THE 1993 NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS: 
A FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

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Abstract

In this paper I apply the Rational Actor model to the 1993-1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis. I begin with two hypotheses: 1) North Korea attempted nuclear armament because of its perception of threat from South Korea and the United States; 2) North Korea attempted nuclear armament because it wanted to use its nuclear program as leverage to obtain economic assistance from the United States. I conduct a diplomatic historical analysis based on the Rational Actor model to determine which was North Korea’s primary objective, and conclude that the primary objective of North Korea was obtaining economic concessions, but that threat perception did seem to play a role in the decision to start the nuclear program. In this process, I show that the Rational Actor model was insufficient in the analysis and that it must be complemented by cultural factors, “thickening” the rationality.
Dedicated to the loving memory of my mother
Dr. Myung-Hwa Han
1946-1988
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Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.

- John F. Kennedy, inaugural address, January 20, 1961
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Chapter I: Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the diplomatic interactions between the United States and North Korea\(^1\) from March 12\(^{th}\), 1993 to October 21\(^{st}\), 1994, regarding the nuclear capabilities of North Korea. March 12\(^{th}\), 1993 marked the point when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and October 21\(^{st}\), 1994 marked the time when the DPRK and the US signed the Agreed Framework, thereby ending the nuclear crisis caused by the DPRK’s withdrawal. This time period represents the negotiations between the DPRK and the US based on their foreign policies. The final outcome, the Agreed Framework, represents the compromise of these two national foreign policies.

The main question scholars have raised regarding this particular chain of events is what the North Korean motive was for developing the nuclear program (Andrianov 2000; Bazhanova 2000; Cumings 1997; Cumings 1998; Kang 1995; Kim 1995; Mazarr 1995b; Oberdorfer 1997; Sigal 1998; Snyder 1999; Yi 1994). There are generally two theories that attempt to explain their motives: 1) North Korea perceived threat from South Korea and the United States to its national sovereignty, and therefore wanted to arm itself with a nuclear equalizer; and 2) North Korea wanted to use the nuclear program as leverage to obtain economic assistance from the West in order to resuscitate its economy. These two strategies are not completely exclusive of each other, because economic resuscitation is ultimately linked with regime survival – yet it is significant to contemplate this issue because of the isolated nature of North Korea’s decision-making process. Which was the North’s primary drive? Had the U.S. perception of the North Korean motive been different from what it was, the entire outcome might have been completely different. This is why this issue is of such importance.

North Korea’s foreign policies are difficult to understand because of the inaccessibility of any data regarding their policies\(^2\). But the inaccessibility of data does

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\(^{1}\) In this proposal and proposed thesis I will use North Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as synonymous.

\(^{2}\) There are various opinions about the North Korean regime. For examples of opinions that categorize North Korea as a crazy, see Hamilton et al Hamilton, Lee H., Henry Sokolski, David A. Kay, Gerald Segal, Alan D. Romberg, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt. 1994. North Korea: crazy ...or crazy like a fox? International
not justify the lack of research on North Korea’s foreign policies. This proposed thesis will attempt to shed some light on this subject, if only from a behavioral perspective. This is why I believe the Rational Actor Model will best explain these events. The Rational Actor Model, if applied from a macro perspective, based mainly on the behavioral outcome, avoids the problem of not having access to the inner workings of the DPRK’s foreign policy decision-making process. The added advantage of applying the Rational Actor Model to this foreign policy interaction between the DPRK and the U.S. is that “we can extend our knowledge of the [North Koreans] by assessing the fit between the stimuli and responses without having to trace or measure any intervening effects” (Rosenau 1987 p.56).

The two major actors during the 1993-1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis were the United States and North Korea. It was the 4 staged-U.S.-DPRK summit talks that found the breakthrough in the stalled talks. Eventually the two countries signed the Agreed Framework in October 1994 bringing the ordeal to an end. Additional actors include South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan and the IAEA. However, the analysis will focus on North Korea and United States as they were the major actors in this compromise.

What was the purpose of the DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT? On the same day that North Korea announced the withdrawal they put forth the reasons for their withdrawal. They were: 1) in order to protect the supreme right of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; 2) that the two factors obstructing the supreme interest of North Korea were the Team Spirit Military Drills and the Special Inspection request. It had stated that DPRK would leave the NPT unless the United States stopped “its nuclear

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4 This is a direct quote from the United Nations Constitution, and is also included in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Article 10 Paragraph 1), where it says that any country can withdraw from the NPT, should their supreme rights be challenged. This is assumed to mean the survival of any country.

5 US-Republic of Korea Joint Military Drills that are held annually. Its intention is to show off the alliance’s strength to the DPRK, thereby deterring any military action against the alliance.

6 The Special Inspection request was made by the IAEA to the DPRK to disclose two unreported sites that the IAEA suspected of nuclear activities. This was only the second time the IAEA enacted this privilege, in order to make up for the embarrassment of Iraq Reiss, Mitchell. 1995. *Bridged Ambitions: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities*: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press. pp 233.
threats against the DPRK” and unless the International Atomic Energy Agency Secretariat returned “to its principle of independence and impartiality”. It seemed that North Korea considered the IAEA to be a pawn of the United States (Dorn and Fulton 1997 p.23; Kim 1995 p.37). In a nutshell, they were claiming that the supreme interest of the North Korean regime, i.e. survival, was under attack because of the Team Spirit Military Drills and the IAEA’s Special Inspection request.

The following chapters will trace the rationality, if any, behind the decisions of the United States and the DPRK during this diplomatic interaction. However, because there is an abundance of data regarding the decision making process for the United States, and hence the rationality behind each of the United States can be easily traced, this paper will delve into the rationality behind the North Korea. What were its purposes for beginning its nuclear program? The next chapter will outline the rationale in greater detail. As such, chapter 2 will outline nuclear power and the diplomatic implications that follow; chapter 3 will describe the Rational Actor Model and the concept of National Interest; and chapter 4 will be the historical narrative of the 1993-94 North Korean Nuclear Crisis; and chapter 5 will be the analysis chapter, analyzing the North Korean rationality based on the historical narrative.

**Literature Review**

There are a few exceptional researches that have been done in this field that are worth mentioning. The first is Byeonggil Ahn’s Rational Actor Analysis of North Korean Foreign Policy in his article “Constraints and Objectives of North Korean Foreign Policy”. Ahn’s analysis will be discussed further in the next chapter. Another is Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou’s “Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?”. Feaver and Nioiu’s article is a quantitative version of the Rational Actor model applied to the proliferator and hegemon who is the anti-proliferator (Feaver and Niou 1996 p.209). Feaver and Niou conclude that the appropriate proliferation management response is a function of the proliferator’s type, which varies according to size, affinity, and risk tolerance. It is also a function of the preferences of the respondent – from purist

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7 See also Sigal, Leon V. 1998. *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea*. Princeton:
to pragmatist regarding proliferation. Lastly, it is a function of what point in time the proliferator has reached in the weaponizing-deploying process (Feaver and Niou 1996 p.218).

The aforementioned articles were progressive in their attempt at a rational actor analysis of North Korea. On the other hand, there are two authors that are particularly relevant to this thesis. The first one if Scott Snyder and the other one is Bruce Cumings. Scott Snyder’s *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* attempts to seek the rationale behind North Korea’s negotiating behavior. Snyder refers to the cultural and historical aspect of North Korea’s negotiating behavior, and ultimately finds the strengths of North Korean foreign policy to be in its capability of “converting weaknesses, through threatening behavior, into leverage so as to gain favorable outcomes to negotiations with outsiders” (Snyder 1999 p.vii). In particular, Snyder points out as determinants of North Korea’s current foreign policy 1) partisan guerrilla tradition⁸; 2) the Socialist revolutionary model⁹; 3) the influence of Japanese colonial rule and the concept of national sovereignty¹⁰; 4) the influences of Confucian norms; 5) influence of the Juche ideology¹¹; and 6) Kim Il-Sung’s cult of personality (Snyder 1999 p.21-42). A similar approach is taken by Kang, who selects five general “facts” known about North Korea, most of which claim that North Korea’s foreign policies are irrational and impenetrable, and refutes them according to the neo-realist theory¹² (Kang 1995).

On the other end of the spectrum is Bruce Cumings’ *Korea’s Place in the Sun*. Cumings argues in this book that it was the United States and South Korea that provoked North Korea into nuclear armament by threatening the very existence of the North Korean

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⁸ According to Snyder, “the will to survive and to sustain oneself in the face of overwhelming odds is an important lesson for current North Korean negotiators, who have little to trade away in a negotiation and therefore little to lose in pursuing a strategy of obtaining maximal concessions while offering few concessions of their own”. See Snyder, Scott. 1999. *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. pp 22.

⁹ Snyder talks about the impact of Stalinism to North Korea and Kim, Il-Sung. See Ibid. pp.27.

¹⁰ Snyder believes that the loss of the national sovereignty to Japan before and during the second World War is an important factor for North Korea’s sensitivity to threats to its sovereignty. See Ibid. pp30.


¹² Kang claims that the conventional approaches to North Korea are based on the “decision making” paradigm which focuses on the elite as the source of foreign policy. See Kang, David C. 1995. Rethinking North Korea. *Asian Survey* 35:253-67.
regime by building up the South’s weaponry and putting it under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S (Cumings 1997 p.477-483). Cumings takes a similar approach in his article “On the Strategy and Morality of American Nuclear Policy in Korea, 1950 to the Present”. Kauzlarich provides details about the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, claiming that this constitutes an international crime (Kauzlarich 1994). If Snyder’s approach could be classified as culturalist, then Cumings’ analysis would be rational. I will later return to this notion of culturalist vs. rational.

There have been several studies about the hawk vs. dove-like foreign policy approach to North Korea. Sigal, Lee, Song and Tanter offer good examples of these efforts. Leon V. Sigal’s *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* offers a dove-like approach to the nuclear crisis. Sigal claims that engaging North Korea in diplomatic negotiations with a constant push and pull was what ultimately succeeded in eliciting the final compromise. He scorns at the idea that the threat of economic sanctions was what brought the nuclear crisis to an end. Of a similar view is Michael J. Mazarr’s article titled “Opportunity Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in Korea”, in *Opportunities missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy*.

Samsung Lee, also known as Samsung Yi, argues that the entire nuclear negotiation that took place during the period was a product of the conflict between the hard-liners and the soft-liners within the United States. In his book, *The Nuclear Question and U.S. Policy on the Korean Peninsula: A Critical Understanding of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Talks and South Korean Unification Policy*, Lee claims that many of the claims about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities made by various intelligence sources during the negotiations were political judgments, not based on objective data (Yi 1994 p.15-28).

Song, Du-Yol takes the stance that North Korea’s purpose in the nuclear negotiations only was to gain political recognition as a legitimate state from the United States. On this basis, Song argues that the nuclear negotiation situation should not be viewed as zero-sum, but non-zero-sum, where the United States and DPRK simultaneously fulfill their obligations (Song 1994 p.106).

Raymond Tanter talks about the hawks and doves within Washington in dealing with North Korea in *Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation*. The battle between the
hard-liners constant asking for military retaliation to North Korea for its noncompliance
to the international regime and the doves who are afraid of the implications that would
entail a crash of the North Korea regime is well explained in that book. He concludes
that the regime itself should be contained but the people embraced. A dual view of
confronting North Korea is also conveyed in A. Walter Dorn and Andrew Fulton’s article
in Global Governance, titled “Securing Compliance with Disarmament Treaties: Carrots,
Sticks, and the Case of North Korea”. Finally, Kenneth W. Dam calls for the use of force
with diplomacy as the best way to force a deal with the North Koreans (Dam and

Finally, there were several publications that offered different accounts of the
diplomatic interactions between the United States and DPRK. Jae-Mok Kim’s The North
Korean Nuclear Negotiation Drama gives a detailed account of the diplomatic
interactions between all the actors during the nuclear crisis. So does Don Oberdorfer’s
The Two Koreas as well as Mitchell Reiss’ Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain
Their Nuclear Capabilities. Whereas Kim’s approach is oriented from a Korean
perspective, Oberdorfer and Reiss’ are more neutral. Another neutral account is provided
by Mark P. Berry’s presentation at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, titled “North
Korea and the United States: Promise or Peril?”.

James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov edited The North Korean Nuclear
Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia, which gives Russian
accounts of the North Korean nuclear program. Vladimir D. Andrianov and Evgeniy P.
Bazhanov contribute “Economic Aspects of the North Korean Nuclear Program” and
“Military-Strategic Aspects of the North Korean Nuclear Program”, respectively, which
are new perspectives into the inner workings of the nuclear armament decision of North
Korea.

Therefore, the question of what purpose my study will serve can be answered as
follows. Although there have been quite a few studies that attempted to analyze North
Korea’s negotiating behavior, not many have applied the Rational Actor Model from
beginning to end of a single incident. This is exactly what my study will do. And by
doing this, I seek to contribute to the literature of foreign policy analysis.
Chapter II: Why Nuclear Power?

It is first important to understand how North Korea’s foreign policies are decided. According to the amended North Korean Constitution of 1992, the Supreme People’s Assembly establish the basic principles of North Korea’s foreign policies and endorses or rejects international treaties; the Central People’s Committee form national policies and administration policies; and under the Supreme People’s Assembly there is the Foreign Policies Committee\(^{13}\) \(\text{(Yang 1995 p.51).} \) However, the role played by the Supreme People’s Assembly in the foreign policy decision making process seems to have diminished since 1972 as the Central People’s Committee took over the foreign policy field\(\text{(Park 1986 p.70).} \) The takeover of the Central People’s Committee of the realm of foreign policies symbolizes the centralization of power to the President \(\text{(Yang 1995 p.51).} \) Also, the role played by the party is significant \(\text{(Yang 1995 p.52).} \) The basic principles of foreign policy are decided at the party conferences, then the Party Central Committee Politburo evaluates and finalizes the decisions. Next the Secretariat International Division ideologically and philosophically monitors the principles and the actual administration is overseen by the International Division \(\text{(Communications 1987 p.179-182; Communications 1990 p.56-57).} \) As indicated before, however, the single most important decision maker in North Korea is the Kim, Il-Sung and Kim, Jong-Il power

\(^{13}\) According to a different account, the three most important decision making members are the Supreme People’s Assembly, the Central People’s Committee, and the Political Affairs Office. But because the DPRK is a party-dominated system, the basic principles of foreign policy are established by the Party Central Committee Politburo, which is then detailed by the Party Central Committee Secretariat and International Division, which is subsequently approved by the Supreme People’s Assembly. The foreign policy is implemented on three levels – the party, the country, and the people. These roles are given respectively to the Party international division, Supreme People’s Assembly Foreign Policy Committee, and Political Affairs Foreign Policy division and Foreign Trade committee. Still, even in this version, the ultimate decision making is done by the Kim dynasty Chung, Kyu-sub. 1997. *Pookhanoekeou Ujaewa Onul (The Past and Present of North Korean Foreign Policy).* Seoul: Ilshinsa.pp 22.

For a study that compared the decision-making processes of Kim Il-Sung and Kim, Jong-Il, see Huh, Munyoung. 1998. *PookhanOekyojungchaek Kyuljungkojojowa Kwajung: Kimg Il-Sung shidaewa Kim Jong-Il Shidaeui Pikyo (The Decision-making process and structure of North Korean foreign policy: A Comparison of Kim Il-Sing and Kim Jung-II).* Seoul: The Korean Unification Research Center. According to Huh, although the two Kims had the ultimate power in foreign policy decision making, the older Kim was of a formalistic duocratic decision making model, and the younger Kim conducted foreign policy in a competitive model.
base. The President begins each week with a written and spoken order for foreign policies, which is then detailed through conferences among the various government divisions (Ko 1992 p.259). Therefore, this is the direct decision making process for North Korean foreign policy. It is important to note that foreign policy decision making was transferred to Kim, Jong-Il long before Kim, Il-Sung’s demise. From 1982-1983, it seems Kim, Jong-Il took over the foreign policy realm, requiring all foreign policy reports to first be submitted to him before the Supreme Leader. Kim, Jong-Il seems to have made the primary decision before submitting the report to Kim, Il-Sung, thereby solidifying the power transfer at least in foreign policy.14 However, as in the case of the Nuclear Crisis, Kim Il-Sung did reverse Kim, Jong-Il’s orders when he deemed it necessary (Ko 1992 p.179). This will be seen in future chapters.

Byeonggil Ahn puts forth a theory of dual forces in the North Korean foreign policy decision making process in his aforementioned article “Constraints and Objectives of North Korean Foreign Policy: A Rational Actor Analysis”15. The hard-liners are those that make high demands of negotiation opponents and place relative weight on security or economic concerns (Ahn 1997 p.87). The economically oriented reformists are more eager to conclude an agreement with the opponents because they want to take advantage of the possible economic benefits of the negotiation (Ahn 1997 p.88). Such a division is apparent in an article in the Rodong Shinmun, where Kim, Jong-Il strongly criticizes economic reformists and ideological revisionists16 (Ahn 1997 p.87). Ahn concludes that the ultimate objective of the North Korean regime seems to be economic resuscitation and regime survival. It is worthy to note that economic revitalization is the more important of the two in that economic revitalization is crucial to the survival of the regime especially after the hardships it has recently gone through. In light of this, Ahn concludes that the economic reformists used the hard liners to derive more favorable concessions from the negotiations opponent (Ahn 1997 p.90).

Why did North Korea attempt to obtain nuclear capabilities? What was the appeal that nuclear powers had towards the North Korean regime? In this chapter I will attempt

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15 See also Reiss, Mitchell. 1995. pp 247
to shed some light on this subject. The approach that I will take will involve first
examining why nation-states would want to acquire nuclear capabilities in general and
then attempt to explain what significance the bomb had for the DPRK specifically.

The first and most obvious approach to the question of why nation-states want nuclear
armament can be answered within the context of power. According to Karl Deutsch,
power is the “ability to prevail in conflict and to overcome obstacles” (Deutsch 1969
p.257). It is natural for any country to desire this kind of power as it guarantees survival
and prosperity for the country in the international society. In order to command this
power, one must employ proper and appropriate techniques of deterrence and coercive
diplomacy. Deterrence requires “that a state genuinely convince its adversary in advance
that it does in fact have both the ability and the will to inflict considerable harm and/or to
prevent the adversary from accomplishing his operation by an effective defense” (Lauren
1979 p.190). While deterrence tries to “dissuade or inhibit behavior through fear…
coercive diplomacy… tries to initiate behavior by fear… Successful coercive diplomacy
requires that one states create in an adversary the expectation of unacceptable costs that
will erode his motivation to… take the action desired by the coercing state (Lauren 1979
p.193)."

