Coordinating Humanitarian Assistance:
A Comparative Analysis of Three Cases

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Abstract

For many years the United Nations (UN) has sought to coordinate its numerous agencies and other humanitarian relief actors during responses to natural disasters and complex emergencies. Its success in this endeavor has been mixed. Through an analysis of three different humanitarian relief operations—the Rwanda genocide in 1994, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and the floods of 2000 in Mozambique—this paper describes more fully the conditions under which coordination efforts occur. Specifically, this essay argues that successful and effective coordination in each particular crisis depends on the extent to which certain capacity and contextual conditions were present. In addition, it suggests that the often-touted “coordination by command” approach, a top-down style of coordination, should not be assumed by the UN since, as the literature suggests, this notion is quite contentious among nongovernmental organizations and United Nations staff alike. This paper critiques the utility of pursuing this model and offers instead an alternative vision of a pragmatic facilitation role for UN agencies in humanitarian relief operations.
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeals Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Revolving Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMG</td>
<td>Emergency Management Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
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<td>GoM</td>
<td>Government of Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Information Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGC</td>
<td>National Institute for Disaster Management (translated from Portuguese)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLOC</td>
<td>United Nations Joint Logistics Operation Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAHT</td>
<td>United Nations Advanced Humanitarian Team</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNDRO</td>
<td>United Nations Office of Disaster Relief Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNREO</td>
<td>United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Each year humanitarian relief organizations respond to as few as 20 and as many as 50 crises caused by natural disasters or political conflict (Wood, et al 2001: 1). The number of agencies responding to each crisis varies greatly depending on the need. Regardless of whether the number of agencies is 40 or 400, the need for humanitarian relief organizations to coordinate their efforts is crucial. Benefits of coordination range from reducing activity duplication to allowing organizations to assist more people in need (Moore, et al. 2003), not to mention that donors increasingly require it (Sommers, 2000). That coordination is important is generally accepted and appreciated in the humanitarian aid field but how to accomplish it remains somewhat more elusive and problematic. This paper analyzes three humanitarian relief efforts in order to define more accurately the conditions under which coordination among relief agencies takes place.

Analytic Framework and Central Research Questions

Coordination is not a new buzzword in the field of humanitarian assistance. For over thirty years the United Nations (UN) has concerned itself with attempting to coordinate better the agencies within its system and, more recently, the numerous other actors that participate in humanitarian relief activities. For over a decade, reports specifically aimed at evaluating coordination efforts have flooded the relief literature. Only one such report, however, by Antonio Donini, has sought to provide an analytical taxonomy of forms of assistance coordination in humanitarian emergencies.

Donini authored the first evaluation of coordination efforts for the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (now the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Only months after the outbreak of genocide in Rwanda in 1994, Donini and Norah Niland conducted interviews with key people involved in coordination of the humanitarian response to that tragedy. In a summary of his findings, Donini offered a taxonomy consisting of three broad categories to describe the forms of coordination that he identified in his examination of the Rwanda relief effort. The first was “coordination by command” in which the agent has authority to pursue coordination through carrots or sticks and possesses strong leadership abilities (Donini and
Niland 1994: 13). “Coordination by consensus,” the second category, posits that in the absence of any direct assertion of authority, “leadership is essentially a function of the capacity to orchestrate a coherent response to mobilize the key actors around common objectives and priorities” (Ibid.). The third category, “coordination by default” described *ad hoc* coordination “in which a division of labor is generally the only exchange of information among actors” (Ibid.). These categories have not been developed further either by Donini or by other researchers beyond these very general descriptions. Indeed, according to Thomas Weiss of the Watson Institute, Donini’s typology should be considered “points on a spectrum” rather than “air-tight categories” (1997: 14).

In the ten years since the release of this report, the debate concerning which agencies or institutions should be responsible for humanitarian assistance coordination and how it should occur has not diminished. Nevertheless, new typologies have not surfaced and, as discussed below in the literature review, much of the discourse regarding coordination in humanitarian assistance supports the coordination by command approach, with the UN assuming the authoritative role. The command model assumes that top-down coordination, in which a central authority that also controls resources and information is the primary decision-maker, is the most desirable approach. However, as the literature also suggests, this very notion is quite contentious among nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and UN staff alike. Therefore, the question remains – is top-down coordination a realistic means to attain coordination in these complex conditions?

In an attempt to describe more fully the conditions under which humanitarian assistance coordination efforts occur, this paper analyzes three different humanitarian relief operations that emerged in response to:

1) The Rwanda genocide in 1994,
2) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and
3) The floods of 2000 in Mozambique.

This paper addresses the following questions through an exploration of how these three emergencies unfolded, the actors involved in each humanitarian response, and a description of their coordination efforts:

- Does Donini’s tripartite typology, command, consensus and default, capture the full sweep of the UN’s coordination efforts in humanitarian emergencies?
• Were there certain contextual conditions that needed to obtain for coordination to transpire?
• Did contextual conditions enable top down control to occur and to be effective?

Beyond the fact that these coordination efforts were undertaken in different ways, I chose these specific events for comparison for two reasons. First, it is significant for comparative purposes that an agency of the United Nations was active in each of these relief efforts. Two UN agencies played central coordination roles in Rwanda, one organization was the designated lead agency in Kosovo, and another United Nations body coordinated certain aspects of the response in Mozambique. This characteristic allows me to consider how the UN attempted to achieve coordination in various emergencies. If Donini’s three forms of coordination describe accurately how the relief efforts were coordinated in these crises, then his typology may provide a useful tool in understanding the humanitarian relief coordination process more broadly. Secondly, there is a fair amount of data concerning these events, allowing me to investigate the cases in some detail. I employ a methodological approach similar to Donini’s to examine the cases selected for exploration.

Methods

While I have not had an opportunity to interview relief workers, I do provide a document analysis and literature review concerning the events in Rwanda, Kosovo and Mozambique to determine the extent to which coordination was a viable option for key decision-makers. The primary sources of information for this study included United Nations documents and relevant scholarly literature, especially books, journal articles, and papers concerning the three cases.

For each case I briefly describe events leading up to the crisis and the main conditions requiring humanitarian intervention and aid, such as refugee outflows. In addition, I define the key players, and outline the coordination efforts undertaken by the principal relief organizations involved. I conclude my discussion of each crisis by highlighting the capacity and contextual conditions that both inhibit and promote the UN’s ability to coordinate the international community’s efforts. In my final section, I map both the capacity and contextual conditions that affected the UN’s capacity to coordinate the responses in all three cases and discuss the extent to which Donini’s tripartite typology provides an adequate explanation of the UN’s coordination efforts in humanitarian emergencies.
Key Findings

Credibility emerged as a recurring theme as I researched these three cases. I found several instances in which UN agencies failed to work together or with other NGOs and government representatives effectively. In one case cooperation faltered due to a lack of faith in the UN agency’s ability to provide the required services. In another the opposite was true—the United Nations displayed a remarkable aptitude to coordinate the activities of other relief organizations. Specific examples of both situations are outlined in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. At this point, however, it is important to address two types of conditions that may play an important part in establishing institutional credibility—capacity and contextual. In general, the UN can more easily control capacity conditions than contextual conditions, since the former are those that are internal to the UN system and the latter are those over which the international body has little authority or power. For instance, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) decides when and how many of that organization’s staff should be sent into a certain area. This is a capacity decision. However, UNHCR is not able to control the response of the refugees to that staff in any given situation, meaning the refugees make their own choice as to whether or not they will cooperate during food distribution or other service provision. This is a contextual condition.

My review of the literature concerning coordination attempts by UN agencies in Rwanda, Kosovo and Mozambique revealed the following prominent capacity issues as important or significant in establishing the institution’s ability to emerge as an effective coordinator of humanitarian response:

- Capacity to establish a “presence” in an emergency during the early stages, including an adequate number of staff in the field to carry implement activities;
- Staff at the level deemed appropriate for the political dimensions of the response, i.e. the availability of senior staff to negotiate with government officials if required;
- Knowledgeable, disciplined and personable staffer that are well trained and willing to work with staff from other organizations (e.g. NGOs, NATO troops, and others).
- Ability of staff to make decisions in the field rather than waiting to hear from headquarters;
- Quick access to or control over information gathering and dissemination; and
- Access to or control over funding resources.

Further assessment of these cases permitted me to analyze the contextual conditions that both inhibited and promoted the capacity of UN agencies to respond in an effective and coordinated
fashion to humanitarian emergencies. For instance, particularly in the case of the Kosovo crisis, I found that identifiable contextual issues often prevented the emergence of conditions that would conduce to Donini’s coordination types, particularly the frequently touted coordination by command category. In that emergency, UNHCR lacked adequate personnel, both in number and level of authority, to accommodate effectively the massive refugee influx pouring into the surrounding countries and to negotiate the political dimensions that resulted from that mass migration. Therefore, early in that crisis, UNHCR lost its credibility to act as lead agency responsible for coordination of the numerous NGOs and NATO troops providing humanitarian assistance.

Through an analysis of the capacity and contextual conditions apparent in each case that affected the perceived leadership credibility of various United Nations agencies in coordinating roles, I conclude by suggesting that the role of the UN humanitarian entities should be reframed. Rather than calling for an ever more authoritative role for the UN, I argue that its entities actually operate most often as pragmatic facilitators, tasked with marshalling resources, assessing needs, and mobilizing service providers toward common objectives.
Chapter 2: Review of Literature

In order to understand better coordination in humanitarian emergencies, it is important to explore the notion of coordination itself. The literature regarding coordination in humanitarian assistance primarily focuses, as might be expected, on evaluations of previous emergencies and the degree to which effective coordination was achieved in addressing them. Moreover, much of the literature on humanitarian assistance management pays particular attention to agencies within the United Nations system. Therefore, the major share of the discussion in this section is gleaned from reports commissioned by the UN about the UN. In addition, I review other independent reports, journal articles and books concerning coordination efforts in various humanitarian crises.

While the concept of coordination is much studied in the organization theory and business literatures, to name only two disciplines, I have narrowed the following analysis to include those sources that discuss coordination as it pertains to the provision of humanitarian assistance. The chapter is divided into the following sections:

- Definitions and general comments;
- History and description of UN coordination of humanitarian relief agencies;
- Factors and obstacles constraining the attainment of coordination;
- Command, consensus and default approaches to coordination;
- Relationships and social networks;
- Non-governmental organization approaches to improve aid.

Definition and General Comments

Many definitions of coordination have been provided in the humanitarian aid literature. Some broadly characterize it as “the orchestration of efforts of diverse organizations” (Seybolt 1997: 4) and “the orderly and organized direction of activities” (McEntire 1997: 223). The Humanitarianism and War Project offers a more specific and often cited definition of the concept as:

The systematic use of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include: (1) strategic planning; (2) gathering data and
managing information; (3) mobilizing resources and assuring accountability; (4)
orchestrating a functional division of labor in the field; (5) negotiating and maintaining a
serviceable framework with host political authorities; and (6) providing leadership (Minear
2002: 20).

Analysts and scholars also often suggest that coordination is important to improve service
delivery effectiveness. Indeed, while effectiveness is rarely defined, it is most often given as the
reason why achieving coordination among service providing agencies is important (Eliasson
framed as securing or improving organizational efficiency, is also frequently offered as a
rationale for why humanitarian organizations should seek to coordinate their assistance
operations (McEntire 1997).

Two kinds of emergencies generally require a large-scale international humanitarian relief
response. The first is a natural disaster, such as a flood or earthquake, described as “a sudden
major upheaval of nature” (Gunn 2003: 17). When floods and other natural disaster emergencies
occur in nations with a stable government, that nation generally handles relief activities.
International assistance workers are expected to respect the sovereignty of the existing
government and to act in accord with its desires (Cahill 1999: 3). In these instances,
humanitarian activities revolve around generally straightforward rescue operations, including
“triage, medical and surgical treatment, rehabilitation and reconstruction” (Toole 1997: 16).

The second sort of crisis requiring a large-scale international relief response is the result of
human action—a so-called complex emergency—such as a civil war, that affects “large civilian
populations, [and] is further aggravated by intense political and/or military interference” (Gunn
2003: 17.). The international humanitarian response to a complex emergency is different from a
natural disaster response since humanitarian agencies assume direct responsibility for refugees
and protection of significant portions of an affected nation’s population. According to Michael
Toole, a founding board member of Médecins Sans Frontières-Australia, victims of armed conflict
“need access to adequate food, shelter, water, and essential services, such as medical care and
sanitation” (1997: 16). Toole argues that the UN and its member governments are charged with
both conflict resolution and the protection of civilians in complex tragedies, although the world
body’s record for taking action “has not been impressive” (Ibid.). Therefore, the direct provision
of humanitarian assistance continues to remain a role of NGOs, though often coordinated with one or more UN agencies.

**History and Description of UN Coordination of Humanitarian Relief Agencies**

United Nations coordination efforts can be traced to early 1970. The General Assembly Resolution 2816 of December 14, 1971, sought to create a comprehensive framework to coordinate the activities of the six key actors of the UN humanitarian system (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Programme, UN Children’s Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Health Organization, UN Development Programme), under the Office of Disaster Relief (UNDRO) (Reindorp 2002). Around the same time, major Western governments and NGOs also seemed “to be acknowledging the need for greater coordination of the international relief network” (Kent 1987: 55). Donors and NGOs wanted intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to handle the coordination efforts. Donors believed that for “coordination to have any meaning, it would [have to] be translated into the activities of the IGOs” (Kent 1987: 56). NGOs seemed to agree with donors that coordination would largely be the purview of the intergovernmental organizations, such as agencies of the UN, “for IGOs had direct access to both donor governments and governments of the afflicted” (Ibid.).

UNDRO sought to structure coordination between UN agencies and other humanitarian relief agencies through “formalized agreements” that outlined the roles and responsibilities of the various organizations in times of disaster (Kent 1987: 58). The reality of trying to implement such agreements was something different. One of the problems with seeking to coordinate the efforts of the key humanitarian agencies within the UN was that each of these organizations was established by separate treaties and had its own governance mechanisms (Reindorp 2002). Therefore, according to Kent (1987), no matter how a coordinating body tried to systematize the behavior of IGOs, the different tendencies of donor and recipient governments added uncertainty and unpredictability to inter-governmental behavior” (p. 61). In other words, governmental responses are difficult to predict. For example, Kent argues that the American response to the plight of the Kampuchean refugees flooding into Thailand in 1979-1982 might have been delayed by many months if the wife of the US President had not become involved personally. He contends that governments “pick and choose how and why they will react to calls for or offers of
assistance” and it is this inconsistency that perpetuates “unsystematic behavior throughout the entire relief network” (Kent 1987: 62).

