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(ABSTRACT)  

This study examines the ways early leaders can influence the process of institutionalization in public organizations. Using Schein’s (1983, 1991) model of cultural creation and embedding as a heuristic device, secondary historical sources detailing the creation and development of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the careers of three significant leaders are used to understand the institutionalizing effects of those leaders, how they created those effects, and what happened to those effects over time.  

The case studies of William Donovan and Allen Dulles at CIA and J. Edgar Hoover at the FBI, provide evidence that these early leaders explicitly and implicitly used several of the cultural creation and embedding mechanisms identified by Schein to entrench their beliefs and predispositions into their organizations. These ensconced attitudes and tendencies seemingly played significant roles in the institutionalization of beliefs, rules, and roles that have developed, persisted, and affected the historical evolution of both CIA and the FBI.
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To Fern Painter and H.C. Huffman
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This study examines the ways early leaders can influence the process of institutionalization in public organizations. Using Schein’s (1983, 1991) model of cultural creation and embedding as a heuristic device, secondary historical sources detailing the creation and development of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the careers of three significant leaders are used to understand the institutionalizing effects of those leaders, how they created those effects, and what happened to those effects over time. The case studies of William Donovan and Allen Dulles at CIA and J. Edgar Hoover at the FBI, provide evidence that these early leaders explicitly and implicitly used several of the cultural creation and embedding mechanisms identified by Schein to entrench their beliefs and predispositions into their organizations. These ensconced attitudes and tendencies seemingly played significant roles in the institutionalization of beliefs,
rules, and roles that have developed, persisted, and affected the historical evolution of both CIA and the FBI.

The considerable effects that early leaders have on their organizations have long been recognized by a broad spectrum of literatures that study organizations. Recognition of these effects has been a significant part of the theoretical lineage of organizational ecology, organizational culture, classical or “old” institutionalism and contemporary or “neo” institutionalism. While each affirms that early leaders can significantly influence organizational development, all remain virtually silent about what specific devices, mechanisms, or instruments leaders use to influence their organizations. This study seeks to address this literature gap by moving the discussion from simple acknowledgement that early leaders play an important role in the long-term development of their organizations to an articulation and discourse of how they do it.

Circumstantial differences between Donovan, Dulles, and Hoover and between CIA and the FBI offer an opportunity to investigate different aspects of organizational culture
Donovan never served as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). His influences and assumptions were transmitted and maintained by a nucleus of Office of Strategic Service (OSS) veterans who served in senior Agency leadership positions from 1947 until the mid-1980's. Dulles was a disciple of Donovan and served as DCI from February 1953 to November 1961. He directly and explicitly shaped internal CIA culture as well as significant aspects of how the Agency interacted with its organizational environment. In contrast, J. Edgar Hoover served as FBI Director for nearly half a century. He worked to meticulously control practically all aspects of Bureau operations and, over time, his personal attitudes and beliefs became virtually indistinguishable from many cultural attributes of the FBI.

Common characteristics and important differences between the agencies make them useful contexts for case

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Stake (1995) states that in instrumental case studies, case selection should be based not on the typicality or uniqueness of the cases studied, but rather primarily on what can be learned. In this vein, these leaders and organizations offer particularly useful and important venues in which to explore culture creation and embedding.
studies of cultural embedding by early leaders. Both CIA and the FBI are pillars of the U.S. national security establishment. Both organizations operate to varying degrees under veils of secrecy, and many of their activities are not open to public view. While many of their organizational successes remain secret, their failures, such as the Bay of Pigs, Iran-Contra, Waco, and Ruby Ridge frequently generate firestorms of controversy and political debate. Due to the nature of their activities, both agencies are subject to close congressional scrutiny.

In contrast, CIA and the FBI have markedly different historical roots and are structurally nested within American government in notably different ways. CIA, established as a part of the 1947 National Security Act, is an organizational descendant of the wartime OSS and an independent executive agency. The FBI evolved from the Bureau of Investigation, established by Theodore Roosevelt,

\[\text{\footnotesize 2 Since Central Intelligence officers commonly refer to their Agency simply as "CIA" rather than "the CIA," while the Bureau is usually known by its agents as "the FBI," that idiosyncrasy is reflected herein.}\]
and has historically functioned as part of the Justice Department under the nominal control of the Attorney General. Taken together, the similarities and differences between the leaders and the agencies themselves provide the opportunity for a broad view of culture creation and embedding by early leaders. This vista included not only the phenomenon itself, but also intergenerational transmission of early leader effects and the formation of hybrid assumptions over time due to environmental factors, organizational learning, and/or the introduction of later managerial generations. Secondarily, but not insignificantly, using these agencies as the contexts for the case studies selected reveals new aspects of their cultural origins as organizations and more fully illuminates their evolution and behavior.

The literature review in Chapter 2 surveys the theoretical development of early leader effects on organizations through four distinct lines of inquiry. Recognition and elaboration of early leader effects by classic institutionalists, organizational ecologists, organizational culture theorists, and contemporary
institutionalists are examined. Several “new” institutional theorists, with their view of institutions as self-sustained and supported, repetitive social relationships and arrangements that are carried or transported by organizational culture, are recognized as a potential link between the different lines of analysis.

Schein’s (1983, 1991) concept of culture creation and embedding by founding executives is fully developed in Chapter 2. Ten mechanisms he postulates that are used by early leaders for these purposes along with their descriptions are arranged in tabular format. This table develops in the chapters that follow as findings from each case are added and the historical sources from which the findings come are identified. The concluding chapter includes the fully developed table that comprises this study’s findings organized against the mechanisms identified by Schein.

The methodology in Chapter 3 describes the tradition of historical analysis in the social sciences and details the three-step procedure used in this study for defining the relevant literature base, selecting a sample of
secondary historical sources, and search procedures employed using the selected sources. Chapter 3 provides the theoretical foundations of qualitative analysis using historical narratives, and details the use of historical accounts by public administration scholars to describe leader effects on their organizations. The acceptance by social scientists of using secondary sources in historical research and the strengths and weaknesses of this form of evidence are explored. The problem of potential selection bias in the use of secondary historical accounts is recognized and various strategies are identified to make clear the decisions made in the selection of material and to recognize the potential bias present in the sources selected.

The literature definition step identifies the search terms used in three widely recognized databases that identified a literature base of 84 biographic sources detailing the lives and careers of the three leaders and 122 full or partial organizational histories of CIA and the FBI. The source selection step describes the judgmental sampling procedures used to choose a workable subset of
sources found in the literature base. The criteria used to select this subset are explicitly identified. Finally, the search procedures step incorporates a three-stage process that includes a short pilot study to determine the likelihood of identifying leader influences consistent with Schein’s (1983, 1991) mechanisms, and index and content search procedures to identify historical incidents consistent with their use.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present the cases of each leader respectively. Each chapter begins with a brief biography of the leader. Separate sections follow that address evidence drawn from the selected historical sources that appears consistent with a number of Schein’s (1983, 1991) culture creation and embedding mechanisms. At the end of each section, a brief description of the evidence, along with the sources providing substantiation are summarized in a simple tabular format.

Chapter 4 examines the case of William Donovan. War hero, successful lawyer, world traveler, unofficial diplomat, and architect/director of the OSS, Donovan’s early life, military and civilian career are detailed.
Sixteen secondary historical sources provide evidence consistent with Donovan’s use of Schein’s (1983, 1991) mechanisms of recruiting and selection and organization design and structure. The long-term effects of these mechanisms are traced through a significant portion of CIA history.

Chapter 5 explores the case of Allen Dulles. A protégé of Donovan, diplomat, and arguably America’s greatest spymaster, Dulles’s background, and CIA career are examined. Evidence from fifteen historical sources provides indications that Dulles employed two of Schein’s (1983, 1991) mechanisms as an early Agency leader. The enduring effects on the Agency of what Dulles paid attention to and controlled as CIA Director and his use of physical buildings, facades, and spaces are detailed.

Chapter 6 considers the case of J. Edgar Hoover. Career public administrator and FBI Director for almost five decades, Hoover’s personal history and long Bureau career are explored. Evidence consistent with his use of two of Schein’s (1983, 1991) mechanisms are cited in fifteen secondary historical sources that describe his use
of role modeling and recruiting to break down and then recreate the organizational culture of the original Bureau of Investigation and the later FBI.

The conclusion in chapter 7 summarizes the literature pertaining to early leader effects on organizations within classic and contemporary institutionalism, organizational ecology, and organization culture theory. The data from all three cases are combined and presented using a tabular display. The table is arranged along four columns that include (1) the mechanisms indicated listed in descending order from most explicit to least obvious; (2) the type of mechanism, primary or secondary as defined by Schein; (3) the leader(s) using the mechanism; (4) the evidence consistent with the use of the mechanism. An appendix provides a comprehensive display of the data from all three cases including the pilot sources in which evidence of the mechanism was found and the non-pilot sources in which supporting evidence of mechanism use was discovered. The findings in each case are discussed and specific aspects of these findings that seem to corroborate facets of Schein’s (1983, 1991) model are explained. The implications of the
findings are discussed within the context of “new” institutional theory and the value and direction of additional study are summarized.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The concept of lasting early leader influences on organizational development is traceable through several distinct literatures. From the earliest writings establishing organizations as a single area of study to contemporary attempts to understand the social and cultural foundations of institutions, scholars have sought to understand the lasting effects of early leaders on their organizations. Classic institutional theory recognizes an incisive role for leaders in the processes transforming organizations into institutions. A well-developed recognition of early leader, entrepreneur, and founder influences runs through both organization ecology and

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Selznik (1996) questions the wisdom of drawing a sharp distinction between "old" and "new" institutionalism. He argues that labeling recent institutional theories a new paradigm in organizational analysis fails to take into full account the theoretical and empirical continuities between modern institutional theory and his own seminal work. I agree with his assessment and, as a result, prefer the terms "classic" and "contemporary" institutionalism. In sum, "new" institutionalism does not replace the "old" institutionalism of Selznik. Rather, it builds upon his original work and in his words, "generate(s) fresh insights as well as interesting shifts in focus."
organizational culture theories. Contemporary institutional theories hold the potential of acting as a bridge between these diverse and sometimes disparate theories and are useful in developing deeper understandings of the effects early leaders have on the process of institutionalization.

This literature review will follow the recognition of significant early leader effects on organizations and the theoretic development of these influences by early institutionalists, organizational ecologists and organizational culture scholars. While each of these theoretical perspectives has differing conceptions of causal units and processes and emphasizes different levels of organizational analysis (Jepperson, 1991), individually and in aggregate they offer important insights into early leader effects. Despite these insights, both conjectural and empirically derived, a lack of elaboration within classical institutional theory and conceptual obstacles within organizational ecology and culture theories effectively stunted theoretical development beyond a certain point. However, work by contemporary institutional
writers, emphasizing the ways in which action is structured and order made possible by shared systems of rules that both enable and constrain organizational behavior, provides a new context in which theoretic expansion of early leader effects may be possible. Modern conceptions of the processes by which organizational forms, structures, and rules are institutionalized offers potentially fertile ground for additional progress in understanding early leader influences on organizations.

**Classic Institutional Theory**

While recognized and examined for many years by social scientists, organizations were not identified as unique types of social forms until relatively recently. March (1965) traces the origins of organizational studies to the period of the late 1930's to mid 1940's with the appearance of a number of seminal works including Barnard (1938), Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939), and Gulick and Urwick (1937). Concurrently, the English translation of selected works by Max Weber on bureaucracy spurred the interest of a pivotal group of sociologists at Columbia University, and

The origins of institutional theory in organizational analysis are rooted in the work of Robert K. Merton at Columbia University during the late 1940's and early 1950's on bureaucracy and bureaucratization, and follow-up empirical studies by a number of his students. Scott (1992) notes that a series of studies carried out by Merton's students on varied organizations – Selznick (1949) of the Tennessee Valley Authority; Gouldner (1954) of a gypsum plant; Blau (1955) of a federal and state bureau; and Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) of a union – served to establish organizations as a distinctive area of study.

Merton's (1936) early work on the "unanticipated consequences of purposive action" and his analyses of bureaucratic behavior (Merton, 1957) directly influenced American sociologist Philip Selznick, who is widely regarded as the father of classic institutional theory, and his later work on institutionalization. Though he did not explicitly use this term, Merton described multiple processes within organizations producing discipline and
orienting members to a valued normative order. This order leads members to orient their actions around rules even to the point where primary concern with the conformity to the rules interferes with the achievement of the purposes of the organization. He noted that the pressures of this normative order were such that organization members were prone to follow rules to the point of rigidity, formalism, and even ritualism (Scott, 1995).

Other scholars of the time, such as Hughes (1936), explicitly recognized institutions as "establishments of relative permanence of a distinctly social sort." He cited essential elements of these establishments as a) a set of mores or formal rules, or both, which can be fulfilled only by b) people acting collectively, in established complementary capacities or offices. More recently, Alexander (1983) notes that early conceptions of institutions constituted "crystallization of (Emile) Durkheim's earlier writing" that cited institutions as the product of joint activity and association, the effect of which is to "fix" or "institute" outside us certain
initially subjective and individual says of acting and judging.

Borrowing from these earlier works, Selznick (1949) rejected the notion of organizations as simply "the structural expression of rational action," but rather advanced the concept of organizations as adaptive, organic systems affected by the social characteristics of their members as well as environmental pressures. Through the dynamics of organizations as social systems, goals and/or procedures tend to achieve an established "value impregnated" status or become institutionalized (Selznik, 1949). Organizational goals and procedures become infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand (Selznik, 1957). Selznik likened the creation of "organizational character" to character formation in an individual. He saw viable organizations as not merely technical systems of cooperation (any more than an individual is merely a mechanism processing food and sensations), but as institutions that have been infused with value so that they take on a special character and
achieve a distinctive competence or sense of mission.

Perrow (1986) states that as organizations become institutionalized:

They take on a distinctive character; they become prized in and of themselves, not merely for the goods or services they grind out. People build their lives around them, identify with them, become dependent on them. (p. 167).

Along with these attributes may also come a Trained or built-in incapacity (Selznik, 1996) similar to what other authors have termed organizational learning disabilities (Schein, 1996) or defensive routines (Argyris and Schon, 1996). Significantly, Scott (1995) notes:

As organizations become infused with value, they are no longer expendable tools; they develop a concern for self-maintenance. By taking on a distinctive set of values, the organization acquires a character structure, an identity. Maintaining the organization is no longer simply an instrumental matter of survival, but becomes a struggle to preserve a set of unique values. (pp. 18-19).

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4 Selznik's Leadership in Administration (1957) is widely considered the source of classical institutional theory in organizational analysis. This work developed out of two earlier efforts, TVA and the Grass Roots (1949) in which he focused on the formation of organizational character in response to external threats and The Organizational Weapon (1952) in which he emphasized the creation of distinctive organizational competence.

5 Kellerman (1984) identifies these attributes as potentially leading to a malady to which all institutions can fall prey - making the continued maintenance of the
Viewing value infusion or institutionalization as a process "that happens to the organization over time," Selznik metaphorically called for a "natural history" description of organizations and the processes by which they develop their distinctive structures, capabilities, and liabilities. Thus, institutional theory traces the emergence of distinctive forms, processes, strategies, outlooks, and competencies as they emerge from patterns of organizational interaction and adaptation (Selznik, 1996). All of which lend stability and predictability to social relationships in organizations enabling them to persist (Kimberly, 1979).

Importantly, Selznik saw a vital role for leaders in the definition and defense of the values infused with their organizations (Shinn, 1996). While recognizing the importance of social factors at the time of organization creation on the development of organizational histories, Selznik identifies "a prime function of leadership" as the building of special, enduring organizational values. He
describes a major responsibility of leadership as infusing value or producing the institutional nature of formal social structures within organizations (Shinn, 1996) and monitoring the costs and benefits of the process of institutionalization (Selznik, 1996). Selznik (1957) refers to successful early leaders as educators stating that they:

Require the ability to interpret the role and character of the enterprise, to perceive and develop models for thought and communication that will inculcate general rather than partial perspectives (p. 150).

Selznik (1957) describes the administrative leader as a "statesman" who uses creativity to recognize and guide the process of institutionalization and defines one of the major tasks of the institutional leader as welding organizational members into a "committed polity," with a high sense of identity, purpose, and commitment.

Years earlier, Barnard (1938) emphasized that "the distinguishing mark of executive responsibility" in organizations is "the creation of moral codes in others." He remarked that this involved a process of inculcating points of view, fundamental attitudes, and loyalty to the
organization. Stressing the creative aspect of executive responsibility, Barnard stated that the best leaders possessed the capacity to create lasting moral codes within their organizations. In one of his most striking observations Barnard (1938) asserts:

Executive responsibility, then, is the capacity of leaders by which, reflecting attitudes, ideals, hopes, derived largely from without themselves, they are compelled to bind the wills of men to the accomplishment of purposes beyond their immediate ends, beyond their times. (p. 283).

While both Barnard and Selznik discerned the importance of environment on organizational development, they recognized a significant role for early leaders in instilling values, attitudes, behaviors, and long lasting belief systems within organizations.

Selznik's early conceptual work, while acknowledging a role for leaders in the process of institutionalization, provides little insight into the mechanisms involved. Classic institutionalism broadly emphasizes adaptation of organizations to the strivings of internal groups and the values of external society and their transformation into vehicles for explicit and sometimes obscure values (Perrow, 1996). Institutionalization results as orderly patterns or
interaction emerge out of loosely organized technical activities serving to infuse a normative order or set of normative values into the organization (Broom and Selznik, 1955). Selznik (1992) states that institutionalization constrains organizational behavior in two main ways: by bringing with it a normative order, and by making it hostage to its own history. While affirming that early leaders are among the primary cast of characters involved in the play creating an organization's normative order, he provides few details as to the devices used as they perform their part.

One of Selznik's students, Stinchcombe (1965) built on his conceptions of institutionalization and was the first theorist to empirically demonstrate the importance of social and institutional conditions present during the founding period or early history of an organization on its later structure. His work indicated that the effects of these conditions tended to persist over time – to become institutionalized. Stinchcombe's much referenced chapter "Social Structure and Organizations" in James G. March, ed. Handbook of Organizations (1965) studied the relation of
external society on the internal life of organizations. He offered evidence that basic features associated with various industries - characteristics of the labor force, establishment size, capital intensity, relative size of administrative bureaucracy, ratio of line to staff workers, proportion of professionals within the organization - varied systematically by time of founding. Stinchcombe argued that his findings were:

A direct indication of the power of persistence in organizational forms ...organizational forms and types have a history, and this history determines some aspects of the present structure of organizations of that type. (pp. 155, 153).

In what is described by later theorists as Stinchcombe's "imprinting" hypothesis, he argues that

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6 While Stinchcombe did not address the role of leadership in organizational history, his thesis that history serves as an important restraining and/or enabling factor in organizational development served as an important venture point for later theorists concerned with early leader effects.

7 The origins of the imprinting metaphor are somewhat obscure. The literature reveals the use of the term by contemporary institutional theorists such as Boeker (1988), Tucker (1990), and Scott (1991) and public administration writers such as Wilson (1989) who attribute the metaphor to Kimberly (1981) and/or Stinchcombe (1965). A review of these earlier works, however, reveals no explicit use of the term by either author. While
organizations construct their social systems with the social resources available at the time of their early history and that they tend to retain the characteristics they acquired over the course of their lifetimes (Tucker, et. Al., 1990). His imprinting hypothesis implies that an organization reflects the historical circumstances of its founding period throughout its existence (Boeker, 1988). The processes accounting for this preservation of early history characteristics are threefold (Stinchcombe, 1965, Aldrich, 1979, and Scott, 1992). First, the early characteristics may be the most efficient for a given purpose - giving a competitive advantage over other arrangements. Second, the early characteristics may be preserved because organizations are insulated from environmental pressures by support from vested interests, traditionalizing forces, or strongly legitimated ideological positions. Third, the organization may not be confronted by competitive forces. Thus, there is no

imprinting offers attractive imagery in which to better understand the lasting influences of environmental factors and early leaders upon organizations, it shares the limitations of all social science metaphors by revealing
pressure to survive. Stinchcombe argued that organizational structures, processes, and behavioral norms imprinted at a point in time tend to persist, even though environmental conditions may have drastically changed. He posited that the phenomenon tends to restrict the introduction of new structures and/or processes unless changes in the organization's environment are particularly stark and dramatic.

Certainly, Stinchcombe's hypothesis was not a new one. Sociology literature provides many examples of attempts to establish links between external societal structures and the structure of organizations. Bendix (1956) explored the relationship between dominant political ideology and how authority of managers over subordinates was legitimated in an industrial context. Abegglen (1958) found that certain features of Japanese social structure were reflected in industrial social organization and Crozier (1964) examined how certain characteristics of French society were embedded in the French bureaucratic system. These studies similarities between two things but, remaining silent about their differences (Hatch 1997).
demonstrated apparent systematic relationships between external social structures and organizations.

Organizational Ecology Theory

Stinchcombe's work was and is of particular interest to organizational ecologists as their perspective implies an imprinting assumption (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1984; Aldrich, 1979). Organizational ecology theorists point to many examples that seemingly support Stinchcombe's thesis. Boeker (1988) highlights the example of most U.S. railroad companies in the twentieth century maintaining structures, staffing patterns, and managerial views that are in many ways manifestations of the environmental conditions during the period of their founding in the nineteenth century. In another example, a study of how "Big Six" tobacco corporations adapted to externally imposed stress and crises, found that the internal political structures of these organizations, imprinted early in their histories, severely constrained the range of choices available to them in responding to anti-smoking societal pressures (Miles, 1982).
While imprinting arguments are frequently cited in the organizational ecology literature, few empirical studies have actually been done (Miles (personal correspondence, September 11, 1998) and the empirical status of those that have remains ambiguous (Boeker, 1988). Miles and Randolph (1981) and Tucker (1990) note that the few studies that deal with the topic support Stinchcombe's view that an organization's early environment and characteristics have an enduring effect on its later structure and behavior.

Stinchcombe's findings seem confirmed in different and more specific venues by Sarason's (1972) observations in his analysis of Yale Psychiatric Institute and by Kimberly (1975) who showed that the type of program, staffing, and structures employed within a population of rehabilitation organizations varied according to when the units were established. Additionally, Boeker (1988), in a study of 62 semiconductor firms, found that characteristics of the early members and of the early environmental context both have strong influences on the development of an organization's initial strategy. More recently, Tucker (1990) showed that institutional conditions present during
the founding of a population of voluntary social service organizations directly influenced the rate of organizational change. Scott (1991) notes that the embedding mechanisms posited to explain the results of such studies embody Berger and Luckmann's (1967) central argument that organizations acquire certain characteristics not by rational decision or design, but because they are taken for granted as "the way these things are done." This taken for granted character of the form is then argued as an important basis for its persistence over time. The totality of these studies firmly establish that the conditions present during the early history of an organization can have significant and enduring effects (Scott, 1992).

More recently organizational ecology theorists have explored the role of early executive leadership in the imprinting phenomenon. Several studies have emphasized value creation by leaders, which serves to shape the direction of organizational development and the ability of organizations to respond to external pressures. Others have examined organizational entrepreneur/founders and
their capacity to originate and embed values or predispositions during the early stages of organizational creation and the process by which these elements are carried forward by the organization over time.

Child (1987), argues that organizational traditions frequently have their origins in:

the ideology of an entrepreneurial founder who sets out both strategic perspective on the task of the organization and a philosophy on the form of labor process to accomplish it. (p. 1971).

Additionally, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) assert that:

a company's ability to respond (to external pressures) is constrained by its internal capabilities, which are shaped by the company's administrative heritage. Internal capability is developed over a long period of time and cannot be changed overnight by management decree. (p. 35).

Wilson (1989) explicitly connects early leaders or founding executives with the imprinting phenomenon.

An organization is endowed with a sense of mission ... during the formative experience of the organization, an experience shaped and interpreted by a founder who imposes his or her will on the first generation of operators in a way that profoundly affects succeeding generations. ... call (ed) 'imprinting' ... the imprint is deepest and most lasting when the executive has a strong personality and a forcefully expressed vision of what the organization should be. (pg. 96)
In a study of semi-conductor firms (Boeker, 1988) differentiates between environmental and entrepreneurial imprinting effects at the time of a firm's founding and their effects on later company strategy. He found that the previous functional background of founders influenced the selection of corporate strategy.

In his tobacco firm study, Miles (1982) found that the internal political structures of these organizations were imprinted with dominant values and beliefs embedded and perpetuated by the firms' early executives. These values and beliefs, along with other factors, severely constrained the range of choices available to these firms in responding to environmental pressures. Miles cites these imprinted "dominant values" as a primary source of organizational inertia that distinctly effect how an organization develops and how it responds to external pressures.

Kimberley and Bouchikhi (1995) refer to this fashioning of organizational values by founding executives as the shaping of an organization's "developmental trajectory." In a study of a small computer firm in France over the first fifteen years of the organization's history,
they observed that the founder's core values represented a point of departure for the organization and became part of the culture from the very beginning. Specifically, this study discovered that founder attitudes regarding style of administration, organization size, employee interaction, client support, and hierarchical authority were explicitly controlled by the founder through mandated management techniques and hiring practices. These overt actions by the founder:

Set this organization on a particular trajectory which has become self-reinforcing and from which it is increasingly difficult to choose to deviate. (p. 16).

Kimberley and Bouchikhi also note the importance of what Sarason (1972) has called "prehistory," or events which played a significant role in shaping an organization which was about to be born but which predated the actual birth. The influence of prehistory may include circumstances shaping the core values of an organization's founder or events molding the institutional context into which a new organization is born. Sarason (1972) states what a major obstacle to understanding the creation and development of settings such as organizations is the lack
of detailed descriptions of their "natural histories." He asserts that such natural histories are a product of a founder's past experience, temperament, intellect, and motivations, the existing social structure into which an organization is born, and the relationships between a newly born organization and already existing ones.

Working from Sarason's concept of organizational natural histories, Kimberley and Bouchiki (1995) stress:

...that the values and orientation of the founder are one, but only one, important part of the story. The whole story involves an appreciation of the co-evolution of the firm and its external context, that is, of how external and internal influences together shape both the opportunity structure and the performance space. (p. 14).

This lack of the "whole story" and the necessity for theorists to shift focus to single units of analysis has severely restricted the ability of organizational ecologists to move beyond simple recognition of early leader effects on organizations. Miles (1982) and Kimberley and Bouchikhi (1995) agree that external and internal influences act together as "engines of organizational development." How the external context acts to imprint a newly born organization with certain
structures and forms cannot be fully understood without an examination of how individual early leaders filter these external influences through his or her ontological, epistemological, and axiological assumptions. Likewise, the role of early leaders in embedding values and assumptions into their organizations cannot be fully grasped without an appreciation for the institutional context into which the organizations were brought into being. Overlaying both external and internal organizational influences are Sarason's (1972) prehistory effects that shape both the contextual circumstances of an organization's birth and the founder's essential values.

Thus, the organizational ecology literature reveals only a general theoretical perspective on the role of early leaders in shaping organizational development. The perspective's analytic emphasis on collections, classes, or aggregates of organizations that are alike in some respect (Scott, 1995) makes it difficult for theorists to move beyond a only a broad recognition of early leader influences in individual organizations and the
identification of a confounding array of variables impinging on the evolution of singular organizations.

Organizational Culture Theory

Concurrently with the work of organizational ecologists, organizational culture theorists recognized similar processes present in the development of shared meanings, belief systems, and rules that inform and constrain organizational behavior. This recognition included the effects of organizational founders and/or early leaders as important creators and carriers of these shared meanings and rule systems and their influence on the historical evolution of their organizations through the embedding of cultural elements.

Theorists have variously defined organizational culture as a set of shared, taken for granted implicit assumptions that a group holds and that determines how it perceives, thinks about, and reacts to its various environments (Schein, 1991); rules, procedures, and goals without primary representation in formal organization (Jepperson, 1991); a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within
systems of coordinated action that lead those systems to respond in different ways to the same stimuli (Wilson, 1989); a set of solutions devised to meet specific common problems (Van Maanen & Barley, 1985); a normative system of values and cognitive systems resulting in routinized behavior (Friedland & Alford, 1991); and "taken-for-granted" reality within organizations resulting from how people interpret the world around them and develop shared understandings (Schultz, 1967).

Working from these and other similar definitions, a series of organizational culture studies from the late 1960's to the present formed another theoretical line which developed the effects of early leaders on their organizations and the creation of implicit values resulting in tangible artifacts. Trice, Belasco, and Alturro (1969) interpreted their observations of personnel practices in various organizations as cultural rites and ceremonials, identifying tangible manifestations of underlying organizational values identified by institutional theorists. Petigrew (1979) referred to these artifacts and others springing from ideology and belief as the "social
tissue" of organizations and the "offsprings" of organizational culture.

At about the same time, Clark (1970) documented the importance of what he called organizational sagas in the long term endurance and prosperousness of three colleges. His concept of saga is very similar to that of organizational culture and his work emphasized the important role that early leaders and historical tradition played in these organizations (Clark, 1972). Follow on work established the potency of "dominant values" embedded within organizational cultures by early leaders that stifle action in response to environmental pressures (Miles, 1982) and restrict commercial strategies (Boeker, 1988). Other theorists explored "commitment mechanisms" impelling participant energy and loyalty (Kanter, 1972; Buchanan, 1974) and the role of early executive leadership in fashioning and communicating values from which these mechanisms develop (Petigrew, 1979).

Qualitative organizational culture transmission studies such as those conducted by Zucker (1991/1977), and Harrison and Carroll (1991) demonstrated the
intergenerational transference of cultural understandings and behavioral effects within organizations and a high degree of generational uniformity of cultural understandings over time. This work also demonstrated that long term cultural intensity is highly responsive to recruitment selectivity and management socialization (Harrison and Carroll, 1991). Recent treatment of the influences of early leaders by Kimberley and Bouchikhi (1995) employs a longitudinal research approach, referred to as "organizational biography," that focuses on the developmental dynamics of an organization. While allowing for the powerful influences of founders or early leaders in shaping an organization's "developmental trajectory," they argue that a mix of factors, both internal and external, influence the way in which an organization grows, develops a culture, and shapes an identity.