It is for this reason that a nation-state would want to obtain the ultimate power
leverage mechanism – nuclear weaponry. Because of Mutually Assured Destruction of

17 Art provides a noteworthy account on diplomacy and military power in his article, “The Fungibility of
Force”: “The peaceful use of military power may be less decisive than its wartime use, but that does not
mean the peacetime efforts are insignificant. To the contrary: the peaceful use of military power explains
why it remains central to statecraft. Lurking behind the scenes, unstated but explicit, lies the military
muscle that give meaning to the posturing of the diplomats. Especially for great powers, but for lesser ones,
too, military power undergirds the other instruments of statecraft. Diplomacy is the striking of compromises
by states with differing perspectives and clashing interests. There are many factors that go into fashioning
diplomatic agreements, but central to each is fear about the consequences of failure. Fear of failure,
combined with the knowledge that force can be used if agreement is not reached, help produce agreement…
The threat of either a destructive war or a prolonged strike represents a catastrophic breakdown that the
parties would prefer to avoid…” Art, Robert A. 1999. The Fungibility of Force. In The Use of Force:
Publishers, Inc. pp 10

18 “Although they do not buy the top position, nuclear weapons nevertheless do significantly enhance the
international influence of any state that possessed them, if influence is measured by how seriously a state is
taken by others… [Nuclear weapons] add to the ultimate resource for which all the other assets of a state are
mustered – political influence” Ibid.

See also Rothgeb, John M. 1993. Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International
System. New York: St. Martin's Press.: “…nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles delivery systems have
both sides that have nuclear capabilities in a confrontation an equilibrium can be formed (Waltz 1981). This equilibrium can be destroyed when one or more third actor(s) attempt to break the equilibrium and develop nuclear weapons. For this reason most nuclear proliferation confrontations can be described as a conflict between the powers that want to maintain their nuclear deterrence and the anti-power that wants to nullify the deterrence (Aronson 1992 p.4). In this case, the confrontation is between the United States, which is the sole superpower in the current international regime, and North Korea, which is challenging this regime19.

The reason that North Korea wanted nuclear armament can also be traced back to the Ju’che philosophy that is so prevalent in society as a whole20. According to Kim, Jong-Ill, Ju’che is based on “the philosophical principle that man is the master of everything and decides everything”(Kim 1982 p.12). The Ju’che philosophy further states that the independent stand is the fundamental stand that must be adhered to in the revolution and construction (Kim 1982 p.24). Perhaps more relevant to the discussion of nuclear weaponry, Ju’che also claims that “only when a man has the consciousness of independence can he conduct conscious activity to conquer nature and actively struggle against the oppressors who encroach and trample upon his Chajusong [independence]. Man’s endeavour to acquire a scientific understanding of the world and transform it actively is none other than the manifestation of his consciousness; man’s role in transforming nature and society, after all, is the role of his ideological consciousness” (Kim 1982 p.31). Hence, the philosophy of Ju’che, as taught by Kim, II-Sung and Kim, Jong-Ill, strongly dictates national pride and independence in the name of revolution. It has deep-rooted belief in the superiority of the revolutionary and the success of the communist revolution. It further elaborates that “nihilism and flunkeyism towards big powers … [that are] nationally deep-rooted [in small countries] as a result of the imperialist policy of assimilating colonies and obliterating [the small countries’] national culture… [must be abolished in order to reclaim their national dignity]”(Kim 1982 p.38-

Kim, Jong-Il points to the United States in particular as a source of the flunkeyism in South Korea (Kim 1982 p.40). In summary, the Ju’che ideology forms a solid basis for independence militarily as well as economically and politically for North Korea. It is possible to deduce that because of this Ju’che philosophy the need for a stronger weapon to ensure this Ju’che was reached. This is because of the “great equalizing force of weapons of mass destruction” (Libicki 2000 p.34).

Bruce Cumings puts forth a noteworthy theory of the reason of North Korea’s nuclear armament attempt. According to Cumings, the fundamental reason of the North Korean ambition was the provocation of the United States and South Korea. Cumings puts forth evidence of McArthur and his successor’s continuous request of use of nuclear bombs during the Korean War (Cumings 1998 p.58-63). The United States also wanted to use napalm bombs and H-bombs after the Chinese intervention (Cumings 1998 p.61). Near the end of the war, the U.S. forces destroyed huge North Korean dams wiping out numerous farming fields and killing thousands of civilians (Cumings 1998 p.62). Entire cities were literally “erased from the map” (Cumings 1998 p.62). As if this was not enough to frighten the North Koreans into creating a nuclear bomb for themselves, after the armistice of 1953, South Korea, unhappy with the signing of the armistice when there was still a chance of militaristic reunification, was planning a surprise attack on North Korea to finish the reunification process (Cumings 1998 p.63). The United States, who constantly demanded an assurance that South Korea would not provoke North Korea into a second Korean War, eventually had to place nuclear weapons south of the DMZ (Cumings 1998 p.64). In addition to this, South Korea, under the leadership of President Park, Chung-hee, attempted to develop its own nuclear capabilities and also exported ballistic missiles to Iran and Iraq during their war (Nolan 1991 p.50). In summary, according to Cumings, it was the United States and South Korea who provoked insecurity in North Korea, pushing them to make their own nuclear bomb to defend themselves from the atrocities commenced by the U.S.-ROK alliance.\footnote{Michael J. Mazarr makes a similar claim, saying, “the North faced a U.S. nuclear threat and appeared to have aggressive ambitions on the peninsula; a nuclear arsenal of its own seems… to have been an obvious response” See Mazarr, Michael J. 2000. Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in Korea. In Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World, edited by B. W. Jentleson. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. pp 331.}
Kang argues that although most people believe that North Korea is reckless and that South Korea is pacifist, in reality it is not so obvious (Kang 1995 p.257-262). He claims that the North has never really shown any intentions of beginning a war on the Korean peninsula, and that the Korean-U.S. deterrent against the North was in fact working. Also, he claims that although the South claims to be pacifist in nature, it has in fact demonstrated its military might in the face of North Korea many times in the form of the Team Spirit military exercises, and that these could hardly be called defensive.

The two theories available regarding the purpose of North Korea’s attempt at nuclear armament are: 1) that North Korea really wanted to obtain nuclear capability because of the threat that it felt from the international community, but especially the United States (Bazhanov 2000 p.101-109); 2) that North Korea only wanted to use the nuclear capability that they had as a diplomatic leverage to obtain economic assistance and “enter the international community on its own terms” (Andrianov 2000 p.41-50; Reiss 1995 p.232). This paper will consider which hypothesis better fits the DPRK’s negotiation tactics.

There seems to be evidence for both of these theories. North Korea believed that the IAEA approach was a result of the United States’ hegemony and abuse of its nuclear capabilities in that the IAEA was the tool by which the United States was stopping other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons (Reiss 1995 p.252). North Korea seems to have believed that the United States was attempting to overturn the North Korean regime by installing nuclear warheads in South Korea and constantly pressuring North Korea to open its doors (Cumings 1998 p.58). North Korea was seemingly assured of this by the annual Team Spirit Military Exercises conducted between South Korean and U.S. troops, and demanded the U.S. to discontinue these exercises every chance it had (Bazhanova 2000 p.134; Dorn and Fulton 1997 p.23; Oberdorfer 1997 p.279; Sigal 1998 p.21). North Korea’s fears were probably not diminished during the Gulf War, when the United States invaded Iraq. It could have thought that the U.S. wanted to do the same thing to them. It is also possible that North Korea wanted to follow the example of Israel where nuclear weapons were developed before the IAEA could discover them, or even the example of Iraq where nuclear weapons were secretly being developed (Kim 1996 p.364).
It is equally possible that North Korea wanted to use the intransparency of nuclear armament to obtain similar effects as a nuclear power. Nuclear intransparency “has the advantages of being a nuclear power without the risks involved with being a nuclear state” (Kim 1996 p.389). Similar effects have been seen in the examples of South Africa, Israel, India, and Pakistan, where the undeclared bomb enabled the states to maneuver as if they had a nuclear weapon (Aronson 1992 p.15)22.

On the other hand, there is evidence for the theory that North Korea saw the end of the Cold War as the end of the nuclear age, and wanted to use its nuclear capabilities as a diplomatic leverage for obtaining economic assistance. The most obvious evidence comes from its long-standing energy shortage. According to one estimate the current capacity the North Korean energy facilities has is 7 million 8 hundred thousand kilowatts, and even of these facilities 50% is more than 20 years old. Because of the large shortage in energy nuclear energy seemed to be a likely decision (Kim 1995 p.357). Also the way North Korea frequently insisted on “cliff diplomacy23” gives us a hint as to their motives (Kim 1995 p.44). Cliff diplomacy refers to the way North Korea frequently drags any talks to the brink of breaking before finally agreeing, as if to make the opponent really desperately feel the need for reaching an agreement. By using this form of diplomacy North Korea has elicited many concessions from the United States during these talks – Light-water reactors, the negative assurance of use or threat of use of nuclear powers against North Korea, guarantee of diplomatic ties in the future, etc24. And North Korea

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23 See Hong, Soon-young. 1999. Thawing Korea's Cold War: The Path to Peace on the Korean Peninsula. Foreign Affairs (May/June 1999):8-12.. Also, according to Snyder, crisis diplomacy is “a manifestation of North Korea’s partisan guerrilla legacy and an excellent means by which weak states can enhance leverage against powerful states in negotiations on specific issues. Brinkmanship is a unilateral strategy influenced by North Korea’s historically isolated position and reinforces by the influence of communist negotiating style and tactics. It employs threats, bluffs, and forms of blackmail to extract maximal concessions from a negotiating counterpart”. See Snyder, Scott. 1999. pp 66

24 There is ongoing discussion as to whether the concessions were sufficient or extravagant. For an example of the former, see Dorn, A. Walter, and Andrew Fulton. 1997. Securing compliance with disarmament treaties: carrots, sticks, and the case of North Korea. Global Governance: a Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 3:17-40. and Washington Times, published on July 19, 1994; for an example
did not expose all of the nuclear facilities in order to use them as a leverage for more economic concessions (Lee 1995 p.100). Although this was another factor in the entire negotiating process, the continuous U.S. concessions to the DPRK also justified North Korea’s cliff diplomacy in that they could think if they stood out enough, more economic concessions might come their way. Reiss claims that by July 1997 North Korea had won several tactical victories: 1) it had dodged UN sanctions; 2) it had stalled U.S. plans for reinforcing American forces in the South; 3) it had prevented a full and independent accounting of its nuclear history; 4) it had continued to defy the IAEA and not permit special inspections; 5) it had turned its claim of “unique” NPT status into reality by obtaining special treatment on IAEA inspections; 6) it had re-engaged the U.S. in high-level talks on its terms; 7) it had not foreclosed its nuclear weapons option (Reiss 1995 p.273). As a outstanding example of the unlimited U.S. concession to North Korea, on December 29, 1993 the United States finally abandoned the formalities of the IAEA, and granted North Korea special status to the NPT (Kim 1995 p.151-152; Sigal 1998 p.98). When the deal was announced, the administration’s domestic critics wondered whether there was any concession the Clinton administration would not make to keep the North Koreans at the negotiating table (Reiss 1995 p.265).

Ahn argues that the two objectives were simultaneously at work in the nuclear crisis. He claims that the plunging economy forced North Korea to resort to foreign resources to overcome the economic hardships it was encountering, but it did not want foreign input that would disturb its isolated political stability (Ahn 1997 p.81).

It is interesting to consider the evidence that the outside world had about the North Korean nuclear program. In order to create a nuclear weapon, two mechanisms are necessary: plutonium and a detonation device (Yi 1994 p.19). The detonation device requires a high level of industrial expertise, and it is believed that North Korea does not have this technology (Yi 1994 p.19)25. Even if they had the detonation device, another

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25 There were some that believed North Korea indeed had a detonation experiment facility, but it was also possible that the facility was for producing special metals. See Shin, Jae-In. 1998. Pookhan Haek Programui Junmangkwa Hanbanboesui Kisool-Kyungjae Hyupnyuk (An Outlook of the North Korean Nuclear Problem).
problem is the delivery system. In order for the Nodong 1 and Nodong 2 missiles to be effective the nuclear war head must be reduced to be less than one ton in weight and it is doubtful whether North Korea has this technology (Yi 1994 p.19). Lastly, for the nuclear bomb to be effective, nuclear tests must be conducted, and there is no direct evidence that North Korea implemented such tests (Yi 1994 p.20). In other words, there was never concrete evidence of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions or possession of nuclear weapons.

In summary, the purpose of this paper will be to analyze the rationality, using the Rational Actor model, behind the decision of North Korea to pursue a nuclear program. It will my objective to see if either 1) the theory that states that the DPRK was forced to arm itself because of the perceived threat, or 2) the theory that the DPRK was in dire need of economic assistance, and perceiving the United States’ strong commitment to the NPT, utilized the nuclear program to obtain economic assistance, was correct. To anticipate the conclusion, I believe that the North Korea mainly was in dire need of re-stimulating its economy, but also believed that it was in danger of collapsing as a regime. In short, North Korea was attempting to obtain multiple goals of external regime stabilization, international recognition, and economic resuscitation.

Chapter III: The Rational Actor Model: The Concept of National Interest

I believe the most appropriate theory that will help the understanding of this interaction is the Rational Actor model. Why specifically the Rational Actor model? The Rational Actor model has the advantage of being applicable in situations of imperfect information (Green and Shapiro 1994 p.23). Because of the lack of information linked to the inner workings of North Korea, which is the main target of this analysis, the applicability of the Rational Actor model is greater than any other model.

The basic unit of analysis of the Rational Actor Model is governmental action as a choice (Allison 1971 p.32). Its main concepts include the national actor, the problem and the static selection (Allison 1971 p.33). In other words, the rational actor model involves the static selection the national actor will choose given a problem. The Rational Actor

*Nuclear Program and the Technological-Economic cooperation on the Korean peninsula). Seoul: Sejong
model can be explained by the 6 principles of political realism, as described by Hans Morgenthau in *Politics Among Nations*. These principles, which are intended to outline political realism, are in fact the assumptions for the Rational Actor Model.\(^2^6\)

1. Politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. There is also belief in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects these objective laws. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus, we can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can surmise what their objectives might have been.

2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood. The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible.

3. The concept of interest is vital. The kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated.

4. Realism considers prudence – the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions – to be the supreme virtue in politics.

5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.

6. The difference with other schools of thought is profound. The “legalistic-moralistic” approach is different from “politics”. Politics should be fully developed, as is economics.

Thus, the Rational Actor model suggests to us that all state’s actions can be justified given the particular situations, and assuming that all man are rational, any person in the same situation will repeat the course of action. Graham Allison introduced a method of organizing concepts in the Rational Actor model in his groundbreaking work, *Essence of*
In doing this Rational Actor analysis, the concept of national interest is crucial. There are categories of interests in non-unilateral instances – identical interests, complementary interests, and conflicting interests. Identical interests are those national interests which two or more nations hold in common (Morgenthau 1959 p.188, 189). Complementary interests are not identical, but at least are capable of forming the basis of agreement on specific issues (Morgenthau 1950 p.146). Conflicting interest are those that are not included above.

Needless to say, nations must prioritize their total national interests and allocate the power resources of the nation accordingly. If they wish to be successful they must, in the first instance, equate their town and their state’s interest with “the pursuit and use of power” (Robinson 1969 p.185). Morgenthau warns us to distinguish clearly between the concepts of national interest, which is necessary and correct, and moralisitically-based thinking, which is politically dangerous and morally wrong (Morgenthau 1992 p.146).

There are three possible outcomes from diplomatic negotiations (Robinson 1969 p.188). If the interests between the two parties are primary and incompatible, there is no possible negotiation. If the interests are primary and compatible interests, negotiations redefine seemingly incompatible interests. And if the interests are secondary, a compromise is arrived at through trading of interest for interest (Morgenthau 1962a p.191; Morgenthau 1962b p.202-203). In the case of the North Korean – U.S.

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negotiations, the interests involved were primary – for the North Korea, it was survival\textsuperscript{28}, and for the U.S., it was a long-standing policy of nuclear non-proliferation, but they were compatible through a tit-for-tat negotiation strategy.

Then what were the specific national interests involved in the nuclear showdown of 1993-1994? The United States had vital interests to protect in the entire interaction\textsuperscript{29}. Nuclear Non-Proliferation is a key interest for the United States because it is the sole hegemon in this era, and nuclear non-proliferation was in its greatest interest (Barry 1996 p.141; Mazarr 1995a p.90; Mazarr 2000 p.303)\textsuperscript{30}. The United States wanted to guarantee the extension of the NPT in the upcoming conference in April 1995\textsuperscript{31}, and the successful containment of the DPRK was vital to the United States in that aspect. If one were to acknowledge the U.S.’s desperation in keeping North Korea in the NPT, the extreme concessions start to make sense. The U.S. efforts for the Non-Proliferation Treaty seem to be an extension of the effort for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty\textsuperscript{32}, to which it is firmly committed along with the other nuclear powers. Also, it is hard not to notice that the U.S. perceived North Korea as a security threat, because of the constant armament it was pursuing (Mazarr 2000 p.304)\textsuperscript{33}. However, it is important to note that even these vital interests were not more important than avoiding war. As will be seen in Chapter 4, the U.S. always gave North Korea room for negotiation even on the verge of economic

\textsuperscript{28} Kenneth N. Waltz talks about regime survival as the ultimate national interest in Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company pp 134. This is more the case for a small country as North Korea, especially so since its survival has been tested ever since the demise of the Soviet Union.
\textsuperscript{29} Mazarr argues that the U.S. interest in non-proliferation is not absolute. It is an interest that must be balanced against other interests, such as stopping North Korea’s drive for nuclear weapons against the U.S. interest in peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, and also the commitment to elicit a soft landing for North Korea. See Mazarr, Opportunities, pp 295.
\textsuperscript{30} See Kenneth N. Waltz’s take on the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons in Waltz, Kenneth N., pp 182
\textsuperscript{31} At the beginning of the NPT regime, Germany and Japan opposed a treaty of indefinite duration. Therefore the treaty called for the parties to meet twenty five years after its entry into force to determine whether the treaty shall be extended indefinitely or for an additional fixed period. See Dam, Kenneth W., and University of Chicago. Law School. 1994. Law, diplomacy, and force : North Korea and the bomb, Occasional papers from the Law School, the University of Chicago ; no. 33. Chicago, Ill. Buffalo, N.Y.: Law School University of Chicago ; Available from W.S. Hein..
\textsuperscript{32} Congressional Record – Senate, January 25, 1994.
\textsuperscript{33} Sigal claims that the shared image among the United States foreign policy decision makers about North Korea was that it was a rogue state, motivated to build bombs by hostility to the outside world, and that the only way to make these rogue states abandon their nuclear ambitions is using the crime-and-punishment approach. See Sigal, pp 11-12
sanctions. This shows that avoidance of direct confrontation, which would have cause massive human and economic losses, was another important factor in the U.S. interests (Mazarr 2000 p.296).

