On the Stage of Change:
A Dramaturgical Approach to Violence, Social Protests, and Policing Styles in the U.S.

Thomas N. Ratliff

Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

John W. Ryan (co-chair)
Dale W. Wimberley (co-chair)
James E. Hawdon
Marian B. Mollin
Karl R. Precoda

July 28, 2011
Blacksburg, VA

Keywords: social protest; U.S. social movements; dramaturgy; collective violence; policing; social performance; repression and social control

Copyright 2011, Thomas N. Ratliff
On the Stage of Change: 
A Dramaturgical Approach to Violence, Social Protests, and Policing Styles in the U.S.

Thomas N. Ratliff

ABSTRACT

Social movement scholars have contended that considerable research on protest policing has been done, but research testing multiple theories in recent decades is lacking. To resolve this gap in the literature, this study integrates major paradigms in repression research and theories of policing styles around a dramaturgical approach to collective action, identifying factors influencing violence at social protests in the United States from 2006-2009. Conceiving of social protest as a form of political and symbolic action, I maintain that social actors and the qualities of their actions and immediate environment importantly influence a protest event’s characteristics and outcomes. Specifically, I code for three violent outcomes—arrests, police violence, and any violence—and one measure of threat—police presence. I identify four components of the protest event which influence these outcomes—actors (e.g., authorities, protesters, and counterprotesters), enemies (e.g., the target of protesters’ claims), the stage (e.g., qualities of place and space where a protest occurs), and protest performance (e.g., protest size and specific tactics employed by actors). Thus, this research focuses on how qualities of police, protester, and counterprotester performances intersect to influence violence at protest events. Data for this project were collected from multiple sources from 2006-2009. Information on protest events was collected by content coding of newspaper articles in the Los Angeles Times and New York Times. Information on community policing styles was derived from lists of funding for agencies participating in the U.S. Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program. In some instances the results of this study show that certain characteristics leading to police presence and violence at social protests in the U.S. persist from research conducted on earlier decades—presence of African Americans or counterprotesters, protester use of “more confrontational” tactics and/or multiple tactics, and the damaging of property by protesters or counterprotesters. However, my findings also contradict previous studies, because I find that: (1) larger protests are less likely to be policed or result in violence; (2) social and cultural targets are more likely predictors of policing and violence rather than government or economic ones; and, (3) specific social movement families and tactical types influence protest event outcomes differently. I also found that community policing styles had no effect on protest event policing. These findings are important because they show how a protest event’s symbolic nature influences policing and violent outcomes.
DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this work to my family: my wife Chrystal, my mother Pamela, my father Thomas Martin Jr., my younger sister Tiffany, my grandmothers Lovilla and Mabel, and my grandfathers John Paul and Thomas Martin Sr. Without their love and support I would not be where I am today.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I came to Blacksburg for the first time only a few days after the tragedy of April 16. In the limited space I have here, I can only speak scantly about the profound impact the sense of community exuded by my fellow Hokies in the wake of such chaos had upon me. Suffice it to say, I am proud to be a Hokie and have enjoyed every day I have spent at Virginia Tech. Wherever I go in life, I will always be a Hokie at heart.

I would thank the Department of Sociology for giving me the opportunity to be part of such a wonderful community that has been the ideal place to live and work for the past four years. My dissertation committee co-chairs—John Ryan and Dale Wimberley—have been wonderful mentors, challenging me intellectually and giving me the toolkit for success in academia. The members of my dissertation committee—Jim Hawdon, Marian Mollin, and Karl Precoda—have provided wonderful support, helping me navigate the interdisciplinary terrain upon which this study treads. I am truly lucky to have had a committee that worked together so well in helping me hone and refine my ideas. I also offer a special thanks to Carol Bailey, Carson Byrd, Toni Calasanti, Ellington Graves, Lakshmi Jayaram, Terry Kershaw, Neal King, and Kevin Stainback for their helpful discussions and/or suggestions regarding this project.

I also could not have completed this project without the help of the office staff—Tish Glosh, Brenda Husser, and Shelton Norwood—who in the process of this project have kept things running smoothly, particularly regarding all of the extra copies, paper jams, technology needs, budgetary questions, and the like which comes along with a project of this scope. Moreover, I would like to thank the library staff at Virginia Tech, particularly Heather Moorefield-Lang and Bruce Pencek, for their assistance with questions regarding digital search engines. In addition, I would like to thank my graduate cohort for their friendship over the last four years. Without such a wonderful support network I could have never made it through the trying times that are the graduate experience.

I would also especially like to thank the National Science Foundation for providing funding for this research (SES-1030291) and the ten anonymous NSF reviewers who provided invaluable feedback over the three different iterations of the grant proposal that culminated in this project. In addition, I would like to thank the members of the Dynamics of Collective Action project—Sarah Soule, Susan Olzak, John McCarthy, and Doug McAdam—for their role in compiling and refining the lists and coding schemes upon which I built in this project. In particular, I would like to send special thanks to Sarah Soule, who provided various content analysis coding documents, invaluable research, and helpful comments and suggestions.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement of the Problem</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Importance of Performance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Questions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodological Overview</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistical Analyses</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Intellectual Merits and Broader Impacts</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the Dissertation</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Movements, Social Control, and Violence</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Violence, Repression, and Policing Styles</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Action, Social Performance, and Dramaturgy</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Action and Social Performance</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Stage of Change: The Model</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Actors</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Group Presence</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterprotester Presence</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Movement Families (or ensembles)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets (or “enemies”)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Stage</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest Performance</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest Participation</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Tactics</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Damage</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER THREE: DATA, METHOD, AND MEASURES</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data and Sample</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest Events and Newspaper Sources</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling Procedures</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concepts and Measures</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variables</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variables</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Actors</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets (or “enemies”)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Stage</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Protest Performance 49
Controls 51

CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 52
Police Presence 52
Arrests 57
Violence by Police 60
Occurrence of Any Violence 64

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 67
The Actors 67
Enemies and the Stage 75
Protest Performance 77
Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research 81

REFERENCES 83

APPENDIX 1: Summary of Hypotheses by Dependent Variable 92
APPENDIX 2: Content Analysis and Coding Procedures 96
APPENDIX 3: IRB Approval 100
APPENDIX 4: Summary Model of Empirical Findings 102
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Total Paragraph Search Hits and Newspaper Articles for the New York Times, 2006-2009 41
Table 2. Total Protest Events Reported in Both Newspapers by Year, 2006-2009 42
Table 4. Logistic Regression Estimates for Police Presence 54
Table 5. Logistic Regression Estimates for Arrests 58
Table 6. Logistic Regression Estimates for Police Violence 63
Table 7. Logistic Regression Estimates for Any Violence 66
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to identify factors influencing violence at social protests in the United States from 2006-2009. By synthesizing research on social movements, culture, and policing styles, I move toward an integrated approach to protest event dynamics. I argue that police presence and violent outcomes at protest events—arrests and use of physical or violent force by police or protesters—are influenced by the symbolic nature of protest event characteristics. Thus, this research focuses specifically on how qualities of police, protester, and counterprotester performances intersect to influence violence at protest events.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

In recent decades, the United States has experienced social protests concerning globalization and worker’s rights, the environment, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, LGBTQ rights, women’s rights, illegal immigration, racial and ethnic minority group civil rights, politicians and their policies, animal rights, and a multitude of other social issues (i.e. local educational policies, housing, healthcare, crime prevention, etc.). With notable exceptions (see i.e., Davenport, Soule, and Armstrong 2011; McAdam 1982; Soule and Davenport 2009), little research has been conducted on an entire era of protest events occurring in the U.S. Thus, longitudinal studies examining multiple social movements, countermovements, and policing at protest events at a national level are relative lacunae in the sociological literature. This is especially true for protest events occurring from 1995 to the present—no research has comparatively examined the extent and intensity of social protests in recent U.S. history. As a result, little clarity exists regarding contemporary protest event dynamics in the U.S. Given research that suggests protest event intensity and violence increase as periods of protest peak and decline (Tarrow 1989b; Tilly
2003), it is crucial to discern the current dynamics of protest activity and the factors that turn dissent into violence.

Repression and social control is a subfield in social movement research that lends itself to studying these dynamics. Literature in this area focuses primarily on the policing of protest events (della Porta and Reiter 1998; Earl 2006; Soule and Davenport 2009), protester tactics (Bromley and Shupe 1983; Davenport 2000; McAdam 1982), space or place (Cunningham and Phillips 2007; McCarthy and McPhail 2006; McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998), the presence of countermovements at protest events (Soule and Davenport 2009), and media coverage (Gamson 1990; Roscigno and Danaher 2001; Wisler and Guigni 1999). Scholars have contended that considerable research on protest policing has been done, but repression research lacks much needed cross-theory testing (Earl 2003), particularly for protests occurring in recent decades (Soule and Davenport 2009). I concur with these conclusions and believe such research could significantly advance our understanding of protest event violence.

To resolve these gaps in the literature, this project integrates major paradigms in repression research and theories of policing styles around a dramaturgical approach to collective action. Dramaturgical approaches emphasize the performative nature of social action and have been made famous by Erving Goffman (Goffman 1959, 1967, 1974). Goffman’s conception of a front stage/back stage continuum upon which humans perform, however, is not without its critics. Some have asserted that emphasizing performance insinuates humans are simply trying to manipulate others or that human behaviors conceived in this way restricts behaviors to superficiality. While such critiques are duly noted, and thoroughly examined in Chapter 2, I would like to briefly clarify the notion of performance and why it is important for studying social protests.
The Importance of Performance

Jeffrey Alexander (2004) has advanced a dramaturgical approach to collective action that focuses on how actions and reactions by collective actors are attempts to control discourse about a particular phenomenon. Conceived in this way collective actions serve the function of goal-attainment and meaning creation. While this premise is likely to be true, I would like to adapt this notion using Goffman’s radical micro-sociology, emphasizing the qualities of actions and how those qualities “energize” those who engage them (Collins 2004). Thus, my reference to the “performance” of protest events does not limit social protests to the superficial, manipulative, or even the artistic, but redirects the focus of research to how social performances are enacted with awareness that others are aware of our actions—notwithstanding the watchful eye of the media.

There are indeed social protests that are performances in the strictest sense of the word, such as protesters using street or “guerilla” theatre to act out scenarios exhibiting their grievances. But all protests are social performances—the ways people perform the role of protester, counterprotester, or police officer are of utmost importance for understanding the emergence of violence. Moreover, these roles are performed on a stage. In the case of protest events, we know that social spaces are the platforms of protest performance and the dynamics of particular places greatly influence the interpretation of protest events. The interpretations of these role performances in their historical context lead to perceived threat or weakness of certain claims-making groups, the volatility of authority-citizen engagement, and the spectrum of violence that may result from these symbolic interactions.

The integrated approach to protest violence I propose, discussed at length in Chapter 2, views social protest as a form of political and symbolic action (Alexander 2004). I maintain that social actors and the qualities of their actions and immediate environment importantly influence
a protest event’s characteristics and outcomes. Hence, I identify four components of the protest event—actors (e.g., authorities, protesters, and counterprotesters), enemies (e.g., the target of protesters’ claims), the stage (e.g., qualities of place and space where a protest occurs), and protest performance (e.g., protest size and tactics employed by actors).

It is also important to note the different “stages” where participant mobilization and social change occur—the back stage (i.e. recruitment and planning), transitional stages (i.e. event preparation), and the front stage (i.e. the protest event itself). Thus, there is a dual meaning to stage—both as a particular “stage” in the process of mobilization as well as a “stage” where symbolic action is performed. In this study, however, I examine only the ‘process-stage’ of mobilized actuality—the protest event—and the nature of its performance on the ‘dramatic-stage’ which consists of the places and spaces where events occur. Undoubtedly, a fruitful research agenda exists in examining the various “stages” of protest from a dramaturgical approach—such as the “back stage” performance of activists in private meetings or the “transitional stage” interactions between activists and city officials when securing a protest permit—but they are beyond the scope of this study.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Importantly for this project, I acknowledge the role protesters, police, and counterprotesters may each play in producing protest event violence. Understanding that all of these actors can contribute to violent outcomes is essential in preventing such violence, for making the assumption that police are always repressive or certain social movements or social groups are inherently violent skews our judgment about practical solutions to this social problem. To more fully comprehend protest event violence, I ask the following questions:
1. Do authorities engage certain claims-making groups differently than others?
   a. Are authorities more likely to be present at protest events when certain groups are protesting?
   b. Do authorities use more violent tactics against certain groups?
   c. Do certain groups disproportionately encounter violent repression at the hands of authorities?
   d. Does the mere presence of African Americans or Latino/a Americans at protest events increase the likelihood of police presence and/or violence?

2. What are the dynamics of protest performances leading to violence and police presence?
   a. What protester tactics are more likely to lead to police presence and/or violence?
   b. Do certain policing styles inhibit or exacerbate protest event violence and the likelihood of police presence at an event?
   c. Does the presence of counterprotesters at protest events lead to violence and/or police presence?
   d. Is protest event violence and/or police presence more likely to occur in certain physical settings?
   e. Are larger protest events more likely than smaller protests to be violent and/or draw police presence?
   f. Does the target (or “enemy”) identified by protesters impact violent outcomes and/or the presence of police?

METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

Data for this project are collected from multiple sources, including two major U.S. newspapers and the U.S. Department of Justice. First, articles from the Los Angeles Times and New York Times are collected on protest events using ProQuest and LexisNexus search engines. Data on the unit of analysis—protest events—are collected from 2006-2009. Specifically, I code for three violent outcomes—arrests, authority violence, any violence—and one measure of threat—police presence—that serve as my dependent variables. I also code for a series of independent and control variables—the date, city, state, and geographic region of protests; estimated number of protesters; protestor claims and targets; places protests occur; presence of certain social groups; protestor, counterprotester, and authority tactics; number of protestor tactics; and property damage.
Second, I also collect policing data from the U.S. Department of Justice to help account for policing styles of departments in jurisdictions responsible for the social control of protest events. Building on previous approaches to policing styles, I compile data from the U.S. Department of Justice to examine community oriented policing services (COPS), a federal program driven by the principle of community engagement which integrates traditional policing techniques with various forms of training that privilege negotiation and partnerships over the hard-nosed ideology of “law and order” and escalated force (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). Specifically, by controlling for COPS training, I examine if such training (i.e. on the excessive use of force) mitigates protest event violence. Thus, not only does this provide a specific evaluation of the COPS program, but it offers the potential for violence reducing strategies that might supplement extant procedures for the social control of protest.

Statistical Analyses
I employ standard statistical methods to analyze the data in this project. I estimate a form of regression commonly used in the analysis of protest events to identify factors influencing protest event violence—logistic regression. I use logistic regression to identify characteristics of protest events which are more likely to lead to police presence. I also use logistic regression to identify what factors influence arrest and various forms of violence at social protests.

SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL MERIT AND BROADER IMPACTS
In sum, this project’s intellectual merits include: (1) testing dominant paradigms in repression research; (2) constructing an integrated model of protest event violence; (3) providing a foundational study for a period of protest yet to be examined; and, (4) evaluating the impact of COPS training on protest event violence. This project will also have broader impacts influencing
policy analysis, policing, and social protest. It will inform activists about strategies for expressing dissent while avoiding significant confrontations that pose the risk of becoming violent. Since this research addresses how certain protest events turn violent, it provides insights for police on how to avoid violent confrontations at these events. Thus, the findings of this study could offer important strategies to policymakers and police departments. Moreover, the influential factors leading to violent encounters identified in this research may provide empirical support for social policies geared toward violence prevention at such events.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

Following the brief introduction I have provided in Chapter 1, the dissertation unfolds as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide the theoretical background for an integrated approach to protest event dynamics. In Chapter 3, I explain my methodology, detailing my sampling procedures, concepts, and measures. In Chapter 4, I then present my analysis and findings. Finally, in Chapter 5, I discuss violence, social protests, and policing styles in the United States, elaborating the findings of this study and its theoretical and practical implications.
CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

As Isaac (2008) reminds us, collective action often takes the form of a performance, be it the more literal aesthetic activism of writers and poets (Isaac 2009), the “socio-drama” of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (King 1963:60), or the general performance of opposition social protest represents (Eyerman 2006). Protesters, as actors, take to the world stage as protagonists (or antagonists, given one’s point of view) in performative dialectics, collectively struggling to control the framing of issues and opponents to foment social change or retain challenged power structures. The dynamics of contention such dissent foments, however, sometimes leads to violent conflict. In this chapter, I integrate research on social movements and the policing of protest events around a dramaturgical approach to collective action to help identify the various dynamics of protest events leading to violence. First, I discuss the nature of social movements, protest events, and violence with an emphasis on policing styles and the social control of protest. Second, I turn to a discussion of symbolic action, social performance, and dramaturgy in the context of social movement theory’s cultural turn. Finally, I present an integrated model of protest event violence.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND VIOLENCE

The right to peaceably assemble, express grievances, and demand solutions to social problems is a cornerstone of democratic societies. Yet violence is often involved in processes of social change. This paradoxical fact is embedded in the history of the United States and appears clearly in the many social movements which have shaped the America of today. Social movements are organized and relatively continuous collective challenges to authority, or resistance to such challenges, that use mostly extra-institutional pathways to produce change in human societies.
As challenges to authority, social movements emerge from outside formal institutional channels (i.e. voting in elections). While different movements may have more or less support from people in positions of power (i.e. politicians), social movement leaders and initiator groups generally do not hold these positions in government or other social institutions. But many social movements do have powerful allies, and may indeed have resources channeled to them from power holders within governments, businesses, and/or organizations. Additionally, instead of challenging a system of power, some movements challenge social, cultural, political, organizational, or institutional changes that inhibit previous or current power relations. Social movements or countermovements can target individuals for personal change (i.e. Christian evangelism and salvation), international organizations (i.e. the World Trade Organization), transnational corporations (i.e. Nike), cultural conventions (i.e. the objectification of women), ideas or ideologies (i.e. white supremacy), as well as foreign, national, state, and local governments, their laws or policies, and/or their social actors (see Snow and Soule 2010).