UNDRO faced many challenges throughout its existence including poor credibility within the donor community (Borton 1993). Explanations for why UNDRO demonstrated uneven capacity to provide effective leadership as a coordinating body include the fact that the agency did not “control a major share of the resources being channeled to the affected population[s], or indeed have a substantial field presence during the response[s]” (Borton 1993: 196). In 1991, prompted by dissatisfaction with UNDRO’s performance and the experience of the Gulf War (Reindorp 2002), “member states held a pioneering debate on the capacity of the United Nations to coordinate humanitarian assistance” (Eliasson 1999: 190). The deliberations provided the basis for Resolution 46/182 (see Appendix 1), adopted by the General Assembly in December 1991. The Secretary-General established the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA), which incorporated and replaced UNDRO. Unlike its predecessor that focused primarily on natural disasters, DHA’s real purpose, according to Weiss (1998), was to respond “to the massive suffering resulting from the growing number of man-made disasters of the 1990s” (p. 11). The primary innovations in Resolution 46/182 included the appointment of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and the creation of three other tools to accomplish coordination: the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF), the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP).

The office of the ERC is headquartered in New York and Geneva. The New York office focuses primarily on policy development and ensures “an effective interface between the humanitarian, political, peacekeeping, human rights and development dimensions of crisis management” (Eliasson 1999: 190), as well as manages the CERF. The Geneva headquarters is responsible for “emergency operational support and relief coordination, as well as for disaster reduction” (Ibid). Once relief operations are in place, the Swiss office monitors on-going relief operations, identifies unmet needs, and prepares situation reports based on information from UN organizations in the field.

The $50 million CERF was “designed to ensure that resources are available to operational organizations for prompt response to emergencies” (Eliasson 1999: 190). One critic of the UNDRO and DHA has observed that while it was assumed that CERF would provide some control, the reality is that “the $50 million within CERF is not sufficiently large in relation to the
overall resource flows to the principal UN agencies and NGOs to have much impact” (Borton 1993: 199). CERF serves as an emergency fund to use when donations are not immediately forthcoming early in a crisis. Guidelines state how the resources are to be used and replenished.

The IASC “meets at the executive level twice a year to address policy issues concerning the United Nations’ response to emergencies. Its membership comprises (sic) the UN agencies involved in humanitarian action” (Eliasson 1999: 190). Members include the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and three NGO consortia. It is chaired by the ERC. Middle-management meet throughout the year and the standing committee gathers when there is an urgent need. Depending on the situation, the IASC “may decide to designate one of the UN agencies as lead agency or to appoint a separate Humanitarian Coordinator” (Eliasson 1999: 192). For instance, if a crisis involves refugee flows, UNHCR will generally become the lead agency. In countries where the UN Development Programme has offices, the head of that program, the Resident Coordinator, generally becomes the Humanitarian Coordinator when an emergency occurs.

The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) was created when the UN “sought to improve its fundraising coordination mechanisms” (Tanguy 2003: 221) in an attempt to “address the inefficiencies and pitfalls of UN agencies competing for funds” (Tanguy 2003: 220). A small DHA team is dispatched to a crisis to gather information. An appeal for funds is then prepared by the ERC in Geneva and shared with donor governments. Critics of the CAP have argued that it consists of nothing but a “shopping list” of “independently designed and poorly coordinated projects of UN agencies and partners” (Ibid).

In 1997, as part of the Secretary-General’s reform program, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) replaced DHA. No longer responsible for field operations, OCHA instead works with NGO representatives and other operational UN agencies “to ensure that an effective and efficient, well-coordinated plan for assistance is prepared” (Eliasson 1999: 192). OCHA performs this role “by ensuring, through the IASC, that the appropriate mechanisms are on the ground – advocacy, and policy development in support of the Secretary-General and the IASC” (Reindorp and Wiles 2001: 5).

The UN’s latest effort to create an effective coordinating body is also the target of criticism. Reindorp concluded, for example, only a year after completing an initial “lessons
learned” for OCHA that “[it] has found itself in the invidious position of having a mandate for coordination that is undermined by a lack of authority, resistance from UN agencies and uncertain funding” (Reindorp 2002: 36). Also absent are guidelines and standards of how to respond to an emergency, and staff rarely have the opportunity to share their experiences with one another because OCHA “faces the structural constraints that come from having an office divided between New York and Geneva, has financial limitations and suffers from weak management” (Ibid). Overall, she found that many humanitarian responses “are based on insufficient analysis of the context, have no clear strategy or goals, are inadequately monitored and the impact[s] of the[ir] response[s] [were] poorly measured” (Ibid).

**Factors and Obstacles Constraining the Attainment of Coordination**

These observations are strikingly similar to others offered nearly twenty years ago regarding the UN’s inability to coordinate the roughly sixteen of its agencies which, in one way or another, can become involved in disaster relief activities (Kent 1987). Varying degrees of autonomy, “sustained not merely by their individual constituents but also by support bases within the government departments of member states” (Kent 1987: 89), continues to prove problematic. In addition to the difficulties either OCHA or another UN lead agency face in their efforts to coordinate other United Nations agencies is the additional and even more complex task of attempting to organize NGO humanitarian actors as well (Minear 2002).

Several factors make NGO coordination a challenge. First, since NGOs are outside the UN system, the world body often has to rely on their good will to be coordinated, but, as with the UN agencies themselves, perceived self-interest often hinders the development of that good will and therefore inhibits coordination (McEntire 1997). NGOs responding to humanitarian emergencies, apart from providing assistance, are highly motivated to increase their visibility (Kent 1987, Minear 2002). If an organization is able to gain media attention for its activities then its reason for existence is justified, and such salience practically guarantees funding for future operations. Second, organizations already in a country, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may be reluctant to turn over authority to the UN or to another agency after a crisis has emerged (Sommers 2000). One reason for this is that there are both operational and strategic differences among organizations already in the field, usually those focusing on development work, and organizations that enter a country after an emergency erupts, such as NGOs and IGOs.
are generally concerned primarily or only with relief activities. These disparate mandates create a climate in which it is difficult to expect these organizations to work together (Kent 1987). In addition, donor funding adds to coordination constraints. Finally, the UN has to respect a country’s sovereignty and provides assistance only with the consent of the affected country and by its request (Eliasson 1999). However, NGOs do not worry about sovereignty issues and can come into a situation more quickly, often garnering donor support before UN agencies have an opportunity to do so (Borton 1993). Armed with separate sources of funds, many NGOs simply do not feel the need to cooperate with the United Nations (Minear 2002, Borton 1993).

**Command, Consensus, and Default Approaches to Coordination**

The literature evaluating past humanitarian assistance coordination efforts often references Donini’s tripartite typology of coordination by command, consensus and default (Seybolt 1997, Rey 1999, Sommers 2000, Minear 2002). Support for coordination by command is common (Weiss 1998, Sommers 2000, Minear 2002) and authors often point to examples where this type of coordination has resulted in successful interventions (Donini 1996, Seybolt 1997, Sommers 2000, Minear 2002). For example, Minear (2002) has argued that the control approach assures a more rapid response to crisis conditions and greater accountability for the steps taken to address those concerns. The authors of a study of lessons learned commissioned by OCHA reviewed past evaluations of that agency’s actions and confirmed that a command or control element, at a crucial time, was the needed ingredient leading to success, whether this was control over, or access to, resources (Reindorp and Wiles 2001). The same authors also interviewed both UN and NGO staff and found that there was an “implicit recognition that timely, effective humanitarian response requires power of command” (Reindorp and Wiles 2001: 14).

Debate within the UN focuses on how best to achieve coordination. On the one hand, many of those interviewed for the OCHA study believe in inter-agency consensus building. Indeed, UN personnel “repeatedly insisted that coordination depends on consensus and that any imposition is inappropriate” (Reindorp and Wiles 2001: 6). On the other hand, “all those with, or who have had, coordination responsibilities, expressed frustration with the difficulty – or impossibility – of coordinating without the means to enforce others to coordinate” (Reindorp and Wiles 2001: 6). Imposition of cooperation has often met with resentment across the UN system (Reindorp and Wiles 2001). Many practitioners believe that coordination by consensus, which
relies on the personalities, goodwill and intellectual leadership of humanitarian actors, is more likely to prove successful than coordination by command. Furthermore, many practitioners interviewed for the OCHA self-study argue that persuasiveness yields demonstrable benefits and that the organizations that recognize these will be more likely to coordinate their efforts effectively (Minear 2002). Additional support for a consensus-based approach comes from Scott-Flynn (1999), who contends that coordination “is not about control but about information sharing and the recognition and clarification of the different agendas of the different agencies.”

Supporters of coordination by default are few, although some argue that a laissez-faire approach is best because it allows for “the magic of the marketplace in which individual agencies pursue independent strategies and arrive at a sound division of labor” (Weiss 1998: 14). It would be best, these authors contend, to make the most of a situation where no one is really in charge rather than trying to add another layer of bureaucracy over whose remit there continues to be conflict and disagreement. Kent (1987) argues, for example, that relief actors, in an attempt to outperform other agencies and maintain their independence, are reluctant to share information or acquiesce to a single agency. Self-regulation is most likely then, where actors “agree among themselves as to the types of functions and assistance each will provide” (Kent 1987: 161).

The UN has turned to what Pugh and Cunliffe (1997) call the “default position”—that of the lead agency—in its response to humanitarian disasters in recent years. This concept arose as a response to pressures “arising from humanitarian operations in the field rather than political direction or legal and normative standards” (Pugh and Cunliffe 1997: 18). In other words, the lead agency fills a vacuum when the United Nations leadership does not feel there is a strong political reason to deploy a team from OCHA in an emergency. Therefore, in the case of a natural disaster, a UN organization such as the WFP, already active in the country, may be designated the lead agency. However, there is no clear definition of what lead agency status demands and therefore no clear outline of what responsibilities such a standing actually entails, although it seems clear that the designation is aimed somehow at deploying humanitarian resources more effectively and efficiently (Pugh and Cunliffe 1997).

**Relationships and Social Networks**

The humanitarian coordination literature suggests that an ingredient of successful coordination stems from “relationships [which] have been built over time” (Reindorp and Wiles
2001: 13). An evaluation of humanitarian relief efforts in Sierra Leone found that the coordination efforts of OCHA were more effective than those of the government of Sierra Leone’s own coordinating body, the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation. According to a Sierra Leonean with experience in working with both the UN and the government, OCHA took the lead because it had “far better relations with the powerful, well-organized, and well-funded NGOs” (Sommers 2000: 29).

In another study evaluating the coordination efforts of the emergency response to a tornado in Ft. Worth, Texas in 2000, McEntire (2002) found that the factors that contributed most to more effective coordination were networking and cooperation among the principals involved in the relief efforts. Many of the key actors whom the author interviewed were friendly with staff from other organizations also engaged in humanitarian efforts. This familiarity facilitated the relief interventions as a whole since individuals had prior knowledge of the other organizations and people in key positions within them. Shared experience bred trust among participants that increased the willingness of these organization principals to work together (McEntire 2002). Kent (1987) has also contended that familiarity “has led to a greater willingness of many in the network to rely upon the influence and capabilities of others,” but he adds that this has only occurred “when circumstances serve mutual interests” (p. 72).

Kent’s use of the word network is illustrative, since he suggests that the commonly used phrase “humanitarian relief system” does not accurately describe forms of interaction among relief agencies, but the word “network” does. He classifies a system as interdependent, bounded, structurally explicit with defined relationships, and goal-focused. However, when analyzing the international relief community, he found a network that was “devoid of any institutional framework, lacks coherent goals, reflects few patterned relationships, yet points to a variety of transnational and functional linkages that have emerged” (Kent 1987: 69). McEntire (1997) has similarly described the international relief community as a “network or a tangled maze” (p. 224).

**NGO Approaches to Increase Effectiveness**

Criticism regarding the lack of coherence among international humanitarian relief actors has not gone unheeded. A variety of approaches aimed at improving inter-organizational cooperation and effectiveness have appeared since early 1990 in the INGO sector, although all
but the Codes of Conduct do not address directly the issue of improving coordination of NGO relief efforts. They include:

- The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, “a small consortium with limited membership, formed out of a desire to improve interagency cooperation” (Williams 2003: 158). Much of the group’s activities have been centered on “representing a group of NGOs before UN decision-making bodies” (Ibid).

- The Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies made up of over 80 European NGOs and dedicated to improving interagency linkages (Williams 2003: 158).

- Codes of conduct, established with the goal of improving effectiveness in humanitarian assistance agencies (Lancaster 1998). The most widely recognized is the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief (referred to as the Code). This Code (see Appendix 2) aims to “govern the way the humanitarian agencies should work in disaster assistance” by “developing a formal instrument against which the performance of humanitarian agencies can be measured” (Lancaster 1998). These codes are not binding, and monitoring and enforcement is not regulated. Nevertheless, they do offer a set of operational principles about which major northern NGOs have reached consensus (Leader 1999). Signing the Code means that an organization realizes the importance of sharing a certain set of values and standards with other organizations that also sign it. In addition, the Code represents standards by which signatory organization conduct can be evaluated by outside groups and individuals (Ibid.).

- The Sphere Project provides “guidelines [that] were intended to increase NGO operational transparency and accountability, both to donor organizations and to the beneficiaries of humanitarian interventions” (Williams 2003: 163). It is another effort to make humanitarian assistance more effective. The Project has created a handbook “containing a humanitarian charter, minimum standards, key indicators and guidance notes on the five basic life-sustaining aspects of disaster response: water and sanitation; food aid; nutrition; shelter and site selection; and health” (Lowrie 2000).

