DECOLONIZING DEMOCRATIC HEGEMONY: THE INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT
AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN ECUADOR

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Decolonizing Democratic Hegemony: The Indigenous Movement and Democratization in Ecuador

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Abstract

This thesis examines the role of the indigenous movement in Ecuador on the ongoing process of democratization in that country. My study demonstrates that a comprehensive social movement such as Ecuador’s indigenous movement has great potential for having a positive impact on democracy. However, these movements are not without their shortcomings which are clearly demonstrated by some of the actions of CONAIE. This study also points out several factors which are crucial in determining social movements’ effect on democracy.
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Chapter 1

In Latin America and throughout the world, indigenous peoples have been the subjects of state policies ranging from assimilation to annihilation. However, during the post-WWII era and particularly since the 1970s the indigenous peoples of Latin America have come under attack from a range of new socio-politico-economic forces such as increasing land pressure, environmental degradation, state militarization, and the implementation of neoliberal economic models. During this period most Latin American countries transitioned from military dictatorships dominated by state-centered economic policies to civilian-led “democratic” governments with more market-oriented economies. This thesis will analyze the impact of indigenous movements on this ongoing process of democratization. In particular, I will address how indigenous movements in Ecuador impact the democratic process.

The research presented in this thesis will suggest that indigenous movements, by challenging the dominant discourse on democracy and democratization, are creating new spaces for the emergence of civil society and creating the opportunities for further democratization. While this is neither a clean nor particularly rapid process as my analysis of Ecuador in particular will show, I contend that identity-based ethnic movements strengthen democracy. They do this by (re)creating identity around which indigenous peoples are mobilized. This new (or newly revived) identity can then be the basis for a new indigenous ideology based on the "production of a distinct rationality" (Andolina 1999: 27) that may run counter to the rationality of the state and dominant culture. "To the extent that this distinct rationality addresses the state (a state that it is likely to problematize and denaturalize) it generates an alternative basis of legitimate political authority (Andolina 1999: 27)."

By openly challenging the dominant values and policies of the state, indigenous movements force the state to either forcefully repress their demands or be more responsive to new forms of political and social rationality and accountable for the policies it pursues, two critical components of democracy. Ignoring indigenous demands has often been a useful tactic for states but has not been feasible in the case of modern Ecuador since indigenous movements often engage in activities (i.e. road blockages, building occupations, mass marches in large urban areas) that severely disrupt daily life and economic interactions and require some sort
of state response. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the national security doctrine that dominated the thinking of most Latin American leaders during that period, violent repression of indigenous peoples would be extremely costly both domestically and internationally (Brysk 2000b: 133). Thus, indigenous peoples are able to make their voices heard, occasionally get their demands met, and (most importantly for this thesis) force the government to behave in a more democratic manner, as will be defined more clearly below. In these ways the indigenous movement is able to decolonize Ecuador’s democratic institutions and challenge the hegemony of the traditional (mestizo) ruling class in Ecuador.

This idea of hegemony is drawn from the work of Antonio Gramsci who argues that hegemony is, "The 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group [ie, through their intellectuals who act as their agents or deputies]; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production (Gramsci 1971: 12)." In the case of the indigenous movement in Ecuador we can amply Gramsci's concept of hegemony to the relationship between indigenous peoples and the political and economic elite. Although indigenous peoples have historically "consented" to the leading role of the dominant (non-indigenous) group(s), the indigenous movement in its current incarnation is working to break this hegemonic cycle of dependence on and subordination to the will of the dominant class.

With the decline of the Marxist left, particularly after the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, ethnicity has regained much of the salience it lost to class-based analyses of inequality and oppression. Thus, identity has become a newly empowered resource to be used by indigenous movements (or other identity-based movements for that matter) in their struggle with the state and dominant culture. This newly (re)formulated ethnic identity can be the basis for making demands on the state and dominant culture, as indigenous interests often are at odds with prevailing political interests and ideology. Many indigenous demands, such as respect, are issues that cannot be adequately addressed solely by the state but require changing the attitudes of the majority white-mestizo masses. However, to the extent that the demands of indigenous movements are addressed to the state, they tend to contest the basis of state legitimacy and authority particularly by making claims for territory, autonomy, and official recognition of the multinational character of the state. Again, identity and history
play critical roles in this process as indigenous peoples are able to contest the dominant interpretation of history with their own story of conquest, exploitation, marginalization, and oppression. By pressing these demands on the state in ways that require a response from the government, they force the state to react. The crux of my argument in this thesis is that this action-reaction process tends to improve democracy and further the cause of democratic consolidation¹.

The normative basis underlying this study is that freedom is generally a good thing and that democracy is the form of government most conducive to protecting freedom. Larry Diamond (1999) asserts three reasons why this is true. First, free and fair elections require certain political rights of organization, expression, and opposition. Second, democracy gives citizens the greatest say in choosing the rules under which they must live. Finally, it facilitates “moral autonomy, the ability of each individual citizen to make normative choices and thus to be, at the most profound level, self-governing (Diamond 1999: 3).”

Background:
Not only has neoliberalism disadvantaged indigenous peoples economically, it has also altered the corporatist citizenship regime that had been set up to incorporate indigenous people into the mestizo nation-state. Under the corporatist system that prevailed prior to the beginnings of (re)democratization in the 1970s and 1980s, indigenous peoples were guaranteed a mix of political, civil, and social rights although all were limited by the authoritarian structures of most Latin American states. The transition to neoliberal democracy has increased political and civil rights at the expense of virtually eliminating all individual and collective social rights. Although in several countries there have been constitutional amendments and provisions recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples, and International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169² codifies many of these rights at the international level, the implementation of these rights is often

¹ This should not be taken to imply that the content of indigenous demands are inherently democratic or that, for instance, an autonomous indigenous-based government would be more or less democratic than the government of the current host state. I am simply arguing that the negotiation process, usually initiated by demands from indigenous communities or organizations, is an important step towards improving the quality of democracy.
spotty at best. In this context Yashar (1999: 80-1) argues that:

in attempting to restructure society into class-based federations that could be controlled from above, corporatist citizenship regimes unwittingly provided autonomous spaces that could shelter rural indigenous communities from state control. And for their part, neoliberal citizenship regimes setting out to shatter corporatism’s class-based integration and replace it with a more atomized or individualized set of state-society relations in fact challenged the indigenous local autonomy that corporatism had unknowingly fostered, failed to secure the individual rights that neoliberalism had promised, and consequently politicized ethnic cleavages.

Hence, in many cases, democracy has marginalized indigenous peoples more than its authoritarian predecessors.

Ecuador has been no exception to this trend. In 1979 Ecuador established its first broad-based democratic government after a long period of authoritarian and military rule. Universal suffrage was implemented and literacy requirements were abolished. Indigenous peoples were some of the primary beneficiaries of the new electoral system since literacy requirements had historically meant literacy in Spanish, a skill few indigenous people possessed.

Ecuador’s recent history with democracy has been marked by instability and corruption. The new democratic regime of the early 1980s quickly failed to live up to expectations as corruption became widespread, or at least more noticeable, thus delegitimizing the new system. In 1981 President Osvaldo Hurtado implemented neoliberal economic policies under IMF pressure. These policies (cuts in state spending and social services, eliminating trade barriers, privatization of state-owned enterprises, etc.) were broadened and extended in 1984 under the Leon Febres Cordero administration. These economic policies, coupled with the corruption and authoritarian tendencies of Febres Cordero, further marginalized and alienated indigenous organizations (Andolina 1999: 157).

Into this context stepped the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador- CONAIE) which by 1992 had established itself as a major player in Ecuadorian politics. CONAIE led or participated in several

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3 See Van Cott (2000) for a discussion of the Constitution building process in Colombia and Bolivia as it relates to indigenous peoples. Also, see <http://web.utk.edu/~dvancott/constitu.html> for a detailed list of constitutional provisions concerning indigenous peoples in all Latin American countries and how these provisions are frequently ineffective.

4 It should be noted, however, that military rule in Ecuador was generally much less violent and repressive than in many of the other Latin American military dictatorships of that era such as Argentina, Chile, Brazil, El Salvador, and Nicaragua due at least in part to the lack of a substantial Marxist insurgency.
mass mobilizations against government policies between 1990 and 1992 culminating in massive marches, demonstrations, and road blockages during the “500 Years of Resistance” campaign of 1992. CONAIE and other indigenous organizations worked throughout the 1990s to place indigenous issues such as territory, bilingual education, and the establishment of a plurinational state on the national agenda (Selverston-Scher 2001).

On 21 January 2000 the organs of democratic government in Ecuador came to a screeching halt for one day when President Jamil Mahuad was overthrown by a “confused” military-indigenous coup (Economist 2000: 10). Under severe international pressure the coup leaders turned over power on the following day to the vice president of the country, Gustavo Noboa, who promised to lead Ecuador out of its crisis by cracking down on corruption in the state bureaucracy and within political parties. However, Noboa’s efforts have come under criticism as being insufficient and disingenuous (Dario Buitrón 2002).

Since the transfer of power from the military to an elected civilian government in 1979 the indigenous movement has played an active role in national politics both as protagonist and critic of government action. The question to be addressed in this thesis is, what consequences the activities of the indigenous movement have had for democracy in Ecuador?

Defining Concepts:

Several concepts to be used in this thesis require further clarification. First, in order to discuss the role indigenous movements play in increasing space for civil society and thus furthering the democratization process, we must be clear about exactly what these terms mean.

In discussing social movements I adopt a social constructionist perspective in which the prime task of movements is to create and disseminate meaning. Alberto Melucci (1989), based on a similar perspective, defines social movements (or what he refers to as collective action) as processes through which social actors (re)produce meaning, communicate, negotiate, and make decisions. Similarly, Escobar and Álvarez (1992: 4) claim that, “social action is understood as the product of complex social processes in which structure and agency interact in manifold ways and in which actors produce meanings, negotiate, and make decisions.” In addition to these attributes of social movements I would add one more in the case of indigenous movements: they challenge the hegemonic norms and institutions of the state and dominant culture(s) and the meanings which these dominant structures produce and communicate. Thus, for this thesis, I
define social movements as processes whereby social actors (re)produce meanings, negotiate and make decisions, communicate those meanings and decisions, and thereby challenge the rules and meanings constructed by state institutions and norms of the dominant culture.

In this thesis I will draw primarily upon two main theoretical perspectives on social movements: resource mobilization and new social movement (NSM) theory. Although I will argue that these two theories can be made mutually compatible, they have traditionally been viewed as competing schools of thought.

Essentially, resource mobilization theory focuses on the strategies of social movements while NSM emphasizes identity. Resource mobilization tends to assume a rational actor model and explains collective action by examining how movements attempt to mobilize sufficient resources to maintain and expand the movements (Foweraker 1995: 16-7). Summarized briefly, "social movement success depends on resources, organization, and opportunities for collective action," where, "opportunities involve the character and formal structure of the state, allies and opponents, and organizational strength (Andolina 1999: 24)."

NSM theory, on the other hand, focuses primarily on the construction of identity through collective action. According to Robert Andolina (1999: 23), "new social movements concentrate on building autonomous, alternative identities and contesting meanings in hegemonic discourses. They are less interested in strategies to take state power." Additionally, NSM refers to the rise of..."new constituencies, values and forms of action created by structural changes in modern society. [New social movements] are new responses to new grievances (Foweraker 1995: 15)."

In the case of indigenous movements in Latin America similar grievances (land, autonomy, respect, etc.) have been around over 500 years but "structural changes" have given rise to new movement activities that emphasize indigenous identity rather than attempt to mobilize large amounts of resources (which indigenous peoples have traditionally been poorly situated to do) in order to confront the powerful state apparatus.

To talk about indigenous movements specifically becomes more complicated as one must confront the question: Who is indigenous? States such as Ecuador often attempt to define indigenous populations based on language, descendancy, and/or land base so as to exclude more assimilated communities from the definition of indigenous. On the other hand, indigenous peoples tend to insist on absolute self-identification. Any use of rigorous definitional standards suits the needs of state-centric bureaucracies but would be foreign to traditional indigenous
beliefs, which emphasize inclusiveness (Corntassel and Hopkins Primeau 1998: 140). For the purpose of this study I will adopt the self-identification approach since there is no viable alternative acceptable to both indigenous and state actors. The language of self-identification is also widely recognized in international law and is the basis for determining indigenous identity in ILO 169 of which Ecuador is a signatory⁵. I will define indigenous movements as those which engage in the social movement behavior described above for the purpose of furthering some self-described indigenous agenda.

In the context of this study, democratization is particularly difficult to define. In fact, I will contend that one of the strengths of indigenous movements is their ability to challenge the existing discourse on democratization and reinterpret both the goals and the means of furthering the democratization process. Therefore, democratization is an evolving concept in the struggle between indigenous movements, the state, and other social actors. At this point it is appropriate to sketch a brief outline of what “democratization” means for both indigenous movements and the state. For indigenous movements, democratization tends to focus primarily on issues of deepening democracy through increasing participation while traditional political actors (state institutions, political parties, and business elites) tend to focus primarily on consolidating the existing (quasi-)democratic structures while pursuing further economic liberalization (Andolina 1998: 3). The state tends to focus primarily on maintaining political stability and economic progress at the expense of democratic reform (Boeninger 1997: 26).

In his classic formulation of democracy, which he terms polyarchy, Robert Dahl (1989) puts forth seven basic criteria which all polyarchies should fill: 1) elected officials; 2) free and fair elections; 3) inclusive suffrage; 4) the right to run for office; 5) freedom of expression; 6) alternative sources of information; and 7) associational autonomy. Based on these criteria we may consider the current Ecuadorian government (and most other Latin American governments for that matter) democratic (or at least polyarchic).

⁵ ILO 169 states that, “Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply (ILO 169).” ILO 169 goes on to further define indigenous populations as, “tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations” and, “peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present State boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions (ILO 169).”
However, when addressing the contribution of indigenous movements to democratization we are discussing the quality of democracy rather than simply its existence. Thus, it is useful to adopt a definition of democracy as an evolving phenomenon rather than a set of minimal institutions and rules. Augusto Varas (1998: 147) does just that by defining democracy as, “a continuous process that is permanently driven by the constant need to extend and institutionalize the rights of citizens in the face of existing or emerging absolute powers.” Therefore, instead of dealing with issues such as voting, elections, and civil-military relations (not to imply that these are unimportant to democracy), I am more concerned here with the effective participation of all sectors of the population in the democratic process and the responsiveness and accountability of elected officials. That is, I am primarily interested in the ongoing transition in Ecuador from procedural democracy to a more substantive form of democracy (Comisso 1997) or from polyarchy to democracy.

**Literature Review:**

Thinkers as far back as Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill have posited that participation is an important element of democracy and that socioeconomic inequality is a barrier to participation and, hence, democracy (Sørensen 1998: 8). More recently, Robert Dahl (1985: 60) has argued that modern capitalism tends to…”produce inequalities in social and economic resources so great as to bring about severe violations of political equality and hence of the democratic process”; and Florencia Mallon (1995: 17), in her study of 19th century popular discourses in Mexico and Peru argues that, "the tension between liberal promise and liberal practice…leaves room for contestation by the excluded." As neoliberal economic policies exacerbate inequality in already highly unequal societies where indigenous peoples have traditionally occupied the bottom rung on the socioeconomic ladder, democratization faces serious challenges in Latin America unless these issues of participation can be adequately addressed. This suggests that, although most Latin American states (with the obvious exception of Cuba) are nominally democratic the quality of these democracies is often suspect. In Ecuador, this lack of meaningful participation is one of CONAIE's main points of contention.