North Korea’s primary interest in the nuclear negotiations is dependent on their political intentions. If their intentions were self defense, it could be said that their interests were survival as a regime in an international atmosphere of communist collapse and provocations from the South and United States (McLauchlan 1995 p.152)34. If, on the other hand, their intentions were to obtain economic assistance, their national interests could be said to have been obtaining economic concessions, although this, too, could be connected with survival35. Another of the apparent primary objectives that North Korea has revealed throughout the negotiation process is the diplomatic normalization between the DPRK and U.S. (Kim 1995 p.108, 112; Reiss 1995 p.274). At any rate, it is apparent that North Korea holds a deep grudge against the United States for 1) causing the division of North and South Korea and 2) the military occupation of South Korea from 1945 to 1948 (Barry 1996 p.135). As will be shown in later chapters, this began a legacy of mistrust against the United States. Another national interest that is involved in the nuclear crisis is the legitimacy of the Kim Jong-II regime. Because of the number of competing parties after the death of Kim Il-Sung, this nuclear crisis was important for

34 This is based on the argument of Cumings in Cumings, Bruce. 1998. On the Strategy and Morality of American Nuclear Policy in Korea, 1950 to the Present. Social Science Japan Journal 1 (1):57-70. See also Mazarr, Opportunities, pp 301.. As for the reason that North Korea only insisted on talking directly with the United States, Chung offers an explanation. He claims that North Korea wanted to talk only with the United States because it considered the U.S. to be the sole reason of the breakout of the Korean War and division of North and South, and also the direct participant in the armistice. Therefore, only a decision between the DPRK and U.S. can end this catastrophic standoff between the two countries. See Chung, pp 243.. From Rodong Shinmun, published in July 27, 1992. See also Sigal, pp 20.

35 Beginning in the late 1980s, North Korea’s gross domestic product (GDP) began to fall: -3.0% in 1991, -7.6% in 1992, -5.4% in 1993, -1.7% in 1994, -2% in 1995, -2.1% in 1996, and –6.8% in 1997 (Source: Korea and the World: Key Indicators 1995 (Seoul: Korea Foreign Trade Association, 1996)). This decline was most apparent in the economically crucial energy sector Andrianov, Vladimir D. 2000. Economic Aspects of the North Korean Nuclear Program. In The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia, edited by J. C. Moltz and A. Y. Mansourov: Routledge. pp 48. or Kim, Yong-ho, pp 403. Because of this decline in the energy sector that undoubtedly affected the entire economy, North Korea seemed to have embarked on the nuclear question to 1) equalize the economic competition with the South; 2) it could be possible to exchange its nuclear program for significant political and economic concessions from the U.S., Japan and South Korea at the highest rate possible Andrianov, pp 49. See also Sigal, pp 6-7.
Kim Jong-Il to prove beyond doubt his diplomatic ability and political legitimacy (Hoon 1994 p.15).

In connection with the North Korean national interests during the nuclear negotiation, it is important to consider the North Korean position. It is highly possible that North Korea verged on brinkmanship in their negotiation tactics because it knew that the U.S., due to domestic and international reasons, would not be able to commit itself to war (Dorn and Fulton 1997 p.35). Andrew Mack thought that North Korea thought it could endure any economic sanctions for “at least as long as it takes to build a modest arsenal of nuclear weapons” (Mack 1994 p.32). This was possible because of the low reliance North Korea has on the international society (Kim 1996 p.394). It had nothing to lose from having bans imposed on them because of the self-reliance it always had claimed to be its primary philosophy in economics. And this is what enabled it go no near to the edge in negotiations.

It is important to remember the situation North Korea was in at the time. It was approximately at this time that South Korea began to normalize diplomatic relations with China. For North Korea, China had been the strongest ally to rely on, and having lost their unconditional support, they must have felt deserted. This was all the more true because Russia, another long-time ally, had declared that it would halt all military assistance to North Korea and that the 1961 Russia-DPRK defense pact, which called for automatic intervention in the case of war, needed to be cancelled completely or drastically revised (Yonhap, Nov. 19, 1992, reported in JPRS-TND-92-045) in 1992.

Before moving on, it is important to mention relevant criticisms against the Rational Actor Model. Green and Shapiro argue that, although the Rational Actor Model has clearly made significant contributions to the discipline, it has yet to prove its sustainability to rigorous empirical testing (Green and Shapiro 1994). One of the biggest reasons for this criticism is the comprehensiveness of some of the hypotheses of rational choice. “Thick” rational accounts take into account not only the individual’s rationality, but also the agent’s preferences and beliefs (Green and Shapiro 1994 p.18). According to one account, human actions cannot be explained without taking all spheres into account - meaning the inclusion of culture in the Rational Actor paradigm (Ferejohn 1991 p.283-
286). Once one enters the realm of culture and beliefs, virtually nothing is testable or falsifiable, which is why these critics argue that this model does not stand up to rigid academic scrutiny (Green and Shapiro 1994 p.22).

However, this concept of culture in the Rational Actor model is essential, especially in the case of North Korea. According to Payne, the traditional approach of Rational Actor, which downplays the significance of internal factors and ideational considerations in the formulation of foreign policies, is seriously challenged by the post-Cold War developments “which buttress the view that culture is one of the most decisive” determinants of international behavior (Payne 1995 p.xiv, 5). Cultural differences exacerbate difficulties that appear in international affairs because of misunderstandings in cultural practices (Payne 1995 p.6). All cultures have hidden codes of behavior that are virtually unintelligible to outsiders (Payne 1995 p. 9). This is what Neack, Hey and Haney call “cultural rationale”, which refers to long-standing traditions or idiosyncratic features that define every decision-making group (Neack, Hey, and Haney 1995 p.94)36. Without consideration of these special aspects involved in the decision-making process, any analysis cannot be complete. There are several Korean characteristics that cannot be explained without an understanding of the Korean mentality. A good example is provided by the importance of “saving face” - a standing strategy for the North Korean negotiating team. It would seem irrational from a Western perspective to insist upon a certain condition purely for “saving face”, but in the Korean mentality, this is as important as life itself37. In other words, being revealed to have lied is worse than defending one’s word even to the point of war and possibly dying for it. Other examples can be found in Snyder’s analysis of the Korean heritage38. The partisan guerrilla tradition and sensitivity towards foreign intrusion are all examples of singular Korean traditions that influence the decision making process. It is my belief that for these reasons

36 In another account, it was shown that ideology is a more potent force in the formulation of policy than is national interest and that dimensions of the national culture are related to the nation’s involvement in foreign conflict. See McGowan, Patrick J., and Howard B. Shapiro. 1973. The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings: Sage Publications. pp 126, 128.
37 In later chapters, this is shown in a quote from a North Korean official.
38 See page 8.
the Rational Actor model should be complemented by the introduction of cultural aspects in explaining the 1993 North Korean Nuclear Crisis.

Chapter IV: The Nuclear Negotiation Drama: The History

1. The Buildup Stage (Before 1993)

North Korea’s nuclear-related activity generally began from the middle of the 1950s as they signed a nuclear technology cooperation treaty with the former-U.S.S.R.’s Dubna Nuclear Institute (Desinov 2000 p.21; Oberdorfer 1997 p.252; Shin 1998 p.31). They signed the Korean-Soviet Union Treaty on the peaceful use of nuclear power in September 1959 and established the Young-byun Nuclear Research Institute (Kim 1995 p.14). In June 1965 they imported the research nuclear reactor IRT-2000 from the Soviet Union (Kim 1995 p.14; Oberdorfer 1997 p.252)\(^{39}\). In September 1974 North Korea joined the IAEA, signed a Partial Nuclear Safety Management Treaty, and had since undergone routine inspections (Kim 1995 p.14)\(^{40}\).

Up to this point there was no concern in the international society about North Korea’s conversion of the nuclear capability into military purposes. All this changes when in July 1970 it became known that North Korea was beginning construction on a 5mW nuclear reactor\(^{41}\) within the Young-byun Research Institute (Kim 1995 p.15; Oberdorfer 1997 p.253; Reiss 1995 p.233)\(^{42}\). It was then that the United States started to pressure the Soviet Union to pressure North Korea to join the NPT. The Soviet Union proceeded to persuade North Korea\(^{43}\), and as a result in December of 1985 North Korea joined the NPT.

\(^{39}\) According to a different account, the 2mW research reactor IRT-2000 was imported in 1963; finished construction in 1965; began operation in 1967. See Shin, Jae-In, pp 31.

\(^{40}\) Cumings has a different version of the date that North Korea joined the IAEA. See Cumings, Bruce. 1997. *Korea’s Place in the Sun*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. pp 466.

\(^{41}\) All nuclear reactors can be described in terms of either their thermal or their electrical capability. The Yongbyon reactor has been characterized as either a 30MW (thermal) or 5mW (electrical) reactor. See Reiss, pp 233.

\(^{42}\) Mazarr discusses the lack of an early warning system in U.S. intelligence. See Mazarr, *Opportunities*.

\(^{43}\) In December 1985, Moscow agreed to supply 4 light-water nuclear power reactors to North Korea but only if North Korea would join the NPT. This conditionality was added at the request of the United States. Oberdorfer, Don. 1997. *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*: Addison-Wesley. North Korea finally joined the NPT on December 12, 1985. Under provisions of the treaty, North Korea was given 18 months to negotiate and sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Near the end of the 18 months deadline, the
(Shin 1998 p.33). However, although North Korea did join the NPT, it did not fulfill Section 3 Paragraph 4’s ‘Safeguards Agreement within 18 months of joining the NPT\textsuperscript{44}. This was the beginning of the conflict between the United States and North Korea.

In 1992 the Pyongyang nuclear research institute installed an MGC-20 accelerator with the technological support of the IAEA. The installation of the accelerator meant that North Korea now had the basic capability of nuclear research (Shin 1998 p.31).

A French commercial satellite picked up that progress on the North Korean nuclear complex was at a fast pace, and this provoked the IAEA to further pressure North Korea to carry out the duties connected with the NPT\textsuperscript{45}. North Korea announced its willingness to sign the Safeguards Agreement and accept inspection, but required that nuclear weapons be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula and a guarantee that no country, especially the United States, would use nuclear weapons nor threaten to use them on North Korea (Kim 1995 p.17). These demands were on the same line as the ‘Korean peninsula De-Nuclearization Zone’ demand that North Korea had frequently used in the past. The Korean peninsula De-Nuclearization Zone demand included: 1) The deportation of the nuclear weapons installed in South Korea; 2) No testing, production, storage, or importation of nuclear weapons; 3) No shipment containing nuclear weapons allowed to embark or transit via South Korea (Kim 1995 p.18)\textsuperscript{46}. These demands from North Korea were timed at about the same time President George Bush of the United

\textsuperscript{44} The rule of the NPT that specifies that any country joining the NPT must sign a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and submit itself for routine inspections. See Kim, Jae-mok. 1995. Pookhaek Hyupsang Drama (The North Korea Nuclear Negotiation Drama). Seoul: Kyungdang. pp 16.

\textsuperscript{45} There is conflicting evidence about whether the initial satellite report came from a French satellite (Kim, Jae-mok, pp 12.) or a US intelligence satellite (Oberdorfer, pp 250.). In January 1986 North Korea began operation of the 5mW Yongbyon reactor. In addition, North Korea also began construction of a 200mW (thermal) reactor at Yongbyon and a 600-800mW (thermal) reactor near Taechon. According to one estimate, these three reactors would produce enough plutonium for up to 45 nuclear bombs a year (Reiss, pp 234.. See also Desinov, Valery I. 2000. Nuclear Institutions and Organizations in North Korea. In The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia, edited by J. C. Moltz and A. Y. Mansourov. New York and London: Routledge. for a detail description of North Korea’s nuclear institutions and organizations.

\textsuperscript{46} Joongang Ilbo, August 20, 1991.
States was preparing to reduce the number of nuclear weapons worldwide because of the end of the Cold War.\footnote{According to Barry, this move was not taken for the sake of the Korean peninsula alone, but had to do much more with seeking the U.S.S.R.’s reciprocity. See Barry, Mark P. 1996. North Korea and the United States: Promise or Peril? In Korea: A World in Change, edited by K. W. Thompson: The Miller Center, University of Virginia.}

Therefore, the United States announced the complete elimination of strategic nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula on September 27th, 1991 (Kim 1995 p.18). In addition, South Korean president Roh, Tae-woo announced the Non-Nuclearization Principles of ‘prohibition of construction, possession, storage, deployment, use of nuclear weapons’\footnote{Joongang Ilbo, November 8, 1991.}. These arrangements were designed to weaken the justification for North Korea’s rejecting inspection.

North Korea then made an announcement on November 25th, 1991. The content of the announcement was as follows: 1) when the U.S. begins withdrawal of the nuclear weapons the DPRK will sign the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA; 2) simultaneous inspection on the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and the nuclear complex in North Korea; 3) North Korean-U.S. talks should begin to discuss the simultaneous inspection and removal of the U.S. threat to North Korea; 4) North-South talks should begin to implement the Korean peninsula De-Nuclearization\footnote{Joongang Ilbo, November 26, 1991.}.

South Korea accepted the North-South bilateral inspection proposition of North Korea, and agreed to proclaim the “Korean peninsula Non-Nuclearization announcement”\footnote{Joongang Ilbo, December 12, 1991.}. The “Korean Peninsula Non-Nuclearization Announcement” was signed and went into effect on February 19, 1992\footnote{Joongang Ilbo, February 19, 1992.}. In compliance, North Korea officially announced its willingness to sign the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and South Korea announced that it would discontinue the 1992 Team Spirit Military Drills (Kim 1995 p.19).

The actual signing of the Safeguards Agreement between North Korea and the IAEA took place on January 30th, 1992\footnote{Joongang Ilbo, January 30, 1992.}. On May 4th North Korea submitted its initial report
to the IAEA. The IAEA proceeded to make ad hoc inspections over 6 instances (1st: May 25th, 1992 - June 6th, 1992; 2nd: July 8th - 18th, 1992; 3rd: September 1st - 11th, 1992; 4th: November 2nd - 13th, 1992; 5th: December 14th - 19th, 1992; 6th: January 26th - February 6th, 1993), and signed Subsidiary Agreements with North Korea for 4 installations (Kim 1995 p.23). These 4 installations were then to move on from ad hoc inspections to routine inspections.

After the six ad hoc and routine inspections the IAEA concluded that there were certain inconsistencies between the inspection results and the initial reports (Dorn and Fulton 1997 p.22; Kim 1995 p.25; Oberdorfer 1997 p.269). North Korea had disclosed that they removed the damaged fuel rod from the 5mW nuclear reactor in March 1990, reprocessed it only once in the nuclear chemical lab, and obtained 90 grams of plutonium (Kim 1995 p.25-26). But the IAEA concluded from the inspection results that the fuel rod had been reprocessed at least three times in 1989-1991 and the extracted plutonium probably was closer to several kilograms. The IAEA claimed on these grounds that it should be allowed to inspect the two non-reported complexes that were suspected to be nuclear waste reprocessing centers. This was the IAEA’s first request for Special Inspections. The logic was that the extracted plutonium and the nuclear waste should

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54 According to Samsung Lee, North Korea submitted 16 nuclear sites on the initial report to the IAEA. It was during the six ad hoc inspections that the IAEA requested the Special Inspections, and therefore 4 of the 16 sites weren’t even exposed to ad hoc inspections. The IAEA applied top priority to the four uninspected sites and the 3 among the 16 that were designated as subject to regular inspection – a total of 7 sites Yi, Sam-song. 1994. Hanbando haek munje wa Miguk oegyo : Puk-Mi haek hyopsang kwa Hanguk tongil chongchaek ui pipanjok insik (The Nuclear Question and U.S. Policy on the Korean Peninsula: A Critical Understanding of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear Talks and South Korean Unification Policy). Che 1-pan. ed, Onul ui sasang sinso ; 170. Seoul: Hangilsa.


56 April 1993 report by Blix to the UN Security Council and General Assembly. A/48/133, S/25556


be of similar structures. After much delay North Korea allowed an official observation\(^59\) and the IAEA could conclude that one structure was of no importance and one could be a nuclear waste storage/reprocessing center. The IAEA continually requested permission to extract samples from the nuclear waste reprocessing centers, but this was rejected each time by North Korea\(^60\). North Korea claimed that these structures were military installations and therefore could not be disclosed\(^61\). North Korea also claimed that they regarded continuous requests of inspection of non-reported installations to be a violation of their national sovereignty\(^62\). The IAEA subsequently called an annual Board of Governors meeting to discuss North Korea’s non-compliance of the Special Inspections request of the IAEA to resolve the inconsistencies between the initial report and inspection results. The Board of Governors subsequently passed the motion for a Resolution urging North Korea’s fulfillment of the duties to the IAEA\(^63\).

In the meanwhile, regarding the bilateral inspections of North and South Korea, the two Koreas began 7 working-level talks about the Joint Nuclear Control Committee and made a joint announcement on March 14\(^{th}\)\(^64\). The announcement stated that the North-South Mutual Inspection Regime would be selected after the first talks, and within 20 days of the selection the actual inspections would begin (Kim 1995 p.31). In compliance, on March 19\(^{th}\) the 1\(^{st}\) Nuclear Regulation Joint Committee was launched. However, due

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\(^{59}\) North Korea was adamant about admitting IAEA officials visiting the new sites. After much negotiation, the DPRK decided to allow the IAEA officials on a ‘observation’ tour, but not inspection tour. This type of nuance negotiations were frequent because perhaps of the Korean concept of ‘face’. See Oberdorfer, pp 278. The North Korean negotiators could not give the impression of subduing to US demands because of this ‘face’. Kokoski puts forth a similar theory about the Korean concept of face, saying that “the use of ad hoc inspections… would have allowed the side-stepping of any perceived stigma associated in the North Korean leadership with special inspections” See Kokoski, Richard. 1995. Technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Sweden and New York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ;Oxford University Press.. Kokoski claims this because he perceives that the North Korean reluctance to subdue to special inspections is because of the fear of what happened to Iraq during Desert Storm, and so the North Korean shudder at the use of that particular phrase.


\(^{61}\) Joongang Ilbo, February 17, 1993.


\(^{63}\) Joongang Ilbo, February 26, 1993.

\(^{64}\) Joongang Ilbo, March 14, 1992.
to minor disagreements between the committee chairs, several talks were fruitless (Kim 1995 p.31; Oberdorfer 1997 p.272; Reiss 1995 p.244)\(^65\). Disillusioned, the United States and South Korea re-announced the 1993 Team Spirit plans. North Korea used this as a pretext to stalemate the Nuclear Regulation Joint Committee. The major disagreements included the Special Inspections and levels of inspection. South Korea claimed that all nuclear facilities and materials should be inspected whereas North Korea claimed that all U.S. bases in South Korea should be inspected while North Korea would exempt the military bases (Kim 1995 p.32-33). Up to this point, the United States had thought that the centerpiece of the North Korean nuclear crisis negotiation should be North-South talks. But this stalemate made the United States reconsider this policy option (Reiss 1995 p.245).

