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Abstract
Recent racial attitude research has focused on whites’ increasing support for the principles of racial equality and lack of support for programs meant to bring about racial equality. As one explanation for this gap some researchers have hypothesized that a new form of symbolic racism with origins in early-learned feelings of individualism and antiblack affect is taking the place of traditional prejudice. According to symbolic racism theory, whites oppose programs such as affirmative action out of moral resentment toward blacks for not living up to traditional protestant values. However, longitudinal studies of racial attitudes continue to focus on whites increased support for the principles of equality. No study has focused on symbolic racism over time. Using data from the American National Election Studies I analyze symbolic racism among whites from the years 1986-2000 by decomposing the time trend into its attitudinal change and cohort replacement components. Results of the analyses support the view that symbolic racism is not decreasing, and has actually increased slightly since 1986. Results of the analysis do not support the view that symbolic racism has origins in early-learned feelings such as antiblack affect. In fact, the effect of antiblack affect on symbolic racism is decreasing over time as symbolic racism is increasing. Based on this finding, an alternative conceptualization of symbolic racism that places the origins of racial prejudice in competition between groups for status and not in feelings and emotions is offered.
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Abstract

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Traditional Prejudice, based in notions of blacks’ biological and social inferiority, and used as a justification for segregation, has declined steadily among white Americans during the last fifty years (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan 1997; Firebaugh and Davis 1988). Today, few whites believe that blacks are biologically inferior, and the vast majority support racial equality in schools and employment. This is a remarkable change considering the 350 years of institutionalized slavery and racial discrimination that preceded the Civil Rights Movement. However, problems for blacks still persist. The median income of black families is roughly half of that for white families. In employment, blacks are over represented in jobs as janitors, bus drivers, taxicab drivers, and vehicle washers, while are underrepresented as engineers, lawyers, and dentists (Hacker 1995). Furthermore, blacks remains largely segregated from whites in housing, with little change over the last twenty years (Massey and Denton 1993). Paradoxically, while support for equality in principle is increasing, whites’ support for equal housing laws, school busing, affirmative action, and other programs meant to bring about racial equality has not increased (Bobo and Kluegel 1993).

As one explanation for this gap between principle and policy, some researchers have proposed that a new form of racism is replacing traditional prejudice. This new form of racism, often called symbolic racism, is believed to “represent a form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism and self reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and
discipline” (Kinder and Sears 1981). After the Civil Rights Movement segregation and
discrimination were illegal, and blacks had the right to vote. Many Americans believed
that the barriers that had historically disadvantaged blacks were gone. When riots broke
out in the North during the late 1960s whites reacted negatively. Whites perceived violent
black post-civil rights rioters as making undeserved demands from the government, and
unwilling to conform to traditional values. Conservative politicians of the 1970s and
1980s would give political expression to these negative white feelings, fueling symbolic
racism (Kinder and Sanders 1996).

Over the last twenty years, symbolic racism has been criticized heavily for
inconsistent measurement over studies, not consisting of a coherent psychological
construct, containing items that make specific reference to racial policies, being too
closely related to traditional prejudice, and not originating in a blend of individualism and
antiblack affect (Bobo 1983; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Bobo, 1988; Bobo and
Kluegel 1993; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Hughes 1997; Schuman 2000; Schuman et al.
1997). Responding to these criticisms, symbolic racism researchers have created a
consistent set of symbolic racism items that are unidimensional, contain no references to
specific policies, and are distinct from traditional racism (Henry and Sears 2002; Sears et
al. 1997; Hughes, 1997). While questions about the origins of symbolic racism in
antiblack affect and individualism persist (Hughes, 1997; Sniderman et al. 2000; Sears et
al. 2000), the concept strongly predicts whites’ racial policy attitudes (Kinder and

Symbolic racism researchers have continuously stated, “that symbolic racism [is]
replacing ‘old-fashioned racism’ as a determinant of whites’ responses to political
matters” (Sears 1988:55) and “the decline of blatant racial bigotry should not be equated with the disappearance of [symbolic racism]” (Kinder and Sanders 1996:127). However, the hypothesis that symbolic racism is not declining like traditional prejudice, and is in fact replacing traditional prejudice has not been tested (Sears 1988). Longitudinal studies of racial attitudes continue to optimistically report the decline in traditional prejudice; no longitudinal study has measured changes in symbolic racism. Some time studies have used a limited number of symbolic racism items under the categories of whites’ beliefs about poverty and attitudes about preferential treatment for blacks (Schuman et al. 1997; Steeh and Krysan 1996). These studies provide limited evidence that symbolic racism is increasing, but more conclusive evidence is needed. This study will use data from The American National Election surveys (ANES) to test the hypothesis that symbolic racism is increasing.
Chapter 2

Review of the Literature

Studies of Racial Attitudes

Racial attitudes are measured in two dimensions: support for the principles of equal treatment, and support for the implementation of racial policies. Social distance and beliefs about poverty items commonly used to measure traditional prejudice fall into the first category of support for principles. Affirmative action and race-targeting items fall into the second category of racial policy attitudes.

Since the 1950s surveys have documented white American’s increasing support for racial equality in principle. Whites were increasingly less likely to believe they should have the right to segregate their neighborhoods and schools, have laws that banned black-white marriage, and oppose eating dinner with a black person during the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and 90s (Taylor, Sheatsley, and Greeley 1978; Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Dowden and Robinson 1993; Schuman et. al. 1997). By 1995 96% of whites agreed that black and white children should attend the same schools, 87% opposed laws against interracial marriage, and 98% would not move if a black person moved in next door (Schuman et al. 1997). The few available measures in the General Social Survey show support for the belief that blacks are lazy and that racial inequality is the result of inborn disabilities has declined in whites into the late 1990s (See Charts 1 and 2 in appendix).
Long standing research has hypothesized that urbanites and non-southerners are more likely to be tolerant of different groups (Stouffer 1955; Wirth 1938). While the effect of living in urban areas appears to be an increasingly better predictor of racial tolerance (Tuch 1987), some research suggests the effect of region on racial tolerance is declining. During the late 1970s and early 1980s traditional prejudice declined faster in the South than in the North. The decline in traditional prejudice during this time was a product of both attitude change and the replacement of older more prejudiced generations with younger less prejudiced generations. The faster decline in the South was the product of a larger cohort replacement effect than in the North. However, levels of prejudice in the South still surpassed levels in the North, even with this decline (Firebaugh and Davis 1988). The cohort replacement trend slowed during the late 1980s. However, younger generations were still considerably more likely to support the principles of racial equality than cohorts that grew up during the 1950s and 1960s (Dowden and Robinson 1993).