Neoliberal economic policies, implemented widely throughout Latin America in the post-transition era, have been particularly detrimental economically to indigenous communities at the same time that the democratic openings in Latin America have created unprecedented spaces for
indigenous peoples to mobilize and express their preferences and grievances (Andolina 1999; Banton 1996; Brysk and Wise 1997; Peeler 1998; Van Cott 1994; Yashar 1998, 1999). Andolina (1999: 31) argues that, although the collapse of socialism as a system of government in Eastern Europe and the decline of the traditional Left in Latin American politics created new space for mobilization by new social actors (including indigenous peoples), it has also created similar spaces for the advancement of neoliberal goals. Thus, the end of military rule and the onset of some form of democracy and neoliberal economic adjustment throughout most of Latin America have created an arena for contestation between those seeking to further the neoliberal project and social movements forwarding other goals. Brysk and Wise (1997) show how these two processes (democratization and economic adjustment) are often contradictory and cause for conflict as shrinking the state (through neoliberal economic practices) also removes channels for popular participation (such as the corporatist links that often existed under authoritarian rule), particularly for those at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. Recognizing this, Tanya Korovkin (2001) shows how local indigenous communities in Otavalo, Ecuador have been able to combine indigenous cultural traditions with the exigencies of modern politics. She argues that the activities of the Otavaleños contributed to democratization by laying claim to national citizenship without abandoning their ethnic identity and, second, by assuming some governmental functions (particularly with regards to education). Thus, they were able to make claims as indigenous peoples for inclusion in the state. This thesis will build on this argument by examining the indigenous movement at the national level and demonstrating several ways (both positive and negative) that the indigenous movement impacts democratization. I will contend that, particularly in the case of Ecuador, indigenous movements have a generally positive impact on democracy.

There is an extensive body of literature on Latin American indigenous movements and their relationship to the state and dominant culture (Brysk 1996, 2000b; Brysk and Wise 1997; Starn 1999; Van Cott 1994, 2000; Yashar 1998). Much of this literature focuses on explaining the strength or weakness of indigenous movements throughout the region. Yashar (1998) stresses the importance of pre-existing social networks for enabling strong indigenous movements to arise in the aftermath of authoritarian rule. She asserts that such networks provide the basis for broader movements and mobilization in communities connected by such networks. She cites
Ecuador as one of the cases where pre-existing networks laid the groundwork for indigenous mobilization.

Donna Lee Van Cott (2000), meanwhile, uses the examples of constitutional reform in Colombia and Bolivia to show how indigenous peoples are able to achieve structural reforms under conditions of state crises of legitimacy and representation. Alison Brysk (1996; 2000b), on the other hand, emphasizes the role of international factors in explaining the growth of the indigenous movement. She adopts a new social movements approach to demonstrate how indigenous organizations have used information and images to create and project identity in the international arena where they can link their grievances to international NGOs and IGOs, primarily in the areas of human rights and environmental protection. Thus, she argues that indigenous peoples are able to turn their domestic weakness into strength through internationalizing their movement.

Building on the arguments of Yashar (1998), Van Cott (2000), and Brysk (1996, 2000b) we see how effective indigenous movements may arise in some cases but not others. Pre-existing social networks which facilitate communication and organization permit indigenous organizations to capitalize on the legitimacy and representation crisis faced by many of the governments of the region and use their links to the outside world to gather resources and support in confronting a weakened government with their demands for participation and accountability.

In attempting to explain the conflict between indigenous movements and states, Brysk and Wise (1997) argue that adopting neoliberal policies puts states in a potentially precarious position. They claim that, “political and economic liberalization are likely to clash when shrinking the state also removes channels for popular participation; moreover, when those that bear most of the adjustment burden are also challengers to national identity, states ignore this challenge at their own peril (Brysk and Wise 1997: 76).” Likewise, Orin Starn (1999) explains the rise of local rondas campesinas in northern Peru as partially the result of poor and deteriorating economic conditions coupled with alienation from a state which was unable to provide basic legal and social services. Van Cott (1994: 12) summarizes four primary sources of indigenous grievances: self-determination and autonomy issues, often presented in terms of cultural differences; political reform; territorial rights, access to economic resources, and control
over their own economic development; and issues of military relations with indigenous communities.

For this thesis I will attempt to link these grievances to the methods of mobilization described above in order show how indigenous movements are able to impact the democratization process. Political analysis of ethnic conflicts often has suggested that ethnic movements hinder the political and economic development of societies (Pachano 1995). Pachano has argued that labor and indigenous movements have contributed to the atrophying of representative institutions by confronting the state directly (through protests) while avoiding formal political institutions. However, I will demonstrate how the opposite is true, at least in regards to political development (i.e. democratization). I will show that, first, indigenous movements have not ignored the formal political realm while focusing exclusively on pure protest activity and, second, that the representative nature of the institutions that Pachano refers to (particularly the Congress and political parties) are less than ideal and that the indigenous movement has, if anything, laid the groundwork for improving and strengthening these institutions.

Neoliberal economic policies not only hurt indigenous peoples economically but also, by atomizing political and social life, isolate indigenous peoples politically. Yashar (1999: 88) contends that indigenous movements are posing a “post-liberal challenge” to Latin American states, “by demanding a different kind of political mapping—one that would secure individual rights but also accommodate more diverse identities, units of representation, and state structures.” This is a theme I will confront in this thesis by linking it to indigenous movement’s anti-neoliberal conceptualization of citizenship.

In addition to the grievances held by indigenous peoples and the challenges they represent to the state and the dominant culture, the tactics indigenous movements use to make their voices heard are also relevant to this discussion of indigenous movements. Brysk and Wise (1997) show how the failure of the Peruvian government to incorporate and address the demands of indigenous peoples contributed to the violence that has plagued that country. Also, Beck and Mijeski (1998) describe how CONAIE backed off its previous policy of renouncing electoral participation in 1996 when it appeared that forming a political party to represent the movement in Congress would be advantageous to the overall goals of the movement. Xavier Albó (1996), reflecting a resource mobilization argument, contends that indigenous movements in Bolivia
need to master the art of national politicking or else their powerful and eye-catching mobilizations and marches will lose their persuasive effect.

Thus, while these authors discuss primarily the roots, tactics, and demands of indigenous movements they fail in most cases to address the outcomes of such movements (one exception to this is Selverston-Scher 2001). This thesis will address these outcomes and link them to the ongoing process of democratization that is occurring throughout Latin America.

Methodology:

In order to demonstrate how indigenous movements are effectively challenging the dominant discourse on democratization and, in doing so, creating new space for the emergence of a strong civil society that will further the democratization process I will use a crucial case study approach. I propose to examine the case of Ecuador. By doing so, I intend to show how the indigenous movement in Ecuador has been able to demand, with some success, democratic reforms from the state that the state was unlikely to pursue of its own volition as well as demanding increased responsiveness and accountability from the state, thus enhancing the democratization process. To evaluate the change in the quality of democracy in Ecuador I will be examining the literature on social movements to establish an analytical framework for assessing the impact of social movements on democracy. Based on this framework and a historical analysis of the actions and narratives of the indigenous movement in Ecuador, I will evaluate the impact of the indigenous movement on democracy in Ecuador.

Ecuador is home to a large and diverse indigenous population (estimated at anywhere between 10% and 60% of the population depending on the definition of indigenous used) which has had significant successes in organizing and achieving its goals vis-à-vis the state. Additionally, Ecuador has a strong national indigenous organization, CONAIE, that can claim to represent the interests of indigenous peoples and has substantial credibility with state leaders. This movement benefited from the internationalization of the Indian rights movement (Brysk

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6 For the purposes of this thesis I will use the figure of 43% used by Van Cott (forthcoming) which she bases on self-defined indigenous identity.
7 CONAIE is actually a national federation of indigenous peoples representing a variety of smaller, local and regional indigenous organizations. The indigenous movement in Ecuador as a whole, however, has become virtually synonymous with CONAIE. Thus the majority of my analysis will pertain to the actions of the national organization (CONAIE) although I may reference some of its sub-organizations as necessary.
In addition, Ecuador is representative of Latin America as a whole but has several characteristics that probably facilitated Indian rights mobilization: small size, a capital city in an area of ethnic density, and a dominant indigenous language in both highlands and lowlands (Meisch 1997). As my interest is in the role of indigenous movements in the democratization process and most of the current indigenous organizations are relatively new (most originating after 1960), I will confine my analysis to the time period after Ecuador made its transition from military to democratic rule in 1979. Since CONAIE has been relatively successful in challenging the state, it presents an excellent case to see how such strong indigenous movements actually impact the democratization process. Therefore, Ecuador is a logical case to analyze how indigenous movements are contributing to and/or challenging the dominant discourse on democratization and impacting the quality of democracy in Latin America.

Outline of the thesis:

Chapter Two will focus on the ongoing process of democratization in Ecuador. I will elaborate the concepts of democracy (substantive v. procedural) and social movements (new v. old; identity-based v. class-based) and relate them to my study of indigenous peoples. I will review the democratization literature, particularly with regards to participation and accountability, the two aspects of democracy that I am most concerned with for this project. I will also develop my ideas on the relationship between resource mobilization theory and new social movements theory as it pertains to indigenous movements and the role these movements play in impacting democracy in Ecuador. Additionally, I will explore the linkages between democratic reform and neoliberalism and how indigenous peoples are contesting the dominant conceptualization of democracy. Finally, I will explore the theoretical literature on how social movements (particularly identity-based movements such as the indigenous movement in Ecuador) affect participation and accountability in new and/or fragile democracies.

In Chapter Three I will explore the historical relationship between the Ecuadorean state and indigenous peoples living within Ecuador. I will outline relations from the colonial era up through the present (although with greater emphasis on the post-1979 era). Among the issues I will explore in this chapter are the development and impact of early indigenous movements, particularly the Indigenous Federation of Ecuador (established in 1944) and the Shuar Federation (established in 1964); the impact of land reform and the 1970s oil boom on indigenous peoples;
the immediate impact of democratization on indigenous peoples and their organizations; the
growth of regional indigenous federations leading up to the creation of CONAIE in 1986; and
CONAIE’s activities since 1986.

In Chapter Four I will address the issue of how CONAIE’s activities impact participation
and accountability in the Ecuadorean political system. I will argue that, by playing the dual roles
of civil society participant (through CONAIE) and state actor (through the Pachakutik political
party), the indigenous movement is expanding participation, increasing accountability, and thus
improving the quality of Ecuadorean democracy.

Chapter Five will summarize my findings and discuss the role CONAIE plays in
democratizing the Ecuadorian state. In this chapter I will discuss the theoretical implications of
my study and address areas that are in need of further investigation.
Chapter 2

In this chapter I seek to explore the relationship between social movements and democracy. To do this requires a clear conceptualization of both of these broad terms. I begin here with a review and discussion of the literature on democratization, particularly that focusing on the Latin American experience. Again, I am most interested in the participative and accountability dimensions of democracy as opposed to just democracy’s formal, procedural aspects. From here I will situate the literature on social movements in the context of democratization. In doing this my aim is to establish a framework for how indigenous social movements impact democracy in Ecuador, both positively and negatively, in the context of ethnic conflict and neoliberal economic reform. I will also briefly examine the possible tension that exists between increased participation on the one hand, and governability on the other.

In Chapter One I addressed the concept of polyarchy and distinguished it from substantive democracy. Here I shall describe the barriers to making the transition from polyarchy to democracy and how social movements can (or cannot) help overcome these barriers. One of the major points of this chapter is that in order to deepen democracy the middle and lower classes must be able to counteract the hegemony of the economically and politically elite class. Scholars have developed a plethora of subtypes of democracy to try to capture the degree to which democratic governments retain significant characteristics of non-democratic regimes. A short list of the adjectives used to describe these "diminished" subtypes of democracy would include illiberal, restrictive, limited, oligarchical, controlled, de facto one-party, electoral, hard, guarded, and tutelary. For my purposes I prefer the term authoritarian democracy (democraduras) to refer to polyarchic regimes which retain strong authoritarian characteristics. In the case of Ecuador these authoritarian characteristics include a weak legislature and judiciary, a quasi-autonomous military, widespread clientelism, personalistic political parties, corruption, and growing economic inequality, among others (Corkill and Cubitt 1988).

In 1991 Samuel Huntington identified a "third wave" of democratization beginning in Southern Europe and spreading to Latin America, Eastern Europe, and parts of East Asia.

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8 See Collier and Levitsky (1997) for a description of each of these subtypes of democracy and a discussion of their merits. Guillermo O'Donnell has also introduced the concept of "delegative democracy" to refer to regimes where the executive is not effectively held accountable either vertically (to the electorate) or horizontally (to other organs of state power).
However, in contrast to Francis Fukuyama's (1992) "end of history" argument, Huntington sees history as a dialectical process where each wave of democratization has been succeeded by a wave of reversion to authoritarian rule. Thus there is disagreement on the permanence of these democracies. Therefore, it is important to consider how democracy can be consolidated and improved in these "third wave" countries. Valenzuela (2000: 120) has emphasized the importance of the longer historic tradition with democratic institutions and practices in determining the success of democracy in the current setting. Edgardo Boeninger (1997) and John Peeler (1998) both argue that the current Latin American regimes can draw on elements of democratic political culture from the Latin American experience.

Ecuador can be considered typical of the “third wave” Latin American democracies by virtue of its checkered history with democracy and weak institutionalization of democratic structures. In Ecuador, democracy has come and gone repeatedly since the late 19th century. The 1895 Liberal Revolution marked the first steps toward democracy and liberalism in Ecuadorean history. This experiment lasted until the 1925 "July Revolution" staged by young military officers in the name of curtailing the privileges of the economic elite. Incidentally, the July Revolution represented the first major attempt by an Ecuadorean government to organize and incorporate peasants and indigenous communities. This regime, however, was short lived as Ecuador experienced the economic decline of the global depression of the 1930s. Political instability was the rule in Ecuador for the next two decades as there were twenty-one governments during the period 1931-1948. From 1948 to 1972 Ecuador experienced it longest period of democratic rule (with the exception of three years of military rule from 1963 to 1966). Again, this era of democracy was brought down by economic crisis; and the military intervened in 1972. Democratic rule was reestablished in 1979 and has persisted to today (Corkill and Cubitt 1988). Therefore, we can see that Ecuador has some history of democracy. However, despite this history of democratic rule, David W. Dent (2000: 359) notes that, “the operating style of government in Ecuador has been authoritarian, whether the regime is civilian or military.”

Ecuador’s current government structure, based on its 1979 Constitution (reformed in 1998), can be characterized as a strong presidential system where the President is directly elected for a four-year term (with no immediate re-election) and has the authority to appoint cabinet members and provincial governors. The unicameral Chamber of Representatives comprises the legislative branch and is made up of 103 members elected nationally by
proportional representation for four-year terms (Economist 2000). In reality, the executive is frequently able to overrule the legislative branch through executive orders and emergency declarations (Dent 2000).

In Latin America, new political institutions established in the post-authoritarian era have often failed to live up to the expectations of securing democratic consolidation as evidenced by the incomplete reach of the state, the persistence of authoritarian enclaves, the uneven incorporation of social sectors, and the emergence of opposing social forces (Yashar 1999: 76). Some scholars have gone as far as to argue that democratization in Latin America is largely a myth since the region is still dominated by state authoritarianism, limited arenas for democratic processes, and intensification of poverty and class conflict (Warren 1998). Laurence Whitehead (1993) has argued that the near future will likely be a period of "democracy by default" as democratic institutions are weakly institutionalized, conflict over scarce resources increases, and elite commitment to democracy is uncertain. As the military in most Latin American countries is reluctant to intervene based on its recent past, Latin America seems destined to muddle through an extended period of not-so-democratic rule. Several authors have noted the durability of these types of quasi-democratic regimes or authoritarian democracies (O'Donnell 1996; Comisso 1997; Agüero 1998). Therefore, Latin America may seem doomed to an epoch of electoral democracy, enjoying the formal rights of democracy such as universal suffrage, free speech and press, while having the basic freedoms inherent in liberalism repeatedly trampled (O'Donnell 1996). However, Evelina Dagnino (1998: 55) argues that, with the basic rights of democracy secured, it is now time to move forward to deepening and extending democracy.

