Rediscovering a Fundamentally New and Practical Administrative Alternative

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Abstract

The dissertation explores the two primary types of public administration feminist literature, equity feminism and other voice feminism, and determines that they do not reveal a clear typology that practically outlines the characteristics of an alternative organizational viewpoint from that of the dominant viewpoint. Building on Stivers' metaphor of the home, and drawing on nine other strands of literature, a typology comprised of 4 primary dimensions -- epistemology; ontology; social theory; and ethics -- was constructed that opposed the home metaphorical perspective and the dominant business metaphorical perspective. The home metaphor, based on Stivers' historical analysis of the early founding of the field of public administration, provided a framework for implementing the rediscovered typology. The following are high-level abstractions of the two metaphors and their general orientations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business Metaphor Overview</th>
<th>Home Metaphor Overview</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>interpretive/critical thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rationality/objectivity</td>
<td>arationality/subjectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>anti-federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>science defines, explains and categorizes</td>
<td>human experience and inner knowledge explain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moral authority is codified in the law and applied</td>
<td>moral authority is a product of context and discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus on steadily improving the way in which life is lived</td>
<td>engage in a process orientation to life; comfortable with here and now orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action is methodological, scientific, privileged, expert</td>
<td>action is tentative, pragmatic, practical, experimental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positivist science</td>
<td>pragmatic action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reinvent government</td>
<td>reconceptualize government</td>
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The home metaphor was then practically illustrated and revealed through a content analysis of two cases of community policing. The analysis of these case studies revealed the apparent difficulty of moving from the dominant business metaphorical perspective to the less familiar home metaphorical perspective. Despite this apparent difficulty, the case studies revealed rich examples of how the home metaphor plays out in cities that are striving to utilize community policing practices. Public administrators and researchers may use this typology to identify other alternative perspectives for analysis and praxis, as well as nonconventional courses of action. The case studies demonstrated that a critical aspect of public administration, that of policing, has begun to strongly value this alternative perspective and the positive gains that it brings to strengthening the relationship between public administrators and citizens.
Dedication

To Mother/Father God

who has infused me with
desire, hope, commitment, determination, endurance,
confidence, insight and wisdom;
who has inspired me to pursue my dreams and passions
of contributing to the transformational work of Planet Earth;
and who has filled my life with abundant daily encounters of miraculous unfoldment;

I give holy and profuse thanks.
Author's Acknowledgments

I thank my life's partner, Spark, for knowing and understanding that completing this project was, in part, a desire to fulfill a dream of expression, of contributing to the transformational work of this planet and its institutions; an effort for me to become the best expression of myself. You never doubted that I would finish this dissertation. You also knew that supporting this effort and commitment demanded much time away from you and our children, Bryce Derrick and Cydney Grace, all of which you willingly and lovingly sacrificed in fulfillment of my dreams to become your Dr. Wife and their Dr. Mom.

To my parents who may not always have understood the ideas that flow through me with great passion and intensity, and who instinctively knew from a young age that I marched to the beat of a different drum, but who have always, unswervingly supported my desire for higher education and encouraged me to be the best that I could be, no matter what challenges or obstacles stood in my way, I give thanks.

I give special thanks to Orion and Cynthia for their faith that, despite the daunting personal challenges I faced throughout the completion of this dissertation project, each of those experiences would only serve to strengthen it and serve to ripen and enhance the perspective from which it is drawn. And, it is they who knew that I would finish this doctorate because of my commitment, my passion for the subject, and my deep reservoir of desire to contribute to the stream of literature that is their intellectual home.

To Larkin, who bravely assisted me in completing this dissertation project in a way that helped me to see and fulfill my desire and this part of my personal destiny, whose encouragement, advice and partnership I will forever treasure, I am deeply grateful.

I thank Jim Wolf and Colleen Woodard for their insights and suggestions, particularly during the prospectus phase of this process, and am most grateful for their patience. I also thank Irene Jung and Missy Graham for patiently and diligently processing all of the paperwork necessary for completing this project, as well as Susan Short and Anne Aker for their tremendous hospitality in hosting my dissertation defense at the Roanoke Graduate Center. They are among the many
unsung heroes who mean so much to me.

To the Addison Library staff, including Dave Beagle (Distance Education Librarian), Bruce Pencek (my college librarian), and the many individuals who are a part of ILLIAD, I am eternally grateful. Without them, it is doubtful that I would have or could have weathered the many pits of frustration or spells of long distance research despair. The arrival of their special delivery packages full of loaned library books and copies of reprinted articles always spurred me to the next peak of excellence. In short, they unfailingly delivered on my every research need with professional dispatch and dedicated assistance. They are another often unsung, yet tremendously important link in the chain of achieving one's higher education goals.

To others who have cared deeply and been extremely supportive in a myriad of profound ways – Debbie Fisher, Margaret Kiernan, Cheryl Simon, Rick & Lisa Belloli, Tim Duperron, Anne Mervenne, Tony & Elaine Semanik, the Girls Group, Karen Burcham, Rick Hopper, Jane Wittmeyer, Marie Williams, Jorge Acker, Lisa Strzelewicz and Susan Maloney – I thank you with all my heart and soul.

And last, but importantly, I could not be more grateful to my "dissertation support" colleague, Allan Jones, who provided solid guidance, active listening, and compassionate ears for many an hour of weekly long distance telephone calls and e-mail exchanges, and unconditional, unwavering friendship and belief that my dissertation was worthy of his time and commitment. I have been mightily blessed by his intellectual companionship along this solitary road.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

In each of us two powers preside, one male, one female; and in the man's brain, the man predominates over the woman, and in the woman's brain, the woman predominates over the man …. If one is a man, still the woman part of the brain must have effect; and a woman also must have intercourse with the man in her. Coleridge perhaps meant this when he said that a great mind is androgynous. It is when this fusion takes place that the mind is fully fertilized and uses all of its faculties.1

-- Virginia Woolf

…the search for other ways of organizing complex collective human activities.2

-- Joan Acker

Organizations and managers are entering new and different times. More of the same will not be the solution for the problems of the future. 'More and better' humanism and other incremental fixes will be insufficient to deal with the major discontinuities that organizations and managers will face in the decades to come. New and different models are needed. … But one thing is certain, we cannot move to a new frame or paradigm, to a new way of thinking about organizations and management, until we lay to rest the old, with its hierarchical assumptions and beliefs. Feminist theory is, in our view, the most developed, most coherent body of knowledge available to help us do that.3

-- Ramsey & Calvert

Background

While a great deal of emphasis has been paid to issues of change and motivation in public administration in recent years, e.g., the reinventing government movement, there continues to be dissatisfaction with the traditional direction that these innovations are taking. This is readily evidenced by critiques emanating from the Public Administration Theory Network (PATNET) and other similar outlets for public administration practitioners and theoreticians. It seems clear

2 Acker, 1992, 260.
3 Ramsey and Calvert, 1994, 96-97.
that the model of administration and organization that we have been using for well over a century is not working well enough to meet the needs of the 21st century and beyond.

When reviewing possible alternatives to current theory and practice, what one finds is a kind of flavor-of-the-month management practice, e.g., Senge, Peters, or Weick, to name but a few popular examples, continuing to flow out of the same basic paradigmatic frame of reference that has dominated public administrative theory and practice for decades, if not centuries. What is not apparent is anything generically different from these ideas, something that could offer not only a fundamentally new way of thinking about administration and organization, but that could also indicate a philosophically different foundation for engaging in practical administrative action. At the same time this new way must be one that is not simply critical of traditional organizational development, but one that indicates both a fundamentally, philosophically different perspective and even more importantly a way to take action based on that perspective. Any truly alternative public administrative perspective must be practical if it is to have any relevance, currency, and a chance at being adopted in today's environment of fast paced change and complexity. More importantly, if it is, at the same time, fundamentally familiar, it will have an even greater possibility of being drawn upon and utilized to enhance the administration of our public institutions.
Purpose and Research Focus

This dissertation proposes a metaphor, that of “home,” to serve as a basis for an alternative perspective or stance based in the feminine that can assist us in better engaging in public administration and policy in the New Millennium and beyond, but more critically provide the necessary tools for doing so in a practical, applied way. This project is possible because the image of home and what it symbolizes is well known. Homes are real and how people think and operate in them is commonly understood. Further, we know that how homes are run is in most ways fundamentally different from how businesses, and more often than not public institutions, are generally operated.

In this dissertation, I construct a typology to distinguish between two opposing metaphors, that of the home metaphor noted immediately above, and that of the business metaphor which is the dominate frame of reference for public administrative practices today. The differences between these polarized metaphors will be both categorized and illustrated. According to William Croft (2002), the "common definition of the term [typology] is roughly synonymous with the 'taxonomy' or 'classification,' a classification of the phenomenon under study into types, particularly structural types. This is the definition that is found outside of linguistics, for example in biology, a field that inspired linguistic theory in the nineteenth century." As such, typologies can be used as a means to specify the dimensions associated with one set of concepts versus those associated with another.

Therefore, in order to develop a typology centered around the metaphor of “home,” this dissertation has four primary research questions:
1) Is there a clear typology distinguishing an alternative organizational viewpoint built on feminist principles in the public administration literature different from other more dominant premises?
   a. Do the major feminist theories distinguish clearly the premises of an organization built on feminist ontology and epistemology?
   b. Are there conceptions of such an organizational framework in related social science fields?

2) If such a typology does not exist, what premises would be the basis for an alternative theoretical typology for public administration based on the worldview of the feminine and grounded in the metaphor of the “home,” a metaphor developed in public administration by Camilla Stivers?

3) Can the home metaphor be revealed in actual case studies through a content analysis of two cases of community policing used as an illustration?

4) What implications does the home metaphor have for public administration research and practice?
   a. Can the use of the premises behind the home metaphor point to alternative understandings?
   b. Can alternative recommendations for action be demonstrated in the analysis of two case studies?

To answer question one above, “Is there a clear typology distinguishing an alternative organization viewpoint built on feminist principles in the public administration literature from other more dominant premises,” I argue that while the major categories of feminist scholarship in
the field of public administration, that of equity feminism and other voice feminism, provide
fertile ground for understanding a feminine contribution to the field of public administration and
research, they do not: a) clarify in the academic literature the dimensions that would help us
distinguish clearly what an alternative organization built on principles rooted in feminism would
be; nor do they b) help us move forward from such an alternative perspective, that is, they do not
provide enough substantive guidance as to how to engage in administrative activities. They do
not tell us how to consistently draw insight from the uniquely feminine and less understood or
less valued perspective in a concrete or specific way. While one of the most valued perspectives,
Other Voice Feminism, describes how the thinking of women is different and how a feminine
perspective might inform leadership theory, for example, it does not show how a distinctly
alternative administrative perspective, based in a feminine worldview, can be understood or
practically enacted across all aspects of public administration.

In addition, with regard to the first question, I explore what commonalities exist and synthesize
these strands from the literature of feminist and gender deconstruction in related fields to build
toward a better conception of an alternative approach to public administration. These strands are
primarily comprised of feminist and gender deconstructions of the following literatures:
sociology; psychology; political science; organizational development; management (e.g.,
leadership and teaming theories); and cognitive science, among others.

This dissertation synthesizes a great deal of material across a wide variety of literatures that
discuss such issues as a different relationship between the masculine and feminine (Shlain 1998);
the influence of right brain/left brain thinking on the business world today (Pink 2005); and the
interdisciplinary study of the mind as revealed by Lakoff in his study of political worldviews (Lakoff 1996). This dichotomy of thinking is experienced by many of us and is not at all unfamiliar. What this dissertation strives to do is to define and fuse these lines of thinking in such a way as to better reveal the less known and less publicly practiced alternative, that which is being referred to as the home metaphor, which is based in and constructed out of the feminine, and which has the potential for providing us with a new way of understanding and approaching public administrative practices.

To address the second question above, "If such a typology does not exist, what premises would be the basis for an alternative theoretical typology for public administration based on the worldview of the feminine and grounded in the metaphor of the 'home,' a metaphor developed in public administration by Camilla Stivers?," I build an alternative theoretical typology for public administration based on the worldview of the feminine and grounded in the metaphor of the "home," a metaphor developed in public administration by Camilla Stivers. As Stivers' most recent work clearly indicates (Stivers 2005), we are looking at home at the level of ontology. Clearly, we know there are homes that in no way represent the types of metaphorical guidance I seek to describe in this dissertation. However, I believe at the ontological level we can build upon Stivers' work to construct a positive, albeit an even ideal or symbolic approach, that can be used to reveal, or rediscover, a fundamentally new and practical administrative alternative.

This dissertation will refer to Stivers' "city as home" metaphor as the home metaphor or perspective as juxtaposed with the "city as business" metaphor or business metaphor that undergirds the vast majority of public administration literature throughout the preceding century.
An attachment to the public-private distinction has underpinned and consequently framed thinking about democratic governance within the field of public administration as will be revealed by the theoretical roots explored in greater detail in the section entitled, "Follett's Emphasis on Holism for the Home Ontology," in Chapter 3. Suffice to say that a strong foundational belief in a limited role for government and a strong emphasis on individualism has led to the creation of a public administration that is grounded on a distinctly adversarial relationship between the public and private, where private choice is concretely separate from public decisions and actions. The home metaphor speaks to how we can work from a primarily feminine metaphorical perspective. The home metaphor not only reveals the theoretical perspective that informs its foundation, it also reveals to us the practical guidance of how to operate from this perspective.

In regard to the third question above, "Can the home metaphor be revealed in actual case studies through a content analysis of two cases of community policing used as an illustration?,” I show how such a perspective can and is being, for the most part, successfully and practically enacted in one key area of government today through a content analysis of two case studies of community policing. Interestingly, Kenneth Meier, in a book review of Stivers' second edition of Gender Images in Public Administration, (Meier and McBride 2003) asks, among other things, the following:

What are the empirical characteristics of an organization built on the lines advocated by Stivers? The world is populated by millions of organizations; some are organizations that have never employed any males. Do such organizations look different in any systematic way from similar organizations performing the same function (233)?

The review of the two cases points to some of the differences that Meier demands. In the
process of review, the alternative typology is applied to the cases to test the typology and to more fully explain the cases.

In regard to question four above, "What implications does the home metaphor have for public administration research and practice?," I demonstrate how the typology constructed in this dissertation can serve to suggest alternative strategies for the reviewed cases as an example of the potentiality of the theoretical frame.

Finally, an important aim of this dissertation is to contribute to both the literature of academia, as well as to the daily practice of public administration.

The Literature Gap: The Worldview of Women and Feminism in Public Administration

The review below places the dissertation research in perspective by arguing that an understanding and an alternative action typology has been built very little on equity feminism and only to some extent on other voice feminism, the two major feminist perspectives that have influenced public administration. In addressing this question of whether we can find or rediscover a fundamentally new and practical alternative for managing public institutions in the worldview of women or from the feminine, the literature that the field has most often drawn upon must first be described. The following reviews the two areas of public administration writing and scholarship that bear on this question, Equity Feminism and Other Voice Feminism.

Equity Feminism

The general pattern that we can see in the writing that has been produced by feminist scholars in
public administration has started from the broad framework of justice. So-called Equity Feminism, at its essence, has been concerned with fair treatment or justice in the way women are treated in employment. Moreover, it is concerned with the way present management processes and policies are being used to the disadvantage of women, specifically. This traditional stream of literature addresses the number of women in government agencies, their rank or success as compared to men or other minorities, and similar types of research. In essence, this literature does not aim at changing the way in which government is administered so much as it aims to open up opportunities for women within current structure, methodology, and practice. This literature is furthest from my area of research contribution, but by far the most prolific.

The vast majority of Equity Feminist literature describes the number of women participating in various levels of government, looks at alleged bias against them and what is preventing them from increased participation, and is most often based on traditional statistical analyses (Dolan 2000); (Hays and Kearney 1990; Stewart 1990; Kelly, Hale et al. 1991; Kearney and Sellers 1996; Mani 1999; Miller and Kerr 1999; Naff and Crum 2000; Pynes 2000; Kim and Dolan 2004).

For instance, in "A National Study of Gender-Based Occupational Segregation in Municipal Bureaucracies: Persistence of Glass Walls?," Miller, Kerr and Reid's research indicates that:

even though cities have achieved gender balance in redistributive functions, women are severely underrepresented in distributive and regulatory agencies. Because salaries in redistributive agencies are, on average, lower than those in distributive and regulatory agencies, the authors argue that occupational segregation is associated with salary inequities. Although the authors uncover some evidence for the erosion of glass walls in distributive and regulatory agencies, the pace of change has been slow (1999, 1).
Other work by Kerr, Miller and Reid discusses "high levels of occupational segregation among administrative cadres in agencies with distributive and regulatory policy commitments; however professional workforces in these agencies have become less gender segregated over time" (Kerr, Miller et al. 2002). Most recently they have concluded that:

women are underrepresented in top-level administrative and professional positions in distributive and regulatory agencies, suggesting the continued presence of glass ceilings in such agencies; women are better represented among administrative and especially professional cadres in redistributive agencies, however their full representation at the uppermost administrative levels remains an unrealized goal; and women are less well represented in higher paying positions (in proportion to their numbers in the agency) in agencies with higher salaries (Reid, Miller et al. 2004).

Bonnie G. Mani explored whether veterans' preference is a "significant barrier to women's career advancement" by measuring "the impact of these policies on the careers of women in the federal civil service" (Mani 1999, 523). Naff and Crum investigated perceptions among federal employees regarding whether various presidential administrations' ideologies have "had a direct impact on the opportunities of minorities, women, and white men for development," by using government-wide date from 1979-1996. They examined "whether such employment opportunities varied in the manner suggested by those perceptions" (Naff and Crum 2000, 98). An earlier work by Naff examined the way in which women continue to be "severely underrepresented in managerial ranks" by reviewing data gathered by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (Naff 1994,).