Overall, these approaches by NGOs point to the fact that cooperation, communication, and ethically principled behavior are desirable. However, only the Code briefly acknowledges coordination as a priority, and then only with “those most directly involved in the relief operations, and should include representatives of the relevant UN bodies” (The Code 1994). This
seems to imply that coordination is only necessary with a few of the prominent organizations responding to a crisis, but does not offer any guidance beyond this aspiration. The Sphere Project “is the first attempt to produce globally applicable minimum standards for humanitarian response services” (Gastelow 1999: 318) but its guiding document, the Humanitarian Charter, provides information about what should be done and why, but not how. Even though hundreds of NGOs and individuals cooperated to create the Charter, the document does not specifically address one of the most pressing concerns of the international relief community—coordination. It appears that NGOs place a higher value on relationship building, information exchange and skill development over ceding authority to a central coordinating body to secure improved coordination.

**Summary**

In sum, the literature on humanitarian assistance management is vast and its contributing authors offer a wide variety of definitions of coordination and a thorough description of the UN system and its role in developing efforts to secure improved synchronization coordination among its own and other organizations engaged in relief. Numerous authors have highlighted

- The difficulties that have arisen with attempts to coordinate.
- Many have employed Donini’s tripartite coordination typology.
- Most highlight the role that inter-organizational networks play in coordination attempts and a major share provide descriptions of the steps that NGOs are taking to improve their effectiveness.

For all of these characteristics and strengths, however, the literature lacks a robust theoretical perspective that moves beyond suggesting that command/control is the most effective coordination option available to a lead agency. Oddly, analysts have continued to embrace the coordination by command alternative despite, or even while, offering evidence that suggests that this choice is simply not available to the UN in the great bulk of the emergencies that it confronts. While various authors mention the important contributions that inter-organizational relationships make to coordination, the literature has not moved beyond the level of such cursory comments.

Moreover, the proliferation of NGO codes of conduct and other organizing bodies suggests a recognition that this sector needs to get its own house in order to be effective. The fact that
coordination discussions are not a central theme in these NGO discussions further suggests that this concept is not as crucial to NGOs as it is to the UN agencies. This may be because the United Nations is intrinsically more bureaucratic because of its governmental composition and inherent institutional complexity, and therefore researchers assume that bureaucratic organizations manage from the top-down. But NGOs are typically less mired in political concerns than is the UN. Moreover, they do not necessarily assume a subordinate role when disaster strikes. They appear to evidence greater concern for service provision than for service coordination. I turn now to a discussion of crisis coordination efforts in Rwanda, Kosovo and Mozambique.
Chapter 3: Coordination in Rwanda

On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying the president of Rwanda, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, was shot down. For the next thirteen weeks, Rwanda was ravaged by a gruesome and pre-planned genocide, allegedly led by Colonel Bagosora and his followers. It is difficult to know exactly how many Rwandans were slaughtered in this short period of time, but estimates range between 500,000 and 800,000. In addition, two million Rwandese fled into neighboring countries and an additional one million were internally displaced (Borton et. al., 1996). The international humanitarian response involved at least eight United Nations agencies, roughly 250 nongovernmental organizations who had programs in Rwanda or neighboring countries or both, and over eight military contingents. Over 20 donor organizations provided resources, and private donations were counted from about the same number of countries (Borton 1996). The UN had a leading role in coordinating humanitarian assistance efforts in Rwanda throughout most of 1994 since that nation’s government lacked the competence and resources necessary to coordinate the number of organizations that became involved in the country (Seybolt 1997). This chapter addresses the events leading up to the crisis, identifies the key agencies responsible for coordination and describes the main activities requiring harmonization and how they were managed. It concludes with a discussion of the UN’s credibility to act as a coordinating body and outlines the capacity and contextual conditions that inhibited and promoted this perception in the Rwanda crisis. Even though the genocide in Rwanda generated many reports, debates, evaluations and articles, discussion regarding the actual events and efforts to coordinate the international humanitarian response is contained in only a few reports.

Events Before April 6

The ethnic tension that exploded in 1994 within Rwanda was decades old. Before colonization first by the Germans in 1899 and then by the Belgians in 1919, Rwanda was ruled by Tutsi kings descended from one ruling clan. In 1935, the Belgians introduced a discriminatory national identification program that divided Rwandese into two groups: those with 10 or more cows became Tutsi and those with less became Hutu. The Belgians favored the Tutsi until this elite group formed a political party that demanded independence from Belgian rule. In response,
Belgian authorities hastily established another political party, the Parmehutu, comprised of Hutu Rwandese. With Belgium’s implicit approval, massacres of Tutsi at the hand of Hutus began in 1959 (Rwandan website). Once the Hutu majority ruled Rwanda (they made up over 85 per cent of the population), massacres became commonplace and “Tutsi were systematically discriminated against and periodically subjected to waves of killing and ethnic cleansing” (Power 2001). In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a group of mainly Tutsi armed exiles from Uganda but also including Hutus, began a civil war against President Habyarimana’s oppressive regime. Over the next several years the RPF gained control over territory in northern Rwanda, near the Ugandan border. Tanzania brokered peace talks in 1993, and RPF leaders and the President signed a power-sharing agreement known as the Arusha Accords that same year.

Under the terms of the Accords, “the Rwandan government agreed to share power with Hutu opposition parties [the RPF] and the Tutsi minority” (Power 2001). The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), a force of UN peacekeepers, was deployed in 1993 to facilitate implementation of the agreement—oversight of a cease-fire, the repatriation of Tutsi refugees, and creation of a transitional government until elections could be held (Seybolt 1997). However, Hutu extremists within the President’s regime did not agree with these terms, and terrorized both Tutsi and Hutu politicians who supported the peace process. Reports of killings of civilian Tutsis (unarmed noncombatants) continued, and two international commissions, one organized by the UN and another comprised of human-rights organizations “warned explicitly of possible genocide” (Power 2000). The President’s assassination, as he was returning from another round of talks in Tanzania regarding the Arusha Accords, signaled the start of a reign of terror throughout Rwanda.

The circumstances surrounding the downing of the President’s plane remain unclear. Nevertheless, extremist Hutus blamed the RPF for the attack, and used this to justify their
murderous rampage against the Tutsi minority. The RPF blamed Hutu extremists for shooting down the plane as an excuse to spark Hutu efforts to kill all remaining Tutsis within Rwanda so that Tutsi opposition to Hutu control would never be questioned again (The Economist 2004).

**Key Players**

Nearly 300 organizations, agencies, and donors were involved in the Rwandan humanitarian relief theater by the middle of June 1994. My purpose here is not to examine what each of these groups and individuals did or did not do, but instead to consider how the UN in particular sought to coordinate the activities of the main participants in this diverse and extensive effort. Therefore, I limit my discussion to the actions of six key UN agencies as summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: UN Organizations in Rwanda, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)</td>
<td>UNAMIR was established in 1993 to provide assistance in the transition to a new governing body in Rwanda as part of the Arusha Accords.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA)</td>
<td>The UNDHA was responsible for coordination of humanitarian aid efforts within Rwanda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO)</td>
<td>An agency of UNDHA, its primary responsibility was to support the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in that nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Advanced Humanitarian Team (UNAHT)</td>
<td>This unit of UNDHA was sent into Kigali, Rwanda before UNREO established offices there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</td>
<td>UNHCR took the role as the lead agency outside Rwanda, coordinating refugee assistance in countries surrounding Rwanda. It is a staff agency and relies on implementing partners, namely NGOs, to deliver services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Description of Coordination Efforts**

**Activities within Rwanda**

Coordination of organizations and agencies inside the boundaries of Rwanda fell under UNDHA’s jurisdiction. Within UNDHA, UNAHT and UNREO played crucial roles. The UNAHT set up an office in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, shortly after April 6. The UN had been criticized for not maintaining a presence in Somalia during the crisis that erupted there the
previous year and the UN Secretariat wanted to get a United Nations humanitarian presence in Rwanda quickly. UNAHT was not an institutionalized part of UNDHA’s response efforts, but an *ad hoc* arrangement. As such, members of UNAHT had to be seconded by other UN organizations including the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNHCR. Despite the way in which the agency was thrown together, UNAHT proved an effective coordinating body. It established offices in the country quickly, disseminated much needed information regarding displaced populations and people in need of assistance to the few organizations already in Rwanda before April 6 so that these organizations knew where to provide their services, and kept UNREO offices in Nairobi, Kenya informed of events as they occurred. By the time UNREO moved into Kigali to replace UNAHT, a framework for coordination through information exchange and dissemination had been developed (Borton, 1996).

Before its move to Kigali, a UN Resident Representative, a UN Development Programme position, was put in charge of UNREO and given the title of Humanitarian Coordinator. UNREO-Nairobi performed several functions. First, it “began to produce Situation Reports that provided timely information on the disposition of the civilian population, the most urgent needs to cover, and what was being done to cover them” (Seybolt 1997: 17). These were of great value to the NGO and donor communities. Second, the Humanitarian Coordinator provided all UN personnel with a required security clearance before entering Rwanda. Non-United Nations personnel were also encouraged to report either to this office or one of several others concerning their whereabouts in the region. This information was passed on to UNAMIR in Kigali. Third, in June, UNREO organized the first needs assessment of areas outside of Kigali. At this point, a division of labor among the relief and UN agencies was established inside the country and agencies were able to use this information to provide assistance quickly (Borton et al. 1996).

Once UNREO set up residence in Kigali, field-level coordination intensified. One of the key activities of the office was to convene regular biweekly meetings to which NGOs, bi-laterals and UN organizations were invited. The meetings included information sharing, and priority-setting discussions “and to a large extent informal decisions were made concerning load sharing and possible future areas of concentration” (Donini 1996: 109). Attendance at these meetings typically exceeded 100. The chair of these gatherings, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, would open with praise for work previously done by specific organizations and ask for agreement on the agenda. Representatives would then provide updates. A clear sense of what
was being done and what still needed to be undertaken emerged from the meetings. Meetings of specific sectors were held on other nights of the week. For example, Monday nights were reserved for water and sanitation meetings. Issues from these meetings were raised for the whole group in the general meetings (Seybolt 1997). Officials from UNREO were authorized to make decisions quickly based on information from these gatherings rather than wait for approval from headquarters in Geneva and New York. This enhanced their role as authorities in the crisis and improved their effectiveness in encouraging and facilitating organizations to coordinate their efforts.

**Activities outside Rwanda**

While humanitarian coordination unfolded as just described, “the Rwandan violence spilled over state borders, giving it a transnational character, [and the] coordination efforts did not follow suit” (Seybolt 1997: 42). This outcome arose for at least two reasons. First, the Special Representative to the Secretary General, the titular head of UN action in country, never received authority to implement a system-wide UN response. Therefore, he was not able to seek action beyond the boundaries of Rwanda (Seybolt 1997). Second, a lack of resources prevented UNDHA from reaching beyond Rwanda. The Humanitarian Coordinator/Head of UNREO theoretically could have exerted control over matters concerning refugees but a lack of funds to undertake such a responsibility prevented UNREO from taking this action. As a result, the WFP and UNHCR were responsible for coordinating most of the efforts in the Great Lakes region (Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire) where they worked together on food distribution in refugee camps. The WFP was responsible for all operations up to the Extended Delivery Points (warehouses or storage tents located at or near the camps being served) and the management of these points. UNHCR’s mandate was “responsibility for the care and protection of refugees” crossing into the surrounding countries, “a role it performed in conjunction with the relevant local and national authorities” (Borton et al. 1996).

An event that captured a great deal of media attention during the Rwanda crisis and required immediate humanitarian support occurred on April 28, when approximately two hundred and fifty thousand Rwandan refugees poured into the Ngara District in Tanzania. The successful relief effort undertaken in Ngara is highlighted in many articles concerning coordination in the Rwanda crisis (e.g. Sommers 2000, Seybolt 1997, Borton et al 1996). Several conditions contributed to that well-coordinated response. To begin, an agreement between the
Tanzanian government and UNHCR had already been reached before the refugee influx whereby UNHCR would approve each NGO that would work in the camps. Only NGOs with previous experience in the region and only twelve total were initially permitted to provide aid and only a few were added to this initial list later. Another factor that contributed to the Ngara success was the fact that the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and later the U.S. government opted “to test a new funding mechanism that funneled money through UNHCR” there (Sommers 2000: 40) rather than wait for requests from NGOs and fund them directly. This provided UNHCR with capacity to make quick decisions and enhanced its sway over field coordination (Sommers 2000).

**Capacity and Contextual Conditions**

In sum, the Rwanda crisis provided a good example of how various United Nations agencies were able to coordinate the efforts of the hundreds of international humanitarian relief actors that sought to provide aid in the Great Lakes region in 1994. This description of how various UN agencies did that highlights some of the capacity conditions that led to various levels of United Nations credibility. Chapter 1 of this paper introduced a suggested list of capacity conditions necessary for successful coordination that appeared prominently in the three cases. The conditions that were found in the Rwanda crisis are restated in Table 2 and illustrated by examples from UN actions.

Table 2: Capacity conditions found in Rwanda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity Conditions</th>
<th>Examples where the capacity conditions were met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to establish a “presence” in an emergency during the early stages</td>
<td>UNAMIR was in Rwanda prior to April 6 and UNAHT was one of the first organizations to enter Kigali soon after the genocide began on April 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledgeable, disciplined and personable staff that are well-trained and willing to work with staff from other organizations (e.g. NGOs, NATO troops, and others)</td>
<td>UNHCR worked with other NGOs in the Ngara District refugee camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to make decisions in the field rather than waiting to hear from headquarters</td>
<td>UNREO had delegated authority to make decisions in conjunction with personnel from other organizations, without having to request permission first from its headquarter office staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Conditions</td>
<td>Examples where the capacity conditions were met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick access to or control over information gathering and dissemination</td>
<td>UNAHT quickly became the primary source of information for the international relief community. UNREO, which replaced UNAHT in Kigali, took over this role and led information meetings attended by NGOs active in the relief efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to or control over funding resources</td>
<td>The assistance provided in refugee camps in Ngara, Tanzania was widely regarded as one of the most successful examples of coordination during the entire emergency. UNHCR had the “power of the purse” and was able to limit the number of NGOs providing aid to a manageable number.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The contextual conditions, or the circumstances that the UN agencies could not have accounted for within their own capacities, were most apparent in Tanzania. There, as previously described, the government of Tanzania arranged for UNHCR to limit which NGOs would provide relief services in the refugee camps in Ngara. Moreover, ECHO decided to channel many of its relief funds into UNHCR in Ngara, further allowing UNHCR to limit the number of NGOs to those with which it wished to work. The result was “an orderly, cohesive, and well-coordinated system” (Sommers 2000: 41). The fact that UNREO did not have control over financial resources inhibited its ability to have authority over relief organizations in Rwanda, but it did act as a clearinghouse for information and created a consensus-based approach in meetings and efforts in humanitarian assistance, despite the fact that it was seeking to coordinate the efforts of NGOs and various agencies with disparate missions, goals and objectives.