**Barriers to Democratization:**

In moving forward, there are several barriers to democratization that must be overcome. The barriers that I will discuss below are:

- Reserved domains of power
- Multiculturalism
- Clientelism
- Lack of effective participation.
I will also briefly touch on issues of party fragmentation and weak state bureaucracies as they relate to these other barriers. I will examine each of these barriers in turn in the following sections of this chapter. Moreover, it has been widely argued that the greatest threats to democracy no longer come from generals and revolutionaries but rather from participants in the democratic process (Huntington 1997; Agüero 1998; Borón 1998). This has certainly been the case in Ecuador as a succession of authoritarian-minded presidents have usually attempted to marginalize or co-opt other actors in the democratic process (Corkill and Cubbitt 1988).

O'Donnell (1992) has identified the process of democratization as a "double transition." First is the transition from authoritarianism to a democratically elected civilian regime (polyarchy). This is followed by the consolidation of democracy by which he means, "the effective functioning of a democratic regime (18)." This may be problematic as elite pacts are often necessary in order to extricate the military from politics. However, these pacts, which may have facilitated the original transition from authoritarian rule, often become a hindrance in the "second transition" to consolidated democracy. As stated by J. Samuel Valenzuela (1992: 58), "what may have eased the first (transition) constrains the second." Military autonomy and reserved policy domains (particularly with regards to economic policy) are examples of arrangements which smoothed the way for a return to democratic rule but now present democratic regimes with some of their biggest challenges. With the gains of the first transition now relatively secure (Dagnino 1998: 55), the task of consolidating and improving the quality of democracy remains a significant challenge.

In moving towards consolidating democracy, regimes must confront the potential tension between governability and participation. According to Elizabeth Jelin (1996: 107), “in the context of the democratic order, the articulation between the need for governability and representation, on the one hand, and participation and citizens’ control of government administration, on the other, are often portrayed as incompatible. But the construction of democracy requires both processes.” Michael Coppedge (1996: 33) elaborates on this idea, arguing that governability requires the representation of actors based on their power while democracy requires representation in proportion to physical numbers. Coppedge defines governability as the degree to which relations between powerful actors obey stable and accepted

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9 The Chilean case is a classic example of this type of "pacted democracy" but a similar process occurred during many regime transitions to democracy in the 1970s and 1980s.
formulas. This conflict is particularly severe in countries, like Ecuador, with a large, ethnically diverse, deeply politicized, indigenous population. Nevertheless, adopting Coppedge’s definition of governability, I contend that the emergence of a strong, well-organized indigenous movement has forced the Ecuadorean state to adapt its “stable and accepted formulas” of power relations. Whether this change will lead towards democratic consolidation or not will be discussed in the next chapters.

Many scholars have stressed the importance of political parties for consolidating both democracy and governability (Hurtado 1996; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Varas 1998). According to Mainwaring and Scully (1995) parties are crucial for organizing political life, presenting candidates for public office, and providing citizens with access to their government. Parties also serve as a shortcut for voters by reducing information costs, thus making it easier for citizens with little political information to participate in politics. Osvaldo Hurtado (1996: 14-5), a former president of Ecuador, has argued that the quality of democracy is determined by the quality of political parties and that the extreme fragmentation of the Ecuadorian party system is jeopardizing not just democracy but also governability as most parties fail to perform their basic representative functions and serve instead as mere electoral vehicles at the whim of political entrepreneurs. In fact, as events in Peru in the past decade have shown, extreme party fragmentation can lead to an anti-party backlash and party system collapse which creates the conditions for a return to authoritarian rule (Varas 1998: 161). As this evidence shows, polyarchy in Ecuador is indeed in a precarious situation.

Reserved Domains of Power:

Another problem in the transition to consolidated democracy is the issue of reserved domains of power. These domains pertain to both relationships internal to the state (i.e. civil-military relations and some aspects of economic policymaking) as well as transnational relationships (i.e. macroeconomic policy influenced by international financial institutions). As the indigenous movement in Ecuador is opposed to many of the outcomes of these reserved domains of power it has sought to open up these areas to democratic forces by increasing participation in the political process.

Reserved domains are problematic because they limit the scope of the democratic process by taking some issues out of the realm of democratic politics. It should not be surprising that, in
many cases, these issues which are effectively isolated from the mechanisms of democracy are some of the most contentious issues in domestic politics. By limiting the scope of democracy to avoid serious debate on contentious issues, policymakers have effectively privileged governability at the expense of participation. As I alluded to earlier, this type of arrangement may have been necessary and useful in making the transition away from military rule, but it has now become a hindrance to improving the quality of democracy.

In the case of Ecuador these reserved domains have been particularly problematic. On the domestic front, the military retains a great deal of effective autonomy from civilian oversight and control. This was most clearly demonstrated in the brief joint-coup staged by the military and CONAIE in 2000. Subordinating the military to elected officials is a key task for achieving deeper democracy in Ecuador.

However, perhaps a greater threat than the military to the democratic process is the influence ceded to international actors in determining economic policy in Ecuador. Ecuador has become one of the “darlings” of the international financial organizations by pursuing strict neoliberal adjustment policies that have been extremely unpopular at home. These adjustment programs, developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and others, claim to be apolitical in that they protect economic processes from political fluctuations (Lechner 1998: 29). Adam Przeworski dismisses this logic by arguing that, “to discuss democracy without considering the economy in which this democracy is to function is an operation worthy of an ostrich (cited in Borón 1998: 45).” As these adjustment programs displace power from the political system to institutions immune to democratic pressures that can better defend minority rights against the political whims of majorities and elites, neoliberal adjustment policies represent a political program whereby politics is replaced by the market as the means of coordinating a highly complex society (Lechner 1998: 29). Melina Selverston-Scher (2001: 90) has gone as far as to argue that, “in Ecuador, as in much of Latin America, politics is largely defined by government-led economic reforms focused on the privatization of national industries, liberalization of market restrictions, and technological advancement in industry, particularly in the export sector.”

While this strategy for social organization may increase the efficiency of social spending, its political implications should not be ignored: "social policies are uncoupled from their political foundation—citizenship—and redefined as a variable of economic growth (Lechner 1998: 29)."
Lechner refers to this process as the colonization of politics by the market. It is hard to imagine such a society being fertile soil for the development of a strong democracy.

Similarly, John S. Dryzek (1996) has argued that, in the current international economic and political system, markets “imprison” government policy. He states that, “it is markets, especially financial ones, not public opinion or parliament, that are the sounding boards for public policy. And if policies are constricted, then so is democracy, for policies that contradict the fundamental interests of business must be vetoed, no matter how popular (Dryzek 1996: 479).” This would indicate that Ecuador remains in a state of oligarchy where the popular will is often thwarted by the interests of a handful of wealthy businessmen, both domestic and international. Carlos de la Torre (1997: 19) contends that this is indeed the case as democratization and economic neoliberalization combined to enable the “modernizing antioligarchical technocrats and politicians to legislate a new system of political domination.” In order to deepen democracy, the middle and lower classes must be able to counteract the hegemony of the elite class. I will argue that CONAIE is leading the way in this direction by challenging the interests of elites, the ideological basis of their hegemony, the legitimacy of their rule, and the reserved domains of power they protect, promote, and represent.

Multiculturalism:

Another possible barrier to democratization that has been widely debated over several centuries is ethnic heterogeneity. In his seminal article on democratic transitions and ethnicity, Dankwart Rustow (1970) argues that ethnic homogeneity is a condition for national stability which, in turn, is a precondition for democracy. John Stuart Mill argued emphatically that a common ethnicity, and in particular a common language, was necessary for a functioning democracy that could guarantee all citizens' freedoms: "free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist (cited in Poe and Walker 2002: 240)." In a recent contribution, Fabio Wanderley Reis (1996) argues that while diversity is not an insurmountable obstacle to democracy, ethnic identity can be recognized only to the extent that it is a necessary step in suppressing its social relevance. He claims that, "the links between individual identity and
collective identities of whatever nature, with their unavoidable appeal to some form of ascription, stand in the way of the fully open and democratic society (Reis 1996: 126)."

In contrast, Lord Acton, a nineteenth century British scholar, argued in favor of the multicultural state. He stressed that ethnic divisions and the desire of different groups for liberty would function as a check against those would-be despots, serving as "an antidote to despotism and…a civilizing influence besides (cited in Poe and Walker 2002: 240)." More recently, Stephen Macedo (2000) has made a similar argument, stating that, "pluralism is important because groups can be oppressive…Freedom and tolerance are fostered by multiple group memberships; being pulled in a multiplicity of directions is the best way of maintaining a critical distance from the demands and expectations of any particular source of identity or allegiance (Macedo 2000: 66)."

In this thesis I tend towards the arguments of Macedo and Lord Acton. Multicultural states such as India and the United States have demonstrated that ethnic diversity can be an impetus for democracy by making it difficult for any one group to dominate the other(s). However, as the case of the United States clearly reveals, diversity can only be considered an asset to democracy (or at least not hostile to democracy) when it is recognized as such and ethnic diversity is respected instead of suppressed. Additionally, as recent ethno-religious violence in India demonstrates, when multiculturalism leads to intolerance and violence, liberty and human rights are the first casualties. In sum, it does not appear that there is anything inherently democratic or anti-democratic about ethnic and cultural diversity. Diversity can be harnessed as a means of controlling the authoritarian impulses of the dominant group or as a means of subjugating, excluding, or violating the most basic human rights of a people based on ethnic and/or cultural background.

Applying these ideas to Ecuador, a country with a 43% \(^\text{10}\) indigenous population (Van Cott, forthcoming: 24), I contend that the multicultural nature of Ecuador can be a force for democratization if harnessed to an ideology of inclusion and participation. Conversely, if based on ideologies of assimilation, exclusion, and/or domination, multiculturalism can be an extreme barrier to democratization.

\(^{10}\) There are a wide range of estimates given for the indigenous portion of the Ecuadorian population, ranging from less than 10% to more than half. The Ecuadorian census does not include an item on ethnicity so all estimates must be considered uncertain. Most of the better sources I have seen have estimated the indigenous population at somewhere between 20% and 45%. This problem is compounded by differing definitions of “indigenous.”
Clientelism and Corruption:

Historically, minority groups (including indigenous peoples) have been incorporated into the Ecuadorian state through clientelist ties (Corkill and Cubitt 1988). Guillermo O'Donnell (1996: 39) defines clientelism as, "nonuniversalistic relationships, ranging from hierarchical particularistic exchanges, patronage, nepotism, and favors to actions that, under the formal rules of the institutional package of polyarchy, would be considered corrupt." He identifies clientelism as one of the strongest institutions in the Latin American polyarchies. Aside from being an institution unto itself, clientelism has effectively warped other democratic institutions, particularly political parties. Frances Hagopian (1996) has argued that elites who depend on the distribution of patronage to compete in democratic political systems:

- have fueled patronage inflation, politicized the delivery of social services, inhibited policymaking, and strained government budgets with their profligate spending patterns...Even when these political systems appear to be operating according to democratic rules, democratic accountability is limited by the appropriation by traditional power holders of mass political parties. (Hagopian 1996: 80-1).

These descriptions of clientelist relationships and their effects on the political party system demonstrate the need for controls on the patronage practices of politicians. However, as parliamentary bodies are normally dominated by political parties, it is unlikely that any substantial reform is forthcoming.

In addition to its effect on the degradation of the political party system, clientelism also degrades the quality of participation, particularly for minorities and the poor who both exercise and sacrifice their political bargaining power in exchange for basic goods and services (Selverston-Scher 2001: 108). Clientelism, in conjunction with reserved domains of power outside the democratic process, has left voting as the act of democratic citizenship. Those without the ability to dispense patronage or exercise other forms of influence are left with no recourse in the political system. Rampant clientelism contributes to a culture of what O’Donnell (1993) calls “low intensity citizenship” whereby even basic democratic activities such as voting are subject to relations of domination and control.

Beyond clientelist practices which weaken democracy by subjecting one of the prime institutions of democracy (elections) to the hierarchy of economic domination, democracy is
impeded by what Terry Karl refers to as the “fallacy of electoralism (cited in Diamond 1999: 9).” This flawed conception of democracy is similar to Comisso’s (1997) notion of procedural democracy in that it privileges elections over other institutions of democratic government and ignores the extent to which multiparty elections are still capable of excluding large segments of the population. Since elections occur only at pre-determined intervals (usually between four and six years) and only allow citizens to select between the already highly aggregated offerings of political parties, relying on elections as the sole means of consolidating democracy is likely an exercise in futility (Diamond 1999: 9).

Civil Society, Participation, and Democratization:
While political parties are critical to the process of democratic consolidation, they represent only part of the spectrum of organized activity necessary for the establishment of a truly democratic regime. Particularly given the exclusive nature of Ecuador’s political parties and the low esteem with which parties are held by much of Ecuador’s population, more effective forms of participation are necessary for the deepening of democracy in Ecuador. Aside from parties and other formal institutions of the state, democratization theory suggests that civil society plays an important role in both the deepening and consolidation of democracy (Schmitter 1997: 247). Furthermore, Robert Putnam (1993) demonstrates, in his study of democracy in Italy, that democratic institutions are of little use if there is not an active civil society to participate in them. However, Brysk (2000a: 151) asserts that the answer is not simply more civil society but a more democratic civil society. My research suggests that Brysk is only partially right. In the case of indigenous movements, democracy is not always considered the highest value (compared to concerns over land, education, etc.) and these movements have been criticized in the past for their lack of internal democracy (Ortiz 1990). However, as I will show below, CONAIE has been quite effective in securing participation not only for indigenous peoples but also for other non-dominant sectors of Ecuadorian society and for international NGOs.

Social Movements and Democracy:
When military regimes closed legislatures and repressed political parties throughout much of Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, social movements arose in many countries to fill
the void in representation (Hagopian 1998: 123). With the return of polyarchy, political parties have re-emerged on the scene; however, due to their often fragmented, personalistic, and clientelistic tendencies, they have not fully transplanted social movements as vehicles of popular representation. If, as David Becker (1999: 145) has suggested, we view democracies as “constructed in parts, or fragments, which complement one another,” then social movements represent only one piece in the democratization process along with parties, institutions (both domestic and international), and economic elites. Significantly, social movements are still important players in reforming Latin American political systems.

Alvarez and Escobar (1992: 326) have argued that, “although the stability of democracy does not depend on being responsive to popular movements, the quality of democracy does.” Therefore, it is important to ask the question of how such popular movements affect the quality of democracy. In this section I intend to explore the theoretical literature on social movements and democratization and develop an analytical framework that will be applied, in later chapters, to the case of the indigenous movement in Ecuador. The framework that will evolve in the following pages suggests that what I will call comprehensive social movements are most effective at both achieving the goals of the movement and improving the quality of democracy. I use the term comprehensive social movements to refer to movements that are able to confront and problematize the state from above (internationally) and below (grassroots movements), from inside (as a participant in political institutions) and outside (as a protest organization), across cultural lines, and using strategies associated with both old and new social movements.

Democracy is a contingent outcome of political conflict (Giugni 1998: xxi). In the case of social movements the outcome depends both on the movement and the political opportunity structure11 in which it exists. Changes in the opportunity structure create incentives for new types of movement organization and activity (Tarrow 1998: 7). Important changes have taken in place in the political opportunity structure in Ecuador which have both facilitated and hindered new forms of organizing. Parties appear and disappear (and officials switch parties on a regular basis), different Presidents respond differently to social movement activity, and elite alliances shift with the electoral winds, just to name a few ways that the political opportunity structure of

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11 Opportunity structure refers to the set of circumstances external to a movement which influence the results of the movement. Examples of elements of the opportunity structure include state facilitation/repression of a movement, the availability of external allies, public response to the movement both domestically and internationally, the stability of political alignments, and divisions within the elites (Foweraker 1995: 71; Tarrow 1998: 20).
Ecuador has changed and continues changing. The changing opportunity structure has created both new opportunities and new constraints for all movements, including the indigenous movement.