**Schein's Cultural Embedding Model**

Schein (1983; 1991) provides the most serious treatment of early leader effects on organizations in the organization culture literature. He advances a model of cultural embedding that postulates how founders create
organizational culture by fixing their major assumptions and predispositions into their organizations. Identifying ten devices that founders both explicitly and implicitly use to embed their predispositions and assumptions, he details how founder beliefs and presumptions form the basis of a new organization's culture. Schein further theorizes that organizational culture evolves over time from the original assumptions and beliefs of the founder through a process of "hybrid" evolution. He proffers that such evolution is driven by new beliefs and assumptions developed from organizational learning and environmental

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8 It is important to note here that Schein uses his cultural embedding model exclusively with the entrepreneurial founders or creators of relatively small private firms. His work does not apply the model to public agencies or large organizations. Despite its limited application, Schein’s model remains the most well developed theory in the organizational culture literature of the mechanisms early leaders can use to effect the development of their organizations. True founders or creators of large public organizations in the entrepreneurial sense are a rarity. Despite arguable dissimilarities between "founders" and "early leaders" and differences between the size and nature of the organizations studied, Schein’s model provides a theoretically vigorous device to better grasp the possible mechanisms early key leaders use in public organizations to influence culture creation, development, and maintenance.
factors, but remains congruous with the original cultural paradigms for many generations.

Schein points out that organizations do not form accidentally or spontaneously. They are usually created by someone taking a leadership role in seeing how the concerted action of a number of individuals can accomplish something that is impossible through individual action alone. Just as religious movements have prophets and messiahs, and political movements are started by leaders with new visions and solutions - organizations are frequently started by founders with a vision of how new products or services can be delivered to the marketplace or how the public or the country can be better served. Schein notes that the process of culture formation in such organizations begins with its founding.

While acknowledging that the history of each organization is somewhat different, Schein identifies four essential steps that are functionally equivalent in the founding of many organizations. First, a single person (the founder) has an idea for a new enterprise. Second a founding group is created on the basis of initial consensus
that the idea is workable and worth running risks for. Third, the founding group begins to act in concert to create the organization. Lastly, others are brought into the group according to what the founder or founding group considers necessary, and the group begins to function, developing its own history.

Schein states that it is in this process that the founder has a major impact on how the organization solves its external survival and internal integration problems. Because the founder had the original idea, he or she will typically have biases on how to get the idea fulfilled. Schein states that in his observations, founders are frequently strong-minded about what to do and how to do it. Usually, they already have strong assumptions about the nature of the world, the role their organizations will play in that world, the nature of human nature, truth, relationships, and time, and space.

Schein (1983) provides three case studies illustrating varying degrees of founder influence on organizations. The first, a large supermarket and department store chain, was built by a founder who served as the dominating ideological
force in the company. Managing with a strong bias for personal hands-on control and through the introduction of several family lieutenants, he created and perpetuated a system of highly centralized organizational authority. The founder's desire for high performance by professional (non-family) managers in other positions resulted in highly competitive peer relationships. The introduction of family members into higher management jobs and developmental positions resulted in a highly politicized senior management environment. Schein notes that these influences resulted in various forms of lasting internal conflict and dysfunction as the organization matured which persisted long after the founder had passed from the scene and his family lieutenants were replaced by later generations of professional managers.

In a second example, Schein describes the influences of a founder of a fast growing manufacturing concern. His management style reflected strong assumptions about the nature of the world, truth, and problem solving. Believing that the best ideas come from group debate and positive confrontation, the founder fostered and promoted a system
of wide debate, group meetings, upward communication, and consensus decision-making. The founder insisted on open office landscaping; minimum status differentiation in terms of office size, location and furnishings. He actively recruited individuals who were intelligent, assertive, and individualistic. The founder insisted that bosses not rely on position for authority, but on the authority of reason. Supervisors were granted authority only to the extent they could sell their decisions. Insubordination was not only tolerated, but rewarded if it led to better outcomes. Schein states that over the years employees who shared the founder's assumptions found themselves feeling increasingly like family members in that strong bonds of mutual support grew up between them. Though implicit, these feelings gave subordinates the sense of security necessary to challenge each other. Schein notes that the founder's assumptions, both in terms of formal business arrangements and internal organizational relationships still reflected themselves some years after the founder's departure.

In a contrasting third example, Schein describes the founding leader of a chain of financial service
organizations who remained distant from his creation. Unlike the first two examples, this founder did not invest himself heavily in his organization. He recruited professional managers to administer his business and gave them a managerial free hand. His only criterion was ultimate financial performance. Schein notes that to determine the cultures of the individual enterprises within the chain, one had to study the managers put into key positions by the founder and organizational cultures varied greatly from one enterprise to the next. Schein states that this example illustrates that there is nothing automatic about a founder’s process of inserting personal vision of style into his or her organization. The process depends very much on whether and how much that person wants to impose him or herself.

Schein uses these examples, to demonstrate that cultural embedding by a founder is very much a function of his or her personality. Additionally, it is based on deliberate decisions to build an organization that reflects their own personal biases while others create basic organizations and turn them over to subordinates as soon as
the organizations have lives of their own. Schein maintains that the basic process of cultural embedding is a teaching process, but not necessarily an explicit one. He identifies ten inculcating and secondary articulation and reinforcement devices that founders use to embed their predispositions and assumptions. A given mechanism may convey an extremely explicit message or a very tacit one. The mechanisms are listed below from more or less explicit ones to more or less implicit ones.

a) Formal statements of organizational philosophy, charters, creeds, materials used for recruitment and selection, and socialization.

b) Design of physical spaces, facades, and buildings.

c) Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching by leaders.

d) Explicit reward and status system, promotion criteria.

e) Stories, legends, myths, and parables about key people and events.

f) What founders pay attention to, measure and
control.

- Founder reactions to critical incidents and organizational crises.
- How the organization is designed and structured.
- Organizational systems and procedures.
- Criteria used for recruitment, selection, promotion, leveling off, retirement, and "excommunication" of people.

Schein maintains that these mechanisms represent all of the ways founders communicate and imprint their beliefs and assumptions. However, these mechanisms vary in potency and he differentiates between those that are "primary" and "secondary." Schein (1991) states that the most powerful or primary mechanisms are based upon a founder’s personal behavior. These include (1) what the founder explicitly pays attention to; (2) how he/she reacts to critical incidents; (3) what the founder role models, coaches and teaches; (4) what the founder rewards; (5) and who the founder recruits or selects. Schein (1991) identifies the other mechanisms as secondary and posits that they are only effective if they are consistent with the primary
mechanisms employed by the founder. When they are consistent, the secondary mechanisms begin to build organizational ideologies and formalize much of what is informally learned from the founder’s behavior. If inconsistent, they will either be ignored or become the source of internal conflict. Schein (1991) concludes that:

...the operating cultural assumptions will always be manifested first in what the leaders demonstrate, not in what is written down or inferred from designs and procedures. (p. 237).

Founders or early leaders may inconsistently apply primary mechanisms when they themselves are internally conflicted. Additionally, the environment may force changes in original beliefs causing different parts of an organization to view things differently. These conflicting messages can result in organizational dysfunction or what Kets de Vries (1984) calls "neurosis." Often, conflicts occur when new strong managers who were not part of the first generation begin to impose their own assumptions and theories.

Schein states that distinctive organizational characteristics or biases introduced by founder assumptions are found in first-generation firms still heavily influenced by the founder, companies that continue to be
run by family members, or in organizations directed by first-generation "disciples" of the founder. After a founder leaves an organization and it continues to mature, distinctions begin to be drawn between first-generation managers and "professional" managers brought into key positions. Schein states that these "professional" managers often have been specifically educated to be managers rather than experts in the organization's activities. They are generally seen to be less loyal to the original beliefs and assumptions that guided the organization and are more concerned with short-run performance. Schein notes that they are typically welcomed for bringing their much-need organizational and functional skills, but they are often mistrusted because they are not loyal to the founding assumptions.

While founders are able to impose their assumptions on first-generation employees, Schein maintains that later generations develop a range of new assumptions based upon their own experience. These new assumptions remain congruent with some of the core assumptions and beliefs of the founder, but add new elements from experience.
Referring to this process as "hybrid evolution," Schein states that this represents a core process of cultural development in many organizations as firms adapt to changing external environments without destroying cultural elements that have given them their uniqueness and that have made life fulfilling in their internal environments.

In summary, both organizational ecology and organizational culture studies have contributed to a greater appreciation and understanding of lasting early leader influences on organizations. From the former's extension of Stinchcombe's thesis to early leaders and an emphasis on value creation in newly formed organizations to the latter's development of cultural embedding by founders, both theoretical approaches highlighted the importance of early leaders upon organizational creation and development. Significant areas of development included: (1) the identification of "cultural artifacts" or palpable manifestations of founder attitudes, beliefs, and values within organizational structures, forms, and procedures, (2) the exploration of intergenerational culture transmission process, and (3) the production of a model for
cultural embedding by early leaders, as well as a methodology for further study of the phenomenon.

Despite these developments, Kimberley and Bouchikhi (1995) note:

...little organizational research and few practitioners speak to the question of how an organization's past shapes the present and may constrain its future. (p. 9).

Van de Ven (1981) asserts that with few notable exceptions, questions surrounding the creation stage of organizations have been ignored in management and organizational literature. Miles (personal correspondence, September 11, 1998) states that real insights into early leader influences on organizations are hard to come by and that no real work has been done on the topic in over a decade. Contemporary theorists who have studied the phenomenon of early leader influences within the organizational culture literature have moved on to other areas of interest such as Schein (employee socialization and career building) and Miles (corporate transformation and change).

A lack of detailed studies seeking to differentiate between early leader effects and external influences on organization creation and development represents a
significant gap in both the organizational ecology and organizational culture literatures. A scarcity of work in this area, beyond a general recognition that an organization's present is nothing more than a moment in the past's trajectory into the future (Smith and Steadman, 1981) -- a present and past influenced by numerous, sometimes amalgamated, often opaque variables -- constitutes a significant part of the theoretical underdevelopment cited by Schein (personal conversation, April 13, 1998) and Miles (personal correspondence, September 11, 1998). Attempts to isolate variables impinging on organizations within these literatures have been conjectural at best (Doig, 1983) and the inability to empirically differentiate between leader influences, environmental effects, and the lasting consequences of pre-history have hindered further theoretic development within these venues.

Contemporary Institutional Theory

Contemporary institutional theorists focus on the creation, maintenance, and reproduction of organizational institutions (Shinn, 1996). Generally, contemporary
institutionalism, through an emphasis on cognitive and cultural explanations, has shifted the focus of institutional study to phenomenon that theorists believe are critical to understanding organizational behavior. These authors maintain that organizations can be understood neither as rational systems for coordinating activities or through the logic of transaction costs. Instead, organizational structure and behavior becomes institutionalized based upon internal and external influences. As a result, the external face and internal workings of organizations can reflect these influences more than the specific demands of technical activities.

Contemporary scholars define an institution as a representation of a social order or pattern, continually produced, which owes its continued existence to relatively self-activating or automatic social processes. When deviations from the social order or pattern are repeatedly counteracted by socially constructed controls, such as sanctions or rewards, the pattern is institutionalized (Przeworski and Sprague, 1971; Fararo and Skvoretz, 1986). Thus, institutionalization is a process variable in which
the property value institution is produced (Zucker, 1983). Simply put, an organization becomes an institution when self-perpetuating internal social patterns reproduce themselves without the need of sustaining action or collective action by its members. Instead, routine procedures support and sustain the pattern, furthering its reproduction, unless collective action blocks or external shocks disrupt the pattern (Jepperson, 1991).

Significantly, contemporary theorists identify organizational culture as one of several primary transporters or carriers of institutions (Jepperson, 1991; Scott, 1995). Drawing from Jepperson's (1991) and Gidden's (1984) previous work, Scott (1995) describes culture as having components of both structure and action. The structural components of culture as an institutional carrier, representing the persistent or more institutionalized aspects of organizational behavior, are described as both the result of past actions - social products - as well as the context or medium within which ongoing action occurs. The action component operates to produce, reproduce, perpetuate, or alter the structural
component. The conception of organizational culture as an institutional carrier and Scott's representation of culture as creating, generating, continuing, or changing institutional effects provides the basis for a fresh examination of lasting early leader effects on organizations.

Jepperson (1991) argues that commentators in organizational analysis frequently confuse the creation and development of organizational culture with institutionalization. Culture is but one "social control structure" which can be more or less institutionalized, but in itself does not encapsulate the broader, abstract property of institutionalization. Meyer, Boli, and Thomas (1987), however, allow that much institutionalization is carried by cultural rules. Jepperson (1991) states that:

Institutionalization can also be carried by 'culture': here simply those rules, procedures, and goals without primary representation in formal organization, and without monitoring and sanctioning by some 'central' authority. These rules are rather, customary or conventional in nature. Institutionalizing in culture produces expectations about the properties, orientations, and behavior of individuals, as constraining 'others' in the social environment. (pp. 150 - 151).
He cautions that institutions can have a "complex embodiment" of different types of rule or control structures and institutions having different primary carriers (i.e. regimes versus culture) may operate in different fashions. Additionally, he proffers that over the course of an organization's history it may rely on differing modes or carriers of institutionalization at different times.

Scott (1995) provides a comprehensive definition of institutions as consisting of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. He maintains that institutions are "transported" by three carriers - culture, structure, and routines - that operate at various levels within organizations. He discerns institutions as multifaceted systems that incorporate systems of symbols - including cognitive constructions and normative rules - and regulative processes that are carried out through and shape social behavior.

He identifies these regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities as the "three pillars
of institutions" which various contemporary theorists stress as central to analysis. The first, regulative pillar, emphasizes the aspects of institutions that constrain or regularize behavior. Emphasis is given to explicit regulatory processes within organizations such as rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activity (including the manipulation of rewards and punishments). These processes may operate through informal mechanisms such as shaming and excommunication to formal mechanisms assigned to specific actors. The second, normative pillar, gives prominence to organizational values and norms establishing preferred or desirable standards against which member behavior is compared and assessed. Norms specify how things should be done and define legitimate means to pursue valued ends. The third, cognitive pillar, stresses the centrality of epistemological rules and the frames through which meaning is made. Importance is given to the establishment of routines taken for granted as "the way things are done," conceptions of identity, guidelines for sensemaking and choosing meaningful actions, adoption of a
common frame of reference, and embracing shared situational definitions.

Culture as an institutional carrier relies on interpretive schemes such as codified patterns of meanings and rules systems to inform and constrain behavior. The resulting behaviors further reinforce the interpretive structures or beliefs within the organization (Scott, 1995). Some cultural beliefs are specific to a given organization or one of its subsystems, giving rise to a corporate culture (Frost, Moore, Louis, Lundberg, and Martin, 1991). Other cultures operate at a more general level constituting interorganizational belief systems that can be widespread. Scott (1995) notes that organizational culture as an institutional carrier is conveyed in the minds of individuals "as ideas and values in the heads of organizational actors."

Significantly, Scott (1995) states that organizational culture as an institutional carrier cuts across all three pillars of institutions. The aspects of culture emphasized by theorists vary depending upon which elements of institutions are given prominence. Regulative theorists
stress the importance of conventions and rules, normative theorists accent shared values and normative expectations, and cognitive theorists the importance of categories, distinctions, and typifications.

Clearly, the emphasis by contemporary institutionalists on organizational culture as a primary carrier of institutions, coupled with the work of organizational culture theorists recognizing the embedding of culture by early leaders, begs the question: In what ways do early leaders influence institutionalization through cultural embedding? Contemporary institutional scholars like their classical predecessors recognize in a general sense a role for leaders in shaping organizations and in the development and perpetuation of institutions. However, both give scant attention to the specific mechanisms involved.

A particularly sharp critic of institutional theory (Perrow, 1986), describes leadership as "decisive" in the process of institutionalization and points to the school's relative silence regarding leader effects on institutions as one of several defects. Further, he rejects
institutional theory's implication that leadership is definitive simply in realizing the goals of organizational members and the environment. Rather, he points to several examples in which leaders of large powerful institutions have successfully pursued their own goals, independent from internal group strivings and environmental demands. He cites the "gravest defect" in institutional theory as the failure to appreciate that powerful institutions (and implicitly their leaders) can proactively define, create, and shape their own organizational environment rather than simply respond to its buffeting effects.

Perrow (1986) also cites what he considers to be myopic study by institutional theorists of "relatively trivial organizations." Excluding works by such authors as Selznik, Wilensky, and Janowitz, he states that most institutional literature has paid little attention to important organizations in our society. He cites causes for this as the relatively small number of researchers doing institutional analysis and problems of access to society's powerful, dominant organizations. Perrow calls for additional institutional studies of large public
organizations. Citing the work of authors such as Cates (1982), Perrow states:

...there is a large body of valuable data on the powerful government and economic organizations in our society,... but it has barely been tapped by organizational theorists. (p. 173).

Perrow argues that a powerful venue for the advancement of organizational studies generally, and institutional theory specifically lies within large, powerful public institutions.

Concurrently, within public administration, a literature including such scholars as Lewis (1980), Wilson (1989), and Cooper and Wright (1992) have pointed the way to this potentially rich area of further study. Their deep case analyses of the organizational lives of such influential public administrators as Hyman Richover, Robert Moses, Harvey W. Wiley, and George B. Hartzog illustrate the profound and long lasting effects exceptionally gifted executive leaders can have on public institutions. These works clearly establish the public sector as a fruitful venue for exploring leadership effects on organizations and the role early leader influences may play in the process of institutionalization.
Perrow's (1986) criticisms of institutional theory and the work of public administration scholars who have analyzed the effects of executive leaders on public institutions frame the purpose of the current study. This project seeks to advance the literature by responding to Perrow's (1986) call for additional study of the effects of leaders on institutionalizing processes. By examining these effects in two of America’s most powerful and important national security agencies, the study also responds to his call for additional institutional studies of large and influential public organizations.

Contemporary institutional writers such as Jepperson (1991) and Scott (1995) identify organizational culture as one of several primary transporters or carriers of institutions. This provides a theoretical bridge for the examination of some of the specific mechanisms or instruments that early leaders may use to influence the institutionalization process. Schein's (1983, 1991) work on the mechanisms that founders use to create and embed organizational culture provides a useful heuristic device for this examination. The case study methods used by
public administration scholars such as Lewis (1980), Wilson (1989), and Cooper and Wright (1992) in their examination of leader effects on public organizations provide helpful approaches in carrying the examination out.

In sum, this study seeks to begin addressing some of the gaps in institutional theory cited by Perrow (1996) by applying work conducted by Schein (1983, 1991) in organizational culture. This is made possible by the contemporary institutionalist bridge built by Jepperson (1991) and Scott (1995) who identify culture as a carrier and transporter of institutions. As will be seen in the following chapter, the deep case analyses conducted by Lewis (1980), Wilson (1989), and Cooper and Wright (1992) in public administration and historical narrative techniques provide a useful methodology for this examination.
CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This study examines historical narratives for evidence consistent with the operation of Schein's (1983, 1991) culture creation and embedding mechanisms and their use by Donovan, Dulles, and Hoover as early leaders within their organizations. The presence or lack of evidence is then used in the final chapter to hypothesize about how and to what extent early leaders can affect institutionalizing processes within their organizations. The mechanisms identified by Schein (1983, 1991) are used to identify and better understand these possible effects.

The use of evidence drawn from historical narratives to test and develop theory has a long history in the social sciences. However, such techniques carry with them a number of threats to validity that must be acknowledged and

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Historical narratives encompass both historical accounts written by others and the "story" (Creswell, 1998) the account chronicles. For the purpose of this study the former definition is used. It is important to note that this study does not employ the word "narrative" in the same sense as some anthropologists, feminist theorists, and historians to refer to first person accounts of experiences and events (Marshall and Rossman, 1989). Rather, the term
addressed to the extent possible. This study employs a four-step process to exploit historical narratives while attempting to address these threats and the issue of replication by other researchers.

**Background**

Research using historical narratives can be defined as study using or analyzing narrative materials that describe past events for the purpose of understanding the events themselves or as a means of studying another question (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber, 1998). Such research may be used to develop evidence for inter-group comparisons, to learn about social phenomena or particular historical periods, or to explore an individual’s personality. The use of history as a laboratory or referent for theory testing and development has a time honored tradition in the social sciences. From seminal theorists such as Weber, Marx, and Freud to contemporary scholars such as Collingwood (1994), Lustick (1985; 1993) and Goldthorpe (1991), the analysis of historical evidence drawn from narratives has been recognized as a valuable
qualitative research approach in fields such as political science, social psychology, and sociology. This is particularly true in sociology because, as Sewell (1999) states, many social (and organizational) processes require a significant amount of time to work themselves out. Investigating such processes only in the present runs the risk of studying incomplete sequences and greatly restricts the number of cases for investigation. Techniques using historical evidence as a database for the elaboration and testing of theories are as old as the social sciences themselves (Lustick, 1996).

Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber (1998) cite a virtual explosion in the number of narrative research projects within various social sciences in the last 15 years. In recent years, methods for drawing historical evidence from narratives have reestablished themselves as a “significant part of the (research) repertoire” within various disciplines such as psychology, psychotherapy, education, sociology, and history. Within public administration, scholars such as Lewis (1980), Wilson on primary and other secondary sources.
(1989), Doig and Hargrove (1990), and Cooper and Wright (1992) have used historical accounts of the lives and careers of public leaders to describe their lasting organizational effects and the significance of these effects for various schools of organizational theory. Increasingly, techniques exploiting historical accounts are viewed by scholars as important additions to the existing inventory of research tools such as experiments, surveys, participant observation, and other traditional methods.

Sources

Evidence from secondary sources is often used in historical research. Skocpol (1984) states that it is appropriate and in many cases necessary for social scientists to rely on secondary sources when using historical evidence for theory testing. She rejects as

\[10\] In historiography, a primary source is distinguished from a secondary source in that the former gives the words of the witnesses or first recorders of an event. The historian, using a number of such primary sources, produces a secondary source (Barzun and Graff, 1985).

\[11\] Lustick (1996) cites Aminzade (n.d.) as offering a differing view. Aminzade stresses the importance for historical social scientists to work with primary sources. Lustick questions this view, citing the issue of “whether a
logistically impossible that social scientists can develop enough expertise as historians in each period and area of interest to conduct their own research using primary sources in these areas. She states:

...if excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion - secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given study. (1984, p. 382)

However, Lustick (1996) notes that determining which studies are “excellent” when evidence conflicts is traditionally problematic in historiography. He states that the unself-conscious or careless use of secondary sources can result in selection bias. Both Lustick (1996) and Tarrow (1995) highlight the strong tendency for social scientists to be attracted to and convinced by historical accounts that agree with the expectation about events.

12 Barzun and Graff (1985) note that “decisive evidence” or evidence that confirms one hypothesis and excludes all rivals is a rarity in historical research. They cite a fundamental rule that historical “truth” is, at best, based on probability and while not computable quantitatively, it must be no less attentively weighed and judged. Baron (1986) agrees, stating that “brute facts” do not exist independent of their historical interpretation.
contained in the concepts they deploy and the theories they seek to test. Lustick (1996) concludes:

If social scientists test their theories against historical episodes by selecting those accounts of the episodes which are organized and presented according to the categories and propositions of the theories they are testing, then it will be no great surprise to learn that the theories receive "empirical" support from the exercise. (p. 610).

He encourages social scientists using secondary sources to direct "explicit and systematic attention" toward the issue of selection bias and to demonstrate care in the selection and reconstruction of historical accounts.

Yin (1994) cites selection bias and biased selectivity as specific weaknesses when using secondary accounts as sources of evidence. However, he also cites specific strengths of secondary sources such as journalistic accounts as evidentiary sources. Specifically, such sources are stable and available for repeated review, unobtrusive or not created as a result of the study itself, exact, containing exact names, references and details of events, and broad in coverage, capable of covering long periods of time, many events, and many settings.
Lustick (1996) suggests two strategies for dealing with selection bias when using evidence from historical accounts. First is the explicit consideration and indication of distinctive (even if implicit) commitments and biases in the secondary sources used. Second is the triangulation of evidence from different secondary sources despite differing approaches, use of archival sources, or political angles. While by no means fully resolving the problems of selection bias, these strategies attempt to make explicit the decisions made in source selection and the evident assumptions and biases within those sources, thus increasing the level of confidence in claims made by the secondary sources about the past.

Method Description

Researchers differentiate between variance and process approaches to explanation in qualitative research (Mohr, 13 The term triangulation is used without implying the precision of its use in trigonometry. In trigonometry, triangulation requires complete knowledge of the theoretical and empirical relationship among the sources of the different lines of sight. Few, if any, historical researchers can claim to possess a theory capable of organizing the different approaches of the sources they are "triangulating" within the same conceptual or theoretical field.

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Process explanations focus attention upon the identification and tracing of some process of interest. Process explanations are usually expressed as narratives that present a series of occurrences over time so as to explain how some phenomenon comes about (Mohr, 1982). A process approach to explanation specifies key events and provides evidence and arguments about the "mechanisms linking the action or events" (Vayda, McKay, and Eghenter, 1991). This dissertation employs a process approach to explanation to explore the possible use of cultural embedding mechanisms by the three leaders selected.

Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber (1998) identify four ideal type approaches for analyzing narrative materials that may be applied to primary and secondary historical sources. These are organized using two

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14 Variance and process approaches to explanation can also apply to research using quantitative data as well.

15 In contrast, Hult, Walcott, and Weko (1999) describe the variance approach to explanation in qualitative research as focusing on dependent and independent variables and the relationships between them.

16 In addition to the "holistic-content" approach to analysis, Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber (1998)
independent dimensions: (a) holistic versus categorical approaches and (b) content versus form. These may be best understood as orthogonal dimensions that create a Cartesian space in which actual analyses can be located. For example:

FIGURE 1.

THE DIMENSIONS OF NARRATIVE MATERIAL ANALYSIS

Content
|       |
|       |
|       |
|       |

Categorical ----------------------------Holistic
|       |
|       |
|       |
|       |

Form

identify "holistic-form" as a technique examining formal aspects of a narrative rather than its content; "categorical-content" examining narrative content irrespective of its context; and "categorical-form"
These theorists caution that the four approaches, in their ideal forms, modeled along these dimensions are very rare but clear examples of the analytic methods possible. In practice, however, the models of whole-content, category content, whole-form, and category-form should be considered possibilities along two continua; actual analyses more often consists of more balanced combinations. Researchers are left not with dichotomies, but rather myriad choices along the dimensions of unit of analysis and how texts are analyzed.

This study employed a technique closest to the whole-content approach to analysis in developing evidence from secondary sources. This technique examines historical accounts and their context -- focusing on the entire narrative content or separate sections that may be used for theory testing. Such analysis is most frequently used in case studies (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber, 1998).

This project employed a three-step methodology including a literature definition, source selection examining formal aspects of separate sections or categories.
procedure, and explicit search procedures within the secondary sources selected.

Step One: Literature Definition

The literature definition step sought to identify an extensive body of leader biographies and organizational histories for the purpose of evidence collection. This step used three widely recognized bibliographic, social science, and historical databases. The databases were (a) WORLDcat Bibliographic records for books, journals, sound recordings, videos and manuscripts collected and catalogued by libraries around the world, (b) Social Sciences Index containing more than 350 international, English-language periodicals in sociology, anthropology, geography, economics, political science, and law, and (c) Historical Abstracts indexing 2100 journals covering world history from 1450 to the present. Searches of these databases used the following terms:

\[\text{of a narrative.}\]

\[\text{17 This step sought to identify an extensive, but not necessarily comprehensive or exhaustive body of literature on each leader and organization. The intent was to identify a body of literature large enough for theory testing using historical evidence and manageable enough to allow replication by other researchers.}\]
"Allen Dulles"
"Allen W. Dulles"
"Allen Welsh Dulles"
"William Donovan"
"William J. Donovan"
"William Joseph Donovan"
"J. Edgar Hoover"
"John Edgar Hoover"
"CIA – History"
"Central Intelligence Agency – History"
"FBI – History"
"Federal Bureau of Investigation – History"

These database searches produced the following sources categorized by leader and organization:

**Allen Dulles**

7 biographies written from 1958 - 1999.


1 television documentary produced and aired in 1962.

**William Donovan**

1 biographic article written in 1993.
3 dissertations written from 1984 – 1999.

**J. Edgar Hoover**


**Central Intelligence Agency**


**Federal Bureau of Investigation**


Appendix A lists the biographies and organizational histories identified categorized by topic.

Step Two: Source Selection Procedures
All historical research employs some degree of judgmental sampling in the selection of sources (K. M. Hult, personal communication, March 9, 2001). However, the judgments made by researchers in source selection are frequently not explicitly revealed. This characteristic of many historical studies makes it difficult for later researchers to replicate methods or to confirm or refute findings. Careful source identification and the description of criteria used to select sources serve to partially address the factors of auditability and reliability in qualitative research such as historical studies (Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Hill, 1983).

The literature definition step identified a significantly larger number of biographic works for Hoover than for Dulles or Donovan and a relatively large amount of material detailing the organizational histories of the FBI and CIA.\textsuperscript{18} A judgmental sampling procedure was devised for

\textsuperscript{18} A number of factors account for the disparate number of biographic sources produced in the literature definition step for Hoover compared to Dulles and Donovan. Hoover served as a highly visible FBI Director for 47 years and constantly sought out press attention during his tenure. Both Dulles and Donovan served in public roles for
Hoover biographic materials and organizational history materials for both agencies. Given the relatively small number of works catalogued for Donovan and Dulles, all identified materials for these leaders were utilized.

Koeller (1996) identifies six considerations in evaluating secondary sources in historical research. These include:

1) How does the source compare to others written on the same or similar topics?
2) How do they differ?
3) Why do they differ?
   a) Do they use the same or different sources?
   b) Do they use these sources in the same way?
   c) Do they use the same methods or techniques?
   d) Are they directed at the same or similar audience?
4) When were the works written?
5) Do the authors have different backgrounds?
6) Does the author have a polemical purpose?

shorter periods of time and held secretive foreign policy and intelligence posts.
Using these criteria as an initial point of departure, ten of the more recent biographies of Hoover were selected which are listed in Appendix B. Emphasis was placed on more recent works based upon the assumption that the authors would be familiar with and rely upon or try to dispute earlier biographic works. Additionally, it was assumed that more current biographies were more likely to use recently available government and/or personal documents. The selected biographies met the criteria of (a) covering Hoover’s entire life and career; (b) being written by authors generally recognized as scholars or litterateurs on Hoover and/or the FBI; (c) relying on significant personal and FBI archival data; and (d) avoiding controversial negative or positive positions toward Hoover or the Bureau.