The next two chapters look at the crises in Kosovo and Mozambique respectively and determine the capacity and contextual conditions that either inhibited or promoted the ability of UN agencies to respond in an effective and coordinated fashion to humanitarian emergencies.
Chapter 4: Coordination in Kosovo

On March 24, 1999, NATO, without the UN Security Council’s approval, began what it called Operation Allied Force. The air strikes “were intended to end Serb violence in Kosovo and make the Yugoslav authorities accept the terms of the Rambouillet peace plan” (Suhrke and Barutciski 2000: par. 29). NATO leaders hoped that the then Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, would withdraw his troops quickly from Kosovo, but the violence on the ground escalated and large refugee outflows and expulsions resulted. Approximately 860,000 Kosovan Albanians fled or were expelled during the 11 weeks of the bombing campaign—444,600 to Albania, 344,500 to the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia, and 69,900 to Montenegro (Suhrke and Barutciski 2000: par. 31). The international humanitarian response to the Kosovo crisis “saw more money, more agencies, and more media interest than any previous humanitarian operation” (Porter 2000).

In addition to these three factors, the Kosovo crisis was unique in other ways, namely NATO’s active participation in humanitarian relief activities on the ground, resulting in a bilateral atmosphere in Albania, FYR Macedonia and Montenegro1. Moreover, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) faced many challenges during the crisis that rendered coordination activities quite difficult. This chapter explores both NATO’s and UNHCR’s role in the Kosovo crisis but first will provide a brief historical overview of the events prior to the air strikes, and then describe the key actors involved in them. Following a discussion of humanitarian efforts and attempts to coordinate those

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1 This term refers to donors implementing operational projects directly, terminology also consistently used during the crisis (Sandison 2000: note 3).
activities, with a focus on Albania, this chapter outlines the capacity and contextual conditions that prevented UNHCR from earning credibility from other organizations involved in responding to the catastrophe and performing as the lead agency in the crisis. The discussion of coordination efforts is limited to Albania because that country received the largest number of refugees. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the Kosovo crisis also unfolded in the other countries that received refugees. Both NATO and UNHCR actions are the subject of several independently authored studies, and this chapter relies heavily on those volumes, in addition to a few other articles, as they provide detailed information about events, rather than addressing much of the controversy and debate that the crisis generated (e.g. Minear 2000: Chapter 6, Porter 2000, Rieff 2000).

**Historical Overview**

The struggle in the Serbian province of Kosovo in which NATO intervened in 1999 dated back to 1981 when Albanians demanded the separation of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo from the Republic of Serbia. Constitutional changes in 1989, under Slobodan Milosevic, limited the autonomy of the province and soon after, the Yugoslav government declared a state of emergency and assumed direct control of the area. For several years the Albanians struggled peacefully, and created a parallel society “which unofficially existed alongside Belgrade’s repressive rule” (Suhrke and Barutciski 2000: par. 25). But the resistance became violent when discussion of Kosovo’s status was excluded from the Dayton peace talks in 1995. Kosovan Albanian militants formed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which easily acquired weapons from Albania over the porous border. Serbian security forces frequently targeted areas of Kosovo that harbored KLA guerrillas to flush out and reduce the strength of their resistance (Suhrke and Barutciski 2000: par. 26)

The next few years were defined by human rights abuses at the hands of Yugoslav and Serbian security forces throughout Kosovo. Serbian security forces terrorized the entire ethnic Albanian population for its perceived support of the KLA. Indeed, “every able-bodied male Kosovan Albanian was a suspect” (Morris 1999a). The liberation army was also responsible for committing human rights abuses of its own and the international humanitarian community feared for the safety of the civilian population caught in this bitter conflict. By the end of September 1998, over 300,000 Kosovan Albanians had fled to various locations within both the region and
surrounding countries (Morris 1999a). Over the next two months, the Security Council adopted two resolutions, Resolution 1199 and Resolution 1203 (see Appendices 3 and 4 for the full texts) that required, among other things, that the majority of Serbian security forces withdraw from Kosovo and that both parties implement a cease-fire. The resolutions also warned of possible further action if their terms were not met (Roberts 1999).

The Serbian security forces began a partial withdrawal in October 1998, and the KLA reasserted itself in certain territories. As winter approached, many of those displaced within Kosovo returned to their homes. However, by late December, the ceasefire was breaking down, and the Serbian security forces started a series of “winter exercises” targeting the KLA that displaced new groups of civilians (Morris 1999a). The media coverage of the massacre of at least 45 ethnic Albanians in the village of Raçak on January 15, 1999 (Roberts 1999) sparked broad international interest. That attention resulted in the Rambouillet negotiating process in February; talks that attempted to establish a broad form of autonomy in Kosovo. These negotiations did not end the violence and displacement and discussions broke up on February 23 without reaching an agreement. A second round of meetings was held March 15-18. The Kosovan Albanian delegation signed the proposed peace agreement that arose from those meetings but talks faltered when the Serbian delegation refused to sign (NATO 1999).

Immediately following the discussions, Serbian security forces increased the intensity of their attacks against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, moving in more troops and materiel, a clear breach of the resolution terms agreed to six months before (NATO 1999). Days before the bombing began, US Ambassador Holbrooke flew to Belgrade in a final attempt to persuade Milosevic to stop the attacks against the Kosovan Albanians and to warn the Serbian President of the consequences if he did not stop. Milosevic refused to comply, “and on 23 March the order was given to commence air strikes” (NATO 1999).

**Actors**

As in Rwanda, hundreds of organizations participated in Kosovo assistance operations. UNHCR was the accepted, rather than the designated, lead agency in the region. It was the designated lead agency in former Yugoslavia following an invitation from the UN Secretary-General in 1991, and since the new emergency was clearly a refugee crisis, “the extension of its lead status was not contested by other UN agencies” (Sandison 2000: par. 370). UNHCR enjoyed
a clear mandate to coordinate other United Nations agencies but it lacked standing to coordinate other actors. Although NGO acceptance of the UNHCR as lead agency for the effort was voluntary, “UNHCR itself clearly expected to fulfill the role of overall humanitarian coordinator in the Kosovo response” (Sandison 2000: par. 368). In addition to UNHCR and the many NGOs engaged, several other organizations had critical roles in the humanitarian response to the refugee crisis arising from fighting in Kosovo. Table 3 provides a brief description of some of the key stakeholders in Albania.

Table 3: Organizations in the Kosovo region in 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)</td>
<td>The OSCE is the “largest regional security organization in the world with 55 participating States from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation” (OSCE website). It was on the ground in Kosovo before the air strikes as part of the Kosovo Verification Mission to observe implementation of the cease-fire between the KLA and the Serbian security forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)</td>
<td>It established air surveillance over Kosovo before the bombing campaign as part of the Kosovo Verification Mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Albania</td>
<td>The government of Albania was sympathetic to the ethnic Kosovo Albanians and supported their independence struggle. The Albanian government had a strong desire to work with NATO and the OSCE from the outset. It wanted to join NATO and modernize its military, and sought economic aid from the OSCE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Coordination Efforts**

UNHCR’s inability to coordinate the international humanitarian response effectively in the early stages of the crisis in both Albania and FYR Macedonia has been roundly criticized by a number of analysts. One of the primary criticisms offered is that UNHCR was simply not ready for the scale of refugee outflows that it had to address. Indeed, Peter Morris, UNHCR’s Special Envoy in Albania from April 1, 1998 to April 30, 1999, has admitted, “the most immediate problem was that we were not prepared for what happened on the scale it happened” (Morris 1999a). Most others working in the region at the time also did not expect that almost 900,000 ethnic Albanians would stream out of Kosovo, one third of which were either expelled or fled within the first week. Key Western governments were hoping that the peace process would be a success and had urged UNHCR to prepare for implementation of the Rambouillet accords.
Ironically, representatives of these same governments were some of the most outspoken in their criticisms of UNHCR’s lack of preparedness, even though it is unlikely that they would have supported the Commissioner’s contingency planning efforts based on failure of the peace talks (Ibid.).

According to Morris (1999a), a lack of staff more than anything else, prevented an effective immediate response by UNHCR. UNHCR had a limited number of experienced field staff to handle the many tasks required in the early stages, such as negotiating with the governments of Albania and FYR Macedonia to assist the refugees. Furthermore, insufficient personnel prevented UNHCR from performing regular needs assessments and monitoring of refugee movements, two important tasks in information gathering. Therefore, UNHCR was not able to contribute information beyond what NGOs in the field were able to provide, leading bilaterals and many NGOs to act “according to their own criteria and priorities” (Sandison 2000: par. 376).

Since UNHCR was severely understaffed—and facing massive refugee influxes in the tens of thousands per day—its leaders quickly recognized that personnel were “becoming overwhelmed by the political problem of asylum in Macedonia and the practical logistical problems in Albania,” UNHCR requested NATO assistance (Morris 1999a). According to one evaluation, Sadako Ogata, the High Commissioner for Refugees viewed NATO’s help as “the only option to take to save lives” (Suhrke and Barutciski 2000: par. 72). Alliance ability to act swiftly in the face of such a massive emergency, coupled with the political dimensions of the catastrophe, necessitated the involvement of the Alliance: “the political importance of the displacement to governments [led] to the initial harnessing of NATO for humanitarian tasks” (Minear et al. 2000: 18). As previously mentioned, both in FYR Macedonia and Albania, there was a desire to work with NATO and the governments insisted that the Alliance play a central role since, “[i]n their view, close cooperation with NATO and bilateral donors would strengthen their chances of becoming members of NATO and the European Union” (Minear et al. 2000: 16).

NATO, for its part, was willing to cooperate with UNHCR. In an effort to limit domestic political criticism in member countries regarding the Alliance’s action, it was imperative to contain the humanitarian crisis. NATO wanted to be seen as “actively helping to alleviate the plight of the refugees” (Suhrke and Barutciski 2000: par. 37). Moreover, the Treaty Organization
did not want the refugee crisis to impede its mobility to send ground troops from Albania and FYR Macedonia into Kosovo, should that step be necessary (Ibid).

Coordination in Albania

The degree to which UNHCR lacked proper staff capacity in the early stages of the crisis to handle the massive refugee migration is shown through an explanation of how the tragedy unfolded in Albania. At the time the bombing started, there were only 18 UNHCR staff in Tirana, Albania’s capital. The group was comprised of six international members at mid and junior-levels, and 12 national associates. Because of shooting incidents in 1998, there was only one national staff member in Kukes, an office located in northern Albania, a likely entry point for refugees. Fully 64,000 refugees arrived from Kosovo through the Kukes office between March 27-29, 1999. Thus, one staff person constituted the UNHCR presence in this critical migration area until additional staff arrived several days later (Suhrke 2000: par. 142). The immediate needs of the refugees were met with the help of the Albanian government and civilian population. The former cooperated with transportation and collection centers and the latter served as host families. In fact, host families, who typically received rent from those they were assisting, would eventually house 60 per cent of the refugee population (Suhrke 2000: par. 145).

The relationship between the Albanian government and UNHCR was uneasy. UNHCR’s apparent lack of preparation for the refugee influx added to Tirana’s desire to work more closely with NATO and the OSCE rather than with the UN agency (Morris 1999a, Minear 2000, Suhrke 2000). Since UNHCR had such a limited presence in Kukes until April 2, donors began to organize their own response. International media coverage of the activities in Kukes, depicting a border choked with refugees and aid workers, helped to undermine the status of UNHCR “and reinforced the inclination of Tirana to work with NATO and individual governments for assistance” (Suhrke 2000: par. 148). Donor governments poured money into refugee camps, trying to attract as many refugees as possible. These measures progressed to the point where pictures of amenities available at various camps were displayed in Kukes to attract refugees to major sites that were further south, away from the border. Many of these locations were established without UNHCR’s staff member’s knowledge, and after the camps had been set up, the NGOs sharing the same nationality were asked to operate them, creating a heavy bilateralist presence and orientation (Porter 1999).
Furthermore during the first week of the crisis, the Albanian government, in close cooperation with the OSCE, established a new coordinating unit—the Emergency Management Group (EMG)—rather than use the Office of Refugees in the Ministry of Local Government, an office that UNHCR had helped to create (Suhrke 2000: par. 166). EMG was comprised of relevant Albanian ministries, donors, IGOs, staff from UNHCR and the WFP and officials from NATO. Rather than the traditional coordination forum made up of international humanitarian agencies, this body had strong national participation “and the involvement of actors usually excluded from the everyday decision-making of an emergency” (Sandison 2000: par. 389). For instance, the EMG included a high-level policy making desk and eventually other sectors linked to policy making were involved as well. This impaired the EMG’s ability to act quickly or decisively because decisions rarely were made within the group but were deferred to those ministries and actors in the field. The slow process of decision-making threatened to limit UNHCR’s implementing capacity. The notion of sharing the platform with national authorities and other agencies was difficult for UNHCR and one analyst has argued that the office failed to adapt to the new organizational arrangements (Sandison 2000: par. 396).