The politics of any country, city, tribe, bureaucracy, firm, or family is deeply embedded in the society of which it is but one component. The more complex a society, the more varied and complex will be the social demands emanating from different segments of that society. The last four decades have been an era of increasing complexity in Latin American societies as demands increased from sectors of society (i.e. women, ethnic minorities, and the poor) that traditionally had been neither heard nor processed within the framework of the polyarchic state (Calderón, et al. 1992: 24). In essence, these demands had been excluded from the realm of “the political12.” Latin American countries’ democratization has been stalled, and at times reversed, by the delimited nature of “the political.” In this area, David Slater (1998) contributes an important insight by claiming that politics (“the ensemble of practices, discourses, and institutions that seek to establish a certain order and to organize social life (Slater 1998: 386”) is the attempted pacification of the political. Latin American states have been able to “establish a certain order and organize social life” by excluding certain domains from political debate. In thinking about social movements we can apply Slater’s logic in reverse: whereas politics is seen as the attempt to pacify “the political”, social movements attempt to re-politicize these exclusive domains of politics. Doing so is a crucial first step towards increasing participation and accountability and improving the overall quality of democracy.

Beyond simply re-politicizing issues and identities that have long been ignored or repressed, social movements can contribute to the improvement of democracy in other ways. The liberal and radical schools of thought take different approaches to the role of social movements in contemporary political systems. Liberalism would wish the role of social movements to be minimal, or at least co-opted. A liberal perspective would view social movements as a hindrance to the incorporation of citizens as individuals into liberal democratic society. The radical school takes a different approach, arguing that mass participation is crucial to democracy. According to

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12 By “the political” I am referring to the realm of issues and ideas considered to be within the purview of legitimate public contestation and discourse. Under authoritarian rule “the political” was a quite narrow realm which excluded civil-military relations, economic policy, and civil and political rights, among others. Under democratic rule the realm of “the political” has expanded somewhat but, as my discussion of reserved domains of power showed, still excludes important policy areas such as certain areas of the economy, as well as issues of concern to women and indigenous peoples.
Geraldine Lievesley (1999: 103), “radical faith in the political potency of the new social movements rests in the belief that they initiate transformative social strategies through the occupation of different kinds of political space and the application of more diverse languages and forms of activity than those present within ‘official’ politics.”

In the following sections I will elaborate the ways in which social movements can impact the quality of democracy. Most of these mechanisms are reflective of a radical perspective on social movements’ contribution to democracy. These mechanisms also are suggestive of a new form of citizenship, one that is based not on the currently dominant liberal perspective but rather one that recognizes the necessity for multiple forms of citizenship.

Social Movements and Political Culture:

First, and perhaps most importantly, social movements can democratize politics by first democratizing society. As stated above, politics is a contingent part of society- as societies change so do their politics. Alvarez, et al (1998), describe a culture of “social authoritarianism” in most Latin American societies. They claim that this social authoritarianism, “engenders forms of sociability and an authoritarian culture of exclusion that underlies social practices as a whole and reproduces inequality in social relations at all levels (Alvarez, et al, 1998: 12).” Social movements that can effectively challenge this social authoritarianism can also undermine the ability of authoritarian structures (both social and political) to reproduce themselves.

Dagnino (1998: 47) has argued that social movements have advanced a conception of democracy, “that transcends the limits of both political institutions as traditionally conceived and of ‘actually existing democracy.’” What is unique about this perspective is that it moves beyond discussions of the political regime and into the realm of society at large. Dagnino (1998: 47) goes on to state:

Emphasizing cultural implications (of social movements) implies the recognition of the capacity of social movements to produce new visions of a democratic society insofar as they identify the existing social ordering as limiting and exclusionary with respect to their values and interests. Fragmentary, plural, and contradictory as they may be, these cultural contestations are not to be seen as by-products of political struggle but as constitutive of the efforts by social movements to redefine the meaning and the limits of the political itself.

Therefore, instead of reforming political institutions to democratize both politics and society, social movements can bypass politics and take their demands and tactics straight to the social
arena. To the extent that these contestations have a democratizing effect on society they can have a similar impact on the formal institutions of government, albeit indirectly. In Chapters Three and Four I will examine the efforts of CONAIE to democratize Ecuadorian society in order to achieve both the movements goals and the improvement of democracy.

**Concrete Proposals for Change:**

Second, social movements can improve the quality of democracy by presenting concrete proposals for change. An often-heard criticism of the political left in Latin America is that they have a very clear idea of what they are against but no positive political project of their own (Castañeda 1993). Political parties of all stripes have also been ineffective at pushing democratic reforms because the fragmented nature of many party systems, including Ecuador’s, have made it extremely difficult for parties to achieve a coherent program of action and implement it in the legislative and executive branches (Yúdice 1998: 353). Since parties are incapable of maintaining concrete programmatic agendas for reform, social movements (and the NGOs that support them) have become, “the most innovative actors in setting agendas for political and social policies (Yúdice 1998: 353).” With regards to ethnicity-based social movements, Carlos Iván Degregori (1998: 223) has argued that ethnic groups are most effective at questioning the nation-state in some of its most obsolete dimensions: centralism, the ideology of national integration, and the ideology of national security. Whether this “questioning” can be transformed into concrete and coherent proposals for reform will be examined in the following chapter.

However, as obvious as this may seem, in order to improve the quality of a democracy, the proposals for change brought by social movements must, in themselves, be democratic in nature, or at least not antithetical to democracy. No matter how well-defined their political project, military or other authoritarian movements do not contribute to democratization.

**Expanding Participation:**

Third, movements that expand participation and citizenship represent major steps forward towards greater democracy (Giugni 1998: xx). Now that the vast majority of Latin American adults enjoy the right to vote the idea of participation has evolved towards a more effective form of participation. It is no longer sufficient to have a voice in the political system if that voice never has a chance to be heard or is consistently over-ruled by forces outside the democratic
process. Hernández and Dilla (cited in Lievesley 1999: 119-20) elaborate on this idea, arguing that, “to participate is not simply to have access to multiple areas of discussion but to contribute to decision-making in these areas.” The assertion by social movements of a right to participation is, simultaneously, a claim to citizenship, the *sine qua non* of democracy (Foweraker 1995: 97). Therefore, by demanding participation social movements are demanding more than just access to the policymaking apparatus, they are demanding the right to a type of citizenship that may run counter to the tenets of the dominant conceptions of liberal democracy and, in the case of the indigenous movement, problematizes the state’s fundamental referent- the nation.

A similar role that social movements can play is to expand the participatory abilities of transnational organizations. To the extent that these organizations promote democratization they need a local organization to legitimize their actions. For example, O’Donnell (1999: 45) has argued that, “their (transnational organizations’) injunctions and recommendations risk being dismissed as undue or insensitive ‘external interference’ if they are not adopted and, so to speak, ‘nationalized’, by domestic agents.” Thus social movements have an important role to play in expanding participation not only for themselves and other “citizens” of the state but also for transnational organizations.

**Movement Autonomy and Democratization:**

Fourth, to be effective in pressing for political change social movements should remain autonomous from political parties and other actors in the democratic process (Sandoval 1998: 194). This does not mean that movements should not interact and even, at times, form strategic alliances with parties and/or other movements. However, the specific concerns of social movements fit uneasily with the agendas of political parties which are more concerned with mobilizing voters for electoral competition (Lievesley 1999: 114). For parties, movements are often little more than co-optable vote sources. Social movements that become co-opted or deactivated by concessions from parties or the government may lose their ability to press their demands on the state. Through being co-opted social movements can quickly go from being part of the solution to poor-quality democracy to one of its main contributors (Peeler 1998: 160).

Movement autonomy is important for other reasons as well. Dryzek (1996: 476) notes that pressures for greater democracy have almost always emanated from an oppositional civil society. By being incorporated into the state a social movement loses its democratizing capability
as a participant in this “oppositional civil society.” Thus, Dryzek describes the tension between inclusion in the state and autonomy from it. He argues that, “there may be some democratic gain in (the) entry (into the state), but there is also democratic loss in terms of a less vital civil society, the erosion of some existing democratic accomplishments, and a reduced likelihood of further democratization in the future (Dryzek 1996: 476).” I contend that the short-term democratic gains of inclusion in the state do not outweigh the possible costs of co-optation and removal from the realm of civil society. However, I believe that a comprehensive social movement is capable of pursuing both short-term and long-term goals at once.

A corollary of this idea is that social movements must maintain a long-term focus. This is not to say that short-term gains should be foresworn but rather that they should not come to dominate the decision making process of movement leaders. Movements that focus primarily or exclusively on short-term gains are most susceptible to co-optation since the would-be co-opters need only meet the basic short-term needs of the movement instead of dealing with larger issues such as participation and citizenship (Lievesley 1999: 115). Democracy is a long-term goal, constructed slowly and partially. Therefore, a movement that would foster improvements in the quality of democracy must maintain a focus on long-term goals.

**Strategic International Alliances:**

Fifth, allying with transnational movements or pro-democracy, pro-human rights NGOs puts social movements in a strong position to both improve the quality of democracy and achieve concrete gains for the movement. Provided the movement in question meets the criteria listed above of autonomy and democratic orientation, international organizations (IOs) can provide material support for the movement as well as providing tools and ideas for strengthening the movement. It is important, however, that such IOs have local allies. As noted above, without such local connections IOs can, and frequently are, dismissed by governments as meddling in the internal affairs of the country and being insensitive to local realities and needs (O’Donnell 1999: 45).

Additionally, internationalized movements and NGOs can, to a certain degree, exert a great deal of influence on governments to respond to the demands of social movements (Banton 1996). In this instance, international norms tend to favor the demands of social movements. In the contemporary world most states wish to be viewed as in conformance with the norms of
liberal democratic government. Thus, they need to be seen responding to popular demands and protecting the rights of citizenship. Social movements can extract some leverage from this situation by putting forward demands that the state accepts (albeit reluctantly at times) in order to “save face” in the international community (Lievesley 1999: 104).

**Political versus Economic Demands:**

Sixth, social movements that contribute to democratization are those that push political demands equally with or stronger than “economic corporate” demands (Foweraker 1995: 98). There are two justifications for this argument. First, economic demands can usually be satisfied relatively easily by a populist and/or authoritarian government desirous of either demobilizing or co-opting a given movement. Second, democratization is a political process involving the expansion of “the political” and those eligible to be players in the game of politics. Thus, while economic concessions may improve the living standards of movement members, they do not necessarily increase their ability to participate in the political process nor do they give them tools for holding elected and appointed officials accountable for their actions.

**Broadening the Movement:**

Seventh, identity-based movements such as indigenous movements must make efforts to broaden their movement by including sectors of society outside their own identity group as well as employing different strategies to address different situations. If movements do not include groups outside their primary constituency, they risk being labeled as exclusive and anti-democratic, and their ability to impact the quality of democracy will be minimal at best. The indigenous movement in Ecuador has historically been criticized on this front. Competing politicians from both the left and the right have labeled the indigenous movement as racist and separatist (Delgado 1995: 82). However, in recent times CONAIE has attempted to incorporate the views of like-minded though non-indigenous peoples and groups into its political program. Partially as a result of this cross-cultural coalition-building effort, indigenous mobilizations and protests have enjoyed a relatively high level of popular support in recent times (Selverston-Scher 2001).

In addition to broadening a movement’s base of support, movements must also broaden the tactics they use to press their demands and confront the state and dominant culture. This
leads to what I term the comprehensive social movement in that it gives the movement multiple options for confronting the state. For example, a revolutionary movement like Sendero Luminoso or the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) have limited options beyond violent confrontation. Without laying down their arms it would be extremely difficult for either of these movements to participate in electoral politics or stage a mass uprising on their behalf. Similarly, prior to 1995 CONAIE had foresworn electoral competition believing that the government was so corrupt and the political party system so dysfunctional that electoral participation would only lead to co-optation (Beck and Mijeski 1998). However, since 1995 the indigenous movement has fielded candidates for local and national elections on the ticket of their own electoral arm, Pachakutik, as well as through other political parties. This has given the movement a voice that had earlier been denied to its members, largely by themselves. While CONAIE’s criticism of the government and party system may be accurate, participating in electoral politics at the same time that it maintains other avenues for contention has enabled the indigenous movement to improve its own situation as well as further the cause of democratic consolidation.

Another aspect of being a comprehensive social movement is acting as both an old and new social movement. While the goals and tactics of these movements may be different, as I will explain below, a movement that can harness the power of both old and new social movement structures can become a powerful force for democratization. The “old” social movements can be characterized based on the analytical frameworks of modernization and dependency and by traditional actors (labor, the bourgeoisie, revolutionary vanguards, etc.) battling for control of the state. These movements tend to focus on the presumably immutable structure of society that only radical changes could overcome (Alvarez and Escobar 1992: 3).

New movements, on the other hand, stress the importance of identity as a way of engaging in “new forms of doing politics (Alvarez, et al. 1998: 5).” New social movement theory argues that:

An era that was characterized by the division of the political space into two clearly demarcated camps (the bourgeoisie and the proletariat) is being left behind. In the new situation, a multiplicity of social actors establish their presence and spheres of autonomy in a fragmented social and political space. Society itself is largely shaped by the plurality of these struggles and the vision of those involved in the new social movements (Alvarez and Escobar 1992: 3).
These new social movements are usually not concerned with seizing state power so much as carving out autonomous zones of authority for the movement. In this sense, new social movements simply continue the job of “old” movements—“they open up the political sphere, they articulate popular demands and they politicize issues previously confined to the private realm (Scott 1991: 155).”

Movements that are to further the cause of democratization would likely combine aspects of both of these ideal-type movements. For the quality of democracy to be improved changes in both the structure of social and state institutions need to be reformed, which suggests an “old” approach while the “new” aspects of the movement struggle for participation, citizenship, and the ability to exert control of those who govern. These two types of movements cannot form a perfect dichotomy and several scholars (D’Anieri, et al. 1990; Foweraker 1995) have argued that there is nothing new or different about “new” social movements and that their supposedly unique features are typical of all social movements. However, the theoretical differences in these two ideal-type movements are analytically useful in assessing the ability of social movements to contribute to democratization.

**Conclusion:**

In this chapter I have outlined the challenges to consolidating democracy in Latin America and Ecuador more specifically. Reserved domains of power, cultural pluralism, clientelism, corruption, party fragmentation, exclusion, weak state bureaucracies, and a lack of accountability are all potential barriers to improving the quality of democracy in Latin America. This chapter also presents the framework that will inform the upcoming chapters. I have laid out seven broad categories or ways that social movements can influence the process of democratization. In the following chapters I will examine the indigenous movement in Ecuador with reference to this analytical framework.
Chapter 3

To understand the impact a movement has on a society and its politics it is important to understand the antecedents and evolutionary trajectory of the movement. In the case of the indigenous movement in Ecuador we could conceivably date the movement back to indigenous resistance to the conquest. However, in this case it has only been within the past sixty years that modern social movements composed primarily of and representing indigenous peoples have emerged (Van Cott 1994). This chapter will examine the early history of the indigenous movement in Ecuador beginning with the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas (FEI) and the Federación de Centros Shuar (hereafter referred to as the Shuar Federation) through the official founding of CONAIE in 1986, the mass mobilizations of the 1990s, and the diverse activities of the present day. This chapter will also show how the state has resisted indigenous demands and, when forced to compromise and/or negotiate with indigenous organizations, has attempted to dilute any agreement reached or stall its implementation.