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19 Rosenfeld (1999) argues that historians have often allowed their political views to cloud objective judgments and to contribute to negative myths about Hoover and the FBI. In contrast, Theoharis (1998) states that positive views of the Bureau were deliberately constructed and perpetuated by Hoover’s manipulation of the popular press. Shafer (1985) identifies other issues for researchers working with historical biographies. He states that all such materials suffer from two weaknesses: excessive sympathy with the subject, and concentration on the life of an individual which can distort perspective.
Given the limited number of biographic articles and dissertations on Hoover that were identified in the literature definition and their relative recentness, all were selected for use in this effort.

Twenty-three books, nine journal articles and ten dissertations on CIA organizational history identified in the literature identification step were selected. Twelve books, six journal articles, and two dissertations on FBI organizational history were selected. Appendix C lists the selected works. Weight was given to organizational history works written by former organization members as first-hand accounts, works produced by the FBI or CIA themselves, works detailing a relatively long stretch of organizational history and breadth of topic coverage, and pieces appearing in recognized peer reviewed journals.

Despite these shortcomings, he notes that biographers can, and often do, follow the canons of critical research, and respond to the latest concepts and methods of investigation and interpretation.

20 A proportionally larger number of sources on CIA organizational history were selected because the literature definition step resulted in a larger number of sources on CIA history from which to draw.

21 An exception was Berry's (1997) Inside the CIA: Architecture, Art, and Atmosphere of America's Premier
The use of participant accounts and organizational works carry certain risks. Writers may provide self-serving and/or distorted interpretations of events (Shafer, 1980). However, such works also offer insights, information, and material not available elsewhere. For the purposes here, given the relatively large number of such works identified and the importance of many of the works themselves, it was judged useful and necessary to emphasize their inclusion as sources selected for each agency.

Step Three: Search Procedures

Koeller (1998) describes several methods for searching out an author’s interpretation in a secondary source and/or searching a text for specific information through a process called “gutting.” This metaphor implies abbreviated procedures for examining historical works for themes or trace evidence of events or processes under study (Barzun and Graff, 1985). These techniques are used to review relatively large bodies of literature efficiently for the purpose of grasping general concepts advanced by authors of Intelligence Agency. This work was specifically included due to its subject matter that seemed to directly address
and/or collecting data without the need to fully digest a large number of volumes.

This project used the following four-stage method for reviewing the selected secondary sources.

Stage One: Pilot Study

The purpose of the pilot study was to determine the feasibility of identifying influences of Donovan, Dulles, and/or Hoover on their organizations consistent with Schein’s (1983, 1991) cultural creation and embedding mechanisms. A limited number of the works selected for each leader and organization were read in their entirety. Insight was developed as to potentially workable processes for reviewing the remaining books, journal articles, and dissertations selected for the purpose of triangulating findings, identifying evidence consistent with the use of additional mechanisms, developing evidence to refute the presence of Schein’s mechanisms, or developing alternate explanations.²²

²² Schein’s (1983, 1991) mechanism “design of physical spaces, facades, and buildings.”

²² Yin (1984) states that one of the primary purposes of a pilot study is to provide necessary conceptual clarification for the research design. In this
Three of the selected biographies on each leader were read in their entirety along with three organizational histories of both the FBI and CIA. The selection of these sources, which are listed and described in Appendix D, was based on their ready availability to the author.

**Stage Two: Index Searches**

Index searches of the remaining selected biographies and organizational histories were conducted for the purpose of identifying possible incidents and historical episodes consistent with a leader’s deliberate or inadvertent use of one or more of Schein’s (1983, 1991) mechanisms. Index examinations were based upon passages found in the pilot study biographies that seemed to describe incidents and situations characteristic of the cultural embedding mechanisms described by Schein. For example, in Hersh (1992) the pages referenced in the index entry "Dulles, Allen Welsh; CIA restructuring and, 233-34, 288-90, 357-59," were reviewed in the context of Schein’s (1983, 1991) description of the mechanism used by leaders to design and investigate, the pilot study provided important methodological insight into what “gutting” procedures might be useful for the larger body of selected sources.
structure their organizations. In another example, in Ranelagh (1986) the pages referenced in the index entry "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), recruitment for, 21n, 25, 200, 278n, 691," were reviewed in the context of Schein’s (1983, 1991) description of the mechanism used by leaders in personnel recruitment and selection. Similar passages identified by index entries were reviewed to determine if they revealed evidence consistent with the use of a mechanism or several mechanisms for the purpose of triangulating findings made in the pilot study, or through subsequent content searches described below.

**Stage Three: Content Searches**

Content searches of the selected non-pilot biographies and organizational histories, for the purpose of possible mechanism identification or triangulation of findings, were conducted through reviews of table of contents and/or the examination of time periods identified through the pilot study as possibly revealing evidence consistent with Schein’s cultural embedding mechanisms. For example, in Leary (1984) the table of contents lists “Organizational
Charts” beginning on page 108 that illustrate in detail the structural evolution of CIA from 1947 through 1975. In the same work, “Part Two: The Dulles Era, 1953 - 1961,” beginning on page 54, describes the eight year tenure of Dulles as CIA director and the “personal stamp” he left on the Agency and the role of the DCI within government.

**Organization of Findings**

The historical sources used in the pilot study revealed evidence consistent with the use of a subset of Schein’s (1983, 1991) cultural embedding mechanisms by each leader. In each case, these findings were confirmed and sometimes expanded upon by several of the non-pilot sources selected. In chapters 4, 5, and 6, the evidence for each leader is presented in narrative form and organized at the end of each chapter using a six-column table. Table 1 illustrates the format.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Indicator(s)</th>
<th>Pilot Source(s)</th>
<th>Non-pilot source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The format identifies the mechanism revealed by the evidence, Schein’s (1983, 1991) classification of the mechanism as primary or secondary, the leader employing the mechanism, a short description of the indicators supporting the use of the mechanism, the pilot source(s) in which the evidence was revealed, and the non-pilot source(s) that confirmed and/reinforced the findings.

In the concluding chapter, the findings for each of the three cases are combined and presented using this tabular format. Taken together, the case findings are used as a basis for conclusions regarding the devices or instruments early leaders use to effect the process of institutionalization in their organizations.

Limitations

This study, its findings, and the conclusions drawn from those findings share the limitations inherent to all historical research and are additionally limited by their principal reliance on secondary sources. As Lustick (1996) notes, all historically grounded social science research relies not on “History,” but rather on multiple depictions of past events, or “histories,” that vary in accuracy and
validity. Such a state of affairs generates a “cloud that casts shadows” on historically based studies in all social sciences and organizational analyses. In this study, the “cloud” is darkened by the use of secondary sources as evidentiary databases. All social science research based upon historical analyses (and particularly those using secondary sources) work with “facts” and inferences drawn from others’ interpretation of past events. Ultimately, as in all qualitative studies, the researcher can only present interpretations of events recounted to them by others (Chell, 1998).

Such ambiguity is common to historical research methodology (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber, 1998). While all researchers recognize the need for being not only accurate in measuring things but also logical in interpreting the meaning of those measurements (Stake, 1995), traditional research evaluation criteria are mainly quantitative in nature and expressed in terms of statistical significance or similar measures. While some scholars believe that the same should apply for all research including historical studies and other forms of
qualitative research, this position is practically
difficult – or impossible – to maintain (Altheide &
Johnson, 1994). Moreover, this view contradicts the very
nature of the historical approach, which, starting from an
interpretive viewpoint, asserts that historical materials
and episodes – like reality itself – can be read,
understood, and analyzed in diverse ways. Alternative
interpretations of and findings from historical accounts
are by no means indications of inadequate scholarship but,
rather, are manifestations of the wealth such materials
offer and the range of sensibilities of different readers
(Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber, 1998).

Compared to quantitative measures of reliability and
validity, the criteria used in most forms of historical
research are qualitative in nature consisting of judgements
that cannot be expressed in scales or numbers. Hammersley
(1992) proposes two very general criteria for historical
research: validity, which asks how truthful, plausible, and

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23 Exceptions include “quantitative history” techniques that seek to extrapolate political and social trends prevailing in a society under investigation at a given time using historical demographic and economic statistical data (Baron, 1986).
credible an account is, and relevance, which asks whether an account is important and contributes to the field, previous findings, methods, theory, or social policy. It is to these standards that this effort aspires.

Narrative research methodologists using historical materials, such as Mishler (1990) and Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber (1998) do not directly refer to a "truth-value" in such studies, but propose a process of consensual validation. The latter theorists state:

...sharing one’s views and conclusions and making sense in the eyes of a community of researchers and interested informed individuals - is of the highest significance in narrative inquiry. (p. 173).

If this project serves to further the dialogue or generate fresh understandings of institutionalization processes within organizational analysis it may be judged a success. As Chell (1998) states, the ultimate validity of a qualitative research methodology in organizational studies must be assessed by its ability to yield genuine insights into processes shaping organizational behavior and its capacity to render a coherent account that makes sense.
CHAPTER 4

THE CASE OF WILLIAM DONOVAN

Historians have called Major General William Joseph Donovan “the spiritual father of central intelligence.” While never serving as CIA Director, he cast in broad definitive strokes the organization of America’s large-scale development of a national intelligence apparatus. Donovan’s role as the designer and director of America’s wartime OSS, his concept of a post-war central intelligence service, his influence upon OSS professionals who later became leaders of CIA, and his tireless efforts to shape the early agency from the outside laid the groundwork for the character of CIA and shaped the institutional environment in which the Agency would develop.  

\[24\] Jefferys-Jones (1989) states that while not a direct ancestor of CIA, the OSS set significant formative personnel, jurisdictional, and operational precedents for the Agency. Ultimately, Pearl Harbor served to frame the post war debate about the need for a permanent American foreign intelligence establishment in terms of such an organization’s power and functions rather than its necessity. Elements of the OSS experience served as an important blueprint for a peacetime central intelligence service (Leary, 1984).
Born to a first generation working class Irish Catholic family in Buffalo, New York, Donovan went on to garner an Ivy League education and to become one of the most highly decorated soldiers of World War I. As an accomplished attorney, he successfully argued cases before the US Supreme Court, served as a US attorney, assistant US attorney general, and was seriously considered for Attorney General by Herbert Hoover. He unsuccessfully ran as a Republican for New York Governor in 1932 and served as an associate prosecutor at Nuremberg.

Undoubtedly talented in law, Donovan’s passions lay in other areas. During the decade preceding World War II, Donovan traveled extensively, both privately and officially, to observe conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Europe. From the Spanish Civil War to Eastern Siberia to Ethiopia Donovan provided “unofficial” eyewitness intelligence assessments to the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations. His war record afforded him extraordinary access to world leaders. He developed a personal relationship with Winston Churchill, as a private citizen
was granted an audience with Benito Mussolini, and met with a young German putschist named Adolph Hitler.

In 1940, following the grave military defeat for traditional allies Britain and France, President Franklin Roosevelt turned to Donovan to provide an assessment of Britain’s ability to continue the war effort. Donovan had been an acquaintance of Roosevelt at Columbia law school and had been seriously considered by the President as a nominee for Secretary of War (Troy, 1984). While in Britain, Donovan conferred with high level military officials and maintained daily contact with officials from MI-6, the British foreign intelligence service (Troy, 1984). He returned in August and reported his belief that Britain would successfully repel a German invasion then thought probable (Darling, 1990) and his positive report provided impetus to the Destroyers-Bases Agreement between the U.S. and Britain (Troy, 1984).

Later in 1940, Roosevelt sent Donovan abroad again to make a strategic survey of American economic and political interests in the Mediterranean (Darling, 1990). Once again, Donovan was accompanied by British intelligence
officials and was provided total access to British intelligence and special operations organizations in the Mediterranean and Balkans (Troy, 1984). Jeffreys-Jones (1989) notes that the British used this trip to advise and encourage Donovan to address the inadequacies of American intelligence and displayed elements of their own apparatus as a model.

Upon his return in March 1941, Donovan reported to the President his views of the importance of Northwest Africa to the U.S., psychological and political warfare, and upon a central intelligence committee being formed in Britain (Darling, 1990). At Roosevelt’s direction, Donovan briefed Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Navy Secretary Frank Knox, and Attorney General Robert Jackson about his concept of an intelligence agency with the accompanying forces of propaganda and subversion. They endorsed Donovan’s proposal to the President for a “service of strategic information” (U.S. War Department, 1949 cited by Darling, 1990).

Urged on by Navy Secretary Knox, Donovan wrote a memo on June 10, 1941, urging the creation of a clandestine
service. Such an agency was to be headed by a "Coordinator of Information" (COI) appointed by the President and "directly responsible to him and no one else." The COI would be funded through a secret fund controlled "solely at the discretion of the President." Bowing to political realities, Donovan proposed that the COI would not take over "the home duties now performed by the FBI" and would not interfere with "the intelligence activities of the Army and Navy." The COI’s purpose would be to coordinate, classify, and interpret "all information from whatever source obtained."

Acting on these recommendations, Roosevelt established the Office of the COI on July 11, 1941. With Donovan as Coordinator, the organization reported directly to the President and its specific duties were to collect and analyze information from senior officials, drawing from information from the Army, Navy, and State Departments (Leary, 1984).

Darling (1990) relates that COI developed rapidly under Donovan and many elements of a central intelligence service were in operation by the time of Pearl Harbor. As
American involvement in WWII began, opposition to Donovan began to disappear. Brigadier General Walter Bedell Smith\textsuperscript{25} convinced his Army superiors that Donovan’s easy access to Roosevelt could be leveraged by the military and the COI was brought under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chief’s of Staff as the OSS June 1942.

The OSS was charged with the collection and analysis of “strategic information” and with the planning and direction of “special services” requested by the Joint Chief’s (U.S. Department of State, 1996). Specifically denied domestic responsibilities, the President established a separate office of war information to handle domestic propaganda\textsuperscript{26}. British intelligence provided invaluable assistance to the OSS furnishing instruction in communications, counterespionage, subversive propaganda, and special operations. Leary (1984) notes that in real terms the British provided the OSS with the essence of

\textsuperscript{25} Smith served as Director of Central Intelligence from October 1950 to February 1953.

\textsuperscript{26} Jeffreys- Jones (1989) notes that this separation addressed long-standing police state fears of Congress and the public who demanded different methods to be used at home and abroad.
“tradecraft” – the techniques required to carry out intelligence activities.

Although by the end of the war the OSS had expanded dramatically, it encountered considerable bureaucratic resistance. The military was reluctant to provide the OSS with information for its research and analysis role and restricted its operations. General Douglas MacArthur barred the OSS from his theater of operations and FBI Director Hoover and Nelson Rockefeller, then Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, insisted on maintaining their own jurisdiction over Latin America (Leary, 1984).

Despite the resistance from other agencies, Donovan remained convinced that a centralized intelligence organization remained an important tool for senior U.S. policymakers in the postwar period. Foreseeing the end of the war, Donovan recommended that OSS functions be continued in a peacetime agency directly responsible to the President (Leary, 1984). In a 1944 memorandum to Roosevelt, Donovan recommended the continuance of a peacetime intelligence organization. This memorandum set out what was later commonly known as “The Donovan Plan.”
This plan called for a central, independent intelligence service headed by an appointee of the President who should be responsible to the President and charged with the conduct of secret operations, the production of national intelligence, and the coordination of the activities of the departmental intelligence services.

Donovan’s hope for a post-war continuation of the OSS died with President Roosevelt in April 1945. Various senior civilian and military officials voiced misgivings of a peacetime role for the OSS to President Truman who disliked Donovan personally (Riebling, 1994). The OSS was officially disbanded by Executive Order in October 1945 and it ceased to exist in January 1946 when Donovan stepped down (Polmar and Allen, 1998).

After serving as an associate prosecutor at Nuremberg, Donovan continued to lobby for an American centralized intelligence organization and he sought to “unofficially” influence a number of studies exploring options for future defense and intelligence organizations. He was deeply dissatisfied with the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in January 1946 that fell
significantly short of his vision of an independent central intelligence service directly under the control of the President. Donovan, as a private citizen, gave a series of public speeches and interviews criticizing CIG. During a speech to the overseas press club in March 1946 he referred to CIG as “a good debating society but a poor administering instrument” and argued in an October 1946 Life interview that America needed “central intelligence appropriate to our position as the world’s greatest power” (Riebling, 1994).

Concurrently, President Truman was growing impatient with continued fragmentation of intelligence reporting from the military services and the State Department. The president had been following a congressional inquiry into the intelligence failures associated with Pearl Harbor and monitored America’s increasing tensions with the Soviet Union. He ordered the implementation of a refined version of Donovan’s 1944 Plan (Riebling, 1994).

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Warner (1995) notes that CIG was a bureaucratic anomaly with no independent budget, no statutory mandate, with staffers assigned from the permanent departments of government.
Congress passed the National Security Act in July 1947 legislating changes in the Executive branch that had been under discussion since 1945. The Act established an independent Air Force; provided for coordination by a committee of service chiefs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a Secretary of Defense; and created the National Security Council (NSC). The CIG became an independent department and was renamed CIA (Leary, 1984).

CIA, formalized by the National Security Act, incorporated several significant ideas of the original Donovan Plan and in future decades the Agency would operate from a base of precedents established by Donovan’s OSS (Jeffrey-Jones, 1989). Troy (1984) maintains that the 1947 Act was not only a return to the Donovan Plan itself, but to a number of Donovan’s fundamental assertions about U.S. national intelligence. It formalized Donovan’s affirmations of the high status of peacetime intelligence, the establishment of a new, strong, central agency headed by a civilian, performing diverse functions, while restricted in its domestic activities. Montague (1992) states that there would have been no CIA without Donovan’s
initiative and Troy (1984) expands the point by stating that Donovan’s initiative forced the military to think thoughts (about intelligence) that they never dared think before.

Troy (1984) continues:

"While the name ‘Central Intelligence Agency’ was not of Donovan’s devising, those three words concisely and accurately summarize Donovan’s contribution to the theory and structure of CIA. More than any other person, it was Donovan who singled out ‘the stuff’ of ‘intelligence’ as an essentially new field of human knowledge and activity. He perceived it as an ‘essential of statecraft,’ as a correlate of war and diplomacy, as a permanent peacetime requirement of government. It was Donovan who recognized that the appropriate status for intelligence was independence and that such independence required the establishment of an ‘agency’ free of any other department of government. Such an agency, he held, had to possess, under the Constitution, internal unity and strength. It was Donovan who recognized from the beginning that the agency’s position in the American government was ‘central’ to the government’s older and necessary departmental intelligence agencies. He sought to serve not just departmental but also a national need.” (p. 410).

Many of Donovan’s influential friends lobbied for him to be appointed the first DCI, but Truman never seriously considered him. On the eve of CIG’s reconstitution as CIA, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter was appointed as the first CIA Director. Despite being denied an official role
within the newly born CIA, Donovan continued almost daily contact with several of his former OSS lieutenants now holding mid-level and senior management positions within the Agency. He attempted to influence Agency operations and continued to press his ideas on clandestine collection, covert action, and intelligence analysis on former subordinates now managing CIA (Leary, 1984; Riebling, 1994).

Donovan continued to practice law into the early 1950’s, arguing several cases before the US Supreme Court. Dunlop (1982) notes that in 1953 Donovan was again considered as CIA director as an alternative to Allen Dulles, but by this time was 70 years old and beginning to slow in his activities. Instead, he was appointed American ambassador to Thailand by President Eisenhower in August 1953 but had to resign 18 months later due to ill health. Donovan was awarded the National Security Medal in 1957 making him the first American to hold the nation’s four top decorations – the Congressional Medal of Honor, the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{28}}\text{Riebling (1994) states that Donovan maintained almost daily contact with DCI’s Walter Bedell Smith and}\]
Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the National Security Medal. He died in 1959 at age 76.

Organization Design and Structure

Schein (1983) states that organization design and structure is one mechanism by which early leaders can significantly influence culture creation and development. He posits that the design of work, the chain of command, degree of decentralization, functional criteria for differentiation, and mechanisms used for integration carry implicit leader messages that affect how culture gestates and evolves. Hatch (1997) differentiates between an organization’s physical structure made up of material elements such as buildings and geographic locations and social structure encompassing relationships between social elements such as people, positions, and the organizational units to which they belong (e.g. departments, divisions). Schein also differentiates between physical and social structure in organizations.

Allen Dulles providing old OSS documents, giving advice on organization, and recommending former OSS personnel.
and the descriptions that follow emphasize the latter. 29

Workflows, hierarchical responsibilities, and task differences both affect and effect organization design and structure. Organizational charts are frequently used to get a quick overview of a social structure. Such charts provide a fairly clear representation of an organization’s hierarchy of authority and division of labor (Daft, 1998). The evolution of an organizational chart also provides a useful descriptive or analytic tool to examine the history of past organizational relationships and stakeholder expectations (Hatch, 1997). Chart evolution may also reflect environmental pressures and/or map the development of organizational sub-cultures.

The selected historical sources provide evidence that Donovan strongly influenced Agency design and structure. Donovan’s organization of the wartime OSS provided a basic point of departure for later CIA structure. His creation,

29 Schein (1983) identifies two other mechanisms that comprise physical and social aspects of organizational structure. “Organization Systems and Procedures” describe information flows, control mechanisms, and decision support systems within organizations while “Design of Physical Spaces, Facades, and Buildings” refer to the physical
the organizational precedent for the Agency, furnished a
"blueprint" (Ranelagh, 1986) of a fundamental set of
structural components that have remained remarkably stable
for over fifty years (Lowenthal, 1978; Leary, 1984) and
provided the foundation around which distinct organization
subcultures within CIA evolved (Hastedt, 1996).

With his appointment as COI by President Roosevelt in
July 1941, Donovan was charged with creating and managing a
relatively modest organization that analyzed and collated
intelligence information and data collected by "the various
departments" including the military services, State
Department and the FBI for the President. Troy (1984)
states that Donovan had other, more ambitious, ideas. He
quickly set about creating a multi-faceted organization
which would also actively collect intelligence, conduct
analysis, print and broadcast propaganda, mount special
operations, inspire guerrilla action, and send commandos
into battle. Far exceeding his authorized activities as
COI, Donovan surpassed his annual Bureau of the Budget
appropriations ten fold within the first two months and COI hiring ceilings by a factor of twenty by March 1942.  

While not explicitly authorized to do so, Donovan established a section in COI named, “Special Activities – K and L Funds” in October 1941 to take charge of espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and guerrilla units. In close association with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) which operated raiding groups and supported guerrilla activities in German-occupied countries (Polmar and Allen, 1997) he laid the foundations for an American force like the British Commandos (Darling, 1990).

Even before the President’s order creating COI, Donovan began shaping the creation of the Foreign Information Service to broadcast radio messages, issue pamphlets, and spread propaganda. With its listening outposts it was soon obtaining information for the production of intelligence. A Research and Analysis Branch 

\[^{30}\text{Troy (1984) cites OSS records that indicate that the Budget Bureau estimated that COI could operate on$1.4M the first year however, expenditures reached$10M by the end of September 1941. Additionally, the Budget Bureau estimated in July 1941 that COI could operate with approximately 90 “special agents and assistants.” At the}\]
was established in August and began to collect the basic material for intelligence reports. By October, a Visual Presentation Branch was working on techniques of delivering intelligence reports and related material to the departments and services involved. An Oral Intelligence Unit was created to interview persons recently arrived from abroad. Through cooperation with the British, a COI office was established in London and the collection of intelligence using covert agents began upon agreement with the Army and Navy in October 1941 (U.S. War Department, 1949 as cited in Troy, 1984).

With the transformation of COI into the OSS, under the JCS, Donovan arranged his organization functionally along three primary directorates reporting to a headquarters staff (Troy, 1984). These directorates, Strategic Services and Operations, Intelligence Services, and Administrative Services formed the basic structure of collection, analysis, and support that was mirrored by the newly created CIA in 1947. Each OSS directorate was organized into several branches. Within the Strategic Services
Directorate the major branches included Secret Intelligence (SI) which collected intelligence through clandestine espionage activities, Secret Operations (SO) which conducted sabotage, subversion, and worked with resistance forces, and Morale Operations (MO) which conducted black propaganda efforts. The Intelligence Services Directorate included Research and Analysis (R&A) which provided economic, social, and political analysis and provided effectiveness assessments of various conventional and secret operations, and Counterintelligence (X-2) which worked to neutralize German “stay-behind” networks working behind advancing Allied lines (Leary, 1984; Polmar and Allen, 1997). 31 The Administrative Services Directorate included Budget and Procedures, Procurement and Supply,
Reproduction, Transportation, Office Services, and Finance, Personnel, and Medical Services Branches (Troy, 1984).

Various functions were organized as staff elements directly supporting the Director and Assistant Director of the OSS. These included General Counsel, Inspector General, Liaison, and Security offices as well as several coordinating, planning, and advisory groups (Troy, 1984).

American innovation both in function and designation that the CIA maintained (Ranelagh, 1994).
Ranelagh (1986) states that the SO Branch required an organizational pattern that was completely military in form
and was as closely tied to military commanders in the various war theaters as it was to OSS HQ. In contrast, R&A Branch was based almost entirely at HQ and had a definite collegiate air to it. SI Branch, while also at OSS HQ in Washington, was a tightly knit group of security-conscious officers who saw bureaucratic checks as important for secrecy. OSS outposts in the war theaters were patterned on the Washington structure, with adjustments made for local needs.

Despite rapid growth and a period of minor reorganization near war’s end, the structure of the OSS remained essentially unchanged during the organization’s three-year history. Dissolved by Executive Order 9621 in October 1945, 1,362 employees of the OSS R&A Branch and the Presentation Branch (which prepared maps and other briefing documents) were transferred to the State Department as the Interim Research and Intelligence Service. 9,028 people in the OSS espionage and counterespionage elements were assigned to the War Department’s newly created Strategic Services Unit (SSU) (Polmar and Allen, 1997).
Significantly, the core OSS elements of analysis and collection remained intact. Each continued to function, albeit at drastically reduced personnel and activity levels, within their adoptive agencies. Other elements of OSS continued to survive as well. Riebling (1994) writes that two days after Truman’s executive order disbanded the OSS, Donovan entered into partnership with retired MI-6 officer William Stephenson in a Panamanian registered company called the World Commerce Corporation. As OSS officers left government service after the transfer of OSS elements to the State and War Departments, Donovan used this company to “hire” them. By 1947, Donovan’s company employed former OSS officers in 47 countries and operated as a “mercenary intelligence system.”

Three months after the dissolution of the OSS, President Truman established the CIG. Truman’s directive provided the CIG with a Director of Central Intelligence.

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32 Cline (1976) notes that neither group received much of a welcome. State sought funding for only 800 to 900 of the transferred OSS employees and the director of the SSU, General John Magruder, resigned in January 1946 in protest of the military’s indifference to his unit.
chosen by the President and supervised by a group comprised of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy and a personal representative of the President collectively known as the National Intelligence Authority (Jeffreys-Jones, 1989). The CIG was staffed by employees detailed from the State, War, and Navy departments including large numbers of former OSS R&A and SI veterans (Troy, 1984).

Frustrated by a lack of cooperation between the various departments and CIG (Jeffreys-Jones, 1989), alarmed by threatening forward pressure from the Soviet Union (Smith, 1997), and in response to fear of another Pearl Harbor-like surprise (Jeffreys-Jones, 1997), President Truman, with bipartisan congressional support, advanced a plan for the creation of an independent CIA to be created as part of the 1947 National Security Act (Troy, 1984). As part of this Act, or Public Law 253, CIA was established as an independent agency under a National Security Council (NSC), headed by the President and directed by a civilian DCI. The Act gave CIA four functions: (1) to advise the NSC, (2) to make recommendations on coordination, (3) to
produce national intelligence, and (4) to perform services of common concern and to perform such other functions and duties as the NSC might direct.\footnote{The expansively written fourth function provided tacit authorization for CIA to conduct foreign espionage and counter-espionage operations as well as “such other” intelligence related activities the NSC might direct (Troy, 1984).} The Agency was specifically denied “police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions” (Ranelagh, 1986).

CIG formed the nucleus of the newly formed CIA along with the OSS R&A Branch from State Department and various intelligence and counterintelligence SI Branch elements that had been incorporated into the War Department’s SSU (Troy, 1984; Leary, 1984).\footnote{Leary (1984) notes that SSU had maintained both OSS SI Branch personnel and field stations since 1945. Seven field stations remained in North Africa and the Near East. OSS equipment, codes, techniques, and communications facilities were intact and ready to be activated.} Overseas OSS veterans hired by Donovan’s World Commerce Corporation joined the Agency and became a substantial portion of CIA’s initial foreign presence in its earliest days (Jeffreys-Jones, 1989; Smith, 1997). Leary (1984) states that in large part, the
functions, structure, and expertise of the newly formed CIA were drawn from the OSS.

The initial structure of CIA continued to follow the basic structural OSS model of collection, analysis, and support. The Agency's 1947 organization pivoted around four primary offices - two of which were tasked with intelligence production and dissemination functions and two charged with intelligence collection. The Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) which incorporated the OSS/CIG R&A Branch was responsible for the production of national current intelligence and the coordination of interagency estimates. The Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD) was tasked with intelligence distribution and the storage and retrieval of unevaluated intelligence. These offices constituted the core of the Agency's analysis function. The Office of Special Operations (OSO) which incorporated the OSS/CIG SI, SO, and X2 Branches was responsible for espionage and counterespionage activities. The Office of Operations (OO) was accountable for the accumulation of overt information. Taken together, OSO and OO formed the heart of CIA's intelligence collection
function. Much like OSS, the initial Agency structure included staff elements directly subordinate to the DCI including legal, inspection, security, and management support entities (Leary, 1984).

FIGURE 3.
1947 CIA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE (PARTIAL)

By 1950, CIA structure included additional analytic and collection elements as well as an expanded support structure. An Office of Scientific Intelligence was added to the analysis function and given responsibility for research in the basic sciences, scientific resources, and medicine. The Office of Policy Coordination was established as part of the Agency’s clandestine collection
function to carry out covert action projects. Additional administrative functions in the form of a medical staff and a coordination and policy staff were added to support CIA’s developing organization.

