But if this is how things stand in our time, then the dignity of philosophy is trampled into the dust; it has even become something ludicrous, it would seem, or a matter of complete indifference to anyone so that it is the duty of all its true friends to bear witness against this confusion, and at the least show that it is only its false and unworthy servants who are ludicrous or a matter of indifference. It would be better still if they demonstrated by their deeds that love of truth is something fearsome and mighty.

—UM III

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis I take up the question of how to use Nietzsche’s Nachlass in interpreting his considered views, and how this question relates to broader issues about what kind of philosopher Nietzsche was. I argue that while the Nachlass can sometimes shed light and assist in understanding certain published passages, it should not be given the same weight as the published work when determining Nietzsche’s philosophy. On the assumption that methodological grounds alone relating to the Nachlass are not conclusive for gaining consensus about what kind of philosopher Nietzsche was—since even those advocating commonsense methodologies can produce traditional Nietzsche’s—I offer further grounds for thinking that Nietzsche was a non-traditional philosopher by critically evaluating and categorizing the methodologies of scholars producing such accounts.

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INTRODUCTION

Listen to me! For I am thus and thus. Do not, above all, confound me with what I am not!

—Ecce Homo

It is of course dear why our academic thinkers are not dangerous; for their thoughts grow as peacefully out of tradition as any tree ever bore its apples: they cause no alarm, they remove nothing from its hinges; and of all their art and aims there could be said what Diogenes said when someone praised a philosopher in his presence: 'How can be he considered great, since he has been a philosopher for so long and has never disturbed anybody?' That, indeed, ought to be the epitaph of all university philosophy: 'it disturbed nobody'.

—Schopenhauer as Educator

In this study I take up the question of how to use Nietzsche’s Nachlass—i.e., notes that he never published during his lifetime—and how it relates to a broader question about what kind of philosopher Nietzsche was. Both issues are uniquely crucial in Nietzsche studies. The issue of what to do with Nietzsche’s Nachlass is crucial for two reasons: first, because some of its content is inconsistent with the content of works he did publish, and second because views expressed in the Nachlass have in many cases been treated as equally important for understanding Nietzsche’s views as his published texts or, in extreme cases, have even been touted as his genuine philosophy. What ‘kind’ of philosopher Nietzsche was is a crucial issue for related reasons: as some scholars have noted, the sometimes deep discrepancies between Nietzsche’s published works and his Nachlass—and the exploitation of these discrepancy by interpreters—has resulted in extremely divergent accounts of Nietzsche’s philosophy. This leads to the broader questions about what place he occupies in the history of ideas. Specifically, there has been and continues to be confusion about

1 See Heidegger, 1979, chapters 2 & 3.
2 See, e.g., Magnus, Bernd, The Use and Abuse of the Will to Power in Higgins & Solomon, 1988, pp. 218-19. Of course there are other reasons stemming from the unconventional nature of Nietzsche’s writings that undoubtedly contribute to the production of many different “Nietzsches”. But where there is consistency of method in using his notes, differences in interpretation are minimized. So the issue of how to use the Nachlass is important in its own right for establishing the general character of Nietzsche’s philosophy, even if scholars using the same method differ in the details of their interpretations. Also, it may be objected that Nietzsche’s “place in the history of ideas” just is wherever it happens to be, that such a position is not out there, fixed, awaiting discovery, but is whatever the latest book on Nietzsche makes it. But such views areply on untenable
whether Nietzsche was a philosopher at all (as opposed to a literary figure), some new kind of philosopher altogether (the first “postmodern”), or a “traditional” philosopher steeped in the western tradition. Part of this confusion is due to the content of the Nachlass, which contains certain passages that are ostensibly philosophical reflections of a traditional sort, e.g., metaphysics and epistemology—reflections mostly or totally absent from the published work. And part of the confusion also stems from Nietzsche’s recent explosion of popularity with ‘analytic’ or ‘problem-solving’ philosophers, many of whom treat Nietzsche as one of their own, and use these passages from the Nachlass to develop traditional philosophical themes. Not surprisingly, then, there has been a debate over what role, if any, these unpublished notes should play in representing Nietzsche’s considered views, since it is not clear from Nietzsche’s published texts that he had anything to do with philosophy of a traditional sort, and even seems to have rejected it. Some scholars believe the issue of what kind of philosopher Nietzsche is depends at least in part on what role the Nachlass is given in interpreting his considered views. My thesis enters the debate on this last level, arguing for a methodology with respect to how to use these unpublished notes that will have ramifications for what counts as Nietzsche’s philosophy, and therefore ultimately for what place he occupies in the history of ideas. I argue that the Nachlass should be used to assist in interpreting published passages when necessary, but should not be given equal standing with Nietzsche’s published texts. I show that Nietzsche’s considered views—to be found in work he published—are inconsistent with recent, ‘traditional’ accounts of his philosophy (e.g., that make him into a metaphysician or epistemologist). Since such interpretations also generally depend on a problematic privileging of the Nachlass, they ought to be rejected. Major texts

conceptions of interpretation, since there is a fact of the matter about what Nietzsche’s views are, which careful interpretation of his writings yield.
representative of the ‘traditional Nietzsche’ industry are Arthur Danto’s Nietzsche as Philosopher, John Richardson’s Nietzsche’s System, Richard Schacht’s Nietzsche, Peter Poellner’s Nietzsche and Metaphysics, and countless articles, all of which seem to take as their motto Arthur Danto’s suggestion that “Nietzsche thought systematically and deeply about each of the closed set of questions which define what philosophy is, and that he gave serious, original, and coherent answers to them all” I show that Nietzsche’s philosophy is actually inconsistent with this view, and I attempt to ‘rescue’ him from it. While my efforts in what follows will be directed solely at Nietzsche scholarship, my arguments may apply to any scholarship on historical figures sharing similarly acute literary-philosophical issues.

My Thesis

I argue for a limited role for the Nachlass in interpreting Nietzsche’s considered views when faithful scholarship, and not philosophical appropriation, is the goal. While it may be impossible to provide precise points of demarcation between these two modes of interpretation, surely there is a difference that marks those who earnestly seek Nietzsche’s intentions from those who borrow aspects of his thought for their own philosophy. In Deleuze’s words:

There is a great difference between writing history of philosophy and writing philosophy. In the one case, we study the arrows or the tools of a great thinker, the trophies and the prey, the continents discovered. In the other case, we trim our own arrows, or gather those which seem to us the finest in order to try to send them in other directions.

In some cases, writers have attempted to say what Nietzsche meant. In other cases, writers have attempted to use what Nietzsche said in order to say something else. In the

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3 Danto, preface.
4 Gilles Deleuze, preface to Difference and Repetition. Not that Deleuze’s Nietzsche et la Philosophie is an example of the kind of interpretation I have in mind!
first case, we attempt to wade through the hyperbole, the stylistic obstacles, the traps Nietzsche has set for us, and attempt to discern what the real concerns were that so captivated him. In the second, we go beyond where Nietzsche's footprints end and see where they might have been leading, or take a different path altogether. My argument is directed toward those who wish to study the arrows, tools, trophies and prey of Nietzsche, rather than at those who wish to use Nietzsche to find new prey or send his arrows in other directions.

I argue against ‘conservative’ scholars who propose to do away with the Nachlass altogether in interpreting Nietzsche's views, since (they argue) using such notes at all may make Nietzsche into a kind of philosopher he is not. My contrary view is that the Nachlass should be used to assist in interpreting passages in Nietzsche's published work that, without such assistance, would remain mysterious or confusing. The Nachlass should be viewed as a valuable scholarly resource and an occasional guide for understanding at least some of the ideas Nietzsche published. Nietzsche's notes should be understood as a kind of thought laboratory, some of the contents of which can illuminate certain issues raised in his published works. In the course of my argument I give examples of such cases. I show that specific notes found in the Nachlass clarify the meaning of certain published passages, thus helping us understand better what Nietzsche's actual views were. The goal is not to encourage the presentation of Nietzsche's unpublished notes—even those that link up quite readily to his published work—as the ‘other half’ or ‘natural continuation’ of his considered views, although some scholars problematically employ this as a methodological principle. Even where it seems tempting to do so, Nietzsche's private notes should not be presented as his considered views, but as thought experiments on or about ideas touched on in his
published work. The Nachlass can provide us with a means of understanding Nietzsche’s published views—an understanding which in some cases may be unattainable without their aid. The upshot is that the notes should be used to gain a better understanding of those views which Nietzsche himself decided to publish, without presenting the notes as his finished thoughts, which are present only in the published work. Those published thoughts, most scholars sensibly assume, should be the primary source for determining his views generally, and therefore his place in the philosophical tradition.

The benefits of the methodology I defend are that the commonsense and widely accepted assumption that Nietzsche’s considered views are present in his published work is preserved, while the problematic and less common assumptions that they are as equally important as the published texts, or even that they are his genuine philosophy, is rejected. With this methodology we can better understand Nietzsche’s published ideas, and therefore better situate him in the history of ideas than has been done thus far, since it is his published views which ought to determine his place in the history of ideas.