Riccucci and Saidel concern themselves with the stream of theory pertaining to the study of representative bureaucracy, specifically that which assesses representativeness "by providing a breakdown of the highest leadership positions in state government bureaucracies by gender, race and ethnicity" (Riccucci and Saidel 1997, 423). In other words, they are concerned with research
regarding political appointees and/or agency leaders and the degree to which they reflect or represent the populations they serve. In a related vein, Meredith Ann Newman shows:

how gender power, sex-role expectations, and institutional dimensions interact with policy types and their accompanying prognostications, especially about the breadth of benefit distributions and level of conflict ... an examination of the organizational environment that might produce significant variations in work experiences across the three agency types, regulatory, distributive, and redistributive ... reveal implicit masculinity and advantages accruing to those who work in heavily male-dominated agencies (Newman 1995, 140).

Joan E. Pynes in a study of women serving in leadership roles of nonprofits, found that while there was a preponderance of women serving as chief executives and fiscal officers, there were "fewer female board members and fewer women serving as board presidents and treasurers" (2000, 35).

Julie Dolan has written several articles looking at women and their progress within the federal Senior Executive Service (Dolan 2000; Dolan 2000; Dolan 2002; Dolan 2004). Most recently she examined whether women's advancement into the SES has been illusory or real and whether they have had the opportunity to "contribute to governance from real positions of power and influence" (2004, 299).

Baker, Wendt and Slonaker's research "show the progress of women in the federal government's labor relations career field during the 1990s" and conclude "women in labor relations have made significant progress toward equity in both salary and level of management" (Baker, Wendt et al. 2002, 559).

This liberal feminist literature tradition suggests that if the number of women active in public
institutions reflected their numbers in the greater population, they would be treated the same as their male counterparts. In other words, "just give me a seat at the table!" These studies often result in recommendations for how the participation, status, or treatment of women in public institutions can or should be improved. Kearney and Sellers, for example, examine thirty-four state task force reports on gender bias in the judiciary and discuss how recommendations for improving the treatment of women are, for the most part, being taken seriously (Kearney and Sellers 1996). Bullard and Wright found that "women have made considerable inroads in securing top administrative posts, especially in certain types of agencies and newly created organizations. However, much of their progress has been accomplished by circumventing or avoiding rather than 'breaking' the glass ceiling" (Bullard and Wright 1993, 189).

A corollary research involves the participation of women in professional associations related to government careers, e.g., the American Society for Public Administration (Rubin 2000). Rubin's work concludes that while women "have continued to increase their proportion of membership in the organization and have achieved full participation in the governance of ASPA during the 1990s ... women have not yet achieved parity with their male colleagues in scholarly contributions to public administration"(1).

This literature echoes earlier research that examines women and their academic research and writing success as compared to men and other minorities in the field of public administration (Condit and Hutchinson 1997)(Rodgers and Rodgers 1999). Along a similar vein, Jean Harris discusses the need to integrate scholarship on women into public administration textbooks (Harris 1994) and DeLysa Burnier (Burnier 1992) explores making public administration courses
more gender inclusive. Most recently, Janet Mills and Meredith A. Newman examine "the extent to which gender issues in public administration are covered in NASPAA-accredited and affiliated master's programs nationwide" (Mills and Newman 2002, 25). They find that gender issues are covered unevenly by these schools and conclude "the study of gender issues in public affairs benefits – and remains essential for – female and male students and practitioners alike" (25).

The Condit and Hutchinson (1997) work is of particular interest to this dissertation project since they look at whether women in public administration have engaged in the types of research that:

- turn feminist eyes of diverse types to a reexamination of the fundamental theories, mechanisms of analysis, and primary values that have given shape to our epistemological techniques and our ontological assumptions. It is at this step that fundamental shifts in human knowledge can be made as the result of the women's movement (1).

Moreover, they conclude, "there has been little feminist influence in public administration research to date" (6).

Not entirely surprising, the literature also contains biographical and historical accounts of exemplary women in the field of public administration and their contributions to it (Hejka-Ekins 1992; Radin 1992; Stivers 1992; Guy 2000).

Other Equity Feminism research focuses on: how gender affects the work place and resulting recommended communication techniques for gaining equality (Hale 1999); how public organizations are not inherently neutral, but instead are gendered as masculine, making it more difficult for women to advance their careers (Guy 1994); using mentoring and networking as a
means to promotion and advancement (Szymborski 1996)(Mathews 1994); research that suggests that how women are treated in public institutions is determined by more than gender, i.e., that work environments of different types of agencies can determine variable patterns of career advancement, affecting the levels of success of women (Newman 1994); and rich descriptions of emotional labor and civil service systems failing to compensate for it, resulting in women continuing to receive less pay for comparable work (Guy and Newman 2004).

All of these works are directed at improving, in one way or another, the level of participation of women in the institutions of public administration. They do not offer any alternative management, leadership, or organizational structure or process practices based on a feminine perspective, let alone guidance for taking pragmatic action based on such a perspective.

Other Voice Feminism
The second major overarching area of literature that stems from the worldview of women or feminism is that of Other Voice Feminism. This entails work that ascribes a unique perspective or viewpoint to women as gendered beings who are then seen to contribute a unique perspective to methods of managing or administering in government institutions. A number of important research pursuits can be found in this area, among them are those that explore: how governance is changed by the very nature of women participating at senior levels (Fox and Shulmann 1999); the effects of gender on moral development (White 1999); the gendered nature of the Weberian bureaucracy (Duerst-Lahti and Johnson 1990); potential feminist interventions (Hult 1995); variations in male and female behavioral styles of management and leadership (Kelly, Hale et al. 1991); and those that directly or indirectly build on Stivers' work described in greater detail
related literature describes types of behaviors or management styles that are often ascribed to women or a feminine perspective, e.g., methods of authentic participation or bureaucratic listening (King, Feltey et al. 1998); (Stivers 1994). While this literature does not directly address women, it is written primarily by women researchers and suggests methodologies or perspectives that are inherent and not generally ascribable to men.

Almost three decades ago, Denhardt and Powell explored the potential contributions of feminist thinking to the field of public administration and predicted the "coming death of administrative man" (Denhardt and Perkins 1976, 384). If this is so, then what does the literature say about what a feminine action model looks and behaves like?

The work of Kathy E. Ferguson, in *The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy* (Ferguson 1984) is a place to begin. Ferguson's groundbreaking book examines bureaucracy and describes an alternative constructed out of the "concrete and shared experiences of women" (27). Her interest is:

First, to clarify and render intelligible the structures and processes of power in bureaucratic society and the effects these structures and processes have upon individuals caught within them ... Second, to offer a basis for opposition to bureaucratic discourse and bureaucratic structures ... Third, to suggest an alternative, nonbureaucratic approach to the problem of organization, one that criticizes and rejects the forms of organization and the terms of self-understanding embedded in bureaucratic discourse and calls instead upon the theoretical and practical terms of a specifically feminist discourse (x-xi).

Ferguson provides us with a rich and detailed description of how bureaucracy impacts our lives, often in a negative manner. Her prescription lies in reframing the ways in which we engage in
bureaucratic discourse by engaging in a new, feminist discourse. Billing builds on Ferguson's work by "trying to give a more optimistic view of the potential of organization and arguing that it is possible and important to counter-balance 'male' values with 'female' values in organizations" (Billing 1994, 179) something which this dissertation will address in considerable detail.

Georgia Duerst-Lahti and Rita Mae Kelly (1995), explore leadership and governance by offering:

… 1) the concept of gender power as crucial to our understanding of leadership and governance; 2) to build upon prior empirical research in sex and sex roles in order to move beyond into a richer conceptual and explanatory realm; and 3) to illustrate concrete ways to deploy the concept of gender power in a spectrum of leadership and governance arenas (2).

By accepting that "gender power exists as a central construct of the political world of governance," they "aim to examine it through explorations of leadership" (5). Their work helps to ground this dissertation project and its direction.

Carol Edlund moves us even closer to this project by identifying the significant concepts of womens' leadership style and how they are a "necessary element in the developing multiversalist paradigm" (Edlund 1992, 75) (italics added for emphasis). Here it is helpful to quote Edlund more fully to grasp how her work contributes to the bridge of literature that informs this project.

The [feminine leadership style] concept refers not to leadership by women but rather to a leadership style that contrasts with the dominant masculine leadership style. The qualities of either style can be possessed by both men and women; in addition, in individual instances the styles are likely to be mixed. The basic assumption here, however, is that men and women, in order to be successful in bureaucratic organizations, have had to adopt the masculine style almost exclusively, one that is dysfunctional in the interconnected world of today. A feminine leadership style incorporating traits usually attributed to women offers more potential for management and problemsolving in the present environment than does the masculine style alone (75) (italics added for emphasis).
Further on she suggests that:

The traditional, bureaucratic model of leadership by itself is not adequate because it fails to meet the needs of an enlightened workforce and to take into account the totality of the human psyche. A masculine leadership style with its emphasis on rational (head) thinking gives little value to the relevance of feminine (heart) thinking. A new reality is emerging in the public workplace in which there seems to be an awakening to the human needs of workers (Cohen 1989). Employees yearn for a more caring, livable work environment. They believe that love, family, and labor can be integrated (76).

Edlund's work provides a very rich source of data for filling in characteristics of the feminine-based practical administrative alternative. She envisions a worker "who relies on an ethic of self-development" (77).

'Feminine leadership' refers to a managerial style that reflects characteristics normally associated with women. In this context, I rely on the Jungian concept of dividing the human psyche into the anima – feminine ('diffuse awareness') – and the animus – masculine ('focused consciousness')(Castillejo 1990). Feminine traits include empathy, intuition, relatedness, nurturing, and cooperation (Cohen 1989), while masculine traits are more commonly associated with analytical thinking, competition, rationality, hierarchy, and quantity (Loden 1985). These qualities belong to both men and women in varying degrees, but the feminine more often pertains to women (Castillejo 1990) (81).

Edlund goes on to sketch out the characteristics of the feminine leadership style and its practice, noting that, "A feminine leadership style is rooted, generally, in women's life experiences" (83). It is this point that leads us to the next critical literature.

At the same time that Edlund was describing the feminine leadership style, Mumby and Putnam (Mumby and Putnam 1992) were describing "bounded emotionality" as contrasted with Herbert Simon's bounded rationality.

…it is maintained that even though bounded rationality provides a modified critique of 'pure' rationality, this concept is grounded in male-centered assumptions that exclude alternative modes of organizing. Through a feminist deconstructive process, bounded emotionality is introduced as an alternative organizing construct …. theorists are urged to move beyond the traditional dichotomy between rationality and emotionality, in order to question the
assumptions that underlie traditional constructs and to create new grounds for future theoretical activities (Mumby and Putnam 1992), 465).

Bounded emotionality also may aid in creating different gender identities for women and men because it may help to develop alternative modes of organizational discourse (479).

This dissertation project builds on the following Mumby and Putnam statements:

The dialectic of emotionality and rationality has far-reaching consequences for the relationship between gender and organizing. Specifically, deconstructing the dichotomy between rationality and emotionality debunks organizational efforts to reify certain experiences and behaviors as either masculine or feminine. Although we provide a feminist reading of bounded rationality and emotionality, we maintain that neither model should be a privileged conceptual and experiential frame for organizational or for masculine and feminine behavior. Rather, through destabilizing instrumental and patriarchal forms of rationality, we show how both women and men constitute their identities by integrating and drawing on the emotional and rational domains of experience. When neither realm is privileged, the possibilities for developing organizations in an unalienated, nongendered context increase (480-1) (italics added for emphasis).

By proposing bounded emotionality as an alternative heuristic, we activate a 'play' between oppositional pairs that is obscured by current organizational theory and research (482).

My research suggests that the field of public administration is so constituted by the masculine/bounded rationality frame of reference that heretofore, few researchers, let alone practitioners, have been able to outline how to enact from the feminine/bounded emotionality frame of reference in a practical way. This project builds on the works of Edlund, Mumby and Putnam and others to construct a feminine-based practical administrative alternative.

In Gender Images in Public Administration: Legitimacy and the Administrative State (1993), Camilla Stivers explores how shared ideas about masculinity and femininity inform our view of the public administrator from a variety of perspectives. She shows how these various viewpoints regarding the roles of public administrators contain mostly traditional masculine features and, as
a consequence, grant men privileges not generally conferred on women. Stivers then urges readers to consider the ways in which feminist thinking could address such problems of gender bias in current theory and practice. Stivers work will be considered in more detail in the next chapter.

More recently, Patterson explores the question of "what place is made for recognition of human bodies, human feeling, and emotion?" in public administration theory and practice (Patterson 2001), while Hutchinson is concerned with the absence of the feminist experience and perspective in public administration discourse and suggests multigendering as a potential remedy (Hutchinson 2001) (italics added for emphasis). Accordingly, Hutchinson suggests a "redefinition that admits multiple others (the gendered-other) who have been, and continue to be excluded in traditional public administration thinking." She does so by calling us to see that "gendered-masculine and gendered-feminine are not dualities, but, for the time being, are anchors on either end of an array of gendered-other" (595).

**Organization of the Dissertation**

For the dissertation to answer some of the questions raised earlier by those in public administration, the project here will be to develop the home metaphor perspective in public administration theory based on Stivers' work. This is done in the spirit of suggesting that a fully realized feminine model of administration can lead to truly new ways of structuring and implementing administrative programs, managing agency life and addressing issues of public and social concern.
In accomplishing these purposes, the dissertation progresses as follows. Chapter Two discusses Camilla Stivers description of the "city as home" metaphor and then explores nine other resource literature fields to identify common themes to inform the home and business typologies. Chapter Three outlines the four primary themes or dimensions of the business and home typologies. Chapter Four describes the academic field of community policing and its primary features particularly as they relate to and exemplify the home metaphor. Chapter Five provides a contextual analysis of two community policing case studies that provide illustrative examples of the home metaphor typology and discuss the difficulty in enacting purely from this frame of reference. And finally, Chapter Six provides suggestions for how to reconcile the tensions between the opposing metaphorical lenses, as well as a discussion concerning implications for additional research and study of the Home Metaphor Typology.
Chapter 2: Grounding the Home Metaphor in a Broader Literature

Unfortunately, as noted earlier, Equity Feminism only provides us with a description of how far women have come, how far they must go, and general guidance for how to change or adjust the existing personnel policies and practices of public organizations and institutions to give women more access. Equity Feminism does not address organizational change issues; it only addresses issues of justice. As such, it offers no alternative theoretical or practical guidelines beyond these ultimate concerns for fair treatment.

On the other hand, Other Voice Feminism literature seeks to describe what a feminine worldview is and how it might be implemented in organizations. However, as suggested, while continuing to grow, this literature is relatively scant. What theoretical work does exist is not practical enough, nor does much of it suggest concrete guidelines for applying such an alternative view. It mostly provides a descriptive analysis of how a feminine gendered perspective reveals what is missing from the dominant, masculine perspective, suggests general philosophical frameworks opposed to current administration, or offers vague guidance on how women may perceive things differently.

The problem with Equity Feminism is that it does not address organizational change issues, only justice issues. Other Voice Feminism, in contrast, generally just describes the different ways in which women think, communicate, or act. As such, it does not go on to provide us with concrete and practical steps for consistently, intelligently and pragmatically applying the insights of the feminine perspective to the management or governance of public institutions. Neither type of feminine scholarship, Equity or Other Voice, speaks to a means by which to practically begin to
enact an alternative administrative perspective in the governance of public institutions.

To correct the lack of a practical alternative, this work builds an alternative based on the “home” metaphor of Camilla Stivers, a metaphor distinguished from that of the metaphor of business. Work by Mary Runte and Albert J. Mills (Runte and Mills 2004) describe the historical split between work and home:

Prior to the Industrial Revolution the primary form or economic activity involved extended families working the land on which they also lived: the concepts of 'work' and 'home' were intertwined and had very different meanings from how they are currently understood (Anderson and Zinsser, 1988). The centering of economic activity, in the Western world, within 'manufactories' and away from dwelling places was the basis of a schism between 'work' and 'home.' … The term 'work' took on new meaning as paid activity undertaken at a 'work place.' The notions of 'domesticity,' 'home,' and 'family,' were contained within the changing work spaces but were also developed and evolved through the exclusion of women from a variety of workplaces through direct violence and legal action; legal prohibitions against child labour and the development of schools, which were organized in such a way that they placed competing demands on working parents; and the emergence of a 'domestic idyll' whereby the 'non-working wife' became a symbol of male economic status (c.f., Ryan, 1979; Strumingher, 1979; Weeks 1990). Increasingly over time, the workplace became associated with men and masculinity, in direct contrast to the 'domestic sphere' that was equated with women and femininity. For all of the 19th and much of the 20th centuries, the male employee was expected to have a primary commitment to paid employment, while the female was expected to have only a temporary association with the workplace prior to marriage and children or due to economic necessity (Anderson and Zinsser, 1988).

Thus, the maintenance of the domains was achieved by the exclusion of females from the work domain and by limiting the involvement of males in the family domain (italics added for emphasis).

… it is nonetheless clear that the discourse of domesticity engaged meaning for large numbers of women as a form of 'valuing' an area of social life in which women were central, that is, as a separate sphere (Weeks, 1990, 238-9).

