Trusted Assistants: A Look at the Governing and Reelection Roles of the Vice President

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to determine if there is a relationship between a vice president of the United States’ governing influence and his involvement in a presidential reelection campaign. The period for this thesis will begin with Richard Nixon’s vice presidency and end with Al Gore’s. To find a connection I will create factors that will examine both governing influence and reelection campaign involvement.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Throughout much of American political history the office of the national vice president was considered to be of little importance when presidents sought to be reelected. Their original vice president was frequently dropped or mostly forgotten during the course of the reelection campaign. Recently, however, the status of the vice president has undergone a change. Since the 1950’s vice presidents have been more involved in policy making more visible politically, and they have participated to a greater extent in reelection campaigns.

Objectives

The basic question this thesis will attempt to answer is whether or not greater involvement of vice presidents in reelection campaigns is a product of the greater roles vice presidents are playing in governing or a result of other factors. My prediction is that those vice presidents who possess a good bit of governing influence during their first terms will be more heavily involved in the reelection campaign. One reason for this is that vice presidents who are granted significant governing roles by the president, especially in policy, during their first term in office would be trusted enough to be given a significant role in the reelection campaign.

One goal of this research is to make a small contribution to scholarship on the presidency as an institution. This thesis looks at the evolution of the presidency during the second half of the twentieth century through the perspective of how a vice president has contributed to his administration and to its reelection campaign. It also will reveal how the modern vice president contributes to an administration in a way that has not been examined in depth by previous scholarly endeavors. This study will, in the final analysis, be of interest to those who care about, are interested in, or study U.S. government and politics. I hope that it can add to our understanding of the evolution of both the vice presidency and reelection campaigns.

Assessment

In order to answer my central question, I have developed a procedure for systematically assessing both the degree of influence a vice president has in an administration and the extent and importance of their involvement in the reelection campaign. For exploring
the former, I created two sets of observations. One focuses on factors that relate to policy influence. The other will focus on political influence. To examine reelection involvement I will create factors that will highlight the contributions of six vice presidents in these elections. The specifics of the protocols for these observations will be provided in Chapter 2.

For the purpose of this research, policy influence will be defined as factors that examine how each vice president contributes to the administration they are a part of generally and the president he serves specifically from inside the White House gates. In other words, these factors will tap the vice president’s influence away from the public spotlight, which if he does well would give him the opportunity to be a part of executive branch policy making which has become more centralized within the White House itself (Patterson, 2000).

As for political influence, these factors will focus on the contribution a vice president makes beyond the White House grounds. These can manifest themselves in many different places and situations be they in the halls of Congress, at a campaign rally for a Senate candidate in the Midwest, or even in the results of a public opinion poll. They allow the vice president, if successful, to improve the image of their administrations.

Chapters 3-6 will look closely at each of the vice presidents who have been included in reelection campaigns in the period under study, 1956 to 1996. This will provide an opportunity to examine specific evidence on how they participated (or in some cases did not participate) both in governing and in the campaigns. Chapter 7 will analyze the evidence in order to determine if it is consistent with my original prediction of a relationship between governing influence and reelection participation. The final chapter will assess the situation of the current vice president and examine both the likely evolution of the office of the vice presidency and possibilities for future study.

At the outset, however, I need to make a note on language. In what follows I refer to the vice presidents exclusively with the male pronoun. This is because each of the cases being examined here is male. This is not meant in any way to ignore the possibility of a female vice president.

**Overview of the pre-1950’s Vice Presidency**

Between 1804 and 1956 most vice presidents were not at all influential in the governing of the United States unless they ascended to the presidency due to the death of their
 predecessors. In fact, prior to 1963, “the vice presidency had been empty for thirty-six years, roughly twenty percent of the nation’s existence” (Goldstein, 1982: p.229). This tells us that the office was considered inconsequential and not worthy of even a placeholder, not to mention someone who would actively influence the administration in which he served.

This point is reinforced by examination of some examples of vice presidents during this period. The first is George Clinton, who in his younger years was a very influential politician in his home state of New York. However, by the time he reached the vice presidency in the early 1800’s under Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, he was worn out and had trouble even fulfilling simple duties such as presiding over the Senate (Witcover, 1992). Clinton later died in office, and the vice presidency became vacant until the next election.

The post-Civil War era continued the legacy of an unimportant vice presidency. Schulyer Colfax, who served as Ulysses Grant’s vice president during his first term in office, personified this. His vice presidency was most noted for the fact that he was denied a second term due to his participation in the Credit Mobilier scandal (US House of Representatives, 2004).

Early in the twentieth century, Thomas Marshall carried on the tradition of the general insignificance by the vice president. As Woodrow Wilson’s nominal second in charge, Marshall was left out of all the important decisions during his eight years as vice president (Kincade, 2000). These earlier occupants of the position did not have the office space, access to the president, or public standing that even the least influential of the six individuals that will be studied here did.

In addition to the lack of governing weight, most evidence tells us that the vice president was also not very important in presidential reelection campaigns throughout the nineteenth century and for much of the twentieth century. In fact, the vice presidents, like Colfax, were often dumped from the reelection ticket. This trend started in 1804 soon after the passage of the twelfth amendment, when Thomas Jefferson and his party removed Aaron Burr (his first vice president) from the ticket and went with another choice (Witcover, 1992). Another example of irrelevance from the nineteenth century was Richard M. Johnson who was Martin Van Buren’s vice president. Johnson became such a burden on the administration
that Van Buren opted to run for a second term without a vice presidential candidate to share the ticket with him (Witcover, 1992). Clinton Rossiter, writing in the middle of the twentieth century, summed up the overall thinking about the vice-presidency during the 1800’s as follows, “However cogent the reasons of the framers and however high their expectations, the vice-presidency was a failure” (1948: p.384).

This “failure” of the vice presidency continued into the early twentieth century. One example was Vice President James Sherman who served under President William Howard Taft. In Taft’s 1912 campaign Sherman was renominated without much of a fight, but he stayed away from the campaign that year (Cooper, 1997). In fact, he died only one week before the election, which did not seem to garner any large degree of national concern, or affect the campaign significantly (Chace, 2004).

In general, the vice president, even in the event that they were renominated, usually played little to no significant role in the presidential reelection campaign process.

**Transition Period**

What caused the shift to greater vice presidential influence beginning in the 1950’s? One answer to this question finds some of its origins in events that took place in 1945. Vice President Harry S Truman was, according to most accounts (including his own), ill prepared to become president because the president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, kept him unaware of important events taking place (Natoli, 1985). This probably would not have been a good idea at any time in history, but this was especially true in 1945 as World War II was nearing an end with many momentous decisions at hand. As it happened, Roosevelt died and Truman was forced to face these monumental circumstances with little to no background information on projects such as the atomic bomb. Presidential scholar Nelson W. Polsby maintains that “we can date the modern vice-presidency from April 12, 1945, the day Franklin D. Roosevelt died” (Goldstein, 1982: p.13).

Another factor contributing to the growth in influence of the vice presidency came in 1951 with the passage of the twenty-second amendment that limited future presidents to only two terms in office. This amendment was championed mainly by Republicans in Congress whose main goal was to restrain presidential power in response to Roosevelt’s four terms in
office. It also had the unintended consequence of making it more likely that vice presidents in the future would run for the presidency (Goldstein, 1982).

Also around this time, the vice-president was given new statutory positions within the government. An important example of this movement was the inclusion of the vice president as a member of the National Security Council in 1949 (Patterson, 1988). This gave the vice president, at least officially, a voice in setting United States’ policies in relation to other nations.

These factors all set the stage for Richard Nixon’s vice presidency to be a break with its dismal historical precedents. Before examining this, however, Chapter 2 will describe the methods employed to explore vice presidential influence systematically.
Chapter 2: Qualitative Methods

In this chapter I will describe construction of three separate sets of observations and protocols that were used to determine whether or not governing influence and reelection involvement complement each other, or were related for the six vice presidents that are being studied.

As a general rule, I gathered information on each factor for each vice president from multiple sources in order to enhance the validity of my descriptions and conclusions. Any inconstancies among sources were resolved by bringing in additional sources on the topic that were able to shed some light on the discrepancies that arose, and I believe pointed me in useful directions.

Governing Influences

The first protocol is designed to gauge how influential a vice president is within the administration he serves, and the second considers vice presidential influence outside the White House. These protocols will differentiate between policy influence and political influence, which were discussed in Chapter 1.

In order to assess policy influence, I sought to identify observations that revealed both the vice president’s influence within the White House itself and with the president, especially in terms of getting his views considered in administration policymaking. The second area of observation deals with the vice president’s role in politics outside the White House. Here, I will seek to describe the degree to which a vice president has been an effective advocate for his administration with diverse groups such as the press, the general public, and Congress

Policy Influence

List of Factors
- Presidential Interaction
- Staff Presence
- Compatibility/Loyalty
- Policy Results

The concept of policy influence includes four categories that will give us a reasonable picture of a vice president’s influence on policymaking within his administration. The first of these that will be included is how often each vice president interacts with the president alone
in a one on one setting or is able to contact the president whenever he feels the need to. This is an important factor to consider when looking at policy issues, because it is reasonable to assume that the more often a vice president can have a discussion with the president, the more chances he has to champion his viewpoints without having to worry about other White House voices challenging him or bringing in their own perspectives. It also shows that the president has enough respect for the vice president to take time out of his extremely busy schedule to confer privately with the second in command. In evaluating this factor, I gave more weight to vice presidents who maintained regularly scheduled meetings with the president and vice presidents that were around the president during times of importance.

To get credible results on this factor I examined sources that focus their attention on the inner workings of the White House and whom the president communicated with during the course of government business. Examples of these types of sources are John P. Burke’s look in the year 2000 at the institutional presidency and Bradley Patterson, Jr.’s examinations of the overall White House organization from 1988 and 2000. From those accounts I determined how much emphasis, if any, was placed upon presidential-vice presidential meetings. In addition, I also included sources that focus squarely on each individual vice president studied here. This group of sources included Timothy Walch’s 1997 edited collection of the vice presidency in the twentieth century, which allowed me to look at this issue from the perspective of the vice president. Together, these allowed me to determine a vice president’s interaction with the president both from a vantage point that focuses on the White House as a whole and sources that highlight each individual vice president.

A second factor that I observed was the size and influence of the vice president’s staff. This involves two main components. One is simply the number of overall staff. The second component is the influence of people on the president’s staff and in the cabinet who have worked for the vice president prior to their time in the White House. For instance, this would include someone who worked for Albert Gore during his time as a United States Senator and then assumed a position on the White House staff such as Roy Neel, who was the deputy chief of staff for Bill Clinton (Patterson, 2000). This is valuable to consider because it is another way for the vice president to build influence with the president without actually having to be with him all the time. A vice president who does well in this set of observations will be one
whose staff is involved in the day to day events at the White House and has confidants that are a part of the president’s inner circle.

For this factor I employed sources that look at the vice presidency in the big picture so I could see how vice presidential staff influence has changed throughout the decades. These sources included Paul C. Light’s work in 1984 on vice presidential power, so that I could get a clear impression of how important each vice presidential staff was. I also utilized sources that focus on the White House staff as a whole, like Patterson’s overall snapshot of the individuals that constitute the staff. This helped me to examine if the vice president played a role in how the White House staff as a whole is organized. As with the first factor, this one gave me perspectives about sources that highlight the vice presidency and other sources that do not place their main focus on the vice president but instead cover the entire White House organization.

The third set of observations attempts to tap the personal compatibility between the vice president and the president he serves. This is difficult to establish because it is very difficult to observe. That being said, it is too crucial to the influence of the vice president to exclude. I would contend that if a president develops a personal antipathy for the vice president behind the scenes (as the relationship between Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey became) (Witcover, 1992), this would cause, despite any outward appearances, a likelihood that the president would not heed any advice from the vice president, making him for all intents and purposes ineffective in policy circles. This is why this could be a critical factor to this study and must be included. In evaluating this factor, I focused on how well the president and vice president got along with each other during their time together in the White House. This leads me to argue that a vice president will appear strong on this set of observations if he had a positive relationship with the president during their term together.

To evaluate this factor for each of the vice presidents I focused on “insider accounts” of people within the administrations they served. I used this approach because these are people who saw firsthand the relationship between the president and the vice president on a daily basis throughout their term in office. These types of sources include books such as William Safire’s look in 1975 at his role in the Nixon administration. Of course, I needed to be aware that those opinions might be slanted to fit the political views of those making the
comments. Once again, I also used sources that focused exclusively on the vice presidency such as Joel K. Goldstein’s book from 1982 on the modern vice presidency, so that I could see the similarities or differences in these relationships throughout the different administrations being studied.

The next element included in the policy area is something I called “policy results.” Basically, this involves asking if a vice president has been able to get ideas that he believes in strongly included as a part of the president’s overall policy package. A problem with this measure might be that since the president and the vice president share a place on the same ticket they would be inclined to agree on most major policy issues. That being said, there is often not total agreement between the two, which would give the vice president an opportunity to nudge the president towards his point of view on a position. In addition, even in areas of agreement, the vice president could convince the president to move certain issues which otherwise might be downplayed to the center of the agenda. In other words, vice presidents with influence here are those who are able to achieve policy outcomes that closely mirror their views.

To investigate this factor I examined sources that focus on the policy accomplishments of each administration, and do so in a balanced manner. For instance, when looking at Dan Quayle I try to balance the view of his policy impact with the views of one of his critics, Charles Tiefer. In cases such as these I look to other sources like the book on Quayle by David Broder and Bob Woodward written in 1992 to iron out any discrepancies that arise. In addition, I also examined the perceptions of other government figures in the administrations being studied to determine how they saw what the vice president’s influence with the president when it came to steering policy. This can be accomplished by using detailed sources such as Light’s book.

Combined, these four sets of observations allow me to judge the policy influence of vice presidents in order to determine if there is a relationship between vice presidential influence in governing and the vice president’s role in campaigning.

**Political Influence**
List of Factors

- Midterm Campaigning
- Influence with Other Politicians
- Public Spokesperson
- Public Approval

The second set of observations concerning governing influence focuses on how influential a vice president is as an ambassador for his administration outside of the White House. As was the case with the policy arena, this set of observations also includes four separate components.

One factor is the vice president’s role in the midterm election campaigns. These observations allow me to see how much he is in demand by both the political party and the specific candidates that he is publicly supporting. If a vice president campaigns often, that implies that he is given the confidence of the administration he serves in. If he is allowed to go on the campaign trail and speak on behalf of the White House, it is reasonable to assume that he has the confidence of the president. In addition, it can also show that he is looked upon favorably by the local and state activists in the political party he is a part of, indicating political influence.

To gather evidence on this factor, I examined sections in the literature on the vice presidency and on presidential elections that discuss the vice president’s involvement in midterm campaigns. This is where books such as Marie Natoli’s work published in 1985 on the contemporary vice presidency become relevant, giving me a “big picture” account of how the vice presidents have been utilized. From these sources, I found out which states the vice president campaigned in most heavily. This, in turn, led me to include accounts from newspapers in those states. To do this I employed a Lexis/Nexis search that looked for articles about the vice president campaigning in these states in the months leading up these midterm elections.

My next observation of political influence involves the effect the vice president has on other politicians. The questions here are: What was the relationship with his former colleagues in the Congress if he served there, and how effective were these vice presidents in
promoting the administration’s agenda with these colleagues? In the case of Spiro Agnew, I instead placed greater emphasis on his interaction with the nation’s governors since he was the Governor of Maryland and lacked any type of Congressional background before ascending to the vice presidency. This is important because to get policies enacted into law, presidents need Congressional approval in passing legislation. In the case of governors, they can build momentum using their “bully pulpit” within their jurisdictions in order to influence the voters and Congressional delegations from their states. For instance, the support of many governors around the nation helped President Clinton develop his welfare policy in the mid-1990’s (Patterson, 2000).

A vice president will do well on this dimension if he is given the leeway by the president to lobby his former colleagues and his advice is accepted and implemented by the politicians he was attempting to lobby. If effective, a vice president can save the president some of the time and effort it would take to cajole these elected officials into accepting the administration’s point of view, and may even get things accomplished that the president could not achieve alone.

To assess this factor I used biographies of the vice president that highlighted their time in elected office prior to becoming vice president to see how much focus is placed upon these kinds of relationships. Two examples are works by journalists Bill Turque writing in 2000 along with Broder and Woodward who focused on Albert Gore and Dan Quayle respectively, which gave me the background essential to further my understanding of the measure. I then consulted these sources once again to see if these relationships evolved once these individuals became vice president. To do this, I examined comments and actions of members of Congress and governors from these accounts to determine how effective they felt the vice president was, since they are the ones who need to respond positively in order for the vice president to do well on this factor.

The third factor included in the political influence area is the vice president’s travel and speech schedule during the first three years of his term, which encompasses his role as a public spokesperson for the administration. This assessment gives more weight to a vice president who spends his time communicating with the public in order to build widespread support for the president’s agenda. However, doing well on this measure may lead to less of
an impact in the policy influence area. Being out on the road pushing administration positions might preclude the vice president from being able to spend valuable time at the White House, where the actual policies are being formulated. I sought to determine if some vice presidents were able to strike the right balance, and do well on both of these measures.

For this factor I again reviewed specific vice presidential biographies such as the one on Spiro Agnew written by Jules Witcover back in 1972 to determine if these vice presidents spent lots of time speaking on behalf of their administration. I also brought in books that take a broader look at the office of the vice presidency. This was done in order to see if any of the individual vice presidents I have looked at differed from the general assessment of vice presidents as spokespersons offered in the accounts of Light, Natoli, and Goldstein.

A final consideration in this arena was how the American public rated the vice president. The best way to go about this is to focus upon selected polling numbers throughout their terms leading up to reelection in order to get an overall assessment of how the public feels through performance/approval ratings. While most national polls do not ask people about their views of the second in charge, there has been enough polling that does include this to enable me to make basic comparisons. These observations show whether or not the vice president’s popularity is consistent with the president’s or varies widely, either positively or negatively, from the president’s. Vice presidents who are as popular or more popular than their president do well on this factor.

More specifically, I focused on polling data taken from sources such as *Gallup, New York Times*, and *Time Magazine* as reported in the Public Opinion Online Archive provided by Lexis/Nexis. This allowed me to have access to the actual results these polls produced. To broaden my outlook I studied mentions of polling results in the literature on the various vice presidents so that I could place the results in a historical context that the data do not provide by themselves. This helped ensure that there is meaning beyond the numbers that the polls produced.

