted in a moral relativism that denied the existence of genuine distinctions between morally abhorrent and morally desirable actions and system. When Ronald Reagan condemned the Soviet Union as an “evil empire,” many denunciations followed. Bloom remarked that “what was offensive to contemporary ears in President Reagan’s use of the world ‘evil’ was its cultural arrogance, the presumption that he, and America, know what is good; its closedness to the dignity of other ways of life; its implicit contempt for those who do not share our ways.” President Reagan’s firm stance and aggressive foreign policy posture, combined with his invocation of a greater moral good, have made him a heroic figure in neoconservative circles; hegemonic
moralism has been described as a neo-Reaganite means of conducting foreign policy with reasonable frequency.

The conclusion is there is an “indispensability of virtue for any political community” in which “communities make claims on the autonomy of man,” “social institutions […] work to inculcate virtue and prepare man to live the good life both in private and as a citizen of the public sphere,” “politics and economics are functions of culture,” “ideas rule the” and “a society [that] does not take seriously the ideas of complexity, evil, and community […] will flounder.”

The third core assumption in support of defending this universalist moral authority is a deduction from the first two assumptions, namely the desirability of pervasive Judeo-Christian virtues (coupled with the Protestant work ethic) and the rise of a nihilistic relativism rolling back religion in the public sphere. As a result of this weakening and the permissive moral relativism dominant in academia, the media and society as a whole, a number of competing and often hostile societal forces have succeeded in permeating the public realm. This is a complex issue in its own right, but it will receive only a summary treatment here.

Depending on the branch of neoconservative thought, different aspects of those forces are alternately emphasized as being more insidious and dangerous:

For Samuel Huntington, the Anglo-Protestant culture\textsuperscript{121} of the United States, consisting principally of its core values and language, is under attack as a result of overly permissive immigration and social policies. This, presumably, is the domestic aspect of the Clash of Civilizations that places the Anglo-Protestant virtues of the United States under external attack, as well. Interestingly, this argument is mirrored in a few other developed nations, such as part of the German public debate over \textit{Leitkultur}, i.e. the belief that immigrants should adopt a primarily German understanding of culture, religion, and social behaviour. In France, social tensions over the integration of largely Islamic immigrants and their presence in French society have led to a similar debate. There has been repeated concern uttered over the potential harm of Islamic cultural values in the United States, as well: this can all be summed up as a modern domestic
Kulturkampf occurring in the public sphere, driven by the belief that the perceived traditional virtues of American society are under attack.

For several other neoconservative thinkers, the permissive relativism that fails to enforce Judeo-Christian virtue as a mode of thought and operation in public policy has also allowed the rise of hostile forces overseas. Those forces are opposed to the liberal bourgeois society that is most openly on display and the United States, and perhaps show the greatest enmity to the moral relativism that accompanies it. The populist formulation of this thesis is that “they hate our freedoms.” ¹²² A more analytical approach postulates that US political culture, fuelled by the relativist morals of the public realm, has become too lax and too cautious to pursue hostile external forces after the Cold War. Despite the existence of potential threats, the absence of a singular danger – such as the Soviet Union – that represented an immediate and obvious risk, resulted in a complacency built on the assumption that there was no moral imperative to confront such threats. Victor David Hanson, who in 2004 and 2005 would assist in President Bush’s speech-writing, describes this complacency by asking “how […] things as odious to liberal sensibilities as Pan-Arabism, Islamic fundamentalism, and Middle Eastern dictatorship — which squashed dissent, mocked religious tolerance, and treated women as chattel — [have] become reinvented into “alternate discourses” deserving a sympathetic pass from the righteous anger of the United States when Americans were murdered overseas.” ¹²³ Although this contains an element of inquiring about security and defense, the foremost thrust of the question is directed at a permissive culture that fails to recognize alternate moralities as incompatible – and in fact actively working against – a Judeo-Christian set of virtues that should be sacrosanct. As Hanson suggests, the “gospel of multiculturalism insisted that Westerners have neither earned the right to censure others, nor do they possess the intellectual tools to make judgments about the relative value of different cultures. And if the initial wave of multiculturalist relativism among the elites — coupled with the age-old romantic forbearance for Third World roguery — explained tolerance for early unpunished attacks on Americans, its spread to our popular culture only encouraged more. This nonjudgmentalism — essentially a form of nihilism — deemed everything from Sudanese female circumcision to honor killings on the West Bank merely ‘different’ rather than odious […] most [undergraduates] come to us prepped in
high schools not to make ‘value judgments’ about ‘other’ peoples who are often ‘victims’ of American ‘oppression.’”124

The tone of Hanson’s argument is populist (although it is merely the most direct and crass expression of much neoconservative sentiment echoed elsewhere), reflecting an ethnocentric nativism that tacitly assumes the superiority of US achievement and universal religious truths into a discourse that fits the criteria for ‘banal nationalism’ described by Michael Billig.125 Using Billig’s analysis, the universal appeal of nations is usually to a moral absolute, normally a deity – whether the Judeo-Christian conception of God or Allah or a different absolute, unquestionable truth. He suggests that nations and individuals continuously reproduce the nation in language and understandings.126 In comparison to other – ostensible less developed – countries, nationalism in the developed west projects a negative identity of nationalism onto others, displaying its emotionally violent (thus ‘hot’) properties, such as blood, struggle, warfare, secession. This disguises the normalization of nationalism as a matter of everyday discourse in the west by placing our societies on a superior level; the implication is that the developed west is too civilized and too cerebral (i.e. ‘cold’) to engage in such barbaric practices, although they have been institutionalized and normalized already. This Orientalism defines good nationalism (usually portrayed as patriotism – i.e. taking pride in only the virtues of the nation) in contrast to bad nationalism (i.e. the vicious tribalism we are free of), although both are often subject to the same universal primordialist assumptions and myths.

The three core assumptions of this claim to wielding a universalist moral authority – the “transcendent moral structure [of] Judeo-Christianity”127 – are thus arguably a social construct of US nationalist discourse. As illustrated, this moral structure is depicted as being under attack, a socially constructed attempt to forge unity through adversity. Billig argues that communities are neither objective nor subjective: the nation is heterogeneous, constructed and interpretive. It is not purely psychological, imagined: the nation requires proactive nationalist participation to maintain the power of its discourse. The form of life that is the nationalist environment actively constructs the world, requiring participation, e.g. by daily reciting the pledge of allegiance, placing symbols in public places, promoting its myths, etc. The imagination of the national identity is
formalized into a ‘common sense’ that pervades society, generalized and accepted by the nation as a whole. In terms of the symbolic strength of religion, Judeo-Christian virtues – or at least the propagandistic articulation thereof – serve as a unifying force that seeks to provide a set of recognizable symbols and meanings. The purpose is to build a unifying consensus of moral authority that assumes the air of normality, becoming accepted into the public discourse. If the popular media in the US are a reliable indicator of this discourse, then it appears as if there is only a small step between the oft-heard “war on faith” and the much-needed “war on terror.”

**Hegemony in the Paradigm of Hegemonic Moralism**

With the assumed foundation of moralist justification providing the universalist aspect of hegemonic moralism, I will now examine the hegemonic aspect of the paradigm. This second core assumption of hegemonic moralism postulates that it is only by applied force in foreign policy that the United States can remain secure and prosper. It is only the execution of a foreign policy that assumes the mantle of the sole global hegemon, enacting a *Pax Americana* and defending a unipolar position that can guarantee prosperity and peace for the United States. The term *Pax Americana* might appear inappropriate, had Paul Wolfowitz not used “How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the *Pax Americana*” as a sub-header in a 1999 essay. That essay was written before Wolfowitz became Deputy Secretary of Defense to George W. Bush in 2000, arguably one of the most important neoconservative thinkers and “leading theoretician” behind hegemonic moralism in shaping US foreign policy.

I will illustrate how the pursuit of hegemony is informed by three important concepts that have contributed towards building a foreign policy dealing with the “shape of the post-cold war world” that Wolfowitz was concerned about. The first concept is the belief in a type of endism, in the achievability of a philosophical and material state of man that reduces the volatility of the international system. The second belief consists of a revisionist historiography and behavioural culturalism that seeks to define modes of operation in foreign policy that are seen as historically successful. The third and final
concept is a deduction based on the first two: the belief in a military strategy that can pre-empt threats and ensure US hegemony in the face of growing global challenges.

The Final State of Man in Hegemonic Moralism

The end of the Cold War brought with it a renewed sense of fluidity in the international system. The comparatively static bipolarity that paralyzed genuine development – or at least made it exceedingly difficult on a large scale – disappeared almost overnight. As Baudrillard writes, the end of the 20th century promised to “user in a new and illustrious resurgence of the final process, to bring fresh hope and a revival of all historical challenges.” The previous events of the century, especially the paralysis of the Cold War, will be rewritten through the process of globalization – more accurately, the hunger for communication and consumer goods, the desire for instant information and the battle against time itself. The reshaping of the nations previously paralyzed through the détente of the Cold War is key to this new world order, as Baudrillard wonders in whose image they will be remade: “And perhaps this is the illumination this fin de siècle offers and the true meaning of that controversial formula ‘the end of history’ […] we are engaged in a gigantic process of revisionism – not an ideological revisionism but a revisionism of history itself.”

Baudrillard’s recognition of the world being remade as a result of the forces of capitalism and freedom includes a reference to Francis Fukuyama’s article on the end of history; but even without specifically mentioning the thesis, it is possible to identify the perception of the international system as being largely seen as being subject to forces seeking to reshape it. The question of agency remains: who is to reshape it, and in whose image? The unspoken assumption is that capitalist-democratic forces will channel the vectors of globalization, probably led by the United States. But this doesn’t truly concern Baudrillard: he merely wants to say that the soil is fertile and that things are afoot. The ground has been cleared, and the only ideology that remains - “where are we going to throw Marxism, which actually invented the dustbins of history?” asks Baudrillard – is
liberal capitalism: “the masked societies (the communist societies) are now unmasked.”

It is on this foundation of triumphalism that Fukuyama – who worked as an intern for Wolfowitz in 1976 – builds his argument, on the “total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism” that marks “unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism” as “the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” The Hegelian philosophy invoked by Fukuyama suggests that human consciousness “may rather take the form of religion or simple cultural or moral habits” which “becomes manifest in the material world, indeed creates the material world in its own image.” In turn, as one observes culture and their comparative economic success, “the cultural heritage of […] Far Eastern societies, the ethic of work and saving and family, a religious heritage that does not, like Islam, place restrictions on certain forms of economic behavior, and other deeply ingrained moral qualities” explain their economic success. Those virtues are not dissimilar to the Weberian description of the Protestant work ethic, duly repeated by Fukuyama, who does not operate in an intellectual vacuum: although Immanuel Kant is curiously rarely-invoked in neoconservative circles, Fukuyama’s thoughts are clearly derived from Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*. A culture’s ability to recognize the success of certain values can lead to their implementation as “the roots of economic behavior lie in the realm of consciousness.” In some countries moving away from central planning, “the consciousness of the elites and leaders ruling them, who decided to opt for the "Protestant" life of wealth and risk over the "Catholic" path of poverty and security” represented “the victory of one idea over another.” As a culture embraces the liberal-bourgeois values, the “state of consciousness that permits the growth of liberalism seems to stabilize in the way one would expect at the end of history if it is underwritten by the abundance of a modern free market economy.” Fukuyama theorizes that the ideal of prosperity and relative well-being of a populace is served best by democratic capitalism, as it allows for the freest expression of markets and consumerism, which in turn provide stability.
In the cases of competing and dangerous ideologies, such as fascism in imperial Japan, Fukuyama argues that the Japanese transformation after the military defeat by the United States shows that “the essential elements of economic and political liberalism have been so successfully grafted onto uniquely Japanese traditions and institutions” as to “create a truly universal consumer culture that has become both a symbol and an underpinning of the universal homogenous state.” The culture of consumption and the display of prosperity in states benefiting from such systems in turn create a greater desire to be part of such a culture. As countries adopt economic reforms that grant greater wealth to their citizens, “a modern, urbanized society with an increasingly large and well-educated middle class” develops, as in South Korea, where “it seemed intolerable to a large part of [the] population that it should be ruled by an anachronistic military regime.” The same trends can be observed even in China, where “Marxism and ideological principle have become virtually irrelevant as guides to policy, and that bourgeois consumerism has a real meaning.” 15 years after the initial publication of *The End of History*, the march of capitalism in China appears unstoppable and any concept of rolling back economic reforms is unimaginable.