From the first colonial contact until the present day indigenous peoples have been subjected to various forms of economic, political, and cultural repression. While it is not my goal to detail these abuses in this thesis, it is important to note that these abuses continued even in the aftermath of the wars of independence. The forms and severity of indigenous subordination have changed over the years as the socio-politico-economic reality of Ecuador has changed. However, well into the twentieth century the political and economic structures that excluded indigenous peoples remained largely unchanged. Indigenous peoples were excluded from the political process by literacy requirements on voting. Economically, indigenous peoples were marginalized by land ownership laws which privileged large, individually owned, export-oriented farms (latifundias) over smaller farms or any form of communal property.

The indigenous movement in Ecuador has evolved from a confusing assortment of separate organizations (usually based around local communities), some of them affiliated with political parties, pressing for essentially material demands, to a unified national organization (CONAIE) for which material demands are only part of its program. Ecuador’s indigenous movement is also one of the oldest in Latin America and the Shuar Federation has served as a model for indigenous mobilization in several other Latin American countries (Selverston-Scher 2001: 33). The evolution of this movement also demonstrates the evolution from old social
movement structures represented by the FEI and the Shuar Federation to a new social movement approach represented by CONAIE. While the FEI was a class-based national organization struggling for mainly material demands (Selverston-Scher 2001: 33) and the Shuar Federation was a locally based movement focused on primarily material demands but also with a smaller cultural component, the indigenous movement at present (represented by CONAIE and Pachakutik) represents a more identity-centered new social movement approach (Andolina 1999). These differences will be developed in greater detail in Chapters Four and Five.

**Early Indigenous Movements:**

The first national attempt to organize indigenous peoples was the FEI. The FEI was closely affiliated with the Ecuadorian Communist Party (ECP) and was used by the party as a way to press for land reform that would redistribute land and wealth in rural areas (Selverston-Scher 2001: 35). Under this organization indigenous communities were organized as laborers and peasants rather than as indigenous peoples. Therefore, the FEI was based primarily on non-indigenous identity and the movement itself was subordinated to the ECP. Hence, its ability to press indigenous demands independent of other influences was severely limited. Nonetheless, the FEI-sponsored protests and land takeovers of the 1950s have been credited with inciting the Agrarian Reform Law of 1964, which I will discuss later (Selverston-Scher 2001: 35).

While the FEI was ostensibly a national organization (although in reality it represented almost exclusively the interests of the indigenous communities of the sierra) the Shuar Federation, established in 1964, was formed to protect the specific interests of the Shuar people of the Oriente, the Amazonian region of Ecuador (see Figure 1 for the location of Shuar territory). The Shuar first organized in response to the colonization of their territory by people (both indigenous and non-indigenous) leaving the highlands and by foreign corporations interested in exploiting the natural resources, particularly oil, of the region (Corkill and Cubitt 1988: 73). Ironically, the Federation was formed with the assistance of Salesian missionaries who were concerned that the colonization of Shuar territory would decrease their influence and authority in the region (Selverston 1994: 135). As opposed to the FEI, which was struggling for agrarian reform, the Shuar Federation's primary goals were the retention of Shuar culture, political self-determination, and economic self-sufficiency (CONAIE 1988: 98).
During the 1970s other regional indigenous organizations began forming, particularly in the Amazon region. The two largest of these organizations are the Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza (OPIP) and the Federación de Organizaciones Indígenas de Napo (FOIN). Like the Shuar Federation, these two organizations were formed with the primary goal of protecting their communities' culture and lifestyle. However, at the same time these organizations were committed to the concrete political struggle over land (Selverston-Scher 2001: 33).

The Agrarian Reform Era and the Oil Boom:

The 1960s and 1970s were also an era of great change in Ecuador's political system. Agrarian reforms laws passed during this period altered the relationship between indigenous
peoples, land, and the government. However, as much as these efforts were originally designed to benefit indigenous peoples and other disadvantaged sectors of the population, the results were often far from those intended. The first agrarian reform law, passed in 1964, eliminated the huasipunguero system of debt peonage. However, these reforms simply turned huasipungos into landless or nearly landless wage laborers. Also, agrarian reform was resisted by the large landowners who simply sold their least productive tracts of land in order to avoid expropriation. The landowners were also largely successful in switching the debate away from land redistribution towards colonization of the sparsely populated Amazon region (Corkill and Cubitt 1988: 33).

Despite the efforts of large landowners to emasculate proposals for agrarian reform, by 1982 nearly one-quarter of the total area of haciendas larger than one hundred hectares (approximately 247 acres) had been redistributed (Zamosc 1994: 42). However, the land was normally distributed individually (not communally as indigenous organizations preferred) and the land redistributed was usually of low quality. The 1964 Agrarian Reform Law also established the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (IERAC) which has had a tense relationship with indigenous communities because its primary solution to the problem of increasing land pressure has been the colonization of the Amazon rainforest (Sawyer 1997: 68).

Therefore, the record of agrarian reform in Ecuador is mixed with regards to its effect on indigenous peoples. Although some land was clearly redistributed and in many cases indigenous peoples benefited from access to land, the reforms did not live up to the expectations that had been created. With regards to the impact of land reform in Chimborazo province in central Ecuador, Tanya Korovkin (1997: 32) sums up the ambiguous results of the 1964 reforms by arguing that:

The 1964 land reform is generally viewed as a defeat of the Andean peasantry because it had to settle for an exceedingly limited form of land redistribution, but this view must be qualified in the light of later events. The communities lost the game in terms of access to economic resources, but they won an impressive victory in political and organizational terms. The 1964 land reform was followed by an opening of the local political arena and the growth of a provincewide indigenous movement. These contradictory outcomes set the scene for the land struggles of the following decades.

Therefore, while indigenous peoples were disappointed by the poor record of land redistribution,
the overall impact of reform was more positive. Though they did not gain much in terms of material demands, the experience of the land reform process did open up the political arena to indigenous demands in a way that democratized the political system in itself, and also strengthened the ability of the indigenous movement to push for further democratic reforms.

To the extent that real land redistribution did occur during the 1960s and 1970s, it was largely a result of the dual factors of populist dictatorship and the discovery and exploitation of large oil reserves in the Amazon region of Ecuador. These two factors allowed the so-called “petroleum generals” to placate the material demands of indigenous communities without alienating the upper classes (Corkill and Cubitt 1988).

However, in late 1970s and early 1980s Ecuador experienced both the end of the national oil boom as oil prices fell after the oil crisis of the 1970s and the end of military rule with the return of electoral politics in 1979. Pressed by international financial institutions and confronted with the loss of a significant amount of oil revenues, the Ecuadorian government began moving in the direction of economic neoliberalism (Korovkin 1997: 35). The agrarian reform era came to an abrupt end with the 1979 Law of Agricultural Promotion which shifted the emphasis of government policy from land reform to creating a stable political environment in rural areas as a precondition for increasing agricultural output (Korovkin 1997: 35).

**CONFENIAE, ECUARUNARI, and the Birth of CONAIE:**

Agrarian reform was never successful enough to forestall the continued organizing activities of indigenous peoples in Ecuador. Based on the example of the Shuar Federation and others, various local indigenous organizations began organizing in larger regional federations. ECUARUNARI (Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui), the regional federation representing primarily the Quichua (the largest indigenous group in Ecuador) but also other indigenous communities of the sierra, was founded in 1972 (see Figure 1) (CONAIE 1989: 245). Its Amazonian counterpart, CONFENAIE (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana), was founded eight years later (CONAIE 1989: 111). CONFENIAE is composed primarily of the Shuar and lowland Quichua communities although other indigenous nationalities—Achuar, Huaorani, Cofán, Siona, and Secoya (see Figure 1 for map and population sizes)—are active participants (Selverston-Scher 2001: 34). Both ECUARUNARI and
CONFENIAE were formed to aggregate indigenous demands and present a unified indigenous voice vis-à-vis the state. ECUARUNARI is by far the larger of the two organizations as it encompasses the Quichua people of the sierra who represent over 95% of Ecuador’s indigenous population.

Table 1: Organizations that comprise CONAIE (CONAIE 1989)¹³.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONAIE</th>
<th>COICE (Coast)</th>
<th>ECUARUNARI (Sierra)</th>
<th>CONFENAIE (Amazon)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FCA</td>
<td>INRUIJTAFICI</td>
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<td>FCBB</td>
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<td>IECAB-BRUNARI</td>
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Shortly after the formation of CONFENIAE in 1980 the two organizations agreed to join forces in a national level federation. In October 1980 leaders of both regional movements met in Sucúa, Ecuador to hammer out the details of the new confederation to be called CONACNIE (Confederación Nacional de las Naciones Indígenas). The new organization aimed to unite the diverse regional interests of CONFENIAE and ECUARUNARI into a unified national indigenous movement. However, the union was not without its problems. Based on the different historical and present-day experiences of highlands and lowlands communities, the two groups had quite divergent goals. Highland organizations were focused almost exclusively on issues of land recuperation and protection, while the Amazonian organizations were more concerned with the problems related to development, such as colonization and environmental issues (Selverston-

¹³ See Appendix A for a list of acronyms with their full names.
Despite its somewhat divided nature, CONACNIE was successful in laying the groundwork for a unified, national-level, indigenous movement. Resolutions passed at the first meeting of CONACNIE in 1980 included commitments to strengthening local organizations, supporting bilingual education, developing leaders, and the rejection of the “paternalism and manipulation” by political parties, missionaries, and other groups or institutions (Selverston-Scher 2001: 38). Thus, CONACNIE established the precedent of independence from other political, social, cultural, and religious organizations that, as we will see later, was a defining characteristic of the indigenous movement until the mid-1990s when the movement began to form alliances with political parties and other social movements. CONACNIE also achieved two important (both concretely and symbolically) goals of the indigenous movement. First, it convinced the national civil registry to accept indigenous language names for the first time in history. Second, it helped force the Summer Institute of Linguistics, a conservative missionary organization with a perceived assimilationist agenda, to leave the country (Selverston-Scher 2001: 38).

At the second meeting of the indigenous General Assembly in 1986 CONAIE was formed to replace CONACNIE. Now, CONAIE could legitimately claim to represent 70 percent of the indigenous population (roughly 2.8 million people) through its affiliated organizations (Selverston 1997: 172). As indigenous peoples constitute approximately 43 percent of the Ecuadorian population, CONAIE now directly represents over one-quarter of the population of Ecuador. The change was due in large part to the addition of a third regional federation (COICE-Coordinadora de Organizaciones de la Costa Ecuatoriana) representing indigenous communities in the coastal area of Ecuador (CONAIE 1989: 275). At this second General Assembly (the first for CONAIE) all nine indigenous nationalities were represented by 27 different organization with over 500 delegates participating (CONAIE 1989: 303).

CONAIE is formed by indigenous delegates from throughout Ecuador representing ECUARUNARI, CONFENAIE, COICE and the sub-organizations that make up these movements (CONAIE 1989) [see Table 2 for an organizational chart of CONAIE’s sub-organizations]. As mentioned above, ECUARUNARI dwarfs the other member organizations in terms of the size of the indigenous population it represents. Nonetheless, other organizations from regions outside the sierra have been able to exert a powerful influence in CONAIE. This is
largely due to CONAIE’s consensus-based decision-making structure.

CONAIE is a consensus-driven organization with controversial decisions rarely being voted on (Collins 2001: 2). This, in part, explains the long delay in allowing movement members to run for elected office. Until 1995 a significant minority of CONAIE members (mainly delegates from the Amazon region) believed that participating in elections only served to legitimate the current exclusionary regime. After the national law was changed allowing independent candidates to run in elections, CONAIE was able to arrive at an internal agreement to support electoral competition by movement members (Collins 2001: 12). This decision spawned the primarily indigenous electoral movement Pachakutik, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

While continuing with the major goals and policies of CONACNIE, the founding of CONAIE also represented a significant tactical shift in the indigenous movement from the earlier days of the movement. Leon Zamosc (1994: 48) has argued that, “rather than insisting on traditional themes like the struggle for land and economic improvements, CONAIE concentrated on an ethnic agenda ranging from vindication of cultural rights to more ambitious programmatic demands such as a redefinition of Ecuador as a plurinational country.” Zamosc may be slightly overstating his case here, as the “struggle for land and economic improvement” is still an important part of CONAIE’s political agenda, indeed arguably the most important part for the most economically marginalized of indigenous communities. Nonetheless, it is clear that during the mid-1980s the focus of the indigenous movement began to shift slightly away from material demands towards more cultural and political demands.

Also, the 1980s marked the emergence of a new group of indigenous leaders. For the first time in history indigenous men and women were attending and graduating from universities in appreciable numbers, often with degrees in law or teaching (Beck and Mijeski 2001: 3)

**CONAIE in the 1990s:**

Throughout the latter half of the 1980s CONAIE spent most of its time either marginalized by the oppressive government of Leon Febres Cordero (1984-1988) or negotiating with his successor, Rodrigo Borja (1988-1992), for wide-ranging reform of the political and economic systems. However, the event that established the legitimacy and demonstrated the strength of CONAIE was undoubtedly the indigenous uprising of June 1990. The uprising
revolved around a variety of demands including bilingual education, scaling back neoliberal reforms, and recognition of Ecuador as a plurinational state (Lucero 2001: 61). After over a week of paralyzing the country with roadblocks, boycotts of markets, cutting off water supplies to urban areas, and the kidnapping of military personnel (they were eventually released unharmed), the government ceded to CONAIE control over the national bilingual education program (Selverston 1994: 141).

Two years later, in 1992, indigenous peoples again took to the streets in protest of the 500th anniversary of Cristopher Columbus’s “discovery” of the “new world.” This time, the primary demand of the indigenous movement was land recuperation and it was partially successful. In order to end the uprising President Borja negotiated an agreement with OPIP (an indigenous organization based in the Amazonian state of Pastaza and member of CONAIE) to cede them 19 different territorial blocks comprising a total of 2.75 million acres (Collins 2001: 11). However, in order to undercut the organizational capabilities of the communities living in these territories, the government designed the 19 blocks to not correspond with any natural barriers or reflect the distribution of various indigenous communities in the territories. Many communities were split between two or more territories. Thus, while CONAIE and OPIP were successful in recovering land for indigenous peoples this cannot be considered a total victory as the land was granted in a way that would create (and has, indeed, created) internal conflict within the territories. CONAIE again mobilized indigenous peoples in 1994 in successful opposition to a neoliberal agricultural reform law supported by President Sixto Durán Ballen (Beck and Mijeski 2001: 4).

The year 1995 marked a turning point for the indigenous movement in Ecuador. Having already established its ability to bring hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of people, both indigenous and non-indigenous, into the streets to protest policies detrimental to indigenous peoples, in 1995 CONAIE proved its ability to mobilize voters when they opposed a strident structural adjustment program proposed by Durán Ballen. This event also represented the first time that CONAIE entered into a strategic alliance with other organizations to press its demand. The organization *Ya Basta!* (which would eventually be transformed into the Social Movement Coordinator-CMS) united indigenous, labor, and other social movements under one umbrella to oppose Durán Ballen’s privatization plans (Collins 2001: 13). When Durán Ballen, against the advice of his advisors, announced that he would hold a popular referendum on the privatization
issue\textsuperscript{14}, the movement mobilized to defeat the referendum. Unified behind a single issue, a “No” vote in the referendum, the coalition was able to vote down all eleven questions being voted on with majorities between 55 and 62 percent (Collins 2001: 14).

Also during 1995 CONAIE was debating whether to eliminate its prohibition against its members seeking elected office. Miguel Lluco, a CONAIE leader explained the prohibition by arguing, “when we advocated against participating in elections, we were questioning the system, a system that did not offer any guarantee of responding to the interests of the whole, much less to Indian interests. So we said: ‘invalidate your vote\textsuperscript{15}.’ (Collins 2001: 12).”