It was after these talks that North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT at 10:50 a.m. on March 12\(^{th}\), 1993, causing the biggest turmoil on the Korean peninsula since 1953 – the end of the Korean War.

2. The NPT Withdrawal Scare

North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT on March 12\(^{th}\), 1993. As reasons, they gave 1) U.S.-ROK Team Spirit Exercises; 2) Special Inspection requests of the IAEA, which North Korea claimed jeopardized its supreme interests (Kim 1995 p.36; Reiss 1995 p.250-251)\(^66\). The withdrawal notice would become effective three months after the notification date\(^67\).

\(^65\) There were signs of progress at first. In September 1992, prime-ministerial talks went well, resulting in three agreements implementing their December Nonaggression and Reconciliation Agreement (Reiss, pp 244). At this untimely moment South Korea discovered a spy ring (Joongang Ilbo, October 13, 1992). Also, on October 8\(^{th}\), the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting declared that it would resume the plans for the 1993 Team Spirit Exercises, if bilateral inspections didn’t take place by the end of the year (Joongang Ilbo, October 8, 1992).

\(^66\) New York Times, March 13, 1993. According to Samsung Lee, North Korea claimed the following: as the United States was suspicious that the Yongbyon sites were nuclear weapon development sites, so the DPRK is suspicious of whether the U.S. installments in South Korea were really nuclear-free. Therefore the United States should allow nuclear inspections of the U.S. military bases to the DPRK before the U.S. can inspect the DPRK sites. See Yi, Sam-song, pp 74. It was the DPRK’s turn to settle its suspicion about the U.S. military bases in South Korea since the U.S. had their chance with the ad hoc inspections.

\(^67\) According to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, member states must notify all other member states three prior to the cancellation of its membership. The NPT Article 10 Section 1 specifies that all member
It was a little after the withdrawal notice that North Korea hinted at the solution to the nuclear problem. In an interview with Hankyoreh newspaper\textsuperscript{68}, Huh Jong, North Korea vice-ambassador to the United Nations, claimed that when the nuclear threat from the United States disappears and the IAEA returns to impartiality the DPRK would return to the NPT. Huh also said that in order to solve the nuclear problem, the United States should be the DPRK’s negotiating partner. In addition, Pyongyang subsequently formally requested a DPRK-U.S. direct negotiations through a diplomatic announcement\textsuperscript{69}. North Korea repeated this request for a direct DPRK-U.S. talk on several different occasions as well\textsuperscript{70}.

The United States media reacted to the North Korean withdrawal in two ways: the hard-liners and the moderates. The New York Times argued that “by displaying unity, the world may yet persuade Pyongyang to reverse its suicidal course”\textsuperscript{71}. Doug Bandow argued that the United States and the ROK should pursue diplomatic options in an attempt to divert the North from a nuclear course… However if the North is firmly committed to acquiring an atomic bomb, the best way to expose that intent is to make an attractive offer that would be difficult to refuse” (Bandow 1993). On the other hand, the Wall Street Journal argued that “some regimes don't play by the rules, and they never will… North Korea, like Iraq or Cuba or Libya, is one of those inherently secretive countries that isn't operating according to normal behavioral patterns among nations.”\textsuperscript{72} Although this was before the withdrawal from the NPT, the Chicago Tribune had previously gone so far as to call for a preemptive strike of the reactors in Yongbyon\textsuperscript{73}.

In such an atmosphere, the Clinton administration cautiously began negotiations with North Korea. The Clinton administration had just been installed, and therefore had not had the time to establish its own diplomatic norms (Oberdorfer 1997 p.281)\textsuperscript{74}. As a tool

\textsuperscript{68} Hankyoreh Shinmun, March 19, 1993.
\textsuperscript{69} Joongang Ilbo, March 29, 1993.
\textsuperscript{70} See “Editorial” Rodong Shinmun, March 29, 1993; Joongang Ilbo, April 6, 1993.
\textsuperscript{72} Wall Street Journal, March 17, 1993.
\textsuperscript{73} Chicago Tribune, November 26, 1991. For more instances of the hysteria within the United States that North Korea’s NPT withdrawal caused, see Cumings, Korea’s Place, pp 474.
\textsuperscript{74} Foreign Minister Han, Sung-Joo’s press conference, Moonwha Ilbo, March 22, 1993.
of exploring the North Korean intentions, the United States requested the resumption of Councilor-level talks in Beijing (Kim 1995 p.72). Although there was no actual progress made in these talks, they were the precept of the high-level talks to come (Reiss 1995 p.253).

After receiving the North Korean notification of its withdrawal from the NPT, Hans Blix, the Secretary General of the IAEA, stated that until the three months grace period was over, the inspections responsibilities still must be performed75. As stated before, the IAEA was in desperation of regaining its posture, due to the embarrassment of Iraq. In a paper that Hans Blix wrote in April 1993, he claimed that despite the recent setbacks, there was good reason to continue the efforts for multi-lateralism in the non-proliferation regime76. The IAEA held an unofficial conference on March 17 and Special Board of Governors meeting on March 18 (Kim 1995 p.78). At these meetings the IAEA urged North Korea to submit itself to the IAEA’s inspection regime, and to further discuss whether to send this problem to the United Nations Security Council77. In addition, the IAEA decided to notify the United Nations of the current progressions in the crisis78. It also passed a resolution asking North Korea to fulfill its responsibilities as a member state until the effective date of the withdrawal79. It is important to notice that China constantly argued for negotiations as the solution method instead of resolutions or discussion about sanctions80.

On April 6th the United Nations Security Council held an emergency meeting regarding North Korea81. The UN Security Council passed a Chairman’s statement on April 8th82, with the following contents: 1) re-confirm the important of a NPT member

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79 Joongang Ilbo, March 19, 1993. Another IAEA Board of Governors meeting took place on March 31, 1993. It was at this meeting that the IAEA officially resolved to report North Korea’s non-compliance to the United Nations. See Kim, Jae-mok, pp 80 and Kokoski, pp 224. This resolution was Resolution 825; IAEA document S/RES/825 (1993) (author has a copy of the document in its entirety).
81 Joongang Ilbo, April 6, 1993.
82 Joongang Ilbo, April 9, 1993. On the same day, Blix made a report to all the members of the IAEA about the non-compliance of the North Korea with the application of safeguards. Author has a copy of the report. IAEA report INFCIRC/419.
state’s compliance with the treaty; 2) support the Korean Non-nuclearization announcement; 3) request that the IAEA attempt to negotiate with the DPRK; 4) observe North Korea’s activity. As this did not influence North Korea’s negotiating stance, the Security Council then passed a resolution. This time China participated in the resolution, but it did soften the degree of hostility in the resolution statement (Shin 1996 p.86).

Two weeks after North Korea’s announcement, South Korean Foreign Minister Han, Sung-joo traveled to Washington, DC to convey the South Korean stance on the negotiations with North Korea. As Han claimed, “pressure alone would not work” on North Korea (Oberdorfer 1997 p.283). He proposed a “carrot and stick” approach to the matter: the stick would be the United Nations Security Council sanctions or the threat of it; and the carrot could be promises such as cancellation of the Team Sprit military exercises and security guarantees. However, the consensus in South Korea was growing that as much as the South Korean did not want to allow DPRK-U.S. direct talks, they were becoming the only solution to this dilemma (Barry 1996 p.141; Kim 1995 p.75). Up to this point, the South Korean consensus was that the North was trying to apply their traditional “divide and survive” strategy – by dividing the U.S.-ROK alliance to gain an advantage in the negotiations (Snyder 1999 p.24).

China, which was a crucial participant in the international arena, was urging the United States to commit to direct talks with North Korea – no doubt due to the request of North Korea (Oberdorfer 1997 p.283). Also, according to Raymond Burkhardt, acting U.S. ambassador in Seoul at the time, the direct U.S.-DPRK talks were “the South Koreans’ idea… they actually came to us and suggested it” (Oberdorfer 1997 p.283). In mid-April, the Clinton administration expressed its willingness to hold direct talks with North Korea to prevent it from leaving the NPT (Reiss 1995 p.252). This was the

83 Joongang Ilbo, May 12, 1993.
84 Moonwha Ilbo, March 22, 1993.
85 Although Reiss seems to imply that it was the United States that initiated the direct DPRK-U.S. talks, Oberdorfer takes the position that it a diplomat at North Korea’s UN mission in New York that telephoned C. Kenneth Quinones, the DPRK country officer in the State Department for a direct meeting Oberdorfer, pp 283.

According to Lee, that the Clinton administration was attempting talks with the DPRK was a sign that the soft-liners within the U.S. government were gaining the upper side. See Yi, pp 76.

3. Renewed Hope: Direct U.S.-DPRK Talks

1) First Round: June 1993

By forcing the United States into direct talks, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seemed to have succeeded in obtaining some of its goals. Specifically, North Korea’s long term request was a direct DPRK-U.S. talk excluding the IAEA or South Korea, which it eventually attained. It was beginning from this point that North Korea’s real national interests and foreign policy goals surfaced for the world to see.

The U.S. official chosen to negotiate with North Korea was Robert L. Gallucci, assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs, and his North Korea counterpart was Kang Suk-Ju, the DPRK’s deputy foreign minister (Oberdorfer 1997 p. 284). Three lower-level talks took place to work out the details of the meeting, after which Gallucci and Kang met in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (Kim 1995 p.98; Oberdorfer 1997 p.284). The date the meeting began, June 286, was only ten days before North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT would become effective.

The North Koreans demanded 1) guarantee that the U.S. would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea; 2) permanent discontinuing of the Team Spirit military exercises; 3) disclosure of the U.S bases in South Korea; 4) stop providing South Korea with the nuclear umbrella; 5) guarantee of impartiality of the IAEA; 6) recognition of the North Korean communist system (Kim 1995 p.98). The main concern for the U.S. negotiating party was the North Korean return to the NPT, given its urgency because of the upcoming deadline (Reiss 1995 p.98).

In the ongoing discussions between the two sides, North Korea was adamant about the U.S. insistence that it return to the NPT as soon as possible, but claimed that if the DPRK-U.S. negotiations were to go smoothly, it would be willing to resolve the

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86 Chosun Ilbo, June 4, 1993.
suspicion regarding the North Korean nuclear problem through a framework other than the NPT-IAEA one (Kim 1995 p.99). As it became clear that North Korea would not unilaterally cancel its withdrawal\textsuperscript{87}, the U.S. negotiating team formed prospective assurances against “the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons” and against “interference in each other’s internal affairs” (Oberdorfer 1997 p.285).

After several rounds of negotiations, the DPRL and the United States announced a joint statement that the DPRK would suspend its withdrawal from the NPT in return for U.S. security assurances\textsuperscript{88}. Because of the uniqueness of North Korea’s situation, it would later claim that it had “unique” status within the NPT, and should it decide to leave the NPT again, it could do so within one day (Reiss 1995 p.254).

2) Second Round: July 1993

After having subdued the DPRK into remaining within the Non-Proliferation Treaty framework, the United States next selected North Korea’s acceptance of inspections from the IAEA as its objective for the second rounds of talks\textsuperscript{89}. This conclusion was based on the belief that the most effective way to resolve the difference between the North Korean voluntary reported amount of plutonium and the IAEA’s report was to restore the IAEA inspection regime. Of course, this meant the restoration of special inspections (Kim 1995 p.110). It was very important for the United States to fulfill North Korea’s responsibilities with the IAEA because of the upcoming renewal of the NPT in April 1995 (Kim 1995 p.112).

Just before the second round of talks, U.S. President Clinton made a trip to South Korea, visited the DMZ, and said, “it is pointless [for the North Koreans] to try to develop nuclear weapons because if they ever use them it would be the end of their country” (Oberdorfer 1997 p.288)\textsuperscript{90}. This prompted the North Korean negotiating party at the second round talks to complain about bellicose language, but they had no intention

\textsuperscript{87} Chosun Ilbo, June 6, 1993.
\textsuperscript{88} The security assurances included a guarantee that the United State would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea unless first attacked upon, a recognition of the system, and a non-interference in internal affairs. See Kim, Jae-mok, pp 102. See Chosun Ilbo, June 12, 1993.
\textsuperscript{89} Chosun Ilbo, July 17, 1993; Xinhua News Agency, June 28, 1993.
\textsuperscript{90} Joongang Ilbo, July 11, 1993.
of breaking off the negotiations (Oberdorfer 1997 p.289). But nonetheless, the demonstration of the U.S.-ROK alliance through this Clinton visit undoubtedly added to pressure North Korea⁹¹.

At the second rounds that took place again in the North Korea Mission to the United Nations in Geneva on July 14th, 16th, and 19th, the U.S. negotiator Gallucci stated that the third rounds, if at all, would only take place after the DPRK fulfilled its obligations with the IAEA, at which the issues that the DPRK wanted resolved would be discussed (Kim 1995 p.111-112). North Korea subsequently demanded 1) documentation of the guarantee not to use nuclear weapons against the U.S.; 2) discontinue the mass joint military exercises; 3) replace the armistice with a permanent peace treaty; 4) declare non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula; 5) eliminate North Korean from the terrorist state list; 6) support the Korea Confederation Reunification Plan (Kim 1995 p.112). In addition, the DPRK proposed a plan to replace the graphite reactors with light-water ones, and asked that the U.S. support this (Barry 1996 p.142; Cumings 1997 p.484). This was the beginning of the light water reactor issue⁹². The members of the U.S. negotiating team saw this as a face-saving technique to obtaining light-water reactors without ever admitting it was developing nuclear weapons (Oberdorfer 1997 p.290).

In accordance with the talks, the DPRK and U.S. announced a joint statement – 1) confirm the principles of the joint announcement of June 11th; 2) the U.S. supports the light-water proposal as a final solution to the crisis; 3) the DPRK will begin negotiations with the IAEA as soon as possible; 4) the DPRK will attempt to resume talks with the ROK⁹³. Thus, the preconditions for the third round of talks were kept at a minimum – talks with the IAEA and South Korea (Reiss 1995 p.255). As a consequence of the joint statement, the DPRK allowed the IAEA inspection team to enter North Korea on August 3rd, and attempted to resume talks with South Korea.

⁹² Light-water reactors, named that way to distinguish them from reactors that use deuterium oxide, or heavy water, rely on ordinary water to cool the reactor. All the key components in a light water reactor must be imported to North Korea. Two standard LWR were capable of producing 2,000 megawatts, compared to 5 megawatts which was all the Yongbyun reactor could produce. See Oberdorfer, pp 289.
4. “Broad and Thorough” Approach

The IAEA inspection team entered North Korea on August 3, 1993\textsuperscript{94}. They managed to change the batteries and videotapes of the movie cameras attached to the reported nuclear sites, thereby guaranteeing the continuity of safeguards, but were stopped when they tried to obtain a sample from the 5mW reactor and laboratory. To Pyongyang, it seemed like the IAEA was clandestinely trying to perform ad hoc inspections (Kim 1995 p.121; Reiss 1995 p.255). The term ‘continuity of safeguards’ was an interim concept created by Washington, to find a midway agreement between the DPRK and the IAEA. Although the IAEA was unhappy with this term, the United States forced it to play along (Oberdorfer 1997 p.292). North Korea claimed that they were agreeing to the continuity of safeguards not as a part of its responsibilities with the IAEA, but because of its agreement with the United States (Kim 1995 p.122). Of course, these safeguard issues were not enough to fulfill the suspicions of the IAEA.

If only to fulfill the promise with the U.S., North Korea invited the IAEA delegation to continue the ad hoc inspection talks which had been suspended since February (Reiss 1995 p.255). However, as North Korea continued to complain about the IAEA’s “misconduct and impartiality”\textsuperscript{95}, the talks did not make much progress. The case was the same with the North-South talks. South Korea agreed to the North’s proposal of an exchange of special envoys but the North then demanded that South Korea cancel some military exercises scheduled for October\textsuperscript{96} (Reiss 1995 p.255-256). As the United States had set talks with the IAEA and South Korea as preconditions for the third round of talks, Gallucci had no choice but to cancel the third round initially scheduled for mid-September (Reiss 1995 p.256).

In September 1993, the IAEA warned North Korea that it must conduct ad hoc inspections in order to meet its inspection goals, but Pyongyang only responded that it would allow the IAEA to maintain the continuity of safeguards as it had done in

\textsuperscript{94} Joongang Ilbo, August 3, 1993.
\textsuperscript{95} Korean Central News Agency, September 17, 1993.
\textsuperscript{96} North Korea proposed several high-level talks with South Korea even after this particular round was stalemated. But every time North Korea proposed a round of talks, it demanded that South Korea abandon the international cooperation system of negotiations and the Team Spirit exercises. See Kim, Jae-mok, pp 133.
August\textsuperscript{97}. The IAEA refused on reasons of insufficiency. Their stance was either agree to full inspections or none at all (Kokoski 1995 p.225; Oberdorfer 1997 p.293). The United States urged the IAEA to accept this, but the IAEA refused (Reiss 1995 p.256). This was most probably because the IAEA did not want to repeat the mistake of Iraq just a few months earlier.

As it became clear that North Korea would not agree to the IAEA’s terms of inspections the annual meeting of the Board of Governors passed a resolution that would send the North Korean nuclear issue to the IAEA General Conference\textsuperscript{98}. Blix stated on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} of September at the annual meeting that the deadline necessary to inspect the North Korean nuclear sites had passed, and it was impossible to confirm the peaceful use of nuclear material because of the limitations by the North Korean government (Kim 1995 p.125; Oberdorfer 1997 p.295). It is important to note that China abstained from this vote, as it continued to do on the North Korea nuclear issue. During these proceedings the Chinese Ambassador to Japan announced that China would oppose United Nations sanctions and that the issues should be resolved through a direct DPRK-U.S. talk\textsuperscript{99}. As the IAEA moved towards sanction based on the North Korean non-compliance, North Korea proposed another meeting, but little progress was made. On the 28\textsuperscript{th} the formal resolution was selected in the General Conference\textsuperscript{100}, calling for full compliance with ad hoc and regular inspections (Kim 1995 p.126). But even the resolution did not have any influence on North Korean behavior, and so the IAEA decided to report to the United Nations\textsuperscript{101}. On November 1, the UN General Assembly subsequently passed the resolution urging the DPRK to cooperate immediately with the IAEA with only one opposition (DPRK) (Oberdorfer 1997 p.294)\textsuperscript{102}.