The Home Metaphor as Described by Camilla Stivers

How a separate sphere has affected public administration is addressed by Camilla Stivers in her
Bureau Men, Settlement Women: Constructing Public Administration in the Progressive Era (2000). In this groundbreaking work, Stivers suggests that Progressive Era settlement women used a metaphor of the home to inform the work that they did in the early settlements. She shows this to be a fundamentally alternative methodology employed by women in the early history of the field of public administration. Stivers describes a world in which women approached their work in a different way and engaged in alternative and practical methodologies that were highly successful. Their work was defined by very specific characteristics that Stivers describes as distinctly different from that of men. This work takes us beyond Other Voice Feminism to something new. We know from our history that the culture and tradition of American society has relegated women to the private. Moreover, women tend to express themselves in a different way because of the way they have been relegated to the private (the home).

In Bureau Men, Settlement Women, Stivers pushes into new territory by describing an alternative frame of reference that informed public activity primarily engaged in by women, but by no means exclusively by women, during the Progressive Era. Based on considerable historical analysis and research, Stivers describes bureau men, who worked in the early public municipal research bureaus, juxtaposed with those of "settlement residents and members of women's reform clubs" (3) or those who enacted out of the home. She constructs two opposing sets of reform approaches carried out by the men and the women. Stivers explains how women "who were increasingly restricted from partisan political work turned to activities directed at improving municipal services, ameliorating poverty, and calling for social and regulatory policies. Women referred to such work as 'public motherhood' and 'municipal housekeeping'"
(9). Men, on the other hand, came to utilize a "masculinized rhetoric that melded science and business around the idea of efficiency" (10). She goes on to say that during the Progressive period, "reform work was visibly bifurcated along gender lines"(10).

Both men and women, whether they worked together or separately, explained their efforts in terms that variably blended 'feminine' concern for social betterment with 'masculine' commitment to efficiency (10).

Stivers describes how bureau men linked their activity with businesslike and scientific practices, such as scientific management, in an effort to gain legitimacy and respect for their work. Such was necessary because of the "deep cultural link in Western society between science and masculinity" (11). She notes:

The cultural power of science and business in the early twentieth century was sought by both men and women, but its effects were different for the male profession of public administration than for the largely female domain of social work. Social welfare reformers and social workers were pressed by the cultural value assigned to masculine science and efficiency and men's disproportionate power in society to try to preserve their commitment to feminine ideas of social justice and caring while persuading the world of their devotion to practicality, hardheadedness, system, and minimum cost. In contrast, public administration's masculine ideology of science and business evolved to justify the actions of its overwhelmingly male membership; there was no need to resolve the kind of contradiction that faced social workers, only – by claiming neutral expertise – to prove itself free of moralizing femininity. Paradoxically, the image of scientific neutrality made public administration appear gender-free. The profession of public administration could comfortably assume the guise of ungendered objectivity it has worn ever since (13).

Stivers' narrative "suggests that gender played a constitutive role in the field's construction, that is, the tension between masculinity and femininity revealed in the ideas of public administration's founders is central to the shape the field assumed" (14). In the concluding paragraphs of her book's first chapter, Stivers:

sets side by side, clear differences in values and reform approaches … visible between bureau men and reform women (16):
Camilla Stivers’ Bureau Men and Reform Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureau Men</th>
<th>Reform Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>City as business</em> (italics added)</td>
<td><em>City as home</em> (italics added)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural reforms</td>
<td>Improved living conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New methods</td>
<td>New programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on system</td>
<td>Focus on caring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science as objective, efficient</td>
<td>Science as connected, experiential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persona: expert</td>
<td>Persona: neighbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship as oversight</td>
<td>Citizenship as involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorite administrative recommendations:</td>
<td>Favorite administrative recommendations:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Systematize (budgeting)</td>
<td>*Humanize processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Centralize (executive control)</td>
<td>*Link agencies to people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Neutralize (politics-administration dichotomy)</td>
<td>*Use discretionary judgment (no politics-administration dichotomy) (16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

She concludes:

Throughout, I argue that the distinctive contributions represented in the women's perspective have been, if not entirely lost to public administration, at a continuing disadvantage. But they might yet be revivified and moved to center stage (16).

Stivers provides us with the historical foundation of how the "city as home" metaphor operated in the public sphere during the Progressive Era. However, she does not go on to fully develop the various dimensions that inform such a perspective and that could be rigorously applied in today's public administration. This dissertation revivifies this distinctive perspective and hopes to move it a bit closer to center stage.
The home metaphor is very powerful for generating specific ways of viewing the world, which will be illustrated in the remaining portions of this chapter. The home metaphor is constructed primarily out of the private realm – out of the feminine. It is specific enough to describe a real and workable alternative to the dominant, business metaphor frame of reference. What enables the metaphor to work is that we know generally how a home runs. Further, there is considerable resource literature, noted earlier, that exposes this alternative worldview and that informs various portions of the dimensions of the home metaphor. This dissertation takes Stivers' historical revelations concerning the way in which women operated during the earliest days of the field of public administration combined with these newer resource literatures and fleshes out the theoretical dimensions of a home based metaphor.

This typology provides a comprehensive, conceptually grounded understanding of Stivers' home metaphor, one that details the various philosophical commitments that it entails and that shows the dimensions and modalities of practical action that it implies. The value of having this comprehensive, practically oriented perspective is that it provides a reference point for implementation and reveals a plethora of additional, seemingly new, administrative choices. Two case studies from the field of community policing will provide illustrative material, as well as provide examples of how programs like these, which attempt to follow the metaphor of the home, but without the benefit of a comprehensive typology, struggle and inadvertently adopt practices from the business metaphor, or more dominant frame of administrative praxis. The model will also provide a framework for practically implementing the typology of the home metaphor of administration in other public agency settings.
But first it is necessary to review the wealth of resource literature that contributes to a much broader understanding of the dimensions of the metaphorical perspectives described in the next chapter.

**Review of the Resource Literature: Writings in Other Fields**

In addition to Stivers work, other fields of social science provide support for the academic dimensions of this dissertation's alternative typology. These strands are primarily comprised of feminist and gender deconstructions of the following literatures: sociology; psychology; political science; organizational development; management (e.g., leadership and teaming theories); and cognitive science, among others. This dissertation synthesizes a great deal of material across a wide variety of literatures that discuss such issues as a different relationship between the masculine and feminine (Shlain 1998); the influence of right brain/left brain thinking on the business world today (Pink 2005); and the interdisciplinary study of the mind as revealed by Lakoff in his study of political worldviews (Lakoff 1996). This dichotomy of thinking is experienced by many of us and is not at all unfamiliar. What this dissertation strives to do is to define and fuse these lines of thinking in such a way as to better reveal the less known and less publicly practiced alternative, that which is being referred to as the home metaphor, which is based in and constructed out of the feminine, and which has the potential for providing us with a new way of approaching public administrative practices.

In all, I found more than enough commonality and consensus to inform the basis of the four dimensions of the typology of the home metaphor. In this section, additional relevant academic
contributions are described to provide the reader with a richer understanding of the underpinnings of this dissertation. These writings form the intellectual grounding for a home-based practical administrative alternative in public administration. As implied earlier, these writings often describe what are considered to be differences between men and women, the feminine and masculine, the subjective and objective, the instrumental and critical interpretive. I suggest that all of them join together to contribute to the proposed metaphorical typology of administrative practice.

Again, however, it must be emphasized that the description of the characteristics of the home are ideal syntheses of these various strands and should not be confused with the separate experiences that individuals have in their respective homes. We are well familiar with the ideal business model, how administrative practice has been described by theorists over the last 100 years. We do not want to confuse that with the aberrant behavior, for example, of business leaders who have corrupted that metaphorical model by engaging in illegal practices. Accordingly, we are describing the positive aspects of what the home metaphor can reveal to us as an alternative administrative practice based primarily in the feminine, not the potential for its corruption.

The Psychological Literature

Some of the earliest and most prolific writings about the differences between the feminine and the masculine occur in the psychological literature. Perhaps the most well known of these is Carol Gilligan's *In a Different Voice* (1993), upon which so many other works later built. In short, Gilligan looked at developmental research conducted by Pearson and applied it to the moral development of women. She states that Pearson's outline of a female moral conception
informs a different description of development:

... the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract. This conception of morality as concerned with the activity of care centers moral development around the understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights and rules (19).

Gilligan's work supports the notion that for women norms are continuously created and recreated, that they are all about the context of a situation and about how to relate to one another.

From a masculine perspective, norms exist as law or tradition and one must conform to them.

Gilligan speaks:

about a more general truth currently obscured in psychological texts .... male and female voices typically speak of the importance of different truths, the former of the role of separation as it defines and empowers the self, the latter of the ongoing process of attachment that creates and sustains the human community (155-156).

In the following table, the major differences Gilligan identified between the masculine and feminine versions of morality are highlighted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gilligan’s Masculine and Feminine Perspectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Masculine Perspective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values are facts; people live lives of separation (xxvi-xxvii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule-bound (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive plan (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal and abstract (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy (these oppositional terms are)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Masculine Perspective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>complementary) (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality of rights/justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to exercise one's rights without interfering with the rights of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primacy and universality of individual rights (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The moral problem arises from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is formal and abstract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He relies on the conventions of logic to deduce the solution to the dilemma, assuming these conventions to be shared.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men see a conflict between life and property, while women see &quot;a fractured human relationship that must be mended with its own thread&quot; (31).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primacy of separation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility means not doing what you want to do because you are thinking of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men may perceive a danger in connection (42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| "...The moral problem as a problem of rights and rules (conception of morality as justice) | "...The moral problem as a problem of care and responsibility in relationships ties the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Masculine Perspective</th>
<th>Feminine Perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ties development to the logic of equality and reciprocity. A formal logic of fairness informs the justice approach.&quot; (73).</td>
<td>development of women's moral thinking to changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships. Thus the logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic of relationships.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The moral imperative that emerges with men is an injunction to respect the rights of other and thus to protect from interference the rights to life and self-fulfillment (100).</td>
<td>The moral imperative that emerges with women is an injunction to care, a responsibility to discern and alleviate the &quot;real and recognizable trouble&quot; of this world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men come to see the limitations of a conception of justice blinded to the differences in human life (100).</td>
<td>Women come to see the violence inherent in inequality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For men &quot;identity is different, clearer, more direct, more distinct and sharp-edged. They have a sense of confidence of certain truth&quot; (160). They use terms of separation: intelligent, arrogant, cocky, logical, imaginative, honest</td>
<td>Women see moral dilemmas in terms of conflicting responsibilities (105) Identity is defined in a context of relationship and is judged by a standard of responsibility and care (160) Morality is seen as arising from the experience of connection and conceived as a problem of inclusion rather than one of balancing claims (160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A morality of rights is predicated on equality and centered on the understanding of fairness</td>
<td>An ethic of responsibility relies on the concept of equity, the recognition of differences in need.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ethic of rights is a manifestation of equal respect balancing the claims of other and self</td>
<td>The ethic of responsibility rests on an understanding that gives rise to compassion and care.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gilligan's conceptions of the ways in which morality is perceived by men and women helps to provide a foundation for several of the typological dimensions that will be discussed in the chapter that follows.
Now we turn to *Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind* (Belenky 1997), the first edition of which expanded on the work of Gilligan and further changed the way psychological research was conducted for future generations. Belenky suggests that:

> When scientific findings, scientific theory, and even the basic assumptions of academic disciplines are reexamined through the lens of women's perspectives and values, new conclusions can be drawn and new directions forged that have implications for the lives of both men and women (15).

It is precisely this insight that is drawn upon to flesh out the details of the metaphor of the home. Belenky "describe(s) in this book epistemological perspectives from which women know and view the world" (15).

People who experience the self as predominantly separate tend to espouse a morality based on impersonal procedures for establishing justice, while people who experience the self as predominantly connected tend to espouse a morality based on care (Lyons 1983). Similarly, we posit two contrasting epistemological orientations: a separate epistemology, based upon impersonal procedures for establishing truth, and a connected epistemology, in which truth emerges through care … when we speak of separate and connected knowing we refer not to any sort of relationship between the self and another person but to relationships between knowers and the objects (or subjects) of knowing (which may or may not be persons)(102).

As noted, insights from Belenky, et al. will be drawn on to help describe the epistemological dimensions of the business and home metaphors, and are described in detail in the next chapter.

In 1998, a treatise entitled *The Alphabet Vs. the Goddess: The Conflict Between Word and Image* was published. Written by Leonard Shlain (Shlain 1998), it:

> proposes that the rise of alphabetic literacy – the process of reading and writing – fundamentally reconfigured the human brain, and brought about profound changes in history, religion, and gender relations. Making remarkable connections across brain function, myth, and anthropology, Leonard Shlain shows why agricultural preliterate cultures were principally informed by holistic, right-brain modes that venerated the Goddess and feminine values and images. Writing, particularly alphabets, drove cultures toward linear left-brain thinking. This shift upset the balance between men and women, initiating the decline of the
feminine, and also ushered in the reign of patriarchy and misogyny (book jacket).

Shlain suggests that:

… one pernicious effect of literacy has gone largely unnoticed: writing subliminally fosters a patriarchal outlook. Writing of any kind, but especially its alphabetic form, diminishes feminine values and with them, women’s power in the culture …. For now, I propose that a holistic, simultaneous, synthetic, and concrete view of the world are the essential characteristics of a feminine outlook; linear, sequential, reductionist, and abstract thinking defines the masculine. Although these represent opposite perceptual modes, every individual is generously endowed with all the features of both. They coexist as two closely overlapping bell-shaped curves with no feature superior to its reciprocal (italics added for emphasis) (1).

These complementary methods of comprehending reality resemble the ancient Taoist circle symbol of integration and symmetry in which the tension between the energy of the feminine yin and the masculine yang is exactly balanced. One side without the other is incomplete; together, they form a unified whole that is stronger than either half. First writing, and then the alphabet, upset this balance. Affected cultures, especially in the West, acquired a strong yang thrust (2).

This dissertation project builds on Shlain’s thesis that both the feminine and masculine need to exist in balance with each other and that our current administrative practices are indeed evidencing a strong yang orientation. He goes on to state:

The introduction of the written word, and then the alphabet, into the social intercourse of humans initiated a fundamental change in the way newly literate cultures understood their reality. It was this dramatic change in mind-set, I propose, that was primarily responsible for fostering patriarchy.

The Old Testament was the first alphabetic written work to influence future ages. Attesting to its gravitas, multitudes still read it three thousand years later. The words on its pages anchor three powerful religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Each is an exemplar of patriarchy. Each monotheistic religion features an imageless Father deity whose authority shines through His revealed Word, sanctified in its written form. Conceiving of a deity who has no concrete image prepares the way for the kind of abstract thinking that inevitably leads to law codes, dualistic philosophy, and objective science, the signature triad of Western culture. I propose that the profound impact these ancient scriptures had upon the development of the West depended as much on their being written in an alphabet as on the moral lessons they contained.
Goddess worship, feminine values, and women's power depend on the ubiquity of the image. God worship, masculine values, and men's domination of women are bound to the written word. Word and image, like masculine and feminine, are complementary opposites. Whenever a culture elevates the written word at the expense of the image, patriarchy dominates. When the importance of the image supersedes the written word, feminine values and egalitarianism flourish (7).

Not dissimilar to the sentiment described by Virginia Woolf on the first page of this dissertation, Shlain notes:

These two mirror-image strategies, gather/nurture and hunt/kill, are combined in each of us. In society at large, there are females who manifest predominantly masculine traits, and there are males who display feminine traits. The lateralization of brain, eye, and hand affects how each person perceives, manipulates, symbolizes, and ultimately, thinks about the world. Herein lies the secret of our success. Each man has a gatherer/nurturer aspect to his personality, psyche, and mind, just as each woman has hunter/killer aspects to hers. Every individual has encased in his or her skull both a feminine brain and a masculine one. Any particular society can accentuate one or the other of these two ways of interacting with the world, depending on the demands of the environment or the shaping influences of its inventions (27).

Shlain concludes:

The rise and fall of images, women's rights, and the sacred feminine have moved contrapuntally with the rise and fall of alphabet literacy. I am convinced we are entering a new Golden Age – one in which the right-hemispheric values of tolerance, caring, and respect for nature will begin to ameliorate the conditions that have prevailed for the too-long period during which left-hemispheric values were dominant (432).

Shlain offers a conception of history that would support one of the premises for this work-- only one set of guiding principles is operating in most of our public institutions, that which arises out of the predominantly masculine frame of reference, as exemplified by the business metaphor described in this dissertation. A primary purpose of this dissertation is to reveal the dimensions and characteristics of the feminine in such a way as to make it possible to practically both draw and enact from this alternative and less well known frame of reference, namely the home metaphorical perspective.
From a different psychological perspective, Sandra Lipsitz Bem (Bem 1993) provides a psychologically-based analysis regarding the lenses of gender. This is another helpful work that informs our understanding around issues of how:

> gender lenses systemically perpetuate not only the oppression of women but the oppression of sexual minorities as well. Specifically, I now believe that there are actually three gender lenses embedded in the culture: gender polarization, androcentrism, and biological essentialism. These three gender lenses provide the foundation for a theory of how biology, culture, and the individual psyche all interact in historical context to systematically reproduce male power (viii).

She goes on to say:

> But as profound as the transformation of America's consciousness has been during the past 150 years, hidden assumptions about sex and gender remain embedded in cultural discourses, social institutions, and individual psyches that invisibly and systemically reproduce male power in generation after generation. I call these assumptions the lenses of gender. Not only do these lenses shape how people perceive, conceive, and discuss social reality, but because they are embedded in social institutions, they also shape the more material things – like unequal pay and inadequate day care – that constitute social reality itself.