Sociologists have long debated the relationship between attitudes and behavior (for discussion see Krysan 2000). Recently studies have shown that attitudes and beliefs often do predict behavior, even if this relationship is not rigid (Schuman 1995). Schuman et al. (1997) agree that these large individual attitude shifts in traditional prejudice have meaning outside of the survey interview, and represent substantial “change in public life over the past half century (1997:312).” They point to prominent black political figures, TV stars, the presence of blacks at Universities, and the long period since the Jim Crow era to claim that there can be little “doubt about the magnitude of the change (1997:312).”
However, Schuman et al. (1997) note that support for the implementation of equal treatment has not increased over time. Support for school integration in principle rose by over 30% from 1963-1986, but support for the federal implementation of school integration declined by 9% during the same time. In a study of 14 surveys on affirmative action, stretching from 1970-1995, Steeh and Krysan (1996) concluded that “attitudes on affirmative action… have not shifted drastically for whites since 1965” and support for these policies remains extremely low. Small increases in attitudes supporting government assistance to help blacks has been observed in studies, but these trends pale in comparison to the increased support for equality in principle (Quillian 1996).

The decreasing effect of region on racial tolerance, supported by multiple studies, only holds for questions about support for equality in principle. The gap between southerners and non-southerners in support for the implementation of racial policies has not narrowed over time, and remains into the mid 1990s (Carter et al. 2005).

Also surprising, the effect of gender varies for racial attitudes. While studies of gender differences in racial attitudes have found that women are other-focused and more likely to be racially tolerant than men, recent work partially contradicts this point. Hughes and Tuch (2003) found that gender differences in racial attitudes tended to be small and inconsistent. However, these differences were strongest for racial policy attitudes.

These contradictory findings often called the “principle-implementation gap” have puzzled social scientists. One possible explanation for this “principle-implementation gap” is that racism has not disappeared, but has changed into a less blatant, subtle form.
Symbolic Racism

The conceptualization of symbolic racism has three parts: symbolic content, cognitive content, and attitudinal origins. It is symbolic because it is phrased in terms that are abstract and ideological: symbolic racism “focuses on blacks as a group rather than on individual blacks” and “reflects whites’ moral codes about how society should be organized rather than instrumental beliefs satisfying their own interests.” Second, the cognitive content involves whites’ beliefs that racial discrimination has disappeared, that blacks should work harder to overcome disadvantages, and that blacks make too many underserved demands for special treatment. Third, the attitudinal origins of symbolic racism are hypothesized to be a combination of anti-black affect with the belief that blacks violate traditional Protestant values of work ethic, traditional morality, and respect for traditional authority (Sears et al. 1997).

The concept symbolic racism draws upon Gordon Allport’s sociocultural learning theory. According to Allport, children learn prejudice and other value predispositions that are common to their social environment during early childhood. These predispositions strengthen as the individual ages, and become the main determinant of their adulthood attitudes. In the case of symbolic racism, antiblack affect and individualism are learned during early childhood. The antiblack feelings and individualism crystallize into adulthood attitudes that are symbolic racism (Katz 1991; Allport 1954).

Items measuring symbolic racism fall into four themes: “(1) blacks no longer are especially handicapped by racial discrimination… (2) they still do not conform to
traditional American values, particularly the work ethic, as well as obedience to authority (as in schools, the workplace, or law enforcement) and impulse control (concerning such issues as alcohol, drugs, sexuality, and prudent use of money)... (3) they continue to make illegitimate demands for special treatment, and (4) they continue to receive undeserved special treatment from government and other elites” (Sears, Henry, and Kosterman, 2000).

Several other theories of modern prejudice closely related to symbolic racism are “modern racism”, “racial resentment” and “subtle prejudice” (McConahay & Hough 1986; Kinder & Sanders 1996; Pettigrew 2000). Each of these theories argues that modern prejudice is rooted in individual psychological feelings learned during childhood. Modern racism and racial resentment are conceptualized and operationalized almost identically to symbolic racism. Modern racism researchers argue that traditional prejudice, like symbolic racism, is learned symbolically during childhood. Because using the term “symbolic” to describe modern prejudice implies that traditional prejudice is not “symbolic” they see the term “modern racism” as more appropriate (Sears 1988). Kinder uses the term “racial resentment” to emphasize that symbolic racism has origins in both feelings that blacks violate traditional values (individualism), and early-learned negative emotions toward blacks. The term symbolic racism can mistakenly leave the impression that conservative values of individualism and self-reliance are simply masks for racism. Instead Kinder argues protestant values are not in themselves racist, it is the blend of these values with racial prejudice that leads to symbolic racism (Kinder and Sanders 1996).
Subtle prejudice, also similar to symbolic racism, was created to describe race relations between groups in Europe (Pettigrew et al. 1998). While some studies use the terms “racial resentment” “modern racism” and “subtle prejudice” instead of symbolic racism, this study will continue to use the term symbolic racism, as it is the most often used of the four.

**Criticism of Symbolic Racism**

Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) argue that symbolic racism has never been distinguished from traditional prejudice. These researchers believe that symbolic racism is measuring traditional prejudice (antiblack affect) and conservative ideology (individualism). Some individuals are prejudiced and oppose racial policies because of negative feelings toward blacks. However, other individuals oppose racial policies because of a belief in the ideals of individualism and limited government. To these researchers, symbolic racism confounds traditional prejudice with conservative values and does not represent a new form of racial prejudice. Recent studies have shown that symbolic racism correlates only moderately with traditional prejudice and is a much stronger predictor of whites’ racial policy attitudes even when controlling for conservative ideology (Sears et al. 1997; Hughes 1997; Bobo 2000). However, Sniderman (2000) is not convinced, and continues to argue that symbolic racism is not a new form of prejudice.