In the meanwhile North Korea was contacting the United States to begin the third round of talks. In connection with this effort, North Korea invited Congressman Gary

\begin{footnotes}
\item[97] Chosun Ilbo, September 22, 1993.
\item[98] Chosun Ilbo, September 23, 1993.
\item[99] Kyodo, October 27, 1993.
\item[100] Chosun Ilbo, September 29, 1993.
\item[101] According to the IAEA-UN agreement of 1959, the IAEA is to report annual activities to the UN General Assembly, and the UN General Assembly will decide to select the report or not. See Kim, Jae-mok, pp 126.
\item[102] Chosun Ilbo, November 2, 1993.
\end{footnotes}
Ackerman. During this visit, North Korea made an interesting offer\(^{103}\) – a detailed “package deal”\(^{104}\) (Oberdorfer 1997 p.293; Reiss 1995 p.257). This was the first of the package deal offer that would surface later again. It was to link the inspection dispute with diplomatic recognition, cancellation of Team Spirit, etc.

On November 7, 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton appeared on a Sunday political talk show on NBC-TV and claimed that “North Korea could not be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb” and stressed that “we should be very firm about this”\(^{105}\). He also claimed that an invasion of South Korea by North Korea would be the same as an invasion on the United States (Kim 1995 p.136; Reiss 1995 p.260). North Korea responded to this, saying that they were “ready to respond with negotiations to negotiations, war to war”\(^{106}\). It was a little after this bellicose interaction that a working level talk between North Korea and the U.S. was announced to open privately\(^{107}\). This provides proof to the fact that neither side in the negotiations had real intentions of going to war and dropping the negotiation option. It was just a struggle to gain the upper hand in the talks (Kim 1995 p.141). As for the United States, the NPT was a vital interest for the sole superpower in the world order, but if forced to impose sanctions on North Korea, it was not sure of its efficacy. The U.S. could not know for sure whether China would veto the resolution, plus tensions on the Korean peninsula was not what the U.S. was ready to heighten. As for North Korea, internal problems such as lack of food resources and the consolidation of the Kim Jong-Il regime were still to be resolved, causing instability for the regime itself. The last thing North Korea wanted would be an international conflict that would speed up the collapse of the system for which Kim Il-Sung fought so fervently (Kim 1995 p.141).

\(^{103}\) Actually the proposal of the package deal was made to C. Kenneth Quinones, the Korean-speaking State Department desk officer for North Korea, who had accompanied Ackerman to North Korea. See Oberdorfer, pp 293.

\(^{104}\) Moonwha Ilbo, October 12, 1993.

\(^{105}\) NBC-TV, Meet the Press, November 7, 1993. It is important to note that the Clinton administration was under extreme pressure for mismanagement in foreign policy. The meandering policy of Bosnia, the death of 18 servicemen in Somalia, the USS Harlan Country incident all contributed to the impression of mismanagement. See Reiss, pp 259.

\(^{106}\) Joongang Ilbo, November 9, 1993.

\(^{107}\) Chosun Ilbo, November 11, 1993.
On November 11, 1993 North Korea’s negotiator Kang Sok-Ju publicly urged the United States to accept the “package solution”\(^\text{108}\). He also restated the willingness to allow the readjustment and replacement of the inspection cameras for the nuclear reactor and reprocessing facility to the IAEA (Reiss 1995 p.260-261; Yi 1994 p.77). He also demanded that the Team Spirit exercises be discontinued before any IAEA inspections (Reiss 1995 p.261).

The package deal included nuclear matters, the Team Spirit exercises, economic aid, and normalization of relations. It was the South Korean analysis that the proposal of a package deal was because of the deep mistrust of the United States (Kim 1995 p.143). For the first time since it was proposed via Congressman Ackerman the Clinton administration considered the proposal in sincerity (Oberdorfer 1997 p.295). As the step-by-step solution first attempted was apparently failing, the package solution seemed to be conceivable. In mid-November, U.S. had a new proposal, its own “package deal” – cancel the Team Spirit exercises first and meet the North Koreans for round three if North Korea agrees to ad hoc inspections, holds direct talks with South Korea, and agrees to hold further talks with the IAEA, including access to the waste sites. It is important to notice that the special inspections were no longer a precondition (Reiss 1995 p.261).

It was about this time that South Korea began to become the obstacle in the negotiations. In an official visit to Washington, South Korean President Kim Young-Sam put the emergency breaks on the package deal\(^\text{109}\). He claimed that South Korean people were being marginalized in the negotiations, and that he should be the final say in deciding whether to abolish the Team Spirit exercises or not\(^\text{110}\). He also insisted that the exchange of special envoys between North and South Korea take place before the third round of U.S.-DPRK talks (Oberdorfer 1997 p.296). Kim also insisted that the terminology of package deal gave the impression of concession to North Korea and

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\(^{109}\) Chosun Ilbo, November 22, 1993.

\(^{110}\) The South Korean hard-liners claimed that the package deal was proposed by North Korea only as a method of buying more time, which could be used to finish its nuclear program. See Shin, Jin. 1996. *Uliui Pookhan Uihumhan Oekyo Jungchaek (North Korea in Crisis; North Korean Foreign Policy in Crisis)*. Seoul: Moonkyung Publishing.
therefore demanded that it be changed to “thorough and broad approach” (Kim 1995 p.145; Oberdorfer 1997 p.296).

Therefore, on November 23, President Clinton and Kim announced that the exchange of North-South envoys would be a prerequisite of the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks, in which a Thorough and Broad approach would be taken as a final solution to the nuclear issue, but held off on the cancellation of the Team Spirit exercises\textsuperscript{111}. However, nobody could agree to the details of the thorough and broad approach (Kim 1995 p. 147; Reiss 1995 p.262). Neither the United States nor South Korea could decide on what concessions to give to North Korea at the third round of talks. North Korea resented having to give in to South Korean demands to reach the United States (Oberdorfer 1997 p.296).

The Clinton Administration had been driven to this policy option because of the lack of deterrence provided by the U.S.-ROK alliance. The North Korea’s isolation from the world would decrease the efficacy of the economic sanctions that would follow should the crisis come to a complete stalemate. The U.S.-ROK alliance may be able to deter the North’s attacking the South, but nothing could stop the North from obtaining that nuclear arsenal, and further, from exporting it to Middle Eastern countries. Thus, the U.S. had no choice but to engage with North Korea at almost any cost (Reiss 1995 p.263).

5. Diplomatic Breakdowns

The hard-liners within the Clinton administration and South Korean administration were the ones bogging down the negotiations (Yi 1994 p.77). They were criticizing the Clinton administration of giving too many concessions to North Korea for their non-compliant behavior. Heading off the hard-liners\textsuperscript{112} was the Department of Defense. In the annual Security Consultation Meeting that ended November 4, 1993, the SCM selected a joint resolution that stated “if South Korea was to be invaded by foreign forces the United States will immediately provide the nuclear umbrella and provide effective

\textsuperscript{111} Chosun Ilbo, November 24, 1993.
\textsuperscript{112} For detailed analysis of the reasons the hard-liners think the North should be prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons, see Shin, Jin, pp 50-53. The reasons can be summarized as a threat to the international order because of North Korea’s unpredictability and ultimate leverage it would assume with nuclear weapons.
and immediate support”. It also declared suspension of the second reduction of U.S. forces within South Korea (Yi 1994 p.79). It was at this time that the United States announced its willingness to talk further with the DPRK about the Comprehensive resolution to the nuclear issue. The Department of Defense argued that the inspections should precede any concessions to North Korea (Yi 1994 p.80). This argument was reinforced by South Korean President Kim Young-Sam when he argued for the preconditions of a North-South envoy exchange. As a result of the hard-liners arguments, the Clinton administration decided to include the 7th Division of the U.S. Navy in the U.S.-ROK Alliance headquarters\textsuperscript{113}. The U.S. Department of Defense also announced that it was selling 317 of air-to-air missiles to South Korea, billing 169 million dollars\textsuperscript{114}. Also, plans for reinforcing the ROK army with Patriot missiles and increase of intelligence satellites were in preparation in the Department of Defense. In other words, while appearing to be willing to negotiate with the DPRK, the United States was strengthening its military in the Korean peninsula. This type of dominance of the hard-liners continued throughout the negotiations until the Chinese Defense Department invited the North Korean Party delegates to demonstrates its strong alliance and thereby nullifying the hard-liners within the U.S. (Yi 1994 p.310).

In early December 1993, the Worker’s Party Central Committee made a surprising admission that the major targets of the seven-year plan had not been met and that the DPRK economy was in a grave situation (Oberdorfer 1997 p.297). Also, it was interesting to notice that about this time Kim Il-Sung re-emerged from his semi-retirement state to daily administration (Oberdorfer 1997 p.298). U.S. experts interpreted this to be a dissatisfaction with the way Kim Jong-II had dealt with administration (Oberdorfer 1997 p.298).

It was about this time that U.S. intelligence reported that there was a “better than even” chance that North Korea already had a nuclear weapon\textsuperscript{115}. This started a frenzy in the U.S. media about the possibility of a new war (Sigal 1998). China expressed its

\textsuperscript{113} Chosun Ilbo, November 4, 1993.
\textsuperscript{114} The Korea Herald, November 25, 1993.
displeasure over economic sanctions, arguing that negotiation was the only method that the nuclear crisis could be resolved\textsuperscript{116}. Leonard S. Spector predicted that even though there was ambiguity as to whether North Korea actually had a nuclear weapon, the United States would have to “swallow hard” and limit action to reaffirming security guarantees to Japan and the ROK\textsuperscript{117}. On December 3, 1993, North Korea and the United States resumed talks (Kim 1995 p.148)\textsuperscript{118}. The North Korean delegation proposed a further progressed version of their concessions. This proposal included an expanded IAEA inspection range. North Korea would allow full inspections of 5 of the 7 ad hoc and regular inspection sites, but would only allow limited inspections on two of those sites\textsuperscript{119}. Of the 16 North Korea nuclear sites, 7 were subject to inspections. Ad hoc inspection sites include the laboratory in Yongbyun, the 5mW nuclear reactor, nuclear fuel rod factory, and storage facility. The rest, the IRT-2000 research reactor, critical facility, and semi-critical facility, were regular inspection sites. Among the 7 sites, North Korea was proposing to allow limited inspections at the laboratory and 5mW reactor. Those were the two sites that the IAEA was most suspicious of. Of course, the two unreported sites, of which the IAEA was requesting special inspections, were not even included in the ad hoc or regular inspection sites. The unreported sites were to be discussed after the third round of talks (Kim 1995 p.148-149). It seemed North Korea was leaving the laboratory and 5mW reactor as a diplomatic leverage (Kim 1995 p.149). The U.S. and South Korea reconfirmed that the North-South talks should also resume before the third round began. In response, North Korea claimed that it was in unique status and therefore should not have to agree to the IAEA inspections, nor did it have to concede to North-South talks, but it would as a generous motion if the U.S. did not make it a precondition for the third round. The U.S. then changed its terminology and proposed that North Korea agree to all necessary inspections of the IAEA to guarantee the continuity of safeguards. Also, if the North agreed to a North-South talk, the Team Spirit issue could be discussed flexibly

\textsuperscript{117} Los Angeles Times, December 27, 1993.
\textsuperscript{118} Joongang Ilbo, December 4, 1993.
\textsuperscript{119} According to Reiss, the proposal was made by the U.S. Washington had changed its tactics on ad hoc inspections, and after the administration stopped labeling these activities inspections, Pyongyang agreed almost immediately. See Reiss, pp 264.
North Korea agreed in principle. The details would be worked out between the DPRK and the IAEA. In return, the U.S. was ready to suspend the Team Spirit exercises and continue the third round with Pyongyang. This round would include the special inspections (Reiss 1995 p.264).

When the deal was announced, Clinton’s critics went into an uproar. They argued the deal was hardly a diplomatic triumph because of all the U.S. concessions, and they were merely back to the same situation as February 1993. The IAEA and DPRK met in early January to talk out the details of the deal between the U.S. and DPRK, but little progress was made (Reiss 1995 p.265). The IAEA continuously requested what amounted to complete inspections, but North Korea argued that it would only allow continuity of the safeguards already in place (Kim 1995 p.156-157). The United States announced that it would continue the Team Spirit exercises if significant progress was not made. Within the Clinton Administration the hard-liners argued that Patriot missiles should be shipped to South Korea. The South Korean government officially announced the U.S. plans to install Patriot missiles on the U.S. bases in South Korea. The installation of the Patriot missiles were designed to soothe the security anxiety of the conservative public opinion within the ROK and U.S. (Kim 1995 p.159). Although many in the Korean administration thought the missiles might cause North Korea to reverse the process, the North Koreans did not raise a major argument about this. It is possible that they did not want to jeopardize a deal that was in motion. The only mention in the North Korea press to this buildup was on January 30th, when Kang Sok-Ju demanded that the U.S. stop the provocations and immediately withdraw its troops from South Korea. Kang did mention that the DPRK “was ready for dialogue or for war”.

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122 The Patriot deployment had been first suggested in December 1993 by the U.S. military commander in Korea. They were meant as a precaution in case a war broke out on the Korean peninsula, but were abandoned because of concerns that it would hinder the negotiations. On January 26th, the New York Times ran an article on preparation for reinforcement of the U.S. forces in Korea including the deployment of the Patriots, and the Clinton administration, afraid of being accused yet again of not protecting U.S. troops, immediately approved the Patriot plan. See Oberdorfer, pp 300.
124 The installations of the Patriot missiles in South Korea nonetheless became a source of conflict because many of the Koreans were worried it would anger the North Koreans. See Joongang Ilbo, January 28, 1994.
although no significant provocations followed. However, North Korea did require the discontinuation of the deployment of the Patriot missiles before the special envoy exchange between North and South Korea (Yi 1994 p.137). This later caused the North-South talks to break down.

In about mid-February, U.S. ambassador James Laney came to Washington expressing deep concern about there being no one in charge of the administration strategy towards North Korea. Laney warned, “you could have 50,000 body bags coming home” (Oberdorfer 1997 p.302). As a result of this Gallucci was named the ambassador-at-large for the North Korean nuclear crisis.

The IAEA was to hold a Board of Governors meeting on February 21, which then might forward the issue to the UN Security Council126. Also, to add more pressure to the negotiation table, Blix had begun preparation for a report that the continuity of the safeguards had been broken (Reiss 1995 p.265). It was at this point in time that North Korea and the IAEA finally reached an agreement on inspections in Yongbyun127. The agreed inspections were still on the line of the “continuity of safeguards”, not the IAEA-intended “ad hoc” inspections. Next the U.S. and DPRK met in working-level meetings to work out the details of the third rounds as agreed previously128. Specifically, they were to work out the simultaneous implementation of the IAEA inspections, North-South Korea talks, DPRK-U.S. third round talks, and the discontinuation of the Team Spirit exercises (Kim 1995 p.175). In the meanwhile the IAEA attempted to send its inspection team to North Korea, but the DPRK continuously delayed issuing visas (Kim 1995 p.177).

While the IAEA hastened the entry of the IAEA inspection team North Korea and the U.S. reached an Agreed Conclusion. The Agreed Conclusion stated that as of March 1st129, the following four actions will be taken simultaneously – 1) the IAEA inspections will resume to maintain continuity of safeguards; 2) North-South working-level talks will begin for the special envoy exchange; 3) South Korea will stop the 1994 Team Spirit

128 Joongang Ilbo, February 27, 1994.
129 U.S. negotiators dubbed this day Super Tuesday. See Oberdorfer, pp 302.
exercises; 4) the DPRK and U.S. will begin the third round of high-level talks in Geneva (Kim 1995 p.177; Reiss 1995 p.265). In an additional note, the U.S. added that without the IAEA inspections making significant progress, and without the special envoy exchange between the North and South, the third rounds would not take place. North Korea responded that the special envoy exchange was never stated in the agreement, and that only the working level talks for the special envoy exchange was required (Reiss 1995 p.178). These factors undoubtedly added to the North’s mistrust of the U.S. But for the United States there was no choice but to include the special envoy exchange as a precondition because of the hardliners within the administration and the public opinion of the South Koreans. At any rate, it seemed the negotiations were finally going somewhere. That thought did not last long.

On March 1st, 1994, a 7-member inspections committee entered the DPRK with the purpose of conducting the inspections from the 3rd to the 14th (Kim 1995 p.188). On this particular trip, the IAEA planned on 1) inspecting the seal on the 7 nuclear sites; 2) film and battery change for the surveillance cameras; 3) inspection of the operation records and sample extraction. Although the IAEA had agreed to the “continuity of safeguards” instead of the ad hoc and regular inspections at the urge of the United States, the IAEA planned on conducting full scale ad hoc and regular inspections (Kim 1995 p.189). But without the North Korean cooperation the attempt to figure out whether or not there has been nuclear conversion was not successful (Kim 1995 p.190). On March 16th the IAEA official announced that the inspection attempt had been unsuccessful and that it was not possible to judge whether or not there had been nuclear conversion (Reiss 1995 p.266).

As soon as the media reported the North Korean resistance to the IAEA inspection team, the hard-liners within the U.S. and South Korea gained momentum. Kim Samhoon, the South Korean nuclear ambassador said “the [South Korean] government

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130 The DPRK and U.S. had agreed to announce the Agreed Conclusion on March 1st, 1994, but the DPRK announced it by itself on February 28, 1994. The DPRK then requested working-level talks with South Korea on March 3rd, 1994, and so the U.S. announced the Agreed Conclusion on March 3rd, 1994. See Kim, Jae-mok, pp 178. Also see Joongang Ilbo, March 2nd, 1994; Joongang Ilbo, March 3rd, 1994.
now has strong suspicion as to whether it should continue to attempt a resolution to the nuclear issue through negotiation. We are now forced to use all alternatives”\textsuperscript{134}. President Clinton was also having a hard time pacifying the hard-liners (Kim 1995 p.194).

On the other hand, North Korea was also outraged. On March 15 it officially urged the United States to carry out the agreements, as the DPRK had fulfilled its side of the bargain\textsuperscript{135}. North Korea claimed that the IAEA and the U.S. had unjustly added new prerequisites and that these should be renounced\textsuperscript{136}. All of these interactions undoubtedly added to the growing suspicion on the North Korean part that the U.S. was trying to cheat them out.

It did not help the influence of the soft-liners within the South Korean or U.S. governments that the North-South talks did not go any better. According to Reiss, it was the deterioration of the North-South talks that caused North Korea to impede the IAEA inspections (Reiss 1995 p.266). At the height of the tensions at the North-South talks a North Korea delegate\textsuperscript{137} claimed that “[Seoul] would be a sea of fire”\textsuperscript{138}. Lee claims that the sea of fire statement was made because of the previous announcement of the OPLAN 5027 by the joint U.S.-ROK military committee, which detailed the plans of a South Korea-led reunification military plan\textsuperscript{139}. In other words, North Korea was reacting in self-defense (Yi 1994 p.128). The North-South talks had also broken down. The United States threatened to resume the military exercises with South Korea if North Korea was going to continue to be uncooperative\textsuperscript{140}.