> The purpose of this book is to render those lenses visible rather than invisible, to enable us to look at the culture's gender lenses rather than through them, for it is only when Americans apprehend the more subtle and systemic ways in which the culture reproduces male power that they will finally comprehend the unfinished business of the feminist agenda (1-2).

She gets at missing pieces by exposing the hugely androcentric policies and practices that exist in America today. She looks at our collective history and describes how we got here and provides prescriptions for how to reconstruct our world to include and value all perspectives and possibilities, particularly those that have heretofore appeared invisible, such as the feminine.

Bem's scholarship is relevant to my project because it again helps us to understand that there is more than one lens or metaphorical perspective and pragmatically revealing the dimensions of that perspective is critical to my scholarship.
The Marriage and Family Literature

In a recent article, Fox and Murray (Fox and Murry 2000) provide an "overview of scholarship on gender and families over the past decade" (1160). Because of the richness of their work, it has been liberally excerpted below and contributes greatly to the theory chapter with particular emphasis on grounding the epistemological and ontological dimensions of the home metaphor. Fox and Murray describe feminist approaches as "tentative, situated and interpretive analysis" (1160), in contrast to more traditional or masculine approaches. They note that:

Despite the variety of feminist traditions (for example, Marxist feminism, radical lesbian feminism, neotraditionalist feminism, Black feminism), it is possible to isolate several elements that are commonly characteristic of feminist approaches to scholarship. We discuss four of these: reflexivity, the centrality of practice, a focus on social processes, and a critical stance toward traditional paradigms and theories (1161).

On reflexivity, they suggest that:

One of the hallmarks of reflexivity is recognition by the scholar that he or she is an actor intimately involved in the generation of knowledge, rather than simply a recorder and reporter of what is seen outside oneself. …subjectivity not only is a valid and valuable orientation to research but may also be a necessary stance for good research. … Another hallmark of reflexivity as a research orientation is the willingness to engage in continuous self-criticism, that is, a conscious second guess of one's expertness, a questioning of the traditional posture of the researcher as the 'knower,' apart from and unrelated to those whom he or she is studying. … Instead of conceptualizing research as something done to (or for) research subjects by an objective observer outside the research setting, feminists acknowledge that their orientations, actions, interpretations, biases, and interests will become integral to the research process and its outcomes, and they seek to understand how it happens as it is happening during the process of their research. … This has also renewed attention to one of the central characteristics of feminist approaches, and that is an emphasis on praxis (1161).

For Fox and Murray and many of their contemporaries, practice is central to feminist scholarship.

*The Centrality of Practice –* Wood (1995) describes a 'vibrant dialectic' in
feminist scholarship between theorizing and practice, a dialectical tension that arises from the recognition that scholarship about the structures and processes that give rise to inequality is inherently political. The knowledge gained from feminist research must be applied not solely in the reshaping of theory but also in arenas of social change so as to reshape existing social conditions toward greater equality for men and women (1161).

As such, they suggest that for feminists, scholarly research is not simply for the sake of research, but must ultimately get at how it might help better the world in which we all live. With that premise, research is most often conducted with the purpose of then taking practical action to improve the conditions of life. Not surprisingly then, "a feminist approach takes as centrally problematic the social processes through which the described patterns are generated, sustained over time, and come to reproduce themselves" (1162). In other words, feminists are concerned with process and view time from a different perspective.

The focus on process also grows out of a sense that life, more particularly the lives of men and women, may be more adequately captured with a sense of time that is ongoing and seamless rather than divided into intervals or stages or marked by discrete events, roles, and achievements (1162).

With regard to the subject of where knowledge resides, Fox and Murray state that:

Scholarship that has been conducted outside a feminist perspective becomes suspect, given the understanding that knowledge is a product of the producer and that values about what to study and how have been determined by those in positions of power, that is, predominantly by men (Lemert 1999; Wood 1995)(1163).

Quoting Gubrium and Holstein (Gubrium 1990), Fox and Murray go on to note that "truth = fact + perspective." In other words, what is seen or experienced as authentic and real depends upon one's standpoint, that is, one's perspective (Haraway 1999). This scholarship thus informs the epistemological dimension of the home metaphorical perspective.

On another front that is important to the development and exposition of the home metaphor and
its ramifications, Fox and Murray discuss gender roles and their importance:

The social constructionist perspective on gender suggests that despite gender role socialization and because gender is not synonymous with the self, men and women not only vary in their degree of masculinity and femininity but have to be constantly persuaded or reminded to be masculine and feminine. That is, men and women have to 'do' gender rather than 'be' gender. … When gender is understood as the product of social processes and as embodying cultural meanings of masculinity and femininity, then it becomes possible to distinguish a person's gender from his or her sex. The former can be understood as sociocultural, the latter as biological; and while the two are correlated, they are not synonymous or isomorphic (1164).

Fox and Murray quote Wood (Wood 1995, 112) as stating:

Because Western culture defines men and masculine perspectives as normative, an androcentric point of view is often assumed and imposed, yet not acknowledged in either social life or research practice (1165).

As noted in other resource literatures, we find here in the marriage and family literature that the dominant perspective, the business metaphor, is again revealed to be so prevalent as to be considered normative. A primary purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that a wide variety of scholarship across many disciplinary fields of research note the assumed androcentric point of view and are attempting to reveal the alternative. And, of considerable concern is the belief held by many that, "Information that is consistent with hegemonic story-lines is privileged, and alternative information is ignored, suppressed, unseen, and unheard" (1169).

The Sociological Literature

Sociologist R. W. Connell (Connell 1994) explored the relationship between the state, gender and sexual politics, and noted that:

Liberal feminism has brought to the surface the suppressed truth that the state is gendered, and has used this truth to inspire a formidable and sustained politics of access. But it has not been able to grasp the character of gender as an institutional and motivational system, nor to develop a coherent analysis of the state apparatus or its links to a social context. The underlying individualism of classical
liberalism … is at odds with the social analysis required for the development of feminism. Only through a break with liberal presuppositions can these antinomies be overcome. It is, indeed, in the more radical feminisms of the 1970s and 1980s that a new concept of the state has emerged (142).

He goes on to note:

While sociological analysis of the state, whether feminist or not, has generally seen the state as influenced by a pre-given social structure, Burton (1985) forcibly draws attention to the role of the state in constituting the categories of social structure. In particular she emphasizes the ways in which masculinity and femininity, and the relation between them, are produced as effects of state policies and state structures. The interplay between schools and families, for instance, is fertile ground in the making of gender (144).

Connell then suggests:

What these arguments have in common is the perception that patriarchy is embedded in procedure, in the state's way of functioning. This perception is extremely important. It allows us to acknowledge the patriarchal character of the state without falling into a conspiracy theory or making futile searches for Patriarch Headquarters. It locates sexual politics in the realm of social action, where it belongs, avoiding the speculative reductionism that would explain state action as an emanation of the inner nature of males. Finally it opens up the question of the state apparatus, overlooked by liberal feminism and earlier radical feminism alike. The character and dynamics of the state apparatus, the actual machinery of government, is a major theme in non-feminist theory, and urgently needs analysis in terms of gender (146) (underline added for emphasis).

In the remaining pages of his article, Connell describes a theoretical framework that speaks to the need to "appraise the state from the start as having a specific location within gender relations, and as having a history shaped by a gender dynamic. This is not the only basis of state history, but it is an essential and irreducible aspect of the state" (148). I am buoyed by his final note that "the state is constantly changing; gender relations are historically dynamic; the state's position in gender politics is not fixed. Crisis tendencies develop in the gender order which allow new political possibilities" (160). It is the opportunity for new possibilities that this project hopes to exploit by proposing a framework for practically enacting from an alternative metaphor based in the feminine worldview.
The Cognitive Science Literature

In *Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know That Liberals Don’t* (1996), George Lakoff, the noted cognitive linguist, looks closely at the very different moral systems exhibited by political liberals and conservatives. What he finds "deeply embedded within conservative and liberal politics are two completely different models of the family" (Lakoff 1996)12). Lakoff is quoted liberally in the following pages in order to fully convey to the reader what is believed to be a definitive link between Lakoff's descriptions of the Strict Father and Nurturant Parent systems of morality and the descriptions of the business and home metaphors.

Conservatism … is based on a Strict Father model, while liberalism is centered around a Nurturant Parent model. These two models of the family give rise to different moral systems and different discourse forms, that is, different choices of words and different modes of reasoning (12).

The link between family-based morality and politics comes from one of the most common ways we have of conceptualizing what a nation is, namely, as a family. It is the common, unconscious, and automatic metaphor of the Nation-as-Family that produces contemporary conservatism from Strict Father morality and contemporary liberalism from Nurturant Parent morality (13).

It is important that the public become aware that we think by using conceptual systems that are not immediately accessible to consciousness and that conceptual metaphor is part of our normal thought processes (32).

The following is Lakoff's succinct description of the conservative worldview – the Strict Father model – that grounds the business metaphor perspective and that will be described in detail in the theory chapter that follows:

This model posits a traditional nuclear family, with the father having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set overall policy, to set strict rules for the behavior of children, and to enforce the rules. The mother has the day-to-day responsibility for the care of the house, raising the children, and upholding the father's authority. Children must respect and obey their parents; by doing so they build character, that is, self-discipline and self-reliance. Love and nurturance are, of course, a vital part of family life.
but can never outweigh parental authority, which is itself an expression of love and nurturance – tough love. Self-discipline, self-reliance, and respect for legitimate authority are the crucial things that children must learn. Once children are mature, they are on their own and must depend on their acquired self-discipline to survive. Their self-reliance gives them authority over their own destinies, and parents are not to meddle in their lives (33).

The liberal worldview centers on a very different ideal of family life, the Nurturant Parent model:

Love, empathy, and nurturance are primary, and children become responsible, self-disciplined and self-reliant through being cared for, respected, and caring for others, both in their family and in their community. Support and protection are part of nurturance, and they require strength and courage on the part of parents. The obedience of children comes out of the love and respect for their parents and their community, not out of the fear of punishment. Good communication is crucial. If their authority is to be legitimate, parents must explain why their decisions serve the cause of protection and nurturance. Questioning by children is seen as positive, since children need to learn why their parents do what they do and since children often have good ideas that should be taken seriously. Ultimately, of course, responsible parents have to make the decisions, and that must be clear. The principal goal of nurturance is for children to be fulfilled and happy in their lives. A fulfilling life is assumed to be, in significant part, a nurturant life – one committed to family and community responsibility. What children need to learn most is empathy for others, the capacity for nurturance, and the maintenance of social ties, which cannot be done without the strength, respect, self-discipline, and self-reliance that comes through being cared for. Raising a child to be fulfilled also requires helping that child develop his or her potential for achievement and enjoyment. That requires respecting the child's own values and allowing the child to explore the range of ideas and options that the world offers. When children are respected, nurtured, and communicated with from birth, they gradually enter into a lifetime relationship of respect, communication, and caring with their parents (33-34).

What we have here are two different forms of family-based morality. What links them to politics is a common understanding of the nation as a family, with the government as parent (35).

What is important is that Lakoff envisions these models as "an idealization," and that he believes them to be: "cognitively real idealized models, that is, models that Americans grow up knowing implicitly" (67). These two metaphors are analogous to the home and business metaphors. More specifically, it is critical to see that the Nurturant Parent metaphor is based on a cooperative
relation of the father and mother. In short, we can draw on Lakoff to inform the dimensions of
the new and practical administrative alternative grounded on Stivers' "city as home."

The Applied Behavioral Sciences Literature

In *A Feminist Critique of Organizational Humanism* (1994), Ramsey and Calvert identify
feminist thought as a way to "stretch our thinking about what organizations of the future might
look like, and to offer new ways of approaching the challenges of managing over the next
decades" (83). Like my work, they are not interested in proposing feminism as the better, or
only, management practice. They view it as an alternative to traditional, more masculine
approaches, whose dimensions have not been sufficiently revealed, explored or utilized. As
such, excerpts from their work will be outlined below, as they provide considerable richness to
the typology proposed in the next chapter.

On Hierarchical Relationships:

- "Feminists refocus the entire discourse and look critically at the nature of hierarchy itself" (88).
- "It might be more effective in today's fast-paced and changing environment to
  borrow a leaf from the feminist notebook and replace permanent power
  relationships with temporary and shifting ones" (88).
- "Temporary, fluid power relationships may make better use of individual skills
  and talents, many of which go unrecognized and underutilized in traditional
  hierarchical structures" (88).
- The underlying principle of ranking so inherent in hierarchies is replaced with the
  principle of linking, where differential roles or responsibilities – no longer
  equated with either inferiority or superiority – can be more fully developed (Eisler
  1987)" (88).

On Shared Power:

- "True shared power can only be attained through 'responsibility with,' that is,
  responsibility for one's own development within relationship supportive of mutual
  development, where power relationships, and hence hierarchy, are fluid. In
  structures more like webs than present-day hierarchies, shared power would put
more emphasis on shared and less on power" (89).

On Competition/Cooperation:

➢ "Feminists have questioned, however, whether competition – with its basis in unequal power relationships and its required outcome of winners and losers – is as inevitable as we are led to believe. Many feminists see competition – unless redefined as competition against one's own internally imposed standards – as a waste of human energy and managing to individuals and relationships (Lugones & Spelman, 1987). Cooperation and collaboration are ends to be sought in and of themselves, because they are much more creative and affirming than competition. Instead of clinging to competition as part of the 'natural order of things,' we need to learn more about developing, maintaining, and nourishing truly egalitarian relationships – what Eisler (1987) has called partnerships – that affirm the worth of each individual and her or his unique contributions" (90).

On Individual vs. Organization Needs:

➢ "A basic feminist value underlying any organizational form is that the needs of people are paramount; organizations should adapt to the needs of individuals rather than vice versa" (90).

On Empowerment:

➢ "Feminists … given their emphasis on the needs of the individual, are more interested in the personal empowerment of individuals regardless of organizational affiliation or position. … The nature of the empowerment process, as envisioned by feminists, is also different: it is an internal, rather than an external process. … Thus, in the feminist view, empowerment and individual development go hand in hand" (90-91).

On Autonomy vs. Relationships:

➢ "A feminist perspective would, alternatively, view relationships with others as central to an individual's identity and crucial to the development of a healthy individual. Understanding connections to others is basic to understanding oneself. Self-identity is not developed in isolation from, but in relationship to others; connection with others is the underlying matrix out of which identity and self-understanding come" (91).

On the Whole Person:

➢ "Until the whole person of individuals who are members of previously excluded groups is fully embraced, anger, hurt, and pain are also emotions that need to be acknowledged and dealt with. … Feminism shifts our thinking about relationships between individuals and organizations and greatly expands our definition of the whole person. More important, it extends these definitions to include overt
consideration of the gender and racial identities, among others, that individuals bring to organizations" (92).

On Going Beyond Managing Diversity:

➢ "A major theme in feminist circles – especially those influenced by the writing of African-American and other feminists of color – is the importance of recognizing, understanding, and valuing differences. Characteristics, behaviors, and viewpoints that make individuals different should be legitimized, affirmed, and embraced rather than treated as something to be identified and 'rooted out' … we know very little about what women's experiences, values, beliefs, expectations, and aspirations would look like if brought fully valued into the organizational arena (Calvert & Ramsey 1992) … we know very little about the effects of race and ethnicity in business organizations … racial minorities may have something to contribute or that race can inform our understanding of organizations in new and different ways. … with a domestically diverse workforce – a workforce made up of individuals with different cultural experience and different gender identities even though all are Americans – it is more difficult to see and accept the validity of difference. The dominant group becomes the standard against which all things are measured. (italics added for emphasis) … The challenge for organizations of the future will be to embrace this diversity and instead of seeing it as a problem, welcome it as a source of new and creative approaches. …From a feminist perspective, organizations should and must examine and remove not only obvious barriers, but also systems and structures that bar individuals with certain kinds of differences from fully participating in and helping to shape organizations. Such a perspective calls for valuing individuals, valuing all of the different characteristics that make up their multiple and complex identities, and embracing the differences as well as the similarities these individuals bring to the organization" (93-95).

Last, Ramsey and Calvert conclude:

Through the feminist glasses used here, organizational and managerial practices would not be simply redesigned, but totally reconceptualized to include:

• nonhierarchical organizational structures;
• shared power based on the principle of linking rather than ranking;
• a new balance of organizational-individual relationships so the needs of human beings are better served by organizations;
• empowerment as a personal act;
• individual development as a relational activity;
• racial and gender identities as important parts of the whole person to be embraced by the organization; and
• the valuing and embracing of diversity.

As will be readily apparent, the detailed descriptions of feminist organizational and managerial practices outlined by Ramsey and Calvert provide considerable foundation for elements of the
typological dimensions of the home metaphor that will be described in the succeeding chapter.