The debate on electoral participation broke down along regional lines with representatives from the sierra region supporting participation while those from the Amazon generally opposed the expansion of tactics. By 1996, however, the tide had shifted in favor of allowing electoral participation. Beck and Mijeski (2001) identify the crucial turning point as the development of a strategic alliance with an array of other social movements, mostly urban-based. This broad alliance was formed in 1995 as the \textit{Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales} (CMS). At first CONAIE, maintaining its traditional position of absolute independence from other movements, was not part of it. However, after the success of the anti-referendum coalition, CONAIE cautiously agreed to cooperate with the CMS. After agreeing to this alliance, the movement began to shift away from some of its strict traditional policies in favor of what many saw as a more practical approach (Beck and Mijeski 2001: 5).

Out of this debate emerged the new indigenous political party, Pachakutik (also referred to as the \textit{Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik- MUPP}). The new party got off to a tremendous start by winning eight seats (about ten percent of the total), in the \textit{Congreso Nacional}, making it the fourth largest party in Congress. Pachakutik fared even better in local elections in the highlands and the Amazon, although it fared quite poorly in the densely populated and primarily non-indigenous coastal region (Beck and Mijeski 2001). However, after the success of the first election Pachakutik’s fortunes sagged in 1998 in spite of constitutional reforms that increased the number of seats in the Congress and, for the first time, allowed independents and social movements to run candidates for election without associating with a

\textsuperscript{14} The referendum consisted of eleven questions concerning privatization of various public enterprises and other neoliberal reforms.

\textsuperscript{15} Voting is obligatory in Ecuador so encouraging people not to vote would have been unrealistic. Hence, the urging to “invalidate your vote.”
political party (Collins 2001: 9).

The instigating factor leading up to the call for a new constitution was the legitimacy crisis created by the downfall of the government of Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1998). After a week of protests by CONAIE and other members of the CMS against Bucaram’s economic policy and authoritarian style of governing, on February 5th Bucaram was voted out of office for “mental incompetence.”

The Constituent Assembly and Constitutional Reform:

To demonstrate the influence CONAIE has gained (and the influence it still lacks) in the political system, it is useful to examine the National Constituent Assembly convened in 1998 to redraft the Ecuadorian constitution. For several years CONAIE had been calling for a new constitution only to be rebuffed by the president and established political parties. However, as a result of the crisis of legitimacy after the downfall of Bucaram, a Constituent Assembly was called to rewrite the Ecuadorian constitution.

Nevertheless, the space that had been created for CONAIE and other social movements after the fifth of February was effectively closed when control of the Constituent Assembly was given to the Congress which was dominated by traditional political forces. To recreate space for itself CONAIE called for an alternative assembly to contest the legitimacy of the “official” assembly (Andolina 1998: 5). The political parties and business elite tried to discourage and disparage the alternative assembly by delaying it until the end of 1998 in order to distance the assembly as much as possible from the events of February 5.

However, social movements felt justified by the events of February 5 to call for an immediate assembly; and when it was delayed almost ten months they decided instead to hold their own assembly. Thus, on October 12, (anti)Columbus Day, the alternative assembly was convened to debate and decide on what a new constitution should look like. While the alternative assembly had no official power (it was empowered only to make recommendations to the official assembly), when the assembly began there was a sense of legitimacy to it that the leaders of the “official” assembly had attempted to deny their “alternative” counterparts. Robert Andolina (1998: 24) argues that the behavior of the delegates at the alternative assembly indicated that,
“most participants in the assembly felt that it was more than a forum to discuss constitutional reforms that would be turned over to the ‘true’ assembly later. This assembly was the legitimate assembly, and more legitimate than any other political authority in the country.” I will return to the significance of these actions in the next chapter.

The alternative assembly concluded with a series of suggestions for constitutional reforms. However, the official assembly, which convened a month later and was dominated by the traditional political parties\textsuperscript{17}, rejected many of these demands and most of the rest were included in ambiguous language. In the end CONAIE saw most of its goals achieved partially at best. It got a chapter on the collective rights of indigenous peoples along the lines of ILO 169 norms\textsuperscript{18}, but no declaration of Ecuador as a plurinational state. It got rights to territory, but not communal land. In addition indigenous people now, “have the right to ‘participate’ in the use and conservation of renewable resources and the right to be ‘consulted’ on the use of non-renewable resources, and ‘where possible,’ to receive compensation for socio-environmental damages (Andolina 1998: 34).” Quichua was not made an official language but the right to use and be educated in indigenous languages was included. Importantly, indigenous representatives have the right to participate in the government (but there is no guarantee or norm of proportionality of representation) but an effective autonomy regime has not been implemented. The constitution also allows for the possibility of indigenous zones (“circumpscripciones”). All of these rights will be guaranteed by the state “where applicable.” In sum, many rights, but few guarantees (Andolina 1998: 34).

Nonetheless, indigenous peoples in Ecuador have secured unprecedented protections for indigenous rights and stronger constitutional recognition of indigenous rights than any other country in Latin America (Van Cott 2000: 258). Table 3 details the rights indigenous peoples

\textsuperscript{16} Delegates were elected to the Constitutional Assembly by popular vote thus giving a clear advantage to the traditional political parties who had a wealth of political campaigning experience and resources at their disposal (Andolina 1998).

\textsuperscript{17} Delegates to the official assembly were elected by direct popular vote while delegates to the alternative assembly were elected by social movements representing the spectrum of interests in Ecuadorian society. Political parties were particularly well suited to win in the former situation, where the financial resources, clienteles ties, and party apparatuses could be put to work. In the latter, political parties were poorly situated to gain significant representation as the delegates were elected primarily from the various movements making up the alternative assembly (Andolina 1998).

\textsuperscript{18} Although the new Constitution included much of the language of ILO 169, the Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations (CEOSL) filed a complaint with the ILO alleging non-observance by Ecuador of Convention 169. In addition, the ILO has yet to receive a requested report from the Ecuadorian government on its
have secured for themselves under the 1998 Constitution in comparison with its neighbors and other Latin American countries with large indigenous populations. Only Colombia has constitutional guarantees similar to Ecuador’s and this is in part due to the small size of Colombia’s indigenous population (Van Cott 2000). No other Latin American country with a large indigenous population has such broad constitutional protections as Ecuador.

Table 3: Constitutional rights guaranteed to indigenous peoples in selected Latin American countries. Data drawn from Van Cott (2000: 266-267).

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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
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<td>In indigenous territories</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECUADOR</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>In indigenous territories</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Gov’t commitment pursuant to 1996 San Andres Accord, but no action has yet been taken.</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Unclear what will result from 1996 Accords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>In indigenous territories</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
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CONAIE in the 21st Century:

Although CONAIE achieved few concrete guarantees from the constitutional reform efforts to implement ILO 169. This may be taken as further evidence of the Ecuadorian government attempting to circumvent its obligations under ILO 169.
process and not all of the rights listed in Table 2 have been fully respected all of the time, CONAIE has still proven capable of influencing politicians and policy in the post-reform era.

The most dramatic example of this came on 21 January 2001 when CONAIE, in coordination with the Ecuadorian military, seized Congress, overthrew the elected President (Jamil Mahuad) and installed the triumvirate of military general Lucio Gutiérrez, former supreme court judge Carlos Solórzano, and CONAIE President Antonio Vargas in power (Collins 2001: 40). However, the following day Gutiérrez, under pressure to return Ecuador to democratic rule, stepped down and by the end of the day Vice President Gustavo Noboa was elevated to the presidency. An interesting note is that the general public was generally supportive of the coup (64 percent approved of the takeover) but were in favor of a return to democratic rule (79 percent said they were in favor of maintaining the constitutional order) (Collins 2000: 46). This can be taken to indicate either the fickleness of the Ecuadorian polity or, on the other hand, the ability of said polity to separate the Mahuad government from the normal functioning of democratic governance. One did not have to support or oppose both. My interpretation is the latter, that Ecuadorians by and large saw the brief interruption of constitutional government as necessary in order to keep constitutional government from degenerating into a guise for authoritarian rule.

However, a disturbing trend was perhaps set in motion during the January uprising. While indigenous peoples have taken to the streets many times in Ecuador’s recent history the protests have been almost exclusively peaceful. In contrast, the January 2001 uprising was tainted by violence both by those supporting the Mahuad government and by those seeking to overthrow the regime (Beck and Mijeski 2001: 4). As stated in Chapter Two, nonviolence is an important tool for social movements in improving the quality of democracy. When a government cannot expect protests to be nonviolent, then repression becomes a much greater possibility.

While there have been no further outbreaks of violence, it remains to be seen whether CONAIE can reestablish its reputation for nonviolent protest or whether, after having tasted the success of overthrowing one government, will be tempted to resort to violent tactics in the future. Democracy in Ecuador may very well hang in the balance.

Conclusion:

In this chapter I have examined the development of the indigenous movement in Ecuador from its roots in the 1940s through the overthrow of the Mahuad government in 2001. During
this time the movement has coalesced around CONAIE, the recognized leader of a national indigenous movement. CONAIE itself has undergone many changes as it adapts to the ever-changing terrain of Ecuadorian politics and society. Recently, over the past ten years CONAIE has gone from a fiercely independent movement of indigenous peoples that shunned alliances with parties or other movements and participation in electoral politics to a movement that frequently forms coalitions to forward its goals and has spawned an indigenous political party that has competed successfully in electoral politics.

In the next chapter I will analyze the events sketched in this chapter within the framework laid out in Chapter Two of how social movements can impact democracy. We will see how CONAIE has had both beneficial and deleterious effects on the democratization process in Ecuador. In addition we will see how CONAIE has positioned itself to affect political developments in Ecuador in the future.
Chapter 4

In Chapter Two I detailed the processes through which indigenous social movements can impact the democratization process and Chapter Three examined the historical evolution of the indigenous movement in Ecuador. In Chapter Four I attempt to fuse these two together to show how the indigenous movement in Ecuador is impacting the process of democratization in that country. I intend to argue that, as a result of diverse and multi-level modes of organization and mobilization, the indigenous movement in Ecuador is, in general, a positive force in the struggle for democratization. This does not mean that the indigenous movement is an unmitigated blessing for those seeking to improve the quality of Ecuadorian democracy. In this Chapter I will examine both the positive and negative effects the indigenous movement has had on democratization. My analysis will be based on the analytical framework, developed in Chapter Two, of how social movements impact democratization. Chapter Two laid out seven main ways that the indigenous movement could impact democratization. This typology is based on a careful review of the literature concerning social movements and democratization and my own observations of the behavior of the indigenous movement in Ecuador. I have identified seven strategies that indigenous social movements utilize to impact democracy in Ecuador, which are:

1. Expanding participation.
2. Broadening the movement beyond just indigenous peoples.
3. Forming strategic international alliances.
4. Not privileging economic demands over political and cultural demands.
5. Establishing and/or maintaining movement autonomy.
7. Democratizing the political culture.

This chapter systematically evaluates the effect of Ecuador’s indigenous movement on these seven realms of democratization.

Before examining the role of the indigenous movement in the democratization process it is important to briefly describe the agenda that CONAIE and Pachakutik are seeking to implement. The indigenous movement seeks autonomy and control over indigenous land, education, and government (Collins 2001: 2). Andolina (1998: 2) argues that, in the run-up to the Constitutional Assembly in 1998 the main aspects of the indigenous agenda were, “plurinationalism, participatory democracy, decentralization, human rights (of all kinds),
alternative development, and ending corruption.” Looking back at previous CONAIE documents these demands seem to have changed very little since the 1980s (CONAIE 1988, 1994; Andolina 1998). These demands are broad enough to garner broad consensus amongst movement members and yet remain flexible on specific policy demands.

As the following analysis will demonstrate, Ecuador’s indigenous movement has generally been a positive force for democratization because the movement is comprehensive. Many movements have limited themselves to only certain forms of activity, either by choice or by necessity. Indeed, CONAIE has behaved in this manner at times, forsaking electoral politics for protest activity. However, CONAIE has progressively evolved into a comprehensive movement that can act both locally and nationally, through protest, proposal, and electoral politics, from within and outside the state, and can draw on both new and old social movement structures and strategies.

Expanding Participation:

My first argument for how the indigenous movement is contributing to Ecuador's democratization is that it is increasing participation in local and national politics for previously excluded sectors of the population. Both CONAIE, as a primarily (though certainly not exclusively) protest-oriented organization, and Pachakutik, an electoral vehicle, have expanded the number of voices being heard and considered in political debates in Ecuador (see Table 4 for the number of seats won by Pachakutik in elections since 1996).

This increased participation is crucial to democracy because, as Selverston-Scher (2001: 25) argues, "inclusive political action expands a governments legitimacy and strengthens the institutional decision-making processes necessary for a participatory democratic system."
Table 4: Performance of Pachakutik in local and national elections from 1996 to 2000 (Data drawn from Van Cott 2001: 30-31).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Won 8 of 82 seats (4th largest bloc in Congress.)</td>
<td>Won 7 of 70 seats (3rd largest bloc) and 3 on allied lists.</td>
<td>Won 8 of 121 seats.</td>
<td>Won 5 of 22 prefectures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Won 68 seats in local elections (Won 70% of races it entered). | | Elected first indigenous leader as provincial prefect. | Won 60% of seats nationwide on parish advisory councils.

As noted in Chapter Three there is often a trade-off between participation and governability. In the case of Ecuador the perceived danger is that opening up the political system to new actors will complicate the already convoluted decision-making process and could eventually lead to institutional collapse as the governing process is paralyzed by too many competing voices. CONAIE has responded to this charge of encouraging ungovernability by arguing that the solution is not in continued exclusion but rather in modifying the institutions of government so that they can accommodate competing voices.

Another argument that increasing participation does not necessarily contribute to ungovernability is that a strong indigenous movement contributes to the strengthening of civil society and, thus, democracy. There may still be tension in the short term as government institutions learn to accommodate increased levels of participation but, in the long run, by demanding equal political participation and holding the government accountable to them as citizens, the indigenous movement is helping to build a strong civil society which can help mitigate the participation-governability dilemma (Selverston-Scher 2001: 4).

There are several examples of how the indigenous movement in Ecuador has increased political participation, both for indigenous peoples and other underrepresented groups. Even before the 1990 uprising indigenous peoples had demanded participation in naming of the directors of bilingual, bicultural education programs. While President Borja adamantly opposed

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19 Ecuador is divided into 22 prefects which are analogous to (very small) states in the US system.
sacrificing what was then his prerogative to name these directors, he eventually supported the measure so as not to offend the increasingly powerful and well-organized indigenous movement (Selverston 1994: 146). In this situation indigenous peoples were not only able to increase their participation in a particular sector of government but also created space and precedent for future activities of the indigenous movement.

As mentioned earlier, the 1990 uprising was crucial in establishing the indigenous movement as a powerful force in Ecuadorian politics. In the aftermath of the uprising Ecuador's president was forced to negotiate directly with indigenous citizens. Previously, indigenous interests were usually represented at the national level by a state-appointed representative of the indigenous communities. As a result of their direct participation and consultation with the President, CONAIE was able to secure land concessions from the government. Equally important, the indigenous movement established a political base so that ethnic protest in the following years was able to produce clear changes in state policy (Brysk 2000b: 155). Brysk goes on to note that CONAIE is now regularly consulted by the government on policies that affect indigenous peoples. In short, indigenous peoples are no longer considered outside protesters to be ignored (or repressed when necessary) but rather are active political players in national government (Brysk 2000b: 255).