The Argument

Bernd Magnus’s important article “On the Use and Abuse of the Will to Power” represents the clearest expression of the issues relating the use of the Nachlass for determining Nietzsche’s views generally, and thus to his place in the philosophical tradition. In his article Magnus responses to a trend in Nietzsche studies that treats the Nachlass on a par with Nietzsche’s published works. This trend achieved its most radical expression in Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche, which treated a special subset of the Nachlass—a book

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5 In chapter 2 I criticize Richard Schacht for utilizing this methodology.
entitled The Will to Power—as Nietzsche’s masterwork. Scholars have shown that Nietzsche abandoned any plans for a book of that title, and the plan for a single masterwork was in the end substituted for the publication of several smaller volumes (Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, E o H o m o, Nietzsche contra Wagner and Dionysus Dithyrambs). Despite this, some scholars continue to treat the Nachlass—and especially the book The Will to Power—as equivalent to Nietzsche’s published work. Bernd Magnus recognizes the motivation for certain philosophers to do this:

Most commentators who treasure the Nachlass do so because it is there that the representational, foundationalist Nietzsche is to be found primarily, the Nietzsche who does not conflate art and philosophy, the Nietzsche who worries about the way the world’s intelligible character is itself to be characterized, the Nietzsche who worries about facts and perspectives, truth and reference, the Nietzsche who worries about which virtues we should value and what we ought to strive for. And that Nietzsche writes relatively straightforward declarative sentences rather than endless hypotheticals and subjective conditionals.

It is in Nietzsche’s unpublished work that traditional philosophical issues, especially in metaphysics and epistemology, seem to be addressed, and it is these notes which lend themselves most easily to the tools of traditional philosophy (deductive argument, conceptual analysis, etc.).

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7 Der Wille zur Macht [The Will to Power] is a posthumously published collection of passages from some of Nietzsche’s notebooks, the majority of which are from the prolific 1886-1888 period, and so is a special subset of the Nachlass. The collection contains some ideas which have obvious corollaries with material Nietzsche published, as well as ontological and epistemological ideas which have no apparent parallel in the published work. Because of its organization, which in the end Nietzsche had no say in, the book lends itself to interpreting Nietzsche as a traditional philosopher. The work is misleading for a few reasons: (a) it patches together notes from different contexts and different times in Nietzsche’s literary career, giving it the false appearance of his published aphoristic works, (b) few of the notes it utilizes are the notes that Nietzsche himself set aside for the original project before he abandoned it, and (c) several of the topics it covers have no parallel in Nietzsche’s published work, e.g. Nietzsche’s ‘proofs’ of the eternal recurrence as a metaphysical fact, the general ontology of power, or eugenics. This discrepancy leads one to believe that these were not his considered views. The material was edited by, among others, Nietzsche’s notorious sister Elizbeth Förster-Nietzsche, and Nietzsche’s editorial assistant Heinrich Koselitz (“Peter Gast”). It was promoted by his sister as Nietzsche’s ‘real’ philosophy, an untruth which Heidegger subscribed to in his influential and fascinating lectures. Fortunately or not the book has had a marked and continuing influence on interpretations of Nietzsche and on philosophy generally in Europe and America.

8 For the most scholarly account of the genesis of the ‘book’ The Will to Power see Klein, 1997, pp. 181-99. For the short story see Magnus, Bernd, On the Use and Abuse of the Will to Power in Higgins and Solomon, 1988, pp. 218-32. Both trace the rise and decline of Nietzsche’s plans for a major work, and show that his sister used an outline for Der Wille zur Macht which Nietzsche had abandoned.
Magnus attempts to undermine scholarly faith in the book *The Will to Power* specifically, and the remainder of the Nachlass generally as containing Nietzsche’s final views by (1) showing that plans for the book *The Will to Power* were abandoned by Nietzsche, (2) showing that traditional philosophic theories of metaphysics, epistemology, or ethics cannot be derived from work Nietzsche did publish, (3) arguing that the Nachlass should not be thought of as a “thought laboratory” for Nietzsche’s ideas, and that, even if it could be so thought of, it doesn’t shed sufficient light on his published work to be useful in that regard. His goal is to lift Nietzsche from his recent ‘academization’ or ‘traditionalization’ due to the misuse of these notes, and situate him instead at the “fountainhead of postmodernity”.

In chapter one I present Magnus’s overall argument and offer critical commentary. I give reasons for accepting claims (1) and (2) above, but criticize Magnus’s arguments for (3). I show that the reasons he gives for rejecting the Nachlass as a thought laboratory do not apply in all cases, and that there are also cases where his own emphasis on the published texts entails utilizing the Nachlass for interpretive assistance. I show both that the Nachlass can be productively utilized as a resource for interpreting Nietzsche’s published views and hence that it should be so used. Magnus’s fourth claim, that Nietzsche should be situated at the fountainhead of postmodernity, or at least as the head of a new, non-traditional philosophical program will be indirectly considered in chapter 3. Instead of attempting to establish this claim, I will offer further reasons for thinking that recent traditionalized Nietzsche’s do not represent Nietzsche as such.

In chapter three I consider an alternative methodological approach to Nietzsche’s Nachlass, offered by Richard Schacht. Schacht agrees with my view that Nietzsche’s published texts should be given interpretive priority, but he argues that we should not treat

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9 Magnus qtd. in Solomon & Higgins 231.
Nietzsche as an idol, his sacred texts to be zealously guarded, but rather as a “colleague or companion”. We should pay special attention to what he decided to publish but also consider his “experiments, tentative suggestions, drafts and sketches”, as we do those of any of our philosophical colleagues. It is Nietzsche’s thinking which interests us, Schacht argues, and his notebooks are surely a sound resource for determining that. According to Schacht, Nietzsche’s notebooks should be used to supplement, clarify and shed light on his thinking.

Schacht and I agree almost exactly in our conclusions. But I criticize Schacht on two grounds. First, Schacht either (a) does not follow his own proposed methodology, or (b) he employs a problematic version of it, with the problematic consequence that his ‘Nietzsche’ is able to speak readily to traditional philosophical issues. Second, and more importantly, justifying the use of the Nachlass to understand Nietzsche’s thinking is a red herring argument that fails to address the relevant issue of justifying the use of the Nachlass for interpreting Nietzsche’s considered views, which Schacht agrees are contained in the published work.11

From the discussion in chapters two and three it will become apparent that even where there is agreement that Nietzsche’s published work should be given priority, in practice such a methodology does not guarantee the production of consensus about what kind of philosopher Nietzsche was, e.g. a traditional academic or a full-blooded postmodern.12 The remaining confusion leads me to offer some further reasons for thinking that Nietzsche was a nontraditional philosopher (chapter 4), because while methodological agreement on how to use the Nachlass points in that direction, such agreement can only take us so far, as chapters 2 and 3 show.

10 Schacht, 1995, Ch. 6.
11 This is precisely the criticism leveled at Schacht by Magnus.
12 Of course it is possible that, ultimately, Nietzsche may fit in both or neither of these very general categories. But in the case of the last twenty years or so of influential Nietzsche scholarship, these are the basic Nietzscheans that seem to emerge.
Thus in chapter four I criticize the methodologies employed by many scholars who wish to make Nietzsche into a metaphysician. I give several examples of the problematic ways that these scholars incorporate ideas found in the Nachlass, and/or how they misinterpret published ideas. Finally, I distinguish three ways of reading Nietzsche, and argue that the recent accounts under consideration are best understood as appropriations of Nietzsche for solving current philosophical problems, rather than as accounts of Nietzsche as Nietzsche.