On March 21\textsuperscript{st}, the IAEA Board of Governors found the DPRK to be “in further noncompliance with its safeguards agreement” and requested that the Secretary General

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\item \textsuperscript{133} Joongang Ilbo, March 17, 1994.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Moonwha Ilbo, March 17, 1994.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Xinhua News Agency, March 15, 1994.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Xinhua News Agency, March 18, 1994.
\item \textsuperscript{137} The North Korean negotiator was Park Yong Su, and his comments were targeted at Song Young Dae. His exact words were “Seoul is not far from here. If a war breaks out, it will be a sea of fire. Mr. Song, it will probably difficult for you to survive”. See Oberdorfer, pp 304.
\item \textsuperscript{138} Joongang Ilbo, March 20, 1994; Chosun Ilbo, March 20, 1994.
\item \textsuperscript{139} This confidential plan was made public by ROK defense minister Lee Pyong-Tae, meant as a deterrent measure. This is in conflict with Lee’s account that the joint committee announced it. See Oberdorfer, pp 312.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Xinhua News Agency, March 19, 1994.
\end{itemize}
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inform the United Nations Security Council\textsuperscript{141}. North Korea did not ignore this announcement. On March 21\textsuperscript{st} the North Korean Speaker publicized a statement saying that “if the U.S. avoids a third round of talks with the DPRK and attempts to apply pressure through the resumption of the Team Spirit exercises or fabrication of the results of the IAEA inspections the DPRK will withdraw from the NPT”\textsuperscript{142}. Park, Kil-Yeun, the North Korean ambassador to the UN said that “if the Security Council decides economic sanction that is a violation of the armistice and the DPRK will consider it a declaration of war” (Kim 1995 p.206). In compliance with the Board of Governors’ resolution Blix reported the progress on the North Korean nuclear inspections case and IAEA’s decision on March 24\textsuperscript{th}\textsuperscript{143}. Blix further stated that in order to decide whether North Korea had pursued a nuclear armament plan or not an additional 3-day inspection and re-inspection 6 weeks later were imperative (Kim 1995 p.206). North Korea subsequently requested that the IAEA cancel its resolution of March 21, because the DPRK had already fully proven non-conversion of the nuclear materials, and also because of the DPRK’s special status of having suspended its withdrawal from the NPT, and threatened that continued pressure would force the DPRK to withdraw from the NPT\textsuperscript{144}.

At the United Nations, the U.S. submitted a resolution requesting that North Korea comply with its NPT responsibilities. However, China made itself clear that it would oppose a U.N.-scale economic sanction motion against North Korea\textsuperscript{145}. It seemed to think that pressure would only complicate the situation and that negotiations were the only and best way to resolve these conflicting interests\textsuperscript{146}. Because of the Chinese emergency breaks on the resolution the UN had to agree to a non-binding statement\textsuperscript{147} by the president of the UN Security Council\textsuperscript{148}. The presidential statement mentioned a six-

\textsuperscript{141} Joongang Ilbo, March 22, 1994.
\textsuperscript{143} Joongang Ilbo, March 22, 1994. The date March 24, 1994 comes from Kim’s account. See Kim, Jae-mok, pp 206.
\textsuperscript{145} Chosun Ilbo, March 24, 1994. In this statement China claimed that no nuclear weapons should exist on the Korean peninsula.
\textsuperscript{147} IAEA statement 310394. Author has a copy of the document. Also see Xinhua News Agency, March 29, 1994.
\textsuperscript{148} Washington Post, April 1, 1994.
week deadline before further Security Council consideration. On April 4, the DPRK rejected the UN Security Council statement on the grounds that the DPRK’s nuclear issue is not an issue to be discussed in the Security Council149.

It is interesting to notice how the U.S. always leaves one last chance for diplomatic resolution of the nuclear crisis even when pushing for economic sanctions150. At the end of March, when the UN was at the brink of a resolution towards economic sanction and a war seemed imminent, the United States had given North Korea a deadline of six weeks to work something out. Within the South Korean and U.S. governments, the soft-liners, who were calling for negotiations as the ultimate solution, despite the gaining voice of the hard-liners due to the non-compliance of North Korea, were still searching for a way to make some sense out of North Korea. An important factor in hoping for a diplomatic solution to the crisis on the part of U.S. and South Korean governments was the concern that the leadership of the U.S. and South Korea would significantly diminish should the crisis escalate (Kim 1995 p.235).

As a breakthrough for the soft-liners within South Korea, on April 15, 1994, the South Korean government announced that it would no longer pursue a special envoy exchange with the North (Reiss 1995 p.268)151. No longer could North Korea blame the South for delaying the U.S.-DPRK talks.

6. The Nuclear Fuel Rod Withdrawal

1) The Carter Visit

Just when things couldn’t seem to get any worse, they did. On April 1, North Korea shut down the 5mW reactor. According to Reiss, the reactor fuel contained enough plutonium to make 4 to 6 nuclear bombs (Reiss 1995 p.268). These rods, a yard long and 2 inches wide, could be treated to separate for nuclear weapons (Oberdorfer 1997 p.306). North Korea sent a letter to the IAEA stating that it would begin the nuclear fuel rod

replacement of the 5mW reactor within ten days\textsuperscript{152}. But North Korea only requested to send an IAEA observation team and did not mention anything about the necessary additional inspections on the laboratory or the resumption of the six remaining nuclear sites (Kim 1995 p.248). The Security Council president’s statement\textsuperscript{153} had requested a follow-up report about the additional inspections and resumption of inspections. The IAEA replied asking about the additional inspections, and subsequently North Korea requested talks with the IAEA. In addition to the request for talks, North Korea sent a negative response to the demand for additional inspections but restated their request for an observation team (Kim 1995 p.250). About this time the Clinton administration shifted its focus. In the past the objective had been to stop the DPRK from obtaining any nuclear bombs. From now, it would try to stop the DPRK from making any more bombs (Reiss 1995; Sigal 1998)\textsuperscript{154}.

According to South Korean analysts, the reason North Korea was requesting an observation was 1) the time for replacement of the nuclear fuel rod was near; 2) the new issue would shift the international society’s focus from the additional inspections to the fuel rod ejection; 3) add one more negotiation card for talks with the United States (Kim 1995 p.250). Oberdorfer also agrees that whenever Pyongyang’s diplomatic leverage diminished, it always managed to create another crisis to increase its bargaining power (Oberdorfer 1997 p.305).

From the perspective of the IAEA, the new issue regarding the nuclear fuel rod replacement was important because once a sample could be taken from the used fuel rod all the past nuclear activities of North Korea would become crystal clear, thereby allowing the IAEA to guarantee the nuclear history of North Korea (Kim 1995 p.250; Oberdorfer 1997 p.308; Reiss 1995 p.268). In a news conference in South Korea, Ham Myong-Chul, the director of the department of international organizations, claimed that the IAEA needed three types of inspections at that time\textsuperscript{155}. The first was an additional

\textsuperscript{152} The exact expression was “at an early date”. See Kim, Jae-mok, pp 248 and Reiss, pp 268..  
\textsuperscript{153} Joongang Ilbo, April 2, 1994.  
\textsuperscript{154} Senior Pentagon officials began to refer to the old nuclear bombs that North Korea may have made “Bush’s plutonium”, indicating the move from deterrence to containment. See Editorial, Washington Post, March 10, 1994.  
\textsuperscript{155} Moonwha Ilbo, April 25, 1994.
inspection of the laboratory; the second was the guarantee of the continuity of safeguards at the 5mW reactor; and the last was the observation of the nuclear fuel rod ejection. However, for North Korea it was a dilemma: if the inspections proved that there had been no nuclear diversion then it would lose significant negotiating leverage; if the inspections did discover nuclear diversion then the regime would lose face for having lied to the U.S (Oberdorfer 1997 p.308).

On April 21, the United States and South Korea announced their plans to conduct the Team Spirit exercises in November if no further progress was made on the nuclear crisis\textsuperscript{156}. Three days earlier the first batch of the Patriot missiles arrived in South Korea\textsuperscript{157}.

On April 28, the DPRK suggested that it and the United States meet in direct talks about replacing the armistice with a permanent peace treaty to end the Korean War\textsuperscript{158}. It subsequently withdrew its delegation from the Military Armistice Committee and asked the same of the Polish delegate in Panmoonjom (Kim 1995 p.253). The U.S. Department of State replied that North Korean should not digress from the issue at hand and focus on the nuclear issue (Kim 1995 p.254).

The interesting fact about the North Korean peace treaty was that despite its appearance of not being related to the issue at hand, it was in fact on the same lines as the direct talks with the U.S. North Korea and the United States had agreed to a third round of talks after certain requirements were met, after which the two parties would meet to discuss broad issues, one of which was a permanent peace treaty to end the Korean War. It was for this reason that neither the ROK nor the U.S. could deny this talk to North Korea (Kim 1995 p.254). According to Han Seung-Joo’s – the South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs - press conference, the Basic Agreement between the ROK and U.S. states that the change to a permanent peace treaty should be pursued by North and South Korea\textsuperscript{159}. Therefore this request was ignored, but it is hard to ignore the fact that it was instances like these that show North Korea’s intention of beginning this nuclear scheme.

\textsuperscript{156} Xinhua News Agency, April 21, 1994.
\textsuperscript{157} Xinhua News Agency, April 21, 1994.
\textsuperscript{158} Editorial, Joongang Ilbo, May 3, 1994.
\textsuperscript{159} Moonwha Ilbo, May 3, 1994.
Once again discussions as to whether to continue the negotiations approach or to send the issue to the United Nations for official collective action surfaced to the top. The IAEA and all connected parties were setting mid-May as the deadline for North Korea to accept IAEA inspections, but there had been no significant progress in the talks (Kim 1995 p.258). The main issue was the scope and range of the inspections. These were connected with the observations of the IAEA inspection team. North Korea had already agreed to matters regarding the additional inspections in a letter from Kang Sok-Ju to Gallucci (Kim 1995 p.258). The IAEA demanded that the fuel rods should be selectively stored for further testing, whereas North Korea was claiming that selective storage was a responsibility given to only NPT member states.

On May 9th, the DPRK and U.S. met in New York to further discuss the issues at hand. China had acted as a mediator for the resumption of DPRK-U.S. talks. Because of the insistence of the IAEA, the United States had no choice but to make the additional inspections and nuclear fuel rod inspections a precondition to the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks (Kim 1995 p.259). If North Korea were to push on with the nuclear fuel rod withdrawals, then turning the matters to the UN Security Council would be inevitable. But North Korea and U.S. did find one agreement: to finish the March inspections (Reiss 1995 p.268).

Despite the warnings, on May 12th, North Korea announced that it had already begun removing fuel from the reactor for safety reasons. North Korea invited IAEA inspectors to observe and secure fuel rods, but not to conduct tests. Testing would be allowed after the third round of talks with the United States (Reiss 1995 p.269). North Korea announced that the withdrawal was in the early stages, implying that there was still room for negotiations (Kim 1995 p.261). It also announced that it would invite the IAEA to Pyongyang to discuss the procedures of the nuclear fuel rod withdrawal. Whether the

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160 In the May 11, 1994 edition of the Joongang Ilbo, the working-level talks between the DPRK and U.S. were near the end, and the third round talks were about the begin.
162 The United States backed the IAEA, but some officials believed that the IAEA was being too rigid. See Oberdorfer, pp 309.
third round would take place was now up to how much the fuel rods had been withdrawn (Kim 1995 p.263).

On May 17th the additional laboratory inspections and inspections for the continuity of safeguards of the 5mW reactor were completed without further problems (Kim 1995 p.265). The fact that North Korea finally allowed the inspections to the IAEA signals to the theory that it had indeed meant to use the fuel rod withdrawal as the last negotiations leverage card against the United States. The Clinton administration decided to go to the third round, even though North Korea was not really being cooperative (Oberdorfer 1997 p.315; Reiss 1995 p.269). It was the next day that the IAEA and North Korea would enter into talks.

But unfortunately the fuel rod withdrawal talks between the IAEA and North Korea collapsed. On June 2nd, Blix stated that the ability of the IAEA to verify that material from the nuclear reactor had not been diverted had been lost. Previously, Blix had announced in a report that the fuel rod withdrawal was progressing at an alarming rate, and that 50% or more had already been withdrawn (Kim 1995 p.275). Nobody in the Clinton administration could figure out why North Korea was forcing the fuel rod withdrawal while the U.S. was willing to talk with North Korea in the third rounds. Kang Suk-Ju had been repeatedly warned that if North Korea were to pull the fuel rods on the 5mW reactor without IAEA’s supervision all negotiations with the U.S. would be automatically terminated (Oberdorfer 1997 p.308). The State Department had a theory: Kang Sok-Ju had always claimed from Fall 1993 that if the DPRK-U.S. relations did not significantly progress the DPRK would withdraw the fuel rods. Without any significant change in the DPRK-U.S. relations Kang had lost influence within North Korea. The hard-liners in North Korea believed that South Korea was applying pressure to the United States and that withdrawing the rods was the best way to cut the ROK-U.S. relations (Kim 1995 p.277). On May 31st the UN Security Council announced a presidential statement urging North Korea to comply with the requirements of the IAEA for the nuclear fuel rod withdrawal. If North Korea agreed to the IAEA’s request of the

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166 Joongang Ilbo, June 1, 1994.
storage procedures of the remaining 30 fuel rods the third round talks between the DPRK and U.S. might have happened. But if North Korea did not subdue to the IAEA requests the report to the UN would be inevitable. This process would mean a move to collective sanctions to North Korea (Kim 1995 p.278-279).

Despite the international multilateral efforts to end the nuclear crisis North Korea continued to withdraw the nuclear fuel rods, and this led to the June 2nd report that the ability had been completely lost (Kim 1995 p.282). North Korea responded by announcing an official statement saying “sanctions means war”. Now the move to sanctions against North Korea would have to begin. Secretary of Defense Perry called this point the turning point in the negotiations. If previously the Clinton administration’s goal had been talks and preventive diplomacy, now it would be sanctions and coercive diplomacy (Oberdorfer 1997 p.316). The issue now was whether China would agree to collective actions. China had consistently argued for a “de-nuclearized Korean peninsula” and had opposed sanctions of the DPRK (Kim 1995 p.283). Stability of the Korean peninsula was China’s main interest. If the resolution were to be passed too early, it would cause the DPRK to withdraw from the NPT again, causing instability on the Korean peninsula. China’s proximity to the peninsula probably prompted this judgment. By mid-June all countries except China had agreed to a two-phased strategy for the sanctions (Reiss 1995 p.270). Actually, the format was a resolution draft that required North Korea to agree to the special inspections of the two unreported nuclear sites within 1 month, and if not, that the sanctions would begin (Kim 1995 p.284). The sanctions would consist of a initial phase of modest sanctions, such as postage, air and sea traffic, etc., and then would be followed by harsher sanctions, including terminating

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168 In Pyongyang, Kim Il-Sung explained the situation to Cambodian chief of state Norodom Sihanouk: “Please compare us to a man: They want us to take off our shirt, out coat, and now our trousers, and after that we will be nude, absolutely naked. What they want us to be is a man without defense secrets, just a naked man. We cannot accept that. We would rather accept war. If they decide to make war, we will accept it, the challenge we are prepared for”. See Oberdorfer, pp 311.
170 China’s participation in the sanctions was vital, because of the important China had as a trading partner for North Korea. In 1992 North Korea’s foreign trade was concentrated in China (28.2%) and Japan (19.2%). See Kim, Jae-mok, pp 285.
171 The inclusion of the special inspections in the resolution draft was because of the important of revealing the North Korean nuclear history. See Ibid., 284.
remittances from Korean nationals in Japan (Reiss 1995 p.270). North Korea responded to this frenzy by claiming that North Korea would consider any sanctions imposed on it as a declaration of war.\textsuperscript{172}

While the UN Security Council resolution was being hindered by the Chinese reluctance, on June 10\textsuperscript{th}, the IAEA passed its resolution\textsuperscript{173}. China abstained from its vote. The resolution 1) expressed its regret that the DPRK was not fulfilling its responsibilities connected with the safeguards agreement; 2) urged the DPRK to fulfill all of its obligations to the NPT; 3) stopped all technological assistance to the DPRK (Kim 1995 p.299). A few days later, on June 13\textsuperscript{th}, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the IAEA\textsuperscript{174}, and announced its intentions to expel all IAEA officials within North Korean borders (Reiss 1995 p.270).

China had been secretly irritated by North Korea’s provocative actions that might bring instability to the Korean peninsula to which it was so closely located (Oberdorfer 1997 p.320). On May 29 U.S. President Clinton had announced that the U.S. would grant Most Favored Nation trade status to China without any human rights conditions (Oberdorfer 1997 p.320)\textsuperscript{175}. This gave China a greater incentive to cooperate with the United States instead of North Korea. China continued to oppose sanctions against the rogue state, but was doubtful whether it could successfully veto any resolution that might come through due to the strong international sentiment. As a consequence, on June 10\textsuperscript{th}, China had no choice but to warn North Korea that it may have to work on its own (Oberdorfer 1997 p.321).

Now the international community hastened the process of the Security Council resolution. The United States entered into negotiations with the 4 other Security Council permanent members. The resolution draft included demands to the DPRK, and when the DPRK was in non-compliance with the demands the sanctions would begin. The demands were that the DPRK fulfill its obligations in regards to the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and that the DPRK fulfill the Korean peninsula Non-Nuclearization Joint

\textsuperscript{172} Official statement by Kang Sok-Ju, June 4, 1994.
\textsuperscript{173} Joongang Ilbo, June 11, 1994.
\textsuperscript{175} Joongang Ilbo, May 29, 1994.
Announcement. The draft did not refer to special inspections to lure North Korea to an agreement (Kim 1995 p.303). This is another example of the patience that the U.S. showed to accommodate North Korea.

Just when the sanctions against North Korea were becoming concrete, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter made a historic visit to North Korea. But before the Carter visit, there were signs of reconciliation north of the DMZ. On June 3rd Kang Suk-Ju announced that North Korea would be willing to dismantle its reprocessing plant if the U.S. would provide replacement light-water reactors. There was also a visitor to North Korea that facilitated the Carter agreements. Selig Harrison, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was one of the few believers that this crisis could be overcome once the right concessions were given to North Korea (Oberdorfer 1997 p.321). Harrison visited North Korea the day after Kang made his statement. In a meeting with Kang, Harrison argued that North Korea should freeze further development of the nuclear program when commitments to the light-water reactors were given (Oberdorfer 1997 p.322). Kim’s response was, “This is a good idea. We can definitely accept it if the United States really makes a firm commitment that we can trust” (Oberdorfer 1997 p.322).