At the center of the social movement phenomena is the protest event. Protest events are in many ways the front line of action in social movements. Reactions by society to these events serve as a barometer for the social acceptance or tolerance for particular groups, their ideas, their desired changes, or claims. The boundaries of a protest event are described by Soule and Davenport (2009) as events having more than one participant articulating a claim that challenges authority in public. Like the claims of social movements, social protests may be directed at nation-states and governments, businesses and international corporations, segments of the population within a nation-state, as well as various cultural groups, practices, and/or ideas that may or may not be solely located within a national context (McCarthy 1997; Smith 2001; Van
Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004). In other words, protest events occur within a spatiotemporal location within the jurisdiction of a nation-state, but: (1) protesters may not necessarily be targeting local or national governments, nor national groups or cultures, but potentially governments, businesses, groups, cultures, or ideas that are international, transnational, or global in scope (i.e. the World Trade Organization); and, (2) there may be protest events occurring simultaneously in different nation-states that have the same target (i.e. the Chinese government during the opening ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Olympics).

It is crucial, however, to demarcate a protest event from a social movement—protest events may mobilize around a single claim or for a limited time, but may not have the historical continuity required to be considered part of a social movement (Ratliff and Precoda Forthcoming; Snow and Soule 2010). For instance, the environmental movement has various social movement organizations that may focus on different issues (i.e. mountaintop removal, soil preservation, air quality, etc.) and protest events directed toward protecting the environment in general terms would therefore cohere to the historical continuity of the environmental movement, often mobilizing resources of environmental advocates and organizations. Conversely, parents holding one rally against cuts to a local school’s budget, while obviously cohering around issues of education, would be considered a social protest but not necessarily a social movement. Other factors such as a regional campaign directed at funding for education and the connection of such protests to other education protests over months or years (i.e. equality in education for African Americans) would have to be considered first before qualifying a protest as part of a social movement proper. Moreover, social movement organizations (SMOs) are not the same thing as social movements—there are usually multiple organizations, sometimes at odds with one another over various issues, composing a movement. These SMOs might also
mobilize for other causes for which their namesake or founding was not intended. Very often, however, protests do evoke themes linked at least in the nature of their claims to social movements of past or present—what I discuss later as a social movement family or ensemble.

It is also important to recognize that social protest is collective action which is not synonymous with collective behaviors like riots (Ratliff and Precoda Forthcoming). Collective action, as social action, is behavior that involves: (1) meaningful thought processes (Weber [1921] 1968); (2) deliberative cognitions deriving from strategies for action generated from cultural repertoires of contention (DiMaggio 1997; Swidler 1986; Tilly 2006); and, (3) the purposive and projective performance of an actor’s consciousness (Schutz 1976). Hence, collective action is not what scholars of mass movements and crowd behavior once thought—random, irrational, and/or contagious behavior emerging from unconscious and uncontrollable drives; an anomic madness which must be suppressed (see LeBon [1895] 1978; McPhail 1991; Park and Burgess [1924] 1978; Smelser 1962; Turner and Killian [1957, 1972] 1987).

Making the distinction between collective action and collective behavior is important to studying social protest. This is particularly salient regarding perceptions of early social movement theorists, such as Gustav LeBon, whose myth of the “mad” crowd directly influenced governmental policy toward the “masses” in some of the most repressive regimes in modern world history (e.g., Benito Mussolini’s Fascist Italy before World War II) (see Ratliff and Precoda Forthcoming). Moreover, it is important to demarcate “riots” that emerge spontaneously without planning (i.e. after a sports team wins or loses a championship), from protest events labeled as “riots” or “melees” by the police, bystanders, the media, or political figures simply because extreme forms of violence occurred. Put differently, there are protests which may reach “riotous” conditions, but violence resulting from collective action is not merely a random act of
collective violence. Understanding this divergence is important in determining how authorities and the public perceive social protests (and activists). Thus, my emphasis in this project is directed at understanding when the qualities of protest events incite violent outcomes. Put differently, exactly how does violence emerge at the interactional level—under what specific conditions and through what specific actions do episodes of protest violence emerge?

**Collective Violence, Repression, and Policing Styles**

Tilly (2003) defined collective violence as interactive episodes where physical damage is inflicted upon persons by at least two perpetrators which have some degree of coordination in the performance of damaging acts. Thus, single actor non-coordinated violence (i.e. homicide) is not collective violence. Some scholars have argued for the inclusion of “non-violent violence” (i.e. exploitation, injustice, etc.) in such a category, but Tilly’s (2003) argument delineates between this “symbolic” violence (see Bourdieu 1990, [1977] 1992) or “structural” violence (see Weigert 1999) and actual physical violence to more clearly understand the causal factors and social conditions producing physical violence. Put differently, lumping “non-violent” violence and physical violence together conflates two analytically distinct phenomena, though obviously one might study how the two are related or how one influences the other (see Tilly 2003). Tilly (2003) also argues that forcible seizure of persons (e.g. arrests) as well as physical assault (e.g. police officers shooting rubber bullets at protesters) are both forms of collective violence, though there is obviously a different degree of magnitude between the two.

While most protest events in democratic societies are not violent, scholars of social movements have become increasingly focused on police repression of social movements (Earl 2003; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009) and the social control of protest (Earl 2006). The distinction between these two analytic frames—repression versus
social control—is based on how we conceive of violence and its emergence. First, there is a question about whether police are always repressive. In other words, while many instances where police use of excessive force has been brought into question or has even been bluntly and tragically obvious, most of the time police protect protesters from crowds or counterprotesters, do not interact violently with protesters, or do not even show up at a protest event (see Soule and Davenport 2009). Second, there is a question about protesters who have the intent of being arrested or that use tactics that are more confrontational (i.e., protesters chaining themselves together to block entrances to buildings). Thus, we know that some protesters do, in fact, “invite” physical force (i.e. being removed from building entrances) or plan and negotiate arrest with police before an event to garner attention from the media or to gain support from the public— notwithstanding what is likely considered by those activists to be a stand for social justice.

Importantly for this project, research on protest event violence has predominantly framed the debate as unidirectional—violent repression against protesters is used to protect the interests of the state and protesters have violence inflicted upon them by state actors (Earl 2004). As Earl (2004) argued, however, such emphasis has become a “theoretical blinder” distracting researchers from other important dimensions of controlling protest, such as the actions of private actors like countermovements (see Earl 2006). While Earl’s argument for reorienting studies of social protest and violence is a matter of framing, it is also an important theoretical contribution because this frame heightens researchers’ awareness that: (1) other aspects of protest control exist (i.e. informal social control); (2) reframing the intellectual discourse might lead to theoretical innovations on nonviolent and private forms of control; and, (3) thinking more broadly about components of protest control might illuminate how repression by various actors impacts social movement genesis, development, dynamics, and outcomes (Earl 2004, 2006).
Three sets of actors are generally implicated in observable, coercive repression: tightly connected or loosely connected state actors and private actors (Earl 2003). In this project, I do not account for observable repression by state actors tightly connected to national political elites (i.e. state-sponsored assassinations of political enemies) because they are indirectly related to the protest events themselves and are seldom used in democratic societies. I focus instead on two forms of observable “repression”: state actors loosely connected with national political elites (i.e., police) and private actors (e.g., countermovements).

Social movement scholars have focused on three major paradigms when examining protest event violence and/or repression—threat, weakness, and threat-weakness interaction. Theoretical approaches emphasizing threat focus on how movements threaten people in positions in power (Earl 2003). This “threat” is linked to new or violent tactics used by protesters, numbers of protesters at events, or radical goals, and often leads to harsh repression (Bromely and Shupe 1983; Davenport 2000; McAdam 1982; Wisler and Guigni 1999). Other approaches argue movement “weakness” influences repression, emphasizing the number of protesters at an event and minority presence (Earl 2003; Gamson 1990; Stockdill 1996). Still other approaches point to an interaction effect—movements are more likely to experience repression when they are threatening and weak. For example, racial minorities using confrontational tactics are more likely to experience repression (Piven and Cloward 1977; Stockdill 1996). This broad and at times fragmented approach to protest event dynamics indicates a need for theoretical integration.

In what follows, I contend that collective violence emerges from the dynamic interaction of all actors involved in a protest event—authorities, counterprotesters, and protesters. Thus, to determine factors influencing protest event violence, I integrate major paradigms on the
repression and social control of protest events and the prevailing model of protest event policing around a dramaturgical approach to collective action.

**SYMBOLIC ACTION, SOCIAL PERFORMANCE, AND DRAMATURGY**

Social movement theorists studying social protests have focused primarily on publically observable characteristics of protest events. Studies have examined diverse subjects from an array of frameworks, but only recently have begun to empirically and quantitatively account for variations of event characteristics in a cohesive theoretical model (see Davenport, Soule, and Armstrong 2011; della Porta and Reiter 1998; Earl 2003; Earl and Soule 2006, 2010; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009). As these models have developed, the symbolic nature of social movements has become more salient in a separate trajectory of literature. Some scholars have examined how a social movement’s “oppositional habitus” sustains their salience to the public and aids in their historical development and continuity over time (Crossley 2003). Others have described how movements “move” through their production, use, and change in culture, often heavily reliant on dramatic performances to achieve success (Isaac 2008). Despite these important developments, a theoretical merger of the repression and social control literature with culturally oriented studies has not been attempted. I make such an attempt in what follows.

**Symbolic Action and Social Performance**

Alexander and colleagues have claimed that *every* human action is embedded in some way within a “horizon of affect and meaning” and that culture is a structure of symbolic sets, with meaningful action read as text (Alexander 1988; 2003, 2004, 2006; Alexander and Smith 1993). In utilizing this metaphor, we must be cautious not to overlook what it means—just as we read words on a page, with the meanings and significance we attribute them through our socialization
and cultural heritage, so too do we read human behaviors, react to them, and sometimes try (successfully or unsuccessfully) to change or control them. Moreover, those reading others’ actions are also being read. Thus, culture is not only patterns of thought, but being in time—valued strategies for action exhibited in ways of behaving. Indeed, culture is the way the social happens and there are many ways culture manifests itself in the social world.

As Eyerman (2006) explained, the characteristics of protest performance make social movements meaningful. Goffman’s (1959, 1967, and 1974) dramaturgical approach to human behavior is particularly useful for understanding these performances. Dramaturgical approaches conceive of life as a stage upon which we are all actors, where our actions have meaning to audiences perceiving that action. Recent research has applied this approach to collective action performances (Alexander 2004, 2006; Eyerman 2006; Eyerman and Jameson 1991). Alexander (2004), in particular, contended that collective action is both political and symbolic; performative actions, like actions in a theatre, symbolize particular meanings within the setting (both historical and physical) in which they are performed. The dialectic between conflicting groups, the actions and reactions of protagonists and antagonists, are thus transformed into symbolic performances and counterperformances (Alexander 2004). Protest performances take place within ongoing social narratives—the storied discourse of human societies—where respective sides attempt to influence how they and their opponents are depicted within the narrative’s plot (Alexander 2004; Eyerman 2006).

Alexander (2004) explained how plots in social narratives are constructed to have emotional and moral effects on their audiences; if effective and powerful, “the audience experiences catharsis, which allows new moral judgments to form and new lines of social action to” emerge (p. 91). This “catharsis” takes work. For a movement to be successful, activists
engage in framing processes to fashion shared understandings legitimating collective action, thus hoping to mobilize observers (potential allies) for their cause (McAdam and McCarthy 1996). Such framing requires “performances” like protest events; there must be aesthetic fusion in the symbolic nature of collective action to attract an observer’s attention and evoke emotional resonance to change people’s perception of an issue (Alexander 2004). Aligning disparate people’s thoughts and feelings by expressing claims or grievances through protest performance determine cultural meaning—it is the power to define a situation (Foucault 1980) and a means to find redress for social problems. What is crucial, however, is the degree to which a movement’s frame is consistent with the dominant culture the more likely they are to be successful (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986; Wimberley 2010). Conversely, as repression research suggests, the more protest performances diverge from expectations held by the dominant culture and people in positions of power about “proper” forms of dissent, the more likely protest will turn violent.

In this project, I utilize the concept of *mise en scène*—the ability to put social-dramatic action in a scene—as the impetus for a dramaturgical approach to protest event violence. The scene of these dramatic enactments involve the mobilization of actors, the defining of a target or enemy, the securing of a platform for performance, and selecting the way social action is performed. The selection of actions and reaction to particular event qualities by protesters, counterprotesters, and various law enforcement authorities (henceforth “police”) create the protest event’s scene. Moreover, when we reexamine our concept of protest events as deliberative social action, we open up our analysis to the spectrum of what happens when things don’t go as planned and when reactive behaviors override the script of performance. In quite a
Goffmanesque fashion, it is in those moments when things go awry that we learn much from the stage of change.

The focus of this study is on the front stage aspects of social protests—the mobilized actuality of the protest event—rather than back stage components of social protest—the processes of mobilization. My focus here is by no means an attempt to say that the back stage is not equally important—indeed, without it, there would be no dramatic performance. The back stage in Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical approach is the place where culture is more freely expressed, where feelings are more openly shared, and where these expressions are more limited to others whom individuals trust. Transposing this to the protest event, the back stage also includes garnering resources and political support, recruiting protest participants and the many acts involved in mobilizing for social change, some not so glamorous as Washington Monument rallies such as sweeping floors in meeting halls or sealing envelopes being sent out on mailing lists. Moreover, these back stage processes take place in police departments, offices of public officials, and in the sites where counterprotesters mobilize their counter to challenges; it includes the plethora of networking, everyday interactions, and relationships that shape and lead up to social protest—future research should investigate the continuum of performances that lead up to protest events, though such investigations are beyond the scope of this study.

In Goffman’s dramaturgical approach, front stage behaviors are generally guided by what individuals see as the expectations of others (Goffman 1959). Applying this approach to protest events, this can include a variety of expectations dependent upon particular actors that are acting. For example, protesters and counterprotesters might have behavioral expectations that include managing the impressions of other protesters, the public, family members, the police, politicians, etc. For police officers, expectations of their superiors, fellow officers, and politicians, as well as
their family and the public might influence their performance. This too is important in the public perception of police and the government they serve, as frequent use of excessive force is generally frowned upon in democratic societies. Whether protester, counterprotester, or a member of law enforcement, then, individuals have expectations embedded in the groups of which they are a part, and there are important political and social dynamics that influence them. These expectations are part of an individual’s consciousness and influence their actions in particular protest situations.

Goffman (1959) also points out that there are modes of expression that occur on the front stage. Thus, protesters and counterprotesters may carry placards, march, sing songs, and throw bricks or sit-down in city streets to block traffic. Police officers may appear in regular uniform or riot gear, use non-lethal weapons or lethal ones, talk with protesters, or keep the peace between protesters and counterprotesters. In other words, the performance of social protest is not just a performance of protesters, but of police and counterprotesters as well. Moreover, protest performances occur “somewhere”. Not only could particular characteristics of place influence how we as observers might perceive a protest event, we must also recognize the strategic aspects of place (i.e. government property) and how certain spaces are more and less controlled (i.e. the Pentagon versus a public park).

As we observe social protests as researchers, particularly when we conceive of the event as a social performance, we must be careful not to take Goffman too literally. As critiques of Goffman have noted, the dramaturgical approach often comes off as presenting a world where people “perform” to manipulate others (Manning 1992). Thus, the critique points out that we might take Goffman’s (1959) *Presentation of Self* as a supposition that human beings hide their true selves and rather cynically try to pursue self-interest at all cost (Manning 1992). We must
also be cautious in our transposition of the dramaturgical approach to the level of a protest event. There are many stages where social change occurs and dissent is expressed, but I speak of the protest event as the front stage in relative rather than absolute terms—the event is the front stage for this study but there are other front stages at different stages of mobilization. To wit, different “stages” (of interactional performances) lead to different “stages” (in the process leading to protest). In addition, many actors involved in a protest event are trying to garner support, but we need not be cynical about their desire to do so, notwithstanding that such cynicism may at times be deserved. Moreover, Goffman’s understanding of people behaving in certain ways should not direct us to the conclusion that this is pure manipulation, but that human beings are reflexive creatures with emotions, though sometimes people do try to manipulate others and public opinion, particularly when this involves politically charged claims.

The question remains, however, as to why I suggest a radical micro-sociology infused with symbolic action as a synthetic glue to move toward an integrated model of protest event dynamics. The radical micro-sociology of Erving Goffman emphasizes that reality isn’t something “out there” but something individuals construct as they engage infinite sense data and its possibilities (Collins and Makowsky 2005). Protest event actors do indeed bring their culture with them, but both in their heads and in their actions. What is truly fundamental to utilizing this approach is that behaviors are symbolic and evoke emotions given one’s cultural background; patterns of reaction and provocation may provide us with the evidence necessary to mitigate violence by more adequately providing training to safely control or express dissent, whether police or protester, respectively, while reducing the likelihood that harm will befall individuals in that process. Moreover, as the lifeblood of democracy, the free expression of dissent—though in a sometimes confrontational but peaceful manner—must be preserved.
ON THE STAGE OF CHANGE: THE MODEL

In studies on the repression and social control of protest events several outcomes of interest have been identified—police presence, arrests, and repression by state authorities of various sorts (i.e. city police, state police, National Guard, etc.). First, the salience of police and other state actors at a protest event importantly influences its qualities and outcomes. As a representative of “the” state, and an arbiter and enforcer of the law, police are often portrayed as one of the antagonists on the stage of change. Davenport et al. (2011) explained how scholarly interest in state repression evolved out of the cycle of protest in the 1960s. As sociologists engaged the issue in that period, they moved away, somewhat, from the larger political and socioeconomic issues studied by political scientists and began focusing on who was protesting, what they were targeting, the implication of their claims, and what power structure those claims threatened (Davenport et al. 2011). Within the narrative of social protest in the U.S., interest in who the police (and by proxy the government) deem a threat is bound up in the meanings attributed to certain social groups expressing dissent as well as to how they expressed that dissent. As such, police presence has become an important indicator for what change is acceptable, which social movements and/or social groups are perceived by power holders to be threatening, and what modes of expression are perceived to pose the greatest threat to public order.