One of the most common critiques of the early work on symbolic racism was inconsistent measurement across studies. From 1971 to 1985 six different scales were
used to measure symbolic racism, each containing different items (Kinder 1986). Some early scales only made reference to whites’ denial of past discrimination, (McConahay and Hough 1976) leaving out many of the more individualistic questions about blacks getting by without welfare if they tried. Recently several modern symbolic racism scales have been developed (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Henry and Sears 2000). While even newer scales contain slightly different items, there is much more consistency in the measurement of symbolic racism. Modern scales contain measures of the four major areas of symbolic racism (Blacks are not handicapped by discrimination, do not conform to American values of work ethic, make illegitimate demands for special treatment, and continue to receive undeserved favors from government and elites).

Another prominent critique is that symbolic racism does not represent a coherent psychological construct. Symbolic racism scales contain both structural items referring to the impact of prejudice and discrimination on blacks and individualistic items asking about blacks’ motivation and work ethic. According to Kluegel and Bobo “A strong theoretical argument can be made for the interdependence of structuralism from prejudice and symbolic racism.” They claim that whites who hold racially prejudiced views, or antiblack affect, are likely to deny structural arguments about blacks’ position in society. On the other hand, the absence of prejudice and antiblack affect do not lead to acceptance of structural views about black’s position in society (Kluegel and Bobo 1993). Consistent with this claim, Henry and Sears found that on some modern symbolic racism scales, individualism and structuralism items form separate dimensions. However, they are highly correlated and are equally strong predictors of whites’ racial policy attitudes (Henry and Sears 2002).
The original symbolic racism scales contained measures of attitudes toward government assistance to blacks and attitudes towards Civil Rights leaders. Critics have argued that questions that make specific references to policies are measuring group conflict (Bobo 1983). Bobo claimed that whites’ opposition to government assistance to blacks and the feeling that civil rights leaders are pushing too fast is rooted in the perception that blacks pose tangible threats to their own interest and not in the feeling that blacks violate traditional values such as individualism (Bobo 1983; Sears and Kinder 1985). Bobo used factor analysis to demonstrate that the items making specific reference to government assistance to blacks and Civil Rights leaders are distinctly different from items without specific references to government policies. Responding to these criticisms, symbolic racism researchers removed all questions that make specific reference to government assistance. Even with these items removed, the symbolic racism scales are still reliable (Sears et al. 1997).

Finally, the origin of symbolic racism in the conjunction of individualism and antiblack affect has also been challenged. The most recent attempts to empirically demonstrate the origin of symbolic racism have provided mixed results. Sears found that measures of anti-black affect (ANES black feeling thermometer, and ANES measures of black stereotypes) consistently predict symbolic racism across two ANES surveys. Using measures of non-racial individualism, morality/sexuality (tolerance of different lifestyles, premarital sex, sex education), and authoritarianism (respect for elders, being considerate or well behaved) across four different surveys provided results “roughly consistent” with the hypothesis that symbolic racism has origins in nonracial values. Interestingly, individualism, the core non-racial value thought to precede symbolic racism only
significantly predicted it in one of three surveys (Sears et al. 1997). Also using data from
the ANES, Hughes (1997) found that antiblack affect consistently predicted symbolic
racism across four surveys. However, the effects of individualism on symbolic racism
were only significant in one of four surveys. Additionally, education, and economic self-
interest were equally strong predictors of symbolic racism (Hughes 1997). Using slightly
different data, other researchers have also argued for the weak effects of individualism in
predicting symbolic racism (Sniderman 2000).

Symbolic racism researches have responded differently to these empirical studies.
Kinder and Mendleberg (2000) conceded that individualism is probably not a strong
predictor of symbolic racism. Sears and Henry (2003) believe the original hypothesis of
the way that antiblack affect and traditional values combined to form symbolic racism
was unclear. All of the current studies on the origins of symbolic racism have used
separate items to measure individualism and antiblack affect. Sears and Henry claim that
the best model to predict symbolic racism uses racialized individualism items that fuse
antiblack affect and individualism into one attitudinal item (“If blacks work hard they
almost always get what they want”). Data from two Los Angeles County Social Surveys
show that racialized individualism strongly predicts symbolic racism (Sears and Henry
2003).

Symbolic racism and Whites Racial Policy Attitudes

Kinder and Sears have always contended that symbolic racism was replacing
traditional prejudice as the most politically potent form of prejudice. Some have argued
that symbolic racism is not a new form of prejudice, others that it is not prejudice at all, but few have disagreed with the strength of symbolic racism items to predict whites’ policy attitudes. Repeatedly, using multiple surveys across different years symbolic racism predicts whites’ opinions on affirmative action better than traditional prejudice, conservative ideology, political party preference, individualism, inegalitarianism, authoritarianism, self-interest, and antiblack affect (Hughes 1997; Sears et al 1997; Bobo 2000). Moreover, symbolic racism predicts whites’ attitudes towards school integration, government assistance and federal spending towards blacks and political candidate preferences (Kinder and Sanders 1996). This predictive power is remarkably strong, even across different surveys.

The Problem

Symbolic racism is hypothesized to be replacing traditional prejudice as the most important determinant of whites’ racial policy attitudes (Sear 1988). According to this theory, whites oppose racial policies out of resentment towards blacks for not living up to traditional values. At the core of symbolic racism are early-learned negative feelings towards blacks and individualism.

Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) do not believe that symbolic racism is a new form of prejudice, distinct from the traditional forms. According to these critics, symbolic racism is caused by traditional prejudice (antiblack affect), and therefore is not a new form of racial prejudice. Multiple studies of traditional prejudice have reported large declines in these attitudes since the 1940s. Regional differences in traditional prejudice
are decreasing, and younger generations are increasingly less racist. Despite the lack of support by whites for racial policies, and the continued regional and gender effects on racial policy attitudes, researchers remain optimistic that things are getting better (Schuman et al. 1997).

One reason for these different perspectives is that no study has tested the claim that symbolic racism is increasing over time. Traditional prejudice declined into the late 1990s (Charts 1 and 2). If symbolic racism increased during this period it would be reasonable to assume that symbolic racism and traditional prejudice are different attitudes.