By giving interpretive priority to his published texts, and by restricting the Nachlass to clarifying their contents, it is clear that Nietzsche’s ‘philosophy’ was something altogether different than recent, analytic accounts make it seem. Even if the Nachlass is used or abused, however, there are independent grounds for thinking that Nietzsche was a non-traditional philosopher: traditional philosophical accounts of his thought depend on untenable interpretive methods for discovering Nietzsche as Nietzsche. Therefore recent academic accounts of Nietzsche’s philosophy ought to be rejected as faithful interpretations of Nietzsche’s views as such, and are perhaps best characterized as attempts to incorporate some of the things Nietzsche wrote into contemporary philosophical dialogue.
In this section I present and critically evaluate Bernd Magnus’s arguments against using the Nachlass for interpreting Nietzsche’s considered views. I argue contra Magnus that there are some parts of the Nachlass that are helpful—at times necessary—for understanding Nietzsche’s published texts. Since it is the published texts that Magnus argues ought to have interpretive priority, and since the Nachlass is sometimes the only means by which understanding of these texts is possible, we ought to view it as a valuable resource and not disallow use of its contents categorically. Otherwise, the meaning of some ideas Nietzsche did decide to publish will be less than fully intelligible. The notebooks can be understood as a thought laboratory, in which Nietzsche experimented with some ideas he would eventually publish, or carried out further experiments on ideas he had already published. We should not use them to add new material to Nietzsche’s considered views (which are to be found in his published work) but rather as an occasional guide for interpreting some of those views.\footnote{E.g., if given the choice between clarifying a specific published passage by appealing to related ideas from the Nachlass and presenting those related ideas as Nietzsche’s final, complete view, I recommend the former.}

Finally I claim that the use or abuse of Nietzsche’s notes is not the only factor relevant to the issue of whether he is the first “full-blooded postmodern”, or at least a non-traditional philosopher, as Magnus suggests, and that there are more persuasive reasons for that conclusion that I give in chapter three.\footnote{I mean by traditional philosophers those who have argued for a single correct way of understanding or interpreting the world and/or how man should act. A more sophisticated definition of traditional philosophy is provided in Ch. 3, sec. I.}

Bernd Magnus’s argument begins with a distinction followed by a dilemma. The distinction is between two kinds of Nietzsche scholars: ‘lumpers’ and ‘splitters’. Lumpers regard the use of Nietzsche’s literary remains as an unproblematic source for explicating his
philosophy. They often work on the assumption that the Nachlass "contains much more of Nietzsche's expressed thinking on certain important matters than do his finished work."\textsuperscript{15} Often supporting this assumption is the view that the notoriously difficult style of Nietzsche's published work is an obstacle to understanding his ideas. Since the Nachlass is generally free from this style, lumpers find them more conducive to understanding what Nietzsche is 'really' thinking or writing about in his published work. The aim of lumpers, Magnus incidentally adds, is generally to situate Nietzsche within the commentator's conception of the history of philosophy. Magnus identifies Jaspers, Heidegger, Deleuze, Danto, Müller-Lauter and Richard Schacht as paradigmatic lumpers.

Splitters, on the other hand, make a sharp distinction between the texts Nietzsche decided to publish and those he did not. Splitters—Magnus names Hollingdale, Alderman, Montinari, and Tracy Strong as typical splitters—read Nietzsche as mandating a break from the standard concerns of philosophy such as metaphysics, epistemology, and moral theory. They argue that Nietzsche did not want to offer any contributions to these areas, but rather that he called into question their presuppositions, questioned the possibility of their success, and urged a turn toward different sorts of philosophic concerns such as cultural decadence, the status of the individual in modern society, science and nihilism, the history and conditions of morality, human psychology, and so on.

Part of what makes the interpretations of a typical lumper different from the interpretation of a typical splitter is the occasional and often marked divergence between the ideas in Nietzsche's notes and those found in his published work. This divergence goes beyond the mere stylistic differences emphasized by lumpers: in some cases the content of the notebooks is substantially different from that of the published work. For example, in

\textsuperscript{15} Schacht qtd. in Solomon and Higgins 220.
some of the Nachlass Nietzsche extends the psychological theory of the “will to power”, which does appear in his published works, into a full-blown ontological theory about the world itself—something he does not do in his published works. Similar divergences occur with other themes.

The dilemma that grows out of Magnus’s distinction is this: if the splitter is correct in his methodology, then Nietzsche may not have been a philosopher after all. The history of philosophy can be generally characterized by attempts to provide answers to ontological, epistemological, and moral questions, and the answers are typically systematic. Since Nietzsche is seldom if ever systematic in his published works, and since it is not obvious that his overarching concerns were with these questions at all, a splitter will have a difficult time saying why Nietzsche ought to be taken seriously by philosophers or what role he might play in the history of the discipline. A lumpers, on the other hand, can make Nietzsche speak readily to these and similar questions. An ontology of power and the perspectival nature of all knowing readily qualify as answers, if unorthodox, to the traditional questions of philosophy. But there is a danger in this methodology too. The lumpers, while keeping Nietzsche within the tradition, risks prioritizing texts which recent scholarship shows he abandoned or even may have attempted to destroy. The dilemma then is that if we use only the texts Nietzsche himself published in interpreting his thought, then we may risk moving him outside of philosophy altogether, or as Magnus says into its margins. If we use notes that Nietzsche did not publish on the other hand, then we can move him squarely into the philosophical tradition, but we can do so only at the expense of making his unpublished notes into his final word.

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16 Cf. the scientific “proofs” of the doctrine of eternal return in Book IV section III of The Will to Power, as well as Book III section II.
Magnus seeks to resolve this dilemma by showing that the lumper’s favorite source for Nietzsche’s unpublished material, The Will to Power, was never intended in its current form by Nietzsche, that a metaphysics of the will to power, a perspectivist epistemology, a moral theory, and other typical concerns of academic philosophy cannot be derived from the work Nietzsche did publish, that the Nachlass cannot be usefully employed as a “thought laboratory” for Nietzsche’s ideas, and that even if it could be it doesn’t shed sufficient light on published material to be useful in that regard. Magnus wants to situate Nietzsche at the “fountainhead of postmodernism”, the beginning of a new philosophical tradition that flows from him to Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, and recent literary theory, rather than move him out of discursive philosophy altogether. I will evaluate these claims in order.

There can no longer be any doubt that at the very least Nietzsche abandoned a book called the Will to Power, as well as any plans for a magnum opus. As both Wayne Klein and Bernd Magnus have shown, any such plans or books by that name were abandoned by Nietzsche by 1888 or thereabout. Compounding skepticism about The Will to Power as a ‘book’ by Nietzsche are the facts that the particular aphorisms he did set aside for a possible opus were different than the ones which made it into the final edition, and that the plan used for it was not even the latest one Nietzsche abandoned. So, clearly, Magnus’s claim that The Will to Power was abandoned is true. What follows from this for matters of interpretation is considered shortly.

Magnus’s second claim, that traditional philosophical concerns are mostly absent from Nietzsche’s published texts, is a confirmable fact. From The Birth of Tragedy to Nietzsche’s last work, Ecce Homo, we simply do not find clear statements of a commitment to

17 Ibid.
or argument for an ontology or a general theory of knowledge. This is not to say that much of what Nietzsche does say has no bearing on these issues, or that the mention of traditional problems of philosophy is wholly absent from his work. On the contrary, much of what Nietzsche writes bears on epistemology, ontology, and other traditional philosophical issues. His texts are littered with comments on or about paradigmatic philosophical problems like free will, God, the soul, etc. While some commentators make much of these passages, typically by trying to systematize them into a metaphysics or epistemology, their attempts often rely on questionable methods of weaving Nietzsche’s words together and by “charitably” filling in “gaps” that, perhaps, Nietzsche never intended to be occupied. Most of Nietzsche’s commentary on these traditional problems is either highly skeptical, or is used simply as a foil for showing a larger or more important problem of which these traditional philosophical problems are a mere symptom. Whether or not Nietzsche produced a moral theory is debatable. It is difficult to say if Nietzsche produced ‘theories’ in the accepted sense at all. But at the very least, to label Nietzsche a philosopher in the traditional sense here is a mistake: Nietzsche does not, in the final analysis, commit himself to a systematic and final treatment of any general ontological, epistemological, or moral views, nor is it clear that he holds any ‘first principles’ from which such conclusions could be drawn.

Magnus does identify “two slender reeds” of what seems to be ontological language from Genealogy of Morals II 12 and Beyond Good and Evil 36, reproduced below toward other purposes, but he rightly says that the meaning of these passages is scarcely clear, and that

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18 I support and defend this view more thoroughly in chapter four.
19 E.g. the variety of methodologies employed by Richardson, Schacht, Danto, and Poellner. I will give examples of this kind of interpretation and its associated problems in chapter three.
20 A review of Nietzsche’s published work, along with explanations for the passages used to develop Nietzschean metaphysics and epistemology will be given in chapter three.
they are not sufficient to establish Nietzsche's commitment to either an ontology or epistemology, and that is all that Magnus is interested in establishing. So Magnus's claim that typical philosophical themes are mostly or wholly absent from Nietzsche's published texts is true. But this leaves us wanting an explanation for these ostensibly metaphysical passages, and while none seems available from the rest of the published work, I demonstrate below that some of Nietzsche's notes make the meaning of these passages crystal clear, thereby casting doubt on Magnus's third claim.

Magnus's third claim, recall, is twofold: first, that the Nachlass cannot properly be thought of as a thought laboratory for Nietzsche's published work. Second, that even if one were to use the Nachlass as a thought laboratory, most of it does not assist in interpreting published remarks. This is the only point with which I disagree, so it is necessary to look at Magnus's support for (3). Magnus suggests:

(a) It is unclear which notes are to count as experiments for which published ideas,
(b) even conceived as thought experiments, they do not shed sufficient light on published ideas to be useful in that regard;
(c) the notes can be read with equal justice as failed experiments, ideas Nietzsche elected not to follow up. The literary estate should be read as one reads rough drafts of papers, plays, novels, or dialogues, as predecessor versions, in which the published word just is the last word.21

In order to evaluate (a) and (b) I use as a case study Nietzsche’s criticisms of the doctrine of self-preservation, or what was in his Germany interpreted as the essence of Darwinism. Let us look at a few of the published passages on the topic:

Once more the origin of scholars.— The wish to preserve oneself is the symptom of a condition of distress, of a limitation of the really fundamental instinct of life which aims at the expansion of power and, wishing

21 Magnus qtd. in Solomon and Higgins 227-8.
Physiologists should think again before postulating the drive to self-preservation as the cardinal drive in an organic being. A living thing desires above all to vent its strength — life as such is will to power — self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of it. — In short, here as everywhere, beware of superfluous teleological principles! — such as is the drive to self-preservation (we owe it to Spinoza’s inconsistency). For this is a requirement of method, which has essentially to be economy of principles.