Second, after the police are at an event, what do they do? Reframing the question, the title of Soule and Davenport’s (2009) article, “Velvet Glove, Iron Fist, or Even Hand?” sums up the interest in police action at protest events quite succinctly. Studies of this type (Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009) are interested in what characteristics of protest events lead to arrest and, more ominously, other physical or violent force. In regard to the latter, several episodes of collective violence are quickly retrieved from the American cultural
memory: fire hoses being used on African American’s in the 1960s; National Guard troops firing on and killing protesters and bystanders at Kent State University on May 4, 1970; riot gear clad police spraying non-violent demonstrators with pepper spray at the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle, Washington, in late 1999. Clear episodes of excessive force such as these have led researchers to examine how often such events occur and what causes them.

What has not been examined, however, is at what types of events, in addition to police use of force, do protesters also turn violent. Thus, in addition to the variables of interest described above, and in an attempt to glean information on private forms social control (i.e. counterprotesters), I ask a more general question: do differences exist in the qualities of protest events where police are violent versus those where both police and protesters are violent? In what follows, I describe my theoretical model and hypotheses for these four protest event outcomes—police presence, incidence of arrest, police violence, and any violence (see Appendix I for a list of hypotheses categorized by dependent variable).

The Actors

On the stage of change—the protest event—there are three categories of actors: authorities, initiator and countering groups, and social movement families.

Authorities

As Wilson’s (1968) classic description of policing behavior reminds us, policing styles used by specific departments are influenced by the geographic area in which they are embedded and the political tendencies of those areas. Trends in the actions taken by police in certain situations are often linked to general trends in types and numbers of arrests (Wilson 1968). In other words, routine patterns of crime in particular jurisdictions are tied to types of behaviors determined to be
“criminal” and these patterns influence strategies police departments develop for dealing with crime. Other research supports these assertions, contending that law is a “quantitative variable” known by standards people are held to and the rates at which they are held accountable to those standards (Black 1976, 1980). Thus, normative styles of police departments—the habits, customs, and practices of local agencies (see Black 1980)—are likely to generate unique police cultures which embrace certain strategies for dealing with crime. Using this logic, we can see how such patterns of policing would operate in the social control of protest events.

Theoretical approaches examining protest policing usually emphasize police department orientations toward types of protest, agency preparation, and police brutality (Earl et al. 2003; McPhail et al. 1998; Waddington 1998). Recent studies focus on three policing styles—escalated force, negotiated management, and strategic incapacitation (Gillham and Noakes 2007; Soule and Davenport 2009). In the U.S., escalated force policing dominated the sixties and early seventies, and consisted of police or soldiers using force to disperse protesters (e.g., the 1968 Democratic National Convention) (McPhail et al. 1998). As protest violence persisted into the early 1970s, however, strategies were disseminated from the federal level when Presidential commissions found police actions proved pivotal in provoking or preventing violence; this led to a shift toward negotiated management policing in 1980s and 1990s which reduced violence at protests when police negotiated with protesters beforehand (McPhail, et al. 1998).

Recently, scholars have argued another form of policing has emerged—strategic incapacitation—involving pre-emptive arrests, zoning restrictions, and heightened use of non-lethal weapons (Gillham and Noakes 2007). Arguably, the use of “non-lethal” weapons (i.e. rubber bullets) still bears a high resemblance to the escalated force style of policing that dominated the 1960s (i.e., using water hoses) (see Fernandez 2008). Yet what is truly salient
with regards to this “new” incapacitory style regards the pre-emption of protest events with mass arrests and the physical restriction of spaces where protests can occur (i.e., the use of barricades). Such pre-emptive strikes are often conducted before protesters have broken any laws or when protesters are not using confrontational tactics. This point is important, because it also highlights the possible evolution of the escalated force style of policing (see Soule and Davenport 2009).

Less studied by scholars of protest events, however, is the community policing style. In the lineage of negotiated management (see della Porta, Fillieule, and Reiter 1998; McPhail, et al. 1998), the program known as “COPS” (Community Oriented Policing Services) began in 1994 with the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. According to the U.S. Department of Justice (2010), COPS was designed to advance community policing styles across the country in departments of all sizes. This policing style attempts to mitigate reactive police responses with a problem-solving approach to crime and social disorder, a synthesis of traditional law enforcement techniques and a pro-active preventative orientation that seeks community engagement and partnerships (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). While the negotiated management style has been shown to reduce violence at social protests (McPhail, et al. 1998), no research has examined this relatively new initiative and its impacts on protest policing.

Part of the reason COPS has not been used to evaluate protest event policing could be the rather gloomy research findings which contend that COPS just doesn’t work (see Fielding 1995). For example, critics have argued that the implementation of community policing had failed in a substantial number of departments (Greene, Bergman, and McLaughlin 1994; Mastrofši 2006; Sadd and Grinc 1994; Tien and Rich 1994; Rosenbaum and Wilkinson 2004), that skepticism by officers concerning the particulars of COPS practical applications are high (Mastrofši 2006; Sadd and Grinc 1994; Zhao, He, and Lovrich 1999; Schafer 2001; and Rosenbaum and
Wilkinson 2004), and that officers not embracing the values of community policing act differently than those that embrace them (Mastrofski 2006; Mastrofski, Worden, and Snipes 1995; Mastrofski, Snipes, Parks, and Maxwell 2000; Terrill, Paoline, and Manning 2003). Moreover, a central concern is whether or not community policing strategies can change extant police cultures at all (Moore 1992).

Proponents of community policing, however, note the popularity of community policing—a popularity that is so high among politicians, city officials, and the public “that few police chiefs want to be caught without some program they can call community policing” (Skogan 2006:27). Other scholars cite important positive impacts on police officers and citizen perception of police (Lurigio and Rosenbaum 1994), and how older police departments with more experienced personnel have higher success rates for COPS implementation (Wilson 2006). By and large, however, research on the effectiveness of COPS provides mixed results, showing high levels of variation across departments and regions both in the implementation and effectiveness of the program (Capowich and Roehl 1994; Fielding 1995; Skogan 1994). This variation is largely tied to how specific departments use COPS funding and what crime-related problems those funds are directed toward solving. Importantly for this project, certain initiatives in the COPS program provide training on the proper use of force (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010), which is directly relevant to police-citizen engagement at protest events. Thus, an examination of COPS funding for a specific issue—protest event policing—may provide important insights into the usefulness of COPS. Therefore, I expect that by accepting funding and/or participating in training provided by the COPS program:

_Hypothesis 1a: Police departments in cities that have engaged in COPS, because this program encourages community interaction and partnerships, will be more likely to attend protest events._
Hypothesis 1b: Police departments in cities that have engaged in COPS will be less likely to use arrests at protest events.

Hypothesis 1c: Police departments in cities that have engaged in COPS will be less likely to use physical or violent force at a protest event.

Hypothesis 1d: Police departments in cities that have engaged in COPS will be less likely to be involved in any type of violent protest event.

Minority Group Presence

A central concern with protest policing is whether different social groups are treated differently—particularly, whether marginalized groups (i.e. racial minorities) are more violently engaged. In particular, research has shown that subordinate group presence (Earl et al. 2003), particularly African Americans (Davenport et al. 2011), elicit police presence at protest events. While these studies have examined U.S. protest events before 1990, particularly the 1960s when African American protest was most salient, studies have yet to examine the recent mobilization of Latino/a Americans surrounding the immigrant rights movement. Thus, given the findings of previous research, I expect:

Hypothesis 2a: Compared to other social groups, police will be more likely to attend protest events when African Americans are present.

Hypothesis 2b: Compared to other social groups, police will be more likely to attend protest events when Latinos and Latinas are present.

Other research has also examined the role of African American presence on the likelihood of arrests or other forms of violence by authorities taking place at an event (Davenport et al. 2011). Davenport et al. (2011) found that not only are police more likely to be at events where African Americans are present (or “protesting while black”), police are also more likely to use force at these events. Thus, to examine if this pattern of arrest and use of authority violence
persists in recent history, and to ascertain if it has been transposed onto current subordinate group mobilization efforts, I hypothesize that:

*Hypothesis 3a: Police will be more likely to use arrests at protest events when African Americans are present.*

*Hypothesis 3b: Police will be more likely to use arrests at protest events when Latinos and Latinas are present.*

*Hypothesis 4a: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force at protest events when African Americans are present.*

*Hypothesis 4b: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force at protest events when Latinos and Latinas are present.*

Finally, I also examine if the presence of African Americans or Latino/a Americans is more likely at protest events where any violence occurs. Because repression can be imposed by private agents like counterdemonstrators, and given the unique history of racism in the U.S., I hypothesize that:

*Hypothesis 5a: Some form of violence will be more likely at protest events when African Americans are present.*

*Hypothesis 5b: Some form of violence will be more likely at protest events when Latinos and Latinas are present.*

**Counterprotester Presence**

A fairly consistent indicator of police presence, arrest, and use of force (Davenport et al. 2011; Soule and Davenport 2009) is the presence of counterprotesters at an event. Thus, as these antagonists enter the scene, the likelihood of physical and violent confrontations increases. This makes sense, particularly since counterdemonstrators are directly targeting and opposing the protesters’ claims and, at times, the protesters themselves. As such, it logically follows that since
counterprotester presence influences varieties of police action and violence, episodes where counterprotesters are present will also be more likely to become violent in general. Thus, I expect:

_Hypothesis 6a: Police will be more likely to attend protest events when counterprotesters are present._

_Hypothesis 6b: Police will be more likely to use arrests at protest events when counterprotesters are present._

_Hypothesis 6c: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force at protest events when counterprotesters are present._

_Hypothesis 6d: Some form of violence will be more likely at protest events when counterprotesters are present._

**Social Movement Families (or ensembles)**

In describing the “movement of movements,” Isaac (2008) defined a social movement ensemble as “a family of movements that hang loosely together in some important way” (p.35). Isaac (2008) defined the “New Left” as a prototypical example. The New Left was a multi-racial coalition of multiple organizations, social groups, and individuals that sought racial democracy and social justice, though it was a coalition which was sometimes practically or ideologically divided (Gosse 2006; Isaac 2008; Isaac, McDonald and Lukasik 2006; Polletta 2003). It has also occasionally portrayed as a short episode of “white protest” occupying the midpoint between the African American civil rights movement and later movements, such as those for women’s liberation and gay rights (see McMillian 2002; Schulman 1999). Other scholars have used the concept of social movement families to categorize social movement organizations within similar issue frames or movement “types” (Amenta et al. 2009). For example, there could be several
social movement organizations opposing different wars (i.e. Iraq versus Vietnam), but all of these organizations would be part of the peace movement family.

It is also important to recognize, however, that particular claims made at a protest event can be categorized within these families even when social movement organizations are either not present or not indicated in newspaper reports. Thus, when a claim or grievance can be identified at a protest event, given that these claims have been articulated over a number of years and with some relative continuity, we can see how this event can be aggregated into these larger families. Hence, a social movement family consists of more or less loosely tied movements and claims-making groups cohering around certain issues or grievances (Amenta et al. 2009; Isaac 2008).

Building on previous research, I utilize lists of claims-making groups collected over three decades by the Dynamics of Collective Action (DCA) project on social protest in the U.S. to identify 6 major social movement families active in the period under study (see Soule, Olzak, McCarthy, and McAdam’s DCA project at http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/). These families include: Human and Civil Rights; Nature and Environment; Workers and Labor; Hate; Peace and War; and, Tea Party and Limited Government (see Appendix 2 for coding details). What is crucial for the integrated model presented here is how associated claims of movement families and protesters condition the levels of perceived threat and/or weakness based on the historical context within which those claims have emerged. My examination of these families consists of two parts.

First, research has examined how the expression of radical goals might influence police repression at protest events (Earl et al. 2003), but has found mixed results (Davenport et al. 2011). But does the aggregation of family specific goals—there are “radical” and “non-radical” ideas within specific families—across different categories of claims mask the impact a salient
challenging group might have on police presence and various forms of violence at protest events? Earl et al. (2003) showed how the presence of social movement organizations—one indicator of family salience—influenced police presence. Thus, it is logical to conclude that social movement families, as protagonists persisting in the U.S. narrative of change, might present a more clear threat to power than other miscellaneous or single issue protests representing a variety of claims. Therefore, when persistent challengers—social movement families—are salient, I expect:

\textit{Hypothesis 7a: Police will be more likely to attend protest events when representatives of social movement families are present compared to single issue events.}

\textit{Hypothesis 7b: Police will be more likely to use arrests at protest events when representatives of social movement families are present compared to single issue events.}

\textit{Hypothesis 7c: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force at protest events when representatives of social movement families are present compared to single issue events.}

\textit{Hypothesis 7d: Some form of violence will be more likely at protest events when representatives of social movement families are present compared to single issue events.}

The second component of social movement families I examine is exploratory. Since no research has systematically, empirically, and comparatively examined how the presence of different social movement families at protest events influences police presence or various forms of violence, I also examine inter-family variation in these outcomes.

\textbf{Targets (or “enemies”)}

Research on protest events has generally claimed that protesters directly targeting the government and its various actors are a key factor in determining level of threat (Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009). Thus, following research which examines if radical goals (e.g. targeting the U.S. government) influences police presence, I disaggregate the
targeting of government from two other categories of targets—economic and social/cultural—to determine their influences on my variables of interest here. Thus, given the symbolic and political implications of specifically targeting the government, and the differences which might exist between other types of targets, I expect that compared to social protests targeting other social and cultural enemies:

**Hypothesis 8a:** Police will be more likely to attend events where protesters are targeting government or political enemies.

**Hypothesis 8b:** Police will be more likely to use arrests when protesters are targeting government or political enemies.

**Hypothesis 8c:** Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force when protesters are targeting government or political enemies.

**Hypothesis 8d:** Some form of violence will be more likely when protesters are targeting government or political enemies.

In addition to targeting the government, recent research has shown how protest events occurring in recent decades directed toward economic targets (i.e., the International Monetary Fund) have resulted in violence (Fernandez 2008; Gillham and Noakes 2007). Thus, I expect that compared to social protests targeting other social and cultural enemies:

**Hypothesis 9a:** Police will be more likely to attend events where protesters are targeting economic enemies.

**Hypothesis 9b:** Police will be more likely to use arrests when protesters are targeting economic enemies.

**Hypothesis 9c:** Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force when protesters are targeting economic enemies.

**Hypothesis 9d:** Some form of violence will be more likely when protesters are targeting economic enemies.
The Stage

Scholars of social movements emphasize place because distinctions between categories of physical setting impact police response (McPhail et al. 1998). Conceiving of social protest as a performance within a field of symbolic action, therefore, requires defining the proverbial stage upon which this performance occurs (Alexander 2004). Scholars of social movements have become increasingly aware of the importance of place and the control of space. McPhail et al. (1998) explained how changing conceptions of public forums—distinctions between categories of physical setting acceptable for social protest—have changed protest policing. Previous research has shown how protest events differ between “traditional” public forums (i.e. public streets) and nonpublic forums (i.e. government property) where limitations on protest events can be more strictly enforced (McPhail et al. 1998). Hence, I examine if different “places” influence violent outcomes. Thus, compared to traditional public forums, I expect:

*Hypothesis 10a:* Police will be more likely to attend protest events occurring in government space.

*Hypothesis 10b:* Police will be more likely to use arrests when protest events occur in government space.

*Hypothesis 10c:* Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force when protest events occur in government space.

*Hypothesis 10d:* Some form of violence will be more likely when protest events occur in government space.

Protest Performance

Protest performances have four fundamental components: number of protesters, tactics by actors, number of tactics employed, and property damage.
Protest Participation

The size of a protest event has been found to be important in determining police perception of threat (Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009; Tilly 1978). Exactly what size of an event that constitutes such a threat, however, has produced somewhat mixed results. Some research has found that the size of an event has no effect on police presence (Davenport et al. 2011) while others have shown larger protests increase the likelihood of police presence (Earl et al. 2003). Moreover, while research has shown that arrests are less likely at larger events (Davenport et al. 2011) more protest event participants increases the likelihood that the police will use other types of force (Soule and Davenport 2009). Following the logic, one might also expect that larger protest events will increase the likelihood of any form of violence. Thus, I expect:

Hypothesis 11a: Police will be more likely to attend larger protest events.

Hypothesis 11b: Police will be less likely to use arrests when protest events are larger.

Hypothesis 11c: Police will be more likely to use force when protest events are larger.

Hypothesis 11d: Some form of violence will be more likely when protest events are larger.

Tactics

Following an extensive tradition studying repertoires of contention (Tilly 1986, 2006, 2008), I conceive of tactics as part of movement repertoires utilized and adapted in specific protest performances. Tilly (1986) contended that these repertoires—the set of means a group has for making claims—evolve slowly due to structural constraints and cultural perceptions of legitimacy. Others contend peaks of protest expand repertoires rapidly if movements are successful (Tarrow 1989a, 1994) because success generates opportunities for activism by others (McAdam 1995), but often increases violence. While scholars disagree about how repertoires of
contention change, we know previous repertoires affect future ones and tactics are crucial factors influencing how authorities react to protesters and protest situations.

Recent work by the late Charles Tilly (2008) described the dynamics of contentious performances as causally and symbolically coherent phenomenon that exhibit similar sequences of action over different instances, acquiring meanings over time which facilitate tactical diffusion and innovation. Thus, as patterned variations of tactical types at the disposal of social movement actors which have acquired social meanings, it figures that specific actions will elicit certain responses. In this study, I focus on the qualities of these categories, what Simmel (1896) might have referred to as the “aesthetics of social reality,” or what others have called the particular styles or modalities of action exhibited by actors in their protest performances (Isaac 2008). Numerous studies in social movement research have examined tactics used by protesters, but often lump tactics into broad categories like “confrontational” or “non-confrontational” tactics, with more or less confrontational tactics, compared to “conventional” ones, being more likely to evoke police presence and repression (Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009). While determining general trends in these categories is important, no research has actually empirically examined what tactics constitute “confrontational” versus “non-confrontational” tactics.