One popular method commonly used in longitudinal studies of traditional prejudice decomposes time trends into period and cohort replacement effects. Cohort replacement refers to change in attitudes of a population that stem from the replacement of older generations with younger generations that hold different attitudes. Period effects refer to change in individual attitudes over time irrespective of cohort replacement. Change in traditional prejudice stems from both period and cohort replacement effects. No study has applied this method to symbolic racism. In this paper I will test the hypothesis that symbolic racism is increasing over time by decomposing the time trend into period and cohort replacement effects.

Seven hypotheses are suggested by the literature review. First, symbolic racism will have increased from 1986-2000. If symbolic racism has increased, this would support the argument that symbolic racism is replacing traditional prejudice. Given the findings that symbolic and traditional prejudice factor into different dimensions, and the predictive power of symbolic racism on racial policy attitudes, symbolic racism would
appear to be a distinct form of prejudice. However, if symbolic racism is traditional prejudice, it will have decreased, and Sniderman and Tetlock would be correct. Symbolic racism might not be a new form of prejudice. This finding would also support the optimistic claims of Schuman et al. that racial prejudice has declined, and large change has occurred as a result of this change.

Second, any change in the levels of symbolic racism should stem from cohort replacement and not period effects. Symbolic racism is learned at young ages when children acquire attitudes of individualism and negative black feelings that are normal to their social environment. These early-learned attitudes combine to form symbolic racism. Presumably, parents play a large role in this socializing process, but media, peer groups, and period specific characteristics such as living during slavery or the civil rights movement can also influence these early-learned attitudes. Because these attitudes are learned during childhood, levels of symbolic racism should remain consistent throughout an individual’s lifetime.

For instance, some politicians use code words to activate this deep-seated prejudice during adulthood. However, the use of code words should not lead to increases in symbolic racism; it merely activates feelings that are already present. Therefore there should not be any increases in symbolic racism from period effects. A period effect would indicate that symbolic racism can be learned later in life, and is not necessarily rooted in learned prejudice (Kinder and Sanders 1996).

Third, the average levels of symbolic racism in non-southerners should be lower than the average levels of symbolic racism in southerners. Previous studies have found that living in the South is a significant predictor of symbolic racism (Hughes 1997). One
possible explanation for this is that a southern socialization exposes people to higher levels of individualism and antiblack affect, the core values that form symbolic racism. If this is true, symbolic racism should not only be higher in the south, but also higher among people born in the south.

Fourth, individuals living in urban areas will have lower levels of symbolic racism. The early-learned content of symbolic racism consists of stereotypes (antiblack affect) not based on real experiences. Urban residents should have more contact with blacks, and therefore have less prejudice (Wirth 1964; Stouffer 1955). In past studies, living in urban areas is a negative predictor of symbolic racism (Hughes 1997). Urbanites are also more likely to support both equality in principle and racial policies than non-urbanites (Tuch 1987; Carter et al 2005).

Fifth, symbolic racism should be lower in white women. According to gender socialization arguments, women’s attitudes should differ from men because they are socialized to be more other-oriented. Studies have show that women form closer relationships with others, and these relationships are more likely to be a part of women’s self concepts than men (Beutel and Marini 1995; Cross and Madson 1997). If symbolic racism theory is rooted in learned negative feelings towards blacks, women will have lower levels than men because of different socialization. The early-learned individualism and antiblack affect necessary for symbolic racism should be more common in men, who are not socialized to be as sympathetic to others.

Alternatively, some research suggests that white women’s racial attitudes are not significantly more favorable than white men’s (Hughes and Tuch 2003). These researchers apply social structural theories of prejudice to the study of gender and
attitudes to argue that racial prejudice stems from the structural position of groups in society. As groups struggle for resources and status in society, a racial hierarchy is formed. Prejudiced feelings stem from one’s sense of group position. Since white men and women share the same group position they should have the same levels of prejudice. If gender is not a significant predictor of symbolic racism, this will support social structural theories of racial prejudice.

Sixth, changes in antiblack affect over time should correspond to changes in symbolic racism over time. Antiblack affect is one of the core values learned during childhood that combines with individualism to form symbolic racism. If there is an increase in antiblack affect, symbolic racism should also increase. If the trends in antiblack affect and symbolic racism do not coincide, there are several possible explanations. The origins of symbolic racism could be shifting. Antiblack affect might no longer be one of the dominant value predispositions making up symbolic racism. Another possible explanation is that symbolic racism does not have origins in early-learned values. Cultural factors such as the way race is framed in political debates might lead to changes in symbolic racism. According to this perspective, it is likely that people with antiblack affect will score high on symbolic racism, but antiblack affect would not be necessary for symbolic racism to increase.

Seventh, the effect of education on symbolic racism should remain strong over time. Studies commonly find that education is negatively associated with prejudice, both traditional and symbolic (Stouffer 1955; Hughes 1997). One exception is the work of Mary Jackman (1984). Jackman proposes that dominant groups create ideologies to justify the status quo and the well-educated are simply the most sophisticated
practitioners of this ideology. With regard to race, well-educated whites might be more likely to hold sympathetic feelings towards blacks, but still maintain boundaries on issues of implementation.

Chapter 3
Methods
Sample and Data

This study will use data from the American National Election Studies 1986-2000. These surveys are conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research. The interviews are administered every two years to independently drawn samples of about 2,500 people who are U.S. citizens of voting age, residing in housing units in the forty-eight coterminous states. The studies from 1986 to 1994 are based on face-to-face interviews. The studies from 1996 to 2000 are mainly face-to-face interviews, with some telephone interviews. The number of people interviewed by telephone as opposed to face-to-face interviews has increased each survey year from 1996 to 2000, with about 45% of the 2000 sample consisting of telephone interviews.

The sample for the 1986 and 1988 surveys is based on a multi-stage area probability sample selected from the Survey Research Center’s (SRC) 1980 National Sample Design. The sample is selected in four stages: counties and county groups, housing unit clusters from the county groups, selection of housing units from the housing unit clusters, and randomly selected respondents from the housing units.
The sample is representative of voting age on or before Election Day in a given survey year, living in the forty-eight coterminous states. The data were obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. The surveys from 1986 to 2000 contain 15,278 cases. The sample analysis consists of the 11,538 whites.