Since UNHCR did not view the EMG as an effective coordination instrument, it played a more active role in the Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC), which it funded but was organized by NGOs. Over 200 participants attended the HIC meetings but because the meetings were so large, they were mainly an opportunity to share information, rather than to coordinate efforts (information sharing is a form of coordination but a low level one). The large meetings were preceded by smaller sector gatherings chaired by UNHCR and weekly inter-agency meetings. In fact, “most NGO coordination continued to take place at the sectoral level outside of the EMG with UNHCR and other UN agencies” (Sandison 2000: par. 390). However, similar to its relations with the EMG, UNHCR’s relationships with the NGOs were strained. Many NGOs within in the HIC felt that the Commissioner’s coordinating capacity was threatened by the independence of the NGO committee. Additionally, UNHCR was late in establishing sub-offices throughout Albania, so NGOs turned to the OSCE as a source of information. The OSCE had staffed offices in all 12 prefectures in Albania and monitored all border crossings (Sandison 2000: par. 399). The result of these circumstances was a missed opportunity for UNHCR “to share its extensive experience within the EMG and the HIC, and thus to improve their coordination capacity and coverage” (Sandison 2000: par. 397).
Yet, as one observer has argued, even if UNHCR had acquired the needed personnel, it would not have been able to provide the coordination required due to the particular character of the humanitarian aid response. One of the reasons for this is that Albania “saw arguably the highest ever proliferation of NGOs in a refugee crisis” (Porter 1999). At one point, there were over 160 NGOs registered with the NGO Centre in Tirana. Many of these were there for altruistic reasons but a high proportion were “briefcase NGOs, there because they could not afford not to be there” (Ibid.). These organizations did not attend coordination meetings and did not register their activities with either the government of Albania or UNHCR.

**Capacity and Contextual Conditions**

The massive refugee outflows from Kosovo immediately following NATO’s air strikes caught the international humanitarian relief community by surprise. A variety of capacity conditions impaired UNHCR’s ability to serve as the lead agency for the overall response to the emergency, a role that perhaps only the High Commissioner itself expected it to fulfill. These conditions are summarized in Table 4, which lists the capacity conditions applicable to the Kosovo crisis along with corresponding examples that illustrate UNHCR’s inability to fulfill these conditions.

Table 4: Capacity conditions lacking in Kosovo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity Conditions</th>
<th>Examples where the capacity conditions were not met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to establish a “presence” in an emergency during the early stages</td>
<td>UNHCR performed poorly in the initial wave of the crisis. This was because the junior staff did not have the authority to negotiate the political dimensions of the response, and the agency did not have the requisite number of staff in the necessary areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff at the level deemed appropriate for the political dimensions of the response</td>
<td>In Tirana, Albania’s capital, the UNHCR staff members comprised six internationals at mid and junior-levels, and 12 national associates. Furthermore, the High Commissioner’s Special Envoy was unable to perform his diplomatic role effectively since he was responsible for two countries at once, both of which required immediate attention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledgeable, disciplined and personable staff that are well-trained and willing to work with staff from other organizations (e.g. NGOs, NATO troops, and others)</td>
<td>UNHCR missed an opportunity to share its experience with members of both the EMG and the HIC because of strained relations with these groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Conditions</td>
<td>Examples where the capacity conditions were not met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick access to or control over information gathering and dissemination</td>
<td>Many NGOs and bilaterals in Albania obtained information regarding the refugees before or at the same time as UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to or control over funding resources</td>
<td>UNHCR “received no cash pledges in the first month of the refugee crisis” because senior political and diplomatic policy makers in the UK, USA and EU “were said to have placed a personal veto on cash funding to UNCHR (Porter 1999: 21). Throughout the crisis, UNHCR funded an average of 15 per cent of the refugees in the camps throughout Albania, which only reflects about 5 per cent of the total refugee population after factoring in those housed with host families.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 4 suggests, UNHCR did not meet any of the above-mentioned capacity conditions necessary to achieve credibility from other NGOs and governmental organizations. This was primarily a result of a lack of staff—either in numbers or in positions of authority. However, several contextual conditions affected the High Commissioner’s capacity to coordinate the international humanitarian relief community in the Kosovo crisis case.

To begin, UNHCR was expecting a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Kosovo rather than the stream of tens of thousands of refugees that actually occurred. The only organization with enough labor to assist in that situation was NATO, since it already had thousands of troops in Albania, so that is where that government turned. Moreover, government authorities had decided from the onset of the crisis that they wanted to work closely with the Alliance and European organizations, straining relations between the High Commissioner’s staff and government members. Strained relations also caused the government of Albania to be unwilling to have UNHCR provide quality-control so that “only the most established agencies operated on the ground” (Porter 1999: 21). Therefore, unlike in the Ngara District of Tanzania where UNHCR funded and approved which NGOs would work in the camps, these organizations in Albania had their own resources and ability to decide where to work, leaving little incentive for them to seek out UNHCR coordination. Indeed, well-funded NGOs and eager-to-assist NATO troops built camps and provided a range of other services to refugee populations, often informing UNHCR of their activities after the fact.

Overall, as UNHCR discovered, other organizations must be willing to be coordinated and will generally only acquiesce to that subordinate role when the coordinating body can offer
benefits beyond what the agency can acquire for itself. “Power relations and considerations of
effectiveness in the provision of humanitarian assistance” dictate acceptance of an overall
coordinating structure, rather than formal authority (Sandison 2000: par. 372). Interestingly, one
military official who served during the Kosovo crisis made the following observation: “When the
UN identifies a lead agency…does that agency have any followers?” (Minear et al. 2000: 19-20).
The UN was surely not at the forefront of the response in Kosovo for a variety of reasons but
power relationships were a critical factor.
Chapter 5: Coordination in Mozambique

No less of an emergency than the tragic events that unfolded in Rwanda and Kosovo were the consecutive floods that befell Mozambique in 2000. While Mozambique has also experienced its own share of civil conflagration, it has been peaceful since 1992. According to one account, at the time of the floods, “Mozambique seemed to be waking up from a three-decade nightmare of war, famine, floods and drought” (Christie and Hanlon 2000: 9). It is still one of the 10 poorest countries of the world with a poverty index of 70 per cent (United Nations 2000). It is understandable then that the Government of Mozambique (GoM) put the majority of its aid resources and loans into economic development rather than into disaster preparation. The government assumed that the private sector would be strong enough to manage the logistics of future emergencies and the staff of the Department for the Prevention and Response to Natural Disasters was reduced from 3,000 (in 1996) to 300 (in 1998) (Simkin and Gottwals 2000). While there were early warning signs that Mozambique would be hit by severe rainfall during its rainy season in 2000, advanced preparation would not have done much to decrease the disaster caused by three successive cyclones in February and March, resulting in the most devastating floods the country had seen in over 50 years. The preparation that had occurred was instrumental to the success of the international response (Christie and Hanlon 2000). That international aid mobilization involved over 49 countries and more than 30 international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) (Moore et al. 2003). An additional 30 local NGOs also assisted in the response to the floods.

After briefly outlining the chronology of events pertaining to these natural disasters, this chapter identifies key organizations involved in responding and discusses the character of their response in relation to the GoM’s efforts to coordinate the numerous international humanitarian relief actors. The chapter also once again highlights the capacity and contextual conditions that enabled an agency of the UN to establish credibility in order to pursue coordination activities. Many of the details in this chapter were drawn from an informative book about the floods entitled Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000. Aside from a few other key sources, including two internal UN documents, it was difficult to find other documentation of this crisis.
Chronology of Events

Southern and central Mozambique’s rainy season falls between October and March, with January to March usually the wettest months. Area forecasts for the 1999/2000 rainy season predicted a 50 per cent chance that rainfall would exceed annual averages for October to December and a 30 per cent chance that rainfall would be above average for January to March due to conditions associated with La Niña weather patterns (Christie and Hanlon 2001: 9-10). As events unfolded, however, the situation was much more severe than predicted. Maputo, in the far south of Mozambique, experienced rainfall at a level of 70 per cent above normal during the last quarter of 1999 (United Nations 2000). The following chronology highlights the main flooding events during 2000 (adapted from Christie and Hanlon 2000):

First flood
January 12-17  Maputo and two other rivers in the Maputo province in southern Mozambique flood.
January 23-30  Limpopo River floods.

Second flood
February 4-7  Cyclone Connie hits Maputo and drops record rainfall before moving to South Africa
February 6, 9  Two rivers in Maputo flood, cutting the main road 60 miles north of Maputo. This road remains closed for a month.
February 13-19  Limpopo River floods again.

Third flood
February 21-23  Cyclone Eline drops heavy rains in Mozambique, then moves up the coast and then inland across Zimbabwe and South Africa.
February 24-25  Buzi River floods and and Save River floods a second time.

Fourth flood
March 5-8  Cyclone Gloria hits with more rain.
March 8-22  Rain falls steadily, setting new records for rainfall in southern Mozambique.
            New floods of the Buzi (second time) and Save (third time) Rivers occur.
March 24-27  Limpopo River floods for a second time.
This unusually severe flooding “inundated areas that people normally treated as safe high ground” (United Nations 2000) while “[o]ver 27 per cent of the population was affected in some manner by the disaster” (Moore et al. 2003: 306) as reflected in the following:

- More than 2.04 million were affected and over 700,000 of those required assistance (United Nations 2000);
- Half a million people were displaced and temporarily sheltered in over 100 camps set up by the government (United Nations 2000);
- 45,000 people were rescued from flood waters or their results (Christie and Hanlon 2001: 37);
- 699 Mozambicans lost their lives as a direct consequence of the flooding (Moore et al. 2003: 305).

According to Virgínia Cossa, a resident of Chilambene along the Limpopo River, “The [civil] war was nothing compared to this. During the war you could run away from the enemy. But the water affected everyone and left us with no refuge” (Christie and Hanlon 2001: 32). Many people in the hardest hit areas climbed onto rooftops and trees to escape the water. Most accounts of the floods report that some people were trapped in that situation for as long as ten days.

**Actors**

For the most part, relief efforts in Mozambique focused on rescue operations and supplying food, water, shelter and healthcare to those displaced from their homes due to the floods. Besides those actors listed in Table 5 below, other key UN players included the Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA), and the WFP. INGOs were present, and local NGOs were also instrumental in relief efforts. The Mozambique Red Cross staff alone, for example, rescued approximately 4,500 people (Christie and Hanlon 2001: 37).

Table 5: Organizations in Mozambique providing relief during the floods of 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government of Mozambique (GoM)</td>
<td>After the heavy rains in Maputo on February 6, Foreign Minister Leonardo Simão took “personal charge of the management and coordination of the emergency” (Simkin and Gottwals 2000: par. 15).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Disaster and Assessment Coordination (team) (UNDAC)</td>
<td>UNDAC was the lead agency and coordinator for the UN effort. It set up offices within INGC and together they established sector desks with representation from the line Ministries, donors and international agencies. These sector desks covered food, health, shelter, water and sanitation, agriculture, non-food items, and information. The meetings were co-chaired by the GoM and UN agencies (Simkin and Gottwals 2000: par.17).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Joint Logistics Operation Center (JLOC)</td>
<td>To coordinate their relief efforts the GoM and the UN established a Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) in Maputo in the INGC. The GoM also tasked the JLOC with managing all air assets (Simkin and Gottwals 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of South Africa</td>
<td>Even though South Africa was also hit by cyclones, it provided much support to the relief efforts. Of the total 16,551 people rescued by air, the South African air force was responsible for aiding 14,391 of them (DeBrouwer 2000).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Coordinating the Actors**

The GoM recognized early that it had limited capacity to handle the emergency on its own, but it was determined to play a leading role in coordinating the international humanitarian response. Therefore, with the onslaught of heavy rains on February 6, Foreign Minister Leonardo Simão began to preside over what were to be daily meetings of the INGC, which eventually included government ministries, UN agencies, donors and INGOs (United Nations 2000). Shortly thereafter, the INGC accepted OCHA’s invitation to deploy a UNDAC team to Mozambique. Disaster team officials set up their office inside the INGC offices in Maputo rather than employing the normal arrangement of working from the offices of the WFP. This was significant because it allowed UNDAC to coordinate directly and quickly with the GoM on its efforts, which primarily centered on developing inter-agency appeals for resources, but also included support and training for the GoM’s disaster management effort.
On the Ground

Even with UNDAC support, INGC experienced many difficulties in its attempts “to coordinate or even monitor the activities of all the [INGOs] that arrived in Mozambique during the emergency period” (Moore et al. 2003: 314). While some INGOs may have had “more accurate information, greater logistical capacity and deeper financial coffers than did governmental ministries at the time” (Moore et al. 2003: 314), capacity issues alone did not limit the Disaster Institute’s effectiveness. Part of the problem was that not all INGOs registered with the INGC or various government ministries when they arrived, even though they were required to do so (Moore et al. 2003: 314). Non-registered INGOs were responsible for a disorganized distribution of food, resulting in five fatalities in one distribution center. These organizations also were responsible for advising displaced people to return home even though there was still flooding in the locations to which they were encouraged to return (Moore et al. 2003: 314).

Another study found that some of the INGOs attended coordination meetings but believed that they were only there to listen, not to share their own information (Christie and Hanlon 2001). Some brought consultants with them to develop individual relief plans, and other INGO aid workers were so determined to provide assistance that they often marginalized the local and provincial authorities, “ignoring their plans, preparations and experience” (Christie and Hanlon 2001: 48).

INGOs operating in the area of Beira also eventually ignored or by-passed the INGC on the grounds that the agency had not adequately directed or supported relief efforts in that region. The Disaster Institute asked the WFP to coordinate the response in Beira but INGC representatives from Maputo rarely attended the coordination meetings. In fact, “few INGC delegates made regular visits to the more than 100 accommodation centers set up to provide shelter and refuge to the hundreds of thousands of displaced people” (Simkin and Gottwals 2000: par. 25). Local and district authorities from the displaced communities exercised leadership of those centers. They arranged people in the camps according to their localities, and organized, along with NGOs and international aid agencies, food distribution, fresh water supplies and rationing, vaccinations, the digging of latrines and public health policing (Simkin and Gottwals 2000).

A UN internal report found that coordination of its aid organizations with NGOs in Mozambique was effective overall in part because UNDAC teams were located within INGC
and thereby served as central coordination points (United Nations 2000). Another factor that led to the coordinated response was the arrival of a Special Humanitarian Envoy: “On 29 February, the Secretary-General named the Director of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs at Geneva as his Special Humanitarian Envoy to Mozambique for the floods, and he arrived in the country the next day” (United Nations, 2000). This appointment stressed to the GoM and the donors that the UN was taking the situation seriously. The Special Humanitarian Envoy was able to mobilize international support rapidly by encouraging “bilateral donors and non-governmental organizations to get involved and to participate in INGC coordination” (Ibid.). According to one UN official in Maputo, “His rank was really important. People wanted to meet a special envoy of the Secretary-General and this made people more anxious to join his team” (Ibid.).