Tactics previously defined, with some degree of variation, as “less confrontational” include rallies, demonstrations, marches, etc., while others have been deemed “confrontational” such as civil disobedience and various strike actions (Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009; Tarrow 1989a). Other tactics, such as leafleting, petitioning, news conferences, legal actions of various sorts, etc., have often been described as “conventional” or “legitimate” forms of protest, with such legitimacy being granted, most often, by people in
power (Soule and Davenport 2009; Tarrow 1989a). Thus, what are generally consciousness raising events are conceived of as legitimate forms of expression and are at times rather diffuse with regard to the salience of the actors, thereby becoming less likely to evoke response from authorities (Soule and Davenport 2009). What is less certain, however, is which of these forms are actually treated as such on the ground by police or counterprotesters. Hence, the model presented here investigates how the symbolic qualities of specific actions (i.e. civil disobedience, rallies, marches, etc.) influence violent outcomes (see Appendix 2 for a full list of protest types).

Building on empirical research conducted by the DCA project, I construct 7 general categories of symbolic actions in the U.S. repertoire of contention: consciousness raising (or conventional), confront and disobey, general demonstrations, rallies, artistic, vigils, and processions (see Soule, Olzak, McCarthy, and McAdam’s DCA project at http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/ for list of forms from which these categories were constructed). Thus, given previous categorizations, I expect the following:

Hypothesis 12a: Police will be more likely to attend protest events where tactics not considered consciousness raising or legitimate are used.

Hypothesis 12b: Police will be more likely to use arrests when protesters utilize tactics not considered to be consciousness raising or legitimate.

Hypothesis 12c: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force when protest event tactics are not considered to be consciousness raising or legitimate.

Hypothesis 12d: Some form of violence will be more likely when protest event tactics are not considered to be consciousness raising or legitimate.

Additionally, like the social movement families I described earlier, no research has actually examined these general tactical types. Thus, I am also interested in exploring if there is any variation between tactics in predicting any outcome variables of interest.
Multiple Tactics

The model also accounts for events with multiple tactics, which are often perceived as more threatening because they are more difficult to police (Soule and Davenport 2009). Thus, I expect:

Hypothesis 13a: Police will be more likely to attend protest events with multiple tactics.

Hypothesis 13b: Police will be more likely to use arrests when protesters use multiple tactics.

Hypothesis 13c: Police will be more likely to use physical or violent force when protesters use multiple tactics.

Hypothesis 13d: Some form of violence will be more likely when protesters use multiple tactics.

Property damage

The final component of protest performance is the damaging of property by protesters. Protest events where protesters damage property have been a strong indicator of police presence and forceful policing (Soule and Davenport 2009). Thus, I expect:

Hypothesis 14a: Police will be more likely to attend protest events when protesters damage property.

Hypothesis 14b: Police will be more likely to use arrests when protesters damage property.

Hypothesis 14c: Police will be more likely to use physical or violent force when protesters damage property.

Hypothesis 14d: Some form of violence will be more likely when protesters damage property.
CHAPTER THREE
DATA, METHOD, AND MEASURES

In this study, I utilize quantitative analyses to identify factors influencing police presence at social protests and protest event violence in the U.S. from 2006-2009. I collected data on social protests, the policing of protest, and law enforcement training. Below I describe the collection of data, sampling procedures, concepts, and the measurement of my variables.

DATA AND SAMPLE

The unit of analysis in this project is the protest event. To qualify as a protest event in my dataset, an event must (1) have more than one participant, (2) articulating a claim, (3) in public, (4) in the U.S., (5) from 2006-2009 (see Davenport et al. 2011; Soule and Davenport 2009). Data on protest events was collected from two major national newspapers: The Los Angeles Times and The New York Times. Data collected on social protests for this study followed guidelines set forth by the DCA project ran by Sarah Soule, Susan Olzak, John McCarthy, and Doug McAdam. In most cases, the content coding of newspaper reports used the DCA project’s exact coding scheme, which details collection and coding procedures for protest event data derived from newspaper reports (see http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/), although minor modifications were made (see Appendix 2). Of the nearly 13,000 newspaper articles examined for this project, 2,466 social protests were identified.

Protest Events and Newspaper Sources

According to Davenport et al. (2011), newspapers are among the most “widely used sources of data in the study of collective action” (p. 157). Some scholars, however, have explored potential weaknesses in data on protest events collected from newspapers (Earl et al. 2004; Davenport 2010; Oliver and Maney 2000; Oliver and Myers 1999; Ortiz et al. 2005). Two critiques
concerning newspaper accounts of protest events are description bias and selection bias. Description bias refers to how accurately (or inaccurately) newspaper reporters describe protest event characteristics. While most research shows “hard facts” of events (i.e. tactics used by police) are accurate, “soft facts” like a reporter’s political opinions are less “accurate” (Davenport et al. 2011; Soule and Davenport 2009). Although I only use information on “hard” facts in this study, I take an extra step to mitigate this potential weakness. Namely, articles containing “editorial” content (i.e. letters to the editor) are not analyzed. This not only helps to reduce potential errors in “hard” information, but it also reduces the likelihood of politically motivated or unwitting distortions of protest events.

The other potential weakness, selection bias, is often viewed as being the most problematic (Ortiz et al. 2005). As Davenport et al. (2011) explained, selection bias “refers to the fact that not all protest events will be covered by a given newspaper and that what is covered is likely not a random sample of all events that took place” (p. 157). Ortiz et al. (2005) provided a useful description of this problem and its implications, though a somewhat less optimistic one than other scholars who maintain newspaper data are vital for social movement research (Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2004; Soule and Davenport 2009), with some calling it a “methodological staple” of the field (McAdam and Su 2002). Ortiz and colleagues’ critique falls into two categories. First, they argue newspaper data do not provide a valid and reliable data source for predicting events—we cannot use chronological sequences of protest events found in newspapers to predict the likely occurrence of future events (Ortiz et al. 2005). This critique is indeed valid, thus using protest event data drawn from newspapers to make event predictions has been abandoned (see Earl et al. 2004).
Second, Ortiz et al. (2005) argued there are two levels of selection bias—the number of protest events reported in newspapers and the number of protest events retrieved in data collection processes by researchers (see also Hocke 1999; Koopmans and Rucht 2002; McCarthy et al. 1996). This critique first emerged from data collection procedures used in early research on protest events which often relied solely upon manually coded indexes with subject categories formed by someone other than the researcher. As research methods have advanced, scholars found that not only were regional and political biases associated with the actual newspaper content, but indexes were also biased because of errant categorization or human error, often leaving out many relevant protest events (Ortiz et al. 2005).

In the face of such critiques, we must not forget that one of the most important and influential books in the history of social movement research, Doug McAdam’s Political Process and the Development of the Black Insurgency, relied solely on such indices (see McAdam [1982] 1999). Taking such critiques seriously, however, I attempt to mitigate these potential biases by drawing my sample from two newspapers, one on the U.S. east coast historically viewed as politically liberal—The New York Times—and another from the west coast viewed, arguably, as politically conservative—The Los Angeles Times (see Brendon 1982). Moreover, this is the first study of its kind to conduct a national level analysis using more than U.S. one newspaper.

Recent research on protest events has derived data from reading daily editions of the New York Times (i.e. Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009), or has utilized technological developments in article digitization and search engine article retrieval (Amenta et al. 2009; Bond et al. 1997; Imig and Tarrow 1999, 2001; Reising 1999). Each of these methods has their weaknesses. Obviously, while also being extremely time consuming, reading daily editions of one newspaper may come under scrutiny from some critics for the
reasons discussed above (i.e. regional coverage). Yet it also provides a large database of articles at the national level. Conversely, search engines provide full-text searches for selected words, finding every article containing selected search terms. These advanced electronic searches, arguably, may provide superior precision, efficiency, and accuracy in locating protest events in newspapers, given that proper search terms are used. It is the latter of these two dominant approaches that I use here.

Sampling Procedures

In this study, I utilized ProQuest and LexisNexis search engines to find articles on protest events in The Los Angeles Times (LAT) and The New York Times (NYT). For the NYT, I searched LexisNexis search engines for every article containing the word “protest,” its variations, and its plural forms.¹ Search hits were then uploaded into QDA Miner, a software program for content analysis (see http://www.provailisresearch.com). I then utilized the word-in-context paragraph function in QDA Miner to facilitate manual coding of newspaper articles (see Appendix 2). The text retrieval function opens two windows linking the searched term in the context of a paragraph in which it appears to the entire article within which that paragraph appears. This allows the researcher to quickly find both the search term in a paragraph and the paragraph within the article of origin. Each paragraph was read in its entirety to determine a search hit’s relevance, thereby allowing for a more efficient elimination of irrelevant articles compared to reading an entire newspaper article. When a potential protest event was identified in a paragraph, the entire article was then read, and if it met the requirements to be considered a protest event it was then

¹Previous research by Olzak and Soule (January 2006), “Collaborative Research on Advocacy Group Activity and Legislative Change Concerning the Environment” (NSF-SES 0620577), used a similar search engine strategy where variations of the word “protest” (e.g. protests, protester, protesters, protested, protesting) were combined with specific terms (i.e. logging), limiting the study to protests concerning the environment. For my study, since I am examining all protest events in a particular time period, I do not use any social movement-specific limiters.
manually coded (see Soule, Olzak, McCarthy, and McAdam’s DCA project at [http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/] for protest event coding details).

As Table 1 depicts below, most “protest” articles included information on phenomena that were not protest events (i.e., ‘Senator X protested on the Senate floor,’ ‘his daughter protested not going to the party,’ ‘Athlete X protested the referee’s call,’ etc.). There are also cases where articles refer to protest events occurring in countries other than the U.S. While these events are not coded, such articles were still read given that simultaneous protest events in multiple countries sometimes occur. For example, if there is a search hit in an article about student protests in Iran, while the protests in Iran are not part of this study, the article still must be read to prevent the exclusion of protest events occurring in the U.S. in support of those protesters or their claims. Thus, while a newspaper article may frame the entirety of its content around the protests occurring in Iran, there may be a sentence or picture caption mentioning protests occurring outside Iran that are related to those protests.

Table 1. Total Paragraph Search Hits and Newspaper Articles for the New York Times, 2006–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Paragraph Search Hits</th>
<th>Newspaper Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,751</td>
<td>3,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,677</td>
<td>3,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5,555</td>
<td>3,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5,530</td>
<td>3,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21,513</td>
<td>12,718</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the LAT, I searched the ProQuest “Demonstrations and Protests” digital index. Due to the particular format of the ProQuest search engine, each newspaper article with potential protest event data was read individually and entirely to determine its relevancy. If a newspaper article in the index for demonstrations and protests had information on a protest event relevant to
this study, it was then manually coded. From 2006-2009, there were 184 total newspaper articles with valid information on protest events for the LAT digital index.\(^2\)

After coding was completed, protest event data was entered for each newspaper in an independent data set, where each set of data were individually cleaned and analyzed for duplicate events.\(^3\) The two sets of data from the NYT and LAT were then merged and checked again for duplicate events or events which appeared in each newspaper. For events appearing in both papers, information for these events was combined. In Table 2 below, I report the number of protest events for each newspaper, the number of events appearing in both newspapers, and the total number of protest events in the merged data set by year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NYT Events</th>
<th>LAT Events</th>
<th>Events in Both</th>
<th>Total Protest Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2239</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2,466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to collecting data on protest events, I also collected other data on law enforcement training to help control for larger structural and cultural factors of policing which may influence protest event outcomes. I compiled data from the U.S. Department of Justice on grant funding by the Community Oriented Policing Services (or COPS) program for jurisdictions where protest events took place as a proxy measure of community policing styles.

---

\(^2\) The data presented here represents part of a larger, ongoing study. The *Los Angeles Times* digital index was searched from January 1, 1997 through June 1, 2010, producing a total of 3,905 newspaper articles. Each article was individually read to determine their validity. Because a total count of articles is only available from January 1, 1997, to June 1, 2010, the aggregated total number of events from 2006-2009 reported here represents the number of articles after the initial reading was conducted to discard irrelevant articles.

\(^3\) For details on cleaning procedures for protest event data derived from newspapers, see the DCA report by Ku, Rafail, and Wang (2009) at http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/.
CONCEPTS AND MEASURES

**Dependent Variables**

In this study, my interests are in identifying factors which lead to various types of protest policing and more general episodes of collective violence. Consistent with previous studies of protest policing (Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2003), I examine the characteristics of protest events which lead to police presence. *Police presence* is a dichotomous variable coded as “1” for protest events where local, state, or federal law enforcement officers were present. During the period under study, authorities were present at events 11 percent of the time. Other research has gone beyond the notion of mere presence, asking what authorities do once they are at a protest event (Soule and Davenport 2009). The most frequent police action is the arrest of protesters and/or counterprotesters. Consistent with previous research, I examine the factors which are likely to lead to arrests at protest events, where the incidence of arrest at an event is coded as “1”, else “0”. During this period, arrests occurred 5 percent of the time. Research has also examined different categories of police action at events, such as physical force (i.e. arrests, pushing, shoving, etc.) and violent force (i.e. hitting, beating, tear gas, etc.) (see Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2003). Following these studies, I use a dichotomous variable indicating *police violence*, where the use of physical or violent force by police is coded as “1”, else “0”. From 2006 to 2009, police used physical force at protest events 7 percent of the time, thus using physical force other than arrest 2 percent of the time. Police only used violent force 1 percent of the time. In all cases where police used violent force, physical force was also used.

Another less studied component of collective violence regards the conditions under which protesters and counterprotesters turn violent. Part of the reason for this could be that protester violence, though often sensationalized, is relatively rare. Physical force by protesters or
counterprotesters occurred only 1.6 percent of the time (26 events). Moreover, the use of violent force, such as weapons, throwing bricks, punching, and the like, was used only 20 times, at 1.3 percent of events. In a departure from the degree of force used by police, where physical force was always used when violent force was used, there were 20 events where use of force by demonstrators bypassed physical force, escalating directly to violent force. In all, protesters used some form of violence at 59 events, or 2.4 percent of the time. Thus, given such a small occurrence of events where protesters do turn violent, it becomes difficult to statistically model these conditions.

Despite the limitations of a demonstrator-only model of violence, I extend previous research by accounting for violence experienced or perpetrated by protesters, counterprotesters, and/or police. *Any violence* is captured by coding events as “1” if any actor at a protest event engaged in any form of violence, whether physical or violent, else “0”. During the period under study, some form of violence occurred at 188 events, approximately 8 percent of the time. Hence, I extend previous research by examining the conditions under which demonstrators and/or authorities turn violent to determine if any variability in event characteristics is present compared to situations where only authority violence occurs. Put differently, are there different conditions on the ground leading to police violence versus collective violence more generally? Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 3 below.

**Independent Variables**

To examine police presence and episodes of collective violence at protest events from a dramaturgical approach, I define four dimensions of protest events which may be important predictors of such violence: actors, targets (or “enemies”), the stage, and protest performance. Below I describe the measures for each of these dimensions in turn. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Enemy</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean/Percent</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government and Political</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55.19%</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Cultural</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29.36%</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.56%</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Stage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Space</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29.72%</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Space</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>70.28%</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confront and Disobey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.66%</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Demonstration</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.81%</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.68%</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artistic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.98%</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consciousness Raising</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34.46%</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigil</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.66%</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processional</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.59%</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation (log)</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>13.82</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Variety</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Damage</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21.25%</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Actors

To examine the impact of community policing styles, I construct a proxy variable to examine the implementation of COPS in jurisdictions where protest events occurred. Community policing styles are measured as a dichotomous variable coded as “1” when a city in which a protest event occurred received Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) funding, else “0”. A time lag of one year is allowed for COPS training implementation, so that the COPS variable is entered for protests in cities the year following the grant award. Total funding is calculated from four specific programs relevant to the policing of protest events—Community Policing Development, Regional Community Policing, the Universal Hiring Program, and Cultures of Integrity—the latter of which provides specific training on the use of force (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010).

Historically, the presence of African Americans at protest events in the U.S., or “protesting while black,” has been an indicator of repressive police actions (Davenport et al. 2011). Consistent with previous research, protest events are coded “1” when at least some of the participants are African American, else “0”. Given recent mobilization of Hispanic populations regarding immigrant rights, I also investigate the impact of Latino/a presence on police presence and collective violence. Protest events are coded “1” when at least some of the participants are of Hispanic origin, else “0”. In addition, since the presence of counterprotesters at protest events

---

4 Two additional measures of community policing styles were estimated: total COPS funding in dollars for law enforcement agencies at the city level and the natural log of total COPS funding. The aggregate total dollars or logged total dollars were entered following the same procedure as the dichotomous variable presented above. Neither the real or logged measure of COPS funding reached statistical significance or influenced the substantive conclusions of any model, with each having extremely high standard errors, so they were dropped from the analysis in favor of the dichotomous measure. Additionally, figures for COPS funding exclude for-profit agencies, state or national agencies (i.e. regional associations of police chiefs), and non-profit organizations conducting research that is not directed at implementing COPS for law enforcement agencies.

5 In separate models, I also examined the more general influence of racial and ethnic minority presence, coding such events as “1” when any racial or ethnic minority group members are present, else “0”. This aggregated measure of minority presence was not significant for any model. Also, while I account for protest events by social movement families that make claims for racial and ethnic minorities, it is important to note that such protests do not necessarily mean that racial and ethnic minorities are present at the events. Moreover, racial and ethnic minorities may be present at events not making group-specific claims.
has been a consistent indicator of violence and hostility, I also include a dichotomous variable coded as “1” for counterprotester presence.

As described in Chapter 2, social movement families are more or less loosely tied movements cohering together in an important way around some social problem (Amenta et al. 2009; Isaac 2008). Building upon the claims-making groups defined by the DCA project, I define 6 contemporary social movement families. For these families, I created a series of dummy variables based on the primary claim or grievance made by protesters (see Appendix 2 for a detailed explanation of the coding for each family).