These observations of political influence, along with observations of policy influence I outlined earlier produced information on governing influence that allowed for an overall assessment of the influence of a vice president during his first term.

**Reelection Involvement**
List of Factors

- Time of inclusion on the Ticket
- Campaign Events
- Opposition Mirror
- Home State

The first of four factors to be included in this section is the time of the vice president’s inclusion on the reelection ticket. This focuses on the unofficial placement of the vice president on his party’s ticket, because the official announcement and ratification historically takes place at the convention during the summertime before the November election. To use a current example, unofficially most assume that Dick Cheney has already been added to George W. Bush’s reelection campaign (Leibovich, 2004), even though that decision will not be set in stone until the Republican Convention in New York City in September of 2004. I regard an early announcement as showing that the president has enough confidence in his vice president to allow him to take part in every facet of the campaign. This leads me to believe that those who are brought back the earliest, relative to the time at which the president makes it clear that he wants a second term, would be regarded as the most valuable.

My research on this factor involved the use of various sources. These included collected reports of academic interpretations of specific presidential elections such as those edited by Gerald M. Pomper following the 1992 and 1996 races compiled in 1993 and 1997, respectively. These have sections on the early campaign stages, which describe the extent of the vice president’s involvement. As I did before, I incorporated newspaper articles from Lexis/Nexis that examined the vice president’s involvement in those early stages. I especially focus on newspapers based in or around early primary/caucus states such as New Hampshire and Iowa, since they are more likely to write about the campaign at that point than they would be if they were based in other regions. I proceeded in this manner by looking for articles that included both the vice president’s name and a date that showed that he was involved early on in the reelection campaign.

A second portion of the vice president’s reelection influence involves the vice president’s speaking engagements at large rallies, and at private fundraisers where significant
amounts of money are raised for the campaign. Those with more influence are those, whose public appearances gain a lot of national attention especially in settings like party conventions. The fundraising aspect of reelection influence could be a counterweight so that public charisma is not the only aspect discussed. Once again, let me use the example of Cheney. Even though his speeches may not be inspirational, his fundraising talks enable the campaign to amass money for other uses such as television advertising and paying the staff. (Bumiller and Firestone, 2003).

This factor also attempts to gauge the effectiveness of the vice president in countering opposition to the reelection ticket. This has been referred to as the “attack dog” role. This was based on situations where the vice president was sent out during the course of the campaign to go after his opponents with charges that he feels will hurt the challengers. This can benefit the reelection campaign by knocking down the opposition and letting the president stay above the fray. Of course, this could also hurt the vice president in his future endeavors (especially in running for president) by making him seem small and petty for engaging in negative, attack style politics. This factor, above all others in reelection involvement, shows the length to which the vice president is willing to go in order to be considered a “team player.” A vice president who can give lots of speeches, raise massive amounts of money, and become an effective weapon against the opposition ticket will do the best here.

To get the best results on this factor, I made use of sources such as the accounts of specific campaigns like those by Pomper and Charles A. H. Thomson and Frances M. Shattuck who wrote in an earlier era (1960). This gave me the opportunity to see how the vice president did or did not act during the campaign season in terms of being a public presence for the reelection effort. Once again, I systematically searched newspaper articles that focused on the vice president in the months of September, October, and November in the campaign year to determine if there is a general pattern that clearly develops about their involvement. I paid the most attention to articles that touched upon speaking engagements, raising money, or attacking opponents. I also accounted for sources that take a broader look at presidential elections such as those written by Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, the most recent published in 2004, to see if there is an instance of a vice president being heavily involved in the campaign through their activities.
Another task was to examine how the vice president compared with his direct counterpart on the opposing ticket in the minds of the public. A favorable comparison would obviously mean that the vice president is being helpful to his campaign and therefore would make him more valuable on this factor of reelection involvement. Among the sources I used in examining this factor were the polling data from the Public Opinion Archive on Lexis/Nexis. This will help to determine how the public feels about the major parties’ vice presidential candidates when they are matched up against one another, allowing me to understand the views of the public on these individuals during the campaign. I also conducted a Lexis/Nexis search that brought forward articles during the campaign season that mentioned both of the vice presidential candidates, putting my focus on articles that feature a comparison between the two. I also examined books written about each election I covered to determine if the comparison of these individuals played any role influencing voters in making their decisions.

The final criterion involves examining how much the vice president is needed by the campaign in his home state. The reason for the inclusion of this factor is that when the vice presidential running mate is selected in the first place in many cases, one of the main criteria for that selection is whether he will improve the chances of the ticket in his home state. This belief, I argue, would continue when he is selected to participate again. Some literature, however, has argued that most voters do not vote based on who the vice presidential candidate is and that their impact is exaggerated (Romero, 2001). However, I would contend that if anyone would vote based on the vice presidential candidate, it is someone from their own state, and I therefore believe this is a factor that should be investigated here. Vice presidents who are believed to have much to offer the campaign in the home states will be judged the most valuable.

To investigate this factor I examined the results from the initial election to office by looking at vote totals from books on each election that list a state by state final vote total, such as the one provided in Pomper’s study of the 1992 election. This allowed me to explore how the home state voters responded to the presidential ticket in the initial election. In addition, accounts like Witcover’s Crapshoot from 1992 were included to give me an understanding of how each vice president’s home state fit into the reelection campaign strategy. Campaign
chronicles such as Elizabeth Drew’s of the 1980 election written in 1981 gave me the opportunity to notice if the vice president was sent to certain locations during the reelection campaign based upon where they were from. This would allow me to locate specific information that might be missed in sweeping accounts of the vice presidency such as Witcover’s.
Chapter 3: Mixed Results

Chapter Introduction

In this chapter I will discuss the vice presidencies of Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew. These individuals were the first vice presidents to be involved in reelection efforts following the transition period I outlined in the introduction. This will give me the opportunity to determine if the changes that occurred in the 1940’s and 1950’s affected these vice presidencies.

Richard Nixon

Background

Nixon first came to the attention of many Americans in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, first as a member of the House of Representatives and then as a Senator from California. At that time, he stood out for his aggressive pursuit of alleged communists within the United States government. The best illustration of this was the Alger Hiss case in which Hiss was accused of passing sensitive government documents to the Soviet Union. Nixon led the investigation of Hiss in the Congress, which led to his conviction in 1950 (Kisseloff, 2001). This controversial case and its aftermath gave Nixon the visibility and approval of many Republicans needed in order to be selected as General Dwight Eisenhower’s running mate in 1952 (Witcover, 1992).

During the 1952 campaign Nixon hit a major bump on the road to the vice presidency when allegations of a secret slush fund were reported by the New York Post (Witcover, 1992). In response to this charge many Republicans wanted to drop Nixon from the ticket. Even Eisenhower was lukewarm in his support of Nixon. To defend himself, Nixon went on national television and gave his famous “Checkers” speech, which galvanized support for keeping him on the ticket. The election itself was not very close and Eisenhower coasted to an easy victory along with Nixon (Witcover, 1992).

Governing Influences

Policy Influence

Presidential Interaction
As opposed to some later vice presidents, Eisenhower and Nixon did not have regularly scheduled talks. However, Nixon was given plenty of opportunities to communicate with Eisenhower. This can be seen by the fact that Eisenhower gave him an open invitation to attend any meeting being held at the White House, a departure from previous administrations (Goldstein, 1982). So, while there was a lack of prearranged get togethers, the evidence shows that Eisenhower and Nixon met enough so that Nixon could be attuned to what was occurring and aware of the president’s thoughts.

**Staff Presence**

During Eisenhower’s first term, Nixon’s staff was very inadequate, especially when comparing to contemporary standards. Someone who worked in Eisenhower’s White House pointed out that Nixon’s budgetary allotment that could be used to pay for functions such as hiring staff members was less than the amount he could spend when he was a Senator from California (Patterson, 1988).

It is significant that Nixon did have some people with whom he was close who served on the president’s staff and in the cabinet. One example was Deputy Attorney General William Rogers who was close enough to Nixon that he was later appointed Secretary of State when Nixon himself became president. Rogers also had the ear of Eisenhower, especially in trying to help him navigate the response to Senator Joseph McCarthy’s communist witch-hunt (Greenstein, 1982).

Another Eisenhower associate Nixon had a close relationship with was the Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith. Before obtaining that position in the Eisenhower administration, Smith had a long history with the president, serving as his Chief of Staff during their time in the armed forces together. Nixon who was Smith’s neighbor often met with him after the day was done to go over current events (Smith, 1997). This connection gave Nixon an important liaison in the State Department, which was headed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who often disregarded Nixon by ignoring his presence in meetings (Patterson, 1988).

Even with these allies, others who were powerful within the administration often saw Nixon only as a nuisance. Nixon found this out firsthand when Eisenhower was stricken with
a heart attack, and Dulles along with White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams colluded to make sure that Nixon would not be the man in charge (Witcover, 1992).

Compatibility/Loyalty

Despite public assurances from President Eisenhower that he and Nixon were good friends (Goldstein, 1982), the facts show that the reality was quite different. Even those who worked with Nixon have admitted that the personal association between the two was distant at best (Safire, 1975). What caused this lack of compatibility? One theory is that Eisenhower never forgave or fully trusted Nixon after the “Checkers” situation during the 1952 campaign (Natoli, 1985). Another school of thought contends that Eisenhower saw Nixon who was much younger and healthier than he as a reminder of his own political and overall mortality (Smith, 1997). A third explanation suggests that Eisenhower disdained politics and by extension all politicians including Nixon (Natoli, 1985).

Whatever the reason for the estrangement, it became one of the factors used by Eisenhower in his attempt to push Nixon aside in 1956. Eisenhower preferred someone with whom he was more compatible like his Secretary of the Navy, Robert Anderson. Anderson was valued by Eisenhower as a respected subordinate, whom the president trusted more than Nixon (Greenstein, 1982).

Nixon was seen as loyal carrying out Eisenhower’s policies without public complaint (Smith, 1997). However, that loyalty was not fully reciprocated by Eisenhower. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that loyalty to Eisenhower was politically advantageous for Nixon because of the sixty-four percent average approval rating given to Eisenhower in the Gallup Poll, which was among other indications of public acclaim of the president (Greenstein, 1982).

Policy Results

What influence did Nixon have on actual presidential policy, especially during the first four years of his vice presidency? For the most part, the record seems to show that few of Eisenhower’s policies were affected by Nixon’s involvement. This was despite the fact that Eisenhower spoke with Nixon more than just about any other previous president had with their vice presidents. Fred Greenstein tells us this was case because “Eisenhower consulted subordinates as much to win them over as to canvass their views” (1982: p.34).
Maybe the most glaring example of Nixon’s lack of influence in policy came during a press conference Eisenhower held during his second term. A reporter asked Eisenhower to give an example of an idea of Nixon’s that he had adopted during his time as vice president. Eisenhower responded by saying, “If you give me a week I might think of one. I don’t remember.” Apparently, Eisenhower never came up with an answer, which illustrated the lack of weight Nixon had within the administration (Witcover, 1992).

**Political Influence**

*Midterm Campaigning*

Perhaps Nixon’s most valuable contribution to the Eisenhower administration during its first term was his involvement in the 1954 midterm campaigns. A major reason for this was that Eisenhower, while not a passive president (as many believed at the time), was a passive campaigner (Light, 1984). Therefore, the burden or opportunity of touring the United States for Republican candidates fell mostly upon Nixon.

In his capacity as a campaigner, Nixon was able to improve his own stock with the rank and file of the Republican Party. His pace was frenetic, travelling twenty-six thousand miles through ninety-five cities and thirty-one states while delivering over two hundred speeches (Witcover, 1992). Despite the fact that the Republicans suffered some losses, they were held to a minimum, and much of the credit for this was given to Nixon (Smith, 1997). This could have been one of the deciding factors that enabled him to be placed for a second time on the presidential ticket with Eisenhower two years later.

*Influence with Other Politicians*

As Nixon entered the vice presidency in 1953 he possessed one advantage that Eisenhower did not have, which was time spent in Congress. Nixon’s background gave Eisenhower an important ambassador to the nation’s legislative body. As a result of his past experiences, Nixon had more of a sensitivity to those who served in elected office that some others in the Eisenhower Administration did not share (Natoli, 1985).

Among Nixon’s accomplishments in dealing with Congress were:

- Nixon mediated between the Eisenhower administration and Senator McCarthy to withdraw a letter demanding an explanation of Eisenhower’s position on trade with the People’s Republic of China; he persuaded McCarthy to drop plans to
investigate the CIA and to oppose some Eisenhower nominations; he urged Republican Senators to press for a meeting between the Wisconsin Senator and one of his targets, Secretary of the Army Robert Stevens. He informed Eisenhower of sentiment for the resignation of Sherman Adams. Along with other administration figures he negotiated changes in the Bricker Amendment with its author (Natoli, 1985: p.178)

Overall, Nixon compiled a fair record of achievement in his dealings with the legislative branch.

Public Spokesperson

On this facet of political influence, Nixon also proved to be quite helpful to Eisenhower. This will become clear as I describe both his attempts to moderate Senator McCarthy’s anticommmunist rhetoric and his role as a spokesperson for the administration overseas.

First, let us examine in more depth the role Nixon played during the Army-McCarthy hearings. Nixon was given an important behind-the-scenes role in trying to get Congress to clamp down on McCarthy. Eisenhower also decided to give Nixon a public role. This latter role involved giving a speech using time granted to the Republican National Committee in order to rebut a speech made by McCarthy (Greenstein, 1982). Eisenhower saw Nixon as an appropriate choice since he had strong anticommmunist credentials going back to his time in Congress. Response to the speech has been divided; some like Marie Natoli called the address “brilliant” (1985), while others such as Jules Witcover have called it “pathetically timid” (1992).

In addition to domestic chores, Nixon often became the public face for the Eisenhower Administration during his many foreign trips. Throughout his time in office Nixon visited 58 nations and took on many valuable diplomatic assignments (Smith, 1997). Among these journeys was a 38,000-mile trip to the Far East in 1953 (Witcover, 1992). These trips helped to raise the profile and credibility of Nixon and the administration he was a part of.

Public Perception

Nixon’s time as vice president saw the widespread growth of political polling (Janda, Berry and Goldman, 2002). As a result, Nixon was among the earliest group of politicians
that were seriously affected by polling. Compared with Eisenhower, Nixon’s poll numbers were quite low. This, however, was to be expected, since Eisenhower was consistently popular throughout his years in the presidency without many of the normal fluctuations in popularity that are associated with most other presidents (Ragsdale, 1993).

Looking at Nixon’s popularity, polls show that his numbers at that time were fairly typical for a vice president. To bolster this contention let us look at some examples taken from that era. One poll done by Gallup in March of 1955 asked people if Eisenhower was not running which Republican they would support in the 1956 election. Nixon was the top choice in a field that included notables such as Thomas Dewey, Harold Stassen, and Henry Cabot Lodge. Even with that top billing, Nixon’s numbers were not overwhelming, with only twenty-seven percent support with seven others splitting up the rest (Public Opinion Online, 1993). Another poll question from the fall of 1956 asked respondents whether they were pro or anti Nixon. The results were split down the middle, with twenty-one percent having a favorable opinion and twenty-three percent not thinking highly of him. Surprisingly, this poll found that, despite his visibility in the vice presidency and the later polarization he created, 47% of the respondents had no opinion of him at all (Public Opinion Online, 1993).

**Reelection Involvement**

*Time of inclusion on the Ticket*

The process of including Nixon on Eisenhower’s reelection ticket was one that took many months and did not end until the Republican convention. Throughout this long process there were rumors of replacing the vice president along with some encouragement of these rumors by Eisenhower himself.

There was no guarantee as 1956 approached that Eisenhower would decide to run for reelection. This especially became an issue in September of 1955 when Eisenhower suffered a heart attack while visiting his in-laws in Denver (Smith, 1997). This health scare according to Fred Greenstein may have had an effect opposite to what conventional wisdom would predict. Instead of wanting to retire as many first thought, it made him instead more duty bound than ever to return (Greenstein, 1982: p.46).

With Eisenhower now officially on board for a second term, people next began to speculate about whether Nixon would maintain the vice presidential position. Since
Eisenhower was not extremely fond of Nixon, he began what Greenstein would call a hidden hand attempt to rid himself of Nixon. The plan hatched by Eisenhower was to try and get Nixon out of the vice presidency by moving him to a cabinet post such as the Secretary of Defense (Witcover, 1992). To achieve this goal, Eisenhower held a meeting with Republican National Committee Chairman Leonard Hall in which he stated his objections to Nixon continuing and asked Hall to see if he could get Nixon to step down. Nixon, showing his tenacity, refused. This behind-the-scenes attempt failed; unwilling to let the situation develop into a public fight Eisenhower let the idea drop (Greenstein, 1982).

This, however, did not give Nixon a clear path to retaining the vice presidency. There was still one more challenge he had to face. At the Republican Convention in 1956 one of Eisenhower’s former advisors, Harold Stassen, was given tacit approval by the president to lead a movement that would oust Nixon in favor of Massachusetts Governor Christian Herter. In response to this effort, Nixon rallied the party’s leadership behind him, finally earning a place on the ticket (Witcover, 1992).

Campaign Events

One way Eisenhower maintained his presidential aura was by getting Nixon to go after the Democrats in his place (Witcover, 1972). This was the strategy used in the 1954 midterm elections, and it was to be replicated in the 1956 reelection campaign (Goldstein, 1982).

At the beginning of the campaign, however, Nixon vowed to take the “high road.” Reverting back to his old form as the campaign got closer to the November election, his tone got harsher, calling opponent Adlai Stevenson, among other things, “a jittery inexperienced novice who is eager to have the job, but who is utterly unqualified” and as an “indecisive, how-not-to-do man, a pathetic Hamlet” (Goldstein, 1982: p.106-7).

These types of attacks were a double-edged sword for Nixon as they are for all vice presidents. On one hand, they maintained his high standing among grass roots Republicans, who had helped him earn the vice presidential nomination in the summer of 1956. They also, however, diminished the presidential image he was trying to cultivate for his own run for the White House in 1960, which may have contributed in his loss that year.