Authors of another study of the flood crisis have argued that neither the INGC nor UN bodies contributed as much to the coordination efforts as those organizations that already had a base in Mozambique. According to Christie and Hanlon (2001), development organizations working in areas not affected by the floods usually had a small office in Maputo, had a staff that spoke Portuguese and English (and/or the agency’s national language), and had links with Mozambican NGOs. These agencies “had a feel for Mozambique, knew how the system worked, were able to make the appropriate links to integrate visitors into the relief effort, and were able to provide a point of contact when people went out into the field” (Christie and Hanlon 2001: 48).

In the Air

While the humanitarian relief efforts on the ground were somewhat difficult to coordinate, air operations proved much easier to synergize. As noted above in Table 5 the JLOC placed its offices within INGC thereby ensuring that the INGC was involved in all decision-making processes concerning the deployment of aircraft. That role undoubtedly helped lend credibility to INGC’s efforts while enhancing its own sense of confidence and capacity (Christie and Hanlon 2001). As the head of JLOC in Maputo observed: “Initially, it was difficult to impose the UN’s centralized-management concept upon the military actors, although coordination between JLOC and the military structures was eventually flawless” (DeBrouwer, 2000). The actions of the US Air Force (USAF) afforded one example. Whereas in the past it had not readily coordinated with UN humanitarian agencies, in the Mozambican emergency, the USAF negotiated terms under which JLOC could coordinate its efforts. Part of the reason for the different approach stemmed
from a bad experience in a humanitarian operation in Albania in 1999. There, US troops had acted like the “big dog on the block” and had provoked hostile reactions from some humanitarian relief workers, according to the Third Air Force’s historian (Christie and Hanlon 2001: 67). The Mozambique emergency was the first time the USAF implemented a new policy and tactic—to provide assistance as well as cooperate actively in a coordinated response—and the results were positive.

The JLOC played a valuable part in the coordination efforts because the floods destroyed many of the roads, and many victims were isolated. Not only were aircraft necessary for rescue efforts but also to distribute much of the aid that had been donated. By its own accounts, JLOC’s “most important task was to manage aircraft, and to coordinate and produce a detailed daily schedule of all humanitarian flights” (DeBrouwer 2000: 26). The JLOC developed a common procedure for all humanitarian organizations to request air transport to support its relief operations. Requests were rank ordered and scheduled with relevant air operators. Each day, schedules for the next day were decided by 4pm. Flights left by 8am the next morning after general coordination briefing sessions for all participating crews. Operations occurred seven days a week, from dusk to dawn: “At the operation’s peak, more than 250 hours were being flown each day” (DeBrouwer 2000). Not a single accident occurred.

**Capacity and Contextual Conditions**

While the GoM was ultimately responsible for coordinating the international humanitarian relief actors that responded to the floods in 2000, the following discussion of capacity and contextual conditions leading to an organization’s credibility to coordinate other humanitarian relief actors will focus once again on UN agencies. Capacity conditions, along with corresponding examples, that illustrate the UN’s ability to fulfill those conditions are summarized in the Table below.

Table 6: Capacity conditions apparent in Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity Conditions</th>
<th>Examples where the capacity conditions were met</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to establish a “presence” in an emergency during the early stages</td>
<td>UNDAC staff members arrived in Mozambique within a week of the first flooding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6 indicates that the UN’s involvement in the relief operations in Mozambique during the 2000 floods met many of the suggested capacity conditions that led to establishing its credibility to coordinate aspects of the response. Two primary contextual conditions affected various UN agencies’ capacities to coordinate the international humanitarian relief community in the Mozambique emergency. First, the U.S. Air Force agreed to be coordinated by the JLOC in an attempt to employ a new strategy in humanitarian emergencies. Although the USAF’s role in the rescue efforts was relatively small, its willingness to cooperate set an unprecedented example for other military actors. The second key contextual condition captured well by Christie and Hanlon (2001) was the important role played by assistance that came from sources outside the international humanitarian community. Development INGOs, for example, placed their newly arrived relief counterparts in contact with local NGOs. This type of activity contributed to a more effective response even though the UN did not itself orchestrate these linkages among development and relief agencies.
The floods of February and March 2000 affected over two million people in central and southern Mozambique. Media coverage, highlighted by the birth of Rosita, whose mother was sheltering in a tree, probably increased the amount of aid donated and relief workers available. Typically, all assistance was appropriate, but not all aid agencies were helpful, as in the case of poor food distribution. Overall, close to 50,000 people were rescued from the floodwaters or their results, and thousands more received necessary assistance. The UN doubtless greatly assisted the GoM’s ability to coordinate the response of members of the international humanitarian community.
Chapter 6: Key Findings, Donini Revisited, and UNOCHA Revamped

The previous three chapters depicted coordination efforts in Rwanda, Kosovo and Mozambique through an exploration of how these three emergencies unfolded, a sketching of the principal actors involved in each humanitarian response, and a description of their management efforts. Each chapter concluded with a discussion regarding certain capacity conditions that United Nation’s agencies had or had not met. Then, I analyzed the contextual conditions that both inhibited and promoted the capacity of those UN agencies to respond in an effective and coordinated fashion to humanitarian emergencies. Table 7 summarizes all three cases, highlighting the prominent contextual conditions at play in each case. Initially, I further explore the findings from Table 7, link those findings to Donini’s tripartite typology of coordination, and suggest that the role of the UN humanitarian entities should be reframed.

Key Findings

Although the UN’s roles in Rwanda and Mozambique were different, the former case an instance in which agencies of the United Nations played a predominant part in coordinating humanitarian actors and the latter in which the UN had a supporting position, there are several similarities as Table 7 outlines. Many of the capacity conditions found in Rwanda are also apparent in Mozambique. The fact that these conditions obtained in the UN agencies active in coordinating other actors in the response suggests that these factors contributed to the organization’s credibility and ability to play a coordinating role. In contrast, UNHCR in Albania did not enjoy most of these capacity conditions and, as several evaluations of that organization in the crisis argue, UNHCR was not a credible agency to coordinate the relief efforts in the Kosovo crisis.

Contextual conditions in all three cases certainly influenced the capacity of the various UN agencies involved. Some of these conditions were created by the decisions of other organizations, such as the extent to which they would support the UN’s more centralized decision-making process or whether they were willing to inform a United Nation’s agency of their activities. This implies that even if a UN agency meets most of the capacity conditions, there may still be many contextual conditions over which it has little control or influence. Each
Table 7: Capacity and contextual conditions apparent in Rwanda, Kosovo and Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity Conditions</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Contextual Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity to establish a “presence” in an emergency during the early stages</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>Rwanda: many organizations had left the area prior to April 6 and immediately afterwards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Kosovo</strong>: refugee influx large than staff on hand could handle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Mozambique</strong>: UN offices were already established prior to the floods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff at the level deemed appropriate for the political dimensions of the response</td>
<td>not discussed in literature</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td><strong>Kosovo</strong>: Special Envoy had to be two places at once.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Mozambique</strong>: Special Envoy could focus on one crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledgeable, disciplined and personable staff that are well-trained and willing to work with staff from other organizations</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td><strong>Rwanda</strong>: UNHCR worked with other NGOs in the Ngara District refugee camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Kosovo</strong>: new meeting arrangements were difficult in which to adapt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Mozambique</strong>: the Special Envoy’s expertise assisted staff members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to make decisions in the field rather than waiting to hear from headquarters</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>not discussed in literature</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td><strong>Rwanda and Mozambique</strong>: circumstances of emergency required this to happen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick access to or control over information gathering and dissemination</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td><strong>Rwanda</strong>: UN agencies were first on the ground and became the primary information source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Kosovo</strong>: other organizations had more staff members placed throughout country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Mozambique</strong>: USAF agreed to a coordination of its resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to or control over funding resources</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>not discussed in literature</td>
<td><strong>Rwanda</strong>: Tanzanian government authorities and ECHO enabled UNHCR to have decision-making power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Kosovo</strong>: poor initial performance resulted in lack of funding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
crisis analyzed for this paper was characterized by specific contextual conditions, with little overlap. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize about the coordination process since capacity issues are related to contextual circumstances. What does this finding suggest for the utility of Donini’s tripartite typology of coordination?

**Donini Revisited**

The introduction of this paper raised several questions. Each is addressed briefly again next.

*Does Donini’s tripartite typology, command, consensus and default, capture the full sweep of the UN’s coordination efforts in humanitarian emergencies?*

UN evaluations of the coordination of the international humanitarian response to the crisis in Rwanda found Donini’s tripartite typology to be a useful extrapolation from actual events. Coordination by command was evidenced in UNHCR’s efforts in the refugee camps in the Ngara District of Tanzania because the High Commissioner had the “power of the purse.” ECHO channeled many of its relief funds into UNHCR in Ngara, enabling that agency to limit the number of NGOs to a manageable number. UNREO on the other hand worked by developing consensus. It acted as a clearinghouse for information and created a consensus-based approach in meetings and efforts in humanitarian assistance. Coordination of only a few organizations describes the efforts of UNAHT early in the crisis, a condition that can best be categorized as coordination by default. UNAHT was one of the first organizations to establish a presence in Kigali soon after the genocide began on April 6 and quickly became the primary source of information for the international relief community. Additionally, a division of labor was established relatively easily among the few organizations in residence. For the rather small number of organizations in the Rwanda region at the time (under ten), coordination of this kind was effective.

Once Donini’s typology is applied to other humanitarian emergencies, it loses much of its descriptive power. For instance, in Albania, UNHCR did not coordinate any of the actors providing relief. It did chair some NGO sector meetings but it did not do much beyond that as a coordinating entity. None of Donini’s categories accurately describes UN coordination in Kosovo. JLOC coordination efforts in Mozambique could be categorized as a consensus
approach since several foreign military air forces agreed to allow JLOC to organize their relief activities. However, this is the only one of the three types that fits the coordination efforts of the UN in this crisis. It applies only because of specific contextual conditions and is only descriptive of one part of the response.

*Were there certain contextual conditions that needed to obtain for coordination to transpire?*

As the cases of Rwanda and Mozambique reveal, favorable contextual conditions are crucial for coordination to occur. Being one of the few organizations in the field quickly helped UN agencies establish a “presence” that other relief actors did not have. As long as capacity conditions were also met, such as enough staff members of the right standing and with appropriate expertise to assume service provision, this presence situated the UN as an authority for information, a key component for effective coordination. Furthermore, other international relief organizations were then much more disposed to agree to coordination by UN agencies. In Albania this did not occur, further compounding UNHCR’s inability to act as the lead agency.

*Did contextual conditions enable top down control to occur and to be effective?*

In only one case, that of Rwanda, did contextual conditions allow the UN to attain a situation resembling Donini’s frequently touted coordination by command category. Closer examination of the United Nations actions in Rwanda reveals that although UN organizations met most of the capacity conditions, these alone did not provide agencies with authority to coordinate by command. Only the addition of funds from ECHO and the Tanzanian government’s willingness to cooperate enabled UNHCR in Ngara to coordinate from the top down. This suggests that the frequent support among academic analysts given to the coordination by command model appears unrealistic. How is it that this model has earned the position of the “best case scenario” when it occurs rarely and, when it does, its efficacy is based on contextual circumstances?

As interviews with UN staff confirm and empirical study of the NGO literature and the cases of Kosovo and Mozambique show, authoritative coordination is undesirable, unattainable and unnecessary, respectively. The idea of top down coordination is improbable to fit most humanitarian emergencies since it not only depends on the various United Nation’s agencies
capacities, but also circumstances outside of their authority and control. Rather than perpetuating the notion that the best strategy for the UN in these emergencies is to act as a micro-manager, analysts should reconsider whether their research is seeking answers to the right questions. For instance, now the questions seem to be based on discovering the impediments that result in the UN’s failure to act as the lead coordinator in certain catastrophic situations, and what can be done to give the organization more power. A different approach would be to evaluate the United Nation’s inherent capacities based on past performance to determine what the UN could actually accomplish in a coordinating role.

UNOCHA Revamped

Ten years ago, Donini (1994) described UNOCHA’s role in Rwanda (then named UNDHA) as a “facilitator”. A facilitator “provides a framework and a range of services [which] allow humanitarian relief agencies to operate under the best possible conditions” (Donini and Niland 1994: 14). The services that Donini argued UNOCHA needed to develop to act as a facilitator are aggregated into his “package approach” to coordination that would clarify the UN’s functions and services and develop its capacities to make them available (Ibid.). Some of these services entail:

- The creation of a clear mandate for UNOCHA;
- An outline of the specific services UNOCHA is able to provide for other organizations in the field (including overall advocacy and strategic planning); and
- An understanding of the functions of the UNOCHA office in the field (information gathering, government liaison, etc.) (Donini and Niland 1994: 14-15).

Analysts appear to have overlooked his package approach to coordination and instead focused on achieving his coordination by command model. This research suggests that this oversight has been a mistake.

Rather than calling for an ever more authoritative role for UNOCHA, a role that neither NGO nor UN staff seem to want and the UN does not have the resources to provide in any case, I argue that the function of a pragmatic facilitator in humanitarian emergencies should be pursued by UNOCHA. In this role, in addition to Donini’s suggestions, the agency would be tasked with marshalling resources, assessing needs, and mobilizing service providers towards common objectives. This means redirecting UNOCHA away from its orientation toward a contentious
centrally controlled coordinating role to one in which it does not face the challenges of trying to manage other organizations in the field. Instead, UNOCHA would survey NGOs, donors and governmental organizations (in the event of a natural disaster) to discover what resources and capabilities each agency possesses. At the same time, UNOCHA would scan the crisis to discern the needs of affected populations. Depending on how rapidly the emergency unfolds, the breadth of the needs assessments would vary, with ongoing monitoring required. These steps would provide UNOCHA with a reasonable map of resources and needs in order to link the two and mobilize action.