Protest events for the Human and Civil Rights family are coded as “1” where claims are made by or for disadvantaged, oppressed, and/or subordinate groups pertaining national or international rights, human dignity, and equality (i.e. amnesty for illegal immigrants, indigenous people’s rights, same-sex marriage, etc.), else “0”. Protest events for the Nature and Environment family are coded as “1” where claims are made regarding protection of the environment and its non-human inhabitants (i.e., protecting plants, trees, animals, etc.), else “0”. Protest events for the Workers and Labor family are coded as “1” where claims are made regarding workers rights (i.e. safety, pay, unionization), as well as globalization, else “0”. Protest events for the Hate family are coded as “1” where claims are made against specific groups, their legitimacy, or existence (i.e., immigrants, Jews, “homosexuals”), else “0”. Protest events for the Peace and War family are coded as “1” where claims are made pertaining to peace or war (i.e. wars in Afghanistan or Iraq), else “0”. Protest events for the Tea Party and Limited Government family are coded as “1” where claims are made regarding “big” government (i.e., state’s rights, taxation, etc.), else “0”.6 Finally, as a reference category, protest events for miscellaneous social,

6 Importantly, many Tea Party “protests” or town-hall meetings occurred which did not meet the criteria of a protest event because they were clearly initiated by elites, such as politicians, thereby disqualifying them from being
cultural, and political issues are coded as “1” where claims are made about what are generally single issue events, ranging from education (i.e. changes to a local school system) to NIMBY or “not-in-my-backyard” events (i.e. opposition to tall buildings blocking views), else “0”.

Targets (or “enemies”)

Scholars of collective violence and the policing of protest have long argued how explicit targeting of the government influences aggressive police action (Bromley and Shupe 1983; Davenport 1995; Davenport et al. 2011; Gamson 1990; Tilly 1978; Wisler and Giugni 1999). Building on these studies, I expand the purview of “enemies” (Tarrow 1989a) to see how various targets influence policing and violent outcomes at protest events. Thus, I examine three different types of targets—the enemy—comprising a set of dummy variables: government or political targets, economic targets, and social or cultural targets.

Protests are considered to be targeting government or political enemies and are coded as “1” if protester claims directly challenge the authority of any level of government or their actors (i.e., presidents, city governments, political parties, etc.), else “0”. Protests with economic targets are coded as “1” if protester claims directly challenge the authority of businesses, corporations or international economic organizations (i.e. Nike, the World Bank, employers, etc.), else “0”. Protests with social or cultural targets are coded as “1” if protesters directly challenge the authority of educational institutions (i.e. colleges, universities, etc.), or the authority, legitimacy, or existence of certain groups (i.e. Jews), cultural practices, organizations, institutions, or belief systems (i.e. objectification of women, television shows, etc.), else “0”. Social and cultural targets serve as the reference category for this set of variables.

considered in this analysis according to the requirements for “social protests” defined by the Dynamics of Collective Action project. All events that were clearly initiated by actors outside formal institutional channels were included in the dataset. An exception to this rule is when a politician initiated an event and Tea Party protesters engaged in other forms of protest (i.e. demonstrations outside the town hall).
The Stage

Conceiving of social protest as a performance within a field of symbolic action requires defining the proverbial stage upon which this performance occurs (see Alexander 2004). Given previous research that has shown differences in the enforcement of protest event limitations between public forums and government property (McPhail et al. 1998), I examine the stages where protest occurs by constructing two dummy variables. Protest events are considered to have occurred in government space and are coded as “1” if an event is in the vicinity of places controlled, at least in part, by the government or military (i.e., military bases, the White House, Capitols, etc.), else “0”. Protest events are considered to have occurred in public space and are coded as “1” if the event occurs in traditional public forums (i.e., streets, parks, etc.), as well as in or near public buildings (i.e. libraries, shopping centers, etc.), schools, and religious sites (i.e. mosques), else “0”. Public spaces serve as the reference category for this set of variables.

Protest Performance

Consistent with previous research, I measure protest participation, the size of an event, as the logged number of protest event participants. I also create a series of dummy variables to account for 7 tactical types representing the primary form in which a protest event occurs. Protest events taking the rally form are coded as “1” when there is a salient degree of formality, generally revolving around speakers and speechmaking, else “0”. Protest events taking a processional form are coded as “1” when some indication of movement from one place to another occurs (i.e. marches, parades, convoys, etc.), else “0”. Protest events taking a vigil form are coded as “1” when protesters are generally silent or solemn (i.e., holding candles, praying, hunger strike, etc.), else “0”. Protest events taking the confront and disobey form are coded as “1” when protesters specifically form picket lines, are technically breaking the law in non-violent civil disobedience
Protest events taking an artistic form are coded as “1” when protesters use (literal) dramaturgical or symbolic displays (i.e., guerilla theater), else “0”. Protest events taking the form of a general demonstration are coded as “1” when protesters, acting with a certain degree of informality, are stationary, usually chanting and holding placards, sometimes shouting or yelling at passersby, else “0”. Protest events taking the consciousness raising, conventional, or “legitimate” form are coded as “1” when protesters use conventional forms of claims making (i.e., petitioning, filing complaints, news conferences, etc.), else “0”. Protests which are consciousness raising events serve as the reference category for this set of variables.

I also account for events with multiple tactics given previous research suggesting multiple tactics are more difficult to police, and thus are more threatening (Davenport 1995; Davenport et al. 2011; Soule and Davenport 2009). Hence, consistent with previous research I measure tactical variety as a continuous variable ranging from 1 to 4 indicating the number of different tactics employed by protesters. As a final component of protest performance, the damaging of property by protesters has been a consistent indicator of police presence, for obvious reasons, as well as the incidence of collective violence more generally (Davenport et al. 2011; Soule and Davenport 2009). Property damage is measured as a dichotomous variable coded as “1” when protesters are reported to have damaged property at an event.

---

7 Three important demarcations about pickets are necessary. First, while protesters are sometimes called “pickets” this lay term does not necessarily refer to the picket form, and is instead referring to the signs they are holding. Second, while picketers often “march” in a picket line, this is distinct from the processional protest form because picketers march in a “picket line” within a fairly defined area of space. Third, while pickets have been traditionally associated with labor strikes, the picket form, as a part of the U.S. repertoire of contention, has been adapted and is often used by non-labor related events. Despite the tactical diffusion of pickets to other non-labor families, however, the picket is still often fairly confrontational. Moreover, since withholding obligations is defined as a form of civil disobedience by the DCA project, strikes are included in the ‘confront and disobey’ form.

8 My reference to “informality” regards the degree of salient difference between a rally and a demonstration. Ultimately, while some milling does occur at rallies, I attempt to ascertain if the lack of speechmakers, notwithstanding charismatic or inflammatory ones, differentially influences collective violence.
Controls

In addition to the variables accounted for in the dramaturgical model presented above, I also created a dummy variable to control for potential geographic variation in policing and violent outcomes. Historically, the South has “a unique history of racial discrimination and over-policing” with regard to protest events (Davenport, et al. 2011:160). Thus, events occurring in the South are coded as “1”, else “0”.

---

9 I also controlled for an element of the political climate or context in the period under study—the election of President Barack Obama. In the period under study, nearly 80 percent of all events (1,965) occurred before Obama won the presidential election, with just over 20 percent of events (501) taking place from November 5, 2008 through December 31, 2009. Following Soule and Davenport’s (2009) measure of post-1969 impacts on protest event policing and repression, I estimated a dichotomous variable coded as “1” for events occurring after Election Day in 2008 and a separate set of models coded as “1” after February 10, 2007, the day then Senator Obama announced his candidacy for President of the United States. Because this variable failed to reach statistical significance in any model and substantive conclusions were unchanged, this control was dropped from the reported estimates to present a more parsimonious model.
CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

In the analyses that follow, I employ logistic regression to identify factors influencing police presence, arrests, violence by police, and any form of violence at protest events. I first examine what factors influence police presence at social protests. To address this question, I examine a baseline model that includes the types of actors at the event (Model 1, Table 4). I then estimate three additional nested models adding protester targets or enemies (Model 2, Table 4), the stage or types of space protests occupy (Model 3, Table 4), and the performance of claims-making groups at these events (Model 4, Table 4). I then examine the same theoretical series of nested models as above—actors, enemies, stage, and performance—to identify the factors influencing the likelihood of arrests (Table 5), violence by police (Table 6), and any violence (Table 7).

Police Presence

Table 4 reports estimates for the presence of any federal, state, or local law enforcement at protest events for my sample. The baseline model (Model 1) indicates that events where African Americans are present are 2.3 times as likely to evoke police presence compared to other social groups (Hypothesis 2a). Model 1 also indicates the strong influence of counterprotester presence (Hypothesis 6a), where events with counterprotesters are nearly 6 times as likely to lead to the presence of police. In Model 1 I also find some support for the effects of specific social movement families on police presence (Hypothesis 7a). First, the Human and Civil Rights family is nearly 1.5 times more likely to spur police presence compared to protests on miscellaneous social, cultural, and political issues (henceforth, “social issues”), net of other actors at the event. Second, the Nature and Environment family is 2.3 times more likely than social issue protests to have police present. Third, I find that Hate family events are nearly 2.5 times more likely than
events about social issues to be visited by police. Finally, I find a strong relationship between the presence of police and the Peace and War family, where events making claims related to peace are 3.2 times more likely than social issue protests to evoke such presence. Two movement families representing workers and the Tea Party, however, fail to reach significance in Model 1. The baseline model in Table 4 (Model 1) also indicates that community policing styles (Hypothesis 1a) and the presence of Hispanic or Latino/a Americans (Hypothesis 2b) were not significant. In fact, these variables failed to be a significant statistical predictor for any dependent variable in this study, so for the sake of brevity I will not discuss those results further until the next chapter.

In Model 2 I add measures that account for the impact of movement “enemies” or targets on police presence (Hypotheses 8a and 9a). Contrary to my predictions (Hypothesis 8a), protests targeting government and political enemies are actually 33 percent less likely than social and cultural targets to have police present. Contrary outcomes are also found regarding Hypothesis 9a, where protesters targeting economic enemies are 41 percent less likely than protesters with social and cultural targets to evoke police presence. This suggests something about the nature of policing protests where protagonists and antagonists may be relatively removed from structural positions of power. Moreover, it also points to the importance of disaggregating social and cultural targets from economic targets, since previous research has generally used government versus “other” targets in their analyses. After adding measures for protester enemies, the remaining substantive results found in Model 1 remain unchanged.
Table 4. Logistic Regression Estimates for police presence (n=873)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>exp^β</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>exp^β</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>exp^β</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>exp^β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td>.20 (.16)</td>
<td>1.22 (1.16)</td>
<td>.23 (.16)</td>
<td>1.26 (.17)</td>
<td>.21 (.17)</td>
<td>1.23 (.26)</td>
<td>.26 (.26)</td>
<td>1.29 (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American Presence</td>
<td>.83*** (.26)</td>
<td>2.30 (.26)</td>
<td>.89*** (.26)</td>
<td>2.42 (.27)</td>
<td>.87*** (.27)</td>
<td>2.39 (.40)</td>
<td>.93* (.40)</td>
<td>2.54 (.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic/Latino(a) Presence</td>
<td>.26 (.25)</td>
<td>1.29 (.26)</td>
<td>.34 (.26)</td>
<td>1.40 (.29)</td>
<td>.08 (.29)</td>
<td>1.09 (.29)</td>
<td>-.19 (.40)</td>
<td>.82 (.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterprotester Presence</td>
<td>1.75*** (.22)</td>
<td>5.77 (.22)</td>
<td>1.76*** (.23)</td>
<td>5.84 (.24)</td>
<td>1.66*** (.24)</td>
<td>5.28 (.39)</td>
<td>2.01*** (.39)</td>
<td>7.43 (.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human and Civil Rights</td>
<td>.40* (.18)</td>
<td>1.49 (.19)</td>
<td>.44* (.19)</td>
<td>1.56 (.19)</td>
<td>.41* (.19)</td>
<td>1.50 (.31)</td>
<td>.22 (.31)</td>
<td>1.25 (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature and Environment</td>
<td>.85** (.27)</td>
<td>2.34 (.27)</td>
<td>.89*** (.27)</td>
<td>2.43 (.28)</td>
<td>.88** (.28)</td>
<td>2.41 (.46)</td>
<td>1.29** (.46)</td>
<td>3.63 (.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers and Labor</td>
<td>-.33 (.27)</td>
<td>.72 (.27)</td>
<td>-.17 (.29)</td>
<td>.84 (.31)</td>
<td>-.26 (.31)</td>
<td>.77 (.51)</td>
<td>-.13** (.51)</td>
<td>.26 (.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hate</td>
<td>.90** (.33)</td>
<td>2.46 (.35)</td>
<td>.72* (.35)</td>
<td>2.06 (.35)</td>
<td>.88* (.35)</td>
<td>2.42 (.61)</td>
<td>-.12 (.61)</td>
<td>.89 (.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and War</td>
<td>1.20*** (.22)</td>
<td>3.23 (.24)</td>
<td>1.35*** (.24)</td>
<td>3.86 (.26)</td>
<td>1.28*** (.26)</td>
<td>3.60 (.39)</td>
<td>1.06*** (.39)</td>
<td>2.90 (.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea Party and Limited Govt.</td>
<td>.23 (.44)</td>
<td>1.26 (.45)</td>
<td>.37 (.45)</td>
<td>1.45 (.51)</td>
<td>.46 (.51)</td>
<td>1.59 (.73)</td>
<td>1.08 (.73)</td>
<td>2.96 (.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemies</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>- .46** (.18)</td>
<td>.63 (.18)</td>
<td>-.18 (.20)</td>
<td>.84 (.20)</td>
<td>-.60† (.32)</td>
<td>.55 (.32)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>- .53* (.23)</td>
<td>.59 (.23)</td>
<td>-.51* (.24)</td>
<td>.60 (.24)</td>
<td>-1.40*** (.41)</td>
<td>.25 (.41)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Stage</td>
<td>Government Space</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-.40* (.18)</td>
<td>.67 (.18)</td>
<td>.01 (.29)</td>
<td>1.01 (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Performance</td>
<td>Confront and Disobey</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>2.23*** (.43)</td>
<td>9.26 (.43)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Demonstration</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>1.13** (.42)</td>
<td>3.10 (.42)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>.35 (.51)</td>
<td>1.42 (.51)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artistic</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-.24 (.61)</td>
<td>.79 (.61)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigil</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-1.45† (.84)</td>
<td>.24 (.84)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procession</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>1.55*** (.45)</td>
<td>4.69 (.45)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation (log)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>.02 (.05)</td>
<td>1.02 (.05)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Variety</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>1.06*** (.23)</td>
<td>2.88 (.23)</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Damage</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constant | -2.50*** (.15) | -2.21*** (.18) | -2.05*** (.18) | -3.73*** (.56) |

Pseudo R^2 | .10 | .11 | .12 | .38 |

Model chi-square | 124.03 | 131.99 | 128.93 | 233.35 |

Note: Models also contain control for South

††This variable was dropped from the analysis due to an extremely high standard error. See results discussion below for a detailed explanation.

Reference variables: Social Movement Families (General Social Issues); Enemies (Social and Cultural); Stage (Public); Tactics (Consciousness Raising)
In Model 3 I account for the “stage” of protest (Hypothesis 10a). The findings here are intriguing. I find that protests occurring in government space are actually 33 percent less likely than protests in public space to garner the attention of police. Yet when introducing stage into the analysis, the significance of government and political targets disappears. Additional examination of government space and government or political targets was conducted to ensure multicollinearity was not the cause of this change—it was not. In fact, over 20 percent of events (n = 119) targeting the government did not occur in government space. Thus, this may suggest something about the nature of policing protests against government or political targets in public versus government space. The remainder of substantive findings discussed in Models 1 and 2 remained unchanged.

In the final model for police presence (Model 4), I add dimensions of protest performance. In Model 4 I found no support for Hypothesis 11a, which suggests that the number of participants at an event increases the likelihood of police presence. I also find mixed results in the likelihood that police will attend protest events that use tactics which are not of the consciousness raising variety (Hypothesis 12a). Consistent with my predictions, I find that protesters deploying confront and disobey tactics are nearly 9.3 times as likely as those who use the more “legitimate” consciousness raising repertoire to see police at their events. Also consistent with Hypothesis 12a, protesters utilizing general demonstrations and processional tactics are, respectively, 3.1 and 4.7 times more likely than those who utilize consciousness raising activities to evoke police presence. I also find marginal support (p < .10) that one tactic is actually less likely than consciousness raising events to evoke the presence of authorities, which suggests variation within the “less confrontational” or “confrontational” protest repertoire. Namely, protesters who utilize vigils seem to be less likely to get a visit from authorities. In
addition, rallies and artistic performances seem significant non-findings, in that their failure to reach statistical significance indicates little difference between their likelihood to garner police attention than protesters deploying the consciousness raising repertoire. These mixed results, both those that support and at least marginally contradict Hypotheses 12a may suggest that the characteristics of specific tactics play an important role in police perception of threat. This suggests that further exploration of specific tactical influences on police presence is noteworthy and that perhaps new categories, when and if they are aggregated, should be employed. I also found support for Hypothesis 13a, which predicted that an increase in the number of tactics used by protesters will lead to police presence. For each additional tactic used by protesters, police were nearly 2.9 times more likely to be present.

In Model 4, property damage was removed from the model due to an unusually large standard error. Of course, as the descriptive statistics in Table 3 described, the incidence of property damage from 2006-2009 was small—only 17 events occurred where property damage was sustained. Ultimately, this small sample was related to police presence, constituting nearly a constant—of the 17 events where protesters damaged property the police were present 16 times. After dropping property damage from the model, no substantive findings changed. Also in Model 4, there was an interesting interaction between government space and targets. After adding dimensions of protest performance to the model, government and political targets return (see Model 2) to a marginal significance while the significance of government space (see Model 3) disappears. This seems to suggest that protest performance may be more influential in determining police presence than government targets or space. Finally, in Model 4 I find that after adding protest performance, the Workers and Labor family becomes significant, where protesters representing this family are actually 74 percent less likely than social issue protests to
be frequented by police at their events. Thus, this suggests that protester performance may be masking the effect of the Workers and Labor family presence.