With the outbreak of the Korean War and the increased demands for coordinated national intelligence that it generated, CIA began reorganizing in 1950. By 1953, under Allen Dulles, the Agency’s structure further formalized and separated the basic functions of collection, analysis, and support through the creation of three primary directorates. These directorates, while larger and much more complex than their OSS structural ancestors, seemed to closely mirror their functions. The Directorate of Plans (DP) or “clandestine service” included all covert collection activities organized into geographical divisions, and the covert action and counterintelligence staffs. The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) included the Office of Research and Reports (formerly ORE), OCD, and an Office of

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35 Leary (1984) relates that the precedent for covert activities existed in OSS. OSS clandestine collection capability had been preserved through SSU and absorbed by CIG in June 1946. The maintenance of that
National Estimates with the sole task of producing "national estimates" that had been coordinated with other departmental intelligence services. All CIA support functions were grouped as part of the Directorate of Administration (DA).

This basic three-directorate scheme established in 1953 has served as the fundamental structure of CIA to the present time. Two significant periods of change have added to and modified Agency organization in response to environmental changes. Despite these adjustments, the functional directorate format has remained the core of Agency organization and the structural pillars of collection, analysis, and support have endured.

FIGURE 4.

1953 CIA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE (PARTIAL)

[Diagram showing the organizational structure of CIA in 1953 with the Director, Deputy Director, and their staffs, followed by the directorates of Plans (DP), Intelligence (DI), and Administration (DA).]

capability and its presence in CIA contributed to the
By the 1960’s CIA had achieved significant advances in its strategic intelligence capability. The development of overhead reconnaissance, beginning with the U-2 aircraft and growing in scale and sophistication with follow-on systems, generated information in greater quantity and accuracy than ever contemplated before (Leary, 1984). In 1962, under DCI John McConne, a Directorate of Research and Development (DRD) was created as part of a concerted effort to harness technology and science for intelligence purposes (Richelson, 1997). This fourth CIA directorate was given responsibility for conducting in depth, research, and development in the scientific and technical fields to support intelligence collection by advanced technical means. Richelson (1997) states that DRD components included the Office of ELINT\textsuperscript{36} and the Office of Special Activities (OSA) that administered the Agency’s four ongoing overhead reconnaissance programs - the “Corona” and

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\textsuperscript{36} ELINT is an acronym for Electronic Intelligence or intelligence derived from electromagnetic radiation other than radio signals. A principal source of ELINT is radar transmissions (Polmar and Allen, 1998).
"Argon" satellite programs and the "Oxcart" and "Idealist" (U-2) aircraft programs. OSA was also responsible for the development of further aerospace intelligence systems. An Office of Research and Development was also established within DRD. While DRD generally maintained control over CIA technical collection systems, the primary analysis component for technical intelligence, the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), remained within the DI (Richelson, 1997).

In March 1963 DRD was renamed the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T). In addition to technical collection systems, the DS&T incorporated the OSI, the first large scale mixing of collection and analysis functions in the Agency’s 16-year history (Richelson,

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37 The development of overhead reconnaissance systems created the need for a new group of intelligence specialists: photographic interpreters. CIA established a photographic center in the DI in 1953. With the deployment of the U-2 and the large quantity of imagery it produced, in 1961 the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) was established under DCI direction. Staffed by CIA and military personnel, NPIC was a DI component until transferred to the Directorate of Science and Technology in 1973 (Leary, 1984).
By 1964, the DS&T incorporated six offices including the Office of Computer Services, Office of ELINT (Renamed Office of SIGINT Operations in 1978), the Office of Research and Development, the Office of Special Activities (which would be renamed the Office of Development and Engineering in 1973), the OSI, and the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center (Richelson, 1997). Later the DS&T incorporated Technical Services Division from the Directorate of Operations (as Plans was renamed) in 1973 and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, whose open source collection activities provided a significant portion of the information used by Agency analysts.

38 Significantly, DCI McCone who established the DS&T was not an OSS veteran. He held various engineering and executive positions in private industry as well as senior government posts such as Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of the Air Force before being appointed DCI after the resignation of Allen Dulles (Polmar and Allen, 1998).

39 SIGINT is an acronym for Signals Intelligence or intelligence derived from communications and electronic intelligence (Polmar & Allen, 1998).
The DS&T’s innovation of combining technical development, collection, and analysis activities under one
management structure was driven in large part by a desire to prevent the Air Force from encroaching on the technical intelligence collections systems developed by the Agency (Ranelagh, 1986). The Agency sought a type of competitive advantage over Air Force intelligence components vying for control of the U-2 and surveillance satellite programs. The circumstances surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis and the speed and perceived magnitude of the threat placed great pressure on CIA to produce a “full service” component for technical intelligence and a “all singing, all-dancing beast” that combined technical development, collection and analysis (Jeffreys-Jones, 1997). The nature of quickly developing technology itself also played a part in CIA seeking a reciprocal relationship between developers, users, and consumers of technical intelligence sources and methods (Leary, 1984).

CIA’s basic five part organizational structure, a small office of the Director and the four functional directorates, remained strikingly stable through the 1980’s. With the exception of the DS&T that combined the functions of analysis and collection, the other CIA
directorates remained separate, narrowly focused, and autonomous entities. The careful separation of analysis from collection reflected a "cardinal rule" of intelligence first established in Donovan’s OSS, never bring together analysis and collection in one place thereby allowing the same unit to conduct intelligence operations and evaluate their results (Hastedt, 1996).

A number of the selected historical sources state that the structural separation of Agency functions influenced the development of organizational subcultures and the flow of information. These authors attribute the development of distinct CIA sub-cultures to the scrupulous functional separation of intelligence collection and analysis. This structural separation and the resultant sub-cultures that have formed around these structures have fostered an environment of information compartmentation that has significantly contributed to critical incidents in CIA history and thus the Agency’s organizational development and evolution.

Cogan (1993) states that while operational (collection) elements of Donovan’s OSS joined the war
overseas, analytical OSS elements remained behind in Washington. As a result, the genesis of two distinct cultures began to take shape – known by OSS veterans as the “cowboys and choirboys” (“The Glory Days,” 1992). Within the relatively short war years, a natural tension began to develop between these elements – one that clandestinely collected intelligence, many times in dangerous overseas environments, and the other that assessed and evaluated the fruits of collection in the relatively sterile and safe surroundings of headquarters. Marchetti and Marks (1974) state that the foundational structures established in the OSS created a fundamental and longstanding distinction in CIA between those who collect and analyze intelligence.

The sub-cultural evolution of collection and analysis continued in the early CIA and coalesced in the structural components of the DI and DO (Cogan, 1993). Hastedt (1996) quotes former DCI William Colby as stating that from its earliest beginnings CIA has been “a loose confederation of three compartmented and competing cultures.” Colby describes them as (1) a sub-culture of well-educated specialists in research and analysis; (2) a covert action
subculture surrounding those who engage in psychological war and acts of propaganda; and (3) a foreign intelligence subculture embracing those who are charged with espionage and counterespionage.

Members of the collection and analysis subcultures have developed distinctive traits that sharply distinguish them from each other. Case officers, who clandestinely collect intelligence overseas, possess a "clandestine mentality" that thrives on secrecy and deception and encourages professional amorality (Hastedt, 1996). The DO, known as the "clandestine clan" (Adelman, 1980), has developed inherent habits of information compartmentation and secrecy. The directorate is known as an elite but, insular confraternity and its officers face isolation from the rest of the Agency and the "the real world." (Cogan, 1993).

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40 Hastedt (1996) cites Martin (1980) as identifying another distinct CIA subculture in his account of the behavioral logic at work in counterintelligence, something akin to what he described as a "wilderness of mirrors."

41 The Agency kept clandestine collection of intelligence separate from covert action operations until
DI analysts, who mold finished intelligence products and exert influence over who receives them and how they are perceived (Hastedt, 1996), share the traits of rigid academicians (Cogan, 1993). Characterized as being distracted by issues of scholarly integrity, DI officers value current intelligence over all else, are consumed with winning the daily competition to get policymakers attention, and work within a world of strictly enforced semantic probability scales built around phases such as “highly likely,” “we doubt,” and “almost certainly” (Hastedt, 1996). The environment of the DI, known as “National University,” is one based upon information sharing between analysts and academically debated and considered estimates (Cogan, 1993).

Ranelagh (1986) states that structural separation of clandestine collections and covert action from analysis has encouraged and exacerbated subculture growth, sharp and often hostile divisions, and an intense competition for resources and dominance between them (Lowenthal, 1978). Despite this, the practice of keeping clandestine

August 1952 when DCI Walter Bedell Smith moved to unify the
collection of information separate from analysis has been a zealously guarded principle at CIA.

The first large-scale merger of collections and analysis functions in the DS&T by DCI John McCone was sharply criticized by OSS veterans who had moved into senior level Agency positions (Hastedt, 1996). Richelson (1997) quotes the memoirs of former Deputy Director for Intelligence and OSS analytic veteran Ray Cline who stated:

"...(the transfer of analytic functions to the DS&T) was a major change in CIA structure (which) I disapproved of. CIA advocacy of its own scientific collection techniques became mixed up with its objective analysis of all scientific and technical developments. The appearance of objectivity was hard to maintain when analysis and collection were supervised by the same staff." (Cline, 1976 as cited in Richelson, 1997 p. 88).

Despite various attempts at consolidating collection and analysis during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the DO and DI continued to closely guard the separation of their traditional functions. In response to environmental pressures at the close of and following the Cold War, the Agency established a series of matrixed "centers" to deal with specific and/or nontraditional threats to U.S.

two functions in the newly created DP (Hastedt, 1996).
security. These entities which included the Counterintelligence Center in 1986, the Counter-narcotics Center in 1989, and the Non-Proliferation Center in 1991, among others, attempted to combine CIA collection and analysis functions into independent cross-functional offices focused on specific issues ("The Glory Days," 1992). Despite these efforts, by the mid-1990’s, the various centers had been reorganized back into the management control of the DO or DI structural monoliths and the functions separated between the directorates.  

Several organizational historians cite episodes of Agency dysfunction resulting from the compartmentation of information between the collection/covert action elements of CIA and its analysts. Adelman (1980) and Thompson (1996) cite the most celebrated of these as the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. CIA analysts were kept completely in the dark about the planning and execution of the operation for security reasons. The DP insured that Cuban analysts in the DI were not informed of the plans for a government-
in-exile and the landing of armed guerrillas. A major cause cited by Adelman (1980), Ranelagh (1986), and Thompson (1996) for the failure of the operation was senior Agency management’s reliance on misleadingly optimistic reports by DP staff officers rather than accurate assessments of the situation prepared by the DI.

While subculture development cannot be attributed solely to the design and structure of an organization, an organization’s established chain of command and information flows can provide the scaffolding around which long-term intra-organizational relationships form (Hatch, 1997; Daft, 1998). The cited historical sources agree that at CIA, the functional directorate model, separating collections from analysis, has provided fertile ground for subculture growth and entrenchment. Donovan’s OSS, that established the fundamental functional structure of collection, analysis, and support, served as the model for early CIA. Carried forward by OSS veterans who initially staffed and eventually managed the Agency, this structure has remained largely unchanged for over fifty years. Only the

Virtually all collection elements of CIC, however, were
environmental pressures of rapid technology changes in intelligence collection during the 1960’s broke Donovan’s mold of functional separation between collections and analysis.

Historians cite the importance of Donovan’s creation and organization of the OSS as the seminal design and structural precedent for CIA. His separation of collection and analysis functions in the OSS carried forward into the newly created CIA through the incorporation of OSS structural elements into the Agency and the large number of OSS veterans who joined the new intelligence service as a founding generation. OSS veterans who became managers in CIA formalized the three structural pillars of collection, analysis, and support, first established in the wartime agency by establishing distinct directorates. While this structural form has survived for over fifty years, environmental pressures during the 1960’s spurred the creation of a fourth directorate that incorporated the previously separated functions of collection and analysis. This structural change and break with tradition was returned to the DO.
initiated by a DCI who was not connected with the OSS and who had significant experience outside of government. This structural change arguably parallels Schein’s (1983) concept of “hybrid” evolution fuelled by external organizational pressures and action by professional managers not part of the original generation.

Evidence consistent with Donovan’s use of organizational design and structure as a secondary cultural embedding mechanism and the pilot and non-pilot historical sources from which this evidence was drawn is summarized below:
Table 2. -- Donovan's Use of Organizational Design and Structure as a Secondary Cultural Embedding Mechanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Pilot Sources</th>
<th>Non-pilot sources</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How the organization is designed and structured.</td>
<td>OSS structural legacy, separation of collections from analysis, distinct subculture development.</td>
<td>Troy (1984)</td>
<td>Marchetti &amp; Marks (1974); Adelman (1980); Leary (1984); Jeffereys-Jones (1989); CQ Researcher (1992); Cogan (1993); Hastedt (1996); Thompson (1996); Jeffreys-Jones (1997); Polmar &amp; Allen (1997); Richelson (1997); Smith (1997)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Darling (1990)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Criteria Used for Recruitment and Selection of People

Schein (1981; 1991) maintains that the explicit or unconscious criteria that leaders use to determine who "fits" and who doesn't "fit" membership roles and key slots in an organization is a potent mechanism affecting the creation and evolution of organization culture. The criteria used to determine who is hired, who moves up, who plateaus, who retires early, and who is ostracized play
important roles in how organizational members learn the right things to do, and what model of reality to adopt. The selection decisions for new members, followed by the criteria applied in the promotion system play a powerful role in shaping, perpetuating, and reinforcing organizational culture (Schein, 1991). Metaphorically, if as French (1990) believes, the recruitment and selection of personnel supplies the lifeblood of an organization, Schein (1981; 1991) might posit that the criteria used by early leaders in making these decisions can determine an organization’s blood type and chemical composition.

Personnel recruiting and selection as a cultural creation and embedding mechanism is subtle because it operates unconsciously in most organizations (Schein, 1991). Organizations tend to find attractive those candidates who resemble present members in style, assumptions, values, and beliefs. They are perceived as the “best” people to hire and have characteristics attributed to them that justify their selection. Unless outsiders are explicitly involved in organizational hiring, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which implicit
assumptions dominate recruiters’ perceptions of candidates (Schein, 1991).

The reviewed secondary historical sources furnish evidence that Donovan left an enduring stamp on CIA hiring trends through recruitment practices he established in OSS. First generation OSS veterans continued these preferences at CIA and sought to hire those sharing similar backgrounds, social characteristics, educational preparation, and belief systems (Adelman, 1980). Jeffreys-Jones (1997) states that these conspicuous hiring predilections continued through the mid-1960’s and began to meaningfully change only after the Bay of Pigs failure spurred the executive branch and Congress to call into question the leadership and wisdom of first-generation managers. Despite these changes, OSS veterans and those sharing similar social and educational backgrounds continued to serve in key management positions into the 1980’s.

Donovan’s OSS cadre included military personnel – assigned from the services – and civilians. Donovan recruited a wide variety of Americans: university
professors such as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.; lawyers, including future Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg; and advertising men, journalists, and writers (including Gene Fodor, originator of Fodor’s Guides, and cookbook author Julia Childs); film makers (John Ford); and economists (for analysis of German war production). David K. Bruce, director of OSS European operations went on to become U.S. Ambassador to France (1949 – 1952), West Germany (1957 – 1958), and the United Kingdom (1961 – 1969) – the only person to hold three major ambassadorships (Polmar and Allen, 1997). Other OSS alumni included author and playwright Robert Sherwood, poet Archibald McLeish, critic Malcolm Cowley, fashion designer Count Oleg Cassini, and former G-man Melvin Pervis, famous as the man who shot John Dillinger (Riebling, 1994).

The ranks of the OSS were filled with men and women listed in the East Coast social registers. Criticized by its contemporaries and in later years for being elitist, “Ivy Leaguish”, and Wall Street oriented, the OSS did in many ways did reflect the social composition of the East Coast Establishment (Jeffrey-Jones, 1989). Forty-two
members of the Yale class of 1943 went into the OSS and many, both inside and outside the service, referred to the organization as “Oh! So Social” or “Oh! So Special.” Polmar and Allen (1997) note that both labels were appropriate; Donovan was a graduate of Columbia University and its law school and his agency was made up by many from the top reaches of American high society. Donovan put together within the OSS a Board of Analysts that he called the “College of Cardinals.” It consisted of prominent American academics including James Phinney Baxter, the President of Williams College, William L. Langer, professor of history at Harvard, and Edward S. Mason, professor of economics at Harvard (Bresler, 1993).

Riebling (1994) remarks that the blue blood moniker attached to the OSS was apt, but somewhat misleading:

“Donovan was a social climber, not a socialite, and he did not deliberately surround himself with Ivy Leaguers, or ‘old boys,’ so that he could pal around with ‘men of his own class.’ He wanted experts to analyze foreign affairs, talented writers to craft subtle propaganda, operatives who knew a few languages and could find their way around Europe. It just so happened that the best qualified people came from the country’s better schools.” (1994, pp. 33-34)
Regardless of his intent, Donovan’s hiring preferences for Eastern Establishment Ivy League educated protestants allowed them to gain a powerful foothold in OSS. Many of them, Allen Dulles for example, subsequently became senior managers at CIA, helped shaped it and provided its leadership for over forty years (Jeffreys-Jones, 1997).

To describe the OSS as only a collection of social elites was an oversimplification. Riebling (1994) recalls that this “crazy outfit,” as Navy Secretary Frank Knox described it, resisted easy characterization.

“At least one COI man posted overseas found the quality of his colleagues ‘appallingly low’; as the organization expanded with the war and absorbed military personnel, it became a ‘convenient dumping ground for useless career officers,’ not to mention a means of draft evasion for ‘playboy bankers and stupid sons of wealthy and politically important families.’ Also, a secret intelligence service in time of war needed ‘special services’ from safecrackers, footpads, and confidence men, so Donovan provided a sort of ‘foreign legion’ for many with silty reputations.” (1994, p. 34).

The organization also included known communists and others with leftist leanings as well as several open homosexuals. This was ignored as long as they were effective against the Axis. In sum, the OSS was a “wide tent” that included
officers from America’s highest social, academic and professional ranks as well as some of its superior burglars, con-men and, in at least one case, murderers (Bresler, 1993; Riebling, 1994).

The core OSS elements that survived in the short-lived CIG and the overseas assets incorporated from Donovan’s World Commerce Corporation, brought with them to CIA a sizable number of the Eastern Establishment’s “very best and brightest” (Adelman, 1980). Characterized by Powers (1987) as an OSS club of “white Anglo-Saxon patricians from old families and old money,” many of these former officers would take on key leadership roles over the next forty years. Four DCIs (Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby, and William Casey) were OSS veterans, while a fifth, Walter Bedell Smith, was closely associated with Donovan’s wartime outfit. Other prominent OSS alumni took on senior management positions in CIA. These included James Angleton, the Agency’s Chief of Counterintelligence for twenty years, Frank Wisner, Director of the Office of Policy Coordination and Office of Special Operations, who was charged with carrying out CIA’s program of political,
psychological, and economic warfare against the Soviet Union during the 1950’s, and Ray Cline who served as Deputy Director for Intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Ranelagh (1986) and Hastedt (1996) define several distinct employee “generations” at CIA serving the Agency from 1947 through the 1980’s. The first generation of CIA employees, called the “Founding Fathers” by Ranelagh (1986) and the “Paradigm Building Generation” by Hastedt (1996) were primarily from Ivy League colleges and the East Coast Establishment. They had served in the OSS and were a mature generation with a wide range of experience gained before the war started. Many had been lawyers, some had been journalists; others had taught at universities or had pursued postgraduate degrees (Ranelagh, 1986). Another, more junior generation, eight to ten years younger than the first, immediately followed. Also predominately OSS veterans, they entered the war straight out of college.

Hastedt (1996) states that the original CIA generation was

\footnote{Hastedt (1996) bases his work on a heuristic model developed by Vlaho (1990) that seeks to describe how new paradigms come to govern the overall conduct of US foreign policy through the emergence of succeeding generations.}
"present at the creation" and carried with it the OSS experience and established the core myths and images that defined the new Agency.

By 1950, Ranelagh (1986) states that the 5,000 CIA officers came from backgrounds that were broadly OSS, FBI, and the military services. Many lawyers, public relations professionals, and journalists also became Agency officers. With the Korean War, CIA expanded rapidly to over 15,000 employees. These new employees differed from the "Founding Fathers" as they were more likely to have come from the West or from mid-western universities. Ranelagh (1986) states these new hires were younger, and out of necessity, more technically oriented that the original generation. With the process of intelligence collection increasing overhead reconnaissance, SIGINT, and ELINT, the Agency needed more electronics experts, engineers, and scientists.

Despite the hiring increases during the Korean War and changes resulting from technology, OSS veterans from the original generation remained entrenched in senior management positions. Jeffrey-Jones (1989) notes that by 1954, of 34 key personnel within CIA’s chain of command,
virtually all had Ivy League, Eastern Establishment backgrounds, and 15 had intelligence experience in the OSS.

Ranelagh (1986) cites Phillips (1977) as stating that:

"The 'Knights Templar,' as the Agency’s top brass were called by some during its first 25 years, all came from the small group of ‘Founding Fathers’ and, with relative few changes, had been running the CIA from the start during this period." (1977, p. 123)

CIA’s original generation reached its apex during Allen Dulles’s tenure as DCI from 1953 through 1961. Adelman (1980) states that by the beginning of the Kennedy Administration two thirds of CIA’s highest executive positions were filled by OSS veterans. Hastedt (1996) marks the end of the Agency’s first generation with the resignation of Allen Dulles after the Bay of Pigs failure. While many of Phillips’s (1977) “Templars” would continue to hold senior management positions for years to come, the failed Cuban invasion seriously tarnished the cowboy mystique of senior OSS managers at CIA in the eyes of the White House and Congress (Jeffreys-Jones, 1997). It also

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44 Phillips (1977) as cited in Ranelagh, 1986) attributes the term “Knights Templar” to DCI James Schlesinger who used it as a derogatory phrase for senior
called into question CIA’s isolated management and
decision-making processes. Adelman (1980) states that this
isolation fostered a type of “group think” in which the
pressures of unanimity overrode individual mental
facilities – something akin to what transpires in a jury
room. (Powers, 1979 as cited by Adelman, 1980) states that
the Bay of Pigs revealed the Agency was:

“...run by a lot of old friends with a common background
and outlook which tended to make them protective
rather than critical of each other...Seldom did fresh
new blood enter the organization or old tired blood
leave, making ‘the Agency almost claustrophobically
insular’.” (1980, p. 166)

Ranelagh (1986) adds that the decline of managerial
dominance by the “Founding Fathers” after Dulles’s
resignation was also a simple matter of time. Many OSS
veterans who reached senior positions under Dulles were in
their 30’s during World War II and were fast approaching
retirement age.

During the 1960’s, with the demands of the Vietnam
War, CIA moved increasingly toward analysis and away from
intelligence operations (which were conducted by the
Agency managers from OSS, Eastern Establishment, and Ivy
military). A new generation took shape that Hastedt (1996) identifies as “The Paradigm Extender Generation.” DCIs and OSS veterans Richard Helms and William Colby represented the heart of this new generation that inherited the guiding ideas and myths introduced by the first. Hastedt (1996) describes this generation as “consolidators who drew strength from remembered experience” and possessing a vision of building upon the Agency’s legacy and correcting past excesses so that CIA might be better positioned to operate in the future. Many recruits continued to come from the finest East coast families and Agency recruiting continued to be based upon recommendation or introduction via CIA alumni or friendly academics (Ranelagh, 1986).

By the early 1970’s, CIA recruiting techniques altered significantly and were expanded to include newspaper ads and direct recruiting from college campuses. Vietnam served as a catalyst for this change in recruiting focus. Marchetti and Marks (1974) state:

“...the Agency had become, to a large extent, discredited in the traditional Eastern schools and colleges. And consequently CIA (was) forced to alter its recruiting base. No longer did Harvard, Yale, League backgrounds. 
Princeton, and a few other eastern schools provide the bulk of the Agency’s professional recruits, or even a substantial number.” (p. 279).

During the decade, the Agency’s did its most fruitful recruiting at universities in middle America and in the armed forces, and the CIA population began to represent a cross section of the more highly educated groups in the United States (Ranelagh, 1986). Hastedt (1996) classifies this group as a third identifiable CIA generation that he calls “The Paradigm Mimicker Generation.” While this generation had no personal experience with the basic set of ideas established by the Agency’s original “Founding Fathers,” these ideas continued to form the basis of their world-view and the Agency’s approach to its work had become thoroughly routinized.

With expanded recruiting and technology requirements, the Agency employee population of the 1980’s continued to

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Adelman (1980) highlights the strength of this world-view during the 1970’s and the continued influences of the original “Founding Fathers” during the decade. He cites the memoirs of Henry Kissinger who stated that even before assuming office, President Nixon “felt it imperative to exclude the CIA from the formulation of policy” since “it was staffed by Ivy League liberals who behind the
diversify (Ranelagh, 1986). Hired during or immediately after the Church and Pike investigations into Agency abuses during the 1970's and the formation of the congressional oversight committees, Hastedt (1996) states that the 1980's marked the beginning of what he calls "The Paradigm-Killer Generation." Citing Vlahos's (1990) definition, he states:

"Like the Paradigm Builders, they possess a new idea on which to build American (intelligence). They see the old paradigm and its set of core ideas and myths as corrupt or irrelevant, and challenges (the original paradigm's) place at the center of foreign policymaking." (1996, p. 252).

Hastedt (1996) adds that there must occur a "big change" in world politics that will empower new ideas and propel this new generation into positions of power and two events in the late 1980's served to strengthen CIA's "Paradigm-Killer Generation." First, the tenure of William Casey as DCI between 1881 and 1987 who sought to reestablish some of the ideas and values of the "Founding Fathers" ended in scandal. While credited with strengthening and reinvigorating the Agency, he personally led the Reagan Administration into the Iran-Contra debacle. 

façade of analytical objectivity were usually pushing their
This uncontrolled covert action project exposed serious weaknesses in founding generation ideas and methods of operation when applied to the modern environmental and political realities (The Glory Days, 1992). Second, the 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union provided Hastedt’s (1996) “big change in world politics” and spurred fundamental questions by Congress and the executive about the Agency’s mission, structure, and budget (The Glory Days, 1992).

Ranelagh (1986) states that the 1980’s generation marked the final end of Eastern Establishment dominance at CIA. He cites a 1984 interview with an unnamed Deputy Director of Administration who stated:

“I can think of some people in pretty senior positions when I was serving through the years who felt their further advancement had been inhibited because they didn’t go to this school or that school or they weren’t invited to this party or that party or their words weren’t given sufficient credence because they were not part of the inner set. There was some of that, but it disappeared as time went by because you don’t have the same kind of people today that you had twenty years ago. You take a hard look at the leadership of the Agency today and you will find little hint of the Eastern Establishment – it’s gone.” (1986, p. 23)
Despite scandal surrounding original generation ideas and methods, a fundamental shift in the geo-political environment, and basic changes in the Agency’s employee population, difficulties have remained for the “Paradigm-Killer Generation” to institute meaningful change at CIA (Hastedt, 1996). The tenures of DCI’s Webster, Woolsey, and Deutch, all of whom were selected at least in part for their lack of intelligence background and their role as “outsiders,” were marked by an inability to put new values into place. As evidenced by the Aldridge Ames affair and discrimination lawsuits by female case officers, these leaders of the new generation appear to have sat atop a CIA whose world-view and approach to its work remain deeply ensconced. New patterns of behavior, such as changes to make analysis more policy relevant and attempts to restructure the Agency — combining the functions of collection and analysis into matrixed centers — have been met with great internal opposition. Hastedt (1996) states that all of these Agency leaders, representing the “Paradigm-Killer Generation,” have had little impact on CIA’s organizational thinking into the 1990’s and did
little more culturally than to serve as focal points of
innate resistance.  

CIA’s generational history provides evidence
conforming to Schein’s (1983) model for culture creation
and development. Regardless of his intent, William
Donovan’s predilection for selecting and hiring officers
much like himself—Eastern Establishment elites educated
in Ivy League schools—for the OSS set into motion
processes consistent with this mechanism at CIA. The
Agency’s “Paradigm Building Generation” or “Founding
fathers” were drawn from these OSS veterans and they shaped
the essential mythos, conceptions, and ideals of the newly
formed CIA. Jeffrey-Jones (1997) and other historians cite


46 It is significant that Hastedt (1996) and the other
authors of the CIA organizational history sources selected
provide little insight into the long-term influences of DCI
Stansfield Turner on internal Agency power distributions
and particularly on the dominance of the DO. Turner served
from March 1977 through January 1981 and began shifting
Agency assets, emphasizing intelligence gathered from
satellites and electronically over reliance on human
intelligence, and drastically cutting back on the Agency’s
clandestine operations. He dismissed a number of Do
veterans and forced nearly 150 more into early retirement
(Polmar and Allen, 1998). The lack of emphasis on Turner’s
long-term effects is a result of the source selection
methodology employed and should be considered a gap in
evaluations of DCI outsider influences.
a virtual “apostolic succession” of Donovan’s Eastern Establishment, Ivy League educated OSS old hands into senior CIA management positions through the 1950’s and into the early 1960’s. Reaching its zenith under Allen Dulles, the management control of this original CIA generation began to wane after his resignation.

The selected historical sources state that later generations during the 1960’s and 1970’s sought to perpetuate and imitate the archetype ideas, beliefs, and world-view of the original “Founding Fathers.” Despite a significant shift in recruiting away from the traditional eastern schools and an increasingly diverse employee population, historians state that the ideas and values of the original generation continue to frame how CIA employees viewed the world during these decades and went about their work.

A 1980’s generation, hired during congressional inquires and the institution of legislative oversight, was reared at CIA after almost all members of the original generation had long gone. Lead by a series of Agency outsiders, historians cited this generation as the first to
offer the possibility of meaningful changes in CIA organizational culture. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of a monolithic enemy, DCIs of this generation have been unsuccessful in changing patterns of Agency behavior or the belief systems and outlook of the original “Paradigm-Building Generation”.

The inability of DCI “outsiders” to significantly change basic assumptions and belief systems established by Donovan’s Eastern Establishment OSS disciples is consistent with Schein’s (1983, 1991) model of cultural embedding by early leaders.