Aside from creating space for indigenous participation in national politics, the indigenous movement has been largely successful in creating space for participation by other un(der)represented groups. For example, the political party Pachakutik has been seen as a vehicle for participation for indigenous and non-indigenous alike (Beck and Mijeski 2001: 7). Beck and Mijeski (2001: 7-8) also argue that "the success of Pachakutik in 1996 may be linked to (a) central feature of Ecuadorian politics in that the 'outsider' and 'non-politician' status of their candidates appeal to many dissatisfied citizens, all of whom are required to vote." Therefore, Pachakutik can be said to increase participation not just for indigenous peoples but also for those who are disaffected by and do not feel represented by the traditional political parties.

Despite the many advances in the area of participation, it would be misleading not to note some of the shortcomings of the indigenous movement in this regard. Indigenous participation in national politics has at times been manipulated by politicians and parties for their own gain. For

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20 Parishes are sub-prefect level governing entities, somewhat analogous to county or local governments in the US system.
example, during the mid-1990s, President Sixto Durán Ballén repeatedly acknowledged the importance of indigenous participation but also took direct steps to undermine the movement, such as granting strategic concessions in hope of co-opting, or at least neutralizing, the indigenous movement and winning the indigenous vote while making minimal concessions (Selverston 1994: 146).

Also, despite the increasing clout of indigenous politicians (or perhaps as a direct result of it), indigenous leaders have not always been above the Ecuadorian traditions of personalistic, populist campaigns which raise expectations that they cannot possibly fulfill (Beck and Mijeski 2001: 7). For example, Ecuadorian TV personality Freddy Ehlers headed the Pachakutik list in both the 1996 and 1998 but seemed intent on bending the indigenous movement to serve his own personal political goals (Beck and Mijeski 2001: 8). Former CONAIE President Luis Macas has also been accused of seeking to dominate the indigenous movement and use it as a tool to forward his own ambitions (Beck and Mijeski 2001: 8). In this regard, indigenous participation does not serve any meaningful end since indigenous politicians at times behave no differently than the more traditional political actors. It should be noted that, although there are no data available on this issue, personalistic politics seems to be much less of a problem in indigenous communities than in the traditional political parties despite the two examples given above. The behavior of Ehlers and Macas is noteworthy in this case because it is rare in the indigenous movement while it is omnipresent in traditional Ecuadorian politics.

In sum, I contend that the net effect of the indigenous movement on political participation has been positive. There are still many areas where indigenous peoples are largely excluded (economic policymaking in particular) and increased participation is not without its drawbacks (the threat of decreased governability); still, increased participation does not look set to upset the fundamental, quasi-democratic institutions of the Ecuadorian government to the point of a return to direct authoritarian rule.

**Broadening the Movement:**

Perhaps the most significant success of CONAIE in terms of forwarding democracy has been its ability to broaden the indigenous movement in various ways to be more inclusive of both indigenous and non-indigenous actors. As I discussed above, participation is crucial to democracy at the national level. Brysk (2000a) argues that the same is true at the level of the
movement. By continually broadening the movement to include new voices and ideas, the movement itself becomes more democratic and becomes a stronger force for democratizing the country as a whole.

The organizational process by which CONAIE was formed is indicative of the broadening of the movement (CONAIE 1988). Organizations from the sierra, the Amazon, and the coast joined forces to contest state policies and practices that threatened their existence as indigenous peoples. The multiple indigenous uprisings also demonstrate the ability of the indigenous movement to broaden its horizons. Every large demonstration, march, or uprising has drawn significant support from non-indigenous sectors of the population, demonstrating the appeal of indigenous-supported policies within the population at-large (Brysk 2000b: 156).

Additionally, by discarding their non-electoral policy, CONAIE has further broadened the scope of the movement. CONAIE changed its policy on electoral participation when the ban on independent candidates and electoral alliances was repealed in 1995 (Van Cott 2001: 28). After the repeal individuals and organizations were allowed to run in any province in which they could register supporters greater than 1.5 percent of the registered voters (Van Cott 2001: 28). Therefore, indigenous peoples are no longer limited to mass protest as the only way of having their voices heard. They now have representatives in Congress and a political party (Pachakutik) with an explicit indigenous agenda (Brysk 2000b: 298). See Table 4 earlier in this chapter for more details of Pachakutik’s representation in various governing bodies.

Beyond the indigenous movement, other social movements have benefited from the broad nature of Ecuador's indigenous movement. Protests against government policies (usually related to neoliberal economic reforms) have generally been unsuccessful without indigenous participation (Selverston 1994: 132). Although there are clearly other movements (workers, womens, environmental, etc.) that can contribute in their own way to democratization, without the participation of the indigenous movement protests and strikes seem to lack legitimacy and are easily ignored/repressed by the Ecuadorian government. Beck and Mijeski (2001: 4-5) also note the importance of broadening the movement beyond just indigenous peoples. In their analysis of CONAIE and the emergence of Pachakutik, they point to the development of the CMS (Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales- Social Movement Coordinator), a conglomeration of labor, environmental, indigenous, and anti-poverty movements, as a key factor both in achieving the goals of these movements and legitimizing civil society actors in the national political arena.
Similarly, Robert Andolina (1998: 18) contends that the presence of CONAIE went a long way towards legitimizing the 1997 alternative constituent assembly that challenged the hegemony of political parties and other traditional political actors. In this way CONAIE and other social movements are not only creating a broad based alliance capable of contesting the current regime’s legitimacy and policies, but they also are increasing the possibilities for participation by delegitimizing the exclusivity of the state and those organizations (such as political parties) that have historically tended to restrict participation (Andolina 1998).

There is still much work to be done in terms of broadening the indigenous movement. In particular CONAIE and Pachakutik have had trouble breaking through the traditional political parties of the Ecuadorian coast, the PSC (Partido Socialcristiano- Social Christian Party) and the PRE (Partido Roldocista Ecuatoriano- Ecuadorian Roldocista Party), to extend their movement to this highly populated region of the country (Beck and Mijeski 2001: 13). In order to become a truly national force the indigenous movement must be able to exert at least some presence in this area. However, due to the small and generally assimilated indigenous populations in this area, it will be difficult for CONAIE and/or Pachakutik to do this without sacrificing part of its indigenous agenda.

**Building Strategic International Alliances:**

In addition to building a broad and inclusive movement domestically, in this globalized era it is helpful for the indigenous movement to establish international alliances with NGOs and other like-minded movements that can supply the resources that the indigenous movement in Ecuador lacks. These transnational ties can also be useful for exerting pressure on the Ecuadorian government to democratize its political and economic institutions. In the context of Latin American indigenous movements Alison Brysk (1996: 43) argues that, "transnational social movement mobilization is…an appropriate response to increasingly transnational social problems, from development projects sponsored by multinational corporations and multilateral development banks to increasing cultural penetration by mission groups." Not only are transnational movements an appropriate response they also are one of the few viable means by
which indigenous people can contest the anti-democratic nature of the exclusionary (and many would argue non-existent) nation-state.\footnote{See Brysk (1996) for a more detailed analysis of how international activity is a more productive and economical means of organizing political action for indigenous peoples than domestic political activity.}

International linkages can both help indigenous movements achieve their goals and also further the democratization process. Indigenous peoples in Ecuador have been quite successful in linking their movement's goals to those of international organizations concerned with more "marketable" issues like human rights and the environment (Brysk 2000b). In particular the environmental movement has been particularly useful by providing resources to indigenous organizations fighting to stop oil exploration and environmental degradation in the Amazonian region and in recuperating indigenous lands in environmentally sensitive areas (Selverston 1994: 137).

With regards to democratization, international organizations such as the OAS, the UN, and the ILO have been more hospitable to hearing the claims of indigenous peoples than have domestic institutions. Additionally, international norms and pressure from international institutions have undoubtedly prevented Ecuadorian police from taking a harder line on indigenous uprisings. For example, during the 1992 uprising Ecuadorian police monitored the demonstrations but did not attempt to intervene and, when the contingent arrived in Quito, the mayor allowed the demonstrators to camp in the central park near the capitol while indigenous leaders negotiated their demands with the president (Brysk 2000b: 156). Another example of the effect of international pressure on the democratization of Ecuadorian politics occurred during the Durán-Ballén administration. Durán-Ballén was preparing to declare a state of emergency and call out the armed forces in response to the 1994 indigenous uprising. However, when CONAIE held direct discussions with the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank and invited the OAS Human Rights Commission and Rigoberta Menchú's \textit{Iniciativa Indígena por la Paz} (Indigenous Initiative for Peace), the government became much more amenable to negotiation and dropped its attempt to declare a state of emergency (Brysk 2000b: 157).

Like the other factors examined so far in this chapter, international alliances are not solely a positive force for democratization. By participating in these alliances the indigenous movement has opened itself up to accusations by sectors opposed to their goals that the movement has been co-opted by outside organizations and that these organizations are a threat to
Ecuadorian sovereignty. While there is no evidence that indigenous movements have been co-opted or that Ecuadorian sovereignty has been threatened, the fact that the charges have been made has, in some cases, harmed the credibility of the indigenous movement and inhibited its ability to influence government policy.

**Pursuing Both Political and Economic Demands:**

When interviewed about the reasons for their participation in the 1990 uprising, indigenous peoples responded with a variety of answers such as: “we want to be treated with respect”; “we demand equality”; “we demand the same attention that mestizos are given by the government”; and “so they will begin to listen to us (Selverston-Scher 2001: 60).” This indicates that political, social, and cultural demands are at the forefront of the indigenous movement. As argued in Chapter Two, this is crucial for democratization, as movements that focus exclusively on economic demands are much more easily co-opted or deactivated by economic concessions from the government. A movement that demands changes in the way the political game is played stands a much greater chance of having a positive influence on democracy. Still, while the quotes above emphasize the importance of non-economic demands, I will show later how economic demands are an important component of the indigenous movement in Ecuador.

Melina Selverston (1994; 2001) has argued repeatedly that the indigenous movement in Ecuador has opened political space by making cultural demands on the political system. In particular she emphasizes the role of bilingual education programs in creating an organizational base from which the movement could enter the national political arena (Selverston 1994: 131). In a later work she argues that:

> the organization (CONAIE) has both immediate and long-term goals. The most immediate objective remains the resolution of land conflicts in the Highlands and territorial disputes in the Amazon. At the same time, more far-reaching political goals have emerged, such as the controversial demand to reform the Constitution and recognize Ecuador as a ‘plurinational state’ (Selverston-Scher 2001: 39).

The demands voiced by CONAIE during the 1994 uprising are representative of indigenous demands on the government. Their demands went beyond the economic catalyst of the uprising (which was staged in protest of government-backed neoliberal economic policies) to include calling for a moratorium on Amazon oil concessions, a national Constituent Assembly, and increases in bilingual education (Brysk 2000: 156).
These demands demonstrate how CONAIE is challenging the boundaries of “the political.” While challenging economic policies and the overall economic situation of indigenous peoples, CONAIE has also stressed non-economic demands for participation, autonomy, and recognition of indigenous peoples as culturally distinct. By doing this they are challenging the essentially modernizing policies of the state and expanding the realm of issues considered to be within the realm of political debate.

While there is ample evidence that political and cultural demands are an integral part of the indigenous movement’s political platform, there is certainly some tension internal to the movement with regards to the lack of material gains achieved over the past two decades. Selverston-Scher (2001: 71) states that, “strategic moves by CONAIE may be focused more on gaining political access than on meeting the material needs of the indigenous communities; this could become a structural weakness and could lead to diminishing popular support for the movement over time.” Therefore, while the movement’s significant concern with political and cultural issues is working to democratize Ecuadorian politics, it is less certain whether the movement will be able to maintain its high level of support unless it can begin to deliver greater economic benefits. The challenge for CONAIE is to secure economic benefits for indigenous communities without allowing itself to be co-opted by the government or other organization. However, by satisfying some of the material demands of indigenous peoples the movement may run the risk of neutralizing the militancy of its supporters or transforming CONAIE from an indigenous social movement organization to an corporatist interest group pressing the government for economic concessions.

**Maintaining Movement Autonomy:**

Autonomy from other movements and from political parties has traditionally been a top priority of CONAIE. Until the founding of Pachakutik in 1995 CONAIE members were prohibited from running for elected office and CONAIE did not officially endorse candidates for public office. The founding of Pachakutik has simultaneously strengthened and weakened this tradition of autonomy. Pachakutik has strengthened the autonomy of the indigenous movement by allowing indigenous leaders to run for office without withdrawing from CONAIE and
affiliating with a political party. Thus, the indigenous movement has more control over the political fortunes of its members and has made it more difficult for other (non-indigenous) parties to co-opt the indigenous agenda for electoral purposes.

On the other hand, CONAIE has begun to form partnerships with other organizations (primarily other social movements) in order to confront government policies that it opposes. The CMS, for example, has operated since the late 1990s as a coordinating body for Ecuadorian social movements. While the CMS has been somewhat successful in achieving concrete gains for its member organizations, it is unclear what effect this conglomeration of social movements will have on the democratization process.

Another danger of the indigenous movement participating in electoral politics is the possibility of the movement evolving from oppositional civil society actor to incorporated (but still largely marginalized) player in state politics. When discussing democracy, the trade-off between the loss of a strong civil society actor and a weak participant in state policy must be taken into account (Dryzek 1996). If CONAIE can maintain both aspects as it is currently attempting to do, then there is every reason to believe that the movement is making a valuable contribution to democracy. If the social movement becomes subordinated to the political party then the impact on democratization will become more difficult to ascertain.

The indigenous movement is clearly in a period of transition as it attempts to incorporate the dual roles of social movement and political party. If autonomy is not a casualty of this transition, then the movement can have a positive impact on democracy. The next few years will be crucial in deciding what shape this transition will take.

**Concrete Proposals for Change:**

As shown in Chapter Two movements with concrete and coherent programmatic agendas are more likely to have a positive effect on the quality of democracy so long as these agendas reflect democratic ideals. In the case of CONAIE, the movement has a quite coherent (if somewhat idealistic) political program and has made strategic, if not always successful, steps toward trying to see its program implemented. In short, CONAIE has become an important force

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22 Among these demands are of legal recognition of Ecuador as a plurinational state, participation and consultation in granting land concessions for oil exploration and extraction, increased funding for bilingual, bicultural education, and representation for social movements in lawmakers bodies (CONAIE 1994).
in setting the government agenda, a significant change from times when indigenous people were
at the whim of white or mestizo politicians for getting their priorities heard in Congress and/or
by the President.

CONAIE has made both broad proposals for overhauling the Ecuadorian political system
and specific proposals on certain policy issues. For example, in 1997 CONAIE led a campaign
against the privatization of the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute (IESS). Instead of simply
objecting to the planned privatization, CONAIE advocated a series of possible reforms that fell
short of full privatization and would improve the inefficient service of the IESS (Andolina 1998:
7). CONAIE’s campaign slogan, "modernization yes, privatization no," enabled the movement to
decouple social security reform from the wave of privatizations occurring in Ecuador.

In broader ideological terms CONAIE has also proposed changes to the current
(neo)liberal democratic discourse. As an alternative, CONAIE espouses what they call
participatory democracy. This model of democracy involves a pluralistic “logic of difference”
whereby citizenship is not only individually based but also group based (Andolina 1998: 13).
CONAIE’s proposal challenges, but does not completely reject, liberal, majoritarian democracy.
According to Robert Andolina (1998: 25-26) CONAIE’s plan:

- challenges and displaces it (liberal, majoritarian democracy) by inserting
  vigilance institutions to oversee and if necessary remove elected officials. In
  addition, it includes a functional representation logic that ensures that a plurality
  of group identities are represented in planning and decision-making bodies at all
  levels of government, with the hope that consensus would be generated among
  social groups by this diversity and mixed representational logic.

CONAIE has also called regularly for indigenous peoples to be able to elect their own
representatives to the National Congress and demanded the same for the National Constituent
Assembly (Andolina 1998: 13).

Additionally, where mayors associated with Pachakutik have been elected, participatory
“People’s Assemblies” have been established to implement this participatory model of
democracy favored by CONAIE. The indigenous movement has viewed these experiments as
highly successful models of alternative democracy.