**Arrests**

Table 5 reports estimates for the likelihood of police making arrests at an event. The baseline model (Model 1) indicates that in events where counterprotesters are present, police are nearly 3.1 times as likely to make arrests (Hypothesis 6b). Again, mixed results were found for the influence of social movement families (Hypothesis 7b). In events where the Nature and Environment family is present, police are nearly 2.4 times more likely to make arrests compared to protests for general social issues. In events where the Workers and Labor family is present, police are 66 percent less likely to make arrests. Finally, the Peace and War family is just over 3 times as likely to be making claims when arrests are made. Other social movement families—Human and Civil Rights, Hate, and Tea Party—failed to reach statistical significance. Moreover, no support was found for Hypothesis 3a in Model 1 or any other model predicting arrests (Table 5), suggesting that there is no statistical difference in the likelihood of arrest at protest events where African Americans or any other social group is present.

In Model 2 I add measures of protester enemies. Contrary to my predictions (Hypothesis 8b), police are 53 percent less likely to make arrests when protesters are targeting government or political enemies compared to social and cultural foes. I also find other evidence contradicting Hypothesis 9b, with protest events targeting economic enemies being 71 percent less likely to illicit arrests. These unexpected results might suggest something about the nature of social and cultural targets which might present extra issues for public safety or the potential for violence.
Table 5. Logistic Regression Estimates for Arrests (n=873)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>exp$^\beta$</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>exp$^\beta$</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>exp$^\beta$</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>exp$^\beta$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( .25)</td>
<td></td>
<td>( .25)</td>
<td>( .25)</td>
<td>( .26)</td>
<td>( .26)</td>
<td>( .38)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>( .43)</td>
<td>( .43)</td>
<td>( .44)</td>
<td>( .44)</td>
<td>( .59)</td>
<td>( .59)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic/Latino(a)</td>
<td>- .06</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>- .01</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>( .42)</td>
<td>( .43)</td>
<td>( .44)</td>
<td>( .44)</td>
<td>( .59)</td>
<td>( .59)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterprotester</td>
<td>1.12**</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>1.11***</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>1.09**</td>
<td>2.96**</td>
<td>.95†</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>( .33)</td>
<td>( .33)</td>
<td>( .34)</td>
<td>( .34)</td>
<td>( .52)</td>
<td>( .52)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human and Civil</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>( .27)</td>
<td>( .27)</td>
<td>( .28)</td>
<td>( .28)</td>
<td>( .46)</td>
<td>( .46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature and</td>
<td>.87*</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>.99**</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>1.04**</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>1.67***</td>
<td>5.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>( .35)</td>
<td>( .35)</td>
<td>( .36)</td>
<td>( .36)</td>
<td>( .60)</td>
<td>( .60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers and</td>
<td>-1.09*</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>-.62</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>-.60</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>-2.11*</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>( .49)</td>
<td>( .52)</td>
<td>( .52)</td>
<td>( .52)</td>
<td>( .94)</td>
<td>( .94)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hate</td>
<td>-1.36</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>-1.72†</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-1.64†</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>‡†</td>
<td>‡†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.03)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and War</td>
<td>1.10***</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>1.35***</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>1.37***</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>1.28*</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( .29)</td>
<td>( .32)</td>
<td>( .34)</td>
<td>( .34)</td>
<td>( .58)</td>
<td>( .58)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea Party and</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>3.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Govt.</td>
<td>( .63)</td>
<td>( .64)</td>
<td>( .79)</td>
<td>( .79)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enemies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.76**</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>-.65*</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>-1.16*</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>( .25)</td>
<td>( .28)</td>
<td>( .28)</td>
<td>( .48)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-1.25***</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-1.24***</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-2.66***</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>( .38)</td>
<td>( .38)</td>
<td>( .73)</td>
<td>( .73)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Stage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Space</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>( .25)</td>
<td>( .25)</td>
<td>( .41)</td>
<td>( .41)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Performance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confront and</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4.71***</td>
<td>111.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disobey</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>( .76)</td>
<td>( .76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.56***</td>
<td>12.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>( .80)</td>
<td>( .80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artistic</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>‡†</td>
<td>‡†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigil</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>‡†</td>
<td>‡†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procession</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.07***</td>
<td>21.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation (log)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>( .82)</td>
<td>( .82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Variety</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-1.13†</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Damage</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.06***</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>( .29)</td>
<td>( .29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.09***</td>
<td>-2.60***</td>
<td>-2.49***</td>
<td>-5.60***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( .20)</td>
<td>( .23)</td>
<td>( .23)</td>
<td>( .87)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R$^2$</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model chi-square</td>
<td>46.41</td>
<td>61.73</td>
<td>60.29</td>
<td>193.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$p < .10$  $^*p < .05$  $^{**}p < .01$  $^{***}p < .001$  Note: Models also contain control for South

††This variable was dropped from the analysis due to an extremely high standard error. See results discussion below for a detailed explanation.

Reference variables: Social Movement Families (General Social Issues); Enemies (Social and Cultural); Stage (Public); Tactics (Consciousness Raising)
Model 3 includes measures of the stage, but finds no support for Hypothesis 10b. When adding government space to the model, however, I find that the Hate family becomes marginally (p < .10) less likely to have arrests occur at their events.

In the final model (Model 4), I add measures of protest performance to discern its impact on the likelihood of arrest at an event. I find only marginal (p < .10) support for Hypothesis 11b, though this model does show some indication that each increase in the standard deviation of the logged number of protesters decreases the likelihood of arrest at an event. Again, I find mixed support for Hypothesis 12b, concerning the general difference between consciousness raising and other forms of protest. Confront and disobey tactics are found to have both a high significance and strong likelihood of resulting in arrest, with these tactics being just over 111 times more likely to lead to arrest compared to consciousness raising activities. Of course, since most of these tactics are “technically” against the law, this finding is not surprising. General demonstrations and processional tactics are also strong predictors of arrest, being nearly 13 and 21.5 times more likely than consciousness raising, respectively, to result in arrest. Rallies were not significantly different from consciousness raising. I did find support for Hypothesis 13b, which predicted that tactical variety would lead to increased chances for arrest. Model 4 shows that for each additional tactic used by protesters, the likelihood of arrest increases 2.9 times. I also found strong support for Hypothesis 14b, which shows that protest events where property is damaged are 20.7 times more likely than ones where it is not for arrests to occur.

There are also several changes to the significance of variables ran in earlier models. After adding protest performance to the model, I find that the statistical significance of counterprotester presence drops precipitously to a marginal level (p < .10), weakening support for Hypothesis 6b. This suggests that protest performance—the ways protesters present their
claims—are crucial factors in the likelihood of arrests given the strength of counterprotester presence in previous models. Protest performance also shows a mediating effect on other variables. First, while maintaining the same level of statistical significance, the likelihood that arrests occur where the Nature and Environment family is present raises from 2.4 in Model 1 to 5.3 in the final model (Model 4). I also find that the Workers and Labor family reaches statistical significance in Model 4 where it had not in previous models. Thus, I find that protest events where the Workers and Labor family is present are 88 percent less likely than other social issue protests to result in arrest. These findings may suggest that, depending on the nature of protest performance, the Workers and Labor family is unlikely and the Nature and Environment family is more likely to have an arrest occur at an event where they are present.

Additionally, I also found that three variables—the Hate family, artistic tactics, vigil tactics, had extremely high standard errors. Thus, they were removed from the analysis. Multicollinearity checks were performed to ensure this was not the problem—it was not. In fact, for each of these variables arrests occurred at only 1 event. Thus, it is possible that these events were excluded from the analysis due to missing data. Models that were ran with or without these variables showed no substantive changes.

**Violence by Police**

Table 6 reports regression estimates for the likelihood of police violence at protest events. In support of Hypothesis 4a, the baseline model (Model 1) indicates that police violence is nearly 2.2 times more likely at protest events where African Americans are present versus those where they are not. Consistent with Hypothesis 6c, Model 1 also indicates that violence by police is 3.8 times more likely when counterprotesters are present. Support for Hypothesis 7c is mixed. For the Nature and Environment family, police violence is nearly 2.7 times more likely than at
protest events for general social issues. Findings with regard to the Peace and War family show that events making such claims are nearly 4 times more likely than social issue protests to involve police violence. Findings for the other social movement families—Human and Civil Rights; Workers and Labor; Hate; and Tea Party—did not reach statistical significance.

In Model 2 I add measures of protest targets or enemies. Contrary to Hypothesis 8c, protest events targeting government and political enemies are 42 percent less likely than events targeting social and cultural enemies to have police violence occur. Similarly, and strongly, protest events targeting economic enemies are 72 percent less likely to have some form of authority violence occur. This suggests a strong relationship between protesters targeting social and cultural enemies and the advent of police violence.

In Model 3 I add the “stage” variables, but contrary to Hypothesis 10c protesting in government space has no effect on the likelihood of police violence. As shown in Model 3 of Table 4, however, I find that when adding protests concerning the stage to my model, government space seems to interact with the targeting of government and political enemies.

In Model 4 I add measures of protest performance to discern their effects on police violence. Contrary to Hypothesis 11c, I find that for each unit increase in protest size, the likelihood of police violence is reduced by 14 percent. For Hypothesis 12c I find mixed results. Confront and Disobey tactics are nearly 15.7 times more likely than consciousness raising tactics to elicit police violence. Of the other specific tactics examined, only the processional form reaches statistical significance, showing that such tactics are nearly 3.9 times more likely to result in police violence. I also find that for each additional tactic used by protesters, the likelihood of police using violence increases by nearly 3.1 times. Model 4 also shows the strong
relationship between protesters damaging property and violence by police, where such acts increase the likelihood of police violence by 108.5 times.

I also find several changes in other measures. While African American presence remained significant across all four models, a general increase in the likelihood of police violence when African Americans are present occurs—from 2.2 times in Model 1 to nearly 3.2 times in Model 4. A similar effect is found for counterprotester presence, which has a likelihood increase from 3.8 times in Model 1 to 4.6 times in Model 4. As shown earlier in Model 3 of Table 4, I again find an interaction between government and political targets, protests in government space, and the dynamics of protest performance. The drop to non-significance of government and political enemies in Model 3 (Table 6) after adding measures for protests on the government stage, and its return to significance yielding a likelihood of being 61 percent less likely than protests targeting social and cultural enemies to illicit police violence is intriguing. This suggests some connection between protester’s enemies, where they are protesting, and their performance with the likelihood of police violence.
Table 6. Logistic Regression Estimates for Police Violence (n=873)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>exp^b</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>exp^b</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>exp^b</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>exp^b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American Presence</td>
<td>.77*</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>.92**</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>.91**</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.16*</td>
<td>3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic/Latino(a) Presence</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterprotester Presence</td>
<td>1.35***</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>1.29***</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>1.18***</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>1.54***</td>
<td>4.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human and Civil Rights</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature and Environment</td>
<td>.99**</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>1.13***</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>1.21***</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.67**</td>
<td>5.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers and Labor</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hate</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>-.82</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>-.72</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>-1.75</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and War</td>
<td>1.37***</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>1.50***</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>1.56***</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>1.68***</td>
<td>5.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea Party and Limited Govt.</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and Political</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.55**</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>-.95*</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-1.26***</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>-1.36***</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>-2.57***</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Stage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Space</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confront and Disobey</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.75***</td>
<td>15.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Demonstration</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artistic</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-1.57</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigil</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-1.77</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procession</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.35*</td>
<td>3.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation (log)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-1.5*</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Variety</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.11***</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Damage</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4.69***</td>
<td>108.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.99***</td>
<td>-2.57***</td>
<td>-2.43***</td>
<td>-3.68***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R^2</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model chi-square</td>
<td>66.79</td>
<td>84.23</td>
<td>89.60</td>
<td>220.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .10  **p < .05  ***p < .01  ****p < .001  Note: Models also contain control for South Reference variables: Social Movement Families (General Social Issues); Enemies (Social and Cultural); Stage (Public); Tactics (Consciousness Raising)
Occurrence of Any Violence

Table 7 reports estimates for the occurrence of any type of violence at protest events. Consistent with Hypothesis 5a, I find that African Americans are 2.4 times more likely to be present at protest events that turn violent than other social groups. I also find strong support for Hypothesis 6d, which shows that protests where counterprotesters are present have nearly a 6.5 times greater chance of turning violent. I find mixed support for Hypothesis 7d. The Nature and Environment family is 2.4 times more likely than protests for social issues to be part of protest events which turn violent. I also find that the Peace and War family is 3.6 times more likely to be part of protest events that turn violent. In addition, I find marginal support (p < .10) that Tea Party family protests are 2.1 times more likely than social issue events to have some form of violence.

In Model 2 I add measures for the enemies of protesters. I find that, contrary to Hypothesis 8d, protesters targeting government and political enemies are 41 percent less likely to turn violent compared to protests targeting social and cultural enemies. Likewise, protesters targeting economic enemies strongly contradicts Hypothesis 8d showing that such protests are 71 percent less likely to turn violent. No other measures change substantively.

In Model 3 I add measures of the stage. I find that while government space (Hypothesis 10d) is only marginally significant (p < .10) it impacts the influence of protester targets once more. Thus, the impact of the stage, though indirectly, can be seen.

In Model 4 I add measures of protest performance. Contrary to Hypothesis 11d, I find that for each unit increase in protest size, the likelihood of violence decreases by 15 percent. I also find mixed results for Hypothesis 12d. Confront and disobey tactics are strongly associated with some form of violence, with these tactics being nearly 15.5 times more likely than consciousness raising activities to occur at violent protest events. I also find that processional
forms are 3.5 times more likely than more conventional protests to be associated with some form of violence. In addition, I find support for Hypothesis 13d, showing that for each tactic used by protesters, violence becomes 3.1 times more likely. Finally, I again find the strong relationship of property damage to violence, where events in which property damage occurs are nearly 96.7 times more likely to turn violent than at events where it does not occur.

In Model 4 I find other interesting effects from adding protest performance to the model. In particular I find that one measure, the Workers and Labor family, becomes a marginally significant (p < .10) predictor of a decreased likelihood of violence at events in which they are involved. I also find that two variables which had been significant or marginally significant in Models 1 or 2 again become significant in Model 4. First, as mentioned above, the stage, enemy, and performance of protest seem to be interacting. As Model 4 shows, after introducing protest performance, events with government and political enemies have a 56 percent less likelihood of becoming violent compared to events with social and cultural targets. Yet the marginal significance of government space in Model 3 is no longer present in Model 4. Model 4 also shows that once protest performance is accounted for, events where the Tea Party family is involved are strongly associated with violence, being nearly 5.5 times more likely than protests about general social issues to become violent. I also find that introduction of protest performance measures increases the likelihood of violence for three actor measures. First, compared to Model 1, in Model 4 African Americans are 3.4 times more likely to be at protest events that turn violent. Second, I find an even stronger association between counterprotester presence and violence in Model 4 (10 times) than in Model 1 (6.5 times). Finally, I also find an increase in the likelihood that the Nature and Environment family will be involved in violent protest, with that likelihood increasing from 2.4 in Model 1 to nearly 4.4 in Model 4.
Table 7. Logistic Regression Estimates for Any Violence (n=873)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>exp^β</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>exp^β</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>exp^β</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>exp^β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American Presence</td>
<td>.89**</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.03***</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>.97**</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>1.24*</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic/Latino(a) Presence</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>-.39</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterprotester Presence</td>
<td>1.87***</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>1.83***</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>1.70***</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>2.30***</td>
<td>9.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human and Civil Rights</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature and Environment</td>
<td>.88**</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>1.02***</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>1.08***</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>1.48**</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers and Labor</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>-1.23†</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hate</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>-1.38</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and War</td>
<td>1.29***</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>1.40***</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>1.39***</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>1.41**</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea Party and Limited Govt.</td>
<td>.74†</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>.84†</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.70*</td>
<td>5.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confront and Disobey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Demonstration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artistic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procession</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation (log)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Variety</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Damage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.89***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.48***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.33***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.42***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R^2</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
<td>.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model chi-square</td>
<td>97.23</td>
<td>115.40</td>
<td>116.71</td>
<td>240.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Models also contain control for South Reference variables: Social Movement Families (General Social Issues); Enemies (Social and Cultural); Stage (Public); Tactics (Consciousness Raising)

*p < .10  **p < .05  ***p < .01  ****p < .001
CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research was to identify the characteristics of protest events that lead to police presence and various forms of violence. Drawing on key works from literature on the policing and social control of protest (Davenport et al. 2011; Earl 2003; Earl and Soule 2006, 2010; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009) and dramaturgical and cultural theories (Alexander 2004, 2006; Eyerman 2006; Eyerman and Jameson 1991; Goffman 1959, 1967, 1974), I constructed an integrated model of protest event dynamics. I investigated how the four components of this model—actors, enemies, the stage, and protest performance—influenced the likelihood of police presence, arrests, police violence, and any form of violence at protest events in the U.S. from 2006-2009. Below I discuss the substantive findings of my research (see Appendix 4 for a summary of my findings), those which were consistent with my predictions and those that were not, as well as other significant non-findings and mixed results. This chapter unfolds as follows. First, I discuss how each component of my model influences the four outcomes of interest in this study. Then, I conclude by discussing the implications of my study, its limitations, and provide suggestions for future research.

THE ACTORS

A sizeable literature has examined the influence various actors exude on protest event outcomes (Davenport et al. 2011; della Porta and Reiter 1998; Earl 2003; Earl and Soule 2006, 2010; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009). These literatures directed me to several key members of the cast—police officers, subordinate and/or minority groups, counterprotesters, and representatives of social movements—which have various, but important effects on the dynamics of social protest.
One actor in my analysis has a doubly complex role—they are at times both a predictor and an outcome variable. I am speaking, of course, about the role played by police—I am interested both in discerning what makes them show up at a protest event and how they perform, as well as if certain policing styles influence the former. Various studies have examined what leads police to attend protest events and what they do once present (Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009). Past research has examined structural factors, such as police force capacity (Earl et al. 2003), which is argued to be a likely factor in a police department’s ability to use resources in the social control of protest events. Such studies have examined how funds available to departments, in the context of its jurisdiction and police force size, becomes a somewhat pragmatic determinant in the choice to deploy police at social protests. While research examining cultural factors has examined what police do once they are at an event, little research has examined how organizational cultures of police or policing styles influence whether police attend protest events.