Opposition Mirror
In the 1956 election Nixon’s direct opponent on the ballot was Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee. In earning the Democratic Party’s vice presidential nomination, Kefauver had to defeat the mostly unknown Senator from Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy, on a floor vote at the Democratic Convention.

Kefauver was a politician of national prominence who helped to make a name for himself by soundly defeating President Harry S Truman in the New Hampshire presidential primary of 1952 (Witcover, 1992). In matching up against Kefauver, Nixon was at a slight disadvantage. A few polls taken in 1955 showed that if these two met in a head to head matchup for the presidency, should Eisenhower not run again, Kefauver would come out on top. The advantage varied by poll, with a range of three to fourteen points (Public Opinion Online, 1993).

During the campaign itself, Nixon mostly went after Stevenson. Kefauver was forced to go after Nixon because little could be gained by attacking Eisenhower directly due to his impressive popularity (Goldstein, 1982). These attacks in the final analysis did not sway much of the public into voting for the Stevenson-Kefauver ticket.

Home State

California, Nixon’s home state, contained a large number of electoral votes that, if won, could go a long way for a candidate in securing a victory in a presidential election. In addition, during the 1950’s the state was home to many Republican heavyweights, including Governor Earl Warren and Senator William Knowland who along with Nixon showed that Republicans could win statewide elections in California (Witcover, 1992). However, in the 1948 presidential election, Republican candidate Thomas E. Dewey failed to carry the state even though the popular Warren was his vice presidential ticket mate (Witcover, 1992).

The addition of Nixon in 1952 was probably academic as the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket won California with fifty-seven percent of the vote, similar to the national total of around fifty-five percent. From these results, one can infer that the continued presence of Nixon on the ticket in 1956 probably was not based on geography. I would argue that this was the case because by this time Nixon was more of a national than a state figure. It should also be pointed out that Nixon had only been in elected office for six years from California and only two of them were spent in a position that was decided upon by the entire state. This factor
therefore denied him the extensive ties that could be built if in a statewide office for a longer period of time.

Conclusion

Putting together all of the evidence we have just looked at, we can tell that the Nixon vice presidency was groundbreaking in some aspects and an important model for future occupants of that office, but had some negatives as well. As we will see in the next case study, history has a way of repeating itself.

Spiro Agnew

Background

The next vice president to be involved in a reelection campaign was Spiro Agnew. Before becoming vice president, Agnew served as the Baltimore County Executive in Maryland and then was elected governor of the state in 1966 (Witcover, 1992). In that election, Agnew faced a Democratic candidate who was a rabid segregationist. As a result, he won much of the support of Maryland’s African-American community, which led to his victory (Greene, 1997).

Once elected governor, however, Agnew’s progressive stand on race relations began to change. This was evident in his response to the riots that occurred in Baltimore following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in April of 1968. This response included Agnew blaming the state’s civil rights leaders for the disorder in a heated meeting (Witcover, 1972). Following this incident, Agnew began to champion a “law and order” platform that won him the favorable attention of Richard Nixon (who by this time had secured the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1968) and his advisors (Witcover, 1972). This led to Agnew’s appointment to the Nixon ticket, and his subsequent election to the vice presidency in a close election that November.

Governing Influences

Policy Influence

Presidential Interactions

As was the case with Eisenhower and Nixon, Agnew did not have a regularly scheduled meeting time to discuss issues with the president. In addition, Nixon often did not bother to alert Agnew about some pressing issues. One of these was Nixon’s trip to China,
which was made in order to break down long-standing barriers and forge closer ties between the two nations. In fact, like others in the administration, Agnew was unaware of Nixon’s back channel attempts at breaking the ice with China. In fact, before Nixon’s trip, Agnew said that visits to China would undermine the United States-Taiwan relationship (Witcover, 1992).

On other occasions Nixon did meet with Agnew, but these meetings usually only dealt with political strategy. One such meeting was held on September 24, 1970 to discuss a plan of action for the upcoming midterm campaigns (Safire, 1975). Overall, especially when it came to policy, Nixon and Agnew did not have substantive discussions.

Staff Presence

The time between Nixon’s vice presidency and Agnew’s saw a continuing buildup of vice presidential presence from its previous anemic levels. This began in 1961, when vice president Lyndon B. Johnson was given an office in the Executive Office Building rather than just one at the Capitol and double-digit staff numbers. This trend continued during Hubert H. Humphrey’s vice presidency, even though neither Johnson or Humphrey wielded much policy influence (Patterson, 1988).

By the time Agnew became vice president, the Budget of the United States included a new line that gave the vice president $700,000 for “Special Assistance to the President.” However, as one White House observer put it, “in Spiro Agnew’s vice presidency the man shrank, but the office expanded” (Patterson, 1988: p.289).

In terms of having influence with Nixon’s most trusted advisors, Agnew failed once again to gain traction. This can be evidenced by his lack of contact with Nixon’s two most important aides, Bob Halderman and John Erlichman (Natoli, 1985).

Compatibility/Loyalty

The personal relationship between Nixon and Agnew, though not as negative as the one between Eisenhower and Nixon, did have its low points. That being acknowledged, it is also true that Agnew had tremendous loyalty towards Nixon; in fact many observers believed that as the first term wound down Agnew was becoming even more loyal than he was in the beginning of his vice presidency, to the point where intimates of his claimed he would step aside in the 1972 campaign if Nixon asked (Witcover, 1972).
It would seem to make sense then since Agnew was considered to be loyal and since Nixon himself had been in Agnew’s shoes a decade earlier that this feeling would be reciprocated. Nothing could be farther from the truth, as Nixon heaped greater humiliation upon Agnew than he had ever received in the same position (Cronin and Genovese, 1998). It even got to the point where Nixon would joke with his some of his advisors that his best protection against assassination was having Agnew as his vice president (Greene, 1997). All of this would lead me to argue that, like the Eisenhower-Nixon relationship, there was a mutual public respect, but at least on Nixon’s end the closed-door reality was quite the reverse.

Policy Results

The fact that Agnew did not exercise much policy influence is illustrated by his failure to get public results for his initiatives. His failures included trying to get Nixon to support a manned mission to Mars, attempts to get Nixon to involve him in plotting strategy for the Vietnam war, and his general opposition to Nixon’s talks with the Chinese leadership (Greene, 1997)

Agnew did achieve one minor success in 1971 when the National Council on Indian Opportunity that he headed proposed the establishment of the Indian Revenue Sharing Program (Greene, 1997). While this may have been an important policy outcome to those involved directly, it paled in comparison with the headline events of the time in which Agnew had no influence. These included the war in Vietnam, the closing of the gold window, along with summits between the United States and the communist nations of the Soviet Union and China.

Political Influence

Midterm Campaigning

The events of the 1970 congressional midterm campaigns made up a large part of Agnew’s vice presidential duties. No matter what the perspective of the observer, Agnew was clearly a key actor.

The Nixon team saw the 1970 elections as an opportunity to defeat the president’s Democratic and liberal Republican critics such as Senator Charles Goodell of New York. To
accomplish this, the plan was to have the president hover above the fray and have Agnew battle in the campaign trenches, much as Nixon did in 1954 (Witcover, 1992).

To assist Agnew with this task, Nixon placed some of his advisors, such as speechwriters Pat Buchanan and William Safire along with policy advisor Dr. Martin Anderson on Agnew’s staff temporarily for the campaign season (Witcover, 1972). The strategy they created was one that would stress polarization and called upon Agnew to level harsh attacks (Natoli, 1985).

Overall, Agnew raised 3.5 million dollars and campaigned in 32 states. While it can be difficult to determine Agnew’s precise impact in specific races, he was credited with helping the Nixon team pick up some important victories. These included defeats of Democratic Senators Joseph D. Tydings of Maryland and Albert Gore, Sr. of Tennessee (Goldstein, 1982). As an added bonus to Nixon, his labeling of Senator Goodell as a “radical liberal” among other attacks aided in his defeat at the hands of Conservative Party candidate James Buckley, whom Nixon preferred (Natoli, 1985). The final results were mixed, as the Republicans gained two senate seats, but also lost nine House seats and eleven governors’ mansions (Witcover, 1972). After initial disappointment over these results, Agnew and his allies soon began to try and spin these numbers into a success (Witcover, 1992).

Influence with Other Politicians

Some observers thought that, upon election to the vice presidency, Agnew would be a useful conduit to the nation’s governors. To facilitate these connections Agnew was named to head the newly created Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (Witcover, 1992). Despite the lofty title and expectations, Agnew failed in building a working relationship with many of his former colleagues. This was brought home when Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York (a former ally of Agnew’s) opted to communicate with Nixon through National Security Assistant Henry Kissinger rather than through the vice president (Greene, 1997).

The relationships Agnew attempted to construct with Congress were not much better. At first, Agnew tried to overcome his legislative inexperience by mingling with senators on Capitol Hill to find out what was taking place politically (Natoli, 1985). He also tried
becoming a student of the Senate by listening to extensive briefings on the rules from the Senate parliamentarian (Witcover, 1992).

Agnew made major missteps in this area. In trying to lobby for the administration’s position on various issues, such as a surtax extension, Agnew came off as too forceful. This led Republican Senator Len Jordan of Idaho to declare a Jordan Rule, which was “Whenever I am lobbied by the vice president, I will automatically vote the opposite way” (Natoli, 1985: p.8). This for all intents and purposes cut off Agnew’s effectiveness with the Congress throughout his tenure as vice president.

Public Spokesperson

As with the 1970 midterm campaign, Agnew was often sent out by Nixon to get the administration’s point of view out into the public arena. This section focuses on two of these efforts, Agnew’s campaign against the major television networks and his overseas journeys where he represented the United States government.

Throughout his time in the White House, Nixon saw the press and especially the “Eastern Establishment” media as being out to get him (Safire, 1975). To counteract this presumed bias, one of the strategies Nixon implemented was to use strongly worded speeches by Agnew. In one of these addresses, given at an event in Des Moines, Iowa, Agnew argued that the commentary provided by the television networks after a major address by Nixon was slanted against him. A series of speeches such as these in front of receptive Republican audiences combined with FCC intimidation efforts caused the networks to tone down their criticism of Nixon (Witcover, 1992). The media was not the only target of Agnew’s wrath; other Nixon “enemies” he took to task included anti-Vietnam War protestors and academics (Natoli, 1985).

In terms of his foreign travel schedule, Agnew’s trips were considered to be inconsequential (Goldstein, 1982). That being said, this may have not been a negative since there was a very real opportunity for him to commit a verbal gaffe (which he was prone to do) that would offend the people he was visiting, causing a worldwide incident (Witcover, 1972). Therefore, these trips, though not significant in the grand scheme of things, still gave Agnew the opportunity to show his critics that he was not totally incompetent and could be a world statesman.
Public Perception

Throughout the first four years of his vice presidency, Agnew like Nixon before him had mixed poll results. One poll conducted by the Gallup Organization indicated that his work as vice president moved him from next-to-nowhere to third on a poll that asked Americans who was the nation’s most admired man, ranking only behind the president and the Reverend Billy Graham (Witcover, 1972). Another poll taken in 1971 found that more people (49 to 32 percent) saw him favorably rather than unfavorably (Public Opinion Online, 1993).

It should be noted that Agnew did not always receive positive poll numbers when different kinds of questions were asked, especially those dealing with him becoming a possible president. Perhaps one of the most damaging polls was one taken in May of 1970 that asked American adults if they would like to see Agnew become president someday; in response, only 19% said “yes” while a much larger 61% said “no” (Public Opinion Online, 1993). Another poll taken about a year later broached the question of whom citizens would like to see as the Republican candidate for president if Nixon did not run again. Agnew finished third out of eight choices, and he was behind both a moderate (Governor Rockefeller) and a conservative Republican (Governor Ronald Reagan of California) (Public Opinion Online, 1993).

For the most part, it seemed as if the American public was content with Agnew being their vice president, but wary of him ascending to the presidency. This parallels how Americans saw Nixon during his vice presidency.

Reelection Involvement

Time of inclusion on the Ticket

Throughout his time in the vice presidency, Agnew heard rumblings that he might be replaced for the 1972 election. The main choice that many believed would take over for Agnew in Nixon’s second term was a Texas Democrat, John Connally, whom Nixon appointed as his Secretary of the Treasury (Witcover, 1972). This speculation was intensified due to the fact that Nixon had a strong affinity for Connally (Witcover, 1992). This belief was bolstered by later attempts by Nixon to groom Connally as his successor in the White House during his second term (Natoli, 1985).
Nixon chose to keep his original team intact. The announcement that Agnew would be included once again came on January 2, 1972 when Nixon said in a television interview that Agnew would be back, putting an end to the dump-Agnew speculation that had been going around. Some believe that Nixon had made the decision months earlier, but did not say anything publicly because nobody asked him directly (Safire, 1975). It is certain, though, that whenever the decision was made, it occurred much earlier than the one made by Eisenhower in 1956.

Campaign Events

Agnew throughout his time in public life seemed to relish going after his political opponents. This continued throughout the 1972 campaign when he went on the attack against the Democratic presidential nominee, Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, by declaring him to be a “liberal” since he had opposed the Nixon Administration’s handling of the Vietnam War (Witcover, 1992). The style was described as “an unrelenting attack on Senator George McGovern and his proposals for national defense” (Goldstein, 1982; p.110).

The accumulation of public attacks that Agnew had levied throughout his first term had won him a large following by 1972 of people who loved his “Agnewisms” (Natoli, 1985). This basically ensured that he had to meet their expectations especially within the Republican Party to attack, even to the point of comparing McGovern to communist leaders in order to make his case (Witcover, 1972). Indeed, this kind of hyperbole was arguably Agnew’s greatest strength on the trail and helpful to Nixon, since it enabled him to get the benefits of the attacks without having to worry about his presidential halo getting damaged. It should also be pointed out that Agnew’s zeal may have been less necessary in this election than it would have been in a race that went down to the wire (Greene, 1997).

Opposition Mirror

In the 1968 presidential campaign the Democrats attempted to focus on their vice presidential candidate, Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine, as a positive contrast to Agnew (Natoli, 1985). The party even went to the lengths of showing an advertisement where a picture of Agnew was accompanied by canned laughter (Witcover, 1972). Obviously, though, the technique of comparing running mates did not work well enough for Hubert H. Humphrey, the Democratic candidate, as Nixon emerged victorious.
In 1972, the Democrats had trouble even getting a vice presidential candidate to be on the ticket. The party’s first selection, Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri, was dropped when it was revealed that he had undergone shock therapy in the past to treat major depression (Gillon, 1997). This revelation left McGovern and the party scrambling to find a replacement. During this time at least four people turned down the opportunity to replace Eagleton, which had the effect of shredding McGovern’s credibility (Witcover, 1992). Finally, R. Sargent Shriver, who had served as the first Peace Corps Director, was offered the spot on the ticket. Some critics felt that McGovern selected Shriver only because of his connection with the Kennedy family by marriage (Greene, 1997).

In contrast to the Democrats’ disorderly process, the renomination of Agnew was accomplished at the Republican convention without any serious discord (Witcover, 1992). It also gave Agnew an edge when compared with Shriver. One poll conducted by *Time Magazine* in the fall of 1972 that included adults in the seventeen largest Electoral College states showed that, if voting solely for vice president, Agnew would prevail by an eleven point margin (Public Opinion Online, 1993).

It seems that in looking at the Democratic vice presidential situation in 1972, the McGovern campaign’s perceived ineptness in choosing a vice presidential candidate denied them the opportunity to go after one of the Nixon presidency’s weak points, a powerless vice president. In fact, the bungled situation made Agnew look more impressive than he would have been had the Democratic vice presidential situation been handled in a better fashion.

*Home State*

Instead of focusing on Maryland, Agnew’s home state, the emphasis here should be placed upon Agnew’s influence in other states, especially those farther south that Nixon wanted to make a part of his electoral coalition (Seligman and Covington, 1989). In 1968, Nixon’s advisors credited Agnew with making an important contribution in the south, even though the ticket was defeated in Maryland (Witcover, 1992).

In appealing to this bloc of southern whites who had historically been Democrats, Agnew throughout his time as vice president continued his championing of conservative causes that aligned him with the white voters of that region. An example of this was Agnew’s
presence at the dedication of a confederate monument in Stone Mountain, Georgia (Safire, 1975).

**Conclusion**

Looking back the 1972 presidential election, it could be argued that it was the high point of the Agnew vice presidency. After all, the landslide victory caused many to speculate that he could be a leading presidential candidate for the Republicans in 1976 (Natoli, 1985). However, following this brief euphoria, Agnew began to hit a downward spiral that eventually forced him to resign the vice presidency under a cloud of scandal. This occurred because of a kickback situation that had first developed when Agnew was a local politician in Maryland (Witcover, 1992). This investigation, occurring at the same time as the Watergate scandal, was just one more problem the Nixon White House would have liked to avoid.

In sum, it seems that the Agnew vice presidency had two sides. On one hand, he was a political asset for Nixon to utilize whenever he needed a front man to champion his point of view. Policywise, however, he seems to have been an utter failure, with even Nixon himself acknowledging that fact.

**Chapter Summary**

From this chapter we can notice that neither Nixon nor Agnew had much policy influence within their administrations, even though there was an increase in staff and in Agnew’s case an office in the White House. However, both did make a contribution when it came to political influence especially with their public pronouncements. This was also the case in the reelection campaign even though neither ticket was faced with what could be considered a serious challenge. Overall, one has to acknowledge that the vice presidency did not reach its full potential during the service of these two individuals, leaving a void that would have to be filled by others.
Chapter 4: A New Visibility

Chapter Introduction

Between the Agnew and Mondale vice presidencies, more national attention began to be placed upon the office due to the Watergate scandal. This forced the implementation of the twenty-fifth amendment (ratified in 1967), under which Gerald Ford and Nelson Rockefeller were the first individuals to be appointed rather than elected to the vice presidency. In fact, Ford even went on to assume the presidency upon Nixon’s resignation. This meant that whoever was next to fill the vice presidency, it would be a different post than the one held by Nixon and Agnew as the nation entered the post-Watergate era of politics.

Walter Mondale

Background

After achieving the Democratic Party’s nomination for the presidency in 1976, Jimmy Carter needed to select a running mate. The process Carter chose to implement was to personally interview a handful of finalists at his home in Plains, Georgia (Gillon, 1997). After careful consideration and an exhaustive search of the candidates’ backgrounds, Carter elected to add Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota to complete his ticket (Witcover, 1992).