“Because original culture is based so heavily on original assumptions and values, outsiders coming into such organizations with new assumptions are likely to find the culture too strong to budge. As a result, they either give up in frustration or find themselves ejected from the organization as being too foreign in orientation” (Schein, 1983, p. 28).

This model argues that basic assumptions such as what CIA’s relationship should be to its environment, the nature of intelligence collection and analysis, what it means to be an intelligence officer, what are the “right” things for CIA officers to do, and the intra-Agency distribution of power were established by the “Founding Fathers.” These
assumptions and beliefs were reinforced by members of the original generation who served in senior management positions for almost 40 years and were solidified by predilections in hiring and promotion.

Evidence consistent with Donovan’s use of recruitment, selection, and promotion as a primary cultural embedding mechanism and the pilot and non-pilot historical sources from which this evidence was drawn is summarized below:

Table 3. -- Donovan’s Use of Recruitment, Selection, and Promotion as a Primary Cultural Embedding Mechanism

<table>
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CHAPTER 5
THE CASE OF ALLEN DULLES

Historians describe Allen Welsh Dulles as America’s greatest “spy master.” He served as CIA Director from February 1953 to November 1961. During his long and historic tenure, CIA became a global power, engaging in covert actions from South America to the Middle East, digging the Berlin Tunnel, and developing the U-2 spy plane. Dulles shepherded the Agency as Deputy Director of Plans (Operations) or DDP and as DCI during an extraordinary period of growth and development effectively taking American espionage from the back alleys of war ravaged Europe to the forefront of American foreign policy in the space age. As an early Agency leader, he significantly molded the way CIA officers perceived the Agency’s primary mission and the way policymakers regarded its contribution to the process of government (Leary, 1984).

Dulles was born in 1893 to a Watertown, New York family with a long tradition of public service. Several generations of the Dulles family included three secretaries
of state and other holders of important positions in diplomacy, government, the law, and the church. Strodes (1999) places the Dulles clan among such monumental historical families as the Adamses, the Lees, and the Roosevelts. The son of a third-generation Presbyterian minister and a rising star in the progressive movement of the Protestant clergy, Dulles was raised in a family which combined a strong sense of moral purpose with a long tradition of service at senior levels of government (Leary, 1984).

A 1914 Princeton graduate, Dulles volunteered to teach in a Presbyterian mission college in India. In 1916, with the help of his uncle, Secretary of State Robert M. Lansing, he joined the US diplomatic service hoping to become the third secretary of state in the family. (His brother, John Foster Dulles, who had similar aspirations, did achieve the goal.) He was assigned to the American Legation in Vienna, Austria and was transferred to Bern,

\[47\] Dulles’s paternal grandfather had been Secretary of State under Benjamin Harrison; his maternal grandfather had served as the United States Minister (then the equivalent of Ambassador) in Mexico, Russia, and Spain; and
Switzerland and served there during the war from 1917 to 1918. He served as a member of the US Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference and after further diplomatic service in Berlin (1919) and Constantinople (1920 to 1922), he was recalled to the State Department to be the chief of its Near East Division.

While in Washington, Dulles completed a law degree at George Washington University. He resigned from the diplomatic service in 1926 and joined his brother's law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, in New York City. He maintained connections with the State Department, and served as legal adviser to the US delegations at the Geneva Conferences of 1927 and 1932. He was also active in the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Dulles unsuccessfully ran as a Republican for Congress in 1938 and he helped organize Wendell Wilkie's presidential campaign in 1940.

In 1942, William Donovan, who had known Dulles in New York legal circles, recruited him for the OSS. From his uncle, Robert Lansing, had been Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson.

48 Dulles became the President of the Council in 1946.
October 1942 until November 1945 Dulles was Chief of OSS clandestine operations based in Switzerland and of the OSS mission that entered Germany after the surrender. He earned the reputation as one of the best operations officers within the OSS. He ran a dazzling array of operations against the Germans and Italians and handled a prolific network of agents providing information on Axis agents operating against the Allies and the Nazi V weapon and atomic programs (Leary, 1984). Brown (1982), Polmar and Allen (1998), and Strodes (1999) quote Maj. General Kenneth Strong, chief of Eisenhower’s intelligence staff as calling Dulles, “undoubtedly the greatest United States professional intelligence officer of his time....”

At the end of 1945, with the dismantling of the OSS, Dulles returned to his brother’s law practice in New York. But, watching the old OSS evolve into the CIA, he marked time, expecting he would soon resume government service. In 1947, President Truman became dissatisfied with the performance of the newly created CIA and asked Dulles to

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49 His achievements in that role are well documented; he gave his own account of them in Germany’s
work with William H. Jackson and Mathias Correa in making an evaluation of the Agency. Forming the DCI's "Advisory Committee" the group published what became known as the "Dulles Report" that criticized DCI Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter for failing to coordinate the efforts of the intelligence community.

In April 1947, when Congress considered statutory establishment of CIA, Dulles submitted a nine-page memorandum to Congress. This memorandum consisted in large part of reiteration that the DCI and his lieutenants should be civilians of judicial temperament, men willing to dedicate the remainder of their lives to the task, rather than transient military officers looking elsewhere for the ultimate fulfillment of their careers. Montague (1992) notes that one cannot escape the impression that Dulles was

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50 Dulles referred to the fact that the first two DCI's were military officers who remained in the position for short periods. Admiral Souers served as DCI for five months and was impatient to return to his private business. General Vandenberg, a career Air Force officer, served for only eleven months and consented to become DCI only as a step toward the realization of his ambition to become Chief of Staff of the prospectively independent Air Force.
thinking of himself as the judicious and dedicated civilian who ought to be DCI.

Dulles worked on Thomas E. Dewey’s presidential campaign in 1948. After Truman won, Dulles expected that he would be ignored as a candidate for an intelligence post. However, DCI General Walter Bedell Smith asked him to become CIA’s Deputy Director for Operations (DDO)\textsuperscript{51}. Dulles accepted, suggesting that “plans” be substituted for “operations” to keep his work - supervising spies and covert action - less revealing. He went to work for CIA in January 1951 and as DDP, Dulles exercised general supervision over CIA’s Offices of Operations, Special Operations, and Policy Coordination. In this position, he maintained control over the Agency’s human intelligence sources, paramilitary, and covert action operatives. In August, Dulles replaced William Jackson as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, a position he held until February 1953, when President Eisenhower named him Walter Bedell Smith’s successor.

\textsuperscript{51} Campbell (1990) states that DCI Smith, responding to Dulles’s critical report of Rear Admiral
Dulles’s experience in the Foreign Service, OSS and the law, coupled with his naturally gregarious personality had won him a vast array of domestic and international contacts in government, the law, and the press. As DCI Dulles used and cultivated these contacts freely to enhance the Agency’s stature. He made public speeches, met quietly with members of the press, and socialized constantly in Washington society. Leary (1984) notes that due in large measure to Dulles’s lobbying through his large web of unofficial contacts, by the early 1950’s the CIA had gained the reputation as a young vital institution serving the highest national purpose.

Another important factor in securing CIA’s favorable reputation during this period was the fact that Dulles’s brother John Foster Dulles served as Secretary of State. Whatever the formal relationship between the State Department and CIA, they were superceded by the personal and working association between the brothers. Most importantly, they both enjoyed the absolute confidence of President Eisenhower. In the formulation of day-to-day

Hillenkoetter, allegedly said, "You made your comments and
policy, their relationships were crucial to the Executive’s support for the Agency and more specifically, for Allen Dulles personally in defining his own role and that of the Agency (Leary, 1984).

Dulles’s role as DCI was rooted in his wartime experience with the OSS. His interests and expertise lay with the operational aspects of intelligence, and his fascination with the details of operations persisted. His absorption with operational details resulted in his inattention to Agency administration. Campbell (1990) quotes DCI Walter Bedell Smith as saying: “Allen is not a bad administrator – he is simply innocent of administration.” Leary (1984) notes that much of the reason for Dulles’s indifference to administration stemmed from his personal temperament. Jovial and extroverted in the extreme, he disliked and avoided confrontations at every level. As a result, the real internal management responsibility fell to his Deputy Director, General Charles P. Cabell, who served throughout Dulles’s term. Perhaps the most important effect of Dulles’s absorption with now come down and run the place.”
operations was its impact on CIA's relationship to the intelligence community - the intelligence components of the Department's of State and Defense. As DCI, Dulles did not assert his position or the Agency's in attempting to coordinate departmental intelligence activities (Leary, 1984). This neglect resulted in the broad expansion of competing intelligence capabilities among the Departments.

During Dulles's tenure as DCI, the DO was given an entrenched dominant role within CIA culture (Adelman, 1980). Intelligence analysis became subordinate in budget, personnel, and senior-level attention. The Agency's covert action capabilities particularly flourished under Dulles's personal direction. CIA paramilitary and political action operations became a preoccupation of the DCI and expanded dramatically between 1953 and 1961. Dulles's overarching

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52 Polmar and Allen (1998) define covert action as a broad collection of activities carried out in a concealed or clandestine manner, primarily to make it difficult, if not impossible, to trace the activities back to the sponsoring intelligence service or agency. The primary purpose of covert action is to alter political, economic, or military realities - preventing developments deemed inimical to a nation's interest and creating situations in which those actions will be furthered (Lefever and Godson, 1979).
influence in developing Agency covert direct action capabilities is cited by Strodes (1999) who states:

First as CIA’s deputy director for operations, and then as DCI, Allen Dulles gave American Presidents a new weapon — an Alexander’s sword to cut through the insoluble stalemates that confound diplomats and block generals from resorting to all out war. By closely merging intelligence gathering and assessment with covert operations and paramilitary intrusions, Dulles provided the presidency with a liberating device that was satisfyingly direct. No president from Harry Truman onward has been able to put that weapon aside. (p. 7).

Dulles’s efforts to emphasis and strengthen CIA covert action capabilities and operations were enhanced during two Eisenhower Administrations by a convergence of factors. These included the composition of the US government, international events, and senior policymaker perceptions of the role the Agency could and should play in US foreign policy (Leary, 1984).

Campbell (1990) notes that Dulles’s interest in covert action produced some important gains that bolstered the Agency’s developing role as a direct but secret instrument to influence world events. These included the creation of an intelligence organization in West Germany under Reinhard Gehlen, the restoration of the Shah of Iran to power in
1953, and the ouster of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Other, more traditional, intelligence successes boosted executive and congressional confidence in CIA during the Dulles years. These included the 1955 completion of the Berlin tunnel allowing CIA to directly tap Soviet military telephone lines in East Berlin and the highly successful production and operation of the U-2 to obtain overhead reconnaissance of Soviet strategic missiles.

Notwithstanding these successes, during Eisenhower’s second term, CIA suffered a number of intelligence setbacks. An Agency supported 1958 coup against Indonesian President Sukarno failed. More significantly, Francis Gary Power’s U-2 was shot down by Soviet air defenses, seriously embarrassing the American government and revealing US overhead reconnaissance capabilities.

Between 1953 and 1960, Dulles enjoyed frequent, direct access to President Eisenhower. Developing a close friendship with the Chief Executive, Dulles was afforded a great deal of latitude in the planning, approval, and execution of covert action and intelligence operations. Additionally, congressional leaders from both parties
avoided detailed briefings on intelligence matters (Leary, 1984).

Dulles’s free access to the President continued with the inauguration of John Kennedy in 1961. Ranelagh (1986) notes that Kennedy’s approach to foreign affairs and CIA involvement in them was far different than his predecessor. Describing Kennedy as a “management man,” (Ranelagh, 1986) states the President placed voracious demands on the Agency to provide minute details of foreign affairs analysis and operational planning. During late 1960 and early 1961 Dulles found himself being pulled more to serving the instant needs of the new President, and spending less time overseeing the details of operations carried over from the Eisenhower administration. The result was a loss of

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53 Historians differ as to the root cause of congressional indifference to intelligence matters during the 1950’s. Authors such as Leary (1984) attribute the apparent apathy to concerns about operational security. Others such as Campbell (1990) cite Dulles’s personal relationship with senior congressional leaders. Still others such as Lefever and Godson (1979) attribute congressional inattention to a desire of members to put distance between themselves and CIA activities for political reasons.
control over the very area of work that had been his primary focus as DCI (Strodes, 1999).  

The Bay of Pigs disaster in April 1961 effectively marked the end of Dulles’s intelligence career. The loss of the Cuban Brigade and undeniable US involvement in the invasion greatly embarrassed the Kennedy administration. As the full extent of the Bay of Pigs failure began to be grasped by the public, pressure built on the president to replace his top security advisors. The President asked for Dulles’s resignation as DCI in November 1961.

Following his resignation, Dulles resumed his law practice with Sullivan and Cromwell. He wrote several books detailing his OSS wartime experiences and his intelligence philosophy – most notably The Craft of Intelligence in 1963. In 1963 and 1964, he served on the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President...

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54 Historians cite this loss of control as a significant contributing factor to the Bay of Pigs debacle. Strodes (1999) notes that unlike previous major covert action projects Dulles delegated much of the final planning for the invasion to subordinates. Many details were not finalized until ten days to two weeks before the operation in April 1961. While initial planning dated back to the Eisenhower administration, Strodes notes “if you look at

Dulles’s career was marked with many decorations, including the National Security Medal, the Medal of Freedom, and the French Legion of Honor. In awarding Dulles the National Security Medal on 28 November 1961, Campbell (1990) cites President Kennedy as stating:

...I know of no other American in the history of this country who has served in seven Administrations of seven President’s, varying from party to party, from point of view to point of view, from problem to problem; at yet at the end of each Administration each President of the United States has paid tribute to his service and also counted Allen Dulles as their friend... I regard Allen Dulles as an almost unique figure in our country. I know of no other man who brings a greater sense of commitment to his work... (p. 40).

What Leaders Pay Attention To, Measure and Control

One of the most powerful mechanisms that early leaders have available for communicating what they believe in or care about is what they explicitly and methodically pay attention to (Schein, 1991). This mechanism may include attention in the form of what is noticed and commented on by the early leader to what is formally measured,

the planning records after January (1961) you don’t see
controlled, rewarded or systematically dealt with. The important determinant of this mechanism’s power is the leader’s consistency in their behavior. Schein (1991) notes that it is the leader’s consistency that sends clear signals to the organization about their priorities, values, and beliefs. He posits that consistency of attention is far more important than intensity. Equally important to subordinates in deciphering a leader’s assumptions is what the leader does not pay attention to. Schein (1991) states that it is through these actions that members of the organization begin to decipher the leader’s priorities and "learn" the right and proper things to do, and what model of reality to adopt.

Leaders may reinforce the explicit attention they give to areas of their organizations through overt means such as differential rewards, promotions, budget distributions, and/or personnel allocations. Leader reinforcement may also take less formal forms such as focused questioning of subordinates in planning and monitoring processes and emotional reactions when important assumptions have been much of Dulles at all."
violated. Using such means, early leaders can force subordinates to focus on certain issues in a certain way and can get across their view of the world and how to look at problems (Schein, 1991).

The surveyed historical sources supply evidence that as DDP and DCI, Dulles significantly influenced CIA’s institutional identity (Leary, 1984) through the preeminent position he afforded the Agency’s clandestine service and the emphasis and importance that he placed on CIA’s covert action capabilities. His allocation of personal attention and organizational resources to the DP, at the expense of other CIA functions, had profound consequences on internal Agency dynamics that continue to the present day. Further, the prominence he provided to Agency covert action capabilities and his concentration on operational details allowed CIA to assume the initiative in defining the ways covert operations could advance US policy objectives and in defining what kind of operations were suited to particular policy needs. Dulles’s preference for intelligence collection over analysis enhanced the internal stature of CIA operational elements. His passion for covert action
profoundly impacted the direction of the Agency and its relative status within government (Leary, 1984).

Jeffrey-Jones (1997) notes that debates within Congress and the Executive in 1947 surrounding the National Security Act assumed only a coordinating role along with intelligence collection and analysis for the newly constructed CIA. Marchetti and Marks (1974) state that President Truman had only a "coordination of information" role in mind for the Agency. They state:

When the war ended, President Truman disbanded the OSS on the grounds that such wartime tactics as paramilitary operations, psychological warfare, and political manipulation were not acceptable when a country was at peace. At the same time, however, Truman recognized the need for a permanent organization to coordinate and analyze all the intelligence available to the various government departments. (p. 21)

However, within one year of the creation of CIA, President Truman approved the creation of an organization for conducting covert action. Through NSC 10/2, Truman authorized the creation of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) which was given the responsibility for conducting covert psychological, paramilitary, political, and economic activities. As a semi-independent entity, OPC
reported directly to the Secretaries of State and Defense who maintained de facto veto power over all covert action activities. CIA provided OPC cover and support.

Two years later, when General Walter Bedell Smith became DCI, he moved to consolidate all major elements of national intelligence under his direct control. As part of this effort he sought to bring OPC into CIA. President Truman eventually agreed and on January 4, 1951, OPC was merged into CIA as part of the newly formed DP under Dulles. Under this arrangement, the DCI was charged with insuring that all covert activities were consistent with US foreign policy objectives and overt foreign information activities. Covert activities were to be coordinated with State Department and the military services as appropriate (Leary, 1984).

As early as 1947, Dulles as a private citizen had argued against President Truman’s “limited” view of intelligence and authorities for CIA (Marchetti and Marks, 1974). They cite a memorandum Dulles prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee that year in which he stated:
Intelligence work in time of peace will require other techniques, other personnel, and will have rather different objectives... We must deal with the problem of conflicting ideologies as democracy faces communism, not only in relations between Soviet Russia and the countries of the west but, in the internal political conflicts with the countries of Europe, Asia, and South America. (p. 22).

For the remainder of Dulles’s career, with Agency covert action authorities under his direct control, he would do more than any leader in CIA history to ensure the Agency would carry out “such other duties” as allowed by the 1947 National Security Act.

Before its incorporation into CIA, OPC conducted limited covert action activities primarily in Central and Eastern Europe. These activities consisted principally of unattributed publications, radio broadcasts, and blackmail. Leary (1984) states that these earliest covert action activities were “amateurish,” small scale affairs that were strictly defined in scope by the State Department and military services. Initial OPC covert action capability was designed as a small contingency force that could mount limited operations. Senior policymakers did not plan to develop large-scale continuing covert operations. Rather,
they envisioned a small capability that could be activated at their discretion (Leary, 1984).

Under Agency control, covert action activities increased dramatically. In October 1951, NSC Directive 10/5 replaced NSC 10/2 as the basis for CIA covert actions and it provided authority on a larger scale (Ranelagh, 1986). During the Korean War, in concept, manpower, budget, and scope of activities, CIA covert action capabilities simply “skyrocketed” (Leary, 1984).\footnote{Hersh (1984) states that from 302 employees in 1949 the OPC listed 2,812 in 1952, plus 3,142 overseas. Half operated in Europe, almost all – 1,200 – from bases in West Germany. These same years the regular budget jumped} Agency covert action projects during the period included paramilitary and psychological warfare operations on the Chinese mainland, paramilitary support for US forces in Korea, and a greatly expanded covert “offensive” against the Soviet Union in Central Europe. Leary (1984) states that during this period, the guidance provided by the State and Defense Departments for CIA covert action became very general. The Departments laid out only very broad objectives and left implementation to the Agency. No
formal mechanisms required that individual operations be brought before the Departments for discussion or authorization. Because it was assumed that covert action would be exceptional, strict provisions for specific project authorization were not considered necessary. With minimal supervision, individual Agency officers took the initiative in conceiving and implementing projects. Operational tasks, personnel, budget, and material tended to grow in relation to one another with little outside oversight.

As DDP, Dulles played an integral part in the rapid expansion of Agency covert action activities and the loosening of external oversight. In this position, he maintained supervisory control over OPC and OSO, the unit charged with the clandestine collection of intelligence. Leary (1984) states that Dulles’s preference for and attention to operations colored the quick growth and institutional dynamism of CIA’s covert action mechanisms. His attitudes, personal oversight of operational details, and recognition of successful subordinates spurred the

from $4.7 million to $82 million, while the number of
maximum development of covert action over clandestine collection during the period (Johnson, 1989). In the Directorate, under Dulles’s management, rewards came more quickly for officers achieving visible operational accomplishments than for officers involved in the quiet, long-term development of agents required for clandestine collection (Leary, 1984).

Again, as DCI, covert action and clandestine collection dominated Dulles’s attention. Cline (1976) as cited by Hastedt (1996) estimates that Dulles spent up to three-quarters of his time and energy in these areas and less than five percent on analysis. Leary (1984) states that as DCI, Dulles was absorbed in the day-to-day details of operations. Working closely with key subordinates, he personally conceived of projects, conferred with desk officers, and “delighted in the smallest achievement.” Dulles also frequently initiated projects independent of the relevant desk officer or the DDP himself (Campbell,
Ranelagh (1986) states that Dulles never extended comparable time and attention to the DI.

As DCI he often spent hours debating and monitoring operational details with operatives, letting appointments slip by, much to the annoyance of the Agency’s analytic staff, who correctly perceived that Dulles was not really interested in research and analysis. (p. 220).

Campbell (1990) adds that:

As DCI, Dulles was most involved in the activities of the DDP. He was not interested in National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). On most Wednesday afternoons, a group from the DI went to Dulles’s office to brief him on a NIE for presentation the next day. It would usually be obvious to the briefers that Dulles had not read the estimate, because he focused on the language of the NIE and not its substance. He thus went to (NSC) meetings in a poor position to control discussion of substantive points. (p. 38).

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56 Hersh (1984) cites an interview with DDP Richard Bissell who served under Dulles in that position from 1959 to 1962. Bissell states that Dulles “administered much like JFK, he skipped many echelons below himself and went directly to whomever was closest to what he wanted to find out. When I protested at one point he was very direct: ‘I will talk to anybody and give orders to anybody I want to in this Agency!’” (p. 375).

57 NIEs are evaluations of national security concerns, usually regarding a specific country, prepared by CIA. Typically NIEs are presented by the DCI to the NSC (Polmar and Allen, 1998).
Campbell (1990) maintains that increasing CIA independence in covert action initiatives from external oversight during and after the Korean War was due in large part to Dulles's relationship with his brother Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Dwight Eisenhower. Ranelegh (1986) states that John Foster Dulles played an important role in Eisenhower’s election campaign and he wanted his brother, Allen, in the job of DCI. John Foster wanted CIA involved as closely as possible with the implementation of US policy. With Allen as DCI he was ensured the use of the Agency as a “finely tuned instrument” of foreign policy – while leaving the operational details to his younger brother. Hersh (1984) states that during Dulles’s tenure as DCI the Agency was given broad freedom of discretion and Dulles himself was allowed to run the Agency largely as he saw fit. Dulles’s relationship with his older brother allowed informal agreements and personal understandings to predominate over clear and exact decisions (Johnson, 1989). The Church Committee found in 1975 that only a small percentage of the
total number of covert actions approved by Dulles had been sent to the NSC for prior approval.

Adelman (1980) and Johnson (1989) state that the personal attention that Dulles as DCI lavished on the DP had important bureaucratic ramifications. The perceived importance afforded to Agency collection operations, the mystique surrounding the DCI’s personal involvement in covert action projects, and the obvious rapid promotion of officers in covert action operations, significantly boosted the Agency’s clandestine side.

The Directorate (of Operations) reigned supreme long after the Dulles era. Two-thirds of the of the highest CIA executive positions were filled by officers whose careers had blossomed in cloak-and-dagger moves, and the covert side long received one half of the Agency’s overall budget. (The Directorate) held a hammerlock on all liaison with the State and Defense Departments and all other agencies until the mid-1970’s. Hence, (the Directorate) was able to spread its own perspective throughout the Washington foreign policy establishment. (Adelman, 1980, p. 159).
The ascension of the Agency’s operational side occurred primarily at the expense of CIA analysis (Ranelagh, 1986). Leary (1984) states that the autonomy afforded the DP by Dulles affected the mission of the DI and had significant consequences on the execution of the intelligence analysis function. These consequences that solidified under Dulles shaped the long-term configuration of CIA (Leary, 1984).

Throughout Dulles’s tenure, direct contact between DP officers and DI analysts were discouraged and became almost nonexistent. The reasoning for this separation was to prevent individual analysts from imposing requirements on the collectors. Under Dulles, the DP viewed itself as serving government-wide intelligence collection requirements. The DI leadership, on the other hand, believed that the DP should respond primarily to its requirements. As DCI, Dulles directed that the former definition would prevail and the DP maintained control over which collection requirements it would or would not accept. Ultimately, the DP itself controlled the specific
requirements for its collectors without ongoing consultation with the DI (Leary, 1984).

Leary (1984) details a further stunting of DI influence during the Dulles years by DP refusals to allow analysts access to raw intelligence data from the field. During the 1950’s, unrefined intelligence information collected by the DP was sent to Headquarters and summarized there for dissemination to analytic components throughout government including the DI. The DP adhered to the principle of not revealing the identity of its assets. Reports only vaguely described the assets providing information. The DI found this arrangement highly unsatisfactory as analysts could not judge the quality of the information they were receiving. As a result, DI analysts tended to look on DP information with suspicion and relied primarily on overt materials and technical collection for their production efforts. Marchetti and Marks (1974) state that this significantly degraded the quality of CIA intelligence analysis during the period and contributed to a number of significant operational failures (Adelman, 1980; Ranelagh, 1986; and Thompson, 1996).
The enforced isolation between clandestine operations and analysis, solidified during the Dulles era, negated to a large degree the potential advantages of having collectors and analysts in the same Agency. Despite efforts in the 1960’s and 70’s to breakdown the barriers between the two Directorates, the lack of real interchange and interdependence persisted (Adelman, 1980; Leary, 1984).

Leary (1984) states that incentives to generate and manage operations under the Dulles regime began to blur lines of authority within the Agency. Dulles’ intense personal interest in and enthusiasm for covert action projects created and perpetuated an internal demand for

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58 Dulles can not be blamed for the blurred lines of authority external to CIA. The decision-making arrangements at the NSC level created an environment of vague accountability that allowed consideration of actions without constraints of individual responsibility. Leary (1984) states that during the Dulles years no one in the Executive was required to sign off on decisions to implement covert action programs. The DCI was responsible for the execution of projects, but not for taking the decision to implement them. Within the NSC a group of individuals held joint responsibility for defining policy objectives, but did not attempt to establish criteria placing moral and constitutional limits on activities. Only a limited number of congressional committee members passed on the Agency’s budget. Some members were informed of most of CIA’s major activities; others preferred not to be informed.
such activities. During this period, the Covert Action and Counterintelligence (CI) Staffs ran field operations while also serving as advisory and coordinating bodies for the operations conducted by the geographic divisions. The CI Staff in particular was allowed to monopolize counterintelligence operations and left virtually no latitude to the divisions to develop and implement their own counterintelligence activities. The staff maintained their own communications channels to the field and its operations were carried out without the knowledge of senior DP management. Leary (1984) and Manigold (1991) cite the example of the CI Staff as being indicative of the compartmentation within the DP during the Dulles era that resulted in “pockets of privilege” for specific operations.

Dulles’s preoccupation with clandestine operations, the value he placed on successful covert actions, and his capacity to free the DP to act with few external or internal controls, established conditions by which discreditable operations could be undertaken. He allowed the clandestine service a measure of autonomy not afforded other Directorates (Leary, 1984). Virtually all of the
operations scrutinized and criticized by the Church and Pike committees during the 1970’s had their genesis during or immediately following Dulles’s tenure as DCI. In many cases the burden of responsibility fell on individual judgements – a situation in which lapses and deviations were inevitable (Leary, 1984). Dulles’s influences on Agency procedures and attitudes that made such “rogue elephant” operations possible cannot be underestimated (Adelman, 1980; Johnson, 1989). Hersh (1984) quotes the congressional testimony of DCI Richard Helms regarding lax internal control of covert operations and operations conducted without NSC approval during the Dulles years:

You don’t understand, Mr. Dulles was a figure of such magnitude on our horizon that we didn’t question Mr. Dulles. (p. 375).

Leary (1984) states that during and immediately following the Dulles years as DCI, excesses such as drug testing, assassination planning, and domestic activities were supported by an environment that permitted individuals to conduct operations without the consent necessary or expectation of justifying or revealing their activities.
Campbell (1990) and Polmar and Allen (1998) state that while Dulles paid little heed to day-to-day administration of CIA, he created important cultural elements that sustained CIA for decades. Some of these elements, products of the prominent status he provided clandestine operations at the expense of analysis, continued to be discernible years after his resignation. For example, 13 years after Dulles’s departure, Marchetti and Marks (1974) note the continuation of the schism between Agency clandestine operatives and analysts:

…the views of (CIA’s) substantive experts – its analysts – do not carry much weight with the clandestine operators engaging in covert action. The operators usually decide which operations to undertake without consulting the analysts. Even when pertinent intelligence studies and estimates are readily available, they are as often as not ignored, unless they tend to support the particular covert action cause espoused by the operators. …to ensure against contact with the analysts, the operators usually resort to tight operational security. (p. 39).

More broadly, the legacy of Dulles’s emphasis on clandestine operations and covert action can be seen in the dominance of clandestine service officers in Agency leadership roles since 1961. Except for Robert Gates, all
DCIs who have been Agency careerists have come from the clandestine service. Leary (1984) states that this orientation has continued the emphasis on covert action and clandestine collection within the Agency and has sustained the perception that clandestine operations are the most highly valued Agency function.

The selected historical sources provide evidence that seems to conform with Schein’s (1983) description of cultural creation and development by Allen Dulles through the mechanism of leader attention, measurement, and control. Although the Agency was established primarily for the purpose of providing intelligence analysis to senior policy makers, Dulles’s intense interest and absorption in clandestine operations and covert action as DCI, played a key role in making these CIA’s preeminent activities. His ability to free the Agency to act in these areas with few external controls allowed the clandestine service to define both the nature and scope of its covert action projects. The erosion of internal controls however, allowed extremes in CIA activity that set into motion events leading to the
creation of the legislative oversight system that continues today.

Dulles’s attention to and control of CIA’s clandestine service in the form of personal focus, resource application, and incentives established the DP and later the DO as the predominant Directorate at the expense of other Agency functions – particularly analysis. The historical sources reviewed follow this trend of clandestine service dominance for at least several decades. Both collection and analysis have suffered from this continuing trend and it has affected the missions of both the DO and DI. Well into the 1980’s, the DI continued not to be informed of sensitive covert operations undertaken by the clandestine service. The DO has also suffered as it has not had the benefit of intelligence support during consideration and implementation of its operations.