The Entrepreneurship Literature

Bird and Brush describe the differences between what they see as traditional/masculine and personal/feminine entrepreneurial activities (Bird and Brush 2002). The charts that summarize their work are reprinted below:

**Gender Perspectives on Entrepreneurial Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Traditional (Masculine)</th>
<th>Personal (Feminine)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concept of Reality</strong></td>
<td>Focused consciousness Analysis Separable nature Knowledge as control</td>
<td>Diffuse awareness Appreciation Interconnected nature Knowledge as caring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td>Future Faster pace Linear</td>
<td>Present Slower pace Circular or spiral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action/Interaction</strong></td>
<td>Rational Strategic, grounded in goals and reason Competitive Aggressive, violent Distant</td>
<td>Emotional Personal, influenced by familial history and biology Cooperative, caring Harmonizing Empathic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
<td>Mastery over others Used for self Centralized</td>
<td>Self-mastery Used for others Shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethics</strong></td>
<td>Responsibility as control over self Restrain aggression/limit behavior Right and laws</td>
<td>Responsibility as a response to others' circumstances/repair harm Caring and fairness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gender Impacts on New Venture Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Dimensions</th>
<th>Traditional (Masculine)</th>
<th>Personal (Feminine)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of resources</td>
<td>&quot;Lease&quot; people</td>
<td>Employ people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low commitment</td>
<td>High commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promoter</td>
<td>Trustee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Personal control</td>
<td>Sharing control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominant coalition of similars</td>
<td>No dominant coalition or coalition of diverse others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems</td>
<td>Value is success for self &amp; firm</td>
<td>Value is well being for self &amp; others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Policies instrumental toward goal</td>
<td>Policies relational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies</td>
<td>Transactional</td>
<td>Accommodating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decisions centralized in entrepreneur</td>
<td>Participative decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boundaries between people, jobs clear</td>
<td>Boundaries between people, jobs fuzzy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growth leads to hierarchy</td>
<td>Resists growth; growth leads to struggles to stay flat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again, here in the entrepreneurship literature we find considerable agreement on elements that are described as masculine and feminine and that map closely to the business and home metaphors that will be outlined in the next chapter.

The Management and Organizational Development Literature

A wide variety of scholarship can be found in the management and organizational development area that is relevant to this dissertation project. The following pages will explore these contributions and provide additional foundation for the alternative administrative practice described in the chapter that follows.

To begin with, Calas and Smircich (Calas 1993) present a cautious concern with what they
They perceive to be the current interest in feminine-in-management. They believe it is a cyclical manifestation that could easily backfire against women, while men continue to advance to the global level:

Rather, we see a repetition of a cycle common in both academic and managerial circles when a need for change appears. On those occasions there is a tendency to obscure the need for fundamental change – which would alter the established balance of power – with a surface change that maintains that same balance while creating the appearance of a radical rethinking of what is. Women have been used for this purpose on more than one occasion (72).

They go on to state that:

The feminine-in-management rhetoric maintains intact — even strengthens — traditional managerial ideologies, because it is the 'female' constructed under patriarchy who is given voice and presence, extending the patriarchal family's female role from the private to the public domain. … this is the primary role that the feminine-in-management performs in the discourses of globalization – as suggested by the saying, 'Behind every successful man there is a woman' (74).

In this article, they ultimately argue that feminine-in-management and the effects of globalization "cancel each other as they maintain existing power relations that benefit only a few" (77).

In a 1996 article, Calas and Smircich describe the various streams of feminist literature and their specific contributions to organization studies.

In our view the task of feminism is not finished. Feminist concerns continue to intersect with organizational issues. Equally important, as we will suggest, 'feminist' theories are not only about conceptual lenses, we believe a more inclusive organization studies can be created, one that brings in the concerns of others, not just women who are directly affected by organizational processes and discourses. Thus, feminist theories articulate problems in both theory and practice of organizations which otherwise might go unnoticed (see also, Billing and Alvesson 1993; Cockburn 1983; 1985; 1991; K. Ferguson 1984; Ferree and Martin 1995; Jacobson and Jacques 1989a; Marshall 1985; 1995) (218).

Each school of thought gives alternative accounts for gender inequality, frames
the 'problem' differently and proposes different courses of action as 'solutions.' …
Our goal is not to judge which approach is 'best', but to recognize that each has an
important contribution to make, even if together they enact a somewhat uneasy
collection (219).

This is a tremendously useful piece of theoretical scholarship because it succinctly identifies the
various feminist/feminine perspectives (liberal, radical, psychoanalytic, Marxist, socialist,
poststructuralist, and Third World (post)colonial feminist approaches), their philosophical
commitments and orientations, as well as their shortcomings. In contrast, while my dissertation
builds on these strong foundations, it does so in a more fundamentally pragmatic fashion.
However, having said that, I find myself resonating with their quote of Betty Friedan who was
participating at the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing while they were writing this
article. Friedan stated:

The problems in our fast-changing social world require a new paradigm of social
policy, transcending all 'identity politics.' … Pursuing the separate interests of
women isn't adequate and is even diversionary. Instead, there has to be some new
vision of community. We need to reframe the concept of success. … 'Women's
issues' are symptoms of problems that affect everyone. … Our job now is to move
beyond polarization to a notion of community that can unite us as decent people.
Are women strong enough to join and even lead men in finding that new vision?

A paper by Nichole Heinecke (2001), presented to the 7th Annual Student Conference in
Economics and Business at St Norbert College in Wisconsin, offers:

a discussion of feminist management discourse and is an initial attempt to merge
philosophy of science with feminist scholarship. The paper provides a review of
how different, and often suppressed, perspectives can lend new insights into
management practices, and it reminds the reader that the feminist perspective is
very much conducive to management effectiveness (1).

Traditional management practices, understandably, have definitive masculine
elements. The masculine traits of organizational behavior emphasize a
hierarchical structure of authority, a strategic direction, planning, and rational
problem solving. … The ability and competencies that women have are not what
is keeping them from the top positions within the managerial structure; the current paradigms that our culture operates within are where the ceiling begins. …From the admittedly limited literature review that was conducted, I was able to discern a series of what may be considered feminist management traits often discussed by various researchers. This list can be summarized as follows: organic, empathetic, intuitive, caring, responsible, inclusive, flat organization, communication, transformational, relationship, openness, and interpersonal (2).

These same characteristics are identified and described again and again across various strains of scholarship and literature and are used to ground the dimensions of the succeeding theory chapter.

A number of scholars discuss the fundamentally gendered nature of organizations, despite the gender neutrality that is claimed by mainstream organizational theorists. Joan Acker, quoted in the introduction of this dissertation, describes the elements in a theory of gendered organizations and makes note that, "Today organizations are lean, mean, aggressive, goal oriented, efficient, and competitive, but rarely empathetic, supportive, kind and caring. Organizational participants actively create these images in their efforts to construct organizational cultures that contribute to competitive success" (Acker 1992, 253). And, echoing earlier commentary on the scholarship of Runte and Mills, Acker discusses the gendered substructure of organizations, specifically noting that:

…practices and relations, encoded in arrangements and rules, are supported by assumptions that work is separate from the rest of life and that it has first claim on the worker. Many people, particularly women, have difficulty making their daily lives fit these expectations and assumptions. As a consequence, today, there are two types of workers, those, mostly men, who, it is assumed, can adhere to organizational rules, arrangements, and assumptions, and those, mostly women, who, it is assumed, cannot, because of other obligations to family and reproduction. … What is problematic is the discontinuity, even contradiction, between organizational realities obviously structured around gender and ways of thinking and talking about these same realities as though they were gender neutral (255).
Acker's work challenges us to reflect on the types of long-term strategies that would be necessary to move away from a culture that privileges "'economy' over life," (260) again echoing the work of previous scholars, as well as the home metaphor perspective. I believe that if we are to draw on the positive notions of what gender can add to organization studies, then we must not only move beyond gender neutrality, we must learn to embrace what it has to offer us, in all of its dimensions.

Not long after Acker's work was published, Nanette Fondas published an article entitled, "Feminization Unveiled: Management Qualities in Contemporary Writings (Fondas 1997)," in which she describes her concern that contemporary management theorists are not naming feminized practices as such, despite the "representation of managerial work in terms of qualities traditionally defined as feminine. This 'feminization,' however, has neither been named by the writers themselves nor identified by management scholars" (257). She argues that:

characteristics that are culturally associated with females are appearing in descriptions of managerial work in the texts of contemporary writers and that these texts function as carriers of a feminine ethos to practicing managers. I am concerned with the mechanism – management writings – used to disseminate and legitimate a management idea (259).

She goes on to say:

This article, thus, is a cultural analysis through which I examine management literature; it is not a discussion of female vs. male management styles and their suitability to different organizations (260).

Fondas forcefully argues:

From a poststructuralist perspective, then, the problem for management writers in naming feminization is that it signifies 'not masculine.' This problem is particularly acute in cultures that give gender a strong reading, in terms of mutually exclusive, binary opposites. In such cultures, feminine words and names are problematic signifiers for management writers whose audience is predominantly male managers. They hear terms such as soft to mean not hard,
connected to mean not independent, helping others to mean not achieving individually, and surrendering to mean not victorious. What they hear reflects the culture's unconscious practice of sexual asymmetry, particularly its denigration of the feminine (Calas & Smircich, 1992a; Lorber, 1994).

To recognize and name feminization is a complete reversal of the subordination of femininity to masculinity in management discourse. If there is one idea researchers can learn from the failure of the writers to do so, it is that the culture is deeply ambivalent about elevating the status of the female and feminine.4 Doing so would call into question the entire system of gender relations that underpins most organization and management theory, that is, the assumption that traits associated with masculinity are 'given' and essential to organizational life, whereas those associated with femininity constitute the 'other,' marginalized and unessential, associated with peripheral organizational functions (Mumby & Putnam, 1992). Elevating femininity would also call into question the notion of a universal being to whom all of organizational theory applies (e.g., motivation, career, and leadership theory), because if the manager in the contemporary writings were personified, it would be clear she represents one sex rather than a universal being. Men would stand in ambiguous relationship to this universal manager, just as women have always done so in regard to the 'universal' beings described in most management theory (273-274).

I review Fondas' work because she is another scholarly voice suggesting that we are dealing with frames of reference that the dominant culture will find difficult to recognize. As such, I agree wholeheartedly with her argument and suggest that the home metaphor is most definitely based in the feminine and is labelled accordingly with no apologies.

Another writer, Carol R. Frenier, penned *Business and the Feminine Principal: The Untapped Resource* (Frenier 1997). According to a review of this work (Page 1998), Frenier describes first the principles of feminine perspective; second the feminine patterns of work behavior; and third, bringing those attributes into the workplace:

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4 On a personal level, the authors of the three books evidently want to give voice to a more feminine management character. It is possible that their creation of more feminine managers represents a need to name or sculpt themselves, though indirectly and perhaps unwittingly. The authors were probably not fully aware of this need. However, they may have had some notion that other writers were describing management similarly, providing the impetus for them to do so as well. Thus, it is possible that the feminine descriptions sprang not only from personal need, structural imperatives, and social change, but also from the overlapping and interlocking ideas that are the cultural milieu of management writing.
She expands the traditional vocabulary of business descriptors with phrases like 'diffuse awareness,' 'quick of the moment,' 'deep community' and 'radical trust.' Well grounded in a Jungian perspective, Frenier puts a positive slant on feeling and subjectivity. Feeling, that process which gives value to thinking, she suggests can provide a needed balance to the traditional objectivity used in most management theory (106).

Additionally, Frenier suggests we maintain a dynamic relationship between masculine and feminine behavior patterns. Develop an awareness of the two patterns so that we can use them as easily as we balance task and process behaviors to conduct successful meetings and business activities where both genders are present. *We need to use both patterns and to discern when one is more appropriate*, and to recognize and applaud the positive dynamics which occur when we collaborate with others using opposite but compatible working styles (italics added for emphasis)(107).

My interest in Frenier's work primarily relates to the fact that I join her in urging dynamic balance between masculine or dominant work culture and so-called feminine behavior patterns. As will be further discussed in the conclusion of this dissertation, while this is a project fraught with tension, I believe it is entirely necessary and required for successful 21st century public administration.

A number of authors have explored the issue of feminine leadership. Olsson (Olsson 2000):

examines women managers' stories of gender within the context of organisational storytelling and heroic masculinism. These transformational narratives provide parallel but distinctive archetypes to heroic masculinity. At the same time, they present parodic inversions of the 'slaying of monster' myths of traditional executive culture. These stories which women tell other women, create resilient images of women's identities in management (296).

In short, Olsson explores masculine and feminine leadership archetypes and the need to celebrate the lesser known and less familiar female archetype of leadership.

A recent article by Billing and Alvesson (Billing and Alvesson 2000) argues:

that it is necessary to critically discuss the whole idea of gender labelling
leadership as masculine or feminine and suggests that we should be very careful and potentially aware of the unfortunate consequences when we use gender labels. Constructing leadership as feminine may be of some value as a contrast to conventional ideas on leadership and management but may also create a misleading impression of women's orientation to leadership as well as reproducing stereotypes and the traditional gender division of labour.

Of particular interest to me is their notion that we should decouple the tying of masculine and feminine to the bodies of men and women, and instead "treat them as traits or forms of subjectivities (orientations in thinking, feeling and valuing) that are potentially present in all persons, men as well as women although to different degrees" (152). Further:

Instead of seeing women's and men's traits and abilities as oppositions, it is possible to see them as complementary or loosely grouped, men as well as women are capable of acting in what may be labelled masculine and feminine ways, based on instrumentality as well as on feelings, dependent upon the situation (152).

In fact, they go so far as to note:

In some non-Western cultures those persons who express a mix of feminine and masculine elements are not stigmatized but 'believed to be of a higher spiritual order' (Gagne and Tewksbury 1996, 124). Why and how did yin values (to use a different and well-known concept in Chinese philosophy where yin is associated with the feminine and yang with the masculine) in Western countries (and other parts of the world) become repressed and dominated by the yang norms and how and why did these values become gendered? In Chinese philosophy *the art of life is not seen as holding to yang and banishing yin, but as keeping the two in balance because there cannot be one without the other* (Watts, in Hines 1992) (153) (italics added for emphasis).

Their conclusion bears notice, as they call for:

viewing feminine leadership as a critical concept offering a counterpoint to dominant ways of conceptualizing leadership. Feminine leadership would then contribute to a de-masculinization of leadership, not necessarily meaning a feminization of it, but loosening up management being culturally connected to men and, in particular, masculine men and given a masculine meaning. As a critique, feminine leadership would support a move away from conventional ideas on management, not so much a move to celebrating a feminine model intimately coupled to a stereotypical, idealized and essentialistic view on talents and orientations contingent upon the female sex.
This kind of understanding of feminine leadership may stir up some debate and questioning through offering a model clearly different from conventional ideas about the exercise of leadership. It may also provide some guidelines and reinforce identity and self-esteem amongst those female and male workers and managers who are open to perceiving themselves as carrying feminine orientations, as described by the literature on feminine leadership (155).

The conclusion of this dissertation discusses a similar desirability of seeing the home and business metaphorical typologies as complementary to one another, and in fact, the necessary and interdependent sides of a metaphorical coin.

More recently, Bowring's (2004) work suggests that we need to move beyond our reliance on the binary distinctions of masculine/feminine and male/female. She urges us to "stop thinking about gender, and thus leadership, as one of two points at either end of a two-dimensional plane, an either/or continuum, and instead refigure it as one of an infinite number of positions in a four-dimensional space" (384). Her writing suggests that if we can get out of the either/or way of thinking, we can move to a more nuanced and thinking that draws on both metaphorical perspectives as in a continuum, which leads to a greater sense of wholeness. Using a Star Trek-themed example, she describes the individual who lives from this perspective as:

a whole person, rather than the fractured person who is ruled by the public/private dichotomy. She is happy, fulfilled and true to herself. Her flexibility and ability to step outside rigidly defined gender roles and be what she needs to be as the situation dictates are important attributes. … She is considered a leader who is adept at teaching others how to be good leaders. … She is a more complete person. She is more fluid in her many identities than the television Janeway and is capable of shifting both her gender identify and her leadership. This Janeway is the captain, but not the sole leader. She is not a leader above, but a leader with her crew. She has a much wider set of responses to danger and is not limited by notions of masculine/feminine appropriateness. Although she is a private person, she does not compartmentalize her life in the same way as the television Janeway. She is complete, because in the crucial areas of her gender and leadership she is fluid, not fixed (401).

Bowring's conclusion calls for:
a leadership literature that does away with the presuppositions and expectations at the heart of the binary distinctions that are so prevalent in positivist research. For example, it should stop assuming that there are only two types of leaders, two gender identities, male and female, and that one male or one female speaks for all males or females respectively. It should stop dividing leaders' lives into public and private domains. It should stop attributing value to one side of the binary distinctions it uses, at the expense of the other side (402-3).

I believe this dissertation project goes a long way toward providing the practical guidance necessary to make it possible for public administrators to enact from just such a position of fluidity by identifying what has been missing, or less visible, and then by encouraging the use of all perspectives, circumstance dependent.

An article by Metcalfe and Linstead (Metcalfe 2003) explores the gendered processes of teams. They are concerned with "the dynamics of team processes, how these processes can be read as gendered, and the way that women's voices are ignored in teamwork theorizing" (95). They go on to "show that team theorizing is built upon masculinist discourses that emphasize managing control and performance, with the 'soft' components of teams, the sensitivities and intimacies of team actors being marginalized and subordinated" (96).

The Education Literature

Shakeshaft and Perry (Shakeshaft and Perry 1995) argue that, "one explanation for the differences in effectiveness and style of women administrators can be found in the language used by women administrators, language that emphasizes power with, rather than power over, others" (17). This theme is consistently revealed as a dimensional trait of the home metaphor perspective. They use noted linguist Deborah Tannen's work to underscore this perspective:

[A man engages the world] as an individual in a hierarchical social order in which he is either one-up or one-down. In this world, conversations are negotiations in
which people try to achieve and maintain the upper hand if they can, and protect
themselves from others' attempts to put them down and push them around. Life,
then, is a contest, a struggle to preserve independence and avoid failure.

[A woman approaches the world] as an individual in a network of connections. In
this world, conversations are negotiations for closeness in which people try to
seek and give confirmation and support, and to reach consensus. They try to
protect themselves from others' attempts to push them away. Life, then, is a
community, a struggle to preserve intimacy and avoid isolation (Tannen 1990, pp.
24-25)(19-20).