In this study, I was able to cull from the literature on policing styles a proxy measure of one such “cultural” influence (della Porta et al. 1998; Fernandez 2008; Gillham and Noakes 2007; McPhail et al. 1998; Soule and Davenport 2009; U.S. Department of Justice, 2010). Thus, drawing on these literatures, I identified the lineage from negotiated management to community policing styles. Because the latter, like the former, deals with negotiation and partnerships, I expected that funding by the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program would influence police presence, actions at protest events, and the possible mediation of any violence that might occur. However, I found no support for these hypotheses.

Because COPS training encourages partnerships and negotiation, I expected this might increase the chances of police going to an event. Ultimately, I cannot glean from my data if the
negotiations between departments with community policing styles may occur with activists and organizers before events and not at the protest site. I also expected that community policing would reduce the likelihood of arrest and various forms of violence, particularly since negotiated management strategies—which have been shown to reduce violence—and community policing do bear a family of resemblances. COPS funding did not significantly impact any of these outcomes. This may not be so surprising, however, given the vast literature that has examined the sometimes rather gloomy success of implementing COPS (Fielding 1995; Greene et al. 1994; Mastrofski 2006; Mastrofski et al. 1995; Mastrofski et al. 2000; Sadd and Grinc 1994; Schafer 2001; Tien and Rich 1994; Terrill et al. 2003; Rosenbaum and Wilkinson 2004; Zhao et al. 1999). Thus, just exactly how or if COPS impacts protest policing may require more specific or different types of analyses.

Another set of protest event actors are subordinate, oppressed, and/or minority groups. Earl et al. (2003), for example, found how politically “weak” groups, such as racial and ethnic minorities, poor people, and other subordinate groups were more likely to have their protests frequented by police. Other research by Davenport and colleagues (2011) drew on theories of systemic racism (Bonilla-Silva 2001; Feagin 200, 2006), among others, to examine the influence “protesting while black” had on police presence. Thus, because the literature on systemic racism suggests that power holders (who are mostly white) are more threatened by African Americans relative to other social groups, the authors hypothesized that because African American protest is more threatening to the status quo, police would be more likely to attend (Davenport et al. 2011). Notwithstanding that the authors make clear that this does not mean individual police officers are racist, their hypothesis was confirmed (Davenport et al. 2011).
In this study, I examined two specific groups—African Americans and Latino/a Americans. While the period studied by Davenport and colleagues—1960 to 1990—is different from the one I examine here, I predicted that due to the historical nature of racism in the U.S. such patterns of racial variation in police presence would continue for African Americans and, given the recent salience of large scale mobilization of Latinos and Latinas in the cause of immigrant rights, the same would hold true for them. The results of my study, however, confirmed only the former and not the latter hypothesis. I also found that while police violence and any violence was more likely at events where African Americans were present, arrests were not. This result is troublesome, for it seems to suggest that police are more likely to use violence rather than arrests at protests where African Americans are present. On the other hand, I found no significant impact of Latino/a presence. Thus, while my results cannot discern if specific police departments made racially biased decisions, this finding does suggest the continuance of perceived “threat” posed by African Americans who challenge systems of authority in the U.S.

Scholars have also consistently shown that counterprotesters at protest events lead to police presence and other forms of violence (Davenport et al. 2011; Soule and Davenport 2009). My study is no different. The presence of counterprotesters has come to represent an important dynamic on the stage of change, one that often becomes a cue suggesting potential hostility. With regards to police presence, police violence, and any violence, counterprotesters are strongly associated with those outcomes. A more curious finding, however, emerges in regard to the relationship between counterprotester presence and the likelihood of arrest. After adding protest performance to the final model, the finding for counterprotester presence became marginal (p < .10). Thus, while counterprotesters might influence arrests, what the protesters are actually doing—their type and number of tactics, their numbers, and whether they are damaging
property—appear more relevant for arrests. At the same time, we also see what types of interactions are more likely when counterprotesters take to the stage: police monitoring, police violence, and/or violence between actors.

The final actors on the stage—social movement families—were hypothesized to be more likely than rather diffuse social protests to influence the likelihood of police presence, arrest, police violence, and any violence. I developed these families from claims-making groups identified by the Dynamics of Collective Action project, which has collected data on social protest in the U.S. From these lists developed about decades of claims-making, I constructed 6 social movement families and an “other” category. Since previous research had suggested that social movement organizational presence influences protest event outcomes, I hypothesized that a salient family at events—for all families—would influence the chances these events would be policed and turn violent. For all outcomes of interest, there was no uniformity across movement families. Thus, I found no support for my hypothesis that the presence of any salient claims-making group would be more likely to result in policing and violent outcomes. Since no research has actually compared movements or movement families and their impact on these outcomes, I was also exploring potential inter-family variation.

The first family I examined was the Human and Civil Rights family. This family was not a significant predictor for any final model in my analysis. There are several possible explanations. First, since they are an established (perhaps institutionalized) component of American life, protest events directed at human and civil rights of various sorts may have become normalized. Second, this lack of predictive power could be because of the diverse array of claims-makers which may be members of this family. For example, civil rights claims for African Americans and immigrant rights protests are both part of this family, along with
women’s rights, gay and lesbian rights, and various other minority and disadvantaged group rights. Yet research has also suggested that groups directly challenging the status quo are more threatening (Davenport et al. 2011). In fact, most of members of the Human and Civil Rights family in some way challenge long-established systems of stratification as well as cultural beliefs and practices. Finally, while other models essentially showed this family had no influence on outcomes, I did find that, until controlling for protest performance, the Human and Civil Rights family was a significant predictor for police presence. Thus, this raises important questions about tactical variation and diffusion across families. Hence, examining the tactics used by this specific family, as well as the different claims-making groups within, offers a fruitful research agenda.

The second family I examined was the Nature and Environment family. The presence of this family at protest events was found to be a significant predictor for every outcome—police presence, arrest, police violence, and any violence were more likely to occur. Part of this could be attributed to the rather rowdy image and tactics attributed to two organizations within the family—the Environmental Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front. These two organizations, fighting to protect the environment and animals, respectively, are somewhat related, with the former being a splinter or development of the latter. While both groups are considered “terrorist” organizations by the U.S. government and each have damaged property extensively, among other things, one must wonder if the more confrontational nature of these two organizations are being transposed onto the entire family of which they are a part. While my analyses here limit me from making such speculation, a more detailed examination of intra-movement variation in concert with other social and cultural factors (i.e. media framing of animal rights or environmental protests) is needed. Moreover, examining this movement’s tactical repertoire could also shed light on the outcomes found here.
The third family I examined was the Workers and Labor family. This family contradicted my hypotheses about movement family salience being more likely to draw police, arrest, or any other form of violence. I found it somewhat surprising that this family was actually less likely than social issue protests to garner police presence or arrests given the vitriol surrounding protests in 1999 against the World Trade Organization in Seattle and subsequent anti-globalization protests. This may suggest a general pattern of protests by this family—they are perceived as relatively non-threatening to police with the exception of a few large scale protests which use confrontational tactics and disrupt routine activities unrelated to the event itself, with exceptions perhaps being shopping and consumerism.

The fourth family I examined was the Hate family. Again I found little support for my hypothesis about family salience. Thus, the Hate family was not significantly different from social issue protests with regard to policing and violent outcomes. Given the blatantly confrontational (and extreme) nature of their claims, the exploration of inter-family variation points to important characteristics of “hate” events relevant to my interests here. Namely, in what ways do the police handle hate group activity? Given the lack of evidence, for example, that police would be more likely to attend Hate family events, and that police presence and arrest models showed some indication of a reduced chance of policing, this might suggest a “hands-off” or de-escalation approach to hate group events.

The fifth family I studied was the Peace and War Family. This family was more likely, in some cases strongly, than social issue protests to be represented at events where police were present, made arrests, and used violence, as well as where some type of violence occurred. In studies on the repression and social control of protest which have studied radical goals, this family’s claims are among those goals, largely because they are targeting the government or
military (see Earl et al. 2003). No doubt, the peace and antiwar movements in the United States have garnered somewhat of a reputation for being confrontational (see DeBenedetti 1990). These findings suggest that this family’s perceived threat persists. Exactly what this particular family does that generates this threat requires further examination.

The final family I examined was the Tea Party and Limited Government family. While not actually the “newest” of the families examined here, as such claims have been made, albeit arguably, throughout the history of the U.S. and before it, the Tea Party family has garnered much public attention in recent years—both good and bad. For all outcomes related to the police or authorities—their presence, use of arrest, or violence—the Tea Party family was not a significant predictor. But they were a significant predictor of any violence occurring at events where they were present. In fact, among all the other social movement families examined here, they bore the greatest likelihood of being associated with events that turn violent. This outcome is intriguing, for it suggests while the Tea Party family does not present a threat to police, violence still occurs. Thus, since my measure of any violence includes police, protester and counterprotester use of physical or violent force, this suggests that Tea Party events are likely to have some confrontation between protesters and counterprotesters. But exactly who is perpetrating this violence (“who started it”) and why is beyond the scope of this study.

The research presented here on the role actors play in protest policing and violence is important, not only because it shows that African American and counterprotester presence remain significant predictors of such outcomes, but also because it illuminates puzzles in the families of actors presenting claims at protest events. Thus, because I find so much variation between movement families with regard to these outcomes, it seems that expecting “any” presence, whether SMOs or social movement families, may indeed mask the unique impact of
each group. With that in mind, a fruitful research agenda rests in further examinations of particular claims for each family, particularly with regard to the Human and Civil Rights family.

ENEMIES AND THE STAGE
The next two components of my model are protester targets or enemies and the stage. I discuss these two components together both for the sake of brevity and due to interesting interactions that occurred between enemies (Model 2) and the stage (Model 3).

For police presence, arrests, police violence, and any violence the enemies protesters were targeting were important factors—but not in the predicted direction. Previous research has argued that targeting the government would likely lead to policing and violence because of the threat it posed to power holders (Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Davenport 2011). Likewise, I expected economic enemies, as power holders in society, to be more likely than social and cultural targets to increase likely policing and violence. To the contrary, it was the reverse on both counts. First, these results speak to the potential practical aspects of policing events which are targeting groups that do not hold some formal position of power. Thus, while this might not necessarily present a direct threat to people in positions of power, it may present a threat to public order.

Second, notwithstanding the symbolic nature of government stages, where protesters may even perceive or “feel” the presence of authority (i.e. protesting in front of the White House) which in itself could influence behavior, the interaction between protests targeting government and political enemies when controlling for space is intriguing. The stage was not a significant predictor for any outcome of interest in any final model. Moreover, in all models the introduction of the stage did not impact the likelihood that protesters targeting economic enemies would be less likely to be policed violently or at all, or that any violence would occur at those events. The
same was not true, however, for government and political enemies. On all fronts, it appears that the place where one is protesting government and political enemies may influence event outcomes, though further analyses are required to discern these relationships more precisely. Additionally, when protest performance is introduced, I also find that this often mediates the impact of government stages on government targets. Hence, while government space often influences the impact of targeting government and political enemies, the particular performance of these protesters also seems to mediate the effect of government space on government targets. Thus, this suggests an important connection, not only between whom one is targeting and where one does it, but the ways claims are presented in those situations.

Third, my results also speak to what constitutes so-called “radical” or threatening goals. In a democracy, it might be expected that citizens would challenge the authority of their government and other power holders—indeed, by definition this would seem to be the case. But do my findings suggest that challenging the authority, legitimacy, or existence of social or cultural groups, their practices, beliefs, or even existence are truly the most threatening goals of all? Moreover, does it suggest something about the nature of targeting the government or economic interests? Ultimately, an in depth examination of the historical and political context, in addition to protests occurring in earlier decades, would be needed to see if this has always been the case. There is, however, something to be said about certain claims, claims makers, and enemies from a dramaturgical approach.

When inspecting my results more closely, an interesting pattern emerges. Namely, the most institutionalized social movement family reaching statistical significance—Workers and Labor—is less likely to evoke police presence and various forms of violence compared to other relative newcomers to the stage of change. Because claims pertaining to worker’s rights, for
example, are often embedded within legal or conventional frameworks (i.e. unions, collective bargaining, etc.), these protests may be seen as less threatening because workers are often at least partially acting according to the formal rules and regulations set forth by those in positions of power—notwithstanding rare exceptions to this rule like the “Battle in Seattle.”

This pattern seems to hold true, though in a different way, for enemies. Thus, while it may seem counterintuitive for government or economic targets to actually be less likely than social and cultural ones to evoke violent outcomes, government and economic “enemies” are well integrated into the structures of power, and challenging them is part of the larger narrative of a democracy that prides itself on the expression of dissent. Hence, the power of these types of enemies may indeed rest on their response to dissent. Conversely, finding that movement families generally targeting economic and government enemies are likely to be associated with violence but their targets are less likely to be associated with violence suggests that the process of challenging these enemies is relatively institutionalized. Such challenges may only be truly threatening when they deviate from the scripted performances set out by the very actors who are being challenged. In other words, it might be okay to challenge government or economic enemies, so long as you play by their rules, yield to their expectations, and follow the script they have laid out for “proper” means of expressing dissent. As such, by institutionalizing the way protests are performed with regard to certain enemies the expectations by authorities are more clearly laid out, resulting in a decreased likelihood of violent behavior so long as the performers stick to the script.

PROTEST PERFORMANCE
The particular tactics and characteristics of protest events have long been of interest to scholars of social movements (i.e. Tilly 1986, 2006, 2008). Recent research has shown the importance of
four factors in determining event outcomes—number of protesters, types and numbers of tactics, and property damage. In regard to the size of protests, a key element to the dynamics of protest performance, I found no support that larger protests increase the chances that police would be present. Thus, compared to other research which has shown this to be the case (Earl et al. 2003), my findings could suggest a change in the types of events perceived to be a threat to power holders and public order. My findings also showed, though only marginally, support for my prediction that larger protest events would decrease the likelihood of arrests. I also found contradictory evidence for the likelihood of police and any violence occurring at larger events—it is actually less likely. Both practical and theoretical implications emerge from these findings.

First, my findings raise a question about the difficulty of policing larger protests and the salience of police at such events. Thus, while it seems counterintuitive that police would be absent at large events, the presence of the “masses” may indeed present cases where, because such a large group is so threatening, police do not make themselves known unless some form of disruptive activity occurs in an effort to prevent provocation or an escalation of conflict. Second, it is also possible that while police would be aware of large events and prepared for deployment to them, they may also not be “at” the event, but ready and waiting in case violence was to occur. Third, there is also a question about informal social control. Thus, while hundreds of thousands of people are highly unlikely to go on a collective rampage, in such large crowds protesters may police one another—absent, of course, the dynamics which are introduced when counterprotesters are present. Finally, that larger protests have no effect on police presence, seem at least marginally likely to reduce the chance of arrest, and reduce the chances some form of violence occurs may also point to the types of violence that does sometimes occur at such events. Thus, the phrase “rogue element” may be pertinent to this situation, in which a small group of
protesters break off from larger social protests and engage in activity that leads to violent outcomes.

As another component of protest performance, I also examined specific tactical types which have often been categorized under one “confrontational” or “less confrontational” category to discern if, despite such general categorizations, specific tactics would still be more likely than consciousness raising or “conventional” tactics to lead police to be present, use arrests, and turn violent, and whether any violence at all would occur. Thus, my examination both tested the strength of previously used categories (Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009; Tarrow 1989a) while also exploring potential variation in the symbolic aspects of these repertories. In general, based on the hypothesis that all of these tactics should be more likely to result in the outcomes of interest, I actually found that some tactics (e.g. rally and artistic tactics), were no different, statistically speaking, from consciousness raising events, where others were, as expected, more likely to result in policing and/or violence (e.g. confront and disobey, general demonstrations, processions). Indeed, though marginally, vigils were actually less likely than consciousness raising events to have police attend, though these tactics were not significant predictors of any other outcomes.

As a result of these findings, scholars might consider the following when creating larger categories. First, in lieu of research that tests these findings across different time periods, tactics for U.S. protests which might be deemed “confrontational” might be: confront and disobey, general demonstrations, and processions. If one were to be more subtle in these demarcations, we might place confront and disobey tactics in “more confrontational” and general demonstrations
and processions in “less confrontational” categories given the relative strength of likelihoods that holds in at least some models. ¹⁰

I also found support for all of my hypotheses regarding tactical variety, which suggests that the more tactics protesters use, the more likely it is that police will be present or that arrests, police violence, or any violence will occur. Thus, consistent with previous research which suggests the inherent difficulty in policing multiple tactics (Davenport et al. 2011; Soule and Davenport 2009) I also find this seems to be the case for the period under study.

The final aspect of performance regards whether protesters damaged property at an event. Indeed, while only 17 events in my sample had property damage occur, the damaging of property is a strong indicator of the protest event outcomes examined here. This is particularly salient for police presence, where property damage was dropped from the model due to a high standard error—of the 17 events where property damage was reported, police were present 16 times. Thus, one might reasonably conclude that missing data might be the reason property damage achieved such a high standard error and that the case where property damage occurred where the police weren’t present might have been deleted for that reason. In all the other models, property damage was a strong indicator that arrests, police violence, and any violence would occur. Yet this also raises the question about whether property damage is a form of violence (an outcome) as Tilly (2003) might have argued or an aspect of performance (a predictor) as most studies like the one presented here have contended (see Davenport et al. 2011). Investigating this categorization, too, is important for future research.