The only genuine challenges Fukuyama foresees are the potential threats from fundamentalist religion and ethno-nationalism, both to some extent a backlash against the fissures of modernity. Traditional competition between states, jockeying for power, is obsoleted in Fukuyama’s argument by “the ability to build up material wealth at an accelerated rate on the basis of front-ranking science and high-level techniques and technology, and to distribute it fairly, and through joint efforts to restore and protect the resources necessary for mankind's survival,” an ideology that represents a “post-historical consciousness.” His thesis is therefore exceedingly simple: if a state can muster sufficient will and ability to maintain a liberal-capitalist market system, a sufficiently bourgeois class will form that will seek greater influence, leading to democratic reforms as it observes greater prosperity in other states that profit from such systems. The ‘end of history’ is attained when a level stability is achieved in the international system that has no convincing alternative to the consumer culture. The benefits of TVs and the comforts of modern life and democracy outweigh any potential benefits that may be gained from
attempting to overthrow such a system – although Fukuyama does include a reference to “material wealth” being distributed “fairly,” thereby ensuring that no violent revolt of the proletariat underclass can occur. The end of history obsoletes “the struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism” and replaces it with “economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.”

The political record in the 20th century illustrates that Fukuyama’s argument is based on historical precedent: the number of violent conflicts between democracies or near-democratic states is vanishingly small and the opportunity costs to a democratic society of waging warfare are enormous – especially if multiple democracies were to confront each other. The forces that would have to benefit from such a conflict would have to overcome enormous resistance from both democracies to reach a point of no return, culminating in warfare. Even with virulent ethno-nationalism at work, a significant proportion of countries with a liberal-bourgeois class remain more interested in their safety and prosperity. The example of occupied Iraq suggests that a considerable number of Iraqis are more concerned with a return to ‘normalcy’ and relative prosperity than with directly (or indirectly) supporting the anti-US insurgency. There are historical precedents for using cleansing ‘western’ (Christian) force to deal with ‘eastern’ (Asian, potentially Islamic) atrocities: Gladstone articulated this very belief in Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East.

The formulation of bourgeois values fuelling democratic reform and thereby reducing the likelihood of aggressive inter-state behaviour has been repeated and codified in a number of different ways. One of the most popular explanations pertaining to US foreign policy was offered by Naval College Professor Thomas P. Barnett in The Pentagon’s New Map which focuses on the economic power of the forces of globalization, representing the flows of capital, goods, labour and information. Barnett argues that where “where globalization is thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security” there are “regions featuring stable governments, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than murder.”
In contrast, regions with weak forces of globalization are “plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and—most important—the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists.” The conclusion is that “a country’s potential to warrant a U.S. military response is inversely related to its globalization connectivity.”

The purported foreign policy goal, in the case of nation-building, is to construct free markets and democratic societies that will be reliant on the interconnectedness of the global market and the forces of globalization, on free flows of capital and information. The ideal result is a growth in average income and individual prosperity to the point where political radicalism is supplanted by the desire for greater prosperity and more consumption.

These beliefs rest on the axiom that history can end, that the liberal-capitalist system is sufficiently stable to not decay or evolve further. It truly assumes the end of civilizational development in the political arena. One vector of criticism has been the presumption of “speak[ing] of what lies beyond the end and also, at the same time, of the impossibility of ending.”

The issue of causality and effect becomes extremely problematic since the belief in the finality of the end is a “gospel,” an “ideal orientation of the greater part of humanity toward liberal democracy.”

Derrida critiques the “neo-evangelistic orientation” of Fukuyama’s gospel, just as many observers of President George W. Bush have noted his evangelical certainty and faith in the virtuousness of his actions. Derrida then realizes that “[t]his end of history is essentially a Christian eschatology,” bringing us full-circle to the earlier universalist claim to moral truth. On the morning of September 12th, 2001, President Bush told reporters that “this will be a monumental struggle between good and evil. But good will prevail.” That is not merely the recognition of a dichotomy, but also the acceptance of the necessity of destroying the ideology supporting ‘evil.’ There can be no clearer articulation of this universalist faith.
History and Ideology

Returning to Vasquez’ account of the three paradigms of international politics in the 20th century, the final paradigm deals with behavioral science, empirical observation and deduction. It is interesting to note that the largest body of thought on hegemonic moralism is built on similar principles; it is assumed that history can be studied, the behavioral aspects can be isolated and analyzed, and that a recommendation – nay, a prescription – can be issued that must inform US foreign policy behaviour. There are identifiable patterns of repeated themes in neoconservative thought anchoring hegemonic moralism that I will analyze. Those themes are both historiographical and cultural: they present a positivist world-view that limits the sources of conduct between states and individuals to observable facts and their relationship.

The most important historiographical account in neoconservative thought regards the phase between the late 1980s and the beginning of the George W. Bush presidency as a period of failure in US foreign policy. In late 1990, Charles Krauthammer articulated the belief in the necessity of global leadership as a result of an unprecedented concentration of power. “The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies.” This conclusion was based “on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself.”149 The threat from small nations, potentially wielding weapons of mass destruction, and the necessity of “ensuring an open and safe world for American commerce”150 were cited as the principal reasons for US intervention abroad; with Iraq’s WMD missiles, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and other states such as Iran were cited as the greatest threats to the US. Fifteen years later, this is much the same stance taken by neoconservatives.

At the time, the crucial question at the time was whether Americans would “support such unipolar status,” with Krauthammer concluding that renewed attempts at isolationism would probably fail but that realism was a “far more sophisticated and serious foreign policy school,”151 and likely to oppose such unipolarity. Although some of the suggested solutions for the perceived dilemmas would be abandoned later, the
general themes would remain recognizable for the next decade and a half: the uniqueness of the United States; its obligation to pro-actively addressing potential threats; the chaotic nature of the international system that required order imposed on it by a hegemon; the hegemonic nature of the unprecedented power wielded by the US; the necessity of increasing defense spending to maintain a viable projection of US power and forestall its decline; the unlikelihood of successful consensus building and genuine multi-lateral action.

Over the next ten years, a number of such neoconservative articles would appear in a variety of journals, notably The National Interest, Policy Review, Commentary and Foreign Affairs. At the same time, both governmental and public think tanks published policy reviews and recommendations that mirrored and restated those themes. Many of them first appeared in public policy in the 1992 “Defense Planning Guidance” draft authored by Paul Wolfowitz, arguing for the need for US pre-emptive military action “even […] conflicts that otherwise do not directly engage U.S. interests.” The draft suggested that worldwide US intervention would become a “constant fixture” as the face of the international system was subject to constant change. It continues by claiming that US military strategy must “establish and protect a new order” accounting “sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership,” whilst maintaining a military stance for “deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” Such military action had to go hand-in-hand with “the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems.” After the draft was leaked to the US press, Democratic Senator Biden attacked it as “literally a Pax Americana;” the Pentagon revised its assumptions, introducing a greater degree of multilateralism and internationalism, and dropping the direct challenges to any other aspiring superpower. Almost eight years later, Paul Wolfowitz would comment on Biden’s term of Pax Americana, alleging that the intervening time had only made the necessity for such unilateral positions more apparent.

Nonetheless, a combination of isolationism, realism, humanitarian interventionism and an internationalist idealism urging greater caution and multilateralism in US foreign policy dominated throughout the Clinton presidency,
making it difficult to identify a clear unifying theme. The doctrine of hegemonic moralism was effective in exile where it continued to publish and design policy statements. In 1996, Richard Perle headed a study for the Likud party to define a more aggressive policy towards Israel’s enemies, ensuring itself of US support whilst recognizing that “[t]he loss of national critical mass was illustrated best by Israel’s efforts to draw in the United States to sell unpopular policies domestically” and arguing for the “reestablishing the principle of preemption.” 154 In the same year, Robert Kagan and William Kristol155 wrote the blueprint for their 2000 compilation of essays arguing for a more aggressive unilateral hegemony. Their Foreign Affairs article attempted to attach conservative foreign policy perspectives to “neo-Reaganite” ideals, recognizing the necessity of “benevolent global hegemony” while “the United States enjoys strategic and ideological predominance.”156

The authors defined “three imperatives” for US foreign policy. First was the need for an increased defense budget bolstering US military power. Second was enhancing the awareness of the American people of the necessity of US foreign policy by “clos[ing] the growing separation of civilian and military cultures in our society,” thereby showing that “citizenship is not only about rights but also about responsibilities” and that “[t]here is no more profound responsibility than the defense of the nation and its principles.” This is an almost verbatim phrase used by William Kristol’s father many decades prior in establishing the moral imperatives of neoconservatism. This domestic purpose is to “emphasize both personal and national responsibility, relish the opportunity for national engagement, embrace the possibility of national greatness, and restore a sense of the heroic.” This is perhaps the clearest possible language demonstrating a universalist appeal to moral greatness as a core component of nationalism, a romantic heroic account that is almost pre-modern in its definition of struggle and purpose. The third and final imperative is to achieve a greater “moral clarity,” postulating that “American foreign policy should be informed with a clear moral purpose, based on the understanding that its moral goals and its fundamental national interests are almost always in harmony.” Although this might be considered mere propagandist rhetoric, the clarity of the neoconservative vision is arguably rooted in the adherence to principles of perceived virtuousness. This “moral clarity” combined with the same logic applied to domestic
policy represents the two sides of the moral framework of hegemonic moralism: nationalist adherence to those values at home and a promotion of those values under US leadership abroad.

Two years later, a number of neoconservative thinkers and former policy-makers compiled a letter¹⁵⁷ to President Clinton under the auspices of the Project for a New American Century. Co-signed amongst others by Francis Fukuyama, Donald Rumsfeld, Elliott Abrams, John Bolton, William J. Bennett, James Woolsey, Richard Armitage, Richard Perle and Robert Kagan, the PNAC letter – concerning US policy towards Iraq - represented the values (but not the restatement) of several neoconservative themes, with an actual suggested policy implementation of regime change in Iraq. Shortly after the September-11-2001 terrorist attacks, a PNAC letter to President Bush¹⁵⁸ restated several themes and once again urged action against Iraq, Afghanistan, and Hezbollah, as well as greater US support of Israel and an increase in the US defense budget.

Those concerns of hegemonic moralism were related to strategic power and the deterioration and spread of desirable values. Yet the desirability of those values was not merely presumed: a discourse developed that sought to explicate the binary valorization of western civilization (represented by the aforementioned neoconservative virtues) against ‘the other.’ In this case, pre-9/11 the threat from jihadism was poorly defined, greater concerns being uttered about WMD proliferation. After 9/11, Islamic fundamentalism and the effects ascribed to it on predominantly Muslim nations became the primary counter-balance to western civilization.

The most popular neoconservative term to describe such predominantly Muslim authoritarian regimes and their effects was ‘islamofascism.’ Much of the neoconservative body of thought concerning the Islamic threat was based on Bernard Lewis’ description of the ‘roots of Muslim rage.’¹⁵⁹ Lewis argues that in the “classical Islamic view, to which many Muslims are beginning to return, the world and all mankind are divided into two: the House of Islam, where the Muslim law and faith prevail, and the rest, known as the House of Unbelief or the House of War, which it is the duty of Muslims ultimately to bring to Islam. But the greater part of the world is still outside Islam, and even inside the Islamic lands, according to the view of the Muslim radicals, the faith of Islam has been undermined and the law of Islam has been abrogated. The obligation of holy war
therefore begins at home and continues abroad, against the same infidel enemy.” This is the same axiomatic differentiation of values – desirable religious virtues inherent in ‘our’ culture and undesirable vices displayed by ‘the other’ – that fuels many ethno-nationalist and fundamentalist religious conflicts. This perception of the world gives way to a negative self-image as “[t]he Muslim has suffered successive stages of defeat” in form of the “loss of domination in the world, […]undermining of his authority in his own country, through an invasion of foreign ideas and laws and ways of life and sometimes even foreign rulers or settlers, […] and] the challenge to his mastery in his own house, from emancipated women and rebellious children. It was too much to endure, and the outbreak of rage against these alien, infidel, and incomprehensible forces that had subverted his dominance, disrupted his society, and finally violated the sanctuary of his home was inevitable. It was also natural that this rage should be directed primarily against the millennial enemy and should draw its strength from ancient beliefs and loyalties.” Muslim rage is thus an externalized vector of power derived from an internal insecurity stemming from the weakening of a culture’s assumptions in the face of modernity.