A significant number of historical sources cite the importance of the personal attention Allen Dulles afforded to clandestine operations at the expense of other Agency activities as being crucial to the development of certain aspects of CIA internal culture and organizational
Dulles’s concentration, almost to the point of personal distraction, on the details of covert action projects and clandestine operations and his indifference to intelligence analysis afforded a preeminent position to CIA’s operations directorate. This preeminence was evident several decades after his departure in the dominance enjoyed by CIA’s clandestine operators in directing Agency activities, the ascendancy of clandestine service officers into senior Agency positions, and the ability of the DO to operate independently without input or direction from analysts.

Dulles’s use of personal focus, attention and control as a primary culture creation and embedding mechanism along with the pilot and non-pilot sources from which the evidence was drawn can be summarized as follows:
Table 4. -- Dulles’s Use of Attention, Measurement and Control as a Primary Cultural Embedding Mechanism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Pilot Sources</th>
<th>Non-pilot Sources</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What leaders pay attention to, measure and control.</td>
<td>Ascension of the DO, emphasis on covert action, dominance of DO in directing activities, number of DO officers in senior positions, ability of DO to operate independently.</td>
<td>Grose (1994); Strodes (1999)</td>
<td>Marchetti &amp; Marks (1974); Cline (1976); Adelman (1980); Johnson (1989); Leary (1984); Hersh (1984); Campbell (1990); Manigold (1991); Hastedt (1996); Jeffreys-Jones (1997); Polmar &amp; Allen (1997)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Design of Physical Spaces, Facades, and Buildings

Schein (1991) states that a significant secondary cultural articulation and reinforcement mechanism used by early leaders can be the design of physical space, facades, and buildings. This mechanism includes all of the discernible features of the organization that clients, customers, vendors, new employees, and visitors encounter. Early leader messages can be reinforced by an organization’s physical environment and a leader’s
philosophy and style can be amplified by the physical manifestations of their organizations. Much can be learned from the physical elements of an organization and leaders can communicate a great deal through the structures and settings they create (Schien, 1991).

Hatch (1997) agrees that physical structure plays an important role in the formation of individual, group, and organizational identity. She states that the physical elements of organization include buildings and their locations, furniture and equipment, decoration, and even human bodies. Citing the communicative power of architecture, Hatch (1997) states that buildings become tangible representations of organizations themselves and according to Urry (1991) and Yanow (1993) have the effect of helping people construct what they think and feel about an organization.

Hatch (1997) identifies three basic aspects of organizational physical structures that are linked to various organizational issues. First, organizational geography refers to the location in which an organization operates and the physical features of its location. This
aspect of an organization’s physical structure can affect the interaction of an organization and its environment, its coordination with outside entities, and how the organization is controlled. Second, layout refers to the spatial arrangements of physical objects and human activities. This aspect of physical structure can impact internal interaction and coordination within an organization. Finally, design/décor refers to the architectural design of an organization’s surroundings that can affect individual and group status, image, and identity.

Several selected historical sources seem to provide evidence supporting geographic location (an element of physical design) as acting in a manner consistent with Schein’s (1983, 1991) description of a secondary cultural embedding mechanism at CIA. Historical authors describe the construction of the Agency’s Original Headquarters Building (OHB), physically isolating CIA from the rest of government, and Dulles’s success in at least partially consolidating CIA offices into one site as being both
efforts to reinforce and change aspects of CIA culture initially embedded through primary mechanisms. Historical descriptions of these efforts appear to confirm the importance of consistency between secondary mechanisms and more powerful primary mechanisms. The evidence indicates that when consistent with Dulles’s assumptions articulated through primary mechanisms, organizational geography served to reinforce those assumptions. However, when the messages sent by organizational geography were inconsistent with those of established primary mechanisms, the Agency ostensibly ignored them.

Leary (1984) and Ranelagh (1986) recount that for the first fifteen years of its existence, CIA was housed in a number of office buildings in downtown Washington and in World War II prefabricated huts or “ramshackle warren of ‘temporaries’” (Strodes, 1999) along the reflecting pool and around the Lincoln Memorial. This group of buildings had served as the OSS command center during the war. Strodes (1999) describes the complex of buildings as:

...federal mansions arranged like a campus on the tree-shaded hill that overlooks the Lincoln memorial as one approaches it from the 23rd Street side of the State Department. The Navy had built the complex during the
1930’s to house its medical research facilities. Its built-in system of underground tunnels and huge metal storage safes for medical supplies were made to order for a spy service home. (p. 223).

The central compound of this collection of buildings remains known as “The Kremlin” located at 2430 E. Street N.W. This building served as Donovan’s central office and headquarters and also served as the office of the first five DCIs. (Berry, 1997).

A scattering of Agency departments across numerous buildings made coordination, administration, and adequate security difficult. Berry (1997) states offices in the temporary buildings and other improvised quarters were crowded, noisy, and uncomfortable. They were also expensive to guard and maintain. There were no secure phones and all documents for coordination had to be hand-carried among several locations.

Ranelagh (1986) cites one of Dulles’s driving ambitions as securing a centralized headquarters site and building for CIA. Several locations were considered, including a single building in the city. However, no

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single downtown structure could accommodate all Agency employees stationed in Washington and also provide the requisite security for the clandestine component (Leary, 1984).

Dulles’s intense, long-term, personal lobbying of congressional leaders resulted in the 1958 purchase of 125 acres of partially wooded land in Langley, Virginia, eight miles northwest of the Capitol along the Potomac River. Strodes (1999) states that Dulles won a $50 million appropriation for CIA Headquarters (an enormous sum for the time), selected the site, and worried over every stage of design and construction. Strodes (1999) states:

Dulles fretted over the décor of rooms down to the light switches, and designed the DCI’s office so that it had an open doorway into the office of the deputy director. Ever the clandestine craftsman, he ordered that there be separate waiting rooms with separate entrances to the DCI’s office, so, as he chuckled, ‘The Arabs can come in one door as the Jews go out the other.’ (p. 548).

Berry (1997) states that Dulles:
...set forth the guiding principle for the headquarters compound. The goal was to create a pastoral, campus-like setting that would attract the best and brightest in the arena of international affairs, while also ensuring visual privacy and physical security for CIA employees. (p. 41).

Dulles made no secret of the fact that he wanted the new Headquarters Building to be his permanent monument and his last weeks as DCI were taken up with the completion of the project that became the final focal point of his personal involvement in CIA (Ranelagh, 1986). Strodes (1999) states that when construction began in 1958, Dulles "fretted" until President Eisenhower agreed to attend a formal ceremony to lay the cornerstone with Dulles’s name firmly engraved on it.

Completed in 1961, the CIA Headquarters building is a modernistic, fortress-like structure that is more concrete than glass with a squared, block-like construction (Marchetti and Marks, 1974; Ranelagh, 1986). The New York architectural firm of Wallace K. Harrison and Max Abramovitz was responsible for the design. Notable among their earlier designs was the United Nations Building in New York (Berry, 1997). Frequently referred to as a college campus environment in Agency recruiting materials
(Marchetti and Marks, 1974), the grounds are heavily wooded. About sixty percent remains undeveloped – with forty percent of the site including natural forest cover (Berry, 1997).

The main access to the site is off Virginia Route 123. The George Washington Memorial Parkway was extended northwestward to the northern perimeter of the complex allowing a secondary entrance (Berry, 1997). Until the spring of 1973 one of the two roads leading into the secluded compound was totally unmarked, and the other featured a sign identifying the installation as the Bureau of Public Roads, which maintains the Fairbanks Highway Research Station adjacent to the Agency (Marchetti and Marks, 1974).

By the mid 1980’s the OHB was showing its age, not only in styling and design, but also in terms of wear and tear (Ranelagh, 1986). It was built at a time when the Agency was much more action-oriented and had a smaller staff. Marchetti and Marks (1974) state that from the beginning, office space was at a premium and from the day it was completed, the OHB proved too small for CIA’s
Washington activities. The Agency never fully vacated annexes in downtown Washington and maintained considerable office space in Rosslyn, Virginia. By the early 1970’s, at least a half dozen CIA components were located in the Tyson’s Corner area of Northern Virginia. According to Marchetti and Marks (1974) this area became something of a mini-intelligence community for technical work due the presence there of numerous electronics and research companies that do work for the Agency and Pentagon.

Ranelagh (1986) states that these CIA “colonies” have continued the problem that the Langley building was meant to solve:

...different departments in different places naturally strengthen the tendency toward competing fiefdoms which exist in any large organization. (p. 17).

The need to expand the Langley campus became evident at the beginning of Ronald Reagan’s presidency. In 1982, Congress approved a $46 million, 1.1 million square foot extension or New Headquarters Building (NHB) so that the Agency could once again try to function on one site. The NHB, designed to provide high-quality office space and the ancillary uses necessary to support the administrative, analytical, and
operational needs of the Agency, was completed in March 1991 (Berry, 1997). This consolidation attempt also failed, and significant CIA elements -- particularly those of the DA and DS&T -- continue to be located in "colonies" outside the Langley campus.

Leary (1984) states that while the effects of the Agency's move from its temporary housing in downtown Washington, DC to the Langley site are "difficult to gauge," he describes two aftereffects of the move that appear to support Schein's (1983, 1991) description of geographic location as a secondary cultural embedding mechanism. First, the move to its secluded Virginia compound reinforced not only the permanence of CIA, but also its disconnection from the rest of government (Leary, 1984). Planned and completed at a time following the ascension of the clandestine service, the dramatic increase in covert action activities, Dulles's personal emphasis on compartmentation of information, and the lack of meaningful legislative oversight, the Langley compound had the "negative" effect of physically isolating CIA from the policymakers it was created to serve (Leary, 1984). Leary
(1984) and Strodes (1999) describe the physical separation of CIA from the rest of government as being consistent with Dulles’s personal attitudes and assumptions regarding secrecy, the ability of CIA to act independently of oversight, and the ability of the Agency to maintain its “pockets of privilege” (Leary, 1984, Manigold, 1991). While not in and of itself a particularly potent cultural embedding mechanism (Schein, 1983), states that secondary mechanisms reinforce primary mechanisms “to make the total message more potent than individual components” (p. 22). Second, Leary (1984) states that CIA’s move to the consolidated site at Langley was an attempt to encourage interchange and cooperation between the DP and the DI. He states that this attempt at a “more integrated organization” through collocation failed “given the procedural and institutional barriers between the two directors” (p. 76). These barriers included to a large degree the explicit and implicit messages sent by Dulles regarding the importance of operations at the expense of analysis and the importance of secrecy and compartmentation of information. Further, DP and DI integration was
inconsistent with CIA’s organizational design and structure established and embedded by Donovan during the earliest days of the OSS. Schein’s (1991) description of secondary cultural embedding mechanisms explains this:

...cultural assumptions will always be manifested first in what leaders demonstrate, not in what is written down or is inferred from designs and procedures. (p. 237).

Strodes (1999) states that one of the great pleasures of Dulles’s last year of life came in March 1968, when DCI Richard Helms invited him out to the Langley headquarters to unveil the bas-relief medallion that carried his portrait. The medallion hangs in the lobby of CIA headquarters, and its inscription is a rough translation of a Latin motto, *Si monumentum requiris circumspice*, “His monument is around us.”

Evidence of Dulles’s use of organizational design and structure as a secondary cultural embedding mechanism and the pilot and non-pilot historical sources from which this evidence was drawn may be organized as follows:
Table 5. -- Dulles’s use of the Design of Physical Spaces, Facades, and Buildings as a Secondary Cultural Embedding Mechanism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
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CHAPTER 6

THE CASE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER

John Edgar Hoover served as FBI Director from his appointment on May 10, 1924, until his death almost 48 years later, May 2, 1972. Notwithstanding recent criticisms, by any measure, Hoover was one of the most powerful public administrators in the history of the United States. His tenure spanned seven presidential administrations as he personally created one of the most effective law enforcement agencies in the world. During his long reign Hoover was the FBI. Despite deep controversy over his methods and suggested abuses of power, in the FBI today, Hoover continues to be lionized as the legendary founding executive of the Bureau and his influences remain etched throughout the organization.

Edgar, as he was called since childhood, was born on January 1, 1895 in Washington, DC, three blocks behind the US Capitol Building. He was the son of a second-generation civil servant, Dickerson Naylor.
Hoover, Sr. who, like his father before him, worked in the print shop of the US Coast and Geodetic Survey. Hoover was raised as the youngest of three surviving children. He and his elder brother and sister grew up in a middle-class, socially conservative, protestant, and segregationist neighborhood of the nation’s capitol. Hoover’s parents were not regular church members, but Hoover through his older brother leveraged church membership as a means to attain social respectability and advancement (Powers, 1987).

Hoover was the product of the turn of the century DC public school system. Skipping a traditional college education, Hoover enrolled in George Washington University Law School, where he attended at night, earning a Bachelor of Law degree in 1916 and a Master of Law degree in 1917 (Theoharis, 1999). During the day, he worked as a junior messenger with the Order Department of the Library of Congress. Through the contacts of an uncle who was a federal appeals court judge, Hoover obtained employment with the Justice Department as a clerk in 1917.
With the completion of his graduate degree, and passage of the DC bar exam, he was appointed within the Justice Department as an attorney in less than a year. This appointment exempted him from military service during World War I. His first assignment within Justice was as an adjudicator within the “Alien Enemy Bureau” or alien registration division. In this position, he decided German civilian deportation actions for national security reasons. Following the end of World War I in November 1918, Hoover was appointed head of the Anti-Radical Division of the Bureau of Investigation. After a series of bombings in May and June 1919, Hoover was appointed as special assistant to the Attorney General and head of a newly created General Intelligence Division, where he collected publicly available information on US radicals\textsuperscript{60}. In 1921, the director of the Bureau of Investigation, William Burns appointed Hoover as assistant director, at that time the second highest position in the Bureau.

\textsuperscript{60} Hoover became convinced that radicals (both anarchists and communists) posed as great a danger to US security as they had to pre-revolutionary Russia in 1917. Throughout his life, he never deviated from that view (Theoharis, 1999).
Significantly, Hoover rose from a lowly Justice Department clerk to the number two position in the Bureau of Investigation in just four years. Historians explain his meteoric rise to assistant director by age 26 by noting his exceptional administrative efficiency and obsessive attention to detail (Powers, 1987), his ability to develop expertise in an area of great political demand (radicalism) (Ungar, 1976), his reputation as an apolitical, principled, reformer in a time of need (Deloach, 1997), and his notoriety within the Justice Department as a stern task-master (Theoharis, 1999). Powers (1987) sums up the reasons for Hoover’s unprecedented rise stating:

Perhaps every great career depends on an improbably run of good fortune. Hoover had the luck to be at the right place, at the right time, with the right aptitudes, credentials, and confidence. (p. 66).

As assistant director, Hoover took over the administration and day-to-day operations of a Bureau badly scarred by political intrigue and cronyism. Director Burns, who had previously headed a private detective agency, was notorious for hiring political friends as Bureau agents, as well as other unqualified individuals with limited education. Attorney General Harlan F. Stone,
appointed by President Calvin Coolidge in 1924, to clean up the scandal-ridden Department of Justice, secured Burns’ resignation in May of the same year. Stone appointed Hoover as acting director of the Bureau and made the appointment permanent on December 10, 1924. Hoover immediately set out to reform the Bureau, whose reputation had suffered under Burns. In the next few months, he fired incompetent and undereducated agents, and he revived the requirement for legal training for agents, as well as ordering background checks, interviews, and physical tests for applicants.

The expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction that occurred with the Lindbergh Law of 1932 and New Deal crime fighting initiatives of 1933 and 1934 provided Hoover’s FBI a dominion over a greater number of crimes and the ability to assume an increasingly high public profile. Hoover recognized that with greater public recognition came a need to maintain public confidence. He enlisted the help of reporters supportive of the Bureau, and others in the

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61 The Bureau of Investigation was renamed the Division of Investigation in 1933 and finally the Federal Bureau of Investigation on July 1, 1935 (Theoharis, 1999).
media, to build the mystique of the invincible “G-Men” and their heroic director.

Hoover used the resultant prestige to educate the public about what he considered to be threats to American society, such as gangsters during the 1930’s and Communists during the Cold War of the late 1940’s through the 1960’s. He carried out this education campaign through books and articles that carried his byline but were written by agents and Bureau support personnel (Kessler, 1993).

In contrast to FBI agents, virtually all of whom were college graduates, local and state police officers during the 1930’s typically had little academic or professional training. Hoover sought to change this in 1935 by establishing the FBI National Academy to train policemen in methods for conducting professional and scientific investigations. Academy graduates would then return home to train their colleagues.

During Hoover’s tenure, presidents regularly requested that the Bureau collect information on their political

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Kessler (1993) also alleges that Hoover personally received illegal royalties for many of these works.
rivals and critics. Hoover complied with these presidential requests and additionally brought whatever derogatory information on government officials that came to the FBI’s attention. Personally, or through his assistants, he regularly briefed each president about the questionable conduct of administration officials. Additionally, he let it be known to high officials when the FBI possessed derogatory information about them, assuring them that the information would be closely held. Much of this information coming into the FBI on public officials and other people of prominence was maintained in files kept in Hoover’s office to limit their accessibility. Theoharis (1999) notes that no conclusive evidence has surfaced that Hoover initiated surveillance of government officials for other than legitimate purposes.

Before America’s entry into World War II, the FBI, using authority granted by President Roosevelt, monitored suspected German agents (and other suspected dangerous aliens) and compiled a list of foreign nationals and citizens for possible detention. Following Pearl Harbor, suspected dangerous aliens were arrested. Because he
considered all potential spies and saboteurs to be in custody, Hoover opposed the Roosevelt administration’s program interning west coast Japanese and Japanese Americans. He was overruled by Attorney General Francis Biddle and President Roosevelt, who acceded to the advice of military officials.

After the end of World War II, Hoover spoke frequently about the dangers of juvenile delinquency and a lax parole system. He is better known for his public campaign against domestic subversion, especially communists and “fellow travelers,” or non-Communist Party members sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Because FBI investigations in the 1940’s uncovered evidence of communist subversion in the US, Hoover remained convinced for decades that communists could gain control in the US as they had in Eastern Europe and China. He made his war on American communism a personal crusade, and by lending his prestige in support of the view that critics of the government were unpatriotic and pro-communist, Hoover was responsible, in part, for discouraging legitimate dissent.
Hoover’s power reached its zenith in the years following World War II as critics claimed he could investigate who, what, and how he pleased. In 1956 he launched COINTELPRO (for counterintelligence program), which involved collecting domestic intelligence about people and organizations Hoover judged were disloyal to the US government including civil rights organizations, religious groups, and labor unions. During the Vietnam War he concentrated COINTELPRO on antiwar activists and drew in CIA. COINTELPRO became the longest-lived and most penetrating domestic intelligence operation in US history. In the face of unprecedented criticism by civil rights groups and by elected officials, Hoover ended the program in 1971.

Simultaneously, Hoover was blamed for the Bureau’s failure to battle organized crime and protect black civil

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63 Known as operation CHAOS, this joint FBI - CIA domestic surveillance program sought to determine if antiwar protest movements in the US were communist inspired (Polmar and Allen, 1998).
rights. At the time, he contended that the FBI lacked clear jurisdiction under federal laws in both these areas.\footnote{Hoover was at least partially justified in this assertion. Until the late 1960's, presidents, Congress, and the courts preferred local to federal crime enforcement. When administration policy, law, and public opinion shifted in response to “law and order” concerns of the 1960’s and local law enforcement abuses during the civil rights movement, the FBI became more aggressive in its organized crime and civil rights investigations (Theoharis, 1999).}

The FBI’s later civil rights successes, however, were overshadowed by Hoover’s personal vendetta against Martin Luther King, Jr. Hoover considered King a liar and a hypocrite. In an effort to destroy King’s prestige and his leadership position in civil rights endeavors, Hoover authorized a program designed to harass and discredit him. The operation against King, first exposed during congressional hearings in the 1970’s, probably did more than any other action to compromise Hoover’s subsequent reputation.

The King vendetta and other illegal Bureau operations were first revealed in the reform atmosphere that followed the Watergate-related revelations of the mid-1970s. Congressional hearings, as well as Bureau documents stolen
and selectively released, revealed the truth behind some of the accusations previously leveled at the FBI by its civil libertarian critics. After the 1970s, Hoover’s anticommunist crusade came to be considered excessive. These revelations altered the public’s perception of Hoover. With the skepticism of government fostered by Watergate, many of Hoover’s real achievements were often disparaged or ignored. While biographers of the 1950’s lionized Hoover, those of the 1990’s emphasized scandalous aspects of his life.

Despite this, during Hoover’s lifetime, the FBI’s known successes, combined with the Bureau’s highly successful public relations campaigns, made Hoover one of the most admired Americans. The FBI Director is subordinate to the Attorney General and any of the seventeen under which Hoover served could have theoretically fired him at any time. However, by 1935 attorneys general were unwilling to challenge him. While maintaining cordial relations with most attorneys general over him, Hoover often dealt directly with presidents and vice versa.
Polmar and Allen (1998) cite former House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel Cellar as once stating:

He was the head of an agency that in turn had tremendous power, power over surveillance, power of control over the lives of every man in the nation. He had a dossier on every member of Congress and member of the Senate (p. 266).

At times, Hoover seemed more powerful than the presidents he served. Theoharis (1999) attributes his longevity to the requested intelligence assistance he provided each administration and the support he commanded from the public, the media, and Congress.

When Hoover reached the age 70, President Lyndon Johnson issued a special executive order waiving the mandatory retirement age for him. He left the legacy of a professionalized American law enforcement community and a FBI internationally respected for its competence and

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65 Deloach, a former Bureau deputy director under Hoover, in his book Hoover’s FBI (1997) specifically denies this. He states that Hoover never investigated members of Congress or other public officials improperly to develop derogatory information. He does relate that occasionally the FBI would develop such information through other investigations and that such information would be noted.
efficiency. Upon his death, President Nixon afforded him a rare honor for a public administrator by having his body lie in state in the Capitol rotunda, where thousands stood in long lines to pay their last respects.

In recent years, rumors have surfaced regarding his private life. Hoover never married and he left a large share of his estate to his close friend, confidant, and professional associate Clyde Tolson. Claims that he was a closet homosexual, while intriguing, have never been proved.

Assessments of his long career reveal a legacy that is profoundly ambiguous. His greatest achievements were the creation of the most effective federal law enforcement agency in the world and the infusion of professional and scientific methods into American police work at all levels. Deloach (1997) writes:

J. Edgar Hoover was a rare individual. He had a nobility of purpose. His early vision and acquired prestige drove the FBI into becoming the world’s foremost law enforcement agency. The new innovations introduced under his watch – the centralization of fingerprints for use by all authorized police organizations; the famed FBI laboratory also used by such organizations; the solution of crimes through scientific analysis; the intense and constant training of agents and police in new methods; the National
Crime Information Center - not only brought higher standards to his profession, but forever branded him as the Father of modern day law enforcement. (p. 418).

He achieved his life’s goal of destroying American communism, and was a powerful support for traditional values; however those values supported racial and other injustices, and his covert attacks on personal and public enemies violated principles of constitutional limits on government (Powers, 1987). Kessler (1993) complains that even today FBI training classes for new agents ignore Hoover’s dark side:

There is nothing about Hoover bugging, harassing, and trying to discredit Martin Luther King, Jr, acts that then Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach called ‘shocking’ and ‘grossly improper’ when he found out about them. There is nothing about illegal surreptitious entries, or about bureau spying on political activities at the 1964 Democratic National Convention for the Johnson White House. There is no mention of how Hoover illegally had FBI employees paint his house each year; build a front portico, a redwood fence, a rear deck, and a flagstone walk at his home; or install artificial turf and plant and move shrubbery outside his home. Nor is there reference to Hoover’s pocketing a portion of the royalties from Master’s of Deceit after bureau employees wrote the book on government time. (p. 441).

In a real sense, Hoover remained throughout his professional life a creature of the 1920s. He ended his
life embittered and isolated, the FBI a monument to his past – and to his memories of an America that hardly existed any longer outside its walls.

**Deliberate Role Modeling, Teaching, and Coaching**

The visible behavior of early leaders has great value for communicating assumptions and values to organizational members and newcomers and serves as a primary cultural embedding mechanism (Schein, 1991). Leader behaviors can be communicated formally, in staged settings, and informally. While both venues have value for the purposes of communicating leader values and expectations, Schein (1991) states that a leader’s observed informal behaviors are one of the most powerful explicit cultural embedding mechanisms available. Leader behaviors serve as a powerful tool for indoctrinating new organizational members and, if consistent over time, can serve as an archetype against which employees can model their behavior.

Yukl (1989) agrees that behavioral role modeling can be a significant way in which early leaders exert power and influence over subordinates. Charismatic leaders, or those possessing such qualities as personal magnetism, a
dramatic, or persuasive manner, strong enthusiasm, and convictions, are most likely to set examples in their own behavior for followers to imitate. When most effectively applied, role modeling becomes more that just the simple imitation of a leader’s behavior, but includes the adoption of the leader’s beliefs and values. Leaders that successfully employ this device can exert considerable influence on follower motivation and satisfaction (Yukl, 1989).

Several of the surveyed historical sources supply evidence that as FBI Director, Hoover profoundly shaped the Bureau’s institutional identity through explicit role modeling. Historians state that in 1924, Hoover inherited a Bureau deeply embroiled in political intrigue, battles between the Congress and the President, corruption, and rampant cronyism. Over the next 47 years, he meticulously developed and cultivated a personal image of “dogged incorruptibility” (Lewis, 1980) both for internal and public consumption that served as a model for FBI employees and came to be a primary asset of the Bureau well into the 1970’s. He created and refined the mythical “G-Man” image
(Potter, 1990) of the FBI special agent that shaped public beliefs and provided a model for employee behavior and performance for over four decades. Personal role modeling by Hoover, as well as his careful internal and public construction of a vision of the FBI special agent, played a significant part in transmitting his beliefs, attitudes, and values, as well as his vision for the Bureau.

Hoover’s 1924 FBI had evolved from a Department of Justice force of “special agents” created in July 1908 by President Theodore Roosevelt’s Attorney General, Charles J. Bonaparte. The new investigative service was called the Bureau of Investigation. It later became the US Bureau of Investigation and then the Division of Investigation. The Bureau’s special agents investigated relatively few federal white-collar crimes, such as bankruptcy frauds and anti-trust violations.

Hoover inherited a Bureau that inspired little public confidence (Theoharis, 1999). Achieving a very poor reputation during its sixteen years of existence (Lewis, 1980), the FBI had been subjected to growing criticisms of its tactics and political activities. The Harding years had
afforded it almost fatal notoriety and there was serious
discussion of disbanding the Bureau and transferring its
functions to the Secret Service (Powers, 1987). The Bureau
had been born out of controversy between the president and
congress and during its short life had continued to be used
by these powerbrokers in the national political theater
(Powers, 1987).

Associated with this “image” problem was the issue of
personnel. Deloach (1995) refers to the 1924 Bureau as
nothing more than a dumping ground for political hacks who
used their patronage jobs as investigators to harass and
intimidate political enemies. The Bureau had grown from
its original compliment of 34 agents to 441 in 1924 (U.S.
Department of Justice, 1983b) with a substantial part of
the difference being hired under the patronage system of
Chief Burns. An “odor” detected by Attorney General Stone
permeated the organization from top to bottom and across
all areas of Bureau operation.

As the newly appointed Director, Lewis (1980) states
that Hoover’s personal integrity and honesty stood in sharp
contrast to the corruption around him. Powers (1987) cites
Whitehead (1956) as stating that within days of his appointment, Hoover wrote to the Attorney General:

I have already commenced an examination of the personnel files of each employee of the Bureau and have already recommended a number of Special Agents whose services may be discontinued for the best interests of the service. (Powers, p.150).

Powers (1987) states that Hoover pursued a policy of personnel reductions with enthusiasm. By the end of his first year, he had dismissed 61 agents and had closed five out of 53 field offices. By the end of the decade, Hoover had reduced FBI personnel to 581, 339 of them agents, far below the Bureau's peak figure of 1,127 (579) agents in 1920. By 1932 he had reduced the number of FBI field offices to 22. (Powers, 1987).

Theoharis (1999) states that in addition to releasing a significant number of employees, Hoover established stricter hiring standards and established a training facility for new agents in the New York field office.

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66 Theoharis (1999) states that most of these initial firings involved agents who had previously served time in prison and part-time employees who were political appointees under his predecessor.

67 Training responsibility was transferred to the Washington, DC field office in 1928 then to a specially
rules were issued to ensure a more disciplined and professional corps (Bresler, 1993). Agents had to meet rigorous dress, deportment, and personal conduct standards. Appointments were removed from political influence, and clear rules were established to evaluate agent performance. Hoover personally authored a Manual of Regulation that was provided to agents to proscribe standards for the conduct of investigations, and he required agents and heads of field offices (special agents in charge, SACs) to abide by the new or revised rules. A special inspection division was established to ensure compliance with these rules, and derelict agents and SACs were given letters of reprimand for poor performance and were fired for serious breeches or repeated rule violations. Taken together, these steps resulted in a personnel system that was stricter than any other in national government (Gawloski, 1975).

Lewis (1980) states that:

Hoover had in his head an ideal agent who was to be duplicated as much as possible during his lengthy career as Director. The personification of this ideal agent did not have to be constructed from abstract

created training facility in Quantico, Virginia, in 1972 (Theoharis, 1999).
theory: Hoover himself was ready to pose for the portrait. (pp. 107 – 108).

Powers (1987) characterizes the public “portrait” of Hoover as extraordinarily professional; exhibiting a tireless work ethic; narrow; provincial; fervently moralistic; straight-laced; energetic; intelligent; possessing unmoving convictions; and skeptically analytical. While actively cultivating a public image of the heroic FBI Director -- locked in mortal combat with criminals, communists, and those who threatened the American way of life (Theoharis, 1998a) -- he perfected an image within the Bureau of an all powerful, all seeing, god-like presence that agents believed constantly “looked over their shoulders” (Wilson, 1989). Kessler (1993) states that:

As a king might be in a foreign country, he was portrayed as all-knowing, magnanimous, and kind to animals. The few attacks on him were labeled ‘smears’ that were ‘Communist inspired.’ (p. 434).