The Clinton administration, unaware of what was going on, was gravely preparing for a war with North Korea. If North Korea was really going to consider sanctions a declaration of war, the United States had to be ready (Oberdorfer 1997 p.324). Defense Secretary Perry had already ordered the reinforcement of U.S. troops and the intensification of intelligence reports (Reiss 1995 p.270). Three policy options were available, each of which involved dispatching state-of-the-art tactical weapons, bombers, troops, and even an aircraft carrier. However there was concern that the military buildup of the United States would trigger North Korea to launch a pre-emptive strike on South Korea (Oberdorfer 1997 p.325). With a grave resolution, Clinton gave the final approval to proceed with the drive for sanction against the DPRK (Oberdorfer 1997 p.330)\textsuperscript{176}.

\textsuperscript{176} According to the Xinhua News Agency, June 14, 1994 news report, the U.S. had reached an agreement about the sanctions against the DPRK with Russia.
It was at this time that U.S. former president Jimmy Carter crossed the DMZ to enter North Korea\(^\text{177}\). Carter had requested permission from Clinton before to visit the DPRK but had been denied because Clinton did not think the time was right (Sigal 1998). This time Carter had requested permission again, and Clinton grudgingly gave his consent\(^\text{178}\), but added a condition that the visit was as a civilian and Carter would not be a representative of the United States (Kim 1995 p.317; Oberdorfer 1997 p.318; Sigal 1998).

Carter met and talked with Kim Il-Sung on two occasions during the historic trip. On the first occasion, Kim said that the initial problem between the two countries was a lack of trust. Kim said that he was frustrated that his claims that he was not interested in nuclear weapons was not being believed. He also said that all he needed was nuclear energy, and if the U.S. were to supply light-water reactors, the DPRK would gladly return to the NPT (Oberdorfer 1997 p.327). Kim then requested that the U.S. guarantee against nuclear attacks on the DPRK. He also mentioned his frustration with the South, who always seemed to get in the way of DPRK-U.S. talks (Oberdorfer 1997 p.328)\(^\text{179}\). Carter then suggested to the Great Leader that he freeze the nuclear program until the completion of the third round of DPRK-U.S. talks and that the IAEA official be allowed to stay in North Korea\(^\text{180}\). Kim Il-Sung subsequently agreed. Carter replied by saying that he would recommend that the U.S. government support the light-water reactor project (Oberdorfer 1997 p.329)\(^\text{181}\).

Carter was exhilarated with the news and immediately called President Clinton\(^\text{182}\). Carter reported that North Korea agreed to permit the IAEA to maintain its monitoring equipment, that it would not refuel the 5mW reactor, and would not reprocess the fuel.

\(^{177}\) Joongang Ilbo, June 15, 1994.

\(^{178}\) Vice President Al Gore favored Carter’s visit, and it was Gore that convinced Clinton that sending Carter was a good idea. See Oberdorfer, pp 271.

\(^{179}\) In fact, South Korean president Kim Young Sam had adamantly opposed Carter’s visit to North Korea. This was because South Korea was concerned that this effort might dilute the drive for sanctions against North Korea. Also, president Kim was unhappy about the fact that Clinton had decided on the Carter visit without consultation of South Korea. These actions show how immature was the South Korean president’s foreign policy. See Kim, Jae-mok, pp 318. However, the South Koreans overall were in consensus about the need for hard-liners in this nuclear crisis. See Shin, Jin, pp 50-53, 82-85.

\(^{180}\) Joongang Ilbo, June 17, 1994.


\(^{182}\) Xinhua News Agency, June 17, 1994. This report talks about the recent concessions Kim Il Sung made to former President Carter.
already ejected, in return for the third round of talks (Reiss 1995 p.271). The Clinton administration was not impressed, as the exact same North Korean promises had been broken before (Oberdorfer 1997 p.330). But at the urge of Vice-President Gore to make the most of the situation, the U.S. asked North Korea if they would accept the U.S. version of the freeze (Kim 1995 p.314). This version stated that North Korea should not place new fuel rods in the 5mW reactor and not reprocess the fuel rods that had been previously removed (Oberdorfer 1997 p.332). The same strategy of interpreting the other’s statement in a way advantageous had been used during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Kim 1995 p.315; Oberdorfer 1997 p.332). To the administration’s surprise, North Korea formally accepted.

It was thus that the tensions that went so near to the brink of war was eased. Leon V. Sigal called this historic event a triumph of Track II diplomacy (Cumings 1997 p.485; Sigal 1998). Carter even managed to obtain Kim’s concession regarding retrieving U.S. servicemen’s remains (Oberdorfer 1997 p.333). Carter also brought up the possibility of a North-South summit to resolve the issue of the divided peninsula, and again Kim Il-Sung conceded, showing his willingness to talk with the South Korea president (Kim 1995 p.319; Oberdorfer 1997 p.333). This was truly a historic incident given the animosity that existed along the DMZ for half a century. Subsequently, the sanctions activity and plans for reinforcement to the Korean peninsula were all stopped, and third DPRK-U.S. talks were underway. It seemed that once North Korea thought that the U.S. could be trusted, all its hostilities dropped. Given the Korean way of thinking, it is possible that North Korea took the visit of a former president of the U.S. to be a form of respect of the North Korean regime, which was what North Korea was looking for all along (Kim 1995 p.323).

The research question of this thesis is perfectly addressed in the initial Carter-Kim Il-Sung talk. The argument that North Korea was threatened into a self-defense measure of
obtaining nuclear weapons was supported by Kim’s request of a security assurance. The U.S. had given this assurance before, but clearly Kim Il-Sung had not been satisfied. Also, the light-water reactor request clearly shows that North Korea wanted to elicit economic assistance from the West, to alleviate its energy shortage. The road now seemed to be clear for an agreement to end this nuclear crisis. Or so it seemed.

2) Third Round: August 1994

Just at this particular historic moment, Kim, Il-Sung died of a heart attack\(^{189}\). The Pyongyang Broadcasting System that announced the Great Leader’s death announced that the memorial would be held in Pyongyang on July 17\(^{\text{th}}\), and that the mourning period would be from the 9\(^{\text{th}}\) to the 17\(^{\text{th}}\). The broadcast also said that the government had decided not to accept foreign mourning delegations\(^{190}\). As a result of this death, the Pyongyang North-South summit, previously scheduled for July 25\(^{\text{th}}\), and the third round of talks for the DPRK-U.S. direct talks, previously scheduled to begin in Swiss Geneva on July 8\(^{\text{th}}\), were postponed.

The United States and South Korea were not sure what to expect from this series of events. What would the new DPRK president be like? Would he continue the process that Kim Il-Sung had begun? Or would he unravel everything and begin a new stand-off? One thing was for sure – the death of the Great Leader would undoubtedly cause a great amount of confusion within the regime (Kim 1995 p.338). The new president, which was by default Kim Jong-Il\(^{191}\), would have to stabilize his regime immediately after the death of Kim Il-Sung, especially as some anticipated a power struggle to fill the void of Kim Il-Sung (Kim 1994 p.380-382; Kim 1995 p.338)\(^{192}\). In a phone conversation on July 10\(^{\text{th}}\), South Korean foreign minister Han and Secretary of State Christopher agreed that the new Kim regime was in the process of consolidating his power and that for now they

\(^{189}\) Pyongyang Broadcasting System, July 9, 1994; Chosun Ilbo, July 10, 1994.
\(^{190}\) On July 15\(^{\text{th}}\), at request of the “deeply saddened North Korean people”, North Korea announced that the mourning period would be extended to the 18\(^{\text{th}}\), the funeral on the 19\(^{\text{th}}\), and the memorial service on the 20\(^{\text{th}}\). The actual proceedings took place as newly scheduled. See Kim, Jae-mok, pp 334.
\(^{191}\) Kim Jong II had already taken over control of the military of North Korea as of April 1993 by having been appointed Chairman of the Defense Committee by the Supreme People’s Assembly. See Ibid.
should wait and see as to what path the new North Korea would take as to resolving the nuclear issue. (Kim 1995 p.338).

Following the death of Kim Il-Sung, many foreign countries expressed their condolences to North Korea. Even U.S. President Clinton expressed his condolences “to the people of North Korea on the death of President Kim Il Sung” on July 9th while attending a G-7 world summit (Kim 1995 p.340; Oberdorfer 1997 p.343). But South Korea did not send any kind of condolence letter to North Korea and even went so far as to ask Japan and U.S. not to send any kind of condolences to the dead leader. The U.S. and Japan subsequently changed their stands on sending messages to North Korea (Kim 1995 p.341; Oberdorfer 1997 p.344). Needless to say, North Korea bitterly resented this type of disrespect to their Great Leader (Oberdorfer 1997 p.345). This would later cause further delay in the North-South talks.

On August 8th, the long-awaited third talks resumed193. On the outset, there seemed to be no difference in the North Korean negotiation strategies (Kim 1995 p.344; Oberdorfer 1997 p.351)194. North Korea suggested the possibilities of a Russian reactor model and clearly stated that it would not allow a Korean model to enter the country. The United States argued that any reprocessing of the nuclear materials was forbidden and that the previously withdrawn material should be transferred to a third country. North Korea responded that the reprocessing issues was one of sovereignty and so should not be interfered with but that an improved method of storing them would be negotiable. This response was supposedly because North Korea was afraid that once the material was shipped to another country all of North Korea’s nuclear history would be revealed, thus losing leverage in the talks (Kim 1995 p.345).

The Geneva talks seemed to be going smoothly, but there were minor disagreements in the third conference of the third round (Kim 1995 p.347). As Gallucci recalled, “there wasn’t sufficient trust for one to take a very large step assuming the other would take the compensatory counter step. There had to be a series of smaller steps linked with constant

192 Editorial, Chosun Ilbo, July 11, 1994. Also, Chosun Il July 11, 1994 about the U.S. estimate of the internal power struggle within the Kim family.
193 Chosun Ilbo, August 9, 1994.
194 According to Oberdorfer, the North Korean negotiators seemed very eager to finish the negotiations and were very businessmen-like and determined to move ahead.
checking on compliance” (Oberdorfer 1997 p.352). North Korea agreed to improving the cooling storage tanks but still could not find common ground about the transferring to a third country. The United States insisted on the transfer to a third country, but at the insistence of North Korea, decided to postpone discussions of that matter. This was another instance of the U.S. enthusiasm to finish the negotiations and keep the DPRK within the NPT. There were other issues of disagreement between the two sides. North Korea insisted that the reactor needed to be reloaded, because of domestic energy needs. Again, the U.S. subdued, and compromised to “continue the safeguards” (Kim 1995 p.348). The last problem in this particular round was of the special inspections. The U.S. insisted that the inconsistencies between the report and the IAEA findings were troubling and that they should be resolved through special inspections, but North Korea responded by renouncing the agency’s impartiality. Therefore, both sides compromised by “agreeing to remain in the NPT accepting full-scope safeguards” (Reiss 1995 p.274). Kang agreed that this included special inspections if necessary, but refused to include this in the written statement, that was announced on August 12th195. North Korea requested a form of compensation for the loss of energy resulting from the shutdown of the graphite-based reactors, and the U.S. agreed to supply heavy oil in the interim (Oberdorfer 1997 p.352).

On August 12th, North Korea and the United States announced a joint statement as a result of the third round of talks196. The announcement included: 1) that North Korea would be willing to change its graphite-based reactors into light war reactors; 2) the U.S. would supply the 2000mW light water reactors to North Korea as soon as possible, and would supply North Korea with the energy to make-up for the loss during the transfer to the light water reactors (Kim 1995 p.350). Of course, the announcement included the shutdown of the 5mW and 200mW nuclear reactors and nuclear laboratory and that North Korea would remain in the NPT. The model of the light water reactor had not been

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decided yet\textsuperscript{197}. In addition, North Korea and the United States agreed to set up “diplomatic representation in each other’s capital”, in connection with the broad and thorough approach (Reiss 1995 p.274). The agreement also stated that the DPRK would be ready to implement the Korean peninsula De-Nuclearization Joint Announcement. Lastly, the agreement included the Negative Security Assurance of the United States against the DPRK and that the NPT would remain a party to the NPT. The two sides decided to meet again on September 23\textsuperscript{rd} to resume the talks.

The United States had succeeded in forcing the DPRK to remain within the NPT regime and now had leverage to extend the NPT expiration in the upcoming talks in April 1995\textsuperscript{198}. This was one diplomatic victory that the Clinton Administration would use for domestic politics (Kim 1995 p.352). However, it was clear that it had compromised the special inspections, but at least it had a workable plan (Reiss 1995 p.274). However, because of the fundamental mistrust between the two sides, the agreement ended up being a detailed timetable of reciprocal actions (Oberdorfer 1997 p.352).

As for North Korea, the new regime was under pressure to “produce a deal that would enhance Kim Jong Il’s stature” (Oberdorfer 1997 p.352)\textsuperscript{199}. Although Kim Jong Il’s legitimacy was ensured by Kim Il Sung’s proclamation of succession early on, Kim Jong Il apparently had to prove his worth by succeeding in producing a deal with the United States. This could be all the more true because of Kim Il-Sung’s apparent mistrust of his son as indicated by his return to power during the nuclear negotiations.

2) Fourth Round: September 1994

The issue of which model of light water reactors to use was now in full discussion\textsuperscript{200}. North Korea had long argued for a Russian model, which was reasonable since they had almost obtained one in the past, had the USSR not collapsed in the early 1990s (Kim 1995 p.357). However, for South Korea, this was a way to get back into the nuclear

\textsuperscript{197} Editorial, Chosun Ilbo, August 14, 1994. The editorial talks about the forseen problems of the model of the light water reactor. North Korea will have concerns about technological dependency, and the United States and South Korea are arguing that the model must be South Korea.

\textsuperscript{198} Chosun Ilbo, August 14, 1994.

\textsuperscript{199} Chosun Ilbo, August 14, 1994.

\textsuperscript{200}
negotiations, and because of the overwhelming public opinion that South Korea had been marginalized in the negotiations, it could not give way on this matter (Kim 1995 p.360). The South Korean government insisted on a South Korean model for the reactor because 1) it would strengthen the say of South Korea in the negotiations; 2) it would help jump start the North-South economic cooperation, and hopefully to the opening of North Korea; 3) to demonstrate the sturdiness of the Korean model, which would advantage the Korean model in the nuclear reactor market (Kim 1995 p.360-361). As for the United States, it could not financially support the project itself because of domestic problems, and so it had to rely on South Korea for this matter (Kim 1995 p.361; Reiss 1995 p.275). North Korea further argued that the Russian technology was easier accessible to North Korea and cheaper in price, but the South Korean analysts thought that it was because of the latter implications of using South Korean technology (Kim 1995 369). North Korea also announced that it would not accept light water reactors from a country that did not even send its condolences at the death of the Great Leader. The diplomatic discourtesy had come back to haunt South Korea. At any rate, the apparent strategy of North Korea to divide the U.S.-ROK alliance was beginning to work. The light water issue was working as a source of tension for the United States and South Korea (Kim 1995 p.370).

On September 10th North Korea and the United States began expert-level talks. In Pyongyang the two sides began talks about the diplomatic representations in each other’s capitals, and in Berlin they began talks about the transparency of the North Korean nuclear program (Kim 1995 p.371-372). In the Berlin talks the U.S. continued to try to convince North Korea about the South Korea model, but North Korea did not give in easily. Although there were minor points to iron out, unlike the previous discussions,

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200 According to Reiss, South Korea first initiated the discussion by proposing that it would provide the light water reactors if only North Korea would first agree to comprehensive inspections. See Reiss, pp 275.
201 The domestic problems were referring to the law restrictions on trade with an enemy state and export to Communist states. See Kim, Jae-mok and Reiss, pp 365.
202 Public announcement, Chungang Communications, August 27th.
203 To be exact, the Berlin talks were focused on discussing 1) North Korean transfer from the graphite-based reactors to light water reactors; 2) alternative energy provision; 3) the issue regarding the withdrawn nuclear fuel rods.
204 Chosun Ilbo, September 12, 1994.
now the discussions were focused on a DPRK-U.S. grand compromise. The days of bickering seemed to be over (Kim 1995 p.372).

On the other hand the tension between South Korea and the United States was becoming worrisome. South Korea wanted the United States to require North-South talks as a prerequisite to the installation of the diplomatic representations, and the United States was worried about the hardliners within South Korea hindering the smoothly progressing talks (Kim 1995 p.373). Foreign Minister Han made an urgent trip to the U.S., and subsequently held a joint press conference with Christopher. The press conference statement read that in order to fulfill the Korean Peninsula Non-Nuclearization Joint Statement North-South talks are essential and that the South Korean-U.S. alliance is as strong as ever (Kim 1995 p.376). This served to tone down the hardliners in South Korea (Kim 1995 p.378).

At this point it is important to note that the reason South Korea was so overrun by hardliners was because of the public opinion that without Kim Il-Sung, North Korea would implode on its own. Undoubtedly, this opinion was grounded in a long-standing hatred toward Kim Il-Sung. The South Korean believed that there was no reason to help North Korea or even attempt to talk with them because the collapse is inevitable (Kim 1995 p.377; Yi 1994 p.195). Also, the perception that South Korea had been marginalized was adding to the criticisms against the diplomatic team.

The Fourth Round of DPRK-U.S. direct talks were about to resume in Geneva. But now a new source of conflict had surfaced – the resumption of North-South talks. In addition, there were the old problems of the type of reactor, the special inspections, and the timeline for the dismantling of the laboratory. The matters of refueling the reactor were also still undecided (Reiss 1995 p.275). Gallucci visited South Korea at this time and reconfirmed the U.S.-ROK stance that the light water reactor should be a Korean

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205 In a news report from the Xinhua News Agency dating September 10, 1994, South Korean Foreign Minister Han had returned to Korea after the trip to the U.S. to calm the U.S. worries about South Korean hardliners, and had claimed that he was satisfied with the results.

206 In the editorial of the September 9th edition of the Chosun Ilbo, the Chosun Ilbo editorial staff proclaimed that the U.S.-ROK alliance was strengthened through the U.S.-ROK compromise, but the South Korean government still felt displeasure with the U.S.’s over-eagerness to cut a deal with North Korea.
model and that North-South talks must precede the diplomatic representations\textsuperscript{207}. Also, the point that the nuclear transparency of North Korea had to be guaranteed was mentioned (Kim 1995 p.391). That the North Korean light water reactors should be of South Korean design was the joint opinion of the U.S.-South Korea-Japan. The format would be one in which the U.S. would responsible and in lead of the project overall, and an international consortium of Japan, Russia, and the U.S., but with a major role played by South Korea, would participate in the project (Kim 1995 p.396).