As with certain branches of Christianity that assume the universal validity of their moral claims to behaviour in the public realm, so does Islam react aggressively to its decaying importance as the march of modernity and globalization continues unabated: “the struggle of the fundamentalists is against two enemies, secularism and modernism.” The direction of this struggle is not inward, although it naturally combats undesirable elements within its own society; yet the wider guilt for those effects of modernity is found elsewhere: “The instinct of the masses is not false in locating the ultimate source of these cataclysmic changes in the West and in attributing the disruption of their old way of life to the impact of Western domination, Western influence, or Western precept and example. And since the United States is the legitimate heir of European civilization and the recognized and unchallenged leader of the West, the United States has inherited the resulting grievances and become the focus for the pent-up hate and anger.” Huntington would quote the sub-header “The Clash of Civilizations” from Lewis essay verbatim as the title of his now famous article 160 three years later in Foreign Affairs.
Edward Said’s critique of Lewis-via-Huntington merely confirms this conceptualization of the belief in the universalist virtues underlying both radical Islam and hegemonic moralism as being a vector seeking the extermination of ‘the other,’ in this case a competing paradigmatic accounting of the world. Said’s concern is that neither Lewis nor Huntington account for the “internal dynamics and plurality of every civilization, or for the fact that the major contest in most modern cultures concerns the definition or interpretation of each culture, or for the unattractive possibility that a great deal of demagogy and downright ignorance is involved in presuming to speak for a whole religion or civilization.” This is completely accurate, but it misses the point: neither Lewis nor Huntington (nor Krauthammer, nor Kagan, nor Kristol) are genuinely concerned with cultural dynamics or the shifting and conflicting forces of nations, ethnicities, religions, self-identification and legitimization. Both the neoconservative vision and fundamentalist anti-modernist Islam operate with simplified epistemologies: their teleological accounts of the world are vastly reduced to identify adversity above all else. The neoconservative publications quoted above (and in the following section) all seek to reduce the complexity of the international system to where threats to their paradigm can be isolated and attacked and where dominant discourses can be established. Without such outward attacks, fending off threats to its explanation of the world, the habitus of the discourse cannot remain dominant.

As an entire world view is under attack, some neoconservative writers have argued that the only means of fighting this civilizational enemy is through overwhelming force, as any display of charity, tolerance or retreat will be seen as a sign of weakness to be exploited. Norman Podhoretz account of the September-11 attacks posits that they were “a product of [Osama bin Laden’s] contempt for American power. Our persistent refusal for so long to use that power against him and his terrorist brethren - or to do so effectively whenever we tried - reinforced his conviction that we were a nation on the way down, destined to be defeated by the resurgence of the same Islamic militancy that had once conquered and converted large parts of the world by the sword.” The failure to respond with strength and with a fervor that seeks subjugation or destruction is thus seen as a civilizational failure. Furthermore, Podhoretz suggests that “[a]s bin Laden saw it, thousands or even millions of his followers and sympathizers all over the Muslim
world were willing, and even eager, to die a martyr’s death in the jihad, the holy war [as] in bin Laden’s view, we in the West, and especially in America, were all so afraid to die that we lacked the will even to stand up for ourselves and defend our degenerate way of life.”

In a sense, the Cold War scenario of mutually assured destruction has been replaced with a post-Cold War scenario that demands the destruction of one of the two incompatible paradigms; neither the neoconservative vision of hegemonic moralism nor the fundamentalist Islamic vision spurred by anti-secularism and anti-modernism will be able to coexist in their current form.

Hegemony as a Categorical Imperative in the Second Gulf War

The publications cited in the previous section represent the principal ideological markers of hegemonic moralism prior to the Second Gulf War. On the brink of the war and as the war progressed, President Bush, several other policy-makers and a number of scholars attempted to further the discourse of hegemonic moralism. For this section, I have selected a few pieces representing this discourse: they come from members of the 2000-2004 US administration, from National Interest and from Commentary, illustrating how hegemonic moralism came to be defined as the Bush Doctrine. They explain how this doctrine became more than an ideology, morphing into a categorical imperative that defined it as a civilizational struggle that had to be won, lest the United States and all the values it stood for were to face absolute destruction.

There is a subtle irony in the previously mentioned sub-header in the article Statesmanship in the New Century by Paul Wolfowitz. The allusion is to Dr Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, a film in which the titular Jewish-German émigré – a military advisor to the President of the United States – encourages nuclear armament (rather than deterrence) and crypto-orgasmically exults at hearing of a nuclear strike. Dr Strangelove is sometimes seen as a parody of Albert Wohlstetter, “one of the fathers of the American nuclear doctrine.” Wolfowitz would write his doctoral dissertation – on nuclear non-proliferation – under the auspices of Paul
Wohlstetter, working with Alan Bloom and Leo Strauss.\textsuperscript{165} Wolfowitz’s veiled invocation of Wohlstetter – or at the very least of the absurdities of nuclear deterrence – is an interesting epistemological marker as it foreshadows much of the hegemonic ambition that would define US foreign policy post-9/11. Wohlstetter believed nuclear deterrence to be immoral and ineffective: immoral since its effects resulted in the deaths of uncountable people and ineffective as the worst-case scenario meant the destruction of all involved parties. He instead suggested the viability of limited warfare, with the use of tactical nuclear capabilities – interestingly, a doctrine of limited nuclear use seen as viable by the administration of the 42\textsuperscript{nd} US President.

The nuclear arsenal is the most lethal and destructive capability available, with much diplomatic and military maneuvering ongoing for the last few decades to prevent what the Bush administration calls ‘rogue states’ from reaching nuclear capability. The ‘nuke’ has entered common consciousness as the single greatest symbol (and enabler) of hegemonic power. What is remarkable about Wolfowitz’s choice of title is that the Soviet Union became a nuclear power almost exactly half a century before the United States accepted hegemonic moralism as the dominant discourse of foreign policy after September-11-2001. In the intervening fifty years, the US and its enemy came close to the brink of nuclear annihilation, only to step back, recognizing the moral and practical problems of nuclear warfare. De-armament and strategic treaties followed until President Bush moved the United States away from ABM and NPT. The irony is inherent in the meta-textual reading of the title: the world has been at the abyss of nuclear destruction but the US is willfully choosing to resume that position, throwing any who would oppose it into the abyss. There can be no clearer articulation of the sheer will to success expressed by this intent. The success in question is the success of America’s nation-hood and prosperity, even if this should require the tactical nuclear destruction of an enemy. Society and the international system are not unchangeable, and culture is not a genuine deterrent – everything appears malleable. In the words of George Will, this view gives rise to a “crusading zeal” in which “moral objectives in politics are universally applicable imperatives.”\textsuperscript{166} These imperatives are informed by the belief “that things - societies, human nature - are more malleable than they are.”\textsuperscript{167}
How did US foreign policy go from the unremarkable early phase of the Bush presidency to embracing this zeal to reshape not just societies and nations but the entire international system? What component of this new world order is represented by the invasion and subsequent regime change in Iraq?

On the night of September 11th, 2001, Richard Clarke recollects returning to the White House, walking “into a series of discussions about Iraq” in which “Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz […] were promoting their agenda […] for war with Iraq.” The agenda had been set with Iraq as the target, with Rumsfeld on the 12th suggesting “that we should considering Iraq, which, he said, had better targets.” President Bush’s reply was that “what we needed to do with Iraq was to change the government.” Woodward’s account supports Clarke’s: “Rumsfeld was speaking not only for himself [as] Paul D. Wolfowitz was committed to a policy that would make Iraq a principal target.” Woodward observes that “[b]efore the attacks, the Pentagon had been working for months on developing a military option for Iraq.” On September 15th, at a US war cabinet meeting, Woodward observed Wolfowitz first-hand, noting that the “US would have to go after Saddam at some time if the war on terrorism was to be taken seriously.” Both Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz sought to prioritize an attack on Iraq as part of the first wave of US retaliation strikes, but could not convince the President of the urgency and the need to do so. As the issue kept being pressed over the following two days, Bush “ended the debate” on September 17th, stating that he would not “strike them now. I don’t have the evidence at this point.” The issue remained unsolved, however, and on November 21, 2001, Bush asked Rumsfeld in a private meeting to “get started on this,” referring to preparing up-to-date battle plans for an Iraqi operation. That preparation “remained secret for months.” By late January of 2002, Rice had provided additional support for Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, against the opposition of Colin Powell. This was not in support of a new and unusual plan: as Woodward shows, regime change in Iraq had been official US policy since 1998, and certainly since the earliest days of the Bush presidency. It merely hadn’t been “a top priority.”
With the majority of the cabinet in support of the war as soon as the Taliban had been dislodged, the remaining problem was to persuade the American people and any potential allies that the Second World War was a worthwhile cause. The earliest formulation of the Bush doctrine was formulated in a speech to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001. Woodward describes the speech-writing sessions as marked by the President’s insistence that he “wanted to conclude with a personal pledge to the American people,” stating that “[t]his is my mission, my purpose, this is the nation’s purpose.” The speech would describe “the scope of a total war” that would “consume [Bush] throughout his presidency […] however long.”

Podhoretz suggests that this first statement of the Bush doctrine “was then clarified and elaborated in three subsequent statements, the first of which was Bush’s first State of the Union address on January 29, 2002.” He specified the most concrete enemies of the United States as the “axis of evil” which indirectly defined Iraq as the most probable target. As Woodward writes, Rice was keeping tabs on what was by then a favourite parlor game in Washington: When does the Iraq war start?” The necessity of action against Iraq was by then unquestionable, although the direct vector of attack remained unknown. Geo-strategically, attacks on the other countries in the axis of evil were highly improbable: North Korea was too well-defended and too close to the Chinese sphere of influence, and Iran was much stronger than Iraq and lacked any potential mandate that could be explained either to US allies or the American people.

The second and third cornerstones of the Bush doctrine were his “speech to the graduating class of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on June 1, 2002 [and the] remarks on the Middle East he delivered three weeks later, on June 24.” At the core of those speeches was “the ‘idealistic’ impetus behind his conception of the American role in the world,” which Podhoretz notes with considerable approval. In Woodward’s account, “chief speechwriter Michael Gerson” believed that the June 1st speech would be “the most important speech he had ever worked on,” with the goal to “change the American mind-set the same way it had been changed at the beginning of the Cold War.” The Bush doctrine became final, committing the US to “improving the world” through “preemption.” The contrast between the reaction of the New York Times and of
Donald Rumsfeld could scarcely be any greater: “Rumsfeld didn’t find much new in the speech. He had been talking publicly about preemption since 9/11 […] a doctrine that went back centuries [when] Sir Thomas More discussed preemption in his *Utopia.*” In comparison, the *New York Times* editorial said “that the US had to take care not to set a dangerous example or get ‘in the business of unilaterally invading other countries or toppling other governments.’”

It is at this very point that the vast gulf between the ideology of the administration and the ideology that a large part of US society assumed to be normal is exposed. The *Times* editorial is a common example of the view held by a large part of the educated American public. It relies on two assumptions, the first being a moral maxim that it is immoral to change regimes through warfare, a belief that was reasonably common as violent conflict as a means of regime change was considered to be outside of the responsibility of the US government (an example being perceived US ‘meddling’ in Latin America). The second assumption holds that all warfare is bad, as it causes enormous suffering and incurs significant cost, especially as America might become embroiled for an extended period of time (as in Vietnam). Yet at this stage, as every section of narrative in *Plan of Attack* and *Against All Enemies* shows, the administration was already fully committed to the Second Gulf War (although timing and details were still fluid) and knowledge of those plans and their implementation had become reasonably commonplace.