¹⁰ On the point of categorization I do offer a brief caveat gleaned from other analyses not presented here. General demonstrations were found not to be significant predictors of police violence or any violence. In the process of running analyses in which all variables with high standard errors (including property damage discussed below) and non-significant variables were dropped, general demonstrations were significantly more likely to result in police violence and any violence, while no other substantive findings changed.
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

In conclusion, this study has highlighted the importance of symbolic action in influencing protest event outcomes by demarcating between types of actors, enemies, stages, and performances. In some instances it has shown that certain characteristics of social protest in the U.S. persist from earlier decades—when African Americans or counterprotesters are present, when protesters deploy “more confrontational” tactics, use multiple tactics, and damage property police presence and/or some form of violence occurs. I also find some variation from previous studies, in that: (1) larger protests may actually be less likely to be policed or result in violence; (2) social and cultural targets are more likely predictors of policing and violence instead of government or political ones; (3) and, specific social movement families and tactical repertoires influence protest event outcomes differently. This last point also speaks to some of the limitations of my study, for just as I argue that previous categorizations of tactics and social movements were too broad, the categories presented here could still be broken down more specifically and given individual treatments with regard to examining within category variation. As such, comparing specific claims within social movement families (i.e. protecting animals generally vs. opposition to laboratory research) and the specific symbolic actions at protest events (i.e. chanting, blockades, picket lines, etc.) may provide a fruitful research agenda. As with any study of protest events, another limitation is the problem of missing data. As Earl et al. (2004) suggested, scholars might use multiple imputation techniques to handle missing data. Thus, examining the impact of multiple imputation on data sets with high percentages of missing data and its implications could be an important advance for protest event research.

By no means does the study here conduct a micro-to-macro analysis of violence, social protests, and policing styles in the United States. What it does provide, however, is the
foundation for a reorientation in language that might be synthesized with discussions of political process theory and the resource mobilization paradigm in social movement research. Put differently, in the future scholars may move further toward full theoretical integration by examining cultural producers, the means of symbolic and material production, resource-based variation of tactical selection, resource-based differences in social movement families and its impacts on policing and violence, as well as focusing on specific cases, whether by city and state or by movement family. Thus, while I emphasize the importance of symbolic aspects of protest events, political process, resource mobilization, and other structural concerns are still of vital importance. What I hope to provide here, however, is a means to develop our scholarly repertoire for discussing the symbolic so that it may lead to an increased understanding of the political, particularly regarding how we might attach individual social protests to political processes and social movement outcomes within ongoing narratives on the stage of change.
REFERENCES


McAdam, Doug and John D. McCarthy. 1996. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge University Press.


APPENDIX 1: Summary of Hypotheses by Dependent Variable

**Police Presence**
Hypothesis 1a: Police departments in cities that have engaged in COPS, because this program encourages community interaction and partnerships, will be more likely to attend protest events.

Hypothesis 2a: Compared to other social groups, police will be more likely to attend protest events when African Americans are present.

Hypothesis 2b: Compared to other social groups, police will be more likely to attend protest events when Latinos and Latinas are present.

Hypothesis 6a: Police will be more likely to attend protest events when counterprotesters are present.

Hypothesis 7a: Police will be more likely to attend protest events when representatives of social movement families are present compared to single issue events.

Hypothesis 8a: Police will be more likely to attend events where protesters are targeting government of political enemies.

Hypothesis 9a: Police will be more likely to attend events where protesters are targeting economic enemies.

Hypothesis 10a: Police will be more likely to attend protest events occurring in government space.

Hypothesis 11a: Police will be more likely to attend larger protest events.

Hypothesis 12a: Police will be more likely to attend protest events where tactics not considered consciousness raising or legitimate are used.

Hypothesis 13a: Police will be more likely to attend protest events with multiple tactics.

Hypothesis 14a: Police will be more likely to attend protest events when protesters damage property.

**Arrests**
Hypothesis 1b: Police departments in cities that have engaged in COPS will be less likely to use arrests at protest events.

Hypothesis 3a: Police will be more likely to use arrests at protest events when African Americans are present.
(Arrests cont.)
Hypothesis 3b: Police will be more likely to use arrests at protest events when Latinos and Latinas are present.

Hypothesis 6b: Police will be more likely to use arrests at protest events when counterprotesters are present.

Hypothesis 7b: Police will be more likely to use arrests at protest events when representatives of social movement families are present compared to single issue events.

Hypothesis 8b: Police will be more likely to use arrests when protesters are targeting government of political enemies.

Hypothesis 9b: Police will be more likely to use arrests when protesters are targeting economic enemies.

Hypothesis 10b: Police will be more likely to use arrests when protest events occur in government space.

Hypothesis 11b: Police will be less likely to use arrests when protest events are larger.

Hypothesis 12b: Police will be more likely to use arrests when protesters utilize tactics not considered to be consciousness raising or legitimate.

Hypothesis 13b: Police will be more likely to use arrests when protesters use multiple tactics.

Hypothesis 14b: Police will be more likely to use arrests when protesters damage property.

Police Violence
Hypothesis 1c: Police departments in cities that have engaged in COPS will be less likely to use physical or violent force at a protest event.

Hypothesis 4a: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force at protest events when African Americans are present.

Hypothesis 4b: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force at protest events when Latinos and Latinas are present.

Hypothesis 6c: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force at protest events when counterprotesters are present.

Hypothesis 7c: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force at protest events when representatives of social movement families are present compared to single issue events.
(Police Violence cont.)
Hypothesis 8c: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force when protesters are targeting government of political enemies.

Hypothesis 9c: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force when protesters are targeting economic enemies.

Hypothesis 10c: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force when protest events occur in government space.

Hypothesis 11c: Police will be more likely to use force when protest events are larger.

Hypothesis 12c: Police will be more likely to use violent or physical force when protest event tactics are not considered to be consciousness raising or legitimate.

Hypothesis 13c: Police will be more likely to use physical or violent force when protesters use multiple tactics.

Hypothesis 14c: Police will be more likely to use physical or violent force when protesters damage property.

Any Violence
Hypothesis 1d: Police departments in cities that have engaged in COPS will be less likely to be involved in any type of violent protest event.

Hypothesis 5a: Some form of violence will be more likely at protest events when African Americans are present.

Hypothesis 5b: Some form of violence will be more likely at protest events when Latinos and Latinas are present.

Hypothesis 6d: Some form of violence will be more likely at protest events when counterprotesters are present.

Hypothesis 7d: Some form of violence will be more likely at protest events when representatives of social movement families are present compared to single issue events.

Hypothesis 8d: Some form of violence will be more likely when protesters are targeting government of political enemies.

Hypothesis 9d: Some form of violence will be more likely when protesters are targeting economic enemies.

Hypothesis 10d: Some form of violence will be more likely when protest events occur in government space.
(Any Violence cont.)
Hypothesis 11d: Some form of violence will be more likely when protest events are larger.

Hypothesis 12d: Some form of violence will be more likely when protest event tactics are not considered to be consciousness raising or legitimate

Hypothesis 13d: Some form of violence will be more likely when protesters use multiple tactics.

Hypothesis 14d: Some form of violence will be more likely when protesters damage property.
APPENDIX 2: Content Analysis and Coding Procedures

Below I describe researcher reliability, the content analysis coding form, codes used for families and claims, and codes for specific tactics. Further information regarding the content coding of articles is available from the author and can also be found at: http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/.

Notes on researcher reliability
Sometimes, as is the case with the Dynamics of Collective Action project, members of a research team individually examine a sample of coded events and compare the way each member coded a particular event, attempting to achieve an inter-coder reliability score above ninety percent—ninety percent of the time different coders code the same event the same way (see Soule and Davenport 2009). Given that I conducted and coded the protest events myself, I utilized a coding scheme which recorded both pre-determined numerical codes and a textual description of the information from the newspaper article that I coded numerically. After approximately two weeks, I performed a time-lagged re-analysis of each event when entering data. For each event, I checked: (1) to make sure that the textual description supported the coding of each item; and, (2) that I assigned the proper code. If any discrepancies were found between the written description and code originally assigned, the original document was revisited and the entire event was re-coded. Written descriptions were made for numerically coded variables, but there was also a description of ‘who’ was acting, ‘what’ they were doing, what or who they were ‘against’, and the ‘purpose’ or claim being made at the protest event.

Coding Scheme
The goal of the coding scheme was to retrieve information pertinent to protest events derived from searches of The Los Angeles Times and New York Times. While other data were collected for this project, I only include data relevant to the presented analyses. In addition, since the coding form used here was a compilation of my own work and those compiled from previous research (Soule, Olzak, McCarthy, and McAdam’s DCA project), I do not include a copy of the actual form and only the list of data sought.

2. Article Title (abridged, first five words)
3. Article Date (#YEAR/MONTH/DAY; e.g. 19890122)
4. Event Date (#YEAR/MONTH/DAY; e.g. 19890122)
5. City of Event
6. State of Event
7. Place/Space of Event: government or public
8. Number of Protesters
9. Presence of Counterprotesters
10. Tactical Types (up to 4 tactics)
11. Symbolic Actions (up to 6 actions by protesters or counterprotesters; specific actions are used to determine tactical categorization and for coding reliability checks during data entry)
12. Social Movement Family
13. Claims made by protesters
14. Initiating and Countering groups (see Soule, Olzak, McCarthy, and McAdam’s DCA project at [http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/] for a complete list of initiator and countering groups)
15. Protest target: government, economic, or social and cultural (see Soule, Olzak, McCarthy, and McAdam’s DCA project at [http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/] for a complete list of targets)
16. Police Presence (state and local)
17. Authority Presence (federal and military)
18. Police use of force
19. Federal use of force
20. Protester use of force
21. Counterprotester use of force (see Soule, Olzak, McCarthy, and McAdam’s DCA project at [http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/] for a complete list of types of force used at events; this project added a code, riot gear, to the “force” list)
22. Arrests made (yes or no)
23. Number of arrests
24. Injuries (yes or no)
25. Number of injuries
26. Property damage (yes or no)

Families and claims
Please note that the list of social movement families described below is based substantially on the template provided by the Dynamics of Collective Action project found under “list of claims” in the documentation section which can be found at the following link, [http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/], and borrows heavily from its original categorization, structure, text, and listings. Changes to the original document are minimal to aid in continuity between the datasets, but include (1) reframing “General Claims Codes” as social movement families/ensembles and, (2) the following additions or modifications to the list of families:
1. the “Tea Party Movement” (codes 0800);
2. added Immigration as a major heading to code 0300 (formerly coded as only “anti-immigrant”) while also including the codes 0307 (Immigrant rights, civil rights), 0308 (amnesty), and 0309 (refugee status, rights) although claims that were directed “at” immigrants, rather than immigration policies, were re-coded as part of the Anti-Ethnic Sentiment/Attacks/Hate or Bias Crimes claims (code 2500), or “Hate” family in the final analysis of data used in this project;
3. added “NSA and other recruitment” to code 0728 in the Peace Movement specific claims codes;
4. added codes 2597 “Anti-Muslim,” 2598 “Anti-Indian ( Continent),” and 2599 “Anti-Arab/Middle Eastern,” to code 2500 (Anti-Ethnic Sentiment/Attacks/Hate or Bias Crimes), which was also expanded to include “sentiment” as well as attacks and crimes;
5. added “occupation” to code 1011 (Non-US war);
6. recoded “Workers and Labor” (code 1200, drawn from original code 1400 ‘other’); and,
7. recoded the claim “Civil Rights—Non-Mexican Latino” as a movement family by the same name as code “1400”, thereby changing the previous claim grouping of “other” from its original code “1400” to its current code “3000".
Below I provide the claims codes which constitute each of the social movement families included in this study. For codes that remained original to the DCA project, I have only included the major heading and the specific claims-codes in parentheses. For codes which I have added or modified, I have listed the name of the claim and included the revised code in parentheses with these claims in boldface.

**Human and Civil Rights Family: Immigrant Rights General** (300, 307), **Amnesty** (308), **Refugee status or rights** (309), **Feminist or Women’s Rights** (600, 604, 609, 610, 611), **International Human and Civil Rights/Democratization** (1000, 1007, 1008, 1010, 1011), **Miscellaneous Social Issues** (1311, 1318, 1340, 1344, 1353, 1354), **African American Civil Rights** (1500, 1501, 1502, 1505, 1509, 1518, 1519), **Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights** (1600, 1602, 1604, 1605, 1606, 1610, 1611, **anti-Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell**), **Native American Civil Rights** (1700, 1708, 1711, 1713), **Mexican American Civil Rights** (1805, 1807, 1808), **Asian American Civil Rights** (1900, 1908, 1912), **Pan Latino Civil Rights** (2003, 2004, 2006), **Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights** (2100, 2101, 2102, 2104, 2105, 2106), **Undifferentiated Minority Group Civil Rights** (2303), **Abortion** (2400), **Arab/Middle-Eastern American Civil Rights** (2800, 2802, 2808), **Senior Citizens Civil Rights** (2901, 2904)

**Nature and Environment Family:** **Environment or Green** (1100, 1106, 1107, 1108, 1110, 1113, 1114, 1115, **anti-mountain top removal**), **animal rights** (2601, 2603, 2604, 2605)


**Hate Family:** Anti-Immigrant (301), Anti-Ethnic Sentiment/Attacks/Hate or Bias Crimes (2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2507, 2525, **anti-Muslim**, **anti-(Asian) Indian**, **anti-Arab/Middle Eastern**)

**Peace and War Family:** anti-Nuclear Power (201), Peace (700, 708, 722, **anti-Guantanamo Bay**, **anti-Iraq War**)

**Tea Party and Limited Government Family:** anti-“Big” government (state’s rights, constitutionally limited government), anti-Obama (only if explicit Tea Party reference made, if not coded as 1336 “political figure”), anti-bail outs (only if explicit Tea Party reference was made, if not coded as 1338 “government policy”), anti-tax increases (taxation, IRS, also code 1306), anti-cap and trade (“drill baby drill” Tea Party reference only), anti-government spending, free market, economic liberty, succession from the union, 1327

**Miscellaneous Social, Cultural and Political Issues:** Miscellaneous social issues (1300, 1305, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1331, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1337, 1338, 1341, 1342, 1345, 1350, 1351, 1352), **Anti-Castro/Cuba** (1401), **Other** (3000, 3001, 3002, 3003)

**Repertoire or “tactics” coding**
The codes for tactics were re-coded from Soule, Olzak, McCarthy, and McAdam’s DCA project
at [http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/](http://www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/cgi-bin/drupal/) list of tactics. The exception is for general demonstrations which were re-coded using specific activities (or “symbolic actions”) which demarcated these tactics from rallies. Rallies required speechmaking.

**Confront and Disobey:** civil disobedience, strikes, withholding obligations, picketing

**General Demonstrations:** demonstration (chanting, sloganeering, holding/waving placards, no speechmaking), motorcades

**Artistic:** dramaturgical or symbolic displays

**Consciousness Raising:** Information distribution (i.e. leafleting), teach-ins, town-halls, legal actions or formal complaints, news conferences, boycotts

**Vigils:** vigils (i.e. candle lighting, hunger strikes), ceremonies

**Processional:** marches, convoys, parades
APPENDIX 3: IRB Approval

Invent the Future
VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY
Office of Research Compliance
Institutional Review Board
200 Kraft Drive, Suite 2000 (0497)
Blacksburg, Virginia 24060
540/231-4606 Fax 540/231-0959
e-mail irb@vt.edu

MEMORANDUM
DATE: June 4, 2010
TO: John W. Ryan, Thomas Ratliff, Dale W. Wimberley
FROM: Virginia Tech Institutional Review Board (FWA00000572, expires June 13, 2011)
PROTOCOL TITLE: Violence, Social Protests, and Policing Styles in the United States
IRB NUMBER: 10-487
Effective June 4, 2010, the Virginia Tech IRB Chair, Dr. David M. Moore, approved the new protocol for the above-mentioned research protocol. This approval provides permission to begin the human subject activities outlined in the IRB-approved protocol and supporting documents. Plans to deviate from the approved protocol and/or supporting documents must be submitted to the IRB as an amendment request and approved by the IRB prior to the implementation of any changes, regardless of how minor, except where necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to the subjects. Report promptly to the IRB any injuries or other unanticipated or adverse events involving risks or harms to human research subjects or others. All investigators (listed above) are required to comply with the researcher requirements outlined at http://www.irb.vt.edu/pages/responsibilities.htm (please review before the commencement of your research).

PROTOCOL INFORMATION:
Approved as: Exempt, under 45 CFR 46.101(b) category(ies) 4
Protocol Approval Date: 6/4/2010
Protocol Expiration Date: NA
Continuing Review Due Date*: NA
*Date a Continuing Review application is due to the IRB office if human subject activities covered under this protocol, including data analysis, are to continue beyond the Protocol Expiration Date.

FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS:
Per federally regulations, 45 CFR 46.103(f), the IRB is required to compare all federally funded grant proposals / work statements to the IRB protocol(s) which cover the human research activities included in the proposal / work statement before funds are released. Note that this requirement does not apply to Exempt and Interim IRB protocols, or grants for which VT is not the primary awardee. The table on the following page indicates whether grant proposals are
related to this IRB protocol, and which of the listed proposals, if any, have been compared to this IRB protocol, if required.

Date* OSP Number Sponsor Grant Comparison Conducted?
6/2/2010 10177402 NSF Not Required (exempt protocol)
If this IRB protocol is to cover any other grant proposals, please contact the IRB office (irbadmin@vt.edu) immediately.

*Date this proposal number was compared, assessed as not requiring comparison, or comparison information was revised.

Website: [www.irb.vt.edu](http://www.irb.vt.edu)
APPENDIX 4: Summary Model of Empirical Findings

**ACTORS**
- Tea Party and Limited Govt. (only sig. for “any” violence)
- Social and Cultural
- Economic
- Government and Political
- Peace and War
- Workers and Labor
- Nature and Environment
- Counterprotester Presence
- African American Presence (not significant for arrests)
- Confront and Disobey
- General Demonstration (not sig. for police violence or any violence)
- Larger Events/Participation (Not sig for police presence)
- Procession
- Tactical Variety
- Property Damage

**ENEMIES**

**THE STAGE**
- Government vs. Public

**PERFORMANCE**


Legend for Summary Model

- Dimensions of the dramaturgical model
- Statistically significant variables
  + Positive association/increased likelihood
  − Negative association/decreased likelihood