Overall, an emphasis on capacity issues privileges the process of coordination over the structure of coordination, i.e. what agency is responsible for coordination and over which organizations. This is important because emergencies, while often sharing common characteristics, are unstructured and require unique response efforts. The contextual conditions in each emergency will vary and a UN that is responsive and flexible to changing conditions (that often evolve rapidly) is crucial. Furthermore, conceptualizing coordination into a typology of capacity and contextual variables would allow analysts to understand better the process of coordination that includes inter-personal, inter-organizational and intra-organizational relationships. As all three cases have shown, human agency and power relations greatly influences UN operations. A focus on resource control and management techniques misses these important aspects. Further evaluation with an emphasis on discerning the capacity and contextual conditions in past and future humanitarian assistance responses would provide researchers with a clearer picture of how and when coordination occurs. This information would then offer a framework for the UN to follow in its role as pragmatic facilitator of common organizational action. Since NGOs seem to be pressing to ensure more efficient and effective service provision, this role for the UN might prove helpful to all participating parties because it does not put any particular UN agency in the contentious position of an “authority” but as a “partner,” striving towards similar objectives as the NGO community.


NATO. 1999. “NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo.”


Appendix 1:
General Assembly Resolution 46/182


United Nations

A/RES/46/182

General Assembly

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19 December 1991

Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian
emergency assistance of the United Nations

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2816 (XXVI) of 14 December 1971 and its subsequent resolutions and
decisions on humanitarian assistance, including its resolution 45/100 of 14 December 1990,

Recalling also its resolution 44/236 of 22 December 1989, the annex to which contains the
International Framework of Action for the International Decade for Natural Disaster
Reduction,

Deeply concerned about the suffering of the victims of disasters and emergency situations, the
loss in human lives, the flow of refugees, the mass displacement of people and the material
destruction,

Mindful of the need to strengthen further and make more effective the collective efforts of the
international community, in particular the United Nations system, in providing humanitarian
assistance,
Taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General on the review of the capacity, experience and coordination arrangements in the United Nations system for humanitarian assistance,

1. Adopts the text contained in the annex to the present resolution for the strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session on the implementation of the present resolution.

ANNEX

I. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1. Humanitarian assistance is of cardinal importance for the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies.

2. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

3. The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country.

4. Each State has the responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and other emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected State has the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory.

5. The magnitude and duration of many emergencies may be beyond the response capacity of many affected countries. International cooperation to address emergency situations and to strengthen the response capacity of affected countries is thus of great importance. Such cooperation should be provided in accordance with international law and national laws. Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations working impartially and with strictly humanitarian motives should continue to make a significant contribution in supplementing national efforts.

6. States whose populations are in need of humanitarian assistance are called upon to facilitate the work of these organizations in implementing humanitarian assistance, in particular the supply of food, medicines, shelter and health care, for which access to victims is essential.

7. States in proximity to emergencies are urged to participate closely with the affected countries in international efforts, with a view to facilitating, to the extent possible, the transit of humanitarian assistance.
8. Special attention should be given to disaster prevention and preparedness by the Governments concerned, as well as by the international community.

9. There is a clear relationship between emergency, rehabilitation and development. In order to ensure a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and development, emergency assistance should be provided in ways that will be supportive of recovery and long-term development. Thus, emergency measures should be seen as a step towards long-term development.

10. Economic growth and sustainable development are essential for prevention of and preparedness against natural disasters and other emergencies. Many emergencies reflect the underlying crisis in development facing developing countries. Humanitarian assistance should therefore be accompanied by a renewal of commitment to economic growth and sustainable development of developing countries. In this context, adequate resources must be made available to address their development problems.

11. Contributions for humanitarian assistance should be provided in a way which is not to the detriment of resources made available for international cooperation for development.

12. The United Nations has a central and unique role to play in providing leadership and coordinating the efforts of the international community to support the affected countries. The United Nations should ensure the prompt and smooth delivery of relief assistance in full respect of the above-mentioned principles, bearing in mind also relevant General Assembly resolutions, including resolutions 2816 (XXVI) of 14 December 1971 and 45/100 of 14 December 1990. The United Nations system needs to be adapted and strengthened to meet present and future challenges in an effective and coherent manner. It should be provided with resources commensurate with future requirements. The inadequacy of such resources has been one of the major constraints in the effective response of the United Nations to emergencies.

II. PREVENTION

13. The international community should adequately assist developing countries in strengthening their capacity in disaster prevention and mitigation, both at the national and regional levels, for example, in establishing and enhancing integrated programmes in this regard.

14. In order to reduce the impact of disasters there should be increased awareness of the need for establishing disaster mitigation strategies, particularly in disaster-prone countries. There should be greater exchange and dissemination of existing and new technical information related to the assessment, prediction and mitigation of disasters. As called for in the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, efforts should be intensified to develop measures for prevention and mitigation of natural disasters and similar emergencies through programmes of technical assistance and modalities for favourable access to, and transfer of, relevant technology.
15. The disaster management training programme recently initiated by the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator and the United Nations Development Programme should be strengthened and broadened.

16. Organizations of the United Nations system involved in the funding and the provision of assistance relevant to the prevention of emergencies should be provided with sufficient and readily available resources.

17. The international community is urged to provide the necessary support and resources to programmes and activities undertaken to further the goals and objectives of the Decade.

III. PREPAREDNESS

18. International relief assistance should supplement national efforts to improve the capacities of developing countries to mitigate the effects of natural disasters expeditiously and effectively and to cope efficiently with all emergencies. The United Nations should enhance its efforts to assist developing countries to strengthen their capacity to respond to disasters, at the national and regional levels, as appropriate.

Early warning

19. On the basis of existing mandates and drawing upon monitoring arrangements available within the system, the United Nations should intensify efforts, building upon the existing capacities of relevant organizations and entities of the United Nations, for the systematic pooling, analysis and dissemination of early-warning information on natural disasters and other emergencies. In this context, the United Nations should consider making use as appropriate of the early-warning capacities of Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.

20. Early-warning information should be made available in an unrestricted and timely manner to all interested Governments and concerned authorities, in particular of affected or disaster-prone countries. The capacity of disaster-prone countries to receive, use and disseminate this information should be strengthened. In this connection, the international community is urged to assist these countries upon request with the establishment and enhancement of national early-warning systems.

IV. STAND-BY CAPACITY

(a) Contingency funding arrangements

21. Organizations and entities of the United Nations system should continue to respond to requests for emergency assistance within their respective mandates. Reserve and other contingency funding arrangements of these organizations and entities should be examined by their respective governing bodies to strengthen further their operational capacities for rapid and coordinated response to emergencies.
22. In addition, there is a need for a complementary central funding mechanism to ensure the provision of adequate resources for use in the initial phase of emergencies that require a system-wide response.

23. To that end, the Secretary-General should establish under his authority a central emergency revolving fund as a cash-flow mechanism to ensure the rapid and coordinated response of the organizations of the system.

24. This fund should be put into operation with an amount of 50 million United States dollars. The fund should be financed by voluntary contributions. Consultations among potential donors should be held to this end. To achieve this target, the Secretary-General should launch an appeal to potential donors and convene a meeting of those donors in the first quarter of 1992 to secure contributions to the fund on an assured, broad-based and additional basis.

25. Resources should be advanced to the operational organizations of the system on the understanding that they would reimburse the fund in the first instance from the voluntary contributions received in response to consolidated appeals.

26. The operation of the fund should be reviewed after two years.

(b) Additional measures for rapid response

27. The United Nations should, building upon the existing capacities of relevant organizations, establish a central register of all specialized personnel and teams of technical specialists, as well as relief supplies, equipment and services available within the United Nations system and from Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, that can be called upon at short notice by the United Nations.

28. The United Nations should continue to make appropriate arrangements with interested Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to enable it to have more expeditious access, when necessary, to their emergency relief capacities, including food reserves, emergency stockpiles and personnel, as well as logistic support. In the context of the annual report to the General Assembly mentioned in paragraph 35 (i) below, the Secretary-General is requested to report on progress in this regard.

29. Special emergency rules and procedures should be developed by the United Nations to enable all organizations to disburse quickly emergency funds, and to procure emergency supplies and equipment, as well as to recruit emergency staff.

30. Disaster-prone countries should develop special emergency procedures to expedite the rapid procurement and deployment of equipment and relief supplies.

V. CONSOLIDATED APPEALS

31. For emergencies requiring a coordinated response, the Secretary-General should ensure that an initial consolidated appeal covering all concerned organizations of the system, prepared
in consultation with the affected State, is issued within the shortest possible time and in any event not longer than one week. In the case of prolonged emergencies, this initial appeal should be updated and elaborated within four weeks, as more information becomes available.

32. Potential donors should adopt necessary measures to increase and expedite their contributions, including setting aside, on a stand-by basis, financial and other resources that can be disbursed quickly to the United Nations system in response to the consolidated appeals of the Secretary-General.

VI. COORDINATION, COOPERATION AND LEADERSHIP

(a) Leadership of the Secretary-General

33. The leadership role of the Secretary-General is critical and must be strengthened to ensure better preparation for, as well as rapid and coherent response to, natural disasters and other emergencies. This should be achieved through coordinated support for prevention and preparedness measures and the optimal utilization of, inter alia, an inter-agency standing committee, consolidated appeals, a central emergency revolving fund and a register of stand-by capacities.

34. To this end, and on the understanding that the requisite resources envisaged in paragraph 24 above would be provided, a high-level official (emergency relief coordinator) would be designated by the Secretary-General to work closely with and with direct access to him, in cooperation with the relevant organizations and entities of the system dealing with humanitarian assistance and in full respect of their mandates, without prejudice to any decisions to be taken by the General Assembly on the overall restructuring of the Secretariat of the United Nations. This high-level official should combine the functions at present carried out in the coordination of United Nations response by representatives of the Secretary-General for major and complex emergencies, as well as by the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator.

35. Under the aegis of the General Assembly and working under the direction of the Secretary-General, the high-level official would have the following responsibilities:

(a) Processing requests from affected Member States for emergency assistance requiring a coordinated response;

(b) Maintaining an overview of all emergencies through, inter alia, the systematic pooling and analysis of early-warning information as envisaged in paragraph 19 above, with a view to coordinating and facilitating the humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system to those emergencies that require a coordinated response;

(c) Organizing, in consultation with the Government of the affected country, a joint inter-agency needs-assessment mission and preparing a consolidated appeal to be issued by the Secretary-General, to be followed by periodic situation reports including information on all sources of external assistance;
(d) Actively facilitating, including through negotiation if needed, the access by the operational organizations to emergency areas for the rapid provision of emergency assistance by obtaining the consent of all parties concerned, through modalities such as the establishment of temporary relief corridors where needed, days and zones of tranquility and other forms;

(e) Managing, in consultation with the operational organizations concerned, the central emergency revolving fund and assisting in the mobilization of resources;

(f) Serving as a central focal point with Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerning United Nations emergency relief operations and, when appropriate and necessary, mobilizing their emergency relief capacities, including through consultations in his capacity as Chairman of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee;

(g) Providing consolidated information, including early warning on emergencies, to all interested Governments and concerned authorities, particularly affected and disaster-prone countries, drawing on the capacities of the organizations of the system and other available sources;

(h) Actively promoting, in close collaboration with concerned organizations, the smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction as relief operations under his aegis are phased out;

(i) Preparing an annual report for the Secretary-General on the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance, including information on the central emergency revolving fund, to be submitted to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council.

36. The high-level official should be supported by a secretariat based on a strengthened Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator and the consolidation of existing offices that deal with complex emergencies. This secretariat could be supplemented by staff seconded from concerned organizations of the system. The high-level official should work closely with organizations and entities of the United Nations system, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Organization for Migration and relevant non-governmental organizations. At the country level, the high-level official would maintain close contact with and provide leadership to the resident coordinators on matters relating to humanitarian assistance.

37. The Secretary-General should ensure that arrangements between the high-level official and all relevant organizations are set in place, establishing responsibilities for prompt and coordinated action in the event of emergency.

(b) Inter-Agency Standing Committee

38. An Inter-Agency Standing Committee serviced by a strengthened Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator should be established under the chairmanship of the high-level official with the participation of all operational organizations and with a standing
invitation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the International Organization for Migration. Relevant non-governmental organizations can be invited to participate on an ad hoc basis. The Committee should meet as soon as possible in response to emergencies.

(c) Country-level coordination

39. Within the overall framework described above and in support of the efforts of the affected countries, the resident coordinator should normally coordinate the humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system at the country level. He/She should facilitate the preparedness of the United Nations system and assist in a speedy transition from relief to development. He/She should promote the use of all locally or regionally available relief capacities. The resident coordinator should chair an emergency operations group of field representatives and experts from the system.

VII. CONTINUUM FROM RELIEF TO REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT

40. Emergency assistance must be provided in ways that will be supportive of recovery and long-term development. Development assistance organizations of the United Nations system should be involved at an early stage and should collaborate closely with those responsible for emergency relief and recovery, within their existing mandates.

41. International cooperation and support for rehabilitation and reconstruction should continue with sustained intensity after the initial relief stage. The rehabilitation phase should be used as an opportunity to restructure and improve facilities and services destroyed by emergencies in order to enable them to withstand the impact of future emergencies.

42. International cooperation should be accelerated for the development of developing countries, thereby contributing to reducing the occurrence and impact of future disasters and emergencies.
Appendix 2:

Principles of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes

(source: http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/code.asp)

1: The Humanitarian imperative comes first
The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As members of the international community, we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to affected populations, is of fundamental importance in exercising that responsibility. The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. When we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.

2: Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone
Wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aid upon a thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those needs. Within the entirety of our programmes, we will reflect considerations of proportionality. Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one part of a country as another. Thus, our provision of aid will reflect the degree of suffering it seeks to alleviate. In implementing this approach, we recognise the crucial role played by women in disaster prone communities and will ensure that this role is supported, not diminished, by our aid programmes. The implementation of such a universal, impartial and independent policy, can only be effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary resources to provide for such equitable relief, and have equal access to all disaster victims.

3: Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint
Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need of individuals, families and communities. Notwithstanding the right of NGHAs to espouse particular political or religious opinions, we affirm that assistance will not be dependent on the adherence of the recipients to those opinions. We will not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.