Yet by early June of 2002, a significant number of well-informed people and even foreign governments did not truly accept that the United States would invade – even without a direct UN mandate – for the purposes of regime change. The realization that the spread of democracy was a genuine part of this ideology had not yet occurred. Realistically, knowledge of this new ideology, of hegemonic moralism had not yet penetrated into the public consciousness. The rhetoric of good and evil was seen as propaganda by a much-ridiculed President, and moralizing nonsense that could not be followed, for the only true conclusion to such action would be a genuine conquest defining the United States as the sole protector of a liberal-capitalist world system in unipolar hegemony.
**Conquering Evil**

At this stage of the analysis, an early conclusion can already be drawn: the shock with which large parts of US society and many foreign governments reacted to the full enunciation of the Bush doctrine suggests that many of their core assumptions were fundamentally undone. This provides very convincing support for the theory that a paradigm shift in international relations was about to take place, with the struggle of discourses only at its very beginning. As the rhetoric of the theorists behind the assumptions of hegemonic moralism convincingly suggests, the war to be fought was indeed a war against the concept of evil, believing that the civilizational advances of the west, with the United States as its champion and protector, had to be promoted through a hegemonic logic of conquest and conversion.

That logic followed several key assumptions distancing US foreign policy-making in Iraq from the previously accepted norms of realism and heralding a clear paradigm shift in the way the US administration perceived the international system and pursued foreign policy. Firstly, US-led western cultural and military supremacy was seen as a cultural necessity that could not be compromised. Secondly, the moral values underpinning liberal democracy and capitalism were seen as final moral goods in and of themselves, providing benefits to populations that could not be outstripped by any further civilizational developments. Thirdly, those values, being under attack, required the pursuit of a muscular foreign policy aggressively defending their benefits and, if necessary, exporting them to assimilate any resisting nations into that hegemonic globalized system. Antagonism to such a hegemonic pursuit, especially in the form of armed struggle or belligerence, represented the continued existence of backwardness and evil in the world, which required attention and extermination. Evil, within the paradigm of hegemonic moralism, cannot be managed: it has to be attacked, reduced, and ultimately destroyed.
Chapter Four
A Realist Reassessment of Germany’s Foreign Policy Goals

“Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite.”

-- Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. XVIII

The example of German involvement in the build-up is curious in its very existence: arguably a satellite of US foreign policy interests in Europe after World War 2, German diplomacy became strongly antagonistic to the United States in the early 21st century. It was during a particular phase in 2002 that Germany’s diplomatic efforts started to openly oppose the United States. This thesis seeks to interrogate what socio-cultural conditions existed in Germany that allowed such diplomatic opposition to find popular acclaim amongst the populace. That cultural analysis is coupled with an analysis of German’s foreign policy goals, finding out what drove German policy-makers to oppose the United States. The hypothesis is that Germany’s leaders, understanding and exploiting popular sentiment, relied on realist principles (as elaborated in chapter two) for the purposes of securing Germany’s interests in the international system. Understanding that the United States’ pursuit of destroying evil was incompatible with realist principles, German policy-makers refused to let Germany become a partner in pursuing a hegemonic logic of conquest and conversion. Evil, in their understanding, could not be vanquished – it had to be managed.
The focus of this chapter is on the realist assessment of Germany’s goals in 2000-2001, specifically the interplay between the Socialist-Green coalition’s inherent moral values and their desire to win re-election, coupled with the latent anti-militarism and anti-Americanism exploitable in German society. Concerning foreign policy, the German-French axis and its interest in shifting the balance of power away from the unipolar international system perceived to be heavily influenced by US interests provides an interesting angle, especially considering the French linguistic acrobatics that deem the US a ‘hyperpower’ and their particular interests. Of some interest is the potential for German foreign policy to appear moralist, driven by moral concerns against military intervention and potential breaches of international law, whereas it is in truth motivated by raison d’etat perhaps to an even greater degree than US policy.

There are three aspects that explain post-WW2 German foreign policy and its eventual shift towards embracing power politics in 2002 whilst maintaining a façade of moralism. To understand this shift, one must consider the historical experience, the moral dimension and the attitude of Germany’s ruling parties (the SPD/Green coalition) in respect to the ongoing development of Germany’s self-perception of its role in the international system. The role of the SPD and Greens cannot be divorced from Germany’s re-alignment in the international system: the conservative coalition opposing the ruling SPD/Green coalition had always been and continues to be stalwartly pro-US. When talking about Germany, it is vital to distinguish between two different actors that influence political decision-making in terms of German foreign policy. The ruling political parties and their definition of Germany’s role are the first actor, but arguably the more important actor is the public discourse in German society that influences political decision-making. The role and strength of public discourse in German society cannot be overstated; the pervasiveness and influence of German civil society is crucial, with its thousands of incorporated social groups, labour union associations and a highly critical (and often independent) press. To illustrate the type of discourse found in Germany at the start of the 21st century, I am providing extensive references to Henryk M. Broder’s work on German attitudes post-9/11, a collection 185 of quotations from mainstream German media by journalists, broadcasters and other German personalities as well as letters
submitted to the most popular German newspapers and newsweeklies. This will explain the social trends that provided the moral foundation allowing German politicians to change Germany’s foreign policy orientation.

This chapter traces the roots of modern German foreign policy that has defined itself along two axes – German relationship with the United States and the role of Germany within international organizations. The analysis will show how the political elites in Germany shifted from a stance supporting US foreign policy to embrace power politics in the guise of moral reasoning, a shift that was an almost natural match for the public discourse dominating the mainstream socio-political debate in Germany. When the SPD/Green coalition shifted to an anti-Iraq War stance, their political fortunes changed so dramatically that they won re-election within half a year of that shift, a turn-around considered unimaginable as the election predictions had forecast their complete defeat at the hands of the pro-US Christian Democrat/Liberal coalition. This chapter illustrates the discourse that allowed such a dramatic change in Germany’s foreign policy, and explains how that realist realignment was accomplished.

The Historical Experience

The social and political climate regarding state-sponsored violence in post-World War 2 Germany was directly influenced by the experiences of the inter-war periods as well as the plight of the German people in the later stages of World War 2. Most saliently, this was expressed as a general cultural strain that perceived warfare to be a barbaric custom that civilized societies had to leave behind.

The roots of this experience can be traced to the most popular German explanations for the causes of the rise of the NSDAP and Adolf Hitler. German historical discourse over the rise of Hitler has at times differed markedly from the themes commonly found in Britain and the United States. The tensions between various historians and popular beliefs in Germany led to the infamous Historikerstreit in the 1980s, a national debate over the nature of Nazi ascension. Although that debate was ostensibly over how the Holocaust should be treated in terms of German history, the
underlying dispute had been ongoing since the end of World War 2. The originator of the *Historikerstreit*, the historian Ernst Nolte, in 1980 published an article in the most respected German daily, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, which did not find much attention until 1986, when Jürgen Habermas replied in the newspaper *Zeit*. The core of the argument was whether the Holocaust was in and of itself an act of singular specialness in history; Nolte argued that it was not – with the exception of the industrialization of gassing. Habermas was particularly concerned that Nolte’s relativism sought to restore a normal type of national identity to Germany. As Habermas wrote, whoever sought to extinguish the German shame over Auschwitz was “destroying our only reliable links to the west by trying to return Germans to a convention form of national pride.”

Ostensibly about the Holocaust, the drive of the debate was whether Germany’s *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* was akin to a historicizing that made Germany into a normal country once more, rather than a state that constantly had to constantly remind itself of its gruesome recent past. Connected to that was the question of the *Sonderweg*, a historical debate that asked the question whether Germany’s history, and especially its 19th-century developments, created a ‘special path’ in history that differed from the rest of Europe’s industrialized nations, and therefore inevitably led to Hitler.

These debates became politicized and took place in popular newspapers and magazines in 1986 and 1987. They are crucial to understanding the post-WW2 German mentality concerning the inter-war period. The experiences of the German people, ultimately expressed through the symbol of Auschwitz, became a constant reminder of the horrific turns of history and the tragedies that can befall a people. The author Martin Walser in 1998 infamously referred to the tendency of ritualistically invoking the Holocaust at every turn as a *Moralleule*, literally a moralist cudgel to verbally (and metaphorically) threaten other Germans. Walser was particularly concerned with the modern German tendency to view all German history through the prism of the Nazis and the Holocaust. In examining the post-WW2 German discourse pertaining to Germany’s role in the international system (as this analysis of foreign policy dictates), it is therefore important to remain conscious of what Walser referred to as “instrumentalized shame.”

The German experience of the inter-war period suggested that the rise of the NSDAP was
greatly aided by German impoverishment, especially wide-spread unemployment and hyperinflation, caused by the terms of settlement of the Treaty of Versailles and the Great Depression. One of the key elements in the German discourse concerning the rise of Hitler is the supposedly weakened state of the German people, and their greater susceptibility to being ‘seduced’ by Hitler’s rhetoric. Although considered to be somewhat dubious by historians, the ‘seduction’ narrative was particularly popular after WW2 and remains popular with some Germans now: the German people, unhappy with unemployment, inflation and poor management of the country, surrounded by enemies, were seduced\(^{191}\) by Hitler. The increased radicalism of Germany and its willingness to participate in Hitler’s schemes are explained by Germany’s economic travails and its humiliation at the hands of the Entente powers in the form of the Treaty of Versailles. This singular explanation is sometimes used inductively to project the German experience onto other peoples and nations, as the later analysis will show.

The German experiences during World War 2 also convinced much of the German populace that the costs of warfare were unacceptable. The symbol of German suffering in WW2 is the Allied firebombing of Dresden that is usually attributed to the United States. Increasingly over the sixty years after the end of WW2, the fate of Dresden came to be considered as a war crime in Germany, an act of barbarism that is often mentioned in the same breath as the nuclear bombs dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If the Holocaust is seen as an industrialized death machine, then the bombings of those three cities are seen as unnecessary mass murder of civilians, even in wartime, perhaps even a symbol of lawlessness. *Inter arma enim silent leges*\(^{192}\) appears to have no real meaning when the issue of war crimes against Axis civilians is discussed in German discourse. The belief that Dresden may in fact have been a war crime has contributed to an omnipresent simmering discontent with Germany’s treatment after WW2 throughout the entire Allied occupation of the country. Particular discontent has been reserved for the American war machine and its potential threats first to the occupied Germany (in the case of Cold War conflict) and then to other, ostensibly helpless countries that found themselves attacked by the United States. Throughout the entire US occupation of Germany, protests against US foreign policy (e.g. in Vietnam) and US foreign policy initiatives (e.g. subversion of socialist regimes) were very common in the broadly
Marxist West German intellectual sphere. Perhaps the most notable such protests against US militarism took place in the early-to-mid 1980s, bringing 300,000 people to the streets in the German capital, oriented at the planned stationing of Pershing missiles in Germany.

The anti-militarist discontent of German intellectual circles did not occur in a German military vacuum. Although West Germany immediately post-WW2 remained resolutely opposed to rearmament, pressure from the United States persuaded German politicians to re-establish German armed forces to aid in the potential defense against Soviet aggression. The German armed forces, later integrated into NATO, became an important part of NATO’s anti-Warsaw Pact strategic planning, making it ultimately impossible for Germany to ever disband its army again. By the time the Soviet Union ceased being a threat, new dangers and new alliances required the continued presence of a German army. Although German Basic Law – its constitution – specified that (initially West) German troops could not be used outside of the defense of NATO territories, later changes allowed the German army to be deployed in support of NATO (or UN) forces. A considerable segment of the German population remained deeply uncomfortable with the very existence of a German army, and reacted extremely poorly to any deployment, no matter where or how. The modern invocation of a famous phrase by the early 20th-century German author Kurt Tucholsky – “soldiers are murderers” – led to lawsuits reaching the highest German court of law, the Federal Constitutional Court. The role of Germany’s armed forces and their use remains the perhaps most hotly-debated topic in the country.