They note that women administrators are empowering, act more like facilitators than experts,
listen more often, are more collegial and spend more time on relationship processes than men
(23-25).

The Feminine/Feminist Organization Literature: A review of this literature does not reveal a
tremendous amount of scholarship directly relevant to this dissertation project. However, what
exists is briefly reviewed in the following pages.

Probably the most notable work is by Ferree and Martin (Ferree 1995), who offer a broad and
enlightening collection of essays directed at initiating a new field of cross-discipline scholarly
inquiry. They look at "the fundamental questions of how and why so many feminist
organizations managed to endure. What price did they pay? What effects have they had? What
promise do they hold?" (5). While this work is related to my dissertation, the essays only
occasionally describe aspects of the home metaphor, and more often reiterate what has already
been outlined by other scholars cited elsewhere in this dissertation.

Morgen (Morgen 1994) notes that:

feminist workplaces favor participatory democracy, collectivity and consensual
decision-making. To this end, personnel decisions have become highly personalized, with hiring and firing tending to be emotional. Personnel management becomes even more difficult when individuals of different races, ethnicities and classes are brought in to one organization. As a result of these problems, some feminist organizations inadvertently reverted back to bureaucracy. Nevertheless, feminists continue to seek appropriate ways of dealing with this challenge (665).

In a dissertation by Iannello (Iannello 1988), she conducts a qualitative analysis of three feminist organizations in a small New England city and finds that:

feminist political ideals do have an impact on the structure of, in particular, the two anarchist organizations within the study. A major contribution of this research is the distinction made between types of leadership and decision-making patterns characteristic of feminist consensual organizations of the women's movement during the 1960s and 70s, and the modified consensual structures developed by feminists of the 1980s (dissertation abstract).

Iannello's dissertation indicates that feminist women's organizations make serious attempts to construct their organizations differently than men appear to do. As such it provides some evidence for the alternative administrative perspective.

Leidner (Leidner 1991) presents a fascinating article about the National Women's Studies Association (NWSA) and its attempts to feminize its organizational structure and activities. Interestingly, the article often illustrates the innate tension between the home and business metaphorical perspectives. The value of this article is that it demonstrates that it is entirely possible to enact, or at least attempt to enact, home metaphor values and perspectives within a national feminist association context. For example, in an effort to make power more equal, the NWSA makes a number of attempts at providing more than proportional power to minority constituencies in an effort to "recognize that the costs of participation are rarely equal for everyone" (274). The dimension of how power is utilized from within the home metaphor
perspective is well illustrated in this article.

Mendez and Wolf (Mendez 2001) "highlight the need for new theoretical perspectives that take into account power differences that exist along various axes – including axes of domination among women. Transnational processes … further complicate such power differentials" (723). The primary focus of this article addresses women actively engaged with other women in international development. While it provides an interesting analysis, it is not directly relevant to my project.

Last but not least, a recent academic symposium comprised of several articles (Coleman, Rippin et al. 2000; Hearn 2000; Meyerson and Kolb 2000) in the journal *Organization*, "have recently been trying to build from our critiques – to go beyond armchair feminism – in order to generate alternative visions of organizing and make them a reality in the workplace" (549). Their overarching goal, however, is to achieve a gender-equitable workplace, which puts the bulk of their writings in the context of equity feminism. As noted earlier in the literature review, equity feminism does not, for the most part, speak to the effort of this dissertation to create a "well-articulated framework that translates theory into practice" (559).

**Common Themes**

In conclusion, by extensively reviewing and analyzing literature from other fields, I have identified a number of commonalities that help to inform two opposing metaphorical typologies that can be used to enhance the number of options we have in administrative practice. These commonalities play out in a variety of fields of research. The major themes that we have
reviewed thus far will help to give depth to the home metaphor. In particular, we can categorize these common themes along 4 primary dimensions.

To begin with, the themes involve fundamentally ontological and epistemological concerns, that is, themes that explore the fundamental nature of being, as well as the nature and grounds of knowledge. Thus, in the next chapter, I draw from the extensive resource literature to flesh out the ontology of the business metaphorical perspective as opposed to that of the home metaphorical perspective. I then do the same regarding issues fundamental to epistemology.

In addition, the resource literature identifies a number of themes related to how we understand the development and maintenance of the social world. Examples of how this social world is experienced from a home metaphorical stance will be juxtaposed to the traditional business metaphorical stance under a dimension called social theory. Finally, the literature describes a remaining theme concerning how the subject of ethics is viewed from the two opposing lens. These will be described in detail as the ethical framework for the overarching typology that is being revealed by this dissertation.

These four dimensions – ontology, epistemology, social theory and ethical framework -- help make it possible to further elucidate and inform the alternative administrative typology based on Stivers' home metaphor that is outlined in the chapter immediately to follow.
Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework: Typologies Defined

Introduction

The important themes noted in the previous chapter have not been well represented in much of the public administration literature. However, the field of public administration has, for the past two decades or more, been beset with proposals for paradigmatic change. There has been a great deal of writing offering critiques of rationalism and a call for the field to reorient itself to a new paradigm of one sort or another.

According to Merriam-Webster, a paradigm is "a philosophical and theoretical framework of a scientific school or discipline within which theories, laws, and generalizations and the experiments performed in support of them are formulated; broadly: a philosophical or theoretical framework of any kind." We will turn to Thomas Kuhn's more explicit definition of paradigms on the next page.

The problem is that, while people can understand paradigmatic differences, they have difficulty seeing how the perspective offered by the new paradigm can be brought into reality. New paradigms are like space aliens coming down to Earth to tell us what their culture is like and advocating that we start living the way they do. The difficulty is that we have very little frame of reference to imagine exactly how to enact from that alien culture, since it is so unfamiliar to us.

In this dissertation, I set out to define a typology of alternative administrative practices that involves a new metaphorical perspective. Building on the common themes identified in the

5 http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/paradigm
previous chapter, I will explicate the primary dimensions of the home typology, as contrasted with the business typology. The tremendous power of the new, or rediscovered, home metaphorical typology is that virtually everyone is already thoroughly familiar with it. In the following pages, I will describe each of these typologies, and compare and contrast their orientations in a manner that will, hopefully, make immediate and convincing sense.

Use of Metaphor as the Means to Explicate an Alternative Typology

Gareth Morgan's *Images of Organization* provides us with a rich and powerful way to examine the feminine worldview in the administration of public institutions. His book is based on the premise:

that all theories of organization and management are based on implicit images or metaphors that lead us to see, understand, and manage organizations in distinctive yet partial ways. ... The use of metaphor implies a way of thinking and a way of seeing that pervade how we understand our world generally. ... We use metaphor whenever we attempt to understand one element of experience in terms of another.... The metaphor frames our understanding (Morgan 1998).

In suggesting that all theory is metaphor, Morgan urges us to consider that:

any theory or perspective that we bring to the study of organization and management, while capable of creating valuable insights, is also incomplete, biased, and potentially misleading.... Metaphor is inherently paradoxical. It can create powerful insights that also become distortions, as the way of seeing created through a metaphor becomes a way of not seeing. ... In recognizing theory as metaphor, we quickly appreciate that no single theory will ever give us a perfect or all-purpose point of view. ... the challenge is to become skilled in the art of using metaphor: to find fresh ways of seeing, understanding, and shaping the situations that we want to organize and manage... (5-6).

Finally, he concludes that metaphors can be used to "generate a range of complementary and competing insights" (6).

In the following chapters, I am proposing a new metaphorical perspective that is based on a
different relation of masculine to the feminine that is found in the metaphorical typology of the home. I believe that this new metaphorical typology can be systematically used to find new and fresh ways of managing public institutions, as well as provide insight and new approaches to other civic and social issues. I am further suggesting that the business metaphor typology, dominant in the world of organizational management literature for the past 100 years or so, is so compelling that it has become practically a paradigmatic frame of reference, and consequently makes it virtually impossible to see or grasp the possible contributions inherent in any alternative worldview, particularly one based on the home.

According to Thomas Kuhn's perspective, as noted in his influential *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Kuhn 1962):

… the scientific paradigms before and after a paradigm shift are so different that their theories are incomparable—the paradigm shift does not just change a single theory, it changes the way that words are defined, the way that the scientists look at their subject and, perhaps most importantly, the questions that are considered valid and the rules used to determine the truth of a particular theory. Kuhn went so far as to say that they were incommensurable — literally, lacking comparison, untranslateable. New theories were not, as they had thought of before, simply extensions of old theories, but radically new worldviews whose basic axioms and first-principles were different from the theories they replaced.

This incommensurability applies not just before and after a paradigm shift, but between conflicting paradigms. It is simply not possible, according to Kuhn, to construct an impartial language that can be used to perform a neutral comparison between conflicting paradigms, because the very terms used belong within the paradigm and are therefore different in different paradigms.6

Returning to Morgan, we find that:

This is the manager's dilemma. We tend to find and realize what we are looking for. ...Reality has a tendency to reveal itself in accordance with the perspectives through which it is engaged.... it is the theory through which we observe a situation that decides what we can observe. In any given situation there are many potential objectivities. … Managers face the challenge of finding or creating powerful metaphors that can help them understand and shape their

organizations.... Favored metaphors tend to trap us in specific modes of action (350).

Last:

... This partiality of insight is inherent in the nature of metaphor and the theories and ideas it generates. It helps to explain the swings in management from fad to fad, and why the latest theory is always in the process of giving way to another. Management theories tend to sell the positive insights of a metaphor, while ignoring the limitations and distortions that it creates. These insights attract. That's why they develop a following and become the trend of the day. But when managers get down to the business of applying the insights in practice, reality presents itself as being much more complicated. Most management theories are developed in a way that inevitably creates disillusionment and disappointment. They usually have an element of 'truth,' but it is a truth that, in effect, denies the complexity of the realities to which the theories are to be applied. ... Hence the main invitation and challenge of this book: To recognize and cope with the idea that all theories of organization and management are based on implicit images or metaphors that persuade us to see, understand, and imagine situations in partial ways.... metaphors create insight. But they also distort. They have strengths. But they also have limitations. In creating ways of seeing they tend to create ways of not seeing. Hence there can be no single theory or metaphor that gives an all-purpose point of view. There can be no 'correct theory' for structuring everything we do. The challenge facing modern managers is to become accomplished in the art of using metaphor: To find appropriate ways of seeing, understanding, and shaping the situations with which they have to deal (348).

By building on Morgan and Kuhn, we have the key to describing alternative perspectives. The perspective proposed in this dissertation has, up until now, lacked definition and therefore utility, because its basic axioms and first-principles, or dimensions, have not been described in a coherent fashion in the field of public administration. Further, because it is based on the metaphor of the home -- and that which has been traditionally relegated to the private sphere and more often to the experiences of women or the feminine -- efforts to describe it have been fragmented at best. This is because the culture and tradition of American society have relegated women and their worldview primarily to the private. The home metaphor, outlined in the succeeding pages, describes a new relation of the feminine to the masculine. Moreover, the resource literature will assist in describing the home metaphorical typology in such a way as to
show that the home is not the sole domain of the woman.

However, as has been noted in the previous chapter, evidence of this metaphorical perspective has existed in the field of public administration as far back as the Progressive Era and the founding of the field and now stands ready to offer new and practical insight into our administrative practices.

**Overview of the Typology of the Metaphor of the Home**

Advances have been made in exploring the home metaphor, particularly in the business management, organizational development and psychological literatures noted earlier. These resource literatures will be drawn on to explicate the home metaphor for public administration. As such, we can extrapolate from the metaphor of the home some ideas and principles that can be applied in organizations.

By drawing on Stivers and the resource literatures, the following explicates a typology that shows the proposed alternative frame of reference, represented by the metaphor of the home, juxtaposed against the dominant, traditional frame of reference, the metaphor of business. This typology illustrates the two metaphorical frames of reference along four primary dimensions: ontology; epistemology; social theory; and ethical framework, each of which will be explored in greater depth in the following pages. Each of the metaphorical perspectives reflects distinctive characteristics when examined from each of these four dimensions and sheds light on the differences between the home and business metaphors. Again, these characteristics are the most common themes drawn from the literature. They are familiar to all of us, but become more vivid
and apparent when juxtaposed in the following overview table:

**Typology Overview**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIMENSION</th>
<th>BUSINESS METAPHOR</th>
<th>HOME METAPHOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td>• Scarcity – there is never enough of what is needed</td>
<td>• Sufficiency – there is always enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The nature of</td>
<td>• Individuals are separate and discrete</td>
<td>• Individuals are interconnected and created by their relationships with one another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>being)</td>
<td>• Humans must dominate nature in order to survive</td>
<td>• Nature and humans are symbiotic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Relationships are instrumental</td>
<td>• Relationships are transformational and constructive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td>• The knower is separate from the process of knowing</td>
<td>• There is no separation between the knower and the external world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The theory of</td>
<td>• Objective knowledge is all that is important to the knower</td>
<td>• The knower carries personal knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the nature and</td>
<td>• Action is based on what is objectively known; it is not experimental, but based</td>
<td>• Knowing is achieved through doing, based on experimentation; it is fundamentally pragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grounds of</td>
<td>on an expectation that outcomes can be predicted</td>
<td>• Fact (consequence) and value (how we regard the consequence) are inextricably connected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowledge)</td>
<td>• Facts and values are separate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMENSION</td>
<td>BUSINESS METAPHOR</td>
<td>HOME METAPHOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Theory</td>
<td>• The social world is achieved through contract or explicit agreement</td>
<td>• The social world is achieved through relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(How we understand the</td>
<td>• Membership is contingent on performance of one's contracted responsibility</td>
<td>• There are no invidious distinctions in the social group; all members are accepted as important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development and</td>
<td>• People are given explicit roles and act or perform according to them</td>
<td>• Common understanding, based on caring and shared life ways, is the basis of the social group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maintenance of the</td>
<td>• Nature is subordinate to humanity</td>
<td>• Nature and humanity adapt to each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social world)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical Framework</td>
<td>• Win/lose; what is best for the individual's survival</td>
<td>• Win/win; what is best for the whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• There are explicit external rules and principles that we must follow</td>
<td>• Relationship itself regulates behavior; context is everything</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fairness; everyone must be treated equally or the same</td>
<td>• Fairness; everyone is unique, important and deserves special treatment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Everyone is treated the same by standards and regulations – &quot;one size fits all&quot;</td>
<td>• Individual needs and unique circumstances are taken into account</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following pages will flesh out the assumptions inherent in each of the above theoretical dimensions, basing discussion primarily on describing the home metaphor, since the business metaphor is so well known and understood, and reflect the resource literatures that inform them and that were described in the preceding chapter.
The Ontological Dimension

The following table illustrates the main features of the ontological dimension of the business and home metaphors.

### Ontological Dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSION</th>
<th>BUSINESS</th>
<th>HOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ONTLOGICAL DIMENSION</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ontological Dimension</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ontological Dimension</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the nature of being; view of the world)</td>
<td>• Being in scarcity - there is never enough</td>
<td>• Being in sufficiency - there is enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Individuals must fight nature in order to get enough – need more and more in order to be secure</td>
<td>• The natural condition is that nature supports all of life and all have a place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• People are discrete individuals with individual drives that motivate them to act</td>
<td>• People are created in relationship with each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Relationships are instrumental</td>
<td>• Relationships are transformational and constructive (identity is implicated)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scarcity vs. Sufficiency**

Ontology refers to assumptions about the nature of being in the world. As informed by Carol Gilligan's work noted earlier, from the home metaphor or feminist perspective the world is experienced from a non-oppositional and more holistic perspective. There is an innate, almost spiritual, understanding that everything is interrelated and united. Stemming from a strong sense of sufficiency, it is felt that ultimately there is enough of whatever is needed. Concepts such as limitlessness and boundlessness exist from within this outlook. This is in striking contrast to that
of the business metaphor perspective, wherein it is assumed that there is never enough of what
one needs. Individuals, families and communities are pitted against one another to ensure that
they each have enough of what they need.

**Humans Dominate Nature vs. Nature is Symbiotic with Human Life**

From the home metaphorical stance, individuals have a place in nature and are one with it. They
are not in conflict with or dominant over it, nor do they need to control it. The natural condition
is that nature will support life and that there is a symbiotic relationship between all. From this
perspective, good is unlimited, and resources are abundant. One has only to look at many native
or indigenous cultures to see additional evidence of this frame of reference. This is, again, in
striking contrast to the business metaphor stance that enacts from an assumption of limited goods
and resources. From such a perspective, for example, the family's goal is to ensure that it
provides enough resources to sustain itself. It is concerned that there may be a limit to those
resources and may engage in stockpiling to ensure that there will always be enough during times
of so called shortages.

From a business metaphorical point of view, there can only be winners or losers. And, you most
definitely want to be considered a winner or on the winning team. On the other hand, from the
home metaphorical point of view, there can only be winners, since there is no need to compete
for goods or services. If another person is in need, it is important for the community to try and
meet that need, regardless of the so-called objective circumstances of lack or limitation. There is
no need to compete for resources, since each individual's needs are different and are addressed
by the whole community. Each individual is critical to the whole and is maintained by the
whole. The world is constantly responding to peoples' needs and they are always met. For
instance, in a home if one family member needs tutoring and another needs new sneakers more often because of growth spurts, the family obtains tutoring for the one that needs tutoring and new sneakers as often as the one that is growing needs them. In such a circumstance, family members are not treated as so-called equals and provided with exactly the same items, both with tutoring and both with new sneakers. They are individually provided with exactly what is needed, when it is needed.