Life is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker... a living body will have to be an incarnate will to power; it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become predominant—not from any morality or immorality but because it is living and because life simply is will to power...

Suppose nothing else were "given" as real except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other "reality" besides the reality of our drives... Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the development and ramification of one basic form of will—namely, the will to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power and one could also find in it the solution of the problem of procreation and nourishment—it is one problem—then one would have gained the right to determine all efficient force univocally as—will to power. The world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its “intelligible character”—it would be “will to power” and nothing else.

Nietzsche thinks that self-preservation is insufficient to explain the behavior of living things. He sees it as a ‘consequence of an impotency’, a doctrine true only in specific circumstances. The more fundamental principle at work in all life is a “venting” or “discharging” of expansive energy, a principle that he thinks better explains the behavior of living organisms than does the “completely one-sided doctrine” of self-preservation. If the activities of procreation and nourishment could also be explained in terms of the will to power, then, Nietzsche thinks, one would have the right to determine all living activity as will to power: overpowering, overcoming what is other, and so on.

Magnus claims that it is altogether unclear which notes are to count as thought experiments for which published aphorisms, and concludes from this that the use of the

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22 GS 349.
23 BGE 13.34, 36.
24 Particularly, the social circumstances under which the doctrine was devised. Cf. GS 348 and 349 for the ad hominem argument against the doctrine of self-preservation.
Nachlass as a “thought laboratory” is misguided. Unfortunately, Magnus does not define “thought experiment”, so it is difficult to pose counter-examples to his claim. In what follows I only wish to demonstrate two things: (1) that there are cases where Nachlass notes link up to certain published passages (those quoted above), (2) that these notes clarify or assist in interpreting the published passages. Whether or not these or other particular Nachlass are in fact thought experiments is not as important as whether they can assist us in interpreting Nietzsche’s published work, which is all I wish to establish here. So below I draw on a few of the Nachlass notes which obviously link up with the published passages above, and explain how they clarify them.

Consider the following notebook entries, from roughly the same period as Beyond Good and Evil (where three of the four above citations from the published work are taken):

A protoplasm divides in two when its power is no longer adequate to control what it has appropriated: procreation is the consequence of an impotency (654, 1885-6).

“Nourishment”—is only derivative; the original phenomenon is: to desire to incorporate everything. “Procreation”—only derivative; originally: where one will was not enough to organize the entire appropriated material, there came into force an opposing will which took in hand the separation; a new center of organization, after a struggle with the original will (657, 1886-7).

... the protoplasm extends its pseudopodia in search of something that resists it—not from hunger but from will to power. Thereupon it attempts to overcome, appropriate, assimilate what it encounters: what one calls “nourishment” is merely a derivative phenomenon, an application of the original will to become stronger (702, March-June 1888).

These jottings explore further the ideas given in the previous citations from Nietzsche’s published texts. Here we get ostensibly empirical evidence for what looked like speculative ontology in the published aphorisms, as well as a sampling of what reducing procreation and nourishment to a single principle would entail (reinterpreting the behavior of, e.g.,
protoplasm)—a project only hinted at in the relevant published passage from Beyond Good and Evil.

Because of both their content and dates (which I discuss again below), it is clear that Nietzsche was going beyond the merely conditional statement of the will to power as life in the publish work (cf. the repeated epithets to “making the experiment” and “venturing the hypothesis”, rather then mere dogmatic assertion) and attempting to develop a more thorough account of what such a view might entail in specific cases, e.g. at the basic level of a protoplasm. As mentioned above, in the published passages Nietzsche thinks that the doctrine of self-preservation is not sufficient to explain the behavior of living things, and suggests in his published work that if one could interpret the “organic functions” (nourishment, procreation, etc.) in terms of a more basic principle than self-preservation (a power-principle), then one would have the “right” to designate the character of life as “will to power”. While this remains only a suggestion in Beyond Good and Evil, the Nachlass notes of this period reflect Nietzsche’s attempts to interpret the behavior of an organism as a manifestation of a “will to power”, and its seemingly self-preservatory efforts as secondary or derivative of this more fundamental activity. In the published passages, procreation as a phenomenon of the will to power is mentioned, but it is not developed. In the Nachlass, procreation is interpreted as the inability of one center of force (organism) to control what it has appropriated, and is thus a sign of its weakness. The new center of force (offspring) wishes to break off from the old (parent) and thus is ‘born’. In the published passages, nourishment as a manifestation of the will to power is mentioned, but also left undeveloped. In the Nachlass, nourishment is not explained by hunger, which seems only to push the

25 The observations seem empirical because they are merely a different way of interpreting the visible behavior of organisms than self-preservation interprets them, not dogmatic assertions about how things are “in-themselves”.

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problem back one step. Rather, nourishment is understood as a consequence of a more fundamental will to “incorporate everything” (in Deleuze’s terminology, nourishment is active—a result of the will to power, rather than reactive, e.g., a reaction to hunger, which in Nietzsche’s mind is linked to self-preservation). Another example to consider, not mentioned by Nietzsche, is an infant’s tendency to put everything into its mouth—whether or not it is hungry.

As can be gleaned from the above analysis, it is only by reference to the specific notes produced that we can understand what Nietzsche had in mind when he wrote the cryptic references to “procreation” and “nourishment” as “will to power” in Beyond Good and Evil. While finding which notes match up to which published ideas may be laborious or difficult, it is an empirical question and the payoff is worth it: in some cases we can understand Nietzsche better than we could have without recourse to his notebooks. Without recourse to the notes, his mere hints and suggestions about a world understood in terms of power leaves an interpreter without an adequate understanding of Nietzsche’s meaning. With such recourse, we gain a more thorough understanding of the published texts, which is the intention of scholarship in the first place.

Magnus’s third support for claim (3) is that Nietzsche’s notes can be read with equal justice as failed experiments, ideas Nietzsche elected not to follow up, and that the literary estate should be read as one reads rough drafts of papers, plays, novels, or dialogues, as predecessor versions, in which the published word just is the last word. But “predecessor version” does not explain the notebook entries relating the will to power and life: all of these entries are dated after the corresponding passages from Beyond Good and Evil. If it is objected that they could be preliminary drafts of ideas for future works (which they may well have been), that would not rule them out of them out as aids in interpreting Nietzsche’s published
work. Even if the notes are drafts, it does not follow that they cannot usefully be employed to clarify specific published passages.

Since there are epistemological barriers to knowing what Nietzsche’s plans were for most of the individual notes, the question of what the general character of the Nachlass is (failed experiments, or whatever) is moot. So we should look at the splitter’s own emphasis on the published texts to determine whether or not that emphasis calls for the use of the Nachlass; I will argue below that it does.

Magnus’s third claim, recall, denies that the Nachlass can be usefully employed as a “thought laboratory” for Nietzsche’s ideas, and that even if it were so employed it doesn’t shed sufficient light on published material to be useful in that regard. There were three grounds for this claim: (1) that it is unclear which notes are to count as experiments for which published ideas; (2) that even conceived as thought experiments the notes do not shed sufficient light on published ideas to be useful in that regard; and (3) that the notes can be read with equal justice as failed experiments, ideas Nietzsche elected not to follow up.\footnote{While I have shown that these particular notes were not predecessor versions (since their dates are after the corresponding BGE passages), I have not shown that they were not failed drafts for future works. For clarification: we don’t know what they are, but it does not follow from that that the notes cannot shed light on published passages (and, in fact, I showed that they can).} By way of just one facet of Nietzsche’s thought—his remarks on Darwinism, the will to power, and life—we saw that each of these grounds was problematic. In his published work, Nietzsche hints at or raises the question of whether the organic functions of life—and therefore life itself—might be interpreted as manifestations of a single principle of expansion, growth, and overcoming, i.e. what he calls the will to power.\footnote{But this is all he says in his published works on that topic, and, as we saw, if we never delved into his notebooks we would be left with questions about what interpreting organic functions in terms of power might mean.} But this is all he says in his published works on that topic, and, as we saw, if we never delved into his notebooks we would be left with questions about what interpreting organic functions in terms of power means.
would entail, leaving our imaginations to do the work. But in the notebooks we find the meaning of Nietzsche’s published hints spelled out, at least in terms of reproduction and nourishment, which he interprets not as a “struggle for existence” but as will to power. Magnus may not deny the obvious, which is that such notes shed light on Nietzsche’s thinking, but he denies that such notes shed light on Nietzsche’s considered views, which he feels are present and only present in the texts Nietzsche published. Now we can see that that categorical claim is false, since the notes in question—and in my view many others, too—do in fact shed light on what Magnus agrees are Nietzsche’s considered views, in our case his views against Darwinism.