Mondale was considered to be a great choice because he was almost everything that Carter was not. For instance, he was from the Midwest and was a Washington, D.C. insider due to his eleven years of service in the United States Senate. In addition, he was strongly supported by key groups within the Democratic Party that were skeptical of Carter such as liberals, Jews, organized labor and other rank and file party activists (Gillon, 1997). During the campaign itself, Mondale contributed to Carter’s victory over President Gerald Ford by putting in a credible debate performance against Republican vice presidential candidate Senator Robert Dole of Kansas (Witcover, 1992). In addition, he campaigned heavily in the Midwest and Northeast, especially in Ohio where 65 percent of his time over the last two weeks of the campaign was spent (Polsby and Wildavsky, 2004).

Governing Influences

Policy Influence

Presidential Interaction
When Mondale was added to the ticket, Carter personally promised him that he would be given every opportunity to be an active vice president (Light, 1984). Part of that process would include regular meetings between the two that would take place every week (Davis, 1987).

That being said, other presidents had promised greater roles for their vice presidents in the past, but often backed away from that vow once their administration had gotten into the White House (Davis, 1987). This did not occur in Carter’s White House, however, as Mondale maintained his personal access to the president throughout the four years they were in office together (Light, 1984). In addition, these meetings were not just for public consumption and were especially valued by Carter (Burke, 2000). Through these actions Mondale was put “in the loop” more than Nixon, Agnew, or any other previous vice president.

*Staff Presence*

Another area where Mondale was able to be influential was with his staff. One reason Mondale’s staff was given high priority was because that they had worked closely with Carter’s staff during the 1976 campaign, building a camaraderie that allowed the two groups to establish trust and good working relationships (Light, 1984). In fact, Mondale’s own staff, headed by Richard Moe, performed assignments that usually went to presidential appointees. These efforts included:

- Heading a White House task force on hospital cost containment,
- Supervising administration efforts to uphold the presidential veto of the defense authorization bill and directed lobbying against the constitutional amendment to balance the budget (Goldstein, 1982: p.150).

The freedom given to Mondale’s staff was impressive, but his influence did not stop there. Further proof of integration emerged when Carter named some of Mondale’s closest aides, David Aaron and Bert Carp, as his deputy national security assistant and domestic policy deputy, respectively (Gillon, 1997). These appointments gave Mondale an important extra set of eyes and ears in the administration’s decision-making councils. It also was a
signal to others in the White House that Mondale was important in the policy process, and that his isolation would not be tolerated (Light, 1984).

Compatibility/Loyalty

In addition to working well together professionally, Carter and Mondale had a close personal relationship. This was attributed to their shared rural upbringings, deep religious backgrounds, and compatible personalities (Light, 1984). Another major reason for their compatibility was Mondale’s decision to keep what was said between the two private, leaving the public’s perception of Mondale’s philosophy blurred, linking him even closer to Carter (Gillon, 1997).

The clues on why Mondale was so loyal may have come from his past where he had attached himself to political benefactors in order to be appointed both as Minnesota’s Attorney General and as a United States Senator (Light, 1984). Mondale was so loyal to Carter that he would sometimes champion a policy position that Carter favored, while being opposed to it behind closed doors (Gillon, 1997). An example of this was when Mondale supported a grain embargo against the Soviet Union that he had strongly argued against directly to Carter (Witcover, 1992). These types of contradictions sometimes worried Mondale and for a time he considered leaving the vice presidency, but decided that his job was to be loyal and maintain his role with the Carter team (Gillon, 1997).

Policy Results

In terms of results Mondale’s impact may be difficult to grasp because much of his advice was delivered behind the scenes (Natoli, 1985). However, there are some places where we can pinpoint polices that were enacted, if not due to Mondale directly, than at least due to his strong encouragement.

Mondale found that to be effective in getting results it was important to enter into the process early, which Carter gave him the opportunity to do (Light, 1984). It was estimated by a Carter domestic policy aide that Mondale’s budgetary influence alone restored 3 to 5 billion dollars in domestic spending (Light, 1984). Among the issues where Mondale successfully used his input were in canceling production of the B-1 bomber, revising the government brief in the Bakke affirmative action case, and slowing the schedule for submitting the tax revision message (Goldstein, 1982).
Even with all of the accomplishments listed here, it would be misleading to say that Mondale was able to change Carter’s mind on every position he favored. This was especially the case in 1979 when the White House was enveloped in a sense of crisis. To alleviate this situation, Mondale argued for focusing more White House attention on domestic issues such as unemployment, civil rights, education, and poverty along with calling for a stronger administration response to the growing energy crisis. Unfortunately for Mondale, these suggestions were mostly rejected by Carter and never implemented (Gillon, 1997). In total, despite some setbacks, most would agree that Mondale won policy battles that cannot simply be explained away as insignificant.

**Political Influence**

*Midterm Campaigning*

Mondale on the whole brought both positive and negative attributes to the 1978 midterm elections. Mondale’s greatest disappointment from that year’s elections had to have been his own state of Minnesota. In Minnesota that year there were two open United States Senate seats, one of which was open due to Mondale’s departure for the vice presidency. Following the Democratic primary, the trouble began when Mondale was forced to support a conservative Democrat in one of those races, which angered many of his liberal allies in the state and elsewhere. The November results just added insult to injury for Mondale as the Democrats lost both of the Senate seats along with the governor's office and control of the state legislature (Light, 1984).

Despite the setbacks in Minnesota, Mondale also helped to achieve some positives for himself and his party on the campaign trail. In the course of travelling to twenty states and giving over one hundred speeches, one of his aides noted:

> Mondale was never asked not to come into a state. He was welcomed by all candidates and never stood alone on a podium. He didn’t campaign for some of the heavies, but he was never told to stay home. I’d guess that he saved four or five close elections in 1978 (Light, 1984: p.39)

Overall, I am led to believe that Carter, though happy that Mondale hit the campaign trail as much as he did, did not see it as Mondale’s only reason for being vice president. This
was somewhat of a departure from the way Eisenhower and Nixon viewed their vice presidents. Overall, the Democrats lost seats, as the party that controls the White House in a midterm election usually does. It also needs to be said that they still retained control of both houses of Congress, which arguably tells us that Mondale did a credible job for the party and his president in 1978.

*Influence with Other Politicians*

One of the greatest weaknesses of the Carter Administration was its initial inability to have positive relations with Congress, which was due in a large part to the fact that much of Carter’s staff came directly from Georgia, and lacked Washington, D.C. experience (Burke, 2000). As someone who had come from the Senate, Mondale would seem to be the ideal person to bridge this gap. In fact, Mondale was very active with Congress in fighting for the confirmation of Paul Warnke as the United States negotiator at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); he also worked with congressional leaders on Carter’s gas regulation bill. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York even went as far as to say that Mondale was “worth ten votes to the president in the Senate” (Goldstein, 1982: p.180). Mondale capitalized on this good feeling by using his Senate connections to sway votes on two of Carter’s most important policy goals: the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty and the creation of the Department of Education (Light, 1984).

Even with all of Mondale’s efforts in the Congress, an influential vice president can only do so much. Mondale in some circumstances could only sit back and be frustrated at Carter’s approach of introducing proposals to Congress and not following through on them (Witcover, 1992). This frustration became commonplace during the second half of Carter’s term when his proposals became more conservative, and Mondale in response began to schedule more vacation time away from Washington in part to avoid having to push policies he did not favor (Gillon, 1997). As a whole, it is easy to believe that when it came to congressional dealings during the Carter years that Mondale tried to make the best of a bad situation.

*Public Spokesperson*

Unlike some of the men who preceded him in the vice presidency, Mondale’s speeches on behalf of the administration may not have generated the same kind of “buzz”;
however, some did carry a measure of importance (Goldstein, 1982). In many instances, Mondale was sent out to talk with certain groups to try and make Carter’s policies more palatable to them. An example of this was the administration sending Mondale out to Jewish groups in order to defend controversial policies that related to Israel (Goldstein, 1982). He also as a link to business groups chastised US Steel in March of 1978 for its price increase (Natoli, 1985).

Carter also utilized Mondale by having him go on international travels as his personal representative. This was the case in the beginning of the administration in 1977, when soon after being inaugurated as vice president, Mondale embarked on a mission to confer with America’s major allies (Goldstein, 1982). This and later trips served a public purpose, namely that the United States would be willing to work with other countries in order to achieve its goals. However, much of his work on these trips was done far away from the cameras and the crowds (Natoli, 1985). This is a pattern we have already noticed in how he dealt with issues inside the White House. In other words, Mondale was not expected to be groundbreaking in his public pronouncements on the road, just a reliable presidential representative.

Public Perception

As Jimmy Carter’s vice president, Mondale did not elicit many strong opinions. Throughout his term in office he generally had a two to one favorable to unfavorable rating. A good way to sum up these sentiments can be seen in a CBS News, New York Times Poll taken during the fall of 1979, which showed that 38 percent of those who participated looked upon him favorably as opposed to 19 percent who were unfavorable. The largest number, 39 percent, came from those who felt they did not know enough about him (Public Opinion Online, 1993). This means that even after more than half of his term was completed many Americans did not have a keen awareness of how he was conducting his work.

These kind of results, while not the most impressive, were still much better than the president he served under. In fact, Carter’s presidency ended with Gallup Poll approval numbers in the 20 percent range (Genovese, 2001). These low poll results were not limited to the end of Carter’s term; instead they had taken a steady drop since his inauguration with only a short-term increase following the Iranian seizure of American hostages (Ragsdale, 1993).
So, due to either disinterest or a nuanced view by the American people, Mondale was personally able to avoid being dragged down by Carter’s historically low approval ratings, even though those numbers eventually cost him the vice presidency.

**Reelection Involvement**

*Time of inclusion on the Ticket*

Since Mondale was heavily involved in the inner workings of the White House on a day to day basis, it would be assumed that his invitation to return would have been an easy decision for Carter to make. However, Mondale was not universally admired by all of those who surrounded the president. This viewpoint was personified by administration figures such as Press Secretary Jody Powell and Attorney General Griffin Bell, who believed that Mondale’s political judgement was outdated and hurt Carter’s attempts to appeal to moderate voters (Gillon, 1997). This faction would have liked to see a change on the reelection ticket, which they tried to engineer by dropping hints in the press that Mondale was lazy (Natoli, 1985).

Events, however, intervened, and by the summer of 1979 most observers fully expected that Mondale would once again be given the opportunity by Carter to be vice president for another four year term (Witcover, 1992). The main reason for this early inclusion was the emergence of a major Democratic Party primary rival, Senator Edward “Ted” Kennedy of Massachusetts, heir to the Kennedy political legacy. By having Mondale on board for the primary season and making him an official part of the team, Carter could have someone with the same liberal credentials as Kennedy defending parts of the administration record that may have been unpopular with liberal voters (Gillon, 1997).

*Campaign Events*

As the primary collision between Carter and Kennedy approached, world events took place that raised the necessity (or at least the perceived necessity) of having to put Mondale out on the campaign trail in place of the president. These events such as the taking of American hostages in Iran and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan were at the forefront of Carter deciding to forgo campaign events and stay mostly in Washington (Witcover, 1992). This “Rose Garden” strategy consisted of Carter staying at the White
House maintaining his presidential image, while Mondale had to “dirty” himself in the primaries (Light, 1984).

The first test of this strategy played out in the Iowa caucuses. These are considered to be important contests because they are the first test of a presidential candidacy, even though the caucus system is the least representative mechanism for selecting convention delegates (Berman, 1987). In any event, Mondale went after Kennedy with harsh rhetoric, telling Iowa voters that Kennedy had no ideological reason to challenge Carter and that he should withdraw from the race and get behind the president. Mondale even implied that Kennedy was unpatriotic for opposing Carter’s grain embargo (Goldstein, 1982). Mondale also served as Carter’s representative at joint appearances of the Democratic candidates (which featured Kennedy and Governor Jerry Brown of California, the other Democratic contender) such as one that took place at a fundraiser of the Black Hawk County Democratic Party (Drew, 1981). When the votes from the caucuses were counted, Carter won a resounding victory in Iowa by getting over 59 percent of the vote compared to only around 31 percent for Kennedy. In addition to Mondale’s contribution, many experts attributed the win to voters rallying behind Carter following the Iran hostage situation; this success in Iowa enabled Carter to build momentum that eventually allowed him to amass a majority of delegates more quickly than he had in 1976 (Polsby and Wildavsky, 2004).

With the party’s nomination secure, the next step for the Carter/Mondale team was to prevail in the general election. Mondale once again went on the attack, now going after the Republican nominee Ronald Reagan. This effort to attack the former governor of California started at the Democratic Convention. This is where Mondale attempted to portray Reagan as someone who would threaten world peace and stability (Drew, 1981). These attacks, for the most part issue-oriented, continued on throughout the duration of the campaign (Goldstein, 1982), which ended in Carter losing by a convincing margin. Despite the failure of Carter to win a second term, this defeat did not negatively impact Mondale, as he came out of the race with his reputation intact if not enhanced (Drew, 1981). While it is clear that Mondale like his Republican predecessors went on the attack, it did not seem to tag him with the same kind of attack dog reputation that Nixon and Agnew acquired.

*Opposition Mirror*
In searching for a candidate to face Mondale, the Republican Party hit a major roadblock in 1980. Wrapping up his party’s nomination well before the convention, Republican candidate Ronald Reagan began a search for a running mate (Witcover, 1992). At the convention itself in Detroit, speculation began to circulate that Reagan wanted to bring aboard former President Gerald Ford to be his running mate in what some Republican operatives were calling a “dream ticket” (Drew, 1981). However, negotiations that would have given Ford an expanded role in the vice presidency, even maybe becoming a “co-president” broke down and left Reagan to look elsewhere (Untermeyer, 1997). Reagan immediately turned to George Bush, one of his rivals in trying to secure the Republican nomination for the presidency. Bush without much prodding accepted enthusiastically (Witcover, 1992).

Now that the tickets for both major parties were set, comparisons between Mondale and Bush were being made. It seems that both of them were seen in a similar light; an example is a poll done in California, where approximately half of the people said that Mondale and Bush would both do a good or excellent job should they become president (Associated Press, 1980). This lack of an advantage on either side probably helped Reagan more than Carter, since it meant that the fact that Bush was his second choice did not reflect negatively on the ticket as a whole. Also, unlike 1976, there was not a vice presidential debate as one journalist put it “to survive” in which some advantage may have been acquired by either candidate (Witcover, 1992).

Home State

Traditionally, Mondale’s home state of Minnesota had been receptive to the message of the Democratic Party. The state party, called the Democratic Farmer Labor Party (DFL), got its name following a merger between the Democrats and the Farmer Labor Party, a minor party consisting of mainly small farmers and urban workers (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2004). This state party launched the careers of some of the most prominent figures of the national Democratic Party. These included Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey and Senator Eugene McCarthy, who in 1968 forced President Lyndon B. Johnson to abandon his reelection effort after McCarthy put together a surprisingly strong showing in the New Hampshire presidential
primary (Witcover, 1992). It was no surprise then in 1976 when the Carter/Mondale ticket coasted to an easy victory in Minnesota.

There had been a major shift away from Democratic/Farmer Labor dominance in the state. This so-called “Minnesota massacre” in 1978 gave hope to some local Republicans that they could win the state in the 1980 presidential election. The national Republican Party did not see things the same way since it decided for the most part to overlook Minnesota (Boosey, 1980). This was evidenced in a memo written by Reagan’s pollster Richard Wirthlin before the election that included Minnesota as one of the states that made up Carter’s base and therefore would not be contested (Drew, 1981). By maintaining Mondale’s presence on the ticket we can see that Carter assured himself that he would not have to put up much of a fight in Minnesota, even though he likely would have won the state anyway.

Conclusion

Following his defeat in 1980, Mondale because of his time in the vice presidency was thought by many to have a head start in the race for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination in 1984 (Goldstein, 1982). This line of thinking turned out to be accurate as Mondale, despite early setbacks at the hands of Senator Gary Hart of Colorado in some of the presidential primaries, ultimately prevailed and became the standard bearer for the Democrats (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde, 1987). However, Reagan soundly defeated Mondale in the general election. This was in a good part due to Mondale’s inability to hold the New Deal coalition together that had allowed previous Democrats including Carter in 1976 to obtain the presidency (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde, 1987).

Chapter Summary

When Walter Mondale’s four years as vice president came to an end, his presence transformed the office in multiple ways. These included his weekly meetings with the president, his being included as one of Carter’s top advisors, and the fact that he was given access if he wanted it to every document that passed the president’s desk (Davis, 1987). He was also an asset for Carter to have in the primaries even though he was less helpful in the general election. It could be argued that his vice presidency was one of the bright spots of the Carter administration, criticized for its seemingly frequent missteps. Even Republicans
acknowledged this as vice presidents like Dan Quayle consulted with him upon assumption of the office for advice on how to handle the position (Gillon, 1997).
Chapter 5: The Republicans Return

Chapter Introduction

The 1980 presidential election brought the Republicans back to the White House after a four year absence. With this change, would the new vice president George Bush be utilized in the manner of his Republican predecessors, or would his vice presidency follow the so-called “Mondale model”? In addition, would the vice presidency of Bush’s successor Dan Quayle be a step back for the vice presidency as some believed when he was first selected? This chapter will try to examine these questions.

George Bush

Background

In terms of diverse governmental experiences, George Bush was probably one of the most qualified people ever to become vice president (Natoli, 1985). Among the posts he held before becoming vice president were two terms as a congressman from Texas, United States Ambassador to China and to the United Nations, chairman of the Republican Party, and director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Goldstein, 1982). In addition, he also made an impressive, but ultimately unsuccessful stab at the Republican presidential nomination in 1980.

His addition to the ticket worried some in the Republican Party, especially conservatives who thought that Bush was too moderate to be included with Reagan (Untermeyer, 1997). In fact, during the presidential primaries Bush referred to Reagan’s economic policy (which he would now have to defend) as “voodoo economics” (Witcover, 1992). As the campaign in 1980 progressed, Bush’s main tasks were to keep moderate Republicans in the fold and to be non-controversial (Kincade, 2000). In meeting these elementary criteria, Bush was successful and may have played a small part in helping Reagan’s surge to the White House.