The home metaphor sees the whole as more important than simply the individual parts. Again, Gilligan's work strongly informs this perspective. From this viewpoint it is not uncommon for the pieces to add up to more than the whole. Building commonality, consensus and alignment over major family issues, no matter how long it takes, is a necessary part of everyday life. A home perspective is fundamentally compassionate, unifying, and dignifying. A home is assumed to contain unique characteristics that distinguish it, however slightly, from all other homes. Accordingly, there is a general sense of tolerance and acceptance for common humanness and frailties—all are flawed human beings, perfect in their own unique ways. Individuals are always concerned with the feelings of others.

**Instrumental Relationships vs. Transformational Relationships**

From a home metaphor perspective, individuals are constructed by their interactions with the world, and their perspectives may and often do change over time based on new interactions. As noted by Lakoff in discussing the Nurturant Parent model, individuals and their opinions are expected to change, evolve and grow, just as children and parents grow and mature within the family home. From a business metaphor perspective, individuals are constrained by their history and previous actions. As such, politicians are encouraged to be loyal to one perspective about an
issue and are often maligned for changing their perspective, the consequence of which is to be labeled as weak, inconsistent, a flip flopper, or even worse, as indecisive and unreliable. Labels are used to categorize individuals, and thus limit potentially alternative perspectives or their consideration.

From the business metaphor worldview, the government or society at large is a regulator of conduct and imposes regulations in order to keep order. Lakoff's Strict Father model again informs this viewpoint. The isolated individual and economic stability are privileged. If the economy is managed appropriately, each individual might maximize his/her consumption and relationships to achieve happiness. If everyone is treated exactly the same, the result is equality. However, the business metaphor tends to privilege the perspective of equality to such an extent that it diminishes one's perspective of the nuances of difference and uniqueness that the home metaphor might reveal.

From the home metaphor worldview, society is viewed as a teacher, a molder of character, and is self-governing (McSwite 1997). The life of the family, home, community and humanity is privileged. An overarching goal, if one can be said to have goals from this worldview, is to ensure opportunities to increase peaceful interactions between individuals.

The business metaphor outlook insists that the citizen and bureaucrat keep an impersonal distance from each other because bureaucrats are experts and must treat everyone exactly the same, regardless of their individual circumstances. Stivers provides an excellent description of this perspective when she discusses the activities of the bureau men. Citizens are treated as
clients and thus must be dealt with from this impersonal distance. For instance, the bureaucrat sits in judgment as to whether a citizen qualifies for a particular public good or service. Moreover, citizens are controlled by government through the imposition of regulations that bind their actions. The business metaphor concept of nepotism arises here, as it is assumed that people become corrupted when they are in relationship with each other (either by blood or through a marital relationship). Therefore, rules and regulations are imposed to discourage and prevent the establishment of intimate relationships. Citizens are viewed with suspicion and individual intentions are always questioned.

In contrast, as Stivers describes the reform era women and their work, the home metaphor outlook brings with it a sense that civil servants are friends, collaborators, helpmates, colleagues and neighbors. They work with their fellow citizens to solve problems or address issues of societal need. The civil servant can put herself "in the shoes" of the other in order to help identify solutions. Building strong interactive relationships between civil servants and citizens is understood to help reveal the solutions that are sought. From this perspective, one assumes the highest common denominator -- individual intentions are assumed to be honorable. And, we are all collectively responsible, to one degree or another, for addressing common issues and solving social problems.

**Oppositions vs. Holism**

From a business metaphor vantage point the overall view of the world is structured on oppositions and tends to be dichotomy-dependent when defining the universe of governance, e.g., rich/poor, black/white, pro-life/pro-choice, we/they, democratic/republican, federal/state, and so
forth. As such, everything is seen as discrete components that are divisional and definitional.

From the home metaphor vantage point, there are more gray areas to consider and acknowledge.

It is more difficult and less necessary to label and scientifically dissect in order to take action.

As such, scientific activity is carried out from a more connected and experiential frame of reference, as demonstrated by Stivers' reform women.

There is danger, however, in relying on a tendency to oversimplify. As Hutchinson (2001) notes:

> Conceptualizations of gender as dichotomous run afoul of the same gross oversimplifications that oppositions of other natural and social phenomena share in common, that is, a connection to the construct normal/deviant (masculine/feminine, white/black, young/old, rational/irrational, heterosexual/homosexual, real men/faggots, rich/poor, virgin/whore) (595).

While it is convenient to contrast the home and business metaphors for purposes of drawing out their divergent characteristics and metaphorical inclinations, it is important to note that I, too, view this predilection for dichotomizing issues as an oversimplification. In the conclusion of this dissertation, I discuss my view that these seemingly binary distinctions are more complementary than irreconcilable opposites. O.C. McSwite (1997) has gone so far as to write about the existence of a gender continuum. I build on their work by suggesting that we are better served by viewing these two metaphors as poles along a continuum of infinite choices from which to construct and engage in administrative practices.

The business perspective assumes a high degree of market scarcity, that is, that humans are separate from nature and other human beings and must fight them in order to get enough of what they need. Further, the perspective assumes that humans will require more and more in order to survive. In fact, they need to control and dominate nature in order to live. This perspective is
centered on a belief that boundaries exist, can be defined, and contain everything. The home perspective, however, assumes there will be enough of whatever is needed, when it is needed, for everyone and everything. Resources will reveal themselves from both traditional and nontraditional sources.

Looking to Gilligan again, we recall the masculine and feminine versions of morality that help to inform the ontological perspectives. From this set of oppositions, we find that the business metaphor describes a world in which there is a limited amount of good. It therefore follows that each individual must fight to get her piece of that good. Fairness is largely based on an underlying assumption of lack, limitation and shortage. Again, from this perspective, individuals must advocate for their own needs to the virtual exclusion of all others or else risk losing or reducing their piece of the pie. As such, we are all separate self-concerned, self-centered creatures who only bond together to conquer what we fear. For example, there are stakeholders and they must always compete for a larger share of this limited pie. Lobbyists are necessary in order to protect or expand their fair share, ultimately at the expense of others, in order to ensure that their needs are met. Consequently, there will always be winners and losers. Giving is viewed as meaning you sacrifice something you could have gotten – meaning that if someone else gets something, then you or your issue do not. A "win at all costs" perspective is privileged over concern for others or the community as a whole. And, from this stance, if you do not know or value having a relationship with your opponent, you will not care if they lose, only that you win.

From the ontology of the home metaphor, people are created by and from their relationships with
Gilligan (1982) and her colleague Nona Lyons (1983) use the terms separate and connected to describe two different conceptions or experiences of the self, as essentially autonomous (separate from others) or as essentially in relationship (connected to others). The separate self experiences relationships in terms of 'reciprocity,' considering others as it wishes to be considered. The connected self experiences relationships as 'response to others in their terms' (Lyons 1983, p. 134) (Belenky 1997).

Connected knowing builds on the subjectivists' conviction that the most trustworthy knowledge comes from personal experience rather than the pronouncement of authorities (112).

Separate knowers learn through explicit formal instruction how to adopt a different lens – how, for example to think like a sociologist. Connected knowers learn through empathy. Both learn to get out from behind their own eyes and use a different lens, in one case the lens of a discipline, in the other the lens of another person (115).

Connected knowers begin with an attitude of trust; they assume the other person has something good to say. This trustfulness builds on the subjectivist notion that because all opinions come from experience and you cannot call anyone's experience wrong, you cannot call the opinion wrong. Connected knowers do not measure other people's words by some impersonal standard. Their purpose is not to judge but to understand. Women seem to take naturally to a nonjudgmental stance. … It is easy to condemn women's refusal to make judgments as evidence of passivity or absence of agency, and indeed in a sense, it is. Connected knowing belongs to David Bakan's (1966) 'communal' mode (involving fusion and acceptance) rather than the 'agentic' mode (involving separation and control). But, as the philosopher Carol McMillan (1982) reminds us, 'Agency need not involve control over events' (p. 131) (116-117).

From the business perspective, associations are constructed with others only for the purpose of meeting mutual convenience (McSwite 1997) and a firm line is drawn between the public (work) and the private (home). Again, rules and regulations are imposed to discourage and prevent the building of relationships, which could destroy equal and fair application of the rules and regulations.

From the home metaphor perspective, life, including governance, is built on networks of
mutually satisfying and rewarding personal and professional relationships. The public and the private are not viewed as distinct and separate parts of life, but aspects of one's whole life experience. Individuals work together nonjudgmentally because they respect each individual's integral contribution to the whole. Everyone is familial. Unique perspectives are encouraged and supported as critical to understanding.

**Follett's Emphasis on Holism for the Home Ontology**

Mary Parker Follett, a true pioneer in the field of public administration, posed a process alternative for administering public institutions (Follett 1998). However, because she did not sufficiently elaborate her alternative, and because the business metaphor increasingly dominated public administration literature during and after her lifetime, her ideas received little serious consideration until more recently. Fortunately, we can now use some of those ideas to construct and inform the home metaphorical perspective. A key aspect of Follett's theoretical frame was the collapse of the distinction between the public (business) and private (home) realms, which is consistent with the home metaphor vantage point.

Follett's ideas greatly inform and further flesh out the ontological perspective that people are created by relationship, as opposed to the dominant business ontology in which people are discrete individuals with individualized drives that motivate them to act. Follett understood the basic unit of social reality to be relationship or mutuality and that people are by nature constituted by their relationships with others. Hers was, generally speaking, a holistic and positive approach to the organization of society that represents a belief in a seamless relationship between individuals and their government, for instance, between the realms of the private (home
metaphor) and the public (business metaphor). Understandably, Follett's perspective has often stood in direct contrast to mainstream thought about government in America, that it is separate from the people. Follett's assumptions conflict with the fundamental but hidden assumption of public administration's axiology, that of maintaining the public-private dichotomy or distinction, so evident in public administration literature.

In the field of organizational development, a review of Follett's contribution to the problem of control in organizational life notes that Follett's work was unfortunately largely neglected, in part due to the fact that she did not fit into one school of thought (Parker, 1984). Parker suggests that because Follett's concepts were holistic in approach, they were undoubtedly viewed as feminine and therefore ignored. Not so surprisingly, here we find evidence that Follett was not always readily understood, perhaps because of her fundamental alignment with the perspective of the home, or fundamentally feminine, metaphor. This can also be seen as an indication of Follett's refusal to buy into the private/public dichotomy, so fundamental to the founding of public administration. A multidisciplinary group of authors presented a review forum on the work of Mary Parker Follett in the journal Organization. In this collection of four papers, the authors "emphasize the need for an ongoing reading of Follett that will lead us to thinking about management and organizations in very different terms from that of the contemporary organizational 'mainstream'" (Burrell 1996, 147). This dissertation suggests that Follett was viewing the world from a primarily home metaphor perspective, and thus her contributions have often been misunderstood and not fully appreciated as a consequence.

To understand Follett’s contributions, first we must note the context of American individualism and the separation of public and private surrounding her ideas. From the business metaphor,
individuals are viewed as entirely discrete and separate from one another. It goes without saying that the American nation and culture may emphasize individualism to the greatest extent ever known in the world. The foundation for this stems from the American Constitution itself, grounded in and strongly inspired by the political theories of Hobbes and Locke. So deeply ingrained is this emphasis on the individual that we cannot see fully the permutations of this idea in our political formula. A deeply rooted part of American political culture is the strong distinction between the private and public. The assumption of the sphere of private activity, separate and apart from public and social activity, appears in the American mind to be a distinction made by nature itself. We do not recognize that, rather than being generic, this assumption is derived from the axiom of individualism, so fundamental to the business metaphor. This is a theme very well developed by Ralph Ketcham, who explored the American phenomenon of individualism and its ramifications for public administration (Ketcham 1987).

Further development of the theme of individualism is found in the Constitution. It has often been said that constitutions play a pivotal role in shaping and informing citizenry. Since the Constitution is fundamental, all subsidiary social theories must support the framework it sets. The American Founding Fathers strongly believed in the idea of limited government and enshrined this logic in a myriad of ways throughout the Constitution. Because the logic of individualism entails limited government, wittingly or unwittingly, the Founding Fathers created a distinctly adversarial relationship between the public and private. In short, our Constitution tells us that the individual is free. Grounded in the ontology of the business metaphor, individual action is privileged, and, by implication, private choice is concretely separate from public decisions and action. As a consequence, we can see that all our institutions emphasize limiting
or controlling the role of the public sphere.

In contrast, we have only to look at nations such as Japan and the Netherlands, among others, to see that such a heavy emphasis on differentiating between the public and private is distinctive to the United States. In these and other nations, government and social life are far more intertwined, perceived as harmonious and certainly not adversarial (Ketcham 1987). More importantly, the citizens of nations like these conceive of no inherent contradiction between governance and freedom. Hence, they are not concerned with controlling government or ensuring that it does not interfere with activities considered private and privileged. Indeed, they see the functions of the two as simply aspects of human social life and often find the American obsession with separating the public from the private as puzzling. The fact that Japan has a society solely devoted to exploring and understanding Follett’s theoretical contributions makes sense given that its perspective of the public and private is that they are not so fundamentally opposed to one another.

This central ontological feature of the American political ethos -- opposing the public and private -- has had the most profound effects on framing the identity of American public administration theory and practice in the United States. These effects could be characterized as a painful irony or paradox. Public administration was created as an institutional device for achieving positive democratic purposes. On the other hand, it is a device regarded with considerable suspicion and there has been a strong and continued desire to control it for fear of its real or perceived potential excesses. The field, as a result, has cast the issue of legitimizing bureaucracy in a democracy as the primary theoretical issue and has sought throughout its history to resolve the conceptual and practical dilemma it thereby configured. The problem of framing the issue in this way, however,
renders it impossible to resolve.

This stalemated theoretical discourse has produced, like neurosis at the level of the individual, symptomatic, unconsciously motivated resistances and intolerances. Like the neurotic, the field has been characterized by theoretical phobias whose sole purpose is to maintain the underlying, hidden premise around which the neurotic's -- or public administration's -- personality is configured. Any concept of institutional arrangement, at whatever level, that ignores, discounts, and diminishes the separation of the public and the private threatens the hegemony of the individual, and indeed strikes a blow at the Constitution itself. It must, therefore, be denied at all costs.

It follows, therefore, that no comprehensive attempts have been made in American public administration to understand and embrace Mary Parker Follett's work because of her assumption that the private and public are concretely intertwined spheres. A theoretician firmly grounded in practical experience, Follett's theory was based on constant association with others. She did not assume, like her colleagues, the fundamental viewpoint of social atomism as the foundation of freedom. Follett rather believed that freedom could be found in community with others and saw no necessity to separate the public and the private. Instead, she encouraged a strong grassroots orientation toward civic work, as did the reform women described by Stivers. Rather than the business metaphor ontological emphasis on separation, individualism, rationalism, specialization, expertise, hierarchical institution building and scientific intervention so heavily stressed by her contemporaries -- Frederick Taylor, for example -- Follett encouraged social integration. Many of her contemporary's theories, heavily aligned with the ontological assumptions of the business metaphor, would have been anathema to Follett, as they were antithetical to her strong devotion
to human beings and their personal growth and education as citizens and workers. Follett's implicit rejection by the field of American public administration may well have had more to do with being completely out of sync with these underlying and primary theoretical assumptions, in large part due to her strong philosophical alignment with the ontological assumptions of the home metaphor.

As suggested above, throughout Follett's career the scientific management movement was gaining precedence and peaking as the most prominent theoretical foundation for public administration. Emphasis on science, hierarchy, centralization of authority, rules and regulations, rational methods of analysis and the strong separation and distinction between public and private were key to this theoretical perspective – and are key to the business metaphor, as will be further revealed in the remaining sections of this chapter. These were in striking contrast to Follett's reliance on the "law of the situation" to inform decisionmaking and her emphasis on teambuilding and decentralized control. As a consequence, Follett was fundamentally out of step with the theories of public administration developing during her lifetime.

Guy B. Adams' article, *Enthralled with Modernity: The Historical Context of Knowledge and Theory Development in Public Administration* (Adams 1992), provides further elucidation of these points. He suggests that public administration theorists strictly adhered to the dictates of modernity and the "scientific-analytical mindset." While Mary Parker Follett was drawn to issues of scientific management, this was primarily because she was interested in empirical research and eliciting information via hands-on experience. In contrast to the scientific-analytic framework elucidated by the epistemological assumptions of the business metaphor, however, she did not believe in identifying or discerning ultimate sets of rigid rules to guide action. She
firmly believed that maintaining flexibility in addressing problems should be a primary focus. Moreover, the modern emphasis on the professional, expert administrator drove a permanent wedge between citizens and the process of government (367), precisely the opposite of what Follett advocated.

In a similar vein, Stephen R. Barley and Gideon Kunda (Barley 1992) identify a bipolar ideational structure in our society, e.g., the contrast between communalism and individualism or mechanistic vs. organic solidarity. According to the authors, these dichotomous surges have radically affected American managerial discourse. Applying their perspective to Follett, we can see that she would have been at the height of her own public administration career during a strong surge in rational ideologies (scientific management) that was present from roughly 1900 to 1920, and which were strikingly at contrast with her own ideology. Barley and Kunda's theory suggests yet another perspective on how Follett's theoretical contributions could be considered to be out of sync with her contemporaries in public administration because of her inclination to collapse fundamental and foundational dichotomies.

The American governance system relegates public administration to the limiting and nebulous role of maintaining the private sector, controlling government and its growth and, therefore, continuing to support at best a hostile relationship between the two. As a result, the field of American public administration has difficulty examining theories in which these basic and constitutional assumptions are not present. Mary Parker Follett did not view American public administration as solely playing a support role to the private sector or as inherently different from it, nor did she believe in a form of government that focused on limiting or controlling the public realm. Instead, she believed that public administration was an organic and wholly
integrated aspect of society – in keeping with the ontology of the home metaphor -- not a distinct and separate sphere, as do I.