**Independent Variables**

**Cohort.** The cohort variable is the birth year for each respondent. This variable was calculated by subtracting respondent’s age from survey year.

**Gender.** Gender is coded as a dummy variable (female = 1 and male =0).

**Education.** Education is coded in four categories: Grade school or less (0-8 grades) = 0, high school (12 grades or fewer, including non-college training if applicable)= 1, some college (13 grades or more, but no degree) = 2, college or advanced degree = 3.

**Work status.** Work status is a set of dummy variables for Homemaker, Student, Retired/Disabled and student. Currently working is the left out category.

**Census region and Region at 16.** Region and region at 16 are each coded as a set of three dummy variables. Northwest (CT, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT), North Central (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI), and West (AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY) are the three categories with South (AL, AR, DE, D.C., FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV) as the omitted category.
**Urban.** Urban residence is a dummy variable with 1= urban residence in a city with a population of 50,000 or greater and 0= nonurban.

**Anti-black affect.** Antiblack affect was measured using the “feeling thermometer” for blacks. Respondents were asked to rate their feelings for various black political figures on the thermometer. A Rating from 50-100 means the respondent has warm feelings towards blacks. A rating of under 50 implies that the respondent does not have favorable feelings for blacks. This item was not reverse coded, and a high score indicates warm feelings for blacks.

**Political Ideology.** Political ideology was measured on a seven-point scale from liberal to conservative. In this analysis extremely liberal is coded 0 and extremely conservative is coded 6.

**Dependent Variables**

**Symbolic Racism.**

Respondents were asked four questions to measure symbolic racism:

1. “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.”

2. “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.”

3. “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”

4. “Over the past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve.”
Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with each of these statements. Questions two and three were coded disagree strongly =1, disagree somewhat =2, neither agree nor disagree =3, agree somewhat=4, and agree strongly= 5. For the questions one and four agree strongly= 1, agree= 2, neither agree nor disagree= 3, disagree somewhat= 4, and disagree strongly= 5. In this analysis respondents’ answers to the four racial attitude questions were summed as a measure of symbolic racism. The scale has an alpha reliability of .7328.

**Analysis**

This analysis consists of three steps. First the means and standard deviations are recorded. Table one list the means and standard deviations for all of the variables used in the study. Table two lists the means by year for both the individual symbolic racism items and the entire index. Second, a correlation matrix of all the variables in this study is given in table three. Finally, tables four through six are the models for symbolic racism regressed on survey year, cohort and a series of control variables. Glenn Firebaugh’s method for analyzing repeated surveys is used to decompose the symbolic racism time trend into period and cohort effects.
Chapter 4

Findings

For tables one through three I will present the means and correlations of some key variables in the study. For the regression tables (four through six) I will not go through each table individually. Instead, I will refer to the proper regression tables as I discuss each of my seven hypotheses.

Means

Table one displays the means and standard deviations for all the variables used in this study. The mean for education was 1.73 (0 = less than grade school 3 = college or beyond). The average respondent has high school education or less. The mean for ideology was 3.351 on a seven-point scale (coded 0-6). The sample tends to be slightly more liberal than conservative. The mean for antiblack affect was 62.62 (coded 0-9 with higher scores meaning warm feelings toward blacks). The average respondent in this sample tends to hold warm feelings for blacks as a group.

Table two gives the means for each symbolic racism items, and the entire index by year. While not a perfectly smooth linear trend, the average levels of symbolic racism did increase from 1986 to 2000 (13.52 to 14.03). For the individual variables, the questions about blacks not receiving special favors, and conditions making it difficult for blacks increased (3.75 to 3.88 for Favors and 2.70 to 3.28 for conditions). The question about blacks getting less than they deserve had little change (mean of 3.59 in 1986 and
mean of 3.52 in 2000) and the mean for the try harder item increased and then decreased (3.46 in 1986 to 3.65 in 1994 than back to 3.36 in 2000).

**Correlation Matrix**

In support of the first hypothesis, there is a positive correlation between survey year and symbolic racism (Table three). However, there is a negative correlation between cohort and symbolic racism. Based on hypothesis two, I expected the relationship between cohort and symbolic racism to be in the same direction as the relationship between year and symbolic racism. This did not happen. As expected, both region (non-South), and region at age 16 (non-South) are negatively correlated with symbolic racism. Being female and having high education are both correlated with lower levels of symbolic racism. Conservative ideology and negative feelings for blacks both lead to higher levels of symbolic racism. Antiblack affect was not reverse coded, so the negative relationship means that cold feelings towards blacks are associated with high levels of symbolic racism. The interaction term for antiblack affect and year was negatively correlated with symbolic racism. In other words, the effect of antiblack affect on symbolic racism overtime is increasing. Interaction terms education and year and education and cohort were negatively related to symbolic racism. This supports hypothesis seven.
Regression Models

The findings from the regression models support hypothesis one, symbolic racism did not decrease from 1986-2000 (Model one, two, three and seven). In models one through three younger generations (cohort) appear to be increasingly less racist, this is explained by both student status and higher levels of education (models four and five). More surprisingly, when education and ideology are controlled for in models six and seven, younger generations appear to be increasingly more prejudiced. In addition to younger generations, symbolic racism has increased in people of all ages. While this increase is small, it is still significant in model seven with all control variables included. The increase in symbolic racism is explained by the decreasing effect of antiblack affect (model eleven) and education (model nine) on symbolic racism over time.

The regression findings only partially support hypothesis that change in symbolic racism over time will stem only from cohort replacement effects. With all controls included, symbolic racism has increased in both younger generations and in people of all ages. When ideology and education are controlled, symbolic racism increases in younger generations (models six and seven). This is consistent with the theory that symbolic racism is learned during early childhood and therefore should only increase in the youngest generations. However, symbolic racism also increased in people of all ages (model seven). This finding suggests that symbolic racism, while probably having some origins in early-learned socialization, is not entirely learned during childhood. These attitudes are subject to change across a person’s lifetime.
Regional variations in levels of symbolic racism still exist. Respondents currently living in the North East and North Central are not significantly less prejudiced than respondents in the South when region of residence at age 16 is included in the model (Model three). Respondents living in the west have lower levels of symbolic racism than respondents in the South even when controlling for region lived in at 16 (Model three). Consistent with the socialization theory of symbolic racism, respondents that grew up in the South have significantly higher levels of racism than respondents in each of the other regions (Model three).