Governing Influences

Policy Influence

Presidential Interaction
In the course of the 1980 campaign, Bush was unsure of exactly what his duties would be, or how he would work with Reagan if he got the opportunity to become vice president (Kincade, 2000). Once the Reagan-Bush tandem was swept into office, the two of them began to set some basic guidelines for interaction.

Their agreement had its roots in the Carter-Mondale experience. Among the procedures they elected to follow were providing Bush with a West Wing office, a regular weekly lunch with Reagan, open access to the Oval Office, along with complete access to intelligence briefings and other vital papers (Witcover, 1992).

Reagan believed that including Bush in the inner workings of the White House was essential for the government’s health, just as including an executive vice president would be for a corporation’s health (Patterson, 1988). In that spirit, Reagan decided that when he was unable to preside over National Security Council meetings Bush would be in charge. This upset those within the administration including Secretary of State Alexander Haig who viewed Bush as an outsider. Ignoring these complaints showed that Reagan was serious when he said that he wanted his vice president to be involved in his administration (Untermeyer, 1997). Even at the outset, we can see that Bush’s role was closer to Mondale’s than to his previous Republican counterparts, Nixon and Agnew.

**Staff Presence**

In terms of vice presidential staff, Bush received a slight increase from the totals that were allotted to Mondale, much of which was concentrated in legislative affairs (Light, 1984). Bush’s staff helped him on projects such as examining ways in which business could be deregulated when Bush was named the head of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief (Untermeyer, 1997).

Bush also put a minor stamp on Reagan’s cabinet; his influence in those appointments was relatively little and largely concentrated in the Commerce Department, which was led by Secretary Malcolm Baldridge who had run Bush’s successful 1980 primary campaign in Connecticut (Untermeyer, 1997). Bush’s main supporter inside the White House was Reagan’s Chief of Staff James Baker. Baker was placed in charge of political affairs, especially in coordinating both congressional and public support and eventually became the most powerful advisor in the White House. Prior to his time in the White House, Baker had
been the primary campaign manager for Bush (Warshaw, 1997). It was even rumored that Baker told Bush to shut down his campaign in 1980 so that he would be viewed as a viable vice presidential choice for Reagan down the line (Witcover, 1992). Without a doubt, Baker gave Bush the kind of ally that most other vice presidents did not have.

Compatibility/Loyalty

When Reagan took the oath of office in January of 1981, there was still some lingering resentment between him and Bush (especially within their staffs) following the primary campaign, even though this rift was beginning to be mended somewhat by the time they entered office together (Untermeyer, 1997). Then an event beyond the control of either man would intervene and help to further solidify their relationship. This was the attempted assassination of the president, which occurred soon after the inauguration in March of 1981 (Witcover, 1992). As Reagan’s life hung in the balance, people began to ask who was in control of the government. At first, others in the administration including Secretary Haig tried to claim publicly that they were in control (Witcover, 1992). In contrast, Bush (who really was the person in charge according to the Constitution) played a low-key role, showing modesty and restraint by not taking provocative actions such as sitting in the Oval Office. This type of reaction boosted Bush’s standing in Reagan’s eyes and those of his senior staff when he got better (Untermeyer, 1997).

Throughout Bush’s first term he would not speak publicly about his views when they deviated from Reagan’s, which led some to wonder if the vice presidency had robbed Bush of his principles (Clines, 1984). Reagan, on the other hand, appreciated Bush’s unwavering support and publicly stated that he felt that Bush was the best vice president of all time (Kincade, 2000). While that kind of language when uttered by politicians can be seen as disingenuous, it seems that Reagan backed this talk up by not privately disparaging his vice president in ways that others had.

Policy Results

Since Reagan and Bush had an agreeable professional connection, the focus then shifts to whether Bush was able to capitalize on that relationship in order to get some policies enacted that he wanted. In some areas, Bush was not very successful. One of these was tax policy, where Reagan was so committed to his deep tax cuts that nobody in the administration
including Bush (who felt Reagan’s tax cuts went too far) was able to derail them (Light, 1984).

A major way that Bush was able to get policies he believed were favorable to be enacted was to take on specific line assignments. Previous vice presidents including Nelson Rockefeller found these assignments to be burdensome and not really important (Light, 1984). Bush, however, disagreed to a certain extent and spent time on assignments that dealt with deregulation. Bush also spent time leading the South Florida Task Force, which coordinated national efforts to shut down the flow of illegal drugs (Untermeyer, 1997). In taking on these kind of assignments, Bush kept in mind the potential pitfalls and tried to avoid any long-term commitments (Light, 1984).

Political Influence

Midterm Campaigning

The vice president is often assigned by the president and their associates to travel the nation in support of their party’s congressional and gubernatorial candidates. In 1982, Vice President Bush was no exception.

Bush was especially needed by the Republicans to carry the party’s mantle because Reagan began to participate less in campaign type events following the attempt on his life (Kincade, 2000). In the course of the campaign, Bush did his best to promote the Reagan agenda, going on programs such as Good Morning America to refute Democratic charges that Reagan was not compassionate enough towards average people (Natoli, 1985). However, the vice president was viewed by some as uninspiring, and he even admitted that he could not be the hatchetman that Spiro Agnew was (Kincade, 2000).

In spite of Bush’s efforts on the stump, the Republicans did not have a great year. This was evidenced by the fact that the party lost eight governors’ mansions and twenty-six House seats, which ended the working majority forged between the Republicans and conservative Democrats that had enabled Reagan to push forward much of his legislative agenda in his first two years (Witcover, 1992). His efforts were not totally in vain as the party maintained its hold on the Senate, and Bush built up good will among many Republican activists across the United States (Kincade, 2000).

Influence with Other Politicians

Influence with Other Politicians
As was the case with some of the other vice presidents I have examined, Bush had much more experience in dealing with the powers-that-be in Washington than the president he served. In his work for the administration on Capitol Hill, Bush was a tireless advocate for Reagan, using his contacts with many members in both chambers of Congress in order to lobby them to move towards the administration’s position (Untermeyer, 1997).

This was a role Reagan had in mind for Bush in the beginning as much of the vice presidential staff was assigned to work on legislative affairs, since Reagan wanted quick adoption of his budget plan (Light, 1984). Specifically, Bush was invited to and participated in strategy meetings of the Republican Policy Committee in the Senate (Clines, 1984). So, while officially Bush was only needed in Congress to break a few tie votes in the Senate, he still contributed in working with Congress away from the spotlight, especially in the hurried legislative pace in the opening years of Reagan’s first term (Light, 1984).

Public Spokesperson

At the outset of Bush’s first term as vice president, he made a conscious effort to try to avoid provocative public statements, instead seeking to focus on the customary chores that those who held the office before had performed (Witcover, 1992). His public profile was so low that he received a letter from a young person asking if he was still alive (Kincade, 2000).

One area in which Bush did become the public face for Reagan came in foreign policy. He accomplished this by becoming a travelling emissary for Reagan, visiting many strategically important nations including China and the Soviet Union (Witcover, 1992). These trips were derided by some as “photo opportunities,” but one of Bush’s aides insisted that some diplomatic achievements were reached. In fact, in the early 1980’s, Bush was the first world figure to meet with two of the new leaders of the Soviet Union (both of whom died before ever meeting with Reagan) (Untermeyer, 1997).

Public Perception

Much of the first four years of Bush’s term was met with public indifference, which was similar to what Mondale faced. This can be shown by polls such as one conducted by CBS News and the New York Times in March of 1982 where a full one-third of those who answered said that they did not know enough about Bush to rate him either favorably or not
favorably (Public Opinion Online, 1993). As with Mondale, when people did have opinions on the job Bush was doing, they tended to respond positively.

One group that Bush did need more support from for his own political future was the conservative wing of the Republican Party. These people for the most part tended to idolize Reagan and felt, especially early on in his first term as president, that Bush and his lieutenant James Baker were trying to usurp the “Reagan Revolution” (Witcover, 1992). To overcome this problem, Bush tried to appeal to the right wing by visiting conservative hotbeds such as Reverend Jerry Falwell’s Liberty University (Kincade, 2000). These sort of visits and his overall low profile paid off to a degree, as polling done in late 1982 showed that aside from Reagan, Bush was the top choice among Republicans for the presidency in 1984 (Public Opinion Online, 1993).

Reelection Involvement

Time of inclusion on the Ticket

As the 1984 presidential election was nearing, some began to wonder if Reagan would seek a second term, speculation he fueled by delaying an announcement as long as possible (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde, 1987). At last, in January of 1984 Reagan released a statement making it clear that he intended to run for reelection; in that statement he made it very clear that Bush would join him on the ticket as the vice presidential candidate (Kincade, 2000).

This inclusion right off the bat was a preemptive strike against the anti-Bush conservatives who would have preferred someone else like New York Congressman Jack Kemp (Kincade, 2000). It also showed once and for all that Bush had indeed gained Reagan’s acceptance (Clines, 1984). This immediate inclusion was a direct result of Reagan’s approval of Bush’s performance as vice president.

Campaign Events

When Reagan finally announced his reelection bid, he was in good political standing with very high poll numbers. As a result, Reagan did not face any serious primary opposition (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde, 1987). As they looked forward to the general election, Reagan’s reelection organization felt that all they had to do was to avoid catastrophic mistakes and they would be assured of victory (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde, 1987).
With that backdrop, what then was Bush’s contribution? For the most part, he was sent to go after former Vice President Walter Mondale (the Democratic nominee) by trying to paint him as an old-fashioned “tax and spend liberal” (Witcover, 1992). These attacks usually were delivered in medium-sized markets such as Lubbock, Texas that were not considered to be worth Reagan’s time and effort (Clines, 1984). In addition, Bush participated in a vice presidential debate. In the final analysis, these campaign events for Bush probably served as a test run for his own presidential candidacy in 1988 (Kincade, 2000).

**Opposition Mirror**

Former Vice President Mondale in securing the Democratic presidential nomination read the same polls everyone else did that showed him far behind Reagan. He needed to do something to ignite his campaign. One of the ways he attempted to do this was with a bold vice presidential selection (Polsby and Wildavsky, 2004). After a series of interviews conducted in his home in North Oaks, Minnesota, Mondale offered a place on the ticket to Geraldine Ferraro, a New York House member who was the first woman to be placed on a major party’s presidential ticket (Witcover, 1992). At first, Ferraro proved to be a considerable asset, giving the Mondale candidacy momentum and redirection (Natoli, 1985). However, soon after these positive initial reactions, Ferraro was stung by questions relating to her family’s finances especially those of her husband’s (Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode, 1987).

When Ferraro was tapped to be the vice presidential candidate in July of 1984, her poll numbers were about equal to Bush’s when eligible voters were asked who they would support if they could just select the vice president (Public Opinion Online, 1993). Even during this time period, however, voters still thought that Bush would make a better president (Public Opinion Online, 1993). Unfortunately, for Ferraro neither of these numbers improved for her during the campaign season. By August, Ferraro trailed by 20 points on the same question (Public Opinion Online, 1993).

This election, unlike the others discussed so far, gave the American people the opportunity to see the vice presidential candidates debate one another. This debate held in Philadelphia was important for Bush because it gave him the chance to steady the campaign after what was generally considered to be a poor performance by Reagan in his first
presidential debate with Mondale (Kincade, 2000). The debate itself, while providing a few sparks, was mostly uneventful. In addition, polls at the time showed that people gave them equal numbers in response to which one was the winner (Public Opinion Online, 1993).

In the end, even though she was ultimately unsuccessful, Ferraro added some interest to an otherwise uninspiring campaign. Even with that being said, poll results indicated that Bush had a more positive effect in the voters’ minds than Ferraro did (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde, 1987).

Home State

Despite considering Texas to be his home state, Bush spent much of his life far away from there. He grew up in Connecticut and attended elite New England educational institutions such as Andover and Yale (Drew, 1981). Even as an adult, Bush was often separated from Texas, spending lots of time in political posts in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Beijing (Witcover, 1992). In fact, his political strength in Texas was so underwhelming that he was pleasantly surprised when he lost the Texas Republican presidential primary to Reagan by a closer margin than what was expected (Untermeyer, 1997).

So, even though he called Texas his home, the support he had there was not too significant, which can be shown by the fact that in addition to the primary loss in 1980 he also fell short in two U.S. senate races (Kincade, 2000). All of this suggests that Bush was not selected based on geography, but rather to balance Reagan ideologically. Texas was one of the states Reagan carried in the 1980 general election by a large margin. However, this result was probably more attributable to Reagan than Bush, since he had many hard-right supporters in the state (Untermeyer, 1997).

Conclusion

The first half of Bush’s years in the vice presidency could best be summed up by one word, caution. This was evidenced not only in how he handled the time spent in the White House, but also in the way he conducted himself on the campaign trail in 1984.

This caution was a double-edged sword for Bush. On one hand it alleviated somewhat the fears of some conservative Republicans about his moderate political leanings (Untermeyer, 1997). It also, however, created an atmosphere in which some of his detractors
believed him to be Reagan’s lackey (Kincade, 2000). In terms of Bush’s political future, this cautious approach may have assisted him in 1988, when he became the first sitting vice president since Martin Van Buren over 100 years earlier to be elected to the presidency.

**Dan Quayle**

**Background**

Bush in the summer of 1988, having been tapped as the Republican nominee, had the opportunity to choose someone who could be his successor in the vice presidency, which gave him the ability to establish his own identity away from Reagan’s shadow (Witcover, 1992). Bush selected Senator Dan Quayle of Indiana to share the ticket with him. Almost immediately, this decision became controversial, as questions began to be raised about Quayle’s academic and military records (Broder and Woodward, 1992). In addition, his verbal slipups took on a life of their own and concerned advisors who worked for the Bush campaign (Witcover, 1992).

These factors worried Republican insiders as the fall campaign heated up. One major test that Quayle was going to have to get through was a vice presidential debate against the Democratic candidate, Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas (who had won his seat by defeating Bush in 1970) (Witcover, 1992). The debate from Quayle’s perspective turned out to be an absolute disaster since just about every poll and pundit showed that he lost to Bentsen, who had mocked Quayle’s comparison of himself to John F. Kennedy. Until Election Day, the Bush campaign decided that Quayle should be seen rarely (Broder and Woodward, 1992). Quayle’s overall ineptness, however, did not preclude Bush from his electoral triumph in 1988.

**Governing Influences**

**Policy Influence**

**Presidential Interaction**

Coming off the experience of being a vice president for eight years, one thing Bush definitely believed was important was to maintain vice presidential access to the president. Quayle had carte blanche to walk into the Oval Office anytime he wanted to (Patterson, 2000). According to Quayle, he also was included in national security meetings every morning with the National Security Assistant, CIA Director, Chief of Staff, and President
Bush. Quayle also continued the tradition begun by Mondale of having a weekly lunch meeting alone with the president (Quayle, 1997).

An outsider looking in would assume that Quayle was very important because he was being included in the important meetings and discussions that were going on inside the White House, such as the formulation of the plans for the Gulf War. The available evidence, however, also shows that his voice was not as valued as other Bush advisors, and he was considered overall to be less influential especially on foreign policy (Broder and Woodward, 1992). It seemed as if, even though there was a façade of Quayle being closely involved, he was more a bystander to many of the key decisions made throughout the Bush administration.

Staff Presence

One of Quayle’s major assets during his tenure as vice president was his own staff of nearly 100 (Patterson, 2000). This group was led by William Kristol, a leading neoconservative who was seen as someone who did a good job of preparing Quayle to be president should the situation arise (Witcover, 1992). As a whole, his staff was filled with people who had impressive academic credentials and like Kristol had close ties to some prominent right wing groups, obviously an important constituency for any Republican politician (Broder and Woodward, 1992).

Quayle’s staff also for the most part had cordial dealings with Bush’s staff until a few years into his term, when Kristol’s opposition to Bush’s tax plan strained his relationship with Chief of Staff John Sununu (Patterson, 2000). In terms of influence on those who worked directly for Bush, Quayle did not have much, shown through his uneasy relationship with Bush’s good friend and Secretary of State James Baker who had been Bush’s key ally during the Reagan years (Broder and Woodward, 1992). In a way, this division was a foreshadowing of the division that occurred especially in foreign policy during the George W. Bush administration between neocons like those on Quayle’s staff and Baker’s supporters who have a different worldview.

Compatibility/Loyalty

Before becoming vice president, Quayle had had only limited encounters with Bush (Witcover, 1992). Once voted into office, however, Bush and Quayle along with their families developed close friendships (Broder and Woodward, 1992). This compatibility on a
personal level was helpful to Quayle as it caused Bush to be especially protective of his vice president when he faced attacks from many sources (Broder and Woodward, 1992).

Quayle in return showed great personal loyalty to Bush that was acknowledged by both critics and supporters of the administration (Witcover, 1992). It was probably one of the reasons, along with his link to right-wing Republicans, why he was renominated as vice president in 1992 (Barilleaux and Adams, 1993). Even after being voted out of the vice presidency, Quayle continued to profess a great affection for Bush personally and professionally (Quayle, 1997). I would even argue that it in terms of personal friendship, it may have been one of the closest relationships between a president and vice president in U.S. history.

Policy Results

Perhaps the greatest imprint that Quayle had on public policy was his work on various committees. Among the assignments he focused on were efforts in space policy and economic competitiveness (Burke, 2000).

On space issues, Quayle was appointed to chair the National Space Council. In that capacity, he got into many battles with the NASA bureaucracy over programs such as the Hubble Telescope and the space station. These battles became so intense that Quayle successfully encouraged Bush to remove NASA’s Administrator Richard H. Truly from his post, because he got in the way of the vice president’s vision for the space agency (Broder and Woodward, 1992).

In addition, Quayle was placed in charge of the President’s Council on Competitiveness, known by many as the “Quayle Council” (Tiefer, 1994). The Council was intended to be the next step in Bush’s work on deregulation that began during his time as vice president (Tiefer, 1994). Overall, Quayle’s efforts on the council were quite controversial as he led the fight in trying to ease regulations formulated by the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Departments of Health and Human Services and Labor (Broder and Woodward, 1992). These decisions led some to accuse the Council of favoring those who had supported the president with campaign contributions (Tiefer, 1994). Whatever the motives, Quayle was able to get much of what he wanted accomplished in these areas.