4: We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy
NGHAs are agencies which act independently from governments. We therefore formulate our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any government, except in so far as it coincides with our own independent policy. We will never knowingly or through negligence allow ourselves, or our employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments. We will use the assistance we receive to
respond to needs and this assistance should not be driven by the need to dispose of donor commodity surpluses, nor by the political interest of any particular donor. We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and finances by concerned individuals to support our work and recognise the independence of action promoted by such voluntary motivation. In order to protect our independence we will seek to avoid dependence upon a single funding source.

5: We shall respect culture and custom
We will endeavour to respect the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries we are working in.

6: We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities
All people and communities - even in disaster - possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. Where possible, we will work through local NGHAs as partners in planning and implementation, and co-operate with local government structures where appropriate. We will place a high priority on the proper co-ordination of our emergency responses. This is best done within the countries concerned by those most directly involved in the relief operations, and should include representatives of the relevant UN bodies.

7: Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid
Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme. We will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation programmes.

8: Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs
All relief actions affect the prospects for long term development, either in a positive or a negative fashion. Recognising this, we will strive to implement relief programmes which actively reduce the beneficiaries' vulnerability to future disasters and help create sustainable lifestyles. We will pay particular attention to environmental concerns in the design and management of relief programmes. We will also endeavour to minimise the negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoid long term beneficiary dependence upon external aid.

9: We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources
We often act as an institutional link in the partnership between those who wish to assist and those who need assistance during disasters. We therefore hold ourselves accountable to both constituencies. All our dealings with donors and beneficiaries shall reflect an attitude of openness and transparency. We recognise the need to report on our activities, both from a financial perspective and the perspective of effectiveness. We recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring of aid distributions and to carry out regular assessments of the impact of disaster assistance. We will also seek to report, in an open fashion, upon the impact of our work, and the factors limiting or enhancing that impact. Our programmes will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertise in order to minimise the wasting of valuable resources.
10: In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects

Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never be lost. In our public information we shall portray an objective image of the disaster situation where the capacities and aspirations of disaster victims are highlighted, and not just their vulnerabilities and fears. While we will co-operate with the media in order to enhance public response, we will not allow external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle of maximising overall relief assistance. We will avoid competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage in situations where such coverage may be to the detriment of the service provided to the beneficiaries or to the security of our staff or the beneficiaries.
Appendix 3:

Resolution 1199 (1998)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting on 23 September 1998

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to that resolution, and in particular his report of 4 September 1998 (S/1998/834 and Add.1),

Noting with appreciation the statement of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (the Contact Group) of 12 June 1998 at the conclusion of the Contact Group's meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Canada and Japan (S/1998/567, annex), and the further statement of the Contact Group made in Bonn on 8 July 1998 (S/1998/657),


Noting further the communication by the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to the Contact Group on 7 July 1998, expressing the view that the situation in Kosovo represents an armed conflict within the terms of the mandate of the Tribunal,

Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the Secretary-General, the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes,

Deeply concerned by the flow of refugees into northern Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and other European countries as a result of the use of force in Kosovo, as well as by the increasing numbers of displaced persons within Kosovo, and other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, up to 50,000 of whom the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has estimated are without shelter and other basic necessities,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, and underlining the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for creating the conditions which allow them to do so,

Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals by any group or individual, and all external support for such activities in Kosovo, including the supply of arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo and expressing concern at the reports of continuing violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998),
Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout Kosovo, alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastrophe as described in the report of the Secretary-General, and emphasizing the need to prevent this from happening,

Deeply concerned also by reports of increasing violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law, and emphasizing the need to ensure that the rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo are respected,

Reaffirming the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998), in which the Council expressed support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration,

Reaffirming also the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

Affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which would enhance the prospects for a meaningful dialogue between the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership and reduce the risks of a humanitarian catastrophe;
2. Demands also that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe;
3. Calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with international involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading to an end of the crisis and to a negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo, and welcomes the current efforts aimed at facilitating such a dialogue;
4. Demands further that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in addition to the measures called for under resolution 1160 (1998), implement immediately the following concrete measures towards achieving a political solution to the situation in Kosovo as contained in the Contact Group statement of 12 June 1998:
   a. cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression;
   b. enable effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo by the European Community Monitoring Mission and diplomatic missions accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including access and complete freedom of movement of such monitors to, from and within Kosovo unimpeded by government authorities, and expeditious issuance of appropriate travel documents to international personnel contributing to the monitoring;
c. facilitate, in agreement with the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and allow free and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to Kosovo;

d. make rapid progress to a clear timetable, in the dialogue referred to in paragraph 3 with the Kosovo Albanian community called for in resolution 1160 (1998), with the aim of agreeing confidence-building measures and finding a political solution to the problems of Kosovo;

5. Notes, in this connection, the commitments of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in his joint statement with the President of the Russian Federation of 16 June 1998:

   a. to resolve existing problems by political means on the basis of equality for all citizens and ethnic communities in Kosovo;
   b. not to carry out any repressive actions against the peaceful population;
   c. to provide full freedom of movement for and ensure that there will be no restrictions on representatives of foreign States and international institutions accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia monitoring the situation in Kosovo;
   d. to ensure full and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations, the ICRC and the UNHCR, and delivery of humanitarian supplies;
   e. to facilitate the unimpeded return of refugees and displaced persons under programmes agreed with the UNHCR and the ICRC, providing State aid for the reconstruction of destroyed homes,

and calls for the full implementation of these commitments;

6. Insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn all terrorist action, and emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community should pursue their goals by peaceful means only;

7. Recalls the obligations of all States to implement fully the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998);

8. Endorses the steps taken to establish effective international monitoring of the situation in Kosovo, and in this connection welcomes the establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission;

9. Urges States and international organizations represented in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to make available personnel to fulfil the responsibility of carrying out effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo until the objectives of this resolution and those of resolution 1160 (1998) are achieved;

10. Reminds the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that it has the primary responsibility for the security of all diplomatic personnel accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the safety and security of all international and non-governmental humanitarian personnel in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and all others concerned in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take all appropriate steps to ensure that monitoring personnel performing functions under this resolution are not subject to the threat or use of force or interference of any kind;
11. Requests States to pursue all means consistent with their domestic legislation and relevant international law to prevent funds collected on their territory being used to contravene resolution 1160 (1998);
12. Calls upon Member States and others concerned to provide adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the region and to respond promptly and generously to the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the Kosovo Crisis;
13. Calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the leaders of the Kosovo Albanian community and all others concerned to cooperate fully with the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the investigation of possible violations within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal;
14. Underlines also the need for the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to bring to justice those members of the security forces who have been involved in the mistreatment of civilians and the deliberate destruction of property;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide regular reports to the Council as necessary on his assessment of compliance with this resolution by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community, including through his regular reports on compliance with resolution 1160 (1998);
16. Decides, should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region;
17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Appendix 4:

Resolution 1203(1998)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3937th meeting, on 24 October 1998

The Security Council,


Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to those resolutions, in particular his report of 5 October 1998 (S/1998/912),


Welcoming also the agreement signed in Belgrade on 15 October 1998 by the Chief of General Staff of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) providing for the establishment of an air verification mission over Kosovo (S/1998/991, annex), complementing the OSCE Verification Mission,

Welcoming also the decision of the Permanent Council of the OSCE of 15 October 1998 (S/1998/959, annex),

Welcoming the decision of the Secretary-General to send a mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to establish a first-hand capacity to assess developments on the ground in Kosovo,

Reaffirming that, under the Charter of the United Nations, primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is conferred on the Security Council,

Recalling the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998), in which the Council expressed support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration,

Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals by any group or individual, and all external support for such activities in Kosovo, including the supply of arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo, and expressing concern at the reports of continuing violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998),
Deeply concerned at the recent closure by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of independent media outlets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and emphasizing the need for these to be allowed freely to resume their operations,

Deeply alarmed and concerned at the continuing grave humanitarian situation throughout Kosovo and the impending humanitarian catastrophe, and re-emphasizing the need to prevent this from happening,

Stressing the importance of proper coordination of humanitarian initiatives undertaken by States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and international organizations in Kosovo,

Emphasizing the need to ensure the safety and security of members of the Verification Mission in Kosovo and the Air Verification Mission over Kosovo,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

Affirming that the unresolved situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a continuing threat to peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Endorses and supports the agreements signed in Belgrade on 16 October 1998 between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE, and on 15 October 1998 between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO, concerning the verification of compliance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and all others concerned in Kosovo with the requirements of its resolution 1199 (1998), and demands the full and prompt implementation of these agreements by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

2. Notes the endorsement by the Government of Serbia of the accord reached by the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States Special Envoy (S/1998/953, annex), and the public commitment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to complete negotiations on a framework for a political settlement by 2 November 1998, and calls for the full implementation of these commitments;

3. Demands that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comply fully and swiftly with resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) and cooperate fully with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo and the NATO Air Verification Mission over Kosovo according to the terms of the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 above;

4. Demands also that the Kosovo Albanian leadership and all other elements of the Kosovo Albanian community comply fully and swiftly with resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) and cooperate fully with the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo;

5. Stresses the urgent need for the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with international involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading to an end of the crisis and to a negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo;
6. Demands that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Albanian leadership and all others concerned respect the freedom of movement of the OSCE Verification Mission and other international personnel;

7. Urges States and international organizations to make available personnel to the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo;

8. Reminds the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that it has the primary responsibility for the safety and security of all diplomatic personnel accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including members of the OSCE Verification Mission, as well as the safety and security of all international and non-governmental humanitarian personnel in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and all others concerned throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia including the Kosovo Albanian leadership, to take all appropriate steps to ensure that personnel performing functions under this resolution and the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 above are not subject to the threat or use of force or interference of any kind;

9. Welcomes in this context the commitment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to guarantee the safety and security of the Verification Missions as contained in the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 above, notes that, to this end, the OSCE is considering arrangements to be implemented in cooperation with other organizations, and affirms that, in the event of an emergency, action may be needed to ensure their safety and freedom of movement as envisaged in the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 above;

10. Insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn all terrorist actions, demands that such actions cease immediately and emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community should pursue their goals by peaceful means only;

11. Demands immediate action from the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to cooperate with international efforts to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe;

12. Reaffirms the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, and underlines the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for creating the conditions which allow them to do so;

13. Urges Member States and others concerned to provide adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the region and to respond promptly and generously to the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the Kosovo crisis;

14. Calls for prompt and complete investigation, including international supervision and participation, of all atrocities committed against civilians and full cooperation with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including compliance with its orders, requests for information and investigations;

15. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to relevant equipment for the sole use of the Verification Missions in accordance with the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 above;

16. Requests the Secretary-General, acting in consultation with the parties concerned with the agreements referred to in paragraph 1 above, to report regularly to the Council regarding implementation of this resolution;

17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Appendix 5: Vita

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EDUCATION

M.A., Public and International Affairs, May 2004
Concentration: Nonprofit Management
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), Blacksburg, VA

B.A., Communications Studies, January 1993
Concentration: Print Media
Sonoma State University (SSU), Rohnert Park, CA

SKILLS

Advanced Oral and Written Communication Abilities
Microsoft Office
Various Graphic Design and Web Design Software (self-taught)
Statistical Software Knowledge (SPSS)

RELEVANT PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Peace Corps Campus Recruiter, 2003-Present
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA
• Organize and present information about Peace Corps opportunities at recruiting events at four universities within the New River Valley.
• Screen and interview applicants for possible Peace Corps service.
• Created and maintain the Virginia Tech Peace Corps website (www.peacecorps.vt.edu).

Peace Corps Volunteer, 1999-2002
The United States Peace Corps, Siauliai, Lithuania
• Organizational development including grant writing and fundraising assistance, and project and seminar planning.
• Director of a week-long camp for 30 high school girls and provided training to the host country nationals who will produce the camp in the future.
• Assisted Human Rights and Peace Center in planning an international conference for over 100 participants.
• Taught English in a local high school and center for the hearing-impaired. Developed curriculum and teaching materials.

Executive Assistant and Development Director, 1998-1999
Lifehouse Agency (formerly MARC), San Rafael, CA
• Supported the Executive Director of a nonprofit organization serving the needs of people with developmental disabilities.
• Fundraised for agency events.
• Developed and implemented public relations, media and community outreach campaigns.
• Produced and edited quarterly newsletter.
• Supervised administrative and volunteer staff.
Marketing Coordinator, 1997-1998
Lowepro USA, Inc., Santa Rosa, CA
• Performed marketing duties for a camera bag manufacturer.
• Coordinated various sponsorship programs.
• Produced and edited quarterly newsletter.
• Updated technical workbooks and coordinated the printing.
• Attended trade shows throughout the United States.

Classified Advertising Manager, 1995-1997
“The Sonoma County Independent,” Santa Rosa, CA
• Managed the classified advertising department of a weekly newspaper.
• Generated profits in less than a year.
• Hired, trained and supervised telemarketing staff.
• Maintained monthly budget for department.
• Processed incoming classified sales (phone, mail, walk-ins).
• Planned, organized and attended monthly promotional events.
• Created marketing materials.
• Assisted production in page layouts.

Marketing Assistant, 1993-1994
The Institute of Reading Development, San Rafael, CA
• Advanced from temporary telemarketing responsibilities to a permanent position as a marketing assistant.
• Produced and coordinated printing of promotional materials to meet daily deadlines.
• Scheduled reading classes.
• Arranged sponsorships of programs.
• Fielded approximately 40-50 phone inquiries daily.

OTHER VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE

English as a Second Language Tutor, 1998-1999
Worked with a family from Mexico to improve English language abilities.

Life Counselor, 1996-1997
Family Connection, Santa Rosa, CA
Assisted a mother and her two daughters move out of a women’s shelter and into permanent housing.

CERTIFICATES, AWARDS, PUBLICATIONS AND HONORS

Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society Member, 2004
Virginia Citizens Planning Association Fellowship for Outstanding First Year Graduate Student, 2003
Compiled the book index of NGOs and Organizational Change by Alnoor Ebrahim, 2003
Journalism Certificate, Sonoma State University, 1993