As past studies have found, respondents living in urban areas have lower levels of symbolic racism than respondents living in the suburbs and rural areas. This supports hypothesis four, individuals living in urban areas are more tolerant. This was expected and holds true for each regression model. Respondents living in the city have more education (Model five), are more liberal in their political ideology (Model six), and tend to have warmer feelings towards blacks (Model seven) than respondents in rural and suburban areas. However, when each of these three variables is controlled, urban residents are still significantly less prejudiced than non-urbanites (Models seven, nine, eleven).

Women appear to have lower levels of symbolic racism than men (models one through six). This supports hypothesis five, white women are less prejudiced than men. In regression model seven the gender difference is explained by controlling for both ideology and negative feelings towards blacks. Women are more likely to hold a liberal ideology and not as likely to have negative feelings towards blacks as men. This supports the gender socialization and symbolic racism arguments. Beutel (1995) found gender
differences in the value orientations of adolescents. Women tended to be more other-focused and less competitive than men. Symbolic racism had origins in early-learned values like individualism and antiblack affect. If women are less likely than men to have individualistic values, and more likely to be other-focused, they should also have lower levels of symbolic racism.

The effect of anti black affect on symbolic racism is decreasing over time for people of all ages (Model eleven). This does not support hypothesis six, as antiblack affect should have remained a strong predictor of symbolic racism. Symbolic racism is increasing, and it appears the increase is not because people have more antiblack feelings. This finding suggests that antiblack affect might not be necessary for symbolic racism.

The effect of education on symbolic racism is also decreasing over time for people of all ages (Model nine). This does not support hypothesis seven, the effect of education should not have decreased. While the effect of education for younger generations on symbolic racism is increasing (Model twelve), it is surprising that education has a decreasing effect on people of all ages. Symbolic racism is a learned, irrational form of prejudice. Education should make people reflect on their irrational feelings, lowering prejudice. The finding that education has a decreasing effect on symbolic racism supports social structural theories of prejudice. These theories see prejudice as rooted in structural differences between groups and not just individual feelings.
Chapter 5

Summary and Conclusions

Brief summary of findings

The findings presented above support the following hypotheses:

- **Symbolic racism is increasing**: Symbolic racism has increased slightly among people of all ages.
- **Regional variations in symbolic racism still exist**: Individuals who lived in the south at age 16 have higher levels of prejudice than individuals who lived outside the south at 16.
- **Urban residence is negatively related to symbolic racism**: Symbolic racism is more common in non-urbanites.
- **White females have lower levels of symbolic racism than white males**: The relationship was significant until political ideology and negative feelings towards blacks were controlled.

The following findings are not supported by the data:

- **Changes in symbolic racism over time will stem from cohort replacement effects**: This hypothesis was only partially supported. Change over time in symbolic racism stemmed from both period and cohort replacement effects.
- **The effect of antiblack affect on symbolic racism will parallel changes in symbolic racism**: The data did not support this hypothesis. The effect of antiblack affect on symbolic racism is decreasing over time.
- **The effect of education on symbolic racism over time will not decrease**: In fact, the effect of education on symbolic racism has decreased in people of all ages.
Discussion

Racial prejudice is increasing

Unlike traditional prejudice, which declined into the 1990s (Charts one and two), symbolic racism increased from 1986 to 2000. Levels of symbolic racism are substantially higher than the levels of traditional prejudice (Chart three). In past research, factor analysis of symbolic racism and traditional prejudice yields separate factors, and symbolic racism is a much stronger predictor of racial policy attitudes than traditional prejudice. These findings counter symbolic racism critics such as Paul Sniderman that argue “there is no persuasive evidence that symbolic racism represents a new, qualitatively different form of racism (Sniderman and Tetlock 1986:173).” Symbolic racism does appear to represent a different set of attitudes from traditional prejudice, and these attitudes are increasing.

This adds a note of pessimism to the work of Schuman et al.. Traditional prejudice has declined, and in many ways conditions for blacks are better than in the Jim Crow era. However, a new from of racial prejudice has replaced traditional prejudice. A majority of whites now believe that slavery and past discrimination no longer affect blacks life chances, black are making undeserved demands, and blacks need to try harder. It is these new attitudes of prejudice that lead to opposition for racial policies and continue to disadvantage blacks.
The origins of symbolic racism

Multiple studies have challenged the role of individualism as one of the early learned values at the core of symbolic racism. The finding that the effect of antiblack affect on symbolic racism over time is decreasing challenges the role of learned negative feelings toward blacks in symbolic racism. It appears that it might be possible for people with low levels of antiblack affect to have high levels of symbolic racism. One possible explanation is that Sniderman and Tetlock are correct in arguing that negative feelings towards blacks are really traditional prejudice. However, these negative feelings, while associated with, are not necessary for symbolic racism to form.

When the finding that period effects can lead to increases in symbolic racism, the findings for antiblack affect are not that surprising. While it is possible symbolic racism can be learned during childhood, it does not have to be. Early-learned values such as individualism and antiblack affect are not the main determinants of racial prejudice. This finding opens the door for the role of interests in symbolic racism. Symbolic racism might not be moral resentment toward blacks, but represent self or group interest that does has origins in group identity, and not individual feelings.

Education and symbolic racism

The findings for education were mixed. Younger generations appear to have more education, and the effect of education on symbolic racism is increasing for younger generations. However, the effect of education for people of all ages is decreasing. Again this contradicts the original theory of symbolic racism. Symbolic racism is an irrational
form of prejudice; education should lead to a permanent change in attitudes. However, according to these findings, levels of symbolic racism in a person with high education can actually increase.

**Symbolic Racism and Social Structural Theory**

One possible explanation for these findings is that while symbolic racism researchers are correct in claiming high levels of racial prejudice still exist, they focus too narrowly on explaining racial prejudice as rooted in feelings and emotions. To borrow from Stanly Lieberson, individual feelings might be superficial causes of racial prejudice, or a cause “that appears, by statistical simulation of the controlled experiment, to affect causally the dependent variable in a symmetrical or asymmetrical way. But in practice, shifts in either direction have no actual consequence for the dependent variable (Lieberson 1986: p186).