Political Influence
Midterm Campaigning

The Republican Party saw the 1990 midterm elections as a great opportunity to gain seats in Congress, reversing the pattern of the president’s party losing seats in midterm contests (Witcover, 1992). As a part of this effort, it was decided that Quayle would be a public part of this strategy. As a campaigner, Quayle was tenacious in his work on behalf of the party, becoming a slashing partisan whose public appearances at times even conveyed bitterness (Witcover, 1992). His travels that year were quite extensive, visiting almost every state while at the same time raising millions of dollars for Republican candidates (Devroy, 1990).

One advantage Quayle had over Bush on the trail were his close ties to the conservative base of the party. This was especially the situation in the fall of 1990 when Republican National Committee Chairman Ed Rollins suggested that candidates distance themselves from Bush on issues such as taxes. This statement was in response to Bush’s support of a bill in Congress that raised some taxes after he had promised not to do so during his presidential campaign (Zitner, 1990). Despite Quayle’s best efforts, the Republicans did not achieve the gains they hoped for, even though they only lost one senate seat and eight House seats (Witcover, 1992). Even with this disappointment, Quayle’s efforts did raise his standing with both Bush and the party as a whole (Devroy, 1990).

Influences with Other Politicians

One area in which the Bush administration felt Quayle could help was in working with Congress. The logic behind this reasoning was that Quayle had spent twelve years in the House and the Senate and had built up friendships with many people on the Hill during that time (Patterson, 2000).

As vice president, Quayle tried to translate these friendships into legislative victories for the Bush agenda. Among the activities he participated in were attending Republican caucus luncheons on a regular basis where he got to hear first hand many of the problems individual legislators were having with Bush (Patterson, 2000). In addition to these luncheons, Quayle also put aside two afternoons a week unless travelling outside of Washington, D.C. to have informal discussions with individual members of Congress. This
according to many was why Quayle as vice president was more effective than Bush was in legislative relations (Broder and Woodward, 1992).

_public Spokesperson_

Quayle’s public remarks on occasion made him the focus of national ridicule. In fact, his frequent misstatements caused many Americans to worry about the constitutional reality that he was only a heartbeat away from the presidency (Witcover, 1992). It also seemed that this problem did not improve during his time in the vice presidency. To the dismay of some, he was reluctant to remedy this by using the help of speech coaches (Broder and Woodward, 1992).

On foreign missions, Quayle’s reputation as a lightweight followed him, causing countries such as Venezuela and Mexico to balk at his visiting since they considered the visit to be an insult to their nations (Witcover, 1992). Even people within the Bush White House made sure that Quayle would not make proposed visits on behalf of the administration to key nations such as the newly unified Germany and the Soviet Union (Broder and Woodward, 1992).

Conservatives were not as bothered by Quayle’s frequent verbal gaffes. In fact, they often were pleased when he spoke in front of party groups and frequently contributed money when necessary so that his travel costs would be reimbursed (Broder and Woodward, 1992). One example of an address these conservatives approved of was his so-called “Murphy Brown” speech, which many conservatives believe supported “family values.” The president himself was not very comfortable with the remarks and was said to have felt alienated by them (Kranish, 1992).

Public Perception

From the time he was tapped by Bush to be the Republican vice presidential candidate, the general public gave Quayle consistently low marks. Throughout his time in office a consistent majority of people believed that Quayle was unfit to be the president (Witcover, 1992). Overall, it was considered by many political observers that Quayle’s low percentages were a drag on the Bush presidency (Pomper, 1997).

Conservatives did not share most of these negative feelings and for the most part strongly approved of Quayle’s work. Many conservatives indicated that he was the person
they trusted most in the entire administration (Kranish, 1992). This did not, however, shield Quayle from accusations of being a “sellout” to their cause for being seen as part of the effort that instituted the tax increase in 1990 (Quayle, 1992). Quayle would have to be considered one of the most unpopular vice presidents in history, which forced Bush into a position of deciding whether or not he would choose to run with him again in 1992.

**Reelection Involvement**

*Time of inclusion on the Ticket*

Bush faced a serious dilemma in mulling over whether to stay with Quayle. Either way, there were bound to be pitfalls. If he opted to drop Quayle, Bush would face the wrath of the estimated 30 percent of Republican state chairpeople and other movement conservatives who were considered to be die-hard Quayle backers (Broder and Woodward, 1992). Bush also had to take into consideration that if he removed Quayle, it would be an acknowledgment that one of his major decisions had turned out to be a mistake (Witcover, 1992).

Eliminating Quayle, on the other hand, could have paid political dividends for Bush especially if he decided to choose someone who was more respected by Americans. Among those who fit that bill was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General, Colin Powell, who had tremendous favorability ratings due to his performance during the Gulf War. In addition, as an African-American, he would help Bush to diversify his ticket and maybe even gain some minority votes for the Republicans (Witcover, 1992). Faced with these options, Bush decided to maintain the status quo and keep Quayle aboard in order to reward his loyalty and to placate the conservative base (Witcover, 1992).

**Campaign Events**

In 1991, the year before the reelection campaign, Quayle hit the fundraising circuit, headlining dinners such as one held in Indianapolis that collected approximately $750,000 for the campaign. That one fundraiser raised about the same amount of money as the then leader on the Democratic side, Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas, had overall (Mashek, 1991).

The vice president also was needed early on to campaign against a primary opponent, conservative newspaper columnist and former White House speechwriter Pat Buchanan, who personified the anti-Bush dissent within the Republican Party (Baker, 1993). The first test of
Buchanan’s strength took place in the New Hampshire primary; for that reason Quayle visited there as a surrogate for Bush. The focus of his message was that the president, not Buchanan, was the true conservative in the race and that Bush was doing his best to fix the troubled economy (Rosenthal, 1992). These visits to New Hampshire were unable to prevent what turned out to be an embarrassing result for Bush. An expected non-contest was closer than most thought it would be, with Bush garnering only 53 percent of the vote. Despite this result, Bush was still able to capture the Republican nomination relatively easily without losing a single primary contest (Polsby and Wildavsky, 2004).

Once the Republican nomination was locked up, Bush and Quayle had to deal with not just one, but two serious opponents. They were Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas, the Democratic nominee, and Texas businessman Ross Perot, who waged a strong third party candidacy bankrolled by his own money. Heading into the fall campaign, Bush started well behind Clinton in the polls and was not successful in closing the gap due to what many believe was a lackluster campaign (Daynes, Tatalovich and Soden, 1998). In somewhat of a surprise, Quayle was considered by election observers to have provided the only spark in the reelection campaign, contributing by being a prominent speaker at the Republican convention and taking on more campaign assignments than he had four years earlier (Pika, 2000). It is almost as if by the time Quayle had improved his ability to function as vice president, his time had run out.

**Opposition Mirror**

Seizing the Democratic nomination, one of the most important decisions Clinton faced was who his vice presidential running mate would be. Clinton chose Senator Albert Gore, Jr. (referred to as Albert Gore in upcoming chapters) of Tennessee. This surprised some because the two shared many qualities including southern backgrounds, moderate Democratic politics, and being “baby boomers” in their forties (Turque, 2000). Beneath the surface, however, Gore had some important characteristics that counterbalanced Clinton’s perceived weaknesses. These included being a Vietnam veteran, having a pro-defense voting record (including being one of the few Democrats in the Senate to vote for the Gulf War), having a solid private life, and being a longtime Washington insider (Maraniss and Nakashima, 2000). Another benefit for Clinton was that the Senator compared quite favorably with Quayle, based
on his reputation as someone who was competent and knowledgeable (Quirk and Dalager, 1993).

As was the case in the previous two election cycles, the principals agreed that there would be a vice presidential candidates’ debate. Along with Gore and Quayle, the debate included Perot’s running mate, Admiral James Stockdale. Quayle, who had to overcome his disastrous performance in 1988, gave what was generally considered to be a strong performance that matched Gore’s and was much better than the unprepared Stockdale’s. Experts argued that since neither Gore or Quayle made a major misstep this debate had little to no effect on the election’s outcome (Quirk and Dalager, 1993).

Following the November election that placed Clinton in the White House, political observers looked back to see how voters felt about the vice presidential candidates on the ballot. Their responses showed that Gore was preferred to Quayle by a three to one margin, and he was also given more positive comments than the other candidates (Pomper, 1997). By selecting someone who was considered knowledgeable, Clinton tapped into doubts about Quayle, which helped his campaign score some important political points.

*Home State*

Traditionally, Quayle native state of Indiana has been receptive to Republican candidates for the presidency, supporting them in every presidential election since the 1930’s except for one (Witcover, 1992). In fact, Quayle was selected in 1988 only after the Bush campaign determined that no vice presidential candidate would help him carry a tossup state. This led them to instead focus on Quayle’s youth (he was in his 40’s), which they believed would give the ticket broader demographic if not geographic appeal (Nelson, 1993).

Despite the fact that Indiana was considered a safe state for the Republicans, Quayle’s presence on the ticket made it even more so in 1988. His popularity in Indiana was established by having been reelected to the U. S. Senate in 1986 by the largest margin in the state’s history (Broder and Woodward, 1992). Keeping Quayle on the ticket in 1992 would allow, if nothing else, for Indiana to be placed off limits for the Democrats, much as Minnesota was for the Republicans twelve years earlier.

*Conclusion*
Following the 1992 presidential election and even before then, Quayle began to lay the groundwork for his own presidential bid in 1996 (Broder and Woodward, 1992). Due in good part to his poor reputation acquired during his time as vice president, Quayle was unable to raise a credible amount of funds to launch a candidacy in that year’s election (Schantz, 1996). Leading up to the year 2000, Quayle decided to give a presidential candidacy a try, but dropped out in October of 1999 before the first votes were cast, once again due to his inability to compete financially (Polsby and Wildavsky, 2004).

In sum, the evidence here seems to highlight that even a term as vice president could not change people’s minds about Quayle, be it in the reelection campaign (which is my focus), or any of his other political endeavors. His story is a good illustration of the old adage that first impressions are the most lasting. In Quayle’s case they were not positive.

**Chapter Summary**

In reflecting upon the questions that were posed in the beginning of this chapter, one can see that the Reagan/Bush team did endeavor to follow much of the system implemented by Carter and Mondale. In addition, Quayle’s vice presidency was probably not the complete negative in terms of policy and political influence that some critics made it out to be. When it came to their involvement in reelection, both were involved to a certain extent, but like most other vice presidential candidates probably did not sway many votes with their presence either for or against their respective tickets.
Chapter 6: The Vice Presidency in the 1990’s

Chapter Introduction

Even though Quayle was an active participant in the first Bush administration (Edwards and Wayne, 1999), his lightweight image with the general public still lingered, hurting the office to some extent (Cronin and Genovese, 1998). This perception gave an impetus for Bill Clinton to choose someone who could try to boost the stature of the post; his choice for the mission was Albert Gore.

Albert Gore

Background

When Gore began his time in the vice presidency in 1993, he had just finished a long and distinguished congressional career that began with eight years spent in the House of Representatives (Maraniss and Nakashima, 2000). Gore then moved to the Senate where he also served for eight years. While he was in the Senate, he took a detour in 1988 to run for the presidency. The campaign did not go very well, and he had in the opinion of some of his associates embarrassed himself (Turque, 2000).

Attempting to recover from that defeat, Gore decided to write a book on environmental issues. This book, *Earth in the Balance*, became a bestseller and was hailed by many in the environmental movement (Turque, 2000). With this publishing success behind him, some thought that Gore would make another stab at White House in 1992. However, faced with President Bush’s popularity following the Gulf War, Gore decided not to run (Levine, 1992). This decision left him free to stay out of the Democratic primary campaign and accept a place on the ticket with Clinton.

Governing Influences

Policy Influence

Presidential Interaction

In the fall of 1992, Clinton promised to make Gore an important part of his administration, saying that the two would share a “full partnership” (Pika, 2000). Clinton tried to keep this promise as president by lunching with the vice president on a regular basis
and consulting with Gore on just about every major policy decision (Edwards and Wayne, 1999).

This kind of regularly scheduled interaction may have occurred because the two of them were comfortable with each other and shared the same goals. As a matter of fact, the better the administration did, the better Gore would fare politically (Patterson, 2000). Gore also was given a seat at policy meetings where he was one of the few people confident enough to challenge Clinton’s viewpoints without fear of retribution (Cronin and Genovese, 1998). Gore made it a priority to be physically near Clinton, as he was often the first to arrive and the last to leave the White House every day (Turque, 2000). These steps enabled Gore to have more access to the president than his predecessors had.

**Staff Presence**

Not only was Gore heavily involved in the flow of daily events at the White House, but his staff was as well. This group, led by its Chief of Staff Ron Klain, was treated as equal to the president’s own staff and had the respect of important Clinton advisors such as domestic policy chief Bruce Reed, who himself was a former Gore aide (Patterson, 2000). There were, however, some tensions between the vice presidential and presidential staffs and even between Gore himself and Clinton’s staff, who he felt in some situations especially early in the first term were overwhelmed (Burke, 2000).

Even though Gore sometimes disparaged the Clinton staff privately, it is important to note that Gore had some people on that staff that had been affiliated with him in the past. One area in which this was especially the case was on the environment. This is where Gore was able to move one of his aides, Kathleen McGinty, who became Clinton’s environmental policy director (Warshaw, 1997); also his former legislative director, Carol Browner, became the head of the Environmental Protection Agency (Pika, 2000). Other Gore associates included on Clinton’s team were the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Reed Hundt, along with many others who served in the subcabinet or agency ranks. Gore even advised on all presidential appointments, not just those that involved his former staff members (Turque, 2000). These sorts of arrangements allowed Gore to have some kind of connection with just about everyone who worked in the Clinton administration.

**Compatibility/Loyalty**
Before they were united on the 1992 presidential ticket, Clinton and Gore had been suspicious of each other, since they were thought to be potential rivals (Maraniss and Nakashima, 2000). This wariness did not cause Gore to turn down the opportunity to share the ticket with Clinton when the situation presented itself. Once in the White House, however, the old rivalry faded away as the two spent lots of time together in settings such as their weekly lunches.

One major presence within the administration that Gore seemingly competed with was the first lady, Hillary Rodham Clinton. In most administrations, this would not have been a problem since most other first ladies did not participate as extensively in public policy as Rodham Clinton did (Patterson, 2000). In the Clinton administration, Gore was often overshadowed by Rodham Clinton, who received massive media coverage for her attempts at reforming the health care system (Pika, 2000). The tension between the two even reached a point where she tried to move the lunches between her husband and Gore off of the president’s schedule (Turque, 2000). In spite of the intra-administration rivalry, Gore maintained a mostly positive relationship with the president that lasted throughout the first term.

**Policy Results**

To give Gore some public policy influence, Clinton placed him in charge of the effort to “reinvent government,” even though the vice president would have preferred to lead the charge on health care reform (Burke, 2000). This effort, dubbed REGO, focused on trying to reorient the executive branch so that it could be more efficient by implementing initiatives such as lessening red tape (Edwards and Wayne, 1999). Following a six-month review of the executive branch, Gore went on a national publicity tour to tout his findings, but due to political pressures many of his recommendations were not implemented (Turque, 2000). That being said, Gore’s efforts did cause some change and got the public to think more about what their government’s role should be.

At the outset of Clinton’s administration, Gore was widely acknowledged to have much more foreign policy experience than the president did (Turque, 2000); because of that Gore was given unprecedented leeway in the international area. His role there also was bolstered because Clinton wanted to focus mainly on domestic issues, especially in the early
part of his presidency (Pika, 2000). Among Gore’s contributions was to help set United States policy towards Russia, South Africa and the Middle East. In addition, he became an influential voice on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation (Cronin and Genovese, 1998). Gore also was credited with influencing the course of military action in Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans (Turque, 2000). Few if any of his predecessors had that type of input in world affairs.

**Political Influence**

*Midterm Campaigning*

Politically speaking, the first two years of the Clinton administration were a disaster. This became clear early on when he suffered the most rapid loss of popularity over a three-month period of any president on record (Cronin and Genovese, 1998). By 1994, his popularity hovered in the low 40 percent range (Ragsdale, 2000). These numbers were even lower in southern and border regions, where people tended to be very upset with Clinton for championing what they saw as “liberal” policies such as the massive restructuring of health care and gays in the military (Turque, 2000). This left Gore to carry the administration cause in that part of the country during the midterms, visiting cities such as Roanoke, Virginia and Raleigh, North Carolina, where he was considered to be more popular than Clinton (Wilmington Star-News, 1993).

Another part of this area that was very important to the Democrats in 1994 and to Gore personally was his own state of Tennessee. Gore campaigned there heavily, because there were two Senate seats on the ballot and a governor’s race to be decided (Branson, 1994). In addition, there were also a few open House contests. As was the case with Mondale in 1978, this election resulted in a humiliating defeat for the Democratic candidates Gore championed. In the Senate races, Democratic Senator James Sasser was voted out of office, winning only 43 percent of the vote; in the race for Gore’s old seat, the Democratic candidate, Congressman James Cooper, did even worse, only garnering 39 percent of the vote.

The national results for the Democratic Party were not much better, as the Republicans took over both houses of Congress for the first time since Eisenhower was president (Warshaw, 1997). Following this defeat, Gore was devastated and worried that like Mondale he might only be a one term vice president. The news was not totally bleak for Gore,
however, as he avoided much of the blame for the defeat, which got tied to Clinton (Turque, 2000).

**Influence with Other Politicians**

Like some of his predecessors in the vice presidency Gore’s background made him a natural to work with Congress on getting the Clinton agenda enacted into law. According to Clinton’s legislative staff, Gore was a very effective lobbyist in lining up support for the administration’s proposals (Patterson, 2000). He also cast a key tie-breaking vote in the Senate in order to pass Clinton’s 1993 deficit reduction bill, which was one of the cornerstones of Clinton’s legislative agenda (Edwards and Wayne, 1999).

After the 1994 election, Clinton and Gore had to deal with a Congress no longer controlled by their Democratic allies, but rather by hostile Republicans. This was a key factor in explaining why Clinton’s legislative success rate fell rapidly (Cronin and Genovese, 1998). Facing this changing reality, Gore continued to be an important asset in congressional relations for Clinton. This was especially true during the government shutdown of 1995 when Gore was deeply involved with negotiations that attempted to end the impasse. In fact Gore was credited with helping strengthening Clinton’s resolve against the Republican leadership (Turque, 2000).