As a result of the experiences of German militarism leading up to WW1 and WW2 and the examples of US militarism after WW2, German society developed a deeply pacifist streak, a strain of anti-militarism and anti-violence that is expressed both in how Germany deals with internal violence and in how German society perceives and debates violence in the international system. The chief perpetrator of western violence in the international system is usually identified as the United States and their encouragement of internal violence (for instance through financing pro-US rebels) or outright military force (as in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, the Gulf War, etc). In direct opposition to the
example of military force, Germany sought to develop alternate means of conflict resolution; the European Union, in its earliest incarnations, was an attempt to create economic ties that later became political. The existence and operation of the United Nations and the encouraging examples of EC/EU cooperation suggested to many Germans that true multi-lateral cooperation was not only possible, but that it was actively supplanting the tensions of power politics, usually described in Germany as the ‘Clausewitzian’ system. This belief in the obsolescence of international violence and the desirability of peaceful resolution permeated deeply into German society and education, to the point where doubts over the workability of voluntary multi-lateral groups never truly entered the public consciousness: in Britain, any High School level study of 20th century European conflict inevitably includes a discussion of the failures of the League of Nations; not so in Germany. Violence, especially in the form of warfare, was considered immoral and downright barbaric, especially in its state-sponsored form. Interestingly, support for the terrorist RAF was perhaps more pronounced amongst much of the German intelligentsia than support for the state’s efforts to apprehend them and bring the RAF to justice.

Without the Soviet threat making Germany reliant on outside protection and with a diminishing US occupation, anti-militarist sentiment directed at the United States increased throughout the 1990s with every military action taken, for instance in Kuwait or the former Yugoslavia. To many Germans, the new world order seemed to define a world of multilateralism, with the ascension of the European Union with Germany at its core a particularly important marker of the post-Cold War period. Fukuyama’s theory of the End of History, with economic progress being of principal interest, seemed to ring true. The partial loss of sovereignty that involvement in the EU and other international organizations represented meant comparatively little to Germany, which had not truly been the master of its own fate since the end of WW2. The German “re-education” into a fervently anti-militaristic society (as compared to the deeply militaristic culture of the Prussian state and its successors) was recognized as being extremely thorough. The most popular German-language newspaper in Switzerland in 2003 memorably asked if German re-education had gone too far, whether the US-influenced restructuring of post-WW2 Germany had produced a people who had adopted the ideals taught to them too
fully. The author Mark Lilla, Professor of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, concluded – after it had been brought to his attention by a German University Professor – that many Germans were disappointed because the ideals of peace and cooperation taught to them by the American victors were now being ignored by their teachers. This gap is a concise summation of the differences perceived by many Germans – and expressed in the German public discourse – between what Germans consider to be good, moral values, and what they believe to be the values that underlie US politics and foreign policy.

Robert Kagan concluded the same, phrasing it in the form of an anti-European polemic titled “Power and Weakness.” As Kagan describes it, “on the all-important question of power — the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power — American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.” The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.” Although Kagan is injudicious in the breadth of his declarations, his statements summarize the difference in how power is perceived in US and German public spheres. The same does not apply to the rest of Europe, as French politics – much more aware of its own post-colonial troubles – realizes the use of military might. Where Germany chose to act as part of a multi-lateral group such as the EU, UN or NATO, the US often chose to act alone. The differences in the two approaches are partly explained by Kagan by invoking the necessity for multilateralism in Europe in contrast to the absence of such necessity in the US: “Consider again the qualities that make up the European strategic culture: the emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism. It is true that these are not traditionally European approaches to international relations when viewed from a long historical perspective. But they are a product of more recent European history. The
modern European strategic culture represents a conscious rejection of the European past, a rejection of the evils of European machtpolitik. It is a reflection of Europeans’ ardent and understandable desire never to return to that past. Who knows better than Europeans the dangers that arise from unbridled power politics, from an excessive reliance on military force, from policies produced by national egoism and ambition, even from balance of power and raison d’état? As German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer put it in a speech outlining his vision of the European future at Humboldt University in Berlin (May 12, 2000), ‘The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.’ The European Union is itself the product of an awful century of European warfare. […] Fischer’s principal contention — that Europe has moved beyond the old system of power politics and discovered a new system for preserving peace in international relations — is widely shared across Europe. As senior British diplomat Robert Cooper recently wrote in the Observer (April 7, 2002), Europe today lives in a ‘postmodern system’ that does not rest on a balance of power but on ‘the rejection of force’ and on ‘self-enforced rules of behavior.’ In the ‘postmodern world,’ writes Cooper, ‘raison d’état and the amorality of Machiavelli’s theories of statecraft . . . have been replaced by a moral consciousness’ in international affairs.”

The inability of the United States to act multi-laterally is often invoked in German discourse: the cowboy mentality, the belief that the US can go it alone, the refusal to accept shared norms and work with other nations – all of those are perceptions that are usually accompanied by examples from foreign policy. US support for Israel despite Israel’s refusal to heed UN Resolution 242 is for instance given as one of the reasons for Arab terrorism and the continued conflict in the Middle East. There is a deep-seated belief held by many Germans (as can be seen by letters to the editor in every German newspaper and newsweekly) that the historical roots of violent conflict can be overcome without warfare or military intervention. This is a historical narrative that isn’t unique to Germany, for instance referencing primordialist theories of ethno-nationalism to explain civil wars and ethnic cleansing. The various post-Cold War conflicts in Bosnia and
Yugoslavia were often referred to as ‘ancient tribal hatreds’ or the results of colonialism or post-colonial humiliation, or as the legitimate expression of discontent at economic disadvantages. When looking for ‘root causes,’ the German discourse often offers up economic inequality, foreign (usually US) meddling or unsolvable structural problems, as Henryk M. Broder illustrates.\(^{199}\) There is little to no recognition of regional or national aggressive warfare that may not be easily solved, such as the conflicts in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia. When the discussion of ethnic cleansing appears, confusion often reigns over the perceived roots of the conflicts; if ‘ancient tribal hatreds’ can be blamed, the public consciousness often turns away, such as in Rwanda. The realization that economic and political elites consolidating their power\(^{200}\) may be to blame does not enter the national debate. In the case of identifiable aggressors, economic or political pressure is often seen as being sufficient to deter ethnic cleansings, warfare, or murder. German public opinion maintained that both Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein most likely could have been persuaded to cooperate without resorting to military action, and anti-war demonstrations sponsored by left-intellectual groups appeared at every US or NATO military action, including the NATO bombing to force the Dayton accords, the first Gulf War, the Kosovo mission, and the war in Afghanistan.

The protests prompted US military action promote the narrative that every US mission is part of an ongoing plan towards American imperialism, to extend its hegemony and military-economic might over the entire planet. The popular protests against the war in Afghanistan, for instance, were presented as protests against US imperialism and aggression. Few protesters marched in defense of the Taliban, however: they instead claimed that the US attacks would miss anyone guilt of anything, and instead unjustly punish the faultless civilian population. This narrative appears at every anti-US protest, reminding the German public that US imperialism always harms defenseless civilians, causing more death and poverty. The inevitable conclusion, so the narrative, is that the US attacks create more death and the destruction than they’re trying to prevent or avenge. In the case of hunting down terrorists, US military action instead creates terrorists by alienating the defenseless civilian population and turning them against the United States. This simmering discontent with perceived US militarism, unilateralism and
aggression entered German mainstream consciousness with the election of G.W. Bush, popularly depicted as highly unintelligent, belligerent, and outright deluded.

The German historical perspective therefore paints a picture of shifting public perceptions concerning the role of violence and warfare, considering the United States as a monopolist (due to its overwhelming superiority) in the use of state-sponsored violence. The German perception of warfare discards a utilitarian viewpoint – examining the ends and purpose – in favour of emphasizing the plight of the innocent civilians subjected to warfare. The theme of innocent victims being subject to an industrial war machine is especially pertinent in the case of bombings, as the anti-war narrative follows a historical thread from Dresden to Hiroshima to Vietnam to Kuwait, Serbia, Afghanistan and Iraq. What that narrative actively denies is the existence of sincere humanitarian or human rights underpinnings to warfare – not just American warfare, but any warfare. That at least partially explains why any German debate of US aggression almost always begins with a condemnation of the industrial-militaristic drive towards imperialism. Yet the public discourse is on the surface driven by moral concerns and moral condemnations of immoral actions without truly elaborating the moral framework on which it operates. This merits closer inspection.

The Moral Dimension

The analysis of the moral dimension of Germany’s self-perception and orientation in terms of foreign policy will center on how the German public discourse dealt with the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent US and German foreign policy behaviour. I will track a number of responses that are representative of the broader public debate, illustrating salient points of morality that were referenced in mainstream German media.

A commonly held belief in Germany is the existence of Völkerrecht, literally the ‘law of peoples,’ although the most common translation is ‘international law.’ The translation of international law omits a linguistic nuance that emphasizes the term ‘peoples,’ rather than nations or even international society or diplomacy. In Germany, the boundaries of international law are described in terms of international organizations and
international treaties, emphasizing the binding nature of such bonds between sovereign states. The popular interpretation of *Völkerrecht* commonly refers to the plight of the peoples subjected to suffering if *Völkerrecht* is ignored. This aspect of international law, in German discourse, thus takes on a moral dimension: the need to respect international law becomes a moral imperative, for to ignore it is to risk the suffering of innocents; only through respect of international law (and membership in international organizations and treaties), so the reasoning, can such suffering be avoided. Interestingly, this debate is often pointedly directed at the United States, rather than those states that – despite membership in bodies such as the UN – have no interest in honoring international law. China, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is such an example. Protests that China is ignoring international law are much less common than protests regarding US defiance thereof. This can perhaps be explained by the assumption discussed above, that the United States – the source of post-WW2 German denazification, reeducation and pacifist indoctrination – would maintain impeccable moral standards in foreign policy. Those moral standards, in the German discourse, are the adherence to peaceful principles and respect for international law. As the historical perspective has shown, Germans by and large do not believe that the US has respected those principles. Not following in the footsteps of the Kellogg-Briand Pact is seen as a de facto declaration of immorality.

The existence of international law and its supposedly binding nature for any moral state means that violent removal of any government, no matter what its nature, is seen as a breach of international law. German society saw wide-spread debate over the removal of the Taliban through warfare, and its supposed moral implications. The removal of the Taliban was sometimes framed as an illegal act of aggression against a sovereign nation, thus a breach of international law. As indefensible as the Taliban’s practices may have been the public debate usually centered once more on the plight of the Afghan people, the creation of more terrorists, and the supposed true motives of warfare. Nobody argued that the Taliban’s inherent virtues meant that it should not be removed; but the public debate essentially made that point: the negatives of removal outweighed the positives. The term of ‘illegal war’ was commonly used, a legal term that is – as the analysis of the moral underpinnings of *Völkerrecht* shows – fundamentally a moral justification.
Although at first just a number of talking points, the idea that the war against the Taliban was less a preventive anti-terror strategy and instead an imperialist American conquest soon took hold on the editorial pages of Germany’s most popular publications, such as the most widely-read tabloid newsweekly Stern. Aside from publishing covers proclaiming Stop This War\textsuperscript{202} prior to the start of the Afghan conflict, Stern also editorialized that the true US motives behind the war were different from the public rhetoric, and that those motives were “sinister.”\textsuperscript{203} The true motives (and the reasons for stopping the war) were mentioned, in order of frequency, as: risk of “escalation,” meaning that there would be “more terror” (mentioned 14 times in that Stern edition); it’s “not about terror”, but “profits or hegemony” of the United States (7); using military force is OK, but it’s the “wrong” US strategy (7); war “always hits the innocents” (5); let the Americans do this, but Germany should not be involved (4); the reasons behind terrorism are not solved by it (3); and finally “make love not war” (mentioned 3 times)\textsuperscript{204}

The mainstream debate quickly shifted – a mere two months after 9/11 – from solidarity with the victims to moralist condemnations of the war in Afghanistan. The common narrative usually explained that the whole affair would have never started had the United States not behaved so immorally, provoking the attacks, and now exploiting them for immoral gain. The terrorist attacks were put into relative perspective to previous American actions: if the US didn’t deserve 9/11, so some argued, then at the very least it was not surprising and had to be expected\textsuperscript{205} as a logical consequence. It was argued that the attacks were an expression of repressed sentiment from those that had their nations interfered with, for instance as an expression of Arab anger over US support for Israel and the oppression of the Palestinians. The argument that 9/11 was the inevitable blowback from 1980s anti-Communist operations became omnipresent: it became commonly accepted that the United States ‘created’ Osama bin Laden. This was an implicit refusal to fully condemn bin Laden and the terrorists, since they were partially absolved from guilt: the US had created them, armed them, alienated them, and made them strike back. Having witnessed US superiority and military dominance for the previous half-century, public discourse agreed that the oppressed had struck back at
someone who wielded superior force: the bully finally got his comeuppance at the hands of the previously humiliated underdog. That narrative carried a barely-contained impression that justice had been served.\textsuperscript{206}