It may be objected that Magnus had a more specific claim in mind. Given that the published passage from *Beyond Good and Evil* is couched in conditionals, (“suppose that...”, “if we make the experiment...”, “let us venture the hypothesis”, etc.) Magnus may admit that the corresponding Nachlass notes shed light on this passage, but deny that they actually tell us whether or not Nietzsche thought these reflections were true: perhaps they were failed experiments anyway. But I am not claiming that, by shedding light or helping us gain understanding of the published texts, certain Nachlass notes can convey Nietzsche’s philosophical conclusions or that they give definitive answers to interpretive questions. Indeed, I take issue with those who employ this strategy. I only claim that they may assist us or give us headway in determining what Nietzsche was trying to say. We will never know if Nietzsche really thought that life itself could be exhaustively characterized as a will to power right down to the basic functioning of a protoplasm—and so we should avoid positing that as his final view. But without recourse to the Nachlass we wouldn’t even know

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27 BG E 36.
28 Cf. my criticism of Richard Schacht’s methodology in the next chapter.
what he meant by tracing back organic functions to the basic will, or by reinterpreting hunger and procreation in terms of it. With recourse to the Nachlass we at least gain some idea of what the terms of the published passage mean, and that is all I wish to use the Nachlass for.

Which notes count as experiments for which published ideas is an empirical and scholarly question, to be decided upon careful review of all of Nietzsche’s unpublished texts. That such notes shed light on Nietzsche’s published texts is true in some cases; and that not all of the notes can be successfully labeled “predecessor versions” is also true. Given that all of the grounds upon which Magnus claimed that the Nachlass shouldn’t be viewed as a though laboratory are problematic, the claim itself becomes problematic and we now have reasons to reject it, at least for the reasons Magnus provides.

But there are also positive reasons for using the Nachlass as a thought laboratory, even if one is, like Magnus, a splitter. The splitter’s commitment to Nietzsche’s published texts as well as his rejection of the Nachlass for interpreting those texts can limit his understanding of certain passages in instances where the Nachlass provides further or more specific content on a given matter. Recall BGE 36 where Nietzsche says:

Suppose all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power and one could also find in it the solution of the problem of procreation and nourishment—it is one problem—then one would have gained the right to determine all efficient force univocally as—will to power.

It is far from clear what someone of Nietzsche’s disposition would have to say about specific organic functions at all. That he mentions them here—and to my knowledge only here—in his published work raises interpretive problems for the splitter that a careful lumper would not have (e.g., interpreting the suggestions about organic functions and what, exactly, such suggestions entail). A lumper can draw on the Nachlass passages earlier cited as experiments for these ideas and get a better picture at just what Nietzsche was attempting to do: stating
the general principles of a paradigm for the natural sciences which does not accept “self-preservation” as the primary motive for all organic action, but rather the “will to power”. Or, alternatively, trying to deduce how the organic functions would have to be explained if the will to power were really the nature of nature. Since it is unclear from Nietzsche’s fragmentary treatment of the issues what exactly he has in mind here, the notes should not be construed as his philosophy. Whatever one’s interpretation of the passage turns out to be, the splitter—if truly consistent in his method—must in the end be left with an interpretation of certain published passages ultimately filled out by his or her imagination, since on principle they would reject looking into the notebooks to see if Nietzsche himself further developed the ideas. This is not to say that such notes were in Nietzsche’s view satisfactory, but only that they help us more fully understand views which he did find satisfactory (e.g., views he published). Since the splitter wants above all else to prioritize and understand Nietzsche’s published work, and since the Nachlass can in some cases serve as a useful guide in such understanding, the splitter should be committed to this very limited role of the Nachlass as a “thought laboratory” by his own prioritization of the published texts. So Magnus’s third claim that the Nachlass cannot or should not permit of being used as a thought laboratory does not stand up to scrutiny. What bearing the refutation of this claim has on his overall position on Nietzsche’s philosophy will now be considered.

Magnus’s fourth and final suggestion is aimed at finally resolving the dilemma posed at the beginning: lumpers can make Nietzsche into a traditional philosopher, but only at the expense of elevating abandoned texts. Splitters may be right in their methodology, but if so, Nietzsche seems not to have answered traditional philosophical questions at all. Magnus’s strategy is to move through the horns of the dilemma by remaining a splitter but also keeping Nietzsche within the philosophical tradition. Because traditional philosophical doctrines are
not derivable (without a level of creativity surpassing faithful interpretation) from
Nietzsche’s texts, and because many are convinced that his thought bears heavily on these
issues, Magnus suggests that situating Nietzsche within the history of ideas as the
“fountainhead of postmodernism” is the best resolution to the problem. Under this
conception Nietzsche would be the beginning of a new philosophical lineage, one which
“honor[s] Nietzsche by placing his published work at the head of that philosophical
genealogy which says that there is no ultimate contrast to mark genealogy off from ontology,
no point in asking the way the world is apart from what we make of it.” This is the
Nietzsche who “... speaks with many voices in his published texts, not with one voice
governing every concern.” This remains only a suggestion, however, and is not something
Magnus attempts to establish in the article under consideration, since his argument mainly
concerns the Nachlass. In chapter three, I go beyond this suggestion and show that the
content and aims of Nietzsche’s published texts are further reasons for thinking that
Nietzsche was not a traditional philosopher at all.

This claim that Nietzsche can usefully be situated as the fountainhead of
postmodernism is contingent upon the rejection of the Nachlass as a thought laboratory for
his published texts, or at least Magnus’s argument sets it up that way. Since I have
demonstrated that his argument against such a view is problematic, and that “thought
laboratory” is perhaps a more accurate and useful designation for the Nachlass, the obvious
question is whether or not I can agree with his conclusion, i.e., the historical placement of
Nietzsche in the history of ideas as the “first postmodern” a non-traditional thinker par
excellence. And I do agree. But I do not see the use of Nietzsche’s notes as either necessary
or sufficient to establish that conclusion: in the next section I show how even when there is

agreement on methodology relating to the Nachlass, the production of a non-traditional
Nietzsche is not guaranteed, and thus agreement on methodology alone is not sufficient to
establish it. In chapter four I give more persuasive reasons—reasons I believe are
sufficient—for believing that Nietzsche was at very least a ‘non-traditional’ philosopher, and
perhaps the ‘first postmodern’.
CHAPTER TWO: A COMMONSENSE METHODOLOGY?

In this section I consider and criticize the methodology for using the Nachlass defended by Richard Schacht. I criticize Schacht on two grounds. First, he either (a) does not employ his own proposed methodology in practice, or (b) he employs a problematic version of it, with the consequence that his ‘Nietzsche’ is able to speak readily to traditional philosophical issues. Second, and more importantly, his justification for using the Nachlass liberally to understand Nietzsche’s thinking is a red herring, which fails to address the relevant issue of justifying the use of the Nachlass for interpreting Nietzsche’s considered views, which he agrees are contained in the published work. I conclude that even where there is agreement that Nietzsche’s published work should be given interpretive priority, this does not guarantee consensus about what kind of philosopher Nietzsche was, and therefore that we should look for independent grounds to make that determination.

In “Beyond Scholasticism: On Dealing with Nietzsche and his Nachlass” Richard Schacht defends the use of Nietzsche’s unpublished materials in interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought. Schacht grants that priority should be given to writings Nietzsche intended for publication, but he argues that Nietzsche is a special case with regard to this general rule of scholarship. Nietzsche is a special case first because his life ended abruptly and early, just as he was hitting his “philosophical stride”, and second because his publications often consisted of material first developed and worked over in his notebooks. Therefore, Schacht concludes, scholars should not be too quick to take the “purist line” in Nietzsche’s case. It is “needlessly puritanical” to disregard everything an author says unless that author approved it for publication, especially when such material can give insight into

30 Ch. 6 of Schacht 1995.
their thought. This “fetishism of the published word” impairs rather than assists in understanding Nietzsche. It is “overly abstemious” and can produce impoverished interpretations of Nietzsche’s thought, inferior to the understanding that is attainable by availing oneself of his unpublished work “with due scholarly and interpretive care”. We should not treat Nietzsche’s published words as a Bible, unduly shielding his writings as if they were sacred. We should treat him as a “colleague or companion”, and pay special attention to what he himself saw to publication but also not neglect the “experiments, tentative suggestions, drafts and sketches” found in the Nachlass, as we often do with our other philosophical colleagues.32

Instead of omitting Nietzsche’s unpublished work from good interpretations, Schacht urges that since it is Nietzsche’s thinking that interests us, we ought to look at relevant unpublished material to supplement the indications of his thinking to be found in what he did publish. Our “conversation with Nietzsche” need not be limited to what he published. It may begin with his books, but it may also continue with his thousands of letters, manuscripts, drafts and notes. The Nachlass can “shed light” on Nietzsche’s thought, and Schacht suggests that in some cases we even need his notes to fully understand him. Schacht writes that “this point is all the more persuasive in light of the character of the published work, none of which gives us a full, final statement of his position on such a topic—one that can be regarded as definitive in relation to the rest.” Also, Schacht recognizes that Nietzsche “does not elaborate upon his points fully enough to make his meaning and thinking entirely clear”.33

31 Ibid. 118.
32 Ibid.
Schacht also addresses the ‘book’ The Will to Power. While he acknowledges that Nietzsche did not in the end intend to write an opus by that title, and that the book is a somewhat arbitrary collection of his notes, it is nonetheless a subset of the Nachlass and therefore, on his argument, available for use in supplementing our understanding of or shedding light on Nietzsche’s published work, just like any other relevant part of the Nachlass would be.