**Public Spokesperson**

One of the challenges Gore has had to overcome throughout his political career is that he has been described as being too dull and wooden in public settings (Maraniss and Nakashima, 2000). As vice president, though, this may have been to his advantage as that persona complemented Clinton’s more outgoing personality (Cronin and Genovese, 1998). Therefore, a Gore event might not be the most exciting, but at least the White House would not have to worry about him going off message when he addressed key Democratic interest groups such as Jewish, minority, and environmental organizations (Pika, 2000).

Gore also became the public face for the administration on one of its major policy initiatives, NAFTA. NAFTA, (the North American Free Trade Agreement) called for the creation of a free trade zone between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. This proposal was especially controversial within the Democratic Party as groups usually sympathetic to the administration such as organized labor strongly opposed it (Edwards and Wayne, 1999).
the vote in Congress to decide whether or not NAFTA should be approved neared, it was
decided (some say by Gore himself) that he should debate NAFTA with Ross Perot on Larry
King Live to increase public and congressional support (Neustadt, 1997). The appearance was
a great success for Gore as he was deemed to be the consensus winner (Pika, 2000). Some
even considered this appearance as the high point of Gore’s first term as vice president.

Public Perception

As vice president, Gore was in the position of being more popular than his boss was. This was evidenced in the brief speculation following the 1994 congressional election debacle when some Democratic party insiders floated the notion of having Gore appear on the top of the ticket in 1996 (Turque, 2000). This point was also illustrated by a number of polls that showed Gore with a consistently higher favorable over unfavorable rating even during the dark days of the first term in the fall of 1994 (Public Opinion Online, 1997).

On the other hand, these high poll numbers may have been due to a lack of any type of public scrutiny of Gore; one example of this was during the midterm campaigns when national reporters almost never bothered to cover his speeches (Kondracke, 1994). Also, especially early on, the press focused more attention on the first lady rather than Gore. As evidence of this, network newscasts and major newspapers such as the USA Today and the Washington Post were found to have devoted a lot more airtime and newsprint to Rodham Clinton than they did to the vice president (Pika, 2000). This lack of coverage may have been the reason that up to half the people surveyed about Gore during his first term as vice president were either undecided or had not heard enough to rate him (Public Opinion Online, 1997). Although Gore was a relatively popular vice president, his popularity may have come from a lack of detailed knowledge, or any knowledge that the public had about him.

Reelection Involvement

Time of inclusion on the Ticket

For the most part, there does not seem to be any evidence showing that Clinton ever had any intention of leaving Gore off the reelection ticket in 1996. In fact, beginning in 1995 Gore played an integral role in helping to set the political strategy for the campaign. This could be seen as he shared a common cause with Dick Morris, a political consultant, to move the White House towards the center of the American political spectrum (Turque, 2000). This
move to the middle included championing policies such as reforming welfare and supporting a balanced budget, programs that were usually not associated with Democratic presidencies (Edwards and Wayne, 1999).

Gore did his part in this “pre-campaign” phase of moving the administration to the center. He took the lead in issues like the deregulation of telecommunication industries and in supporting “family values” topics by endorsing the use of the V-Chip (Pika, 2000). By going along with this focus on the reelection effort, Gore showed that he was going to join Clinton again on the campaign trail.

Campaign Events

Since 1960, the money that presidential candidates have had to raise has grown exponentially, far outpacing inflation (Wayne, 1997). To meet these burgeoning costs, presidential candidates have to use all the tools they have at their disposal, which for the incumbent president includes the vice president. Gore was ready for this challenge, especially considering that a large amount of money would bolster the president’s standing and dissuade any intra-party challengers (Corrado, 1997). As a fundraiser, Gore was quite effective, raising millions of dollars for the campaign itself and in “soft money” for the Democratic National Committee to use in conjunction with the reelection campaign (Wayne, 1997). This success came at a steep cost later on when Gore was investigated by the FBI for being overly aggressive in his pursuit of campaign funds, especially for making calls asking for donations from the White House grounds (Maraniss and Nakashima, 2000). Gore also came under fire for his appearance at a Buddhist Temple near Los Angeles that was alleged not to have followed campaign finance laws (Turque, 2000).

In 1996, Gore did more than just fundraise; he also made other contributions on behalf of the ticket. One of these was his prominent role at the Democratic convention in which he delivered two prime time speeches and visited with almost every state delegation (Pika, 2000). This was more exposure than vice presidents usually had at these events, but this attention backfired somewhat on Gore after he gave a speech on tobacco that focused on his sister whose addiction led to her untimely death (Turque, 2000). This campaign speech marked the first time that Gore received any type of sustained negative press coverage. The coverage only got harsher during his second term (Turque, 2000).
Opposition Mirror

To challenge Clinton in 1996, the Republicans nominated Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, the Senate Majority Leader. Following the 1994 congressional victory in the midterms, Dole became the Party’s odds-on favorite to take the nomination, and considering Clinton’s unpopularity at that time, the presidency as well (Dover, 1998). However, Dole’s popularity ratings began to fall as his image as a man who seemed dour, saturnine, and hard-edged was shown to the American public during the Republican primaries (Burnham, 1997). Falling further behind Clinton, Dole hoped that his vice presidential choice at the Republican convention would narrow the gap. The selection was former Congressman and Housing and Urban Development Secretary Jack Kemp, which surprised those covering the campaign who believed that Dole would probably choose a governor instead (Just, 1997). The choice did boost the Republican ticket in the short term, but the campaign still lagged behind the incumbents (Wayne, 1997).

As has been the case in every presidential election since 1984, a vice presidential debate was scheduled between Gore and Kemp. This debate, which was held on October 9 in St. Petersburg, Florida, was a positive one for Gore as he came off as well prepared and made points that Kemp decided not to answer (Just, 1997). This perception was reinforced when reports began to circulate that Dole himself was dissatisfied with how Kemp performed that evening (Dover, 1998). With this successful presentation, Gore did nothing to hinder the reelection campaign as it rolled to victory.

Home State

At one time in history from the reconstruction period to the World War II era, the southeastern part of the United States was so reliable for the Democratic Party that it became known as the “solid south.” By the 1950’s and 1960’s, this support for the Democrats began to erode as Republican presidential candidates such as Dwight Eisenhower, Barry Goldwater, and Richard Nixon each won multiple southern states (Euchner, 1997). In fact, by the 1980’s, national Democrats were performing miserably in these states (Levine, 1992), a complete opposite of what had occurred earlier in the century. Among these states was Gore’s own state of Tennessee, which had not given its Electoral College votes to a Democratic

As already discussed, Tennessee had gone through some major political shifts between 1992 and 1996 that were quite favorable to the Republicans. This made Tennessee a precarious state for the Democrats to hold onto in 1996. Maintaining Gore’s presence in the face of these shifts allowed the campaign to keep Tennessee on the radar in 1996, an effort bolstered by Gore’s numerous trips to the state in 1996 leading up to the election, which produced a narrow victory for the Clinton/Gore ticket there (Turque, 2000).

**Conclusion**

In the year 2000, Gore attempted to take the presidency after serving two full terms as vice president. His record as vice president was both a blessing and a curse. In his favor was the belief held by many that he was the most influential vice president in history, and therefore that he would be capable of handling the presidency (Cronin and Genovese, 1998). Going against him were the scandals that dominated the second half of Clinton’s time in the White House, even though Gore had no direct part in the Lewinsky situation, which got President Clinton impeached (Kincade, 2000). No matter how his vice presidential years were viewed, Gore was unable to be Clinton’s replacement, losing one of the closest elections in history to Texas Governor George W. Bush, the son of the former vice president and president.

**Chapter Summary**

The Gore years in the vice presidency saw an active presence in the office not only when it came to policy and political influence, but in presidential reelection campaign involvement as well. This is in sharp contrast to his predecessors who had a large impact in only one or two of these areas, signaling a new day for the vice presidency.
Chapter 7: Analysis

I have included three summary figures in this chapter, which are intended to give an evaluation of how each of the six vice presidents fared on the factors that have been discussed in earlier chapters. The evaluations range from high (signifying the most influence or involvement) to low (which signifies the least influence or involvement) with medium falling in between. The bottom row of each of the figures includes an overall evaluation of each vice president. Each figure will be placed following a discussion of the individual factors.

Governing Influences

Policy Influences

Presidential Interaction

Among the six vice presidents studied, Gore fared very well. He made it a point to work beside Clinton, evidenced by the fact he left Clinton’s side to travel abroad only once during most of his first year in office (Pika, 2000). Mondale also spent significant time with the president, as shown by his weekly meetings with President Carter. These allowed him to build up “capital” that allowed him to become one of Carter’s top advisors (Light, 1984). Bush as vice president tried to follow the Mondale model, and through their time together Reagan and Bush put aside much of the hostility that lingered from running against each other in the 1980 primary campaign (Light, 1984). Still, it can be argued that he never gained the level of confidence with Reagan that Mondale did with Carter.

Bush’s successor, Quayle, was given an impressive amount of access to the president, but in some instances it was merely for show (Broder and Woodward, 1992). Nixon as vice president lost opportunities for interaction because he did not have an office in the White House, a situation that forced him to make special visits in order to talk with Eisenhower or anyone else based there (Patterson, 1988). Agnew fares quite poorly because he was almost never around when the Nixon administration made its key decisions, making him mostly unneeded in Washington, D.C. (Greene, 1997).

Staff Presence

Mondale did well on this factor because of the presence of two of his former aides in the decision making process of the Carter administration. This helped to ensure that he would
be kept aware of important developments and that there would be a representation of his views even when he was not physically present (Light, 1984). Bush also does well here, not because of the quantity of his allies, but rather in the quality, especially James Baker who gave Bush a ticket into Reagan’s inner circle that he probably would not have had otherwise (Light, 1984). Gore also had a solid staff, with its members and former members dispersed throughout the Clinton administration (Turque, 2000).

Dan Quayle’s staff was considered to be top notch by many observers, but it in the long run could not transform him into a more significant figure within the White House (Pika, 2000). Nixon once again was handicapped by being a vice president at a time when the office was not given major staff allocations (Patterson, 1988). Agnew was found lacking in influence because he was by and large isolated and ignored by Nixon’s staff (Witcover, 1992).

Compatibility/Loyalty

Once again, Gore does very well on this factor because his working relationship with Clinton was strong, so strong that Gore was considered by Clinton to be his most valued advisor (Patterson, 2000). Some believed at first Bush would not work well with Reagan, but through the years they became so closely tied together that Bush was seen as a “lackey” for Reagan by his detractors, a far cry from when the two men were bitter presidential rivals (Cronin and Genovese, 1998). Quayle also comes out quite well here, since he got along remarkably well with President Bush and the two men thought of each other as family (Broder and Woodward, 1992).

Mondale was extremely loyal to Carter in most situations and the duo established a genuine friendship, but that did not keep Mondale from seriously considering breaking away from the Carter ticket in 1980 (Gillon, 1997). Agnew for his part was very loyal to Nixon, despite Nixon’s belittlement of the vice president to many of his confidants (Greene, 1997). Another relationship that was strained was that between Nixon and Eisenhower (Smith, 1997).

Policy Results

Once again, in looking at different policy areas, Gore comes out favorably. Gore as vice president was able to get some results in both domestic (reinventing government,
environment) and foreign (NAFTA & Russian relations) policy areas (Cronin and Genovese, 1998). Mondale, earlier was given and took advantage of many opportunities to influence administration policy (Light, 1984). Many might be surprised that Quayle despite his negative public reputation was especially successful in assisting business interests by helping them to bypass Congressional oversight and administrative regulation (Tiefer, 1994). He would have been more influential if he had had more of a voice in foreign affairs decision making.

Bush during his time as vice president did initiate some policy accomplishments, but he was in an administration that did not really seek input from “outsiders” who had not been long time Reagan supporters, especially when it came to economic issues (Light, 1984). Once again, Nixon was not able to exert much influence because Eisenhower let it be known that he would have to take a backseat to other advisors especially to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (Witcover, 1992). Agnew fares quite poorly again, because he was basically isolated from the important decisions made in the Nixon administration (Light, 1984).

**Figure 1: Policy Influence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Nixon</th>
<th>Agnew</th>
<th>Mondale</th>
<th>Bush</th>
<th>Quayle</th>
<th>Gore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Interaction</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Presence</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatibility/ Loyalty</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Results</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Closing Comments**

Examination of the policy influences revealed at least two patterns. One is that vice presidents who have been in office more recently have tended to be very influential. There has been a strengthening of the vice presidency especially following Agnew’s time in office (Pika, 2000).

Second, the Democratic vice presidents have had more policy influence opportunities than their Republican counterparts. I believe this happened largely because those Republican presidents, as a general rule, had more overall national policy experience. This left these
presidents in a position where they did not need, or felt they needed, their vice president’s input as much. The enormous policy influence wielded by Vice President Cheney (Walsh, 2003) who serves under a president without experience as an elected official in Washington indicates that it is the president’s experience and not party affiliation that is determinant here.

**Political Influence**

*Midterm Campaigning*

Influence on this factor tends not to correspond exactly with what was found in the policy areas. This may be the case because time and effort on the campaign trail on behalf of others could mean less time to influence policy.

Agnew was a model for exhaustive midterm election influence by becoming the president’s public face in going after members of and candidates for Congress who were not seen as ideologically in step with Nixon during the 1970 campaign (Witcover, 1992). Nixon like Agnew was his administration’s standard bearer on the trail and helped the Republicans to a better showing than they had expected, but he did not get the direct administration support that Agnew had (Smith, 1997). Quayle’s tours of the nation were helpful in many places where he could rally the party’s base voters that Bush often had trouble appealing to (Devroy, 1990).

Bush himself did a steady if unspectacular job in defending the Reagan administration in a midterm election that reaped mixed results for the Republicans (Kincade, 2000). Mondale also did a credible job in helping some Democrats to prevail in close races (Light, 1984), but he was embarrassed by the “Minnesota Massacre” (Boosey, 1980). This was similar to the fate that struck Gore during the 1994 midterms in Tennessee, where the results were a major part of the electoral disaster that befell the national Democratic Party (Warshaw, 1997).

*Influence With Other Politicians* 

Mondale was very helpful to the president by constructing close ties with many Democratic members of Congress, both with his liberal ideological soulmates and more surprisingly with southern conservatives (Light, 1984). Quayle also had his fair share of influence with Congress, which he cultivated by visiting Capitol Hill a few times a week and sought to maintain past friendships and create a positive atmosphere (Broder and Woodward,
Gore was also effective at times in intensely lobbying Congresspeople who were wavering as to whether they supported the Clinton administration on a bill (Patterson, 2000). In some instances Bush could be helpful to Reagan in congressional relations, especially by regularly participating in Republican Senate policy committee strategy meetings (Clines, 1984). Nixon during his time as vice president had some limited success with Congress, highlighted by his involvement as a mediator between the Eisenhower administration and Senator Joseph McCarthy during the Army-McCarthy hearings (Goldstein, 1982). The one vice president of those studied here who had little to no influence with other politicians was Agnew, who spent little time working in Congress and was not even effective in collaborating with his former gubernatorial colleagues (Light, 1984).

**Public Spokesperson**

On this measure, Agnew compares quite well with his counterparts because he was often sent out by the Nixon administration to rally support behind certain initiatives. He especially excelled in accomplishing such goals as getting network news commentators to tone down their perceived criticism of Nixon (Witcover, 1992). Gore was especially helpful in getting public opinion behind the Clinton administration’s support of NAFTA following his television debate with treaty opponent Ross Perot (Turque, 2000). Quayle was successful as a spokesperson primarily in gaining approval from Republican conservatives; this can be seen when they gave him full support following his attacks on the title character from the *Murphy Brown* television program (Kranish, 1992).

Nixon also had his moments in the public arena as vice president, which mainly aided Eisenhower by taking criticism that avoided the president (Natoli, 1985). Bush was helpful to the Reagan team by giving substantive addresses on foreign policy issues and by attempting to build up his own support among conservatives, who mistrusted him on a whole range of issues (Pika, 2000). Mondale did not get much headline appeal for his speeches, but they did try to flesh out administration policy on important issues such as taxes, foster care, and welfare reform (Goldstein, 1982).

**Public Approval**

Gore was in the enviable position of not having his popularity tarnished by Clinton’s historically low approval numbers during their first term in office together (Wilmington Star-
News, 1993). Agnew’s divisive image earned him enemies; this also allowed him to create a large base of die-hard supporters, who listed him as one of the most admired people in America along with Nixon (Witcover, 1972). Mondale, for the most part, received a generally positive rating from the public, which tended to be better than Carter’s, especially among liberals (Light, 1984).

Like Mondale, Bush enjoyed the confidence of the public; however, that might have been only because he served under Reagan who was much more popular overall than his immediate predecessor (Ragsdale, 1993). Nixon as vice president also served in a popular administration, but was personally much less popular than Eisenhower, who was hailed by the American public as a non-partisan war hero (Edwards and Wayne, 1999). Faring quite poorly in this area is Quayle, whose public perception never really improved after his shaky introduction to most of the United States during the 1988 campaign (Devroy, 1990).

Figure 2: Political Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Nixon</th>
<th>Agnew</th>
<th>Mondale</th>
<th>Bush</th>
<th>Quayle</th>
<th>Gore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Midterm Campaigning</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence w/ Other Politicians</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Spokesperson</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Approval</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Closing Comments

Agnew in particular compensated for his lack of intense overall policy influence by becoming a political asset for his president, at least with targeted groups. In addition, Gore was influential both policywise and politically. I would argue that this occurred because the office of the vice president had evolved and past misuses of the post had been examined by those in power, allowing for the vice president to be utilized in a more effective fashion.

Reelection Involvement

Time of inclusion on the Ticket

76
Gore’s inclusion was made clear early on when he became one of the main proponents of the rightward drift the administration took following the 1994 elections that would go on to be the centerpiece of the successful reelection strategy in 1996 (Turque, 2000). Bush may not have been the earliest inclusion, but as soon as Reagan declared publicly that he wanted a second term, it was made very clear that he preferred to have Bush once again as his running mate (Kincade, 2000). Another early addition was Mondale who was brought aboard late in 1979, in good measure to help Carter counteract the primary challenge of Senator Ted Kennedy (Gillon, 1997).