Historical comparisons appeared once more: images of Dresden were contrasted with the bombing of Vietnam and Hiroshima, accompanied by implicit warnings that those were all symbols of military aggression, referencing the bombings in Afghanistan. The picture of the naked running Vietnamese girl\textsuperscript{207} in the public mind melded seamlessly into images of Dresden and Hiroshima ruins and ominous forecasts about the upcoming humanitarian catastrophe in the harsh winters of Afghanistan that had broken many other previous invading forces. The equivalence of all victims of US military aggression was complete.\textsuperscript{208} German criticism of the United States was always accompanied by simple solutions to the problems of terror and warfare: removing US influence from other nations and reducing economic imbalances in the world would solve those problems.\textsuperscript{209}

The moral climate in which this discourse took place was thoroughly atheist: post-WW2 Germany had steadily distanced itself from state-church affiliations, embracing a humanist ethos in the public realm. The German public generally seemed to be thoroughly dismissive of the possibility that genuine religious radicalism was at fault for some acts of terror. When the discussion moved to religion, two main ideas dominated the public discourse: firstly, the belief that religion in and of itself – including Islam and its offshoots – was not a source of violence. Secondly, that religious radicalism and violence was a reaction to offensive acts taken by another culture, humiliating that religion. The widely-accepted explanation was that US-sponsored globalization, pushed through with imperialist fervor, alienated many Muslims, especially since Americans were ostensibly ignorant of cultural and religious norms other than their own. As Germans didn’t widely accept that there were deeper civilizational issues (unlike the American Neocon movement discussed in the previous chapter), another suggested solution was “police action,”\textsuperscript{210} the removal and trial of the guilty parties without perpetuating acts of warfare. Military action, as already discussed, was merely considered to be a way of perpetuating war and creating more terrorists. The solution to global
terrorism was thus seen as avoiding warfare and stopping the western behaviour that caused it in the first place.211

The public debate in Germany therefore reversed the guilt association, suggesting that it was the inability of the West not to trample the dignity and human rights of peoples elsewhere that was to blame. A binary valorization of ‘them’ and ‘us’ was created, with the German debate eager to place itself morally in the camp of the oppressed, the ones that merely yearned for justice. This also absolved ‘us’ – as a capitalist western culture – from the shared guilt of the West, since we were subjectively on the side of the oppressed, recognizing the truly guilty party: US aggression, oppression and exploitation. It was a key part of the conclusions drawn in public debates that it was necessary to “have respect” of other cultures and other religions in order to avoid extremist attacks on the West.212

Having illustrated the historical perspective that provided the foundation for such a moralist public discourse, it is important to concisely document the diplomatic shift undertaken by Germany. Arguably, that shift was a betrayal of an alliance – albeit originally involuntary – going back nearly sixty years. It presented a significant change in Germany’s diplomatic orientation, albeit one that was not entirely unforeseen, as the previous demonstration of the German mood shows. As the German parliamentary magazine Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte editorialized in March of 2004, Germany was showing “a new self-confidence,” with its “French partner,” heralding the “end of the transatlantic epoch” and pursuing “Europe’s interests.” Every article, every headline declared that “the future of German foreign policy is in Europe,” that there was a “normalization” of German foreign policy, and that that the German armed forces were a “tool of German foreign policy.”213 Rhetoric that, five years earlier, was unimaginable.

The SPD/Green Coalition in 2002 and Germany’s Position in the International System

At the start of 2002, the ruling German coalition of the Social Democrat Party (SPD) and the Green Party found itself so far behind in the polls that no recovery seemed possible
by election time in mid-autumn of that year. Surprise landslides in federal elections are highly uncommon in German elections, and election-day predictions tend to be fairly accurate, although long-term predictions are uncommon. Although the German people would respond very well Chancellor Schröder’s handling of the catastrophic floods in August, no popular turnaround appeared possible. There was general discontent at Germany’s economic malaise and high unemployment. Yet by the end of 2002, the SPD/Green coalition had been re-elected into government, possessing a slim but workable majority. Studies of the Red-Green victory document that in “June and through much of the summer […] polls showed the governing parties trailing far behind and headed for certain defeat.” Numerous discussions of the German foreign policy re-orientation in summer of 2002 have suggested that re-election was foremost in Chancellor Schröder’s mind, and that he populistically exploited a popular sentiment, giving in to the simmering anti-war sentiment from both the pacifist Greens and the traditionally anti-war Social Democrats. This analysis does not consider the option that Schröder engaged in a populist re-election power play; there have been persuasive indications based on historical modeling showing that Schröder’s re-election was actually to be expected, and not in fact at all surprising: “Were [last-minute events like the flood and the Iraq issue] a necessary condition without which a swing would not have happened? We do not believe so. Chancellor Schröder enjoyed a huge advantage in the chancellor’s race long before the flood and Germany’s role in a possible war with Iraq made headlines. […] The only way for the red-green coalition to have lost the 2002 election was for the chancellor’s approval to collapse […] instead Schröder enjoyed a steady lead over Stoiber throughout 2002, typically in double digits. Had the polls and media concentrated on the chancellor race, there would have been little movement or few surprises to report.” Interestingly, the ‘chancellor popularity question’ has featured prominently in federal election polls after 2002. Even studies that focus solely on the effects of issues such as Iraq on the 2002 election show that independent voters and East Germans favoured the anti-war position already held by the SPD and Greens previous to Schröder’s full realignment in summer of 2002: only a clear pro-war position could have hurt the ruling coalition, driving votes to the post-Communist PDS. Since such a
position was never going to be taken by a government with a Green minister of foreign affairs, the attachment of independent voters was never in question.

Schröder, traditionally one of Germany’s most successful populist politicians in the state of Lower Saxony, almost certainly didn’t work contrary to what was perceived to be the German mood. Yet there is no indication that Schröder discarded a successful foreign policy approach, or that he acted against the convictions of his own party, as Blair did in Britain. The Red-Green coalition may have co-opted the anti-war sentiment, but they did not change the course of German foreign policy to instrumentalize that sentiment for re-election purposes. This is strongly supported by the narrative of German-US diplomatic maneuvering through early 2002: German diplomats were already sufficiently alienated by US policy and diplomacy, not needing re-election concerns to motivate them. In terms of party politics, much of the SPD and Green party basis was in principle against any open warfare, and especially against Afghanistan. The German Constitutional Supreme Court judgments throughout the 1990s that legitimized German troop deployment had often met fierce SPD and Green resistance. Yet there was sufficient legitimization for Afghanistan, especially since it could be explained in terms of international law: a NATO member state had been attacked, a common response in defense of the United States was merely a matter of legalist wrangling, despite widespread moral hand-wringing, as already shown.

The shift to Iraq, however, utterly alienated the party bases of both ruling parties. Support for any war in Iraq was minuscule; whereas Blair could rely on backbencher support, at least in name, Schröder did not have that luxury. The only party in favour of supporting US action in Iraq was the main opposition party, the Christian Democrats. Green opposition to the first Gulf War and Iraq sanctions throughout the 90s had only grown as the threat of a new war loomed. For both ruling parties, the possibility that the UN and weapons inspections could resolve tensions in Iraq remained completely plausible. The reticence of the United States to fully support weapons inspections and a slower diplomatic process was, in the eyes of many Germans, a self-fulfilling prophecy, since the United States under G.W. Bush had already shown a refusal to participate in other international treaties: the failure of the Kyoto Agreement was commonly used as the typical example of US inability to cooperate on the world stage. As far as most
members of the Green party were concerned, the refusal of the Bush administration to ratify Kyoto represented the worst possible scenario: not only was the US unwilling to collaborate with international treaties, but they refused to sign an ecological treaty. It is difficult to overstate how much universally negative mainstream press coverage the Bush-Kyoto connection received in the German press. Culprits were easily identified in the military-industrial complex and the Bush ties to oil and big industry, which played extremely poorly to the working class base and labour union base of the SPD.

Historically, Germany had been a satellite to US foreign policy ambitions since the end of WW2, first in the form of the buffer that was the FRG, then as a location of strategic importance for NATO. Towards the end of the 1990s, however, Germany’s strategic importance began to wane, especially as it became obvious that Germany would never have a fighting force that’d fully supplement NATO. German troops were largely relegated to support work after combat operations had ended, and with a few notable exceptions such as the Leopard II tank, the German military had little to offer for combat operations. Although the FRG had largely been a staunch US ally, there had been occasional departures from the course plotted by the United States, such as Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. It would be exactly 30 years between the SPD chancellor Brandt and the SPD chancellor Schröder, both alienating the United States by pursuing foreign policy goals incompatible with a greater US strategy in 1972\textsuperscript{217} and 2002, respectively. Post-1990, as the reunified Germany’s strategic importance waned, German politicians sought to fully integrate Germany into the European Community, then later the EU. Stability and influence were believed to be found as part of an international organization that minimized national characteristics, moving towards a crypto-federal European superstate. Although German politicians were quick to dismiss the idea of a federal superstate, it is undeniable that economic and political integration had been the aim of both the Kohl and Schröder administrations over a period of two decades. Kohl’s focus on European integration undoubtedly served the greater purpose of “break[ing] the pattern of destructive nationalism and war in Europe.”\textsuperscript{218} Europe’s history, marked by nationalist and feudalist warfare, seemed to dictate the necessity for avoiding yet another relapse. What started as a set of coal-mining treaties in the 1950s was to end with a
unified federalist Europe, united under a common Constitution, common laws, a common economy and a common foreign policy. It is the last item that is genuinely interesting in the context of German policy re-orientation in the summer of 2002.

As Germany found itself more independent from US influence in the 1990s, it began crucial foreign policy initiatives, all of which failed. In the earliest stages of the Yugoslav break-up, the German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was the very first international diplomat to push for the recognition of the newly independent Croatia. By doing so, the fluidity and volatility of that regional crisis was heightened almost immediately, as Serbian nationalism reacted violently to this perceived loss of territory and power. Without Germany’s immediate and overly hasty recognition, a slower diplomatic exchange may yet have stabilized the crisis. The previous time a German government had quickly recognized Croatian independence was in 1941. As the Yugoslav war worsened, Germany tried to maintain a leadership position, negotiating ceasefires and treaties with the warring parties as part of the European Union and independent peace commissions. After dozens of supposedly agreed-to ceasefires, German politicians eventually recognized that Slobodan Milosevic was unaware of the supposed End of History. Similarly futile was the never-ending German quest for a permanent UN Security Council seat which continues as of 2005.

It was only when the constitutional Supreme Court ruled that sending troops outside of NATO territory was admissible that Germany began to restructure its armed forces for the explicit purpose of foreign deployment. Fifteen years after reunification, Germany has the most foreign-deployed forces after the United States, although the vast majority does not take any combat roles. The transformation of the Bundeswehr into a foreign-deployment force has been pursued with great vigor by the Schröder administrations. After the success of the Afghanistan campaign, German troops provided support as well. The only question remained how Germany’s foreign deployments would be coordinated: public dissents over Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan notwithstanding, those were precisely the roles that the Bundeswehr was being transformed to fill. Would Germany continue to follow after US armed forces deployments, or would Germany find a different role for its troops, for instance as part of a unified European army? The
summer of 2002 answered that question, at least for the duration of the second Schröder administration.