To illustrate Lieberson’s notion of superficial causes, suppose the racial gap in income is partially caused by educational differences between whites and blacks. Assuming that all other black-white dynamics remain unchanged, and the influence of outside factors on income and education do not change, the racial gap in income should narrow if educational differences between whites and blacks are equalized. However, what if the real cause of the income gap is not educational differences, but the desire for whites to take as much as they can, and give only enough to maintain the system? If this is true, the influence of education on the income gap is not that important. An individual black person might be able to get ahead by gaining high education, as long as the
majority of blacks do not follow. However, if a superficial cause of the income gap, such as educational differences disappears, this will not change the income gap. Instead, the importance of other variables will change to maintain the current state of inequality.

If racial prejudice were caused by feelings and emotions such as hatred, dislike, or some type of moral resentment towards a specific group, the solution to ending prejudice would be to eliminate these feelings. Once these irrational individual feelings are eliminated, racial prejudice will cease to exist. Without racial prejudice, residential segregation, income, education and all black-white differences in social standing should be eliminated. However, after the Civil Rights Movement only modest improvement occurred in the conditions of blacks, even though the traditional white feelings of hatred for blacks decreased. Symbolic Racism researchers believe that black-white differences still exist because racial prejudice has not really disappeared, but changed shape into a new form that still has origins in feelings and emotions. These new feelings and emotions are different from the old stereotypes of blacks popular in the Jim Crow era. However, this study finds that the supposedly new early-learned feeling of antiblack affect is not necessary for symbolic racism to occur. Multiple studies have challenged the role of individualism in symbolic racism. In fact, the idea that symbolic racism has to be learned is not even supported by the results of this study. It appears that early-learned feelings and emotions are superficial causes of racial prejudice.

A more probable explanation is that the basic cause of racial prejudice is competition between groups for status, power, and resources (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1988). Through competition a racial hierarchy is formed and group members gain a sense of group position. The feelings commonly associated with racial prejudice are products of
the “positional arrangement of racial groups (Blumer 1958:4).” According to this theory, a change in feelings and emotions will not lead to a decrease in prejudice. Prejudice occurs when an individual feels that the status of his or her group is being threatened. Feelings toward a specific group are not important. As long as structural differences between groups exist, there will be competition for resources and status leading to racial prejudice.

Social context has changed over time, discrimination and segregation are illegal and whites and blacks interact with each other in daily life. The feelings of anger and disgust associated with blacks during the Jim Crow era are less applicable today. However, the Civil Rights Movement did not lead to large structural changes in the position of groups. Whites still hold a dominant position in the racial hierarchy, and symbolic racism is racial prejudice more appropriate for this slightly altered group position. The individual feelings commonly associated with racial prejudice are superficial causes that do not have a significant influence on prejudice. The basic, or fundamental cause that actually affects the form of racism is the structural arrangement of groups in society.

Support for Social Structural Theories of Prejudice

The role of group interests has long been debated in symbolic racism literature (Bobo 1983). While hard to measure, research has found that the perception of threat, more so than realistic threat, is a predictor of symbolic racism (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Symbolic racism researchers argue that perceived threat, without conditions, is
irrational and the product of early-learned values. With the finding that symbolic racism does not necessarily have origins in early-learned values it may be possible to re-interpret these past findings on group interest. Affirmative action and government assistance to blacks, while not posing an immediate threat to most whites, could be perceived by whites as posing a threat to their group’s position in society. Period fluctuations in symbolic racism could represent whites’ increased sense of threat.

Research on subtle prejudice in Europe can also reveal important details about the role of group interest in symbolic racism. Subtle prejudice is often measured and conceptualized almost identically to symbolic racism, but the concept is used to describe race relations in Europe. A study by Meertens and Pettigrew (1997) found that high levels of symbolic racism exist in many European countries. The symbolic racism items in their study changed the target group for each country (In Germany the target group was “Turks not “blacks”). According to the original theory of symbolic racism, these findings are unexpected. How can symbolic racism exist, often directed at newly arrived immigrant groups, in countries without a strong history of individualism? A more reasonable explanation is that the specific target group and early-learned feelings towards that group are not important for symbolic racism. What is important is that a group poses some type of threat to the racial position of the dominant group. Several recent studies of racial attitudes have moved beyond individual level variables such as education to studying group level variables like the size of a black population in a given area, and its effects of racial attitudes. These studies commonly find that group level variables explain a significant amount of racial attitudes (Taylor 1998; Quillian 1996). Studies on Europe
and the United States both find that group level variables have a significant influence on racial prejudice (Quillian 1995).

**Urban and Regional Residence and Gender**

Some of my findings did support the original conceptualization of symbolic racism as a form of early-learned racial prejudice. Women had lower level of symbolic racism than men because of a more liberal political ideology and warmer feelings toward blacks. This could very well be because women are socialized to be more other-oriented and are less likely to learn these values during childhood. Respondents that lived in the South at age 16 also had higher levels of symbolic racism. This is consistent with southern socialization theories. Finally, urbanites had lower levels of prejudice, and this was explained by political ideology, feelings towards blacks, and education. These findings suggest that early socialization does play a role in prejudice. However, symbolic racism researchers have probably too narrowly focused on these individual level variables.

**Directions for further Research**

Further research should pursue the role of interests and symbolic racism. I suggest three possible approaches. First, no study has attempted to see if the size of the blacks population in a given area increases levels of symbolic racism. If symbolic racism really does represent a learned moral resentment towards blacks the size of the black population
should have no effect on white attitudes. Second, symbolic racism questions that ask about feelings towards other minority groups such as Asians and Hispanics should be included in surveys. If symbolic racism does have origins in learned feelings towards blacks, whites’ should not have these same feelings towards other minority groups. Third, comparative work on symbolic racism in the U.S. and subtle prejudice in Europe needs to be done. A comparative study would provide new insight into how symbolic racism should be conceptualized.