Spiro Agnew, despite rumors to the contrary and maybe even Nixon’s own wishes, was brought back well before Nixon faced any type of serious electoral challenge, either from within the Republican party or by the Democrats (Witcover, 1992). Quayle’s place on the ticket was not guaranteed for a long time due to the persistent speculation that he would be dumped in favor of those such as Dick Cheney (then Secretary of Defense) or Senator Nancy Kassebaum of Kansas (Witcover, 1992). Nixon’s inclusion was not considered to be a “done deal” until the Republican Convention in the summer of 1956 when he was officially nominated for the post (Thomson and Shattuck, 1960).

**Campaign Events**

Since this category is similar to those that tapped midterm campaigning and public addresses, it is not surprising that Agnew does well here too. In 1972, Agnew was successful in launching attacks against the Democratic ticket, painting them as “soft” on issues such as national defense, allowing Nixon to keep his distance from the election year mudslinging (Goldstein, 1982). Gore did his fair share of work as well in order to ensure victory for his ticket, especially in his seemingly endless quest to raise money (Pika, 2000). Nixon himself helped out Eisenhower’s reelection campaign by taking on an attacking role which allowed Eisenhower to stay in the background and look “presidential” (Goldstein, 1982).

Despite the fact his ticket was ultimately unsuccessful in 1980, Mondale was somewhat helpful here. This was shown in early primary/caucus states like Iowa where Mondale played a key role in fighting off an intra-party challenge from Kennedy, while Carter mostly stayed behind at the White House (Drew, 1981). Quayle was especially needed by his campaign early on as he focused on defending Bush from conservative primary challengers,
namely Pat Buchanan in states such as New Hampshire (Rosenthal, 1992). Bush, for the most part, did not seem to be needed as much by Reagan, since the president faced no major primary opposition and was not seriously challenged in the general election in 1984. This meant that it was not as necessary for Bush to attack the opposition harshly like many of his counterparts had been forced to in the past (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde, 1987)

**Opposition Mirror**

As with the other components of reelection involvement, Gore performed impressively here as well. This is primarily due to his positive debate performance against Jack Kemp, who some experts felt beforehand would best Gore. The debate helped to maintain the forward momentum the reelection campaign had built (Turque, 2000). Agnew also does well here, not so much due to his own efforts, but rather because the Democratic Party’s selection process for nominating a vice president left them significantly weakened and made Agnew look good by comparison (Witcover, 1992). Nixon during the 1956 campaign worked to counteract the attempts of Senator Estes Kefauver to damage the overall Eisenhower/Nixon ticket and himself specifically (Goldstein, 1982).

Bush faced a unique situation in 1984 when his challenger, Representative Geraldine Ferraro, was the first woman to be included on a major party ticket. To be successful, Bush had to ensure that he would not be seen as disrespectful of or patronizing towards her during the campaign, especially when debating, and he was generally considered to have done a good job (Witcover, 1992). Mondale was unable to translate his unprecedented policy influence into a favorable comparison with Bush in 1980; in fact about half of the voters even felt that he was a notch below Bush (Associated Press, 1980). Quayle does not fare well here either, which in a large part is tied to his inability to overcome the perception of many that he was a lightweight, especially in comparison with Gore who was considered to have more gravitas (Nelson, 1993).

**Home State**

Gore’s presence on the presidential ticket was decisive for Clinton’s Tennessee victory in 1992, the first one for the Democrats in 16 years. Four years later, in 1996, Gore was sent to Tennessee for a series of last minute visits on behalf of the reelection effort which won a narrow victory there (Pomper, 1997). Mondale’s presence on the ticket did allow Carter to
avoid having to worry about Minnesota since Mondale made many visits there on behalf of the ticket. However, the state was considered to be a Democratic stronghold likely to go into Carter’s column in any event (Boosey, 1980). Quayle also helped to deliver his home state for the Bush campaign in 1988, which won almost 60% of the vote there. However, there would have been a very good possibility that Indiana would have supported Bush even without Quayle’s presence, since the Republicans had won the Electoral College votes of that state in every presidential election since 1964 (Euchner and Maltese, 1997).

Agnew was not on the ticket because Nixon believed he could deliver Maryland in 1972 since the ticket had failed to do so four years earlier; rather it was to appeal to southern conservatives (Witcover, 1992). Nixon as vice president was a part of a ticket that won his home state of California in 1952, but not by the strongest margin. Even so, Nixon was dispatched by the Eisenhower campaign in 1956 to visit the state often in the days and weeks that led up to the election (Thomson and Shattuck, 1960). Bush was not on the ticket to aid Reagan in Texas, mainly because in that state he was not as popular as the man he ran with, evidenced by the fact that he had lost a presidential primary in Texas to Reagan in 1980 (Drew, 1981).

Figure 3: Reelection Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Nixon</th>
<th>Agnew</th>
<th>Mondale</th>
<th>Bush</th>
<th>Quayle</th>
<th>Gore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time of Inclusion on the Ticket</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Events</td>
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<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Mirror</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home State</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Medium/Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium/Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary Assessment

The central objective of this research was to determine if and how vice presidents translated the role they played in the policy and political life of the first term in the administration in which they served into a role in the reelection campaign that followed. My
anticipation was that there would be a general correspondence between the levels of policy and political influence vice presidents exercised in their first four years in office and the level of their involvement in the reelection campaign. The results were quite mixed, with three of the vice presidents (Gore, Bush and Nixon) fulfilling my expectations and three (Agnew, Mondale and Quayle) not doing so.

Albert Gore fit my “model” best of all in that he was assessed as “high” in influence on seven of the eight policy and political factors, and rated “high” on all four of the reelection involvement factors. Bush fit the prediction fairly well in that he was rated “medium” on five of the eight policy and political factors and “medium” on three of the four reelection factors.

Nixon’s performance conformed to my expectations in a complex way. Having rated “low” on all four policy factors and “medium” on three of the four political factors, he could be expected to be only moderately involved in the reelection campaign. Consistent with this expectation, he split the reelection factors with two “low” ratings and two “medium” ratings.

Agnew’s performance did not conform to my expectations well at all. Having been rated “low” on five of the eight policy and political factors, one would have expected a low level of involvement in the reelection campaign. However, Agnew was rated as “low” on only one of the four reelection factors and earned an overall reelection rating of “medium.”

Quayle generally reversed Agnew’s pattern. Having been rated “high” or “medium” on all but one of the eight policy and political factors, it seemed reasonable to expect him to rate “medium-to-high” on the reelection factors, but he turned in only a “low-to-medium” reelection performance.

Mondale also had less reelection involvement than his earlier performance would have suggested. His performance was “high” on five of the eight policy and political factors, but he was only “medium” in his reelection involvement.

Judging from this analysis, I think it can be said that a vice president influential in both policy and political realms can also be heavily involved in reelection. That statement is illustrated by Gore who contributed heavily in all of the major areas. It makes sense that a vice president like Gore who is involved in every facet of his administration would help with its reelection, which would allow his administration to be given another four years in office.
As for the others, political influence evidently coincided more with reelection involvement than policy influence. This may be because many of the skills prized in the political influence category are similar to ones a vice president needs in order to be helpful on the reelection circuit. The one exception to this is Quayle, due to the fact that he seemed to mesh better with specific groups such as conservative members of Congress and interest groups rather than with the mass public, with which a candidate needs to connect in a general election campaign.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

In this final chapter, I will summarize some of the major findings of this work, while applying the insights gained to an assessment of the vice presidency of Richard Cheney. This will be followed with sections on the study’s limitations and comments on the methods I employed. The chapter ends with a discussion of the probable evolution of the role of vice presidents in governing and in reelection campaigns.

Findings

What have we learned from this analysis of how vice presidents have translated or failed to translate their influence during their first terms into reelection campaigns? The first point, which has been argued previously by scholars and other political observers, is that the vice president’s policy influence has grown dramatically beginning with the Mondale vice presidency (and, to a lesser extent, Nelson Rockefeller’s under Gerald Ford) (Pika, 2000).

Another finding is that the political influence of the vice president depends significantly on who the president is. Political influence has not followed the same course that policy influence has. In other words, political influence has not continued to grow with each vice president who has entered the office the way policy influence has for the most part. For example, Nixon and Agnew were given the opportunity by their presidents to be more influential as public spokespersons than two of their successors, Mondale and Bush.

Examining the reelection roles of United States vice presidents, one notices that there is not the same time sequence that was evident in the policy arena. This finding is inconsistent with the prediction I made in the introduction. In fact, some vice presidents who are involved heavily in policy and political matters such as Albert Gore also play a large role in the reelection campaign. Had that held true for all the vice presidents studied, this research would have supported my prediction. However, someone like Agnew who had little to no policy influence was more politically influential and still played an active role in helping Nixon to be reelected.

Will this change in the future? The 2004 campaign, I think, will tell us at least part of the answer. To develop this thought further, I am going to weigh the impact of the current vice president, Richard Cheney.
Background

In 2000, many in the political world were surprised when the Republican nominee George W. Bush tapped Cheney (who was supervising Bush’s vice presidential selection committee) to be his running mate (Nagourney and Bruni, 2000). Cheney served as a White House chief of staff for President Gerald Ford, a Congressman from Wyoming who rose to a leadership position within the Republican caucus in the House of Representatives, and the Secretary of Defense in the George H. W. Bush administration (Leibovich, 2004). In addition, he has written extensively on constitutional issues (Hosenball, Isikoff and Thomas, 2003). With his experience, Cheney was seen as a choice who would counter the perception that Bush was too inexperienced to govern on the federal level (Polsby and Wildavsky, 2004). This selection was helpful to the Texas governor in the election, since many voters especially independents found Cheney to be a reassuring presence on the ballot (Allen, 2004). This may have tipped the balance towards Bush in an extremely close election.

Policy Influences

Most observers, whether they agree with Cheney politically or not, acknowledge that he has the reputation of being the most influential vice president in history (Liebovich, 2004). This perception took hold early on when some believed that the vice president-elect, not the president-elect, made the final decisions as to which people would be a part of the cabinet and the White House staff (Hult, 2003).

Cheney has maintained the recent tradition of meeting with the president alone once a week to discuss major issues facing the United States (Hosenball, Isikoff and Thomas, 2003). Cheney’s staff is also a powerful force within the White House. This can be evidenced by the fact that two of his top aides, Lewis Libby and Mary Matalin, were also named assistants to the president and by the fact that the presidential and vice presidential staffs work closely together (Hult, 2003). Even on foreign trips, he only travels with his own foreign policy advisors instead of having to deal with the State Department or the National Security Council staff (Kessler, 2004).

Even though the president and Cheney may not be best friends, it is clear that they share a mutual respect and admiration for each other. This can be highlighted by the deep loyalty Cheney gives the Bush administration and its agenda (Walsh, 2003). When it comes
to getting results, Cheney is unmatched within the administration, especially in the post 9/11 White House. This was evidenced in the leadup to the Iraq war where Cheney was seen as the most prominent voice within the administration arguing Saddam Hussein was an immediate threat and needed to be dealt with sooner rather than later (Hosenball, Isikoff and Thomas, 2003). On some other issues, especially domestic ones, Cheney has less clout, especially when it comes to “faith-based” initiatives and educational policy (Walsh, 2003). Even so, there is no doubting the influence held by the vice president in many other policy areas.

**Political Influences**

Does the policy strength that Cheney apparently wields also transfer into politics? The answer is both yes and no. On the one hand, Cheney is very involved politically with Congress, especially through its leadership, as illustrated by his friendship with House Speaker Dennis Hastert (Leibovich, 2004). Cheney also has set up a vice presidential office in the House of Representatives, which he maintains along with the customary vice presidential office in the Senate (Hult, 2003). Cheney is a popular speaker with the so-called heartland conservatives who make up the core of the Republican Party’s base (Allen, 2004).

Cheney’s lack of a public presence has been a disadvantage in certain situations, especially when he has been the focus of negative press attention relating to Halliburton (the oil company he used to run) and its dealings in Iraq (Leibovich, 2004). His lack of response in large part has contributed to a dramatic 25 percent drop in the polls in his approval within the last year (Raum, 2004). Therefore, looking at the Cheney vice presidency politically, he may not be the most active person to hold the office, but when he does act he can be very influential.

**Reelection Involvement**

Cheney, for all intents and purposes, has been a part of the reelection team since 2003. Among his contributions early in the 2004 campaign were speaking at big-ticket fundraisers (Bumiller and Firestone, 2003). These events are not isolated; in fact the vice president spends many Mondays and Fridays raising campaign dollars (Allen, 2004). Besides bringing in cash, Cheney has engaged in blistering verbal assaults on Democratic presidential nominee, Senator John Kerry, challenging his support of the military (Raum, 2004).
As the campaign gets closer to November, it will be more and more likely that Cheney will be right in the middle of the action. This will likely be the case when Kerry selects his own vice presidential running mate that can directly match up against Cheney. No matter who it is, there is a good chance that person will attempt to make an issue of Cheney’s influence and how he has used it while in office. This would correspond with the growth of policy influence I have highlighted and how it could impact the vice president’s involvement in a presidential reelection campaign, since it will force Cheney to defend his influence.

**Limitations and Reflection**

When working on a project dealing with political figures of this stature there are bound to be many limitations. One limitation is that some of these vice presidents, especially Gore, have served quite recently. This hinders the availability of some information about these administrations since it is not yet public. Also, some people, especially in the most recent administrations, might still be cautious about the negative implications of their comments, leading them to be more guarded now in what they say than they might be a decade from now.

Another major limitation is my lack of resources. A study such as this one would likely have been much improved if I had more time and money to travel in order to meet with those who were centrally involved in some of the events that I have discussed and to examine relevant documents. This is less of a limitation than it might have been in the past due to advances in information technology.

In this study, I sought to determine vice presidential influence in both governing and in reelection. I believe the factors I examined gave me an accurate impression of vice presidential influence, but some observations could have been improved upon.

In the policy area, I felt the indicators that examined presidential interaction and staff presence provided good indications of the vice president’s influence. This was the case because these areas brought to center stage the respect the president gave to their vice president on a day to day basis. They also indicated if the vice president was at the table when reelection issues were discussed. In other words, if a president did not want to meet with the vice president or include their staff in a meaningful way, then it would be highly unlikely that the vice president could have any influence.
Upon further reflection, the personal compatibility factor may not have been the best way to go about uncovering policy influence. Although it may be helpful that the president and vice president are cordial, that alone will not signal that the vice president has policy influence. In the end, it is likely that the president will put his own policy and political goals ahead of personal friendship. In addition, this is one of the factors that is the most difficult to gauge accurately.

As for the “policy results” factor, it provided a good indication of the degree to which the vice president could build upon their presidential interaction and staff presence in order to develop policy points that could be publicly manifest. This also was a way that an outside observer can gauge a vice president’s influence in policy without having to go inside the White House gates.

Shifting over to the political influence area, the two most important factors were the vice president’s role in midterm campaigns and his role as a public spokesperson. This would be true because these elements are similar to what a vice president has to do out on the reelection campaign trail, in both supporting candidates other than themselves and being a voice for their administration outside of the White House.

The other factors I found to be less compelling. One of them, influence with other politicians is on balance more helpful in getting policies enacted than boosting the political appeal of the administration. The polling indicator also did not really give me much help in this endeavor. This was for the most part because the public has little interest in or awareness of the vice president during their time in office.

The reelection involvement I observed sought to capture some of the ways a vice president can be involved in reelection. Among the strongest were the factors that discussed inclusion on the ticket and campaign events. The time of inclusion factor showed the point at which the vice president became involved, indicating whether or not they were a force in laying the groundwork for the reelection campaign. The campaign events factor allowed for an opportunity to observe the ways that the vice president presented a case to the nation as to why his ticket should be elected.

The home state factor was not as helpful in determining reelection involvement as the other factors were. This indicator may at best have played a small role in determining vice
presidential involvement in these campaigns. This was bolstered when my research did not find any cases where the home state of the vice president played a significant role in their involvement, which it probably has not for the last several decades.

Together, some of these factors in all three areas were helpful in allowing me to better understand the vice president’s involvement. However, future research could be improved by avoiding use of some of the poorer influence factors.

Methodology Comments

In this study, I created multiple factors that sought to tap the governing influence and reelection involvement of the vice president. This sort of approach could be helpful to future qualitative researchers in political science and more specifically within the study of American government. I make this argument because I believe that the factors created a structure that can also help to bring a clearer focus to other qualitative projects and overcome the skepticism of those in the social sciences who see qualitative work as lacking clear standards.

Even though this thesis used qualitative methods, I believe it can also be of use to those who work with quantitative methods. This is the case because many of the factors I included could also be approached in a quantitative manner. For instance, a quantitative researcher could on the public spokesperson factor create a measure that ranks the vice presidents studied here based on the number of speeches they gave or come up with a rating system that gives extra weight to addresses considered more important. This kind of quantitative modification could also be implemented with a number of other factors used throughout the thesis.

Conclusions

Considering the fact that the United States Constitution is unlikely to be amended any time in the near future on issues relating to the vice presidency, it is likely that his role in reelection and other matters will ebb and flow depending upon the president he serves. This brings us to an examination of the outcomes of the current situation, since it is likely to continue. One of these is the fact that the vice president is working with the president and is not in a situation that would give him an incentive to go after the president politically, hurting the credibility of the executive. The status quo also allows vice presidents one last “test run”
in a national campaign so that voters can see how they balance the post and campaigning before running for the presidency in the next election.

Future studies in this area may seek to place their focus upon a smaller set of indicators than the ones I used here. Other researchers could also try to find alternative ways of determining a vice president’s reelection involvement besides policy and political influence. One way could be to focus squarely on the president and how he has delegated authority in the past when he has run for the presidency and other offices. A second way could be to find a linkage between how lieutenant governors are utilized in state elections and the way vice presidents are utilized in national ones. However, I would not anticipate a strong connection, since the rules for electing lieutenant governors in many states do not correspond with how the vice president is elected.

In total, this examination developed a framework that, while not perfect, gives a template with which future researchers could assess vice presidents, especially their role in presidential reelection campaigns. It also has started a discussion of vice presidential involvement in reelection that traditionally has not been acknowledged in depth by those studying the United States presidency. There is also a good chance that sitting vice presidents will be a part of a good percentage of the presidential campaigns over the next fifty years, making it relevant to understand the dynamic by which they are brought into that role.
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