The Transition to Unipolarity and the Multipolar German Shift

As Josef Joffe, the editor of *Die Zeit* suggests – at least from a German perspective – “the United States demonstrated a surfeit of autonomous power that finally rendered explicit the transition to unipolarity. Moving unopposed, and several military-technological orbits above the rest, it needed merely assistants, not allies. And so Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld would famously proclaim that the mission determines the coalition and not the other way around.” This was made abundantly clear to Chancellor Schröder in the spring of 2002. Stephen F. Szabo’s careful chronological dissection of how diplomatic relations over the Iraq build-up fell apart between the US and Germany merits closer inspection. In February of 2002, “just days after the State of the Union speech, [Schröder] met with President Bush in Washington and was told that there was no war plan for Iraq on the table.” As the previous chapter shows, that was a simple act of deception, most likely motivated by the need for secrecy: Germany was not an important ally who had to be consulted. Germany was going to be told when the time was right, and Germany was presumed to follow – but even if they did not, it mattered little in terms of military might. At the next major meeting between Bush and Schröder, in Germany on May-22 and May-23, the issue became muddled: “The American view of the thrust of both this meeting and the February meeting in Washington was that the chancellor had explicitly told the president that he would support a war as long as it was quick and civilian casualties were kept to a minimum.” In contrast, “the German version of the meeting is less clear,” with Schröder maintaining that “[w]e did not enter into commitments. We had talks. We met and talked.” The most likely explanation for this discrepancy, which Szabo refers to as the “unraveling” of Bush-Schröder relations, is the different perception of what form Germany’s support would take. Schröder probably expected a long and drawn-out battle in the UN over Hussein’s reticence to accommodate weapons inspectors, similar to previous eight years of Clinton policy towards Iraq. Bush,
in retrospect, had no such thing in mind and probably expected the hitherto staunch German satellite to remain in orbit.

Bush neglected to fully brief Schröder of the accelerated plans towards Iraq, leading to a rapid alienation in the month following their May meeting: “Within a month of the Berlin meeting on June 1, the president gave an important speech at the United States Military Academy at West Point in which he outlined for the first time a robust new U.S. approach to security.” This speech is generally recognized in Neocon circles, for instance by Norman Podhoretz, to be the first formulation of the Bush doctrine, as the previous chapter showed. As of June 1, unless Bush had suddenly found a talent for lofty but empty rhetoric on foreign policy, it had to be obvious that the United States intended regime change in Iraq. Faced with the need to unify his party base and draw voters away from the Communist PDS, Schröder openly declared his refusal to support an Iraqi regime change on the first of August: “[W]e will show solidarity with our partner, but […] we are not available for adventure, and we stand for that.” This vague statement stands in stark contrast to Bush’s clear rhetoric at West Point, but it demonstrates the rapidly-widening gulf between Germany and the United States. On August 5, Schröder added that “playing games with war and military intervention – against that I can only warn. This will happen without us […] we are not available for adventures, and the time of checkbook diplomacy is finally at an end.” On August 15, Schröder “openly criticized the Bush administration for not consulting with Germany and declared the need for a ‘German Way.’ He […] made it clear that there would be no German military contribution to a war in Iraq, even though the Bush administration had not asked for one.” The June-to-August period, between the speech marking the appearance of the Bush Doctrine and the speech marking the end of Germany’s “unlimited solidarity” with the United States. From then until the US invasion of Iraq, the German rhetoric didn’t weaken: it in fact continued to fan the flames, as Szabo phrases it, through the comparison of the Bush Doctrine with Adolf Hitler’s policies, as enunciated by the German minister of justice. Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld would then lament that an “atmosphere has been created in Germany that is […] poisoned.” Schröder reacted to his minister’s comments by sending a letter that the White House considered to
be a justification, rather than an apology, and President “Bush felt personally betrayed.”

After his election victory, Schröder continued the anti-war course, rather than change his approach, which would have been an indication that much of his rhetoric was a mere election ploy. Bush’s refusal to send a congratulatory message after Schröder’s electoral victory was followed by Schröder’s declaration to his party “that his decision on Iraq was fundamental and unshakeable.” As the United States pushed for a UN resolution, the German presence on the Security Council gave it a greater role, albeit as a supporting actor. It was in the first few months of 2003 that German foreign policy adopted a clear position of power politics. With the United States clearly determined to enact regime change, the question was whether it would receive symbolic legitimation from the United Nations. The wording of UN resolution 1441 was sufficiently vague to leave the door open for consequences of an unspecified sort.

By allowing the United States to pursue their Iraq policy without compromise, without symbolic weakening or visible opposition, Germany (and her allies) would arguably have capitulated at the altar of unilaterism. As the discussion in chapter 2 has shown, true unipolarity can only exist if nations do not seek to redress the imbalance in power. There is no doubt that the realization that the United States had the ability to impose its will on Iraq – and possibly the entire Middle East – shocked Europe, and especially Germany, seeing an opportunity to rebalance power. As previously discussed an imbalance of power is usually sought to be rebalanced by realignment of states fearing hegemony. France, in turn, saw the opportunity to gain a more permanent ally in Germany. The Paris-Berlin axis had been much-discussed as an economic and political force in Europe, but now the opportunity had truly risen to demonstrate genuine political power. Previous to the rebalancing of power in the first few months of 2003, the roles of France and Germany in the international system had been very limited. Yet after those few months, the positions of ‘France and Germany’ entered the public debate, even in the United States. Throughout the 2004 US presidential campaign, the failure of President Bush to get support from France and Germany surfaced repeatedly, certainly disproportionately to the contributions that the two countries could have provided. There
were two steps to the Franco-German power play: firstly, Joschka Fischer and Dominique de Villepin “ambushed” Colin Powell on January 20 in a discussion over UN Resolution 1441, “the moment when the differences between France over Iraq became inescapable.”

This is a crucial point: Germany and France were already in agreement that allowing open US aggression towards Iraq was unacceptable. Realizing this, the US tried to in turn get further political support for their cause, creating “a countercoalition within Europe.” Cleverly splitting support within the European Union, the US countercoalition caused significant friction, especially between France and several new EU member states and potential members. The month of February saw further Franco-German delays in the Security Council, as well as a Rumsfeld speech in which he “lumped Germany with Libya and Cuba on the issue of Iraq” as well as the creation of a truly bi-polar system within the UN Security Council (at least on the issue of Iraq), as “Schröder told Chirac, ‘I will bring Putin along. Then we can create a trilateral relationship.’ […] A new phase began. Germany no longer fought against isolation, but shaped a new alliance. On February 10, France, Belgium and Germany blocked NATO preliminary defense support for Turkey […]” Every single diplomatic initiative by the US and the Franco-German axis represented further maneuvering in a bi-polar system, shifting influence and forging alliances. If ever there was an example of diplomatic power politics, the transatlantic scheming prior to the Second Gulf War is it. The sudden German return to global power politics, seeking to pressure nonpermanent members of the Security Council, was recognized for what it was: “The U.S. team saw this as a deliberate strategy to create a bloc against the U.S. position.” The shifting positions of other members over the months of February and March suggest that this is true, as the US never received enough support on the council (nine votes) that would have necessitated a veto. Nonetheless, the French threatened with a veto, giving the UK a way to leave council resolutions behind and begin joint airstrikes with the US.

The anti-American alliance-building had worked: the US had not received a genuine mandate for military action, which made several of its “coalition” allies uncomfortable with their role, for instance Spain. Simultaneously, through the prolonged
maneuvering, it had suddenly legitimized Germany and France (and their Russian ally) as a genuine counter-balance to US power. The most important point, however, is the common perception of the roles taken by the United States and of the Franco-German axis. Arguably, the popular discourse in many countries, including Germany, France, Britain and even the United States suggested that Germany (and France) had adopted a moral position. Half a million German protesters (and millions more across Europe, including in Paris, London, Madrid and Barcelona)\textsuperscript{236} in February asked for peace, an ostensibly moral appeal for avoiding war and violence. Germany and France were publicly seen as the countries that tried to block the war: the countries that opposed military aggression. The US position, in contrast, was widely condemned as warmongering and of generally dubious merit. The multi-year saga over Weapons of Mass Destruction, false evidence and the real causes for war then added additional fuel to the anti-war fire. In 2005, the merits of the Iraq war, both from a security and a moral standpoint, are often seen as being limited, at best. The war itself remains unpopular in both Britain and the United States, and will probably continue to remain unpopular for the foreseeable future as the general populace fails to see any appreciable benefits from the war.

This is the true irony of Germany’s return to power politics, starting with Schröder feeling snubbed and ignored by Bush in the summer of 2002, and reaching its zenith with anti-US coalition building in the UN Security Council in January-March of 2003: public perception of the German position suggests that Germany’s objections to the war were of a moral nature, whereas the American stance towards Iraq was supposedly driven by power politics. Yet the opposite is the case: Germany found itself in a position where only a push for multi-polarity and the rebalancing of power was acceptable for its political elites, and the United States found itself following a doctrine that was fundamentally moralistic – rather than motivated by power politics – as chapter 3 demonstrated. Somehow, the Franco-German maneuvering succeeded in emulating the maxim from chapter XVIII of Machiavelli’s \textit{Prince}: “appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright […] but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite.”\textsuperscript{237}
Conclusion

Hegemonic Moralism, Power Politics and Paradigm Shifts

Conflicts and Conquests

The differences between German and US foreign policy conduct leading to the Second Gulf War are glaring: whereas the US position holds that the civilizational advanced and benefits of ‘the West’ are unmatched and a moral good in and of themselves, the German position is much more wary of the results of continued antagonism in the international system. After analyzing the principles of realist theory and the assumptions underlying US policy-making vis-à-vis Iraq, it is eminently apparent that the key difference lies in their perception of human nature, the organization of the international system, and the ability of a nation or group of nations to conquer the vices of humanity that are described as ‘evil.’ The Hobbesian assumptions of the international system forming part of the realist paradigm are discarded by neo-conservative ideology, arguing that it is possible to lock societies into cycles of democratic capitalism, focusing their attentions on consumption and the minimal amounts of representation that limit their desires for conflict. Warfare between democracies, one of the main arguments of this ideology, is extremely uncommon at the dawn of the 21st century: democracies do not go to war with each other, as there is no political or economic will to do so. It is more profitable to engage in trade and negotiation, especially as multi-national capital interests are under threat should democracies engage in war with each other.

Perhaps the best conception of ‘evil,’ in the context of hegemonic moralism, is therefore the perception of the forces opposing capitalist democracy. Any religious orientation eschewing individualized consumerism must surely be considered harmful, as
would any nation opposing market-driven globalization and the free flows of capital. Emphasizing tribal distinctions over democratic-capitalist pursuits would similarly be considered open antagonism to the hegemonic logic of capital and democratic representation. It is that perception of antagonism that drives US policy-making towards Iraq, and indeed towards any nation belligerently opposing US interests: through the very existence of their aggression, they display traits that are incompatible with hegemonic moralism. The paradigm considers them as enemies, morally unable to co-exist; in comparison, Germany – itself democratic and capitalist in the corporatist vein – does not openly oppose nations or groups incompatible with capitalist democracy. The realist principles driving foreign policy instead suggest a form of balancing and containing such enemies, rather than casting them in the light of civilizational conflict having to exterminate the existence of evil from this world. German politicians, often negotiating with dictators for the economic benefit of the German state, appear to lack a zeal for conquest, which is in turn displayed openly by the theorists and politicians following the principles of hegemonic moralism. To them, evil cannot be managed: it must be destroyed. Given those beliefs, it is not surprising to see transatlantic perceptions hardening, and ‘with us or against us’ camps forming rapidly as a result of assumed civilizational struggle.

Transatlantic Perceptions

In the build-up to the Second Gulf War, rhetoric concerning the attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic has grown more and more heated. Although France usually assumes the position of the anti-American villain in US policy, the previous analysis has shown that the German contribution to counter US hegemony is of at least similar importance. Germany does not appear as frequently on the editorial pages partly because it has succeeded in appearing deeply moral in pursuing power politics. Two examples of transatlantic perceptions show how wide the Atlantic has become.

T.R. Reid writes that “pancontinental America-bashing is an important mindset for Americans to understand, because the sheer pleasure that Europeans take in
denigrating America has become a bond unifying the continent. Widespread anti-Americanism has strengthened Europeans' belief that an integrated European Union should stand up as a counterweight to the American brute. Until the early years of the 21st century, a majority of Europeans reacted warily to the suggestion that the European Union should become a "superpower." Today, Europeans have broadly embraced the notion that their united continent should be the superpower that stands up to super-America. Surveys taken in the summer of 2003, after initiation of the intensely unpopular military action in Iraq, showed that more than 70 percent of Europeans wanted the Union to become a superpower - and that more than 70 percent expected this to happen. To a large extent, the zeal for America-bashing stems from opposition to U.S. foreign policy - and particularly the foreign policy of George W. Bush."