Conclusions

Symbolic racism has increased slightly in people of all ages from 1986-2000. The findings that urban and regional residence and gender all are significant predictors of symbolic racism support the original conceptualization of symbolic racism as early-learned prejudice. The findings that symbolic racism does not have to be learned and the effect of both education and antiblack affect do not support the original conceptualization. It is possible that group interests play a larger role in symbolic racism than was originally thought. While future research is needed, symbolic racism does appear to be a separate attitude from traditional prejudice that is not decreasing over time. Future studies would benefit from using these new measures of prejudice.
Chapter 6

Appendices with tables

Chart 1: Belief that Blacks are Lazy (White Respondents)

Chart 2: Attributing Racial Inequality to Inborn Disability (White Respondents)
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Std. Deviation</th>
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<td>Female</td>
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Table 2. Means by year for Symbolic Racism and Index

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Try Harder</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Favors</th>
<th>Deserve</th>
<th>Index</th>
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<td>2.70</td>
<td>3.75</td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<td>3.88</td>
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix

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<th>Income</th>
<th>Educ.</th>
<th>Political Ideology</th>
<th>Antiblack Affect</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Work Status</th>
<th>Region at 16 years</th>
<th>Antiblack affect x Year</th>
<th>Educ. x Year</th>
<th>Education x Cohort</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>-.087**</td>
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<td>Income</td>
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<td>Region at 16 years</td>
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<td>-.033**</td>
<td>.415**</td>
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<td>.006</td>
<td>.012</td>
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<td>Educ. x Yr</td>
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*p<.05, **p<.01
Region is coded as a dummy variable with South equal to 0, and non-South equal to 1.
Work Status is coded as a dummy variable with currently working equal to 0, and not-currently working equal to 1.
Region at 16 years is coded as a dummy variable with South equal to 0, and non-South equal to 1.
Table 4. Symbolic Racism regressed on Year, Cohort, Female, Income, Region, Region at 16, Urban, Occupation, and Education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
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<td>.027* (.12)</td>
<td>.029* (.12)</td>
<td>.026*** (.13)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.012*** (.03)</td>
<td>-.012*** (.03)</td>
<td>-.012*** (.03)</td>
<td>.001 (.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>-.321*** (.095)</td>
<td>-.323*** (.095)</td>
<td>-.431*** (.099)</td>
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<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
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<td>-.139*** (.044)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
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<td>-.375 (.222)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.201 (.193)</td>
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<td>-1.183*** (.201)</td>
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<td><strong>Region at age 16</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.523* (.224)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.909*** (.117)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemaker</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
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<td>.620*** (.167)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
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<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<td>15.627***</td>
<td>15.746***</td>
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<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.061</td>
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***p < .001  **p < .01 *p < .05 (two-tailed test).
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 5. Symbolic Racism regressed on Year, Cohort, Female, Income, Region, Region at 16, Urban, Occupation, and Education, Education X Year, Antiblack Affect, Antiblack Affect X Year, Ideology.

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
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<td>.062*** (.016)</td>
<td>.066*** (.015)</td>
<td>.024 (.037)</td>
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<td><strong>Cohort</strong></td>
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<td>.011** (.004)</td>
<td>.11*** (.004)</td>
<td>.005 (.004)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
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<td>-.400*** (.110)</td>
<td>-.190 (.107)</td>
<td>-.361*** (.110)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
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<td>.110* (.055)</td>
<td>.111* (.053)</td>
<td>.173** (.055)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
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<td>-.419 (.241)</td>
<td>-.266 (.232)</td>
<td>-.345 (.240)</td>
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<td>-.216 (.212)</td>
<td>-.261 (.204)</td>
<td>-.213 (.211)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.806*** (.213)</td>
<td>-.741*** (.205)</td>
<td>-.830*** (.213)</td>
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<td><strong>Region at age 16</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.646* (.234)</td>
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<td>-.707*** (.205)</td>
<td>-.690*** (.197)</td>
<td>-.749*** (.204)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.806*** (.238)</td>
<td>-.657** (.229)</td>
<td>-.670** (.237)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Urban</strong></td>
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<td>.498*** (.498)</td>
<td>.445*** (.126)</td>
<td>.696*** (.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Homemaker</td>
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<td>.245 (.198)</td>
<td>.209 (.190)</td>
<td>.401* (.197)</td>
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<td>-1.796*** (.399)</td>
<td>-1.485*** (.385)</td>
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<td>.533* (.192)</td>
<td>.483* (.185)</td>
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<td>Unemployed</td>
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<td>-.551 (.326)</td>
<td>-.477 (.314)</td>
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<td>-1.109*** (.063)</td>
<td>-1.034*** (.061)</td>
<td>-1.199*** (.106)</td>
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<td>AntiBlackAffect</td>
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<td>-0.050*** (.003)</td>
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<td>AntiBlack X Yr</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
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<td>.123</td>
<td>.193</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>.198</td>
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***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05 (two-tailed test).
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 6. Symbolic Racism regressed on Year, Cohort, Female, Income, Region, Region at 16, Urban, Occupation, and Education, Education X Year, Antiblack Affect, Antiblack Affect X Year, Ideology and Education X Cohort.

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<tr>
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<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
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</thead>
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<td>-.004(.036)</td>
<td>-.028(.052)</td>
<td>-.033(.050)</td>
<td>.068***(.015)</td>
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<td>.005(.004)</td>
<td>.010**(.004)</td>
<td>.022***(.007)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>-.364***(.110)</td>
<td>-.192(.107)</td>
<td>-.190(.107)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>.177*(.055)</td>
<td>.114*(.053)</td>
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<td>Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>-.261(.232)</td>
<td>-.344(.240)</td>
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<td>-.258(.232)</td>
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<td>-.214(.214)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.486*(.232)</td>
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<td>-.660***(.229)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Homemaker</td>
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<td>.402*(.197)</td>
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<td>.204(.190)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-1.498***(.384)</td>
<td>-1.454***(.385)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
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<td>.483***(.185)</td>
<td>.476*(.185)</td>
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<td>-.499(.314)</td>
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<td>Educ. X Year</td>
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<td>AntiBlack X Yr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.659***(.038)</td>
<td>.655***(.038)</td>
<td>.653***(.038)</td>
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<td>.252</td>
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<td>.252</td>
<td>.251</td>
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</table>

***p < .001  **p < .01 *p < .05 (two-tailed test).
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
References