I have argued that Nietzsche’s unpublished notes can give us insight into his published views, and I agree that an approach to Nietzsche that rules out the use of such notes in an attempt to understand him may impair rather than assist in that effort. One may also agree that such materials can and should be used to supplement the published word. And finally one can agree that we ought to treat Nietzsche as a colleague and not as an idol, as Schacht suggests, and not simply ignore his unpublished texts just because Nietzsche, for whatever reason, did not publish them. Unfortunately even if all scholars agreed to these commonsense principles the matter of Nietzsche’s philosophy is hardly settled. Consider that Schacht’s own use of the Nachlass does not seem to abide by his own suggested methodology of even minimally prioritizing the published works: in his groundbreaking work Nietzsche, more than half of the quotes Schacht uses—861 out of 1,718—are from the Nachlass. And certain sections of the book—sections where Nietzsche is interpreted as giving a metaphysics of the will to power in terms of life—more than three quarters of the quotes are from the Nachlass. When Schacht’s scholarship is measured against his own suggested use of the Nachlass, some disappointing results obtain.

34 Ch. 2.
36 Ibid.
First, it is a stretch to quote unpublished material more than half the time and still call it “shedding light” or “gaining insight” on published material, since by these terms one generally means clarifying or gaining a deeper understanding of specific published passages. Certainly, some of the passages that Schacht uses seem impenetrable without aid of the Nachlass (e.g., the same passages on the will to power and Darwin I present in chapter 3, where I myself am committed to using the Nachlass for assistance). But the use of the Nachlass in Schacht’s text is not limited to explaining the meaning of difficult passages from the published work. Nor is it limited to considering Nietzsche’s tentative suggestions and drafts as such, which Schacht says we should do. Rather, much of the Nachlass in this account is presented as Nietzsche’s finished thoughts on certain matters, as if Nietzsche had decided once and for all what the nature of truth, language, knowledge, and the world, among other things, was. As a result, one gets the idea that Nietzsche did, after all, present fixed answers to these very difficult and very traditional problems of philosophy. This methodology violates Schacht’s own recommended principles of interpretation, which are to use the Nachlass to “supplement and clarify”, to “shed light” and “gain insight” into the published ideas. Instead of giving priority to the published texts and then using the Nachlass to shed light on especially difficult or confusing published ideas, as one would expect his methodology to entail, in practice Schacht gives the same priority—more priority in some cases—to the Nachlass as he does to the books Nietzsche published.

There are also important reasons to reject even Schacht’s proposed methodology, and even more so the methodology he utilizes in practice. Schacht’s defense for his liberal use of the Nachlass in his major work was that “it is Nietzsche’s thinking that interests us”. Since this is his assumption, it follows that anything Nietzsche wrote down, published or not, can

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37 Ch. 2 “Truth and Knowledge”, Ch. 3 sec. 3, “Things”, Ch. 4, etc.
possibly give us indications of that thinking, and is therefore fair game. But in this argument Schacht is responding to the charge that in giving an account of Nietzsche's philosophy his use of the unpublished notebooks is unjustified. Being interested in Nietzsche's thinking is different than being interested in what messages Nietzsche intended to deliver through works he published, and I am suggesting that what Nietzsche intended in works he published is precisely the issue. Schacht's appeal to our interest in Nietzsche's psychology as a justification for using the notebooks in interpreting his published word is clearly a red herring. "How Nietzsche thought" is a psychological issue, and interesting only as a subsidiary question beside the more philosophically interesting question of what Nietzsche's considered philosophy is, which Schacht agrees is to be found primarily in the published work. Thus Schacht avoids the question of what interpretive value Nietzsche's unpublished notes have with respect to his considered views, and vindicates a methodology for psychologists, but not scholars of the history of philosophy.

The account of Nietzsche's philosophy that emerges from Schacht's methodology is, as one could expect, highly "academic". With chapter titles like "Truth and Knowledge", and "Metaphysical Errors", Nietzsche comes across as a thinker deeply concerned with the traditional problems of philosophy (what exists, how we know, what is right), and not much else. It is doubtful that such a Nietzsche could emerge without a frequent and objectionable recourse to the Nachlass for support, and as we saw earlier the degree of such recourse necessary to produce Schacht's Nietzsche—even when Schacht purportedly gives 'priority' to the published work—is indefensible. And while there is an interesting final chapter on "Art and Artists", issues which for Nietzsche were much more central to his interests than

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38 Cf. Higgins and Solomon, 1988, p. 220 where Magnus leveled exactly this charge at Schacht, who was present at the conference where the paper was given and who is clearly responding to it (and similar charges) in his 1995.
Schacht’s account makes it appear, issues more questionable to contemporary liberal audiences like Nietzsche’s politics are systematically—and suspiciously—avoided. If one is to give an account of Nietzsche’s philosophy, and claim to privilege his published work, then surely his frequent exhortations to a return to aristocracy must be given a hearing.

So it seems that despite availability of even the most commonsensical methodologies for using Nietzsche’s Nachlass, abuse of it is still frequent—even amongst the proponents of such methodologies. What the debate over the Nachlass is really about is over what kind of philosopher Nietzsche was. Bernd Magnus wished to restrict Nietzsche scholarship to the published work, where little ‘traditional’ philosophy can be found, in an attempt to situate him at the “fountainhead of postmodernism”. Schacht avails himself without restriction of all of Nietzsche’s texts, published or unpublished, in order to show that Nietzsche was a much more academic and tradition-bound than previously thought, giving answers to the all of the ‘big questions’. The same pattern of trying to find ‘the real Nietzsche’ by different interpretive methodologies can be found in Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche, which utilized only the Nachlass to determine Nietzsche’s thought, and likewise in the accounts of other interpreters. The mistake in all of this is to think that a methodological principle applied to the Nachlass is the only way of determining whether or not Nietzsche was a non-traditional philosopher. Restricting use of the Nachlass is one step in the right direction, but, as demonstrated above this step only takes us so far, since even those who advocate commonsense methodologies may still end up with a very tradition-bound Nietzsche. In the next and final chapter I give some reasons independent of Nachlass issues altogether for thinking that Nietzsche was not, after all, an academic philosopher.

39 The fact that Schacht does not really apply the principles he suggests is just another reason to think that, when we really look at what Nietzsche wanted to put in the public domain, his philosophy is hardly as tradition-bound as contemporary accounts make it seem.
CHAPTER THREE: CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONALIZING METHODOLOGIES

... it is quite indisputable that academic youth will soon be able to manage without the philosophy taught at their universities, and that unacademic men are already able to manage without it. One has only to recall one’s own student days; in my case, for example, academic philosophers were men towards whom I was perfectly indifferent: I counted them as people who raked together something for themselves out of the results of the other sciences and employed their leisure time in reading newspapers and going to concerts, and for the rest were treated by their own academic comrades with a politely masked contempt.

"only now and then does one of them [academic philosophers] still hoist himself up to a little system of metaphysics, with the consequences the usually follow, namely dizziness, headache and nosebleed."

In part 1 of this chapter I present an example of an attempt to make Nietzsche into a traditional philosopher—in particular, an attempt to make him a metaphysician—and show why it is problematic. The account is problematic for two reasons: (1) because of a dubious privileging of the Nachlass in determining Nietzsche’s final views, and (2) because of equally dubious readings of Nietzsche’s published texts. Although for reasons of economy my criticisms are restricted to a single influential example, the same or similar problems and issues arise with related interpretations of Nietzsche in Anglo-American scholarship, which I briefly cover.