In direct contrast, Richard Lambert notes that "the op-ed columns and editorial comments of The Washington Post, in particular, carried a long stream of anti-French abuse during this period. Robert Kagan: “When negotiations and inspections stop and fighting begins, the American global superpower goes back to being a global superpower, and France goes back to being France.” George Will: The UN “can hardly be taken seriously as long as it incorporates the fiction that France is a significant power.” Charles Krauthammer: The French “have spent the past decade on the Security Council acting as [Saddam] Hussein’s lawyer.” Fareed Zakaria: France and Russia “have seats on the UN Security Council only because they won the last great war 50 years ago. (I use the word ‘won’ loosely when speaking of France).” The Post’s editorial writers, too, claimed that both Paris and Moscow had been championing the cause of Saddam Hussein in the Security Council for years.”

Ultimately, those are the signs of a growing conflict between two potential powers in a multi-polar global society. The shallow rhetoric of enmity cloaks a deeper divide that cannot be easily bridged. The force of neoconservatism has become sufficiently dominant in US foreign policy that it is now itself splitting into several competing variants, each seeking greater influence. In Europe, many political elites now realize the need to align either with US power projection (such as in the case of Poland) or with a European power bloc. The need to counter US hegemony is seen as crucial by
the political elites of many European countries, although the potential return of the German Conservatives to power may yet unbalance that coalition. Neither Russia’s attempt to counter US influence in Asia (such as Byelorussia and Uzbekistan), nor the continued Chinese militarization directed at US naval supremacy in the region suggest that the perceived US hegemony will last for long. Schröder and Villepin are merely two players trying to create a pole in a potentially multi-polar world. In the long term, there may only be two roles any other country can assume: allied with and subject to US hegemonic ambitions in projecting power, or assuming the same role in one of the other coalitions seeking to project their own hegemonic power. Questions will also arise over China’s ability to merely expand its economy without developing ambitions to project hegemonic power over its entire region. Recent US moves towards alliances with India suggest that US elites are similarly concerned.

Hegemonic Moralism

In terms of US foreign policy, it will be interesting to see which school of thought can triumph. The isolationism of Buchanan is dead and cannot be resurrected in the age of globalization. Attempts at a more cosmopolitan, nuanced diplomacy with a humanitarian touch, which marked periods of the Clinton administration, are also unlikely to make a return, since the logical conclusion of such an approach is greater participation in international organizations and binding international treaties. Even under a Democrat President, such binding contracts seem improbable. What was grouped under the umbrella term ‘neoconservatism’ is therefore the most likely to survive as the dominant thesis in US foreign policy for at least another administration. The real question is whether the key component of spreading democracy will survive in neoconservatism: a “band of neoconservatives, whose most prominent spokesman is Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer, has put forth a slightly different vision. They also favor a principled and proactive foreign policy but are less inclined to see America’s national interests as perfectly coinciding with democracy promotion abroad. Krauthammer, for instance, opposed American involvement in Kosovo and Liberia because the connection
between these conflicts and our national interest, however broadly the latter might be conceived, was in his view tenuous. To these neoconservatives, the ambition to spread democracy world-wide or to make democracy’s tastes and predilections those of every other state is unachievable. They also believe, contrary to their neocon allies, that purely humanitarian missions, such as Kosovo, are more likely to turn Americans off from foreign affairs and foster isolationist sentiment at home.¹²⁴⁰ This brand of neoconservatism appears less forceful than the moralist hegemonic version discussed in chapter 3, which places a reasonably cohesive view of modernity at the core of the ideological framework, with democracy and capitalism as forces of stability and interconnectedness with the modern world.

As chapter 3 showed, the assumptions underlying hegemonic moralism are fundamentally anti-realist. There is a belief in the ability of human nature to assume a state of relative inertia in which societies will be content to consume, but little else. Realism postulates that human vices introduce a level of instability into any system, that greed and human desires cause instabilities impossible to counter by appeals to virtue. If anything, hegemonic moralism suggests that there is deeper human virtue, an ability to not do evil if there isn’t sufficient reason to do so. If people live in a capitalist consumer society, then their reasons to commit acts of evil decrease in proportion to their ability to consume: the links of globalizations their societies create tie them to jobs, civil society, popular culture and non-violent means of existence. This analysis makes no attempt to argue whether the doctrine of hegemonic moralism can work; it would be unwise to try to predict how such a doctrine can be implemented (successfully or not) across continents and on vastly different cultures, some of whom have reacted violently to the fissures of modernity. With the United States locked into an ongoing effort to impose hegemonic moralism to transform the Middle East, however, it appears like a serious attempt will at least be made.

The Flows of Power and the New Paradigm Shift

What suggests that hegemonic moralism may not succeed is the reaction of Germany once it understood the Bush Doctrine. The principles of power politics suggest that power
vacuums cannot exist for long – and in the case of perceived imbalances in the polarity of
the international system, the system rebalances itself, or at least tries to. A few years ago,
it would have seemed absurd to suggest that Germany would be openly pursuing
Realpolitik in the UN Security Council, building alliances to hinder US ambitions to
spread democracy. Yet that is precisely what Germany did – and in the vein of The
Prince, it appeared virtuous whilst doing so, whereas the force that is arguably driven by
moralist concerns, the United States, seems to be pursuing naked power politics.

The belief that a paradigm shift is occurring in the international system would
appear to be true: the United States continues its pursuit of hegemonic moralism, a
foreign policy framework summed up in the Bush Doctrine and popularly known as
neoconservatism. In almost direct reaction, the international system seeks to redress the
perceived attempt at hegemony, with alliances forming to counter the Bush Doctrine. As
suggested in chapter 1, Germany’s policy-makers followed the principles of realist theory
scrupulously in the build-up to the Iraq war by openly and bluntly opposing the United
States. It truly was in the interest of German policy-makers, at the time of the build-up to
the war, to not only oppose the United States pursuit of hegemonic moralism, but to seek
to redress an imbalance of power in the international system by doing so. German policy-
makers understood that the United States was engaged in a conquest against evil itself, a
hegemonic pursuit that, under the principles of realism, could never succeed. It was those
assumptions that drove Germany to oppose the United States; given that perception, it is
arguable that the US itself became evil that had to be managed in the eyes of German
politicians, bolstered by socio-cultural perception of the US as a dangerous aggressor. On
the other side of the Atlantic, US politicians were then unable to perceive Germany as
anything but a roadblock to the American pursuit of hegemony for their democratic-
capitalist hegemony: Germany itself became an ally to evil. Thus the binary valorization
was complete, each nation defining itself as the exact opposite of what they sought to
oppose.
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13Hillhouse Professor of History and Classics at Yale University and author of *While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today*
14Professor at Johns Hopkins University and author of *The End of History and the Last Man* as well as *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*
15PNAC, ibid.
16Francis Fukuyama and several other strong proponents of the outlined foreign policy approaches were advisory board members for *The National Interest*
17A former speech writer for G.W. Bush who coined the phrase ‘Axis of Evil’, perhaps the most prominent neo-conservative Canadian
18A former Pentagon and Likud adviser, former chairman of the US governmental Defense Policy Board and author of the paper “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm” (which advocated the removal of Saddam Hussein as a matter of Israeli foreign policy interest) whilst working at the Jerusalem-based Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies

95
25Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p.80
31Ibid., p. 238
33Kaplan, *Warrior Politics - Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos*, p. 45
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35Ibid., p. 48
36Ibid.
38 Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, p. 59
39Referring to arguments of ‘endism’ that assume a type of finality, e.g. in the unchanging nature of the present system, or the attainability of a system possessing infinite stability and immutability.
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44Ibid., p. 282
45Ibid.
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155 The son of Irving Kristol, whose body of thought appeared prominently in the early parts of this chapter


164 This is somewhat disputed, as it is occasionally attributed to Wernher von Braun (as Peter Sellers claimed), Herman Kahn (who worked at the RAND Corporation, with the ‘Bland Corporation’ being mentioned in the film), Henry Kissinger (denied by Sellers and Stanley Kubrick), Edward Teller, or an amalgamation of several figures.

165 Frachon and Vernet, "The Strategist and the Philosopher."

166 As fictionally retold in Saul Bellow’s Ravelstein


169 Clarke, Against all Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror., p. 30

170 Ibid., p. 31

171 Woodward, Bush at War., p. 49

172 Ibid., p. 83

173 Ibid., pp. 83-85

174 Woodward, Plan of Attack., p. 2

175 Ibid., p. 3

176 Woodward, Bush at War., p. 328

177 Woodward, Plan of Attack., pp. 10-12

178 Woodward, Bush at War., p. 102

179 Podhoretz, "World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, and Why We Have to Win."

180 Woodward, Plan of Attack., p. 87

181 Podhoretz, "World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, and Why We Have to Win."
Two and a half years later, in the middle of the Second Gulf War, Bush would restate
the doctrine in a commencement address at the Air Force Academy on June 2, 2004 by
emphasizing the spread of democracy as a fundamental part of securing the United
States: “America has always been less secure when freedom is in retreat; America is
always more secure when freedom is on the march. […] Through it all, our confidence
comes from one unshakable belief: We believe in Ronald Reagan’s words that 'the future
belongs to the free.'”

Henryk M. Broder, *Kein Krieg, nirgends: Die Deutschen und der Terror* (Berlin,
Germany: Berlin Verlag, 2002).

Literally ‘dispute between historians,’ although the term ‘Streit’ usually has a more
common meaning than ‘dispute’ – ‘row’ would perhaps be more appropriate

Author’s translation of ‘Wer den Deutschen die Schamröte über Auschwitz austreiben
wolle, wer sie "zu einer konventionellen Form ihrer nationalen Identität zurückrufen will,
zerstört die einzig verlässliche Basis unserer Bindung an den Westen."

A value-loaded term that translates into ‘dealing with the past,’ but more specifically
addresses the realization of guilt and admission thereof by subsequent German
generations, and their desire (and implementation) to avoid any similar events in the
future.

Martin Walser’s full speech is at [http://www.literaturseiten.de/walser.htm](http://www.literaturseiten.de/walser.htm) -- Walser
was accused of anti-semitism almost immediately and a lengthy debate developed over
whether any German was allowed to doubt the validity of invoking the German historical
experience (using Auschwitz as its symbol) as a means of cautioning other Germans.

The *Verführung* of the German people, literally their ‘seduction,’ is now more widely
considered to be a cryptic apologia that avoids admitting any actual conscious guilt of the
German people in allowing and aiding the ascension of the NSDAP

Cicero’s saying that “In times of war, the law falls silent” from Pro Milone, phrased

[http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1424280,00.html](http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1424280,00.html), accessed Mar-1-2005
[http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/Entscheidungen/Bundesgerichte/soldat_2.html](http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/Entscheidungen/Bundesgerichte/soldat_2.html), accessed
Mar-1-2005


[http://www.nzz.ch/2003/04/05/fe/page-article8RKX6.html](http://www.nzz.ch/2003/04/05/fe/page-article8RKX6.html), accessed Mar-1-2005


Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our


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[http://european-prophecies.de/Aktuell01.11.17.htm](http://european-prophecies.de/Aktuell01.11.17.htm), accessed Mar-1-2005, *Stern
edition from Nov-11-2005*
102

205 Broder, *Kein Krieg, nirgends: Die Deutschen und der Terror*, p. 166
206 Ibid., p. 158
208 Broder, *Kein Krieg, nirgends: Die Deutschen und der Terror*, p. 159
209 Ibid., p. 167
210 Ibid., p. 170
211 Ibid., p. 171
212 Ibid., p. 180

214 Helmut and Gschwend Norpoth, Thomas, "Against All Odds? The Red-Green Victory," *German Politics and Society* 21, no. 66 (2003), p. 31
215 Ibid., p. 32

217 Willy Brandt in 1972 signed the ‘Basic Treaty’ that created a mutual recognition of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, concerning their basic relations. US politicians considered Brandt’s Ostpolitik as leading to ‘Finlandization,’ turning a US ally into a neutral state that refused to challenge a more powerful neighbour.

221 Ibid., p. 18
222 Ibid., p. 20
223 Ibid., p. 21
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid., p. 22
226 Ibid., p. 23
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid., p. 30
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid., p. 34
231 Ibid., p. 38
232 Ibid., p. 39
233 Ibid., p. 40
234 Ibid., p. 41
235 Ibid., p. 42
237 Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ch. XVIII