In seeking to replicate his personal image, Hoover sought to control virtually all aspects of his agents’ lives. Ungar (1976) characterizes his discipline and
regimentation as sometimes exceeding the military in severity and lack of compassion. Reibling (1994) states that the FBI’s code of conduct sprang directly from the sheer force of Hoover’s personality and failure to conform resulted in immediate and severe punishment. Highly successful agents were strongly discouraged from seeking personal publicity lest they detract from Hoover’s aura. Those that did frequently found their careers ended and reputations publicly smeared (Powers, 1987). Hoover assumed the right to set standards for his agents’ personal lives, and the sexual taboos, for example, were absolute. Both male and female employees were immediately dismissed for cohabitation and unmarried sex. Employees were also summarily fired if they knew of such indiscretions and

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68 Powers (1987) recounts the fate of Special Agent Melvin Pervis who gained wide acclaim as the man who killed John Dillinger in 1934. The publicity afforded Pervis resulted in his falling into disfavor with Hoover and in his subsequent resignation in 1935. Powers (1987) attributes Pervis’s ultimate suicide to his rejection by the “boss.”

69 Ungar (1976) states that these rules persisted long after Hoover’s death. As late as mid-1974, FBI Director Clarence Kelley approved the transfer and demotion of the Salt Lake City Field Office SAC for alleged unmarried sex.
failed to immediately report them. Bureau cars had to be kept clean and shiny, and agents were to wear conservative suits and white shirts – even though such dress and characteristics made them less effective in their work. Coffee drinking on the job was expressly forbidden, especially at FBI headquarters.⁷⁰ Hoover’s official justification was that his agents must have “an unblemished reputation.” Significantly, in implementing many of the new rules, Hoover specifically used himself as an example. For instance, Powers (1987) cites Whitehead (1956) in quoting a 1925 Hoover memo to all SACs:

> I am determined to summarily dismiss from this Bureau any employee whom I find indulging in the use of intoxicants to any degree and upon any occasion. ...I do believe that when a man becomes part of this Bureau he must so conduct himself both officially and unofficially as to eliminate the slightest possibility of criticism as to his conduct or actions. ...I myself am refraining from the use of intoxicants... and I am not, therefore, expecting any more of the field employee that I am of myself. (Whitehead, p. 71).

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⁷⁰ Bureau veterans recount “Black Friday” in the 1950’s when Hoover caught a large number of agents drinking coffee after the 9:00AM deadline at FBI headquarters and severely punished them. (Ungar, 1976).
Powers (1987) states that as part of basic training, new agents were indoctrinated in an idealized legend of Hoover’s life, and “how he built this Bureau from the ground up.” Instructors told the trainees that:

…the Director chose the path of sacrifice, and electing to forgo private wealth and to what to lesser men are the pleasures of life, he dedicated himself instead to the creation of the organization we are proud to serve today. Against all odds, our Director stuck doggedly to his purpose; today he remains the guiding light of the FBI. …he still works longer hours than any of us, every day of the year …yes, boys, J. Edgar Hoover is an inspiration to us all. Indeed, it has been said, and truly – ‘the sunshine of his presence lights our lives.’ (p. 381).

Anything having to do with Bureau image received Hoover’s personal attention and he created what has been called “the world’s most successful public relations machine” (Kessler, 1993). During the 1930’s, Hoover, with the help of a ghost writer, turned Bureau history into mythology; he made the Bureau’s greatest cases demonstrate the virtues the FBI defended, the vices it warred against, and the inescapable power of scientific crime-fighting methods (Powers, 1987; Littieri, 1991). Hoover began a formal media program in which FBI officials collaborated with several freelance writers and journalists who were
given exclusive access to Bureau information to prepare articles, speeches, books, and even a comic strip to glorify the FBI’s conquest over celebrated criminals of the day (Theoharis, 1999) and to create an image of the FBI as a superior and exclusive organization (Gawloski, 1975). He formalized this effort with the creation of the Criminal Records Division that became the FBI’s public relations arm (Littieri, 1991; Theoharis, 1998a). Kessler (1993) states that the Criminal Records Division had a “special correspondents list” of reporters who could be counted on to project the Bureau in a positive light in exchange for cooperation and exclusive leaks from Bureau files.

Hoover’s sole purpose was to have the Bureau and its agents portrayed as morally convicted, highly efficient, well-trained, and more than up to the task of catching the nation’s most sinister “public enemies” (Theoharis, 1999). Ungar (1976) states that the “G-Man” image that emerged from these efforts became central to the FBI culture during the Hoover regime. Although derived in large part from the 1930’s politics of crime control, Hoover also turned this positive popular reputation into an
internal self-image of professionalism and dedication for his agents. The G-Man identity also incorporated the ideas of an invincible FBI and an infallible Director. If a public enemy was loose in society or a major crime unsolved, it was just a matter of time before the Bureau and its G-Men would capture the fugitive or solve the most difficult crime. If agents looked for the quintessential G-Man, the perfect FBI agent, Hoover sought to provide the archetype.

The myth of the G-Man was perpetuated and reaffirmed in books, movies, television, and newspaper accounts of the Bureau’s work. The 1959 movie, The FBI Story, and the television series, “The FBI,” that began in 1965, were two of the more notable productions -- both of which were closely monitored by Hoover.71 The G-Man culture was further embellished during the 1950’s and 1960’s by

71 Theoharis (1999) states that the television series “The FBI” was completely controlled by the Bureau. Hoover personally approved all scripts, personnel, and sponsorships. He went to great lengths to ensure that the series did not contain excessive violence or sexual innuendo and he approved the manner in which Bureau employees were portrayed. At the time of his death, 40 million Americans watched the show each week and it was syndicated in 50 countries.
publicity concerning the FBI’s national security responsibilities, with the Bureau becoming the nation’s protector against both crime and the subversion of the “American Way.” (Theoharis, 1999). Riebling (1994) states:

Hoover’s government agents were demigods. American myth had previously provided only individual heroes: solitary trappers (Daniel Boone), lone-gunslinger sheriffs (Wyatt Earp), crazy-ass all purpose misfits (Buffalo Bill). There had been no collective order of virtue, no legion of honor, until Hoover’s American Knights. Like king Arthur’s men, Hoover’s heroes were thought to be chaste, incorruptible, invincible, and they went around the country doing good deeds. As real knights had done in medieval times, Hoover’s men literally kept roads safe for travelers and protected the country’s treasure in its vaults. The FBI had almost a holy aura about it... (p. 6).

In aggregate, the cited historical sources indicate that Hoover not only explicitly used personal role modeling as a mechanism to communicate his assumptions and values, but also reinforced this mechanism through strict discipline and an aggressive public relations campaign to embed his vision of the FBI and its employees (Lettieri, 1991). Not only through personal example but also through his careful manufacture and perpetuation of the G-Man ideal, Hoover successfully superimposed his values and beliefs on his organization. While creating his own image
as a public emblem of stability of and rectitude (Bresler, 1993), he mandated and enforced these same attributes in his employees. In summary, Gawloski, 1975 and Powers, 1987, state that Hoover’s philosophies became the FBI’s philosophies and his role modeling activities were successful in producing both external and internal images of his organization and employees that served as cornerstones of the Bureau’s culture until his death in 1972.

Evidence of Hoover’s use of deliberate role modeling as a primary cultural embedding mechanism and the pilot and non-pilot historical sources from which this evidence was drawn are summarized below:
Table 6. -- Hoover’s Use of Deliberate Role Modeling, Teaching and Coaching as a Primary Cultural Embedding Mechanism

<table>
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Criteria Used for Recruitment and Selection of People

Schein (1991) states that because organizational culture perpetuates itself through the recruitment of people who fit into it, an ongoing culture can be hard to change. Organizational change based upon radically different core assumptions and ideas essentially asks large groups of people to adopt norms and values that do not fit their own cultural background and may be totally unpalatable. However, Schein (1991) posits that culture change can be accelerated if one recruits and selects new
members according to criteria that fit new cultural assumptions. Such a strategy will produce a period of interim turmoil, but new members will not be uncomfortable with the new culture if they have been initially hired to fit into it.

Hatch (1997) agrees that a central element of organizational “culture management” involves recruiting practices aimed at finding value-compatible employees. She describes hiring and selection as one of several managerial control or influence mechanisms that may be used to direct the norms and values of an organization in such a way that desirable behaviors and organizational outcomes occur.

The reviewed secondary historical sources provide evidence that Hoover used recruitment practices as a primary mechanism to both break the Bureau of Investigation culture he inherited in 1924 and to create a new culture of the FBI that endured for years after his death. Taking over a Bureau staffed by ill trained patronage appointees, Hoover acted to depoliticize and professionalize the Bureau through strict hiring standards. Implicitly, he instituted hiring practices that enlisted the “value-compatible
employees” described by Hatch (1997) that demographically and culturally mirrored Hoover’s fundamental assumptions and beliefs.

The earliest Bureau of Investigation agents received no formal training (Kessler, 1993). The first appointees were either already special agents in the Justice Department or were transferred from the Secret Service. As the Bureau grew, it accepted agents with detective experience or legal training as well as some with “a good general education” (Theoharis, 1999) and some other relevant skill such as foreign language proficiency or journalistic experience. Some pre-World War I agents possessed several of these qualifications. The early Bureau was extremely small (34 permanent and 5 temporary special agents in July 1909), and all who requested applications, including women, received them. By 1910, most agents had legal training and had often worked previously in government or private law offices. Early Bureau special agents, like the famous G-Men of later years, lacked civil service protection and essentially “served at the pleasure of the Director.” After World War
I, Bureau employees who lacked college and sometimes high school were elevated to special agent status.

Lewis (1980) states that during the Bureau’s 13-year pre-Hoover history, patronage was used in a manner unseen in government agencies since the nineteenth century. The Bureau was organized along the lines of “a private detective agency” (Theoharis, 1999) and new agents, “selected in a manner of small town honorary deputy sheriffs” (Ungar, 1976), were hired on the basis of recommendations of congressmen and political bosses with little or no background checks. Some new agents were discovered, after the fact, to be ex-convicts, con men, and in one case, a convicted murderer.

Ungar (1976) quotes Hoover as stating to Attorney General Harlan Stone when offered the position as Bureau Director:

The Bureau must be divorced from politics and not be a catch-all for political hacks. Appointments must be made on merit. …promotions will be made on proved

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Ironically, Hoover himself was a product of the patronage system. He initially obtained a job at the Justice Department as a file clerk in 1917 and was promoted to attorney a year later because of his family’s political connections (Powers, 1987).
ability and the Bureau will be responsible only to the Attorney General. (P. 48).

Hoover lost no time in cleaning out what Ungar (1976) describes as “one of the most discredited agencies in government.” He fired agents with criminal records and drove out many of those who had no qualifications but their politics. While housecleaning, Hoover established the first qualifications for Bureau agents and improved upon the cursory training requirements previously established. He established the first formal training course for new agents in January 1928 (Kessler, 1993). Those with legal or accounting backgrounds were preferred for the position of Special Agent, unless there were other “outstanding” qualities that came to the Bureau’s attention (Ungar, 1976). Hoover established a career service with salaries and retirement benefits better than any comparable agency in the federal government or private industry. Promotions at all levels became merit based and SACs were given greater authority and discretion.

Ungar (1976) quotes Attorney General Stone as stating that Hoover:
...removed from the Bureau every man whose character there was any ground for suspicion. He refused to yield to any kind of political pressure; he appointed to the Bureau men of intelligence and education, and strove to build up a morale such as should control such an organization. (p. 54).

Theoharis (1999) states that when Hoover took over as Acting Director in 1924, less than 17 percent of special agents possessed legal training and less than 14 percent qualified as accountants. By 1939, over two thirds of FBI agents had legal training and over 17 percent qualified as accountants. By 1939, new special agents were required to be between 23 and 35 years old and to be either a graduate from a recognized law school and have bar membership or be "expert" in accounting with practical experience. Agents were required to pass a rigorous physical examination conducted by Navy physicians, and an exhaustive background investigation. In 1953, when the Bureau was accepting very few new agents, applicants had to be between 25 and 40; had to be willing to serve anywhere in the US or its territories, and Puerto Rico; and to have graduated from a resident law school with a Bachelor of Laws degree, or from
an accounting school with at least three years of practical accounting or auditing experience.

Theoharis (1999) states that all women were excluded from the position of Special Agent between 1926 and 1972. However, the Bureau did accept certain men who did not meet all of the requirements. These exceptions included men who had desirable language or scientific skills, firearms experts, those with law enforcement or military experience, and even athletes who could strengthen Bureau basketball and softball teams. Male Bureau clerks could advance to agent status, although they usually had to finish college first. Ultimately, the FBI amended its official qualifications to eliminate legal or accounting backgrounds as a requirement and sought those with scientific, computer, and linguistic skills.

In addition to exacting recruitment and selection requirements, Hoover conceived of the idea of a National Academy to train Bureau agents and local police from around the country in the latest law enforcement techniques. While the principle objective of the FBI Academy was to raise the level of professionalism in law enforcement nationwide, it
also established the FBI as the model of professionalism and served as a primary mechanism for indoctrinating agents in appropriate behavior and uniform procedures (Powers, 1987). Theoharis (1999) notes that the training and expertise of FBI agents remains one of the Bureau’s hallmarks and contributes to its elite status.

By the mid-1930’s, Hoover had effectively broken the old Bureau culture through removals and the integration of new more professionally qualified and educated agents. The breaking of the old culture was not without the turmoil cited by Schein (1991). Powers (1967) states that Hoover placed such extreme pressure on original Bureau personnel that “some of the human materials began to crack.” Small-scale revolts occurred against his authority during the 1920’s and Ungar (1976), Powers (1987), and Theoharis (1998b; 1999) all cite virulent complaints by agents to the Attorney General over the strict discipline, “unfair” standards, and perceived mistreatment of “original” Bureau of Investigation veterans by Hoover.

Ungar (1976) and Theoharis (1999) state that Hoover set about creating a new FBI culture through hiring largely
homogeneous individuals that appeared in many ways to be reflections of himself. Throughout his tenure as Director, his FBI recruits shared remarkably similar demographic traits and regional characteristics and these reflected Hoover’s personal prejudices and values (Ungar, 1976).

During the 1930’s Hoover’s FBI recruited almost exclusively white male, protestant agents from small southern towns (Ungar, 1976; Theoharis, 1999). Beginning in 1940, Catholic appointments increased – especially Catholics of Irish decent.²³ Twenty years after Hoover became FBI Director:

The typical agent was a white male, 34 years of age, with a wife and two children. His father was a businessman who was moderately well off, but not rich. In high school, the agent had earned above average grades and was a good athlete. He went to a state university, earned a bachelor’s degree, and later entered law school. (Theoharis, 1999 p. 196).

Ungar (1976) states that agents tended to be churchgoers and a remarkable number had relatives who were members of the clergy. The most striking trait of Hoover’s

²³ As the Bureau began stressing language skills, many Mormons became Special Agents due to their language proficiency gained during their overseas “missions.”
recruits was the number originating from small towns. The effect was the carrying over of small town values and principles to the Bureau. The small town mentality also led to:

...a certain narrow-mindedness and intolerance, an unspoken insistence that all agents should conform to the same set of personal standards and ideals. (p. 327).

Ungar (1976), Powers (1987), and Theoharis (1999) all state that the reason for the racial and background uniformity in FBI recruiting until Hoover’s death in 1972 was his personal prejudices and those of Clyde Tolson.

They wanted to be surrounded by all American types, and not allow too much variety to be mixed in. (Ungar, 1976 p. 327).

Hoover wanted his agents to share his old-fashioned, narrow minded, southern - old Washington, DC - attitudes.

During Hoover’s tenure there were very few Jewish agents or members of other minority ethnic groups. Ungar (1976) and Theoharis (1999) cite only a handful of American Indians or Spanish surnamed agents. Until 1962, only five blacks worked at the Bureau and were designated “honorary agents.” They worked as personal servants, retainers,
chauffeurs, or office boys for Hoover. When pressured by
Attorney General Robert Kennedy to increase minority hiring
and recruiting, Hoover made an “enormous fuss” over the
fact that he was not going to “lower standards” just to
integrate the Bureau. Kessler (1993) quotes Hoover in
testimony before the House Appropriations Committee in 1966
in which he spoke about the qualifications he looked for in
agents.

I will not appoint any man merely because of the color
of his skin. We have some employees who are full-
blooded Chinese. We have white and Negro employees.
I will not lower the qualifications. I must insist
that appointees be above average in intelligence and
reputation, of good character, and be above average in
personal appearance. (p. 399).

He gave in slightly and agreed to double the number of
black agents – to a grand total of ten – by 1963 (Powers,
1987). Kessler (1993) states that by 1972 the FBI had only
70 blacks and 69 Hispanics out of 8,659 agents.

Hoover steadfastly excluded women from special agent
positions throughout his career. The first female agent
candidates were hired and entered the FBI Academy under
Acting Director L. Patrick Gray two months after Hoover’s
death (Ungar, 1976). Clarence Kelly, the first permanent
Director after Hoover, endorsed the hiring of more female and minority agents, but Theoharis (1999) notes that it was not until William Webster became FBI Director in 1978 that women and minority agents were actively recruited.

Theoharis (1999) sums up FBI recruiting and selection and its effects on Bureau’s culture under Hoover stating:

The Bureau’s biased selection of agents reflected the background of FBI Director Hoover. Having grown up in a segregated Washington, DC, at the turn of the century, Hoover held turn-of-the-century Southern racial attitudes and a conservative Christian worldview. Given his authoritarian management style, these values were translated into FBI culture, and Hoover did not tolerate deviation from the conservative, Southern small-town vision of America and of the FBI. (pp. 196 – 197).

Powers (1987) states that by the end of the 1960’s, this selection bias began to adversely affect the Bureau’s ability to recruit new agents. The closed, highly disciplined Bureau, permeated with Hoover’s inflexible presence, ran counter to the expectations and habits of most college graduates in the sixties. (p. 362).

By the fall of 1960, there were three occasions that new agent classes had to be postponed due to a lack of “qualified” applicants. In response, the FBI began
recruiting directly from the ranks of its clerical staff. Many of these FBI staffers had gone to work for the Bureau directly out of high school and all were “pre-sold” and pre-indoctrinated in the Bureau’s ways, called by FBI critics “Bureau-think.” Powers (1987) cites Turner (1971) as stating that this inbreeding, with its consequent suspicion of outsiders, was one reason that critics charged that the Bureau had become a “secret society.”

The homogeneity of Bureau recruiting and selection hampered the effectiveness of a number of FBI investigations by the end of Hoover’s tenure. Ungar (1976) states that the FBI had increasing difficulty conducting effective investigations in ethnic communities during the mid to late 1960’s. Few agents could conduct successful investigations in Orthodox Jewish communities and the Bureau had very few agents it could confidently send into Mexican-American or Puerto Rican neighborhoods, onto Indian reservations or into black ghettos. Instead, the FBI had to increasingly depend on informant coverage or help from local police, who themselves were sometimes not welcome in those communities. Increasingly, the Bureau had difficulty
in cases in which religion or skin color was of obvious investigative advantage (Kessler, 1993).

In the years following Hoover’s death, FBI agent selection and recruiting became much more inclusive. Within four years of Hoover’s death, the Bureau’s minority hiring record compared favorably with other federal agencies (Ungar, 1976). Theoharis (1999) states that under Director William Webster, female hiring for agent positions increased dramatically and a strong minority recruitment program was initiated. During Webster’s tenure (1978 – 1987), the number of minority agents more than doubled, from 413 to 943. In addition, the first black agent was appointed to a senior level FBI position – executive assistant director. The number of female agents increased from 147 to 787. By 1992, one in ten FBI special agents were female and one in ten were minorities.

Other aspects of Bureau selection and recruiting changed as well. Kessler (1991) notes that by the late 1980’s most agent candidates originated from New York State and California rather than the south. By 1992, rather than law and accounting degrees, most new FBI agents held
academic degrees in the social sciences. Theoharis (1999) states that by the 1990’s the Bureau was called upon to conduct an increasing span of investigations and operations. In order to meet requirements for undercover operations against organized crime figures, the pursuit of terrorists in foreign countries, security violations on Wall Street, investigations of drugs and violence in the inner cities, cyber crime, and enforcing civil rights laws the FBI recruits today from the broadest population base. Diversity among agents has become an important component of modern Bureau culture (Theoharis, 1999).

Hoover’s ability to change and perpetuate organizational culture at the FBI through recruitment and retention is consistent with Schein’s (1983, 1991) cultural embedding model. Culture management through the recruitment of value-compatible employees is a primary mechanism by which early leaders can destroy one culture and replace it with another. Using this mechanism, Hoover successfully abolished the private detective model of the Bureau of Investigation and over the next 47 years shaped basic assumptions about the FBI’s relationship with its
environment, what it meant to be special agent, and what were the "right" things for FBI agents to do.

Significantly, the organizational changes that occurred after Hoover’s tenure, literally months after his death, appear to further reinforce Schein’s (1983, 1991) idea that the presence of an early leader can play a major role as a dominant variable in the maintenance and perpetuation of an organization’s culture.

Evidence of Hoover’s use of deliberate role modeling as a primary cultural embedding mechanism and the pilot and non-pilot historical sources from which this evidence was drawn are summarized below:

Table 7. -- Hoover’s Use of Recruitment, Selection, and Promotion as a Primary Cultural Embedding Mechanism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Pilot Sources</th>
<th>Non-pilot sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criteria used for recruitment, selection, promotion, leveling off, retirement and excommunication.</td>
<td>Southern, conservative, white male, protestants from small towns with strong Christian values.</td>
<td>Ungar, (1976); Powers (1987); Kessler (1993); Deloach (1995); Theoharis (1999)</td>
<td>Turner (1971); Lewis (1980); Theoharis (1998a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The cases examined in this study demonstrate that there are a number of discernable mechanisms that early leaders can use to create and embed culture within public organizations. Collectively, they also provide insight into the potency of cultural assumptions established within organizations and how such assumptions are transmitted over time. The ability to identify specific devices that leaders use to embed cultural assumptions into their organizations, indications of the extent to which these assumptions are embedded, and insight into what happens to those assumptions as time goes on serves to further clarify our understanding of how early leaders can influence the process of institutionalization.

A variety of literatures that study organizations recognize powerful and lasting influences by early leaders. These effects have been acknowledged and theoretically developed by classical and contemporary
institutionalists, organizational ecologists, and organizations culture theorists. While these perspectives emphasize different units and levels of analysis, each has added insight into early leader effects. However, with one notable exception, these literatures fail to address the specific mechanisms early leaders use to affect their influence on their organizations.

Selznick’s (1957) fundamental work in classic institutionalism identifies as prime functions of leadership the creation and maintenance of organizational values (Shinn, 1996), interpretation of organizational character, and the development of organizational models of thought and communication. While also emphasizing the importance of environment on organizational development, Selznik posits a significant role for early leaders in inculcating lasting beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors within their organizations. Identifying early leaders as one of several primary characters playing a lead role in creating and perpetuating an organization’s normative order, he provides virtually no insight into the specific devices or mechanisms used.
Stinchcombe (1965), a pupil of Selznik's, established the importance of conditions present at the time of founding or during the early history of an organization as being crucial to later structure and development. He argued that important aspects of many organizations could be traced directly to conditions present during the organization's early history. While silent on early leadership effects on organizations, his view that an organization's early history serves as an important developmental restraining and enabling factor served as an important point of departure for later theorists studying the lasting effects of early leaders.

Studies by organizational ecologists largely support Stinchcombe's (1965) thesis that conditions present during an organization's early history can have lasting and profound effects. Within this literature theorists such as Miles (1982), Child (1987), Boeker (1988), Bartlett and Goshal (1989), and Kimberley and Bouchikhi (1995) advance the argument that early leader predispositions and values serve as a decisive starting point for organizational development and that early leader effects can serve as one
of several crucial factors in an organization's evolution. Restricted by their analytic perspective, these theorists remain mute as to the operational aspects of early leader effects and the mechanisms or devices used by early leaders that influence organizational development.

Concomitantly, organization culture studies have examined the effects of early leaders on their organizations and have emphasized the creation and maintenance of values that result in tangible organizational artifacts. Trice, Belasco, and Arturro (1969), Clark (1970), Kanter (1972), and Buchanan (1974) to varying degrees explored the role of early executive leaders in fashioning and communicating organizational values while quantitative studies by Zucker (1991) and Harrison and Carroll (1991) have demonstrated the intergenerational transmission of these values. In the main, organization culture studies have focused on the influences of early leaders in creating organizational values, the perceptible artifacts of those values, and the diffusion of these values from one organizational generation to the next. For the most part, these studies
have examined the effects of early leader influences and their transmission rather than the instruments used by leaders to affect their influences.

Schein’s (1983, 1991) theory and explanation of the devices used by early leaders to influence their organizations is the most highly developed in the organization culture literature. He puts forward a model of cultural embedding that proposes that early leaders create organizational culture by putting into place their major assumptions and predispositions within their organizations. Schein (1983, 1991) identifies ten inculcating and secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms that leaders use both explicitly and tacitly to embed their beliefs and attitudes into their organizations and explains how these form the basis of a new organization’s culture. He further proposes that organizational culture evolves from the original assumptions and predispositions of the leader through a process of “hybrid” evolution by which new beliefs and assumptions are developed through organizational learning and environment. He states that despite this evolution,
the culture of an organization can remain remarkably congruent with the early leader’s original paradigm for many generations.

Contemporary institutional theory concentrates on the creation, maintenance, and reproduction of organizational institutions (Shinn, 1996) and identifies organizational culture as one of several transporters or carriers of institutions (Jepperson, 1991; Scott, 1995). While recognizing that institutions are an intricate mixture of different rule and control structures (Jepperson, 1991), these theorists agree that much institutionalization is carried by cultural rules (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas, 1987) and in some organizations culture can be the principle element generating and continuing institutional effects (Scott, 1995).

Contemporary institutional scholars like their classical forerunners generally recognize a significant role for early leaders in influencing organizations and in the formation and continuation of institutions. Nevertheless, like most other literatures reviewed, they give little or no attention to the mechanisms, devices, or
instruments early leaders use to affect their influences. Perrow (1986) cites this as a significant weakness in contemporary institutional theory along with the paucity of studies involving the largest and most powerful public and private institutions within society.

Several public administration writers, addressing many of the same effects, have conducted studies of executive leaders and their great and enduring effects on public institutions. Lewis (1980), Wilson (1989), and Cooper and Wright (1992) have conducted deep case analyses of leaders and their “organizational lives” and have highlighted their powerful and lasting organizational effects. The work of these scholars also have established public agencies as a productive venue for exploring early leader effects and the role that these leaders may have in the process of institutionalization.

This study uses Schein’s (1983, 1991) model of cultural embedding by early leaders in the organization culture literature as an analytic device to address some of the shortcomings in contemporary institutional theory cited by Perrow (1986). This approach is made possible by the
work of contemporary institutional theorists such as Jepperson (1991) and Scott (1995) who identify organization culture as one of several carriers or transporters of institutions. The work of Lewis (1980), Wilson (1989), and Cooper and Wright (1992) in public administration provide methodological insight into how this analytic device may be applied using large and significant public institutions as a context.

This study identifies five distinct cultural embedding mechanisms described by Schein (1983, 1991) that appeared to be used by the leaders considered. All three leaders ostensibly employed at least one primary embedding mechanism and, in two cases, one secondary articulation and reinforcement device. In the cases of Donovan and Hoover, both apparently employed the same primary mechanism – criteria for recruitment and selection. Table 8 provides a data display from all three cases. The table provides mechanism descriptions; the types of mechanisms employed; the leader utilizing the mechanism; and a brief description of mechanism indicators. The mechanisms are listed in descending order from most to least explicit. Appendix E
provides a comprehensive data display that includes all data indicated in Table 8 along with a listing of pilot and non-pilot sources from which the data was derived.
Table 8. -- Comprehensive listing of mechanisms found from most to least explicit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Leader(s)</th>
<th>Indicator(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design of physical spaces, facades, and buildings.</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Dulles</td>
<td>Construction of Langley, VA HQs campus, reinforced permanence of CIA, strengthened emphasis on secrecy and compartmentation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching by leaders.</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Hoover</td>
<td>Construction and preservation of personal image. Creation and perpetuation of the G-Man mystique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control.</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Dulles</td>
<td>Ascension of the DO, emphasis on covert action, dominance of DO in directing activities, number of DO officers in senior positions, ability of DO to operate independently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How the organization is designed and structured.</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Donovan</td>
<td>OSS structural legacy, separation of collections from analysis, distinct subculture development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria used for recruitment, selection, promotion, leveling off, retirement and excommunication.</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Donovan</td>
<td>East coast establishment, Ivy league educated, OSS old hands. Southern, conservative, white male, protestants from small towns with strong Christian values.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As stated in the methodology chapter, one objective of this study was to determine if any evidence could be developed that tended to refute Schein’s cultural embedding model. This attempt to prove the null hypothesis was unsuccessful as the historical sources used consistently described the same incidents, episodes, and events that are attributable to the operation of the five mechanisms cited in Table 6. While it is significant that evidence was not found to support the operation of all ten of Schein’s mechanisms, this lack of evidence does not confirm the null hypothesis, but is attributable to methodological factors. The lack of evidence tending to confirm the operation of all of Schein’s mechanisms does argue that this study’s findings are based on the evidence available and not simply a predisposition of the author to find these mechanisms in operation.

It is significant to note that the mechanisms cited in Table 6 and detailed in each case were not the only mechanisms for which the historical sources provided some degree of evidence. For instance, in the cases of Allen Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover, one or more historical
source(s) recounted episodes in which each responded to critical incidents or crises within their organizations in ways that seemed to reinforce and underpin their use of mechanisms cited in each of their cases. In another example, a few sources provided information on organizational systems and procedures used by CIA that arguably appeared to bolster the preeminence of clandestine collection and covert action over intelligence analysis. While it was tempting to pursue additional evidence from historical narratives not selected as pilot or non-pilot sources to garner further evidence of the use of these mechanisms, faithful adherence to the methodology developed would not permit this.