In part 2 I distinguish three ways of “reading” Nietzsche: (a) in a contextualist way; e.g., as a nineteenth-century philosopher, (b) in a “evaluative” way, e.g., as a philosopher today, to be judged in terms of the present, and (c) in a “appropriative” way, as a resource to solve contemporary philosophical problems. I suggest that the current confusion over what kind of philosopher Nietzsche was is partly due to a general failure among the scholars identified in section 1 to distinguish their accounts, of type (b) and (c) (appropriation), from accounts of type (a) (contextualist). These scholars—and those producing similar Nietzsche—do not give consideration to Nietzsche’s negative attitude toward modern

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40 UM III 188.
41 UM III, 188.
philosophical projects (of, e.g., Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and their metaphysical and epistemological undertakings) but rather focus their efforts on recasting Nietzsche's words to develop systems of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on under the name "Nietzsche". The result is that Nietzsche qua Nietzsche is confused with contemporary accounts of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics under his name. I suggest that in future Nietzsche studies if accounts of type (b) and (c) are more adequately distinguished from accounts of type (a), the prevailing confusion over what kind of philosopher Nietzsche was will be diminished.

I. How Contemporary Scholars Make Nietzsche into a Traditional Philosopher

In Richard Schacht's influential study *Nietzsche*, in a section entitled "The world and will to power", Schacht produces a Nietzsche who held specific metaphysical views. There are three problems with this: the argument relies too heavily on the *Nachlass*, it depends on an untenable reading of work Nietzsche did publish, and its conclusions conflict with other things Nietzsche wrote. The section begins:

"Nietzsche deems it his 'purpose'... 'to demonstrate the absolute homogeneity of all events'... and what he here has in mind is the idea that it is in terms of 'will to power' that the 'ground and character of all change' is to be understood. In all events, he contends, this same fundamental tendency is at work. 'And do you know what the world is to me?', he asks; and after characterizing this world as a 'monster of energy, without beginning, without end, at once 'eternally self-creating' and 'eternally self-destroying', he goes on to suggest that the 'solution for all its riddles' is this: 'This world is the will to power—and nothing besides!'".

There are several important problems with Schacht's methodology—problems typical of academic Nietzsche interpretation. First, all of the quotations Schacht uses to introduce this section are from the *Nachlass*. This is problematic because Nietzsche never published these ideas, and so we cannot be sure that they represent his philosophy, which I have argued in
chapter 2 and 3 is to be found in work he himself published—a principle to which Schacht agrees. Secondly, Schacht presents these quotations as essentially continuous, as if they were all directed toward the same purpose. But that is an assumption. The dates of the quotations as well as their placement in The Will to Power hardly bear it out: the first quote is from 1885, the second from 1887, and the last from 1888; and each quote is taken from sections of the Will to Power that are in fact disposed to different purposes: the first quote is from a section dealing with morality and a critique of prevailing cultural values, the second from a section criticizing Darwin, and the last from a highly speculative section on the doctrine of the eternal recurrence that Nietzsche discarded. Thus Schacht not only privileges passages that Nietzsche did not publish, but he also ignores the context of such passages and the purposes toward which Nietzsche was putting them in order to derive a Nietzschean metaphysical system.

Despite these problems Schacht does attempt to link up these diffuse notes with things Nietzsche wrote in his published work. But even Schacht’s reading of the published passage in question is problematic. Thus, in the section following the one quoted above, Schacht quotes from Beyond Good and Evil section 13, where Nietzsche makes the experiment of conceiving “all efficient force univocally as will to power”. Unfortunately, Schacht glosses over the conditional nature of Nietzsche’s conclusions in this passage. Nietzsche speaks here of “venturing the hypothesis” and “making the experiment” about all life as will to power. But Nietzsche carefully avoids the use of declarative sentences and implicitly avoids conclusions that his own empirical method would not warrant. Schacht, in order to make the disparate Nachlass passages and this particular published passage appear to link up

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43 Schacht 212.
44 Cf. the first section of Ch. 3 for Schacht’s full view of how to use the Nachlass.
45 Cf. WP 272, 685, and 1067. For the history of the final note, see Magnus qtd. in Solomon & Higgins, 225.
more easily writes that “Nietzsche is able to satisfy himself that the results of this ‘experiment’... are sufficiently convincing to warrant the conclusion he here sets forth hypothetically”. But there is no textual evidence for Schacht’s hasty conclusion. Nietzsche does not change course at the end of the passage, there is no indication that he is “sufficiently convinced” by his admitted experiment. It is in order to derive a Nietzschean metaphysical system that Schacht must read the passage in this untenable way, which requires altering its meaning to fit with the scattered reflections from the Nachlass (also untenably) used to support such an interpretation.

Although I have singled out just one example to criticize, a brief review of the general attitude of scholars wishing to “traditionalize” Nietzsche lends further evidence to the view that many of these traditional interpretations are untenable. Thus John Richardson, in his book Nietzsche’s System, approaches Nietzsche as a metaphysician. Richardson writes that while Nietzsche expressly casts doubt on and seems to reject metaphysics in his published work, that “other evidence supports this approach”, namely, that in his notebooks Nietzsche wrote some things that appear to be rudiments of a metaphysical system. The problem with this justification is that when presented with the choice to take Nietzsche at his word (e.g., to heed his many and diverse criticisms and oppositions to traditional philosophy, especially metaphysics) or to take the Nachlass notes as evidence of a fundamental Nietzschean metaphysics, Richardson opts for the latter at the expense of devaluing the former. Richardson explains Nietzsche’s reluctance to publish metaphysical views (somewhat embarrassingly and inadequately) by writing that “... this could be because Nietzsche thinks his philosophy’s deep structural unity is a product of mainly unconscious

46 Schacht 213.
processes and is best left in that implicitness". The claim is impossible to confirm, and conflicts with the commonsense assumption that Nietzsche’s philosophy is contained in his published texts. Given that Richardson’s methodological approach to Nietzsche depends on it, we should be suspicious of such an interpretation and other interpretations that rely on similarly dubious methodological principles.

Finally, Arthur Danto, in his watershed Nietzsche as Philosopher holds that despite Nietzsche’s expressed distrust of systems and traditional philosophy, “… because we know a great deal more philosophy today, I believe it is exceedingly useful to see Nietzsche’s analyses in terms of logical features which he was unable to make explicit, but toward which he was unmistakably groping”. This methodological approach allows Danto to also reach his more radical conclusion that depends on it, viz., that “Nietzsche thought systematically about each of the closed set of questions which define what philosophy is, and that he gave serious, coherent, and original answers to them all”. Unfortunately, many of these answers come from material Nietzsche never published, as Danto admits (“I make heavy use of this material”). Danto does not consider the possibility that the answers he makes Nietzsche provide are unattainable from the published texts alone, as Bernd Magnus has argued (see Ch. 1). Nor does he see his unrestricted use of the Nachlass as in any way problematic, even where the answers he derives might conflict with things Nietzsche did say in his published works. As just one example of how this account is suspect, consider Danto’s account of the will to power construed as a general ontological claim—a conclusion derivable only from Nietzsche’s notebooks—instead of a general psychological theory—which it remains in the published texts:

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47 Richardson 8.
48 Danto, preface.
49 Ibid.
It is hardly avoidable that we think of will-to-power in almost exactly the terms in which men once thought of substance, as that which underlies everything else and was the most fundamental of all. For will-to-power is not something we have, but something we are. Not only are we will-to-power, but so is everything, human and animal, animate and material. The entire world is will-to-power; there is nothing more basic, for there is nothing other than it and its modifications.

Plainly, then, will-to-power is an elemental concept in Nietzsche’s thinking, a concept in whose terms everything is to be understood and to which everything is finally to be reduced. It is a metaphysical, or better, an ontological concept, for “will-to-power” is Nietzsche’s answer to the question “what is there?”

Reducing Nietzsche’s philosophy to certain ideas he experimented with in his notebooks does not do justice to his true philosophy, which is to be found in the books, so pregnant with new philosophical ideas, that Nietzsche himself wrote.

In this section I have provided an example of an attempt to make Nietzsche into a metaphysician, and raised methodological and philosophical objections to it. I then gave examples of the methodologies employed by other scholars attempting to do much the same thing, and provided some reasons why such accounts are suspect in general: they either fail to employ a reasonable methodology relating to Nietzsche’s Nachlass, or they alter the meaning of passages Nietzsche did publish in order to furnish a coherent, traditionalist Nietzsche. This gives scholars reasons for thinking that accounts of Nietzsche as a traditional philosopher (e.g., as a metaphysician, epistemologist, ethicist, and so on) are not really accounts of Nietzsche’s philosophy as such, but are rather attempts by contemporary philosophers to appropriate Nietzsche for their own philosophical projects. In the following section I draw this distinction out further.

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50 Danto 215.
II. Three Ways of Reading Nietzsche

Nietzsche’s criticisms of “philosophy”—for him, the series of philosophical systems represented by, e.g., Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and often Plato—are well known. To cite just a few examples from his criticisms of metaphysics specifically: in *Human, all too Human*, in a section entitled “On First and Last Things”, Nietzsche writes that “Perhaps we will recognize that the thing-in-itself deserves a Homeric laugh, in that it seemed to be so much, indeed everything, and is actually empty, that is, empty of meaning” and that “Belief in unconditioned substances and identical things is likewise an old, original error of all that is organic. To the extent that all metaphysics has dealt with substance, however, one may characterize it as that science which deals with the basic errors of man—but as if they were basic truths”.