Finally the Fourth Round talks began on September 23\textsuperscript{rd} in Geneva\textsuperscript{208}. Regarding the special inspections North Korea was adamant that it could not allow that\textsuperscript{209}, and so the U.S. agreed to be flexible in that it was the North Korea’s last negotiation card. Also, it is important to note that the North Korean negotiator Kang’s stance on the special inspection had significant softened over the break between the third and fourth rounds (Oberdorfer 1997 p.353). The refueling issue was also a point of tension as North Korea argued that refueling was inevitable given the energy shortage in North Korea. Regarding the laboratory issue, North Korea was arguing that it would stop its operation, whereas the United States was arguing that it should be dismantled completely (Kim 1995 p.404; Reiss 1995 p.275). On September 29\textsuperscript{th}, both sides stopped the talks and took a brief intermission. Gallucci returned to Washington for consultations and returned to the talks on October 4\textsuperscript{th}.

Around this time South Korea President Kim Young Sam told the New York Times that “The Clinton administration does not know that much about North Korea and is only focusing on making a deal with them”\textsuperscript{210}. The United States became worried about this sort of hardliner opinion from the South Korea President as it might hinder the talks (Kim 1995 p.407; Oberdorfer 1997 p.354-355; Reiss 1995 p.275)\textsuperscript{211}. As the U.S. media

\textsuperscript{207} Chosun Ilbo, September 15, 1994; Chosun Ilbo, September 17, 1994.
\textsuperscript{208} Chosun Ilbo, September 23, 1994.
\textsuperscript{209} As recently as in a news report from the Xinhua News Agency dating August 20, 1994, the DPRK had said that it “would never allow the inspections of its military sites at the expense of its sovereignty merely receive new light water reactors.
\textsuperscript{210} New York Times, October 8, 1994.
\textsuperscript{211} Washington Post, October 9, 1994. This newspaper claimed that the South Korean hardliner stance was making the DPRK-U.S. talks difficult. On one account, it seemed that the United States becoming frustrated by South Korea’s erratic behaviour. See Shin, Jin. 1996. \textit{Uiliui Pookhan Uihumhan Oekyo Jungchaek (North Korea in Crisis; North Korean Foreign Policy in Crisis)}. Seoul: Moonkyung Publishing..
attacked President Kim’s opinions, President Kim corrected his stance, saying that there was no tension between the U.S. and South Korea. The last thing that the U.S.-ROK alliance wanted was a divided front. However, President Kim did succeed in convincing Gallucci that the North-South talks should be included in the final agreement (Oberdorfer 1997 p.356).

The DPRK-U.S. talks that had resumed on the 4th continued into the 13th of October, and the transparency of the nuclear program and model of light water reactors had all found common grounds. On October 6th, Kang coolly proposed that North Korea not be required to submit to special inspections until seventy to eighty percent of the light water reactors were delivered (Oberdorfer 1997 p.354). In the meeting of the 14th, the two sides were working out smaller details and working on the final agreement (Kim 1995 p.413). The agreed issues up to the 13th were 1) North Korea must guarantee the transparency of the nuclear program when the major facilities of the light water reactors arrive; 2) as soon as North Korea begins the freeze on the nuclear facilities the diplomatic representations should be installed in Pyongyang and Washington; 3) as soon as the light water reactor deal is signed North Korea confirms that it is a part of the NPT and resume talks with the IAEA about regular and ad hoc inspections. Also the South Korean model of the reactor had been confirmed, as had the negative security assurance of the U.S. Finally, North Korea agreed not to refuel the 5mW reactor and that the withdrawn fuel would be transferred to a third country after the first phase of construction was finished. Also the nuclear laboratory would be dismantled and the alternative energy provision would be further talked at expert-level talks (Kim 1995 p. 413-414).

Most of the details had been worked out with a “give and take” approach between the United States and North Korea, but the last remaining issue was the North-South talks. Because of the reluctance of North Korea, the U.S. and South Korea could not make the North-South talks a prerequisite to anything, but only requested that the North-South talks progress in parallel with the DPRK-U.S. talks (Reiss 1995 p.421). Finally North Korea agreed to include in the final agreement that “the DPRK will engage in North-South

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212 CNN-TV, October 12, 1994; Chosun Ilbo, October 11, 1994.
213 Chosun Ilbo, October 6, 1994.
dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue” (Oberdorfer 1997 p.356).

7. The Agreed Framework

On October 21, the DPRK and United States announced the final agreement between the two parties – the Agreed Framework215. The IAEA, China, South Korea and Japan immediately announced their endorsements of the final deal216. The Agreed Framework contained these key features:

- The immediate shutting down and eventual dismantling of the North’s graphite-moderated reactor program217
- Full compliance by the DPRK with its obligations under the NPT and its IAEA safeguards agreement before any nuclear components are delivered218
- Controlling the spent nuclear fuel already in North Korea by first preventing its being reprocessed, then stabilizing it for storage, and then removing it from the DPRK
- Alternate energy for North Korea in the form of annual shipments of heavy fuel oil in an amount sufficient to offset the 255mW of electrical power and thermal heat lost through shutdown of the three graphite-moderated reactors
- The formation of an international consortium to provide two proliferation-resistant light water reactors to replace the current graphite-moderated facilities. The ROK and Japan will provide the bulk of the funding (Slocombe and National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies. 1995 p.2).

218 According to Oberdorfer, North Korea would have to come into full compliance with the IAEA, including the special inspections, before the delivery of key elements of the light water reactor, which would be in approximately 5 years. Also, North Korean existing nuclear facilities would be completely dismantled by the time the light water reactors were completed, which were estimated in 10 years. See Oberdorfer, pp 357.. Also, see Yi, pp 231-232.
Unfortunately, the model of the light water reactors was still a problem, as the North Korean had not fully agreed to the South Korean model\textsuperscript{219}. This would prove to be a future problem in the light water reactor talks (Kim 1995 p.423). The two sides also agreed to take the first steps towards a normal political and economic relationship, including removing trade barriers and the implementation of setting up diplomatic representations in each other’s capitals\textsuperscript{220}. Also, the North would engage in dialogue with South Korea in order to implement the Korean peninsula Non-Nuclearization Joint Announcement (Reiss 1995 p.276-277). As an act of good faith, the U.S. and ROK suspended their plans for the Team Spirit exercises for that year after the announcement had been made\textsuperscript{221}.

The New York Times published its own analysis of the Agreed Framework, and the results were that in the Geneva agreement North Korea’s Kim Jong-Il was the single biggest winner, and South Korea was a winner and a loser at the same time. It also claimed that Japan became a lucky spectator and the IAEA was the single biggest loser in this agreement\textsuperscript{222}.

The criticisms against the Agreed Framework from within the United States flared. First of all, the withdrawn fuel rods would remain in the cooling ponds for another 5 years or so. It was argued that North Korea could use the heavy oil and reprocess this fuel to create plutonium. Second, the five-year delay in the special inspections eroded the NPT regime. Although this was true, proponents argued that it would not harm the IAEA’s analysis of the material. Thirdly, it was argued that this would set bad precedent to would-be nuclear powers, that if one were to stand-off long enough with the U.S., one could walk away with significant concessions. Finally, many believed that the North Korean simply could not be trusted (Reiss 1995 p.277-278). But, as Slocombe claimed in

\textsuperscript{219} According to Lee, the agreement itself did not state that the reactor would be of Korean model, but that in reality North Korea had agreed to the Korean model in Wooljin. The later problems would arise in the interpretation of this. See Ibid.

\textsuperscript{220} According to Barry, as much as political and economic concessions, diplomatic recognition from the United States is important for North Korea. See Barry, Mark P. 1996. North Korea and the United States: Promise or Peril? In Korea: A World in Change, edited by K. W. Thompson: The Miller Center, University of Virginia.

\textsuperscript{221} Xinhua News Agency, October 21, 1994.
his analysis of the Agreed Framework, the agreement was “based on action, not trust” (Slocombe and National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies. 1995 p.2)\textsuperscript{223}.

However, as Cumings claims, it is significant to note that North Korea had made many concessions, some of which were not even required of them as a member of the NPT (Cumings 1997 p.485)\textsuperscript{224}. The complete dismantling of the nuclear program provides a good example of this. Also, the shipping out of the spent fuel rods was not required under the NPT regime (Reiss 1995 p.278). This signifies the fact that North Korea desperately wanted this deal as well.

Although the deal is obviously not the best choice, it can be argued that it was “a necessary but not sufficient response to the multiple security challenges posed by North Korea” (Armitage and National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies. 1999 p.1). Given the circumstances, with North Korea preparing itself for war in the event of a collapse of the talks, this outcome was far more preferable.

\textbf{Chapter V: The Rational Actor Analysis: United States VS. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea}

In the case of the United States, the motives and objectives are unambiguous. Throughout the negotiation process, the United States had the ultimate objective of upholding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and it consistently stuck with it (United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 1995 p.14). There seems to have been internal conflict as to the methodology of how to uphold the NPT regime, between the hardliners, who believed that North Korea is a menace that can only be stopped by being deterred through military

\textsuperscript{222} New York Times, October 23, 1994.
\textsuperscript{223} Cumings also notes that the agreement was “predicated on mutual mistrust, and therefore both sides must verify compliance at each step toward completion of the agreement…” See Cumings, Bruce. 1997. Korea’s Place in the Sun. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
\textsuperscript{224} Also see United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 1995. Implications of the U.S.-North Korea nuclear agreement : hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
and economic means, and the softliners, who believed that only through negotiations could the North Korean be convinced to abandon their ominous nuclear program (Yi 1994 p.310). However, overall, the U.S. approach has been one of negotiations over sanctions (Mazarr 2000)\(^{225}\). Contrary to opinions otherwise, such as that of Bruce Cumings or Leon V. Sigal, I believe that the U.S. vehemently tried to resolve the conflict through negotiations. Even at the brink of a military showdown, the U.S. had always given the North Koreans room to return to the negotiation table\(^{226}\). It might have taken a Track II diplomacy path to ultimately end the conflict situation, but it was only after numerous attempts at talks having failed that the U.S. reluctantly headed into preparation for war. In summary, the U.S. main interest was to protect the NPT regime, which was a vital national interest.

On the other hand, the objectives of North Korea are not so clear. It has been one of the primary purposes of this paper to ascertain what was the purpose, judging from its behavior in the negotiations, of the initiation of the nuclear program. To state the hypotheses one more time, they are 1) North Korea felt threatened by the U.S. and ROK’s demonstration of military strength and commitment of the alliance and therefore tried to arm itself with a nuclear weapon, hoping that this would be the equalizer of power; or 2) North Korea wanted to use the nuclear program to obtain much needed economic assistance from the West.

It is my belief that the primary objective of North Korea was to obtain economic assistance from the West, but there is some evidence backing the claim that North Korea was scared of the U.S. nuclear attack against its country. Therefore I am favoring hypothesis 2, but am claiming that there is not enough evidence to refute hypothesis 1. The reason for my believing that hypothesis 2 was overall correct is because of the way

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\textit{225 According to one of the estimates submitted to the Congress about this time, negotiation strategies are preferable over sanctions if only because it will help build a consensus among other countries. However, even if sanctions were to take place, the recommendation states that they should help urge North Korea of the uselessness of its nuclear program. See United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 1994. \textit{U.S. policy toward North Korea : hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, March 3, 1994. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the U.S. G.P.O. Supt. of Docs. Congressional Sales Office.}}
North Korea first initiated the light water reactor suggestion (United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Arms Control International Security and Science., United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs., and United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade. 1992 p.14). Not only that, but also the way North Korea completely abandoned all of it strong stands, including the refueling of the reactor, dismantling the nuclear facilities and the laboratory, and eventually about the North-South talks, after the light water reactor deal had been completed suggests the primacy of hypothesis 2. In addition, and perhaps most significantly, the concession of North Korea regarding the special inspections is of primary importance in this aspect, especially if one considers the important Korean place on “saving face” (Snyder 1999 p.90). That the special inspections concession came after the solidification of the light water deals should be of great significance.

One might ask, why did North Korea go so close to war, if all they wanted was economic assistance in exchange of its nuclear program? An understanding of this move by North Korea can be gained once one understands the significance of North Korean “cliff diplomacy”. As Snyder points out, this may result from the guerilla tactics North Korea so frequently employs in diplomatic negotiations (Snyder 1999 p.68-96). By driving all events to the brink of collapse and showing the willingness to walk away from the negotiating table, North Korea hoped to enhance its negotiating leverage. Another factor that adds to the rationale behind the guerrilla tactics is the apparent mistrust of the United States (Barry 1996 p.147). From the perspective of North Korea, the United States had been very erratic in its requests of North Korea in the past (Cumings 1997), and therefore North Korea did not have sufficient trust to reach a deal. For this reason, driving the U.S. to the edge would make a better deal possible for North Korea. This is all the more true because North Korea knew of the U.S. vital interest in the NPT. Going against the vital interest of the opponent would make the opponent anxious enough to make good concessions. It is obvious that despite the apparent willingness to go to war as

\[226\] See earlier chapters.
shown in the nuclear fuel rod withdrawal, North Korea was very much eager to end the dispute. This was exemplified by the sudden turning around after the Carter visit. The significance of the dramatic turnaround instigated by the Carter visit alone should be enough to refute the first hypothesis.

However, there are also aspects of the negotiations that point to the validity of hypothesis 1. Despite the constant U.S. promise of Negative Security, North Korea repeated asked the U.S. to documentize this Negative Security Assurance. The best example of this came during the Carter visit, when Kim Il Sung himself asked Carter to guarantee that the U.S. would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea. Also, as Cumings puts it, the threat of the nuclear, hydrogen, as well as napalm bombs against North Korea during and Korean War and after was very real, and good enough a reason for North Korea to feel threatened (Cumings 1997; Cumings 1998). In addition, North Korea’s utter hatred toward the Team Spirit exercises is yet another example of the threat perception North Korea had felt leading up to the nuclear negotiations. Also, with the USSR and China consecutively establishing diplomatic ties with South Korea, North Korea must have felt more isolated than ever. On the other hand, the isolation factor could also be used in support of hypothesis 2, because without economic assistance from the two former allies, North Korea was forced to seek out new channels for economic assistance, and found the United States. North Korea’s insistence on a diplomatic representation in each other’s capital and diplomatic recognition of North Korea as a regime also point to hypothesis 1, because a normalization of relations would undoubtedly enhance security from North Korea’s perspective (Barry 1996 p.142).

Whether or not this perception led to the nuclear program in search of self-defense is, again, unclear. However, given the evidence mentioned above, it seems that self-defense, while highly likely one of the reasons for nuclear armament, was not the main purpose of initiating the program. Although not highly reliable, Kim Il-Sung and Kang Suk-Ju repeatedly claimed that it was never the North Korean objective to obtain nuclear weapons (Oberdorfer 1997 p.327). But there is ample evidence that point toward economic assistance – such as the apparent economic shortage, the negotiating behavior, etc. Also, it was clearly the U.S. perception that the North Korea motive was hypothesis
2, which led to the eventual compromise. Had the U.S. perception been one closer to hypothesis 1, the results might have been catastrophic. If the U.S. had thought the North Koreans were unambiguously determined to arm itself with nuclear weapons, which would have led to the hardliners gaining the upper-hand within the decision-making process, the result most definitely would have been war.

Also, it is important to note that because of the delays agreed to in the Agreed Framework, North Korea also retained its bargaining chips should further need to utilize them arise.

In conclusion, I ascertain that North Korea attempted to elicit economic assistance from the U.S. in order to revitalize its economy, but its military perception of threat also played a role in the decision. Therefore, it seems North Korea was seeking to “catch both rabbits”\textsuperscript{227}, economic revitalization and military negative assurance by implementing a nuclear program.

As indicated in earlier chapters, the Rational Actor model has provided an appropriate framework for analyzing the 1993 North Korean Nuclear Crisis. The concept of national interest combined with the assumption of a unitary rational actor for the purpose of analysis has served well to deduce the North Korean motives behind the diplomatic actions. However, it is important to note that the Rational Actor model was not sufficient in itself. This was because of the North Korean culture that had to be taken into account. The Rational Actor model is largely based on the Western concept of rationality. The biggest fallacy of this is that it assumes the same rationality across the border, ignoring the fact that different cultures have different definitions of rationality. Samuel Huntington claimed that this world is one of “double standards: people apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard to others” (Huntington 1993 p.36). Huntington’s statement, although starting from a slightly different notion, nonetheless refers to the U.S.’s ignorance of different cultures and rationality. The exact same action taken by a friendly country and a hostile country is interpreted completely differently. This is because the cultural difference with the hostile country hinders a clear and objective analysis of the action. Countries tend to justify kin countries’ actions, while
they attempt to condemn culturally dissimilar countries’ actions (Payne 1995 p.6). The solution to this problem lies in the concept of “thick-rationality”, referred to in Chapter 3. With a complete understanding of the cultural and ideological background of each negotiating partner, thereby “thickening” the rationality, the Rational Actor analysis could be more comprehensive. In response to the criticism that “thick” rationality is not falsifiable and therefore not a science, I would argue that without proper consideration of all the factors behind the decision-making process, no Rational Actor analysis would be complete. Basing judgment on the assumption that all cultures should be the same and the assumption that there is one universal rationality runs the risk of cultural prejudice.

Recent Developments in North Korea

In the recent months, North Korea has begun engaging the outside world aggressively. It will conduct a historic summit with South Korea on June 12-14, which is the first time the head of the two states will meet since the end of the Korean War. It has recently established diplomatic relations with Italy, Japan, and Australia. A North Korea delegation is scheduled to visit Washington sometime this year. Kim, Jong-Il visited China on June 2 to tighten the friendship between the two countries. All of these recent events point to the primacy of hypothesis 2 in my thesis. Many experts say that this is Kim. Jong-Il’s effort to bring about a rebound from North Korea’s economic collapse. China had long encouraged North Korea to engage the outside world and gradually open its market to overcome the economic difficulties. North Korea seems to be walking that path.

Hence, it seems to have been North Korea’s long-standing foreign policy to engage the Western world to obtain economic assistance and eventually establish trade relations to help the North Korean economy come out of its slump. It is my belief that the 1993

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227 A South Korean saying applicable in cases where a subject is attempting to obtain two goals at the same time.
228 See Los Angeles Times, April 10, 2000.
Nuclear Crisis was the overture of this effort. The recent North Korean diplomatic efforts confirm my thesis. We will have to wait and see whether the new North Korea foreign policy will succeed as China has in the past and if North Korea will continue this effort in the future.

**Note on Future Research**

As can be seen in the case of the 1993 North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Track II diplomacy can be far more efficient than bureaucratic diplomacy, depending on the situation. Although Leon V. Sigal goes into some detail about Track II, there is no significant literature that fully discusses the implications and efficacy of Track II diplomacy. If any of the readers were to embark on this analysis, within the North Korean foreign policy context or not, his or her contribution to political science would be noteworthy.
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