This faithful adherence, however, produced a number of methodological “blind spots” that deserve recognition and discussion. The cultural embedding mechanisms identified and elaborated upon in each case are those for which the greatest amount of evidence was present in the historical sources used. Judgment was used as to the level of evidence necessary to include a description of a mechanism in the cases studied. Generally, a standard of evidence
from multiple pilot sources with triangulation of findings from multiple non-pilot sources was followed. Two specific methodological issues became apparent in this study that restricted a more complete examination of the presence and operation of cultural embedding mechanisms. First, the methodology’s source selection step relied on judgmental selection criteria that precluded a number of biographic materials on Hoover and some of the organizational history material for both CIA and the FBI. A complete review of all materials identified in the literature definition step may have provided additional evidence supporting the operation of the mechanisms noted or may have identified the operation of other mechanisms not apparent in the sources used. Second, the total reliance on secondary historical sources as foundational evidence restricted the view of the cultural embedding mechanisms ostensibly in operation and a full development of their function and behavior over time. The secondary sources were useful only to the point of their creation. In every case, the “story” continued after the publication date of the secondary sources and the use of additional sources of evidence, such
as primary source material and interviews may have provided a clearer picture of mechanism operation and the existence of other mechanisms for which the secondary sources used provided little or no evidence. Additional studies, using other methodologies, such as a more complete compilation of secondary sources or other evidence collection techniques, may provide a more complete picture of the mechanisms identified in this study or develop evidence of the operation of other cultural embedding mechanisms for which little or no evidence was found.

The evidence cited in the three cases support Schein’s (1983, 1991) assertion that primary and secondary mechanisms employed by early leaders that reflect their beliefs, preferences, and predispositions can have discernable organizational effects that can last for many years and through multiple employee generations. The cases demonstrate that these effects may take the form of cultural assumptions as to who are acceptable members of an organization and how they should behave, how employees and functions should be organized and interact, how information is shared within an organization, and what organizational
activities are deemed dominant or most important. The cases also provide insight into a number of aspects of cultural embedding by early leaders that seem to corroborate other facets of Schein’s (1983, 1991) model. These are (1) in some instances, leader embedded effects can prevent organizational change based upon environmental pressures and in others, environmental pressures may modify early leader effects; (2) leader embedded effects can result in organizational dysfunction and these embedded effects may persist despite this dysfunction; (3) leader embedded effects may be intergenerationally transmitted, but appear particularly strengthened by the presence of the early leader within the organization; (4) secondary mechanisms will reinforce leader embedded effects if congruent with those effects, but are ignored by the organization if not compatible with those effects; (5) primary mechanisms that are compatible appear to co act to strengthen leader embedded effects. Altogether, the insight provided by these cases into the forms that early leader effects can take as cultural assumptions and some of their characteristics provide a clearer understanding of
how early leaders can affect the process of institutionalization in large public organizations.

The cases of Donovan and Hoover illustrate the power and lasting effects of the criteria early leaders can impose on recruiting and selection of employees. Donovan’s preference of Eastern Establishment Ivy League educated intelligence officers was transmitted directly into CIA as first generation OSS veterans continued those preferences and demonstrably sought to hire those sharing similar backgrounds, social characteristics, educational preparation, and belief systems. This generation of OSS alumni and those they hired with similar social and educational backgrounds dominated CIA senior management positions for decades. Reaching their zenith of power under Allen Dulles as DCI, the ascendancy of the “Knights Templar” began to wane only after the Bay of Pigs invasion seriously tarnished their mystique of infallibility and the Vietnam War forced significant changes in CIA recruiting strategies.

Throughout his 47-year tenure as FBI Director, Hoover’s clear predilection to recruit and hire Agents that
shared his regional, racial, religious, socio-economic status, conservative values, and personal standards deeply entrenched his values and attributes into the Bureau. This background uniformity in recruitment and selection resulted in a population of largely homogeneous Agents that appeared in many ways to be reflections of Hoover himself. By hiring Agents who shared remarkably similar demographic traits and regional characteristics, Hoover was able to enforce strict standards of discipline and performance. This homogeneity in recruitment and selection collapsed virtually overnight with Hoover’s death and within four years the inclusiveness of the FBI’s hiring record compared favorably to other federal agencies.

The Hoover case also demonstrates the potential force and effectiveness of deliberate role modeling and teaching by early leaders on organizational culture. His meticulous construction of both the “G-Man” mystique and his own personal image as Director deeply influenced both the FBI’s internal vision of itself and the public’s view of the Bureau. The icon of the perfect “G-Man” he created internally fostered and perpetuated expectations of
professionalism, dedication, and obedience among his Agents and also shaped the public’s opinion and view of the Bureau and “Hoover’s American Knights.” His own painstakingly crafted persona incorporated the ideals of an invincible FBI and an infallible Director that were propagated and reaffirmed in the media. These images served as cornerstones of the FBI’s culture until Hoover’s death in 1972.

Together, the Donovan and Dulles cases illustrate that early leader choices about organization design and what to pay attention to, measure, and control can have significant long lasting effects on how an organization’s activities are structured, how subcultures evolve, and how specific groups and/or activities come to dominate others. Donovan’s design of the OSS, separating collection from analysis into narrowly focused and autonomous entities, was passed directly to CIA through the integration of original OSS structures into the newly formed Agency in 1947. These structures, carrying with them two distinctive OSS subcultures, evolved into the directorates of operations and intelligence in the early CIA. As the subcultures
within these directorates matured, members of each
developed distinctive traits. Sharp and often hostile
divisions along with an intense competition for resources
and dominance resulted that have continued for almost 50
years.

The preeminent position afforded the clandestine
service by Allen Dulles and the emphasis and importance he
placed on CIA’s covert action capability decisively
established the primacy of collections over analysis in the
struggle for dominance within the Agency. His allocation
of personal attention and resources to intelligence
collections and his relative indifference to analysis
afforded ascendancy to the Agency’s operations directorate
that persists to the present day. The supremacy of CIA’s
DO continues to be evident in the dominance of clandestine
service officers in directing Agency operations, the number
of DO officers rising to senior management positions, and
the ability of the operations directorate to independently
operate to a large extent without input or direction from
Agency analysts.
All three cases reveal varying interactions between leader embedded effects and organizational environment. The cases demonstrate that organizational changes based on environmental pressures can be obstructed by leader effects and in other circumstances changes driven by environmental pressure can modify an organization despite a leader’s embedded effects. The Hoover case highlights the ability of early leader embedded effects to prevent organizational changes despite enormous environmental pressures. The FBI’s recruitment, selection, and maintenance of a largely homogeneous Agent population continued despite environmental pressures during the 1960’s. Hoover successfully resisted calls to significantly increase the number of minority and female Agents. Upon his death, Directors Clarence Kelly and William Webster immediately moved to diversify hiring to include large numbers of blacks, Hispanics, and women.\footnote{It is significant to note that while FBI recruiting policy changed almost immediately after Hoover’s death, other Bureau cultural attributes that this study ascribes to Hoover’s use of recruiting and role modeling persisted. The rapid change in recruiting “value compatible” employees to a much more heterogeneous pool of minorities and women evidences the process of hybridization due to environmental pressures.}
Donovan’s “cardinal rule” of separating collection from analysis in the OSS was transmitted to CIA by the incorporation of OSS elements into the Agency and by first generation OSS veterans who served in management positions. Environmental factors in the form of developing technology, competition from other agencies, and world events forced changes in this rule with the creation of the science and technology directorate in 1963. Despite sharp criticism by OSS old hands, now in senior management positions, the DS&T combined technical development, collection, and analysis under one management structure. This sharp deviation from CIA’s traditional organizational design was in response to rapidly evolving technology, attempts by the Air Force to encroach on the technical intelligence collections systems developed by the Agency, and the perceived speed and magnitude of the strategic nuclear threat.

Also at CIA, the influence of the “Knights Templar” reached its peak during the years Allen Dulles served as pressures described by Schein. It is noteworthy that Hoover’s overwhelming leadership presence at the FBI blocked such changes for years despite the dysfunction it caused and the strong societal and political pressures for change.
DCI. The Bay of Pigs debacle effectively marked the point of decline of the influence of these Eastern Establishment Ivy League educated intelligence managers. While many would serve for some years to come and one, William Casey, would serve as DCI during the 1980’s, their influence was forever blunted by executive and Congressional loss of faith in their dependability. Changes in the public’s view of CIA and American involvement in Vietnam also forced changes in CIA recruiting bringing a more inclusive mixture of new employees into the Agency.

The Donovan and Dulles cases show that early leader embedded effects can be modified by environmental pressures rapidly and in some instances slowly in a fashion similar to Schein’s (1983, 1991) description of “hybrid” evolution. In the case of Donovan’s “cardinal rule,” modifications occurred relatively quickly in response to technology development, competition, and changing world events. CIA organizational structure rapidly changed to include elements of Donovan’s culturally embedded assumptions (DO and DI) and an entirely new structure that, for the first time, included collection and analysis functions in one
directorate. The decline in influence of the “Knights Templar” at CIA after the Bay of Pigs demonstrates a slower evolutionary change in leader embedded effects resulting from environmental changes. Executive and congressional loss of confidence in this group of managers coupled with changing perceptions of CIA brought gradual but permanent changes in Agency recruitment and selection.

The Hoover and Dulles cases demonstrate that leader embedded effects can continue within an organization despite causing serious dysfunction. The FBI’s insistence on recruiting a homogeneous group of Agents well into the 1970’s continued despite the Bureau’s inability to fill new Agent classes with “qualified” applicants and increasing difficulty in successfully handling investigations in racially and religiously diverse communities. In a similar fashion, CIA leadership staunchly continued to insist on the separation of collection from analysis despite a weakening of Agency analysis and risks posed to clandestine operations. Even with its contributions to the Bay of Pigs debacle, this functional isolation continued well into the 1990’s.
The ability of early leader effects to be intergenerationally transmitted is demonstrated by all three cases. Donovan's recruiting and selection preferences persisted at CIA for decades and his structural predilections continued to be reflected in the Agency organizational chart through the mid 1990's. The dominance given the Agency's clandestine service by Allen Dulles continued to be discernable for decades after his resignation. This orientation largely continued into the late 1980's and sustained the perception that clandestine operations are the most highly valued agency function. Notwithstanding the rapid change in FBI recruitment practices after Hoover's death, the emphasis he placed on professionalism, behavioral and conduct standards, discipline, and the importance of training and scientific law enforcement techniques have remained embedded for decades and has contributed to the FBI's continued image as the world's preeminent law enforcement agency.

The Dulles case also highlights the operation of Schein's (1983, 1991) secondary cultural embedding mechanisms and the importance of mechanism consistency.
At CIA, the construction of the Langley headquarters compound, consolidating the Agency and separating it from the rest of government, reinforced and strengthened Dulles’ emphasis on secrecy, compartmentation of information, and the desirability of CIA to operate independently with minimal oversight. In this case, the effects of the secondary mechanism design of physical spaces, facades, and buildings reinforced and formalized the primary mechanism of what Dulles paid attention to, measured, and controlled. Conversely, the move to the Langley site, as an effort to consolidate and better coordinate Agency functions, failed, as it was inconsistent with the emphasis Dulles placed on collection over analysis. In this case, the effects of the secondary mechanism were ignored by the organization because it was incompatible with the primary mechanism used by the Dulles.

These examples clarify the analytic utility of distinguishing between primary and secondary cultural embedding mechanisms. In the former case, the consistent operation of the secondary mechanism reinforced and formalized what organization members had internalized from
a primary mechanism. In the latter case, the secondary mechanism operated inconsistently or in conflict with a pre-existing primary mechanism. As a result, the secondary mechanism failed to have any discernable effect and was ignored by organization members. These cases illustrate the usefulness of drawing distinctions between primary and secondary cultural embedding mechanisms. This analysis can more fully explain organizational behavior and potentially offer insight into how Schein’s mechanisms may be employed to effect change within organizations or clarify why attempts at organizational change are unsuccessful.

Finally, the Hoover case demonstrates the ability of multiple primary mechanisms, sending the same or similar messages, to act in concert -- greatly strengthening their effects. Hoover used recruiting and selection to bring into the FBI “value-compatible” Agents that he subjected to powerful role modeling, teaching, and coaching which he reinforced with severe discipline. This served as an effective combination that Hoover used to destroy the Bureau of Investigation culture he inherited and replace it with a FBI that reflected his values. Arguably, the
primary mechanisms of recruitment and selection working in tandem with role modeling, teaching and coaching more strongly influenced the FBI’s culture that either mechanism could have operating alone.

This study demonstrates that Schein’s (1983, 1991) model of cultural embedding by early leaders provides a useful lens through which to examine possible leader effects on public organizations. The three cases considered reveal that early leaders can employ a number of discrete and identifiable mechanisms to embed their beliefs, assumptions, and predispositions into public organizations and that these may be embedded with varying degrees of potency. This study also strongly suggests that the mechanisms cited by Schein (1983, 1991) may operate in predictable ways and that their effects can be recognized through multiple employee generations. Additionally, these findings make plain the value of historical narrative methodologies in identifying early leader use of cultural creation and embedding mechanisms and in tracing the effects that these mechanisms have on organizations over time.
These findings are relevant to contemporary institutional theory and the role of organizational culture as a "carrier" or "repository" of institutions (Jepperson, 1991). Scott (1995) states that as an institutional carrier, organizational culture relies primarily on interpretive structures such as codified patterns of meanings and rule systems that inform or constrain ongoing behaviors and also reinforce those behaviors. He stresses the internalization of cultural beliefs by organizational actors and cites Bourdieu (1977) and his concept of habitus that refers to the existence of a system of lasting and similar dispositions of organizational actors that integrates past experiences and continually functions as a template or model for perceptions, appreciations and actions. Thus, Scott (1995) asserts that organizational culture is one of several repositories and transporters of institutions. In this role, culture takes the form of internalized rules, laws, values, and expectations that are internalized and carried by members of the organization that structure their behavior within situations. These internalized rules, laws, values, and expectations, based
on past experience and learning within the organization, form a matrix of understanding and action that are “carried in the heads” of organizational actors. These are transmitted from organizational generation to organizational generation over time and through them the essence of the institution is conveyed and transmitted.

If Scott’s (1995) characterization is correct and is coupled with Perrow’s (1986) assertion that leadership plays a “decisive” and largely unexplored role in the process of institutionalization in many large and powerful organizations, then this study’s findings suggest new areas of inquiry to better understand the process of institutionalization. If it is possible to establish that early leaders can employ distinct and identifiable mechanisms to create and perpetuate patterns of understanding and action that are “carried in the heads” of organizational actors and if it can be shown that these mechanisms appear to behave predictably, then closer inquiries into their operation can provide new insights into the nature of institutionalization and the role of culture as a carrier of institutions. Further study in
this area can explore the role of early leaders in creating what institutional elements are transported, how organizational culture functions to transport them, and the effects of specific mechanisms in these processes.

In sum, as Perrow (1986) suggests, deeper and more detailed examinations of early leader effects and the operation of those effects are necessary in contemporary institutional theory. While leader effects are one and only one of a myriad of factors that influence the creation and maintenance of institutions, in many notable cases involving the most powerful and dominant organizations in our society, early leaders have demonstrably played crucial roles in the creation and perpetuation of organizational beliefs, assumptions, and predispositions (Perrow, 1986), particularly in large and powerful public agencies (Lewis, 1980; Wilson, 1989; and Cooper and Wright, 1992). As the cases of Donovan, Dulles, and Hoover demonstrate, evidence points to the operation of a distinct set of mechanisms or devices that are used by early leaders to achieve these effects which appear to operate in predictable ways with foreseeable consequences. Additional study aimed at
further identifying these mechanisms and understanding their operation is necessary to more fully discern and comprehend their implications on the processes of institutionalization.
APPENDIX A

BIOGRAPHIES AND ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORIES IDENTIFIED IN THE LITERATURE DEFINITION STEP CATEGORIZED BY TOPIC AND TYPE

William J. Donovan (Books)


William J. Donovan (Dissertations)


Wooten, Laura Kathleen A Biographical Approach to Espionage: CIA Directors From Donovan to Casey Dissertation: Honors Paper (History) Mississippi College 1984

William J. Donovan (Articles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allen Dulles (Books)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strodes, James</td>
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<td>Grose, Peter</td>
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<td>Wooten, Laura Kathleen</td>
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<td>Mosley, Leonard</td>
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<td>Winks, Robin</td>
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<td>Vandenbroucke, Lucien</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carpozi, George</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nathan, William</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Allen Dulles (Other Media)**

| CBS TV Network | CBS Reports: The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles | Thursday, April 26, 1962, 10-11PM | 1962 |

**J. Edgar Hoover (Books)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher and Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bitterli, Robert L.</td>
<td>The Hoover Print</td>
<td>Austin, TX: Devin Lane Pub. 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deloach, Cartha D.</td>
<td>Hoover's FBI</td>
<td>Washington, DC: Regnery 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demaris, Ovid</td>
<td>J. Edgar Hoover: As They Knew Him</td>
<td>New York: Richard Gallen/Carroll &amp; Graf 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bailey, Barry</td>
<td>America: Hoover and Martin Luther King, Jr.</td>
<td>Fort Worth: First United Methodist Church 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denenberg, Barry</td>
<td>The True Story of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI</td>
<td>New York: Scholastic 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirchner, Larry R.</td>
<td>Triple Cross Fire!: J. Edgar Hoover and the Kansas City Union Station Massacre</td>
<td>Kansas City, MO: Janlar Books 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoharis, Athan</td>
<td>From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover</td>
<td>Chicago: Ivan R. Dee 1993</td>
</tr>
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<td>Jung, Patrick</td>
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<td>Dissent and the State: Unleashing the FBI</td>
<td>The History Teacher, 24, no. 1 (Nov1990): 41 - 52</td>
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**Federal Bureau of Investigation (Other Media)**

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<tr>
<th>Author</th>
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<tr>
<td>Carroll, Michael</td>
<td>FBI Counterintelligence</td>
<td>Orland Park, Ill: MPI Home Video</td>
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<td>The 60's, The Legacy</td>
<td>Video Tape: Dastar Corp/Marathon Music &amp; Video</td>
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<td>Kupcinet, Jerry</td>
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### APPENDIX B

**BIOGRAPHIES SELECTED ON J. EDGAR HOOVER**

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<tr>
<td>Kiel, R. Andrew</td>
<td>J. Edgar Hoover: The Father of the Cold War</td>
<td>University Press Of America</td>
<td>Lanham, MD</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>Bitterli, Robert L.</td>
<td>The Hoover Print</td>
<td>Devin Lane Pub.</td>
<td>Austin, TX</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>Crompton, Samuel</td>
<td>100 Americans Who Shaped American History</td>
<td>Bluewood Books</td>
<td>San Mateo, CA</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>Demaris, Ovid</td>
<td>J. Edgar Hoover: As They Knew Him</td>
<td>Richard Gallen/Carroll &amp; Graf</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denenberg, Barry</td>
<td>The True Story of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI</td>
<td>Scholastic</td>
<td>New York</td>
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<td>Lewis, Eugene</td>
<td>Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a Theory of Bureaucratic Political Power</td>
<td>Indiana University Press</td>
<td>Bloomington, IN</td>
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## Central Intelligence Agency (Books)

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<td>Weber, Ralph E.</td>
<td>Spymasters: Ten CIA Officers in their Own Words</td>
<td>Wilmington, DE SR Books</td>
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<td>Whitmore, Simon</td>
<td>Eisenhower, the Central Intelligence Agency and Covert Action</td>
<td>Leeds: Univ of Leeds School of International Development and European Studies</td>
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<td>Berry, F. Clifton</td>
<td>Inside the CIA: Architecture, Art, and Atmosphere of America's Premier Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>Montgomery, AL: Community Communications</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>The Agency</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>Langley, VA: The Agency</td>
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<td>Thomas, Evan</td>
<td>The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA</td>
<td>New York: Touchstone</td>
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<td>Riebling, Mark</td>
<td>Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA</td>
<td>New York: Alfred A. Knopf</td>
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<td>Hersh, Burton</td>
<td>The Old Boys: The American Elite and the origins of the CIA</td>
<td>New York: Scribner's</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>Author</td>
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<td>Manigold, Tom</td>
<td>Cold warrior: James Jesus Angleton: The CIA’s Master Spy Hunter</td>
<td>New York: Touchtone Books</td>
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<td>Gilligan, Tom</td>
<td>CIA Life: 10,000 Days with the Agency</td>
<td>Connecticut: Foreign Intelligence Press</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>Ranelagh, John</td>
<td>The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA</td>
<td>Sevenoaks: Sceptre</td>
<td>1988</td>
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<td>Powers, Thomas</td>
<td>The Man Who Kept the Secrets - Richard Helms and the CIA</td>
<td>New York: Knopf</td>
<td>1979</td>
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<td>Marchetti, V. and Marks, J. D.</td>
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<td>New York: Knopf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spector, Jeremy A.</td>
<td>An Analysis of Central Intelligence Agency Operational Activity Beyond Intelligence Gathering Functions and Consequent Ramifications for American Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Senior Honors, Thesis: Barndeis Univ, Waltham, Mass</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gibbs, Edward A.</td>
<td>Agency Without Adversary: The CIA and Covert Actions in the Nineteen Eighties and Beyond</td>
<td>Dissertation: Thesis (MA) Univ of Nevada Las Vegas</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<td>Pitt, Justin D.</td>
<td>An Examination of Eisenhower's Opinions Concerning the Role of the United States Central Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>BA Honors Project, Carson Newman College</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>Fellman, Philip V.</td>
<td>Congress and the CIA: Critical Dimensions in Intelligence Policy</td>
<td>Dissertation: Cornell Univ</td>
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<td>Central Intelligence Agency (Articles)</td>
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<td>Jeffreys-Jones, Rhordi, Richelson, Jeffery</td>
<td>Why was the CIA established in 1947?</td>
<td>Intelligence and National Security 12(1), 21 – 40.</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>Hastedt, Glenn</td>
<td>CIA’s Organizational Culture and the Problem of Reform</td>
<td>International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9(3), 249 – 269.</td>
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<td>Johnson, Loch K.</td>
<td>The Golden Age of the CIA</td>
<td>Diplomatic History, Vol. 20 No. 4, pg. 675</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cogan, Charles G.</td>
<td>The In-Culture of the DO</td>
<td>Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 8, no. 1</td>
<td>1993</td>
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### Federal Bureau of Investigation (Books)

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<td>Fidelity, bravery &amp; integrity: the history of the FBI.</td>
<td>Silhouette Productions, Inc</td>
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<td>Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI</td>
<td>Paducah, KY: Turner Publications</td>
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<td>Israel, Fred L.</td>
<td>The FBI</td>
<td>New York: Chelsea House Publishers</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>The FBI: The First 75 Years</td>
<td>Washington, DC: US Dept of Justice</td>
<td>1983</td>
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<td>Berger, Melvin</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>New York: F. Watts</td>
<td>1977</td>
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<td>Ungar, Sanford</td>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press</td>
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<td>The Identification Division of the FBI</td>
<td>Washington, DC: The Bureau</td>
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<td>Whitehead, Don</td>
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<td>Lettieri, Jennifer</td>
<td>Modified in the Public Interest: J. Edgar Hoover and FBI Publicity</td>
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<td>Rosenfeld, Susan</td>
<td>Doing Injustice to the FBI: The Negative Myths Perpetuated by Historians</td>
<td>The Chronicle for Higher Education, Oct 8, 1999, v46, i7, pB6(3)</td>
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<td>The History Teacher, 24, no. 1 (Nov 1990): 41 - 52.</td>
<td>1990</td>
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APPENDIX D

BIOGRAPHIES AND ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORIES SELECTED FOR THE PILOT STUDY

William J. Donovan

Dunlop (1982) provides an authoritative chronicle of Donovan’s entire life. This work includes detailed descriptions of Donovan’s early years, military experiences, work for President Franklin Roosevelt before World War II, creation and leadership of the OSS, role in the creation of CIA, and his late career and ambassadorship. It is drawn primarily from interviews, journals, documents, and official records.

Brown (1982) provides a detailed study of Donovan’s formative years, military career, role in World War II, influences on the creation of CIA, and later life. It is based upon Donovan’s personal papers and his wife’s diaries.

Troy (1984) details Donovan’s role in the prewar intelligence services, service as FDR’s Coordinator of Information, creation and direction of the OSS, and influences on the creation and early history of CIA. This
study is based upon official OSS and CIA records and interviews with former officials of both agencies.

Allen Dulles

Srodes (1999) furnishes a detailed account of Dulles’s formative years, career in the OSS, service in the early CIA, tenure as CIA Director under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, service on the Warren Commission, through his late years. This biography is based upon official records, Dulles’s personal papers, interviews, and personal and official journals.

Grose (1994) recounts Dulles’ life and career, highlighting his World War II service in the OSS and his tenure as CIA Director. This biography is based upon official records, Dulles’s personal papers, interviews, and personal and official journals.

Edwards and Dunne (1961) provides an overview of Dulles’s early history, his activities in World War II, his legal career, and intelligence failures during his tenure as Deputy Director of Plans and DCI. Co-authored by a member of the British Parliament, the work is based on few explicitly named sources, and chronicles Dulles’s alleged
role in erroneous intelligence estimates of Soviet strength and intentions.

J. Edgar Hoover

Deloach (1995) offers the insight of Deke Deloach who served from the level of agent to Deputy FBI Director during Hoover’s tenure. The work provides details into Hoover’s day-to-day activities, involvement in Bureau operations, and effect on FBI culture. The book is based on first-person observations and conversations.

Denenberg (1993) furnishes a detailed history of the FBI - from its pre-Hoover days through the Nixon years -- and Hoover’s role in shaping the organization and its members. The work is based upon official records, interviews, archives, and analysis of news reports.

Powers (1987) provides a full biography of Hoover and his four-decade tenure at the FBI. The work traces Hoover’s early life, entry into the Justice Department, service in the Alien Enemy Bureau, activities during the Red Scare, his years as Assistant Director, and service as Director through seven presidential administrations. Powers’s book draws from official records, personal
archives, journals, interviews, news articles, and congressional and Justice Department reports.

Central Intelligence Agency

Darling (1990) is a historical account of how CIA was created in the years immediately following World War II. It attempts to establish an accurate historical record of the origins of Central Intelligence. The work endeavors to recreate the atmosphere of the times and attitudes of the officials who took part and is based on historical documents, official records, and interviews.

Ranelagh (1986) provides an account of the development of CIA from the OSS to its modern-day form. The book focuses on the personalities of senior Agency managers, their policies, and the effects of those policies on CIA’s development as an organization. The work relies on interviews with CIA officials and over 7,000 pages of previously classified documents.

Leary (1984) recounts the development of CIA from origins in the American Revolution and early US military adventures through the Reagan Administration. Sources include approximately 75 volumes from the series of
internal CIA histories, interviews with Agency officials, and special studies and reports compiled both within and outside the Agency.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Theoharis (1999) provides a highly detailed account of the Bureau’s history before, through, and after Hoover’s tenure. The work provides a comprehensive description of Hoover’s effects on FBI traditions and culture. The work is drawn from an expansive array of books, articles, and FBI administrative files.

Kessler (1993) surveys the history of the Bureau, the effects of Hoover’s years as director on FBI organizational culture and efforts by later Directors to institute changes. The book draws primarily from interviews and official records, but also cites journalistic accounts.

Ungar (1976) provides a dated, but widely recognized history of the Bureau written during a time of organizational crises and transition. A mixture of history, anthropology, political science, and journalism, the author emphasizes tangible aspects of Hoover’s legacy on the FBI as an institution. The work is drawn primarily
from interviews with contemporary and retired FBI officials and official records.
## APPENDIX E

### COMPREHENSIVE DATA DISPLAY FROM ALL CASES WITH LISTINGS OF PILOT AND NON-PILOT SOURCES PROVIDING DATA

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<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
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<th>Indicator(s)</th>
<th>Pilot Source(s)</th>
<th>Non-Pilot Sources</th>
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<tr>
<td>Design of physical spaces, facades, and buildings.</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Dulles</td>
<td>Construction of Langley, VA HQs campus, reinforced permanence of CIA,</td>
<td>Ranelagh (1986);</td>
<td>Marchetti &amp; Marks (1974); Leary (1984); Berry (1997)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>strengthened emphasis on secrecy and compartmentation.</td>
<td>Strodes (1999);</td>
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<td>Grose (1994)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching by leaders.</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Hoover</td>
<td>Construction and preservation of personal image. Creation and perpetuation of</td>
<td>Ungar, (1976);</td>
<td>Whitehead (1956); Gawloski (1975); Lewis (1980); Wilson</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>the G-Man mystique.</td>
<td>Powers (1987);</td>
<td>(1989); Potter (1990); Littieri (1991); Bresler (1993)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Kessler (1993);</td>
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<td>Deloach (1995);</td>
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<td>What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control.</td>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Dulles</td>
<td>Ascension of the DO, emphasis on covert action, dominance of DO in directing</td>
<td>Grose (1994);</td>
<td>Marchetti &amp; Marks (1974); Cline (1976); Adelman (1980);</td>
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<td>activities, number of DO officers in senior positions, ability of DO to</td>
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<td>Johnson (1989); Leary (1984); Hersh (1984); Campbell (1990);</td>
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<td>operate independently.</td>
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<td>Manigold (1991); Hastedt (1996); Jeffreys-Jones (1997);</td>
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<td>Polmar &amp; Allen (1997)</td>
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<td>How the organization is designed and structured.</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Donovan</td>
<td>OSS structural legacy, separation of collections from analysis, distinct</td>
<td>Troy (1984)</td>
<td>Marchetti &amp; Marks (1974); Adelman (1980); Leary (1984);</td>
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<td>Hastedt (1996); Thompson (1996); Jeffreys-Jones (1997);</td>
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<td>Richelson (1997); Smith (1997)</td>
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**COMPREHENSIVE DATA DISPLAY FROM ALL CASES WITH LISTINGS OF PILOT AND NON-PILOT SOURCES PROVIDING DATA**

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Cogan, Charles G. (1993). The in-culture of the DO, Intelligence and National Security, 8(1).


Charles N. Painter

The author is a seventeen-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency who is currently assigned as a senior manager to the National Reconnaissance Office. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Psychology from Lenoir-Rhyne College in Hickory, North Carolina and a Master of General Administration Degree from the University of Maryland, University College in College Park, Maryland. He is married with two children and resides in Herndon, Virginia, a suburb of Washington, DC.