Of metaphysical knowledge in general, Nietzsche writes that “No matter how well proven the existence of such a world might be [a metaphysical world], it would still hold true that the knowledge of it would be the most inconsequential of all knowledge, even more inconsequential than the knowledge of the chemical analysis of water must be to the boatman facing a storm”. Thus Nietzsche thinks not only that the “metaphysical enterprise” represented by past philosophical projects is merely a “science of man’s errors”, and that metaphysical worlds are “empty” and “meaningless”, he also thinks that, even if the existence of such a world could be convincingly demonstrated, knowledge about it would be totally without consequence. Nietzsche’s later criticisms of the philosophical tradition are similar in theme: the section “Reason in Philosophy” in *Twilight of the Idols* criticizes philosophers for their lack of a “historical sense”, which leads them to treat their concepts as timeless reflections of the foundation of reality, when in fact these so-called “highest

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51 Ibid.
52 Sec. 17, 18.
concepts” are the “most general, emptiest concepts, the last wisp of evaporating reality” and do not reflect the dynamic, contingent, and ‘Heraclitean’ nature of human experience. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche entertains the idea that the systematic philosophies he is reacting to are merely the “confessions” and “unconscious memoirs” of their authors, and thus that their reflections have never been directed perceptions of Truth.

If many of the current, traditionalized accounts of “Nietzsche” as a metaphysician or epistemologist are to be taken seriously, then they must be measured against the many reflections like that above, and found throughout Nietzsche’s work. When they are, two questions arise: if Nietzsche was so adamantly against the philosophical projects typical of traditional philosophy before him (i.e., metaphysical systems), what value could contemporary accounts of Nietzsche’s own metaphysical system (or epistemology or ethics) have? How could they be tenable, given that Nietzsche himself seems to have rejected and avoided that kind of project? I suggest that an answer to both questions lies in differing modes of “reading” Nietzsche, which authors and/or readers of contemporary accounts fail to distinguish.

The first way to read Nietzsche is to read him contextually, reading (a). This means to take into account biographical facts that may shed light on his motivations and purposes in his writing. Such facts probably include that he was writing in the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe, that in his times speculative philosophy had been exhausted in the systems of Hegel and Schelling, that an unrestricted faith in science was dominant, but also that a faith in God was diminishing because of the spread of Darwinism and the empirical method, and so on. When Nietzsche is read with these facts in mind, his criticisms of traditional philosophy make sense: philosophical systems, which often include “God”,

53 Ibid. sec. 9.
depend on presuppositions that would have been untenable (because they could not be confirmed in experience) in Nietzsche’s time. The same goes for his more specific criticisms of metaphysics and other-worldly longing: God is dead, we have no experience of other worlds, and to believe in them devalues this life and this world, which Nietzsche thinks we ought to focus on.

The second way to read Nietzsche is as a philosopher today, in an “evaluative” way, reading (b). That means either evaluating Nietzsche’s philosophy in terms of what relevance it holds for today’s issues and problems, or evaluating today’s issues and problems in terms of Nietzsche’s philosophy. I call it “relativist” because it does not judge Nietzsche qua Nietzsche, but from the relative perspective of contemporary culture. An example of such a reading might include Alan Bloom’s *The Closing of the American Mind*, where Bloom holds Nietzsche responsible for the nihilism and relativism of contemporary culture. It is nihilism and relativism that are Bloom’s real concern, not “Nietzsche” in the sense of (a).

Finally, there is the “appropriative” reading of Nietzsche, as a resource for dealing with contemporary philosophical projects, reading (c). This means appropriating from Nietzsche whatever ideas or concepts found in his work that seem useful for one’s own philosophical projects. In this way of reading Nietzsche one is concerned not with Nietzsche qua Nietzsche, or even with Nietzsche qua contemporary philosopher, but only with developing one’s own ideas (even if under the name “Nietzsche”). So naturally little or no attention need be given to the context in which Nietzsche wrote, nor need much consideration be given to the possibility that the philosophy developed using this method conflicts with other things Nietzsche says. Furthermore, if Nietzsche is approached in this way...

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54 I take it that (c) is a species of (b), but distinguish them since accounts of Nietzsche’s philosophy proper are different in important respects from accounts of his contemporary relevance.
way one need not worry about methodological issues relating to unpublished notes and manuscripts, since even those contain ideas that might be useful.

Now that three ways of reading Nietzsche have been distinguished, we must attempt to locate the many contemporary accounts of “Nietzsche” within this taxonomy. Since contemporary accounts that I have considered in this study often conflict with things Nietzsche himself says, and since they also fail to adequately recognize the context in which Nietzsche was writing, they must be excluded from category (a). If we were to place them in category (a), the result would be inconsistent or contradictory Nietzsches: in one and the same type of reading (contextualist) we would have a Nietzsche who railed against metaphysics, as well as Nietzsche-as-metaphysician. So these accounts must belong to a different category. But they do not adequately fit into readings of type (b), either. As mentioned, accounts of type (b) identify a contemporary problem or issue and bring Nietzsche in as a responsible party, or as someone whose thought could assist us in understanding or solving it. To be sure, many accounts of “Nietzsche” do fit into this category. But not the accounts I have considered: these accounts are strictly philosophical, and generally do not venture beyond the confines of the problems of philosophy. This leaves us with the “appropriative” reading, (c). These accounts mostly disregard the fact that Nietzsche qua Nietzsche rejected metaphysics and traditional philosophy in general, and they show little concern for distinguishing between what Nietzsche published and what he did not. Rather, they weave together Nietzsche’s words in order to form coherent answers to traditional philosophical questions, with the result that old problems are seen in a new light, or perhaps even solved. Thus the accounts of Nietzsche’s philosophy that I have given attention to in this study ought to be understood as readings of type (c), that is, as attempts
to deal with contemporary philosophical problems by using Nietzsche’s words, ideas, and concepts, rather than as readings of type (a), that is, as Nietzsche proper.

There were two questions asked earlier: if Nietzsche was so adamantly against the philosophical projects typical of traditional philosophy before him (i.e., metaphysical systems), what value could contemporary accounts of Nietzsche’s own metaphysical system (or epistemology or ethics) have? How could they be tenable, given that Nietzsche himself seems to have rejected and avoided that kind of project? We now have an answer: recent Anglo-American accounts of Nietzsche’s philosophy are valuable insofar as they advance the discussion of Anglo-American philosophy—but they are tenable only as such, and should not be conflated with Nietzsche as Nietzsche.

In this chapter I have shown that contemporary scholars have attempted to make Nietzsche into a traditional philosopher, and evaluated their methods of doing so. While these methods are problematic for producing accounts of Nietzsche qua Nietzsche, they are appropriate for other types of accounts of Nietzsche’s philosophy. I then distinguished between three ways of reading Nietzsche: the contextualist, evaluative, and appropriative. I argued that the recent Anglo-American accounts of Nietzsche’s thought that I have considered in this study are best understood as appropriations of Nietzsche’s ideas for solving contemporary philosophical problems, rather than as accounts of Nietzsche qua Nietzsche. The recognition of these basic ways of reading Nietzsche, and their employment in Nietzsche studies should lead to less confusion about what kind of philosopher Nietzsche was.
CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have taken up the question of how to use Nietzsche’s Nachlass in interpreting his considered views, and how this question relates to broader issues about what kind of philosopher Nietzsche was. I have argued that while the Nachlass can sometimes shed light and assist in understanding certain published passages, it should not be given the same weight as the published work when determining Nietzsche’s philosophy. I then argued that methodological grounds alone relating to the Nachlass are neither necessary nor sufficient for gaining consensus about what kind of philosopher Nietzsche was, since even those advocating commonsense methodologies can produce traditional Nietzscheans. So I offered further grounds for thinking that Nietzsche was a non-traditional philosopher by critically evaluating and categorizing the methodologies of scholars producing such accounts.

NOTE ON POSTMODERNISM

Readers will have noticed that throughout my thesis I have hesitated to assent to Magnus’s proposition that Nietzsche be placed at the “fountainhead of postmodernism”, opting instead to establish the less contentious claim that Nietzsche was a “non-traditional philosopher”. The reason for my hesitation is that there is not a general consensus about what postmodernity is or what characterizes “postmodern philosophy” specifically. But just as philosophers in the Enlightenment began to ask what Enlightenment meant, so philosophers in the postmodern period are beginning to ask what postmodernity is. So, in time, when we more fully understand the conditions in which we are philosophizing, we may one day be able to assert without a doubt that philosophy began again with Nietzsche. And while I suspect that Nietzsche is at least a watershed in a new kind of philosophizing, I do
not believe that there are sound or unambiguous grounds for declaring him the “first, full-blooded postmodern”.
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