Whether we consider the participatory model of democracy more or less democratic than
the representative model is a matter of personal preference. However, I contend that the simple

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existence of an alternative form of democracy expands the realm of the political and allows new voices to be heard that are often shut out of the traditional representative institutions. Thus, regardless of whether these alternative governments led by Pachakutik are ever “successful” by whatever yardstick we choose to measure them by, the indigenous movement has seriously called into question the legitimacy of the current institutions of Ecuadorian democracy. And by putting forward concrete proposals for reforming and/or abolishing these institutions the indigenous movement has positioned itself to make a valuable contribution to the democratization of Ecuador.

**Democratizing Political Culture:**

This final category of how the indigenous movement can contribute to democratization also has arguably the most long-term potential for producing meaningful reforms in the Ecuadorian political system. While reconfiguring institutions may or may not contribute to an improved democracy, educating the population about values amenable to democracy is perhaps the surest way to produce a democratic outcome. Unfortunately, this is the area where there is the least amount of evidence that the indigenous movement is having a significant impact, although the movement has certainly fostered a certain degree of tolerance, understanding, and respect for indigenous peoples (Brysk 2000: 258).

On the positive side, through its actions in the Alternative Constituent Assembly it has demonstrated how its alternative vision of democracy (discussed in the previous section) can be effective, although it is important to keep in mind that this assembly had more symbolic value than real authority. Had the assembly had more official standing, it is quite likely that the traditional political actors would have played a greater role and the outcomes of the assembly would have been significantly different.

On the negative side, Pachakutik, CONAIE, and its affiliated organizations have not proven immune to the common Ecuadorian (and Latin American more generally) phenomenon of personalistic politics. For example, in the most recent presidential elections (1995 and 1999) Pachakutik has supported the candidacy of TV personality Freddy Ehlers who eventually split from Pachakutik to form his own political party *Ciudadanos de Nuevo País* which seems to emulate more and more the personalistic traditions of Ecuadorian politics (Beck and Mijeski

See also Brysk (2000): 154 for a list of CONAIE’s 16 demands during the 1994 uprising.
Other leaders of the indigenous movement (Luis Macas in particular) have at times shown more brightly as individuals than as representatives of the indigenous movement.

The most important way that CONAIE has retarded the growth of a democratic political culture in Ecuador has been through its participation in the January 2000 coup. While many members and sympathizers of the indigenous movement have justified the coup in terms of “destroying democracy to save it”, Beck and Mijeski (2001: 12) argue that:

if the attempted coup had been carried out by factions of the military in alliance with groups wishing to disband Congress so that the government’s plans for privatization and dollarization could be advanced without the encumbrance of parliamentary procedures, it is surely the case that spokespersons for the indigenous movement would have condemned the coup for its anti-democratic action.

Therefore, while the coup may indeed turn out to benefit Ecuadorian democracy in the long run, it did little to inspire the valuation of democracy within Ecuadorian society or place CONAIE in a position to act as a credible defender of democracy. This demonstrates an inconsistency in the indigenous movement as it rhetorically stresses democracy while taking actions that are at best problematic for the consolidation of democracy in Ecuador.

**Conclusion:**

In this chapter I have analyzed how the indigenous movement in Ecuador has impacted the democratization process in that country. The results are mixed though favoring the view of the indigenous movement as a force for deepening democracy. However, we must view this conclusion with some caution as there are some clear anti-democratic tendencies in the movement. Among the most serious of these concerns are the participation by CONAIE in the 2000 coup that overthrow an elected president, increasing personalism within the movement, the failure of the movement to gain any substantial support from the coastal region (the most populous region of the country), and the tension between the electoral and social movement branches of the movement.

In the closing chapter I will summarize all these findings and fit them into the framework of how a comprehensive social movement can improve the prospects of fragile democracies. I will also evaluate the contribution of my own research presented here to the larger theoretical
literature on indigenous movements and point out some of the most promising avenues for future research in the area of indigenous social movements in Latin America.
Chapter 5

In chapters One through Four I have demonstrated how the indigenous movement in Ecuador has enhanced democratizing trends in that country by challenging the hegemony of the traditional economic and political elite. In this closing chapter I will discuss the theoretical implications of my research focusing on two specific issues. First, I will discuss the importance of social movements being comprehensive in nature instead of narrowly focused. Second, I will elaborate on the relationship between resource mobilization and new social movements theories and show how these two can be seen as compatible instead of competing interpretations of social movement behavior. To conclude this thesis I will discuss some of the ongoing issues in this discussion and suggest possible avenues for further investigation, focusing particularly on the tension between democratic participation and governability.

The Indigenous Movement as a Comprehensive Social Movement:

The indigenous movement in Ecuador is what I have termed a comprehensive social movement. Comprehensive movements are those that can contest state structures and policies from above (internationally) and below (locally, as a grassroots movement), from inside (as a participant in political institutions) and outside (as a protest organization), across cultural lines, and using strategies associated with both old and new social movements. Ecuador’s indigenous movement is comprehensive because it is not limited to a single activity or range of activities. Instead, the movement has diversified to include various types of collective action. This is important since different situations may call for different forms of collective activity. For example, a protest-oriented movement is ill equipped to contest national or local elections. Conversely, Pachakutik, as a political party and a player in national political institutions, would be unlikely to overly-criticize the institutional makeup of the government since it is a part of these institutions and the fortunes of the party hinge in part on the fortunes of the institutions in which it participates.

For these reasons I argue that a comprehensive movement is the type of movement best suited to deepening democracy through a process of contesting democratic hegemony. As demonstrated by the case studied here, such a movement is particularly apt at increasing participation and improving government accountability, two crucial aspects of democratization.
CONAIE and its affiliated organization have in many regards been successful in decolonizing democracy by giving a traditionally excluded sector of the population a voice in the political process. In Ecuador, the indigenous movement has been effective in attracting international support and having international pressure put on the government to accommodate, or at least negotiate, many of the movement’s demands (Brysk 1996; 2000b). At the same time, CONAIE has been able, through its affiliated regional organizations, to pressure the regime through protests while Pachakutik has won control of local government in several indigenous-dominated areas and implemented new governing structures such as the People’s Assemblies which are based on a more participatory model of democracy. In addition, the indigenous movement has crafted an ideological platform with concrete proposals for reforming government policies and institutions. These proposals have seriously challenged the legitimacy of the current regime and forced the government to respond, usually through negotiations, to the demands of indigenous peoples. Thus, through its activities at the local, national, and international level the indigenous movement in Ecuador has expanded participation in government while holding the government accountable for its policies. Thus, my assertion that CONAIE is effectively challenging the hegemony of the dominant sectors of Ecuadorian society.

In addition to being able to act internationally as well as locally, Ecuador’s indigenous movement also is capable of pursuing its agenda either from within the state apparatus or from outside the state. Again, this ability to act simultaneously in multiple arenas increases the ability of the indigenous movement to demand increased participation and accountability from the government. While CONAIE is blocking roads, marching in Quito, or organizing the next indigenous uprising, Pachakutik representatives are walking the halls of Congress, voting on important pieces of legislation, and preparing for the next round of elections. Because of this, it is virtually impossible for the government to ignore or bypass the indigenous movement in making policy decisions. While decisions are frequently made which are detrimental to the interests of indigenous peoples, it is increasingly difficult for these decisions to be made without indigenous voices being heard. For indigenous peoples this is one of the unfortunate realities of life as an ethnic minority under a procedurally democratic regime- participating does not always mean winning. However, this merely lends credence to my thesis that Ecuador’s indigenous movement is generally an asset in the process of democratization. While indigenous people certainly protest their defeats and occasionally take to the streets, the movement generally
accepts the eventual outcome of the governmental process (with the glaring exception of the 2000 indigenous-military coup). In this way the movement is contributing to the creation and growth of a democratic political culture.

The indigenous movement has also been largely successful in attracting support across cultural lines. While CONAIE and Pachakutik are dedicated to forwarding an explicitly indigenous agenda, they have gained broad support from non-indigenous sectors as an alternative to corrupt government agents and political parties (Brysk 2000b: 298). In addition, through the CMS the indigenous movement has been able to join forces with other, non-indigenous social movements. Appealing to international organizations, primarily in the United States and Europe, is another way that the indigenous movement works across cultural lines.

The final way that Ecuador’s indigenous movement comprises a comprehensive movement is by blending the structures and strategies of both old and new social movements. While not aiming to take state power, the indigenous movement approximates an old social movement in its struggle over the provision of basic needs and resources and its focus on the enduring social and political structures left over from the colonial period. To the extent that the indigenous movement has crossed over to recruit support from non-indigenous sectors of the population it has done so largely along class lines (Brysk 2000b) and some of CONAIE and Pachakutik’s rhetoric is inclined towards a revolutionary (though peaceful) change in the existing social and political structures (Andolina 1998). However, in many regards the indigenous movement is representative of a new social movement in that the movement is built around indigenous identity and aims at transforming existing structures of domination and exclusion. The actions of CONAIE within the CMS and at the 1997 Alternative Constitutional Assembly demonstrate its commitment to a multiplicity of voices and actors instead of viewing the state and society in strictly dichotomous class terms (Andolina 1999). Additionally, by focusing on contesting the meaning of terms like “nation” and “democracy” the indigenous movement has attempted to contest the hegemony of the dominant state discourse, a key aspect of new social movements (Foweraker 1995).

CONAIE and Pachakutik also are representative of both new and old social movements respectively. CONAIE, mobilized around ethnic identity and focused on achieving autonomous spaces for the exercise of indigenous authority, can be viewed as a new social movement while Pachakutik, struggling within the governmental framework to achieve political representation
and eventually control of the organs of state power, looks more like an old social movement. Taken as a whole these two organizations form a comprehensive movement. By employing both strategies the indigenous movement is more effective in achieving its own goals while at the same time increasing the prospects of improved democracy by repeatedly demanding responsiveness and accountability from the government.

**Theoretical Implications:**

The two dominant contemporary schools of thought concerning social movements are resource mobilization and new social movements (NSM) theory. I discussed the basic tenets of these theories in Chapter One but wish here to demonstrate how, particularly in the case of Ecuador’s indigenous movement, the two theories are quite reconcilable. In the case under study the strengths of resource mobilization can fill in the gaps left in an NSM perspective and vice versa.

Klandermans and Tarrow have succinctly identified the limitations of a reliance on either of these two theoretical approaches. They argue that:

Resource mobilization theory has been criticized for focusing too much on organization, politics, and resources while neglecting the structural precondition of movements—that is, for focusing too much on the ‘how’ of social movements and not enough on the ‘why.’…The new social movement approach has stimulated the opposite criticism. Some contend that it focuses in a reductionist way on the structural origins of strain and does not pay enough attention to the ‘how’ of mobilization (Klandermans and Tarrow 1988: 9).

Some scholars have argued for a fusion of these two theories that can provide an explanation for both the “how” and “why” of collective action. The Ecuadorian indigenous movement provides a good example of how the two theories can be made compatible. The key bridge between a resource mobilization approach and an NSM approach to explaining the emergence and success of Ecuador’s indigenous movement is to view ethnic identity not only as a source of shared discontent but also as a resource to be mobilized through collective action. In this sense identity can simultaneously explain both how and why social movements form and succeed or fail. Therefore, based on my research I contend that resource mobilization and NSM theory should not be viewed as competing schools of thought but rather as complimentary in that one (resource mobilization) can explain the economistic, rational side of social movement activity while the
other (NSM) is more capable of explaining the source of collective action and its more expressive components.

In understanding the relationship between social movements and democracy both sides of the equation are crucial as, for example, Ecuador’s indigenous movement has organized around ethnic identity to challenge the undemocratic aspects of the state and create the basis for an alternative democratic order. Neither resource mobilization nor NSM theory can fully explain this phenomenon. However, by viewing these two theories as complimentary we can gain a fuller understanding of the dynamics of the role social movements play in democratization.

**Unresolved Issues, New Questions, and Conclusions:**

The primary issue left unresolved in this thesis is the relationship between increasing participation and accountability on one hand and governability on the other. Critics of indigenous movements in various countries have criticized the movements on these grounds (Warren 1998). While I concur that increasing participation in fragile democratic systems is a recipe for ungovernability, it is difficult to pin responsibility for this ungovernability on those who have been perpetually excluded from participation in the political process. CONAIE has regularly made the point that if institutions cannot accommodate increased participation then the institutions should be reformed to be more amenable to inclusion and participation rather than continuing the exclusionary practices of the past (CONAIE 1994). For a government that has existed in a continuous state of instability and uncertainty, perhaps increasing participation could be the solution to ungovernability instead of its cause. Increasing participation could increase the legitimacy of the regime, thus decreasing the endemic strikes and protests in Ecuador and thereby creating a more governable situation. However, more work is needed in this area to be able to make these kinds of claims with more confidence. More work is also needed in disaggregating the factors I discussed in Chapters Three and Four of how social movements can impact democratization. Are some factors more important than others? Are any of them in conflict with others? These and other questions must be answered to achieve a full understanding of the processes affecting democratization in Latin American and throughout the world.

Additionally, to be able to generalize these finding to states and regions outside Ecuador comparative research will be necessary. This research should focus on the linkages between civil society, social movements, and democracy. Another significant area for future study is the
mechanisms through which social movements can affect state legitimacy and, consequently, democratization. This study moves in that direction by examining the relationship between Ecuador’s indigenous movement, its contestation of the state’s legitimacy, and the ongoing process of democratization in that country.

In sum, this thesis has argued that an ethnically-based social movement can have a positive impact on democracy. The case of Ecuador is instructive in that it is usually considered a fragile or unconsolidated democracy (particularly after the 2000 coup) and the indigenous movement is unusually powerful by Latin American standards. The comprehensive nature of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement has enabled it to contest and expand the dominant conceptions of democracy, nation, and other debated concepts in addition to fighting for concrete economic gains such as land and limits on neoliberal economic reforms. Additionally, Ecuador’s indigenous movement has effectively challenged the hegemony of Ecuador’s political establishment therefore opening up spaces for increased participation and contestation by other excluded actors in the political system. Although it will take time for the full effects of the indigenous movement to be completely known and there will undoubtedly be setbacks along the way, both for the movement and for democracy, the research presented here supports the conclusion that Ecuadorian democracy will be deepened and strengthened by the presence of a strong, active indigenous movement.
APPENDIX A

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Coastal organizations affiliated with COICE:
FCA- Federación de Centros Awa
FCC- Federación de Centros Chachis
GT- Gobernación Tsáchí

Highland organizations affiliated with ECUARUNARI:
FCBB- Federación Campesina de Bolivár-Bolivarmanta
FRYH- Fundación Runacunapac Yachana Huasi
IECAB-BRUNARI- Runacunapac Riccharimui
INRUJTA-FICI- Imbabura Runacunapac Jatun Tantanacui
MIC- El Movimiento Indígena de Cotopaxi
MICH- Movimiento Indígena de Chimborazo
MIT- Movimiento Indígena de Tungurahua
OIS- Organización de Indígenas de Saraguro
PR- Pichincha Riccharimui
UCIC- Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de Calderón
UIS- Unión de Indígenas Salasacas
UNASAY- Unión de Campesinos de Azuay
UPCCC- Unión Provincial de Comunidades y Cooperativas del Cañar

Amazon organizations affiliated with CONFENAIE:
ACSS- Asociación de Centros Sionas-Secoyas
AIPSE- Asociación Independiente del Pueblo Shuar Ecuatoriano
FCS- Federación de Centros Shuar (Shuar Federation)
FCUNAE- Federación de Comunas Unión de Nativos de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana
FOIN- Federación de Organizaciones Indígenas del Napo
JCA- Jatun Comuna Aguarico
NA- Nacionalidad A’í
NH- Nacionalidad Huao
OPIP- Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza
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