No doubt it is this difference in philosophical perspective that relegated Mary Parker Follett to the sidelines of discourse in the field of public administration. Because Follett did not assume the public/private dichotomy as underpinning or framing her perspective, she was misunderstood and for the most part ignored in this field of theoretical endeavor. A great deal has changed in the field of public administration since the work of Mary Parker Follett. Reconceptualizing her work now, as being primarily based in the home metaphor, allows us to view her theory and praxis in a new and informed way.

Returning to the ontology of the home metaphor while building on Follett, we find that relationships are fundamentally constructive and transformational. According to Brian Fry (1989):

Follett argues that her concept of the group does not deny the concept of individualism. On the contrary, she asserts that the group permits the truest expression of individuality. According to Follett, there is no separate ego. Instead, individuals are created by reciprocal activity, and 'individuality' is the capacity for union or the ability to find one's place in the whole, not uniqueness (Follett 1998, 62, 65). The power of relating makes the individual of value, and the act of relating allows the individual to offer more to the group.

Furthermore, the group process does not result in the loss of individuality through either domination by others or domination by the whole. The individual is not dominated by others because the group process involves the intermingling and the interpenetration of the ideas of all. The individual is not dominated by the whole because the individual is part of the whole. Thus the group process represents a synthesis of individualism and collective control in the form of collective self-control. There are not individual rights, only group rights; and the group does not protect rights, it creates them. The duty of the individual is neither to himself or herself nor to others, but to the group and the group serves the true and long-term
interests of the individual (Follett 1998, 104).

On the contrary, from the ontology of the business metaphor, relationships are primarily instrumental. As noted previously, individuals interact with each other to exchange information or to provide instructions, for example. Their identity is not implicated from this perspective, whereas it is clearly implicated from the perspective of the home metaphor.

**Time as Commodity vs. Time as Thoughtful Reflection**

Finally, as noted earlier by Bird and Brush (1992), even the use of time is addressed differently from the masculine and feminine perspectives. Through the more common and traditional business metaphor lens, the bureaucrat expert is concerned with linking problems with previously identified solutions – fitting the problem into the proper box and making it fit, regardless of individual circumstances. Then the bureaucrat expert takes consequent and appropriate action. Time is viewed as a commodity. The more time that is consumed, the higher the expense of engaging in a particular activity. Therefore, there is a sense that bureaucrats must make the most efficient use of time. Issues should be quickly and efficiently analyzed and correct solutions identified and applied. Failure to find the correct answer when the problem is first addressed indicates that the problem was not correctly categorized and time has been wasted.

In contrast, time and leisure are privileged through the home metaphorical lens. People think together about the weighty issues that concern them and action is taken in response to thoughtful reflection. Attention is not placed on how long it takes to solve a problem. Again, we see Follett’s process view of existence revealing itself in this dimension. Action arises out of the interaction between the civil servant and the citizen once a situation is examined and completely
understood. Aspects of the situation may not reveal themselves until well into the process of interaction. If, after the solution is acted upon and revealed to have some flaws, it is appropriate to return to it and reconsider additional solutions. A return to the situation is not viewed as failure, but simply an integral part of the process. Simple, pragmatic action is privileged over finding one overall solution that may also fit problems believed to be similar.

**Use of Sub-metaphors**

Finally, the ontological dimension reveals the use of different sub-metaphors from within each perspective. From the home metaphor worldview, there is an emphasis on using positive and inclusive metaphors. The perspective emphasizes a "we're all in this together," "we're all family," and "we always manage to muddle through" point of view. From the business metaphor perspective, metaphors of battle, war, sports and competition are more common, i.e., "us vs. them." The metaphors tend to be negative in character and oppositional in style. A prime example is the following statement by a candidate during the most recent presidential election cycle:

> As president, I will fight a smarter, more effective war on terror. We will deploy every tool in our arsenal: our economic as well as our military might; our principles as well as our firepower. Only then will we be able to tell the terrorists: You will lose and we will win.7

From this perspective, it would be natural to create a "war room" to bring together expert bureaucrats to solve an urgent public problem. In contrast, the home perspective lends itself to involving citizens in the solution-finding process. As family members bring important perspectives to a discussion, so too can the citizens who are most closely associated with a social

7 Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John Kerry, D-MA, cited as the quote of the day by *Congressional Quarterly* online, August 19, 2004.
concern. From this metaphorical viewpoint, bureaucrats might convene a series of discussions or focus groups to illicit a wide variety of opinions, perspectives and potential solutions in order to hopefully draw consensus around a proposed course of action for a community.

In summary, the ontological stances of the business and home metaphors reveal striking contrasts that, when enumerated, reveal a plethora of divergent means to accomplish goals and objectives. Because of our innate understanding of how homes generally operate, we are not unfamiliar with the alternative perspective that has been revealed thus far.
The Epistemological Dimension

The following table illustrates the main features of the epistemological dimension of the business and home metaphor typologies.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION</th>
<th>BUSINESS</th>
<th>HOME</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The knower is separate from the process of knowing</td>
<td>• There is no separation between the knower and the external world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Objective knowledge is all that is important to the knower</td>
<td>• The knower carries personal knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Action is based on what is objectively known – it is not experimental,</td>
<td>• Knowing is achieved through doing, based on experimentation – it</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>but based on an expectation that outcomes can be predicted</td>
<td>is fundamentally pragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Facts and values are separate</td>
<td>• Fact (consequence) and value (how we regard the consequence) are</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>inextricably connected</td>
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From the epistemological dimension of the business metaphor, the knower is fundamentally separate from knowing. Therefore, individuals seek to develop and privilege objective knowledge. The individual must first find the "Big T Truth," and then base actions on what is known. Theories of action are constructed and then tested and improved upon. As such, action is never experimental; it is always based on so-called rules of law (Shlain 1998). There is an overall belief that there is a right answer to every problem that can and will be discovered through the proper application of methodical scientific processes.
Objective and Expert Knowledge vs. Subjective and Personal Knowledge

We see tremendous evidence of this perspective in the field of public administration. Practitioners operate from the belief that hypothesis testing will ultimately bring about the right answer or solution to a properly defined social problem. The bureaucrat is an expert and has specialized knowledge and privileged information that is used to discern, identify and apply solutions to problems. Once identified, a solution is then applied to a myriad of similarly constructed problems, often resulting in large programmatic approaches to governance based on official policy and a rigorous scientific orientation. Practitioners base their actions on agreed upon theories or best practices, i.e., benchmarks, which are recorded for review by others, who then try to improve upon them. Theoreticians focus on refining their models, so that the best action can be identified and lead to the proper actions to be taken. Tremendous energy is spent on identifying overarching correct ways to address public problems and then writing peer-reviewed research articles instructing others how to follow these methods. From this angle, it is imperative to arrive at conclusions and judgments and record them (Shlain 1998).

The business metaphor reveals a view of science that is by far superior to human experience. As such, scientific models are privileged as more important, objective and unbiased and therefore superior to human subjectivity and inner knowing. Within a public administration based on the business metaphor epistemology, there is a core belief that the unknown and mysterious can ultimately be dispelled by dissecting and explaining, or disclaiming and decrying it. There is an objective reality out there and we can discover, describe, analyze and predict it. Thus, one arrives at epistemological assumptions through individual rationality (McSwite 1997).
Moving to the epistemological dimension of the home metaphor we find that knowing is achieved through doing. There is no separation between the individual knower and the external world. As such, the knower has to interact or engage the external world in order to know it. Consequently, the knower carries significant, internal personal knowledge. This knowledge base is intuitive by nature. From this perspective, all knowledge is tentative, as one can never know for sure. Hence all action based on knowledge is experimental, and therefore fundamentally pragmatic.

A dramatic illustration of this point is that Stivers' settlement women were not concerned with identifying the most effective and efficient governance processes, as were their counterparts, the bureau men. They were simply and most wholeheartedly concerned with how to address the particular social concern that was presenting itself to them at that moment.

Last, from this worldview, there is no separation of value and fact, as they are considered to be the same thing. This is because fact is consequence and value is how we regard the consequence.

The epistemological dimension of the home metaphor is most clearly articulated by Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule in their seminal work entitled, *Women's Ways of Knowing* (1986). This book describes the ways of knowing that women employ in their daily lives and helps to vividly describe the home metaphor perspective. They state:

> In this book we examine women's ways of knowing and describe five different perspectives from which women view reality and draw conclusions about truth, knowledge, and authority. We show how women's self-concepts and ways of
knowing are intertwined … we believe that conceptions of knowledge and truth that are accepted and articulated today have been shaped throughout history by the male-dominated majority culture. Drawing on their own perspectives and visions, men have constructed the prevailing theories, written history, and set values that have become the guiding principles of men and women alike (Belenky 1986).

They further note:

When scientific findings, scientific theory, and even the basic assumptions of academic disciplines are reexamined through the lens of women’s perspectives and values, new conclusions can be drawn and new directions forged that have implications for the lives of both men and women (8-9).

The book goes on to describe five major epistemological categories, all of which inform the perspective of this dimension of the home metaphor typology. They found that women:

…repeatedly used the metaphor of voice to depict their intellectual and ethical development; and that the development of a sense of voice, mind, and self were intricately intertwined. The tendency for women to ground their epistemological premises in metaphors suggesting speaking and listening is at odds with the visual metaphors (such as equating knowledge with illumination, knowing with seeing, and truth with light) that scientists and philosophers most often use to express their sense of mind. Physicist Evelyn Fox Keller (Keller and Grontkowski 1983), tracing the metaphorical uses of vision in the history of Western intellectual thought, argues that such analogies lead to a favored model for truth and the quest for mind. Visual metaphors, such as 'the mind's eye,' suggest a camera passively recording a static reality and promote the illusion that disengagement and objectification are central to the construction of knowledge. Visual metaphors encourage standing at a distance to get a proper view, removing – it is believed – subject and object from a sphere of possible intercourse. Unlike the eye, the ear operates by registering nearby subtle change. Unlike the eye, the ear requires closeness between subject and object. Unlike seeing, speaking and listening suggest dialogue and interaction.

We also note that philosophers and scientists who use visual metaphors to connote 'mind' value the impairment of that sense. Thus moral philosophers argue for 'blind justice' and donning the 'veil of ignorance' so that 'she' (justice) may choose impartially without either considering the intimate and the particular or anticipating the consequences. Similarly, the scientist tries to approach his studies 'blind' or 'double blind' so that he, too, may be removed from the influence of the particular. Attempts to blind the seeing knower have made it difficult for the scientist and the philosopher to acknowledge the role the knower plays in the construction of knowledge. Indeed, it is only now that there is widespread recognition among scientists and philosophers of the importance of 'putting the
knower back into the known' as they come to understand how intentional blindness limits what one can 'see' with the mind's eye.

By holding close to the women's experience of voice, we have come to understand conceptions of mind that are different from those held by individuals who find 'the mind's eye' a more appropriate metaphor for expressing their experience with the intellect (18-19).

The authors "posit two contrasting epistemological orientations: a separate epistemology, based upon impersonal procedures for establishing truth, and a connected epistemology, in which truth emerges through care" (102). How these contrasting orientations play out within the field of public administration is profound. While one perspective concerns itself with developing rational, realistic methodologies for constructing the public, the other, rooted in the metaphor of the home, is more concerned with the pragmatic concern of helping, out of which emerges a sense of truth for any particular situation. This reminds us of the viewpoints of Follett and Stivers' settlement women.

From the home metaphorical epistemology, then, the approach to knowledge is humble. Individuals and civil servants do not expect to have nor desire to know all the answers. There exists a willingness to try different solutions to the same problem and a willingness to say when they do not work. Incremental approaches are based on hunches. There is a comfort with the belief that there is no ultimate truth, only small truths arrived at collectively. There are many potential right answers and directions to take. What works today may not work tomorrow. This epistemology is based on concepts of pragmatism, "where knowing and acting are collapsed into one process" (McSwite 1997).

The home metaphor views science as often denying the human experience. As such, humans have an inner knowing that can lead to solutions without any concrete or necessarily so called
scientific evidence to support the direction they might choose to go. There is complete and utter comfort with the unknown, the mysterious, and so-called feminine knowledge. Life is viewed from a fundamentally subjective point of reference. Consequently, one arrives at epistemological assumptions through engagement in the process of discourse.

The business metaphor views science as superior to human experience – models are more important than human subjectivity and inner knowing, which has the potential of being corrupted. It is believed that hypothesis testing will ultimately bring seekers to the right answer or solution they are seeking. From this perspective, there is a belief that the unknown can be objectively dissected, described, analyzed and explained. There is an objective reality out there and once it is understood then appropriate action(s) can be taken.
The Social Theory Dimension

The following table illustrates the main features of the social theory dimension of the business and home typologies.

Social Theory Dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL THEORY DIMENSION</th>
<th>BUSINESS</th>
<th>HOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(how we understand the</td>
<td>The social world is achieved through contract or explicit agreement</td>
<td>The social world is achieved through relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development and</td>
<td>Membership is contingent on performance of one's contracted</td>
<td>There are no invidious distinctions in the social group – all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maintenance of the</td>
<td>responsibility</td>
<td>members are accepted as important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social world)</td>
<td>People are given explicit roles and act or perform according to them –</td>
<td>Common understanding, based on caring and shared life ways, is the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>individuals strive to become experts</td>
<td>basis of the social group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nature is subordinate to humanity</td>
<td>Nature and humanity adapt to each other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moving to the home metaphor perspective of social theory, there are particular ways in which to understand the development and maintenance of the social world. A variety of these are described in the pages below, contrasting the home and business metaphors.

Objectivity and Rationality vs. Subjectivity and Arationality

The business metaphor privileges objectivity and rationality as primary axiological assumptions.
There is a real world out there and we can experience it and then objectively describe it. Because the world is an objective place, individuals use their brains to determine right courses of action to take in the world. They can collectively arrive at solutions by rationally putting their heads together. This perspective finds facts and figures to be definitive. If proper action is taken to collect good facts and figures, they will undoubtedly lead to proper solutions for the problem being addressed. A search for objectivity and rationality informs the search for solutions.

From the business stance, party politics and ballot box democracy are foundational, e.g., the use of referendums to determine courses of action. Institutions reflect democratic majority rule policymaking and the basis of action is primarily political. The act of organizing is federalist in orientation and reflects a comfort with generalizations and consequently, big government policies and programs. Not surprisingly, we see here a tendency toward favoring "universalistic, objective, corporate structures … social institutions" (McSwite 1997, 5).

Arriving at public interest is a result of special interest group struggle (McSwite 1997, 170). Self-interested, privately concerned individuals engage in debate as economic/maximizing "Men of Reason" (McSwite 1997, 170). As such, all social considerations are grounded in self-interest. Individuals are expected to engage in the act of satisficing and minority perspectives are rarely, if ever, actively considered or incorporated into policy. Moreover, efficiency and effectiveness are privileged, which implies that there is a best way to get something done. Consequently, experts and professional elites are expected to know or discern the answer to a problem through the proper utilization of scientific tools.
A primary goal of legislative debate, from the business metaphor perspective, is to create sound bites and "spin" and thus gain support for a particular position with the ultimate goal being to garner enough votes for a particular position to beat the opposition. Majority rule, compromise, or split-the-difference are common outcomes of policymaking (legislation). Within the executive branch agencies, scientifically conducted policy analysis helps to derive the best solutions, which are agenda and goal-driven (strategic, planned outcomes).

A major goal of the business metaphor outlook is to steadily improve the capacity to legislate and regulate, i.e., engage in national performance reviews to improve the ways in which government institutions are administered. Once a correct policy direction is determined, action is scheduled, regulated, standardized, and timely. Whether funds are available to enact the policy is a separate activity and process, e.g., the legislative authorization and appropriations processes.

In contrast, subjectivity and arationality are primary axiological assumptions for the home metaphor lens. The world is felt to be a creation of group consciousness and it is therefore constantly changing as a result of collective thought. My fellow citizens and I can trust our instincts to guide our actions and decisions in concert with each other. Moreover, the world is a relative place. What works in one part of it may not work in another part of it. The identification of solutions to problems is more often than not discovered when one trusts her heart and feelings to guide appropriate action. One needs to gets out of one's head and might even choose to be purposely suspicious of so-called rational solutions. It is believed a subjective or arational stance can lead you to the answers and solutions you seek in the immediate. Such a
perspective is often associated with ancient and/or isolated civilizations, those that are known to rely on mystical means to arrive at a direction to take.

From the home perspective, the aim of the social world is to create peaceable kingdoms, in contrast to the creation of prosperous markets (McSwite 1997, 3). The home perspective views civil society as foundational and would link together private, voluntary associations with public institutions to serve the needs of the whole. The basis is organizational. It stands to reason, therefore, that from this perspective, the act of organization is more anti-federalist in orientation, reflecting a comfort with small, familiar units. In fact, this perspective emphasizes a tendency toward "organizing social process within more personalistic communities" (4).

Civic virtue and public interest evolve out of relationships between individuals in community with each other. Together, individuals engage in experimental, iterative action that is situational and variegated. Individuals are inspired to take action collectively. Such a faith that good thought held together can move mountains, includes a comfort level with tentativeness, muddling through, not knowing the answers all the time, and vagueness. Commonsense, practicality, and continuous experimentation are believed to lead to acceptable short-term solutions.

The home metaphor emphasizes engaging in a concept of timelessness and being in the now that enhances the perception of options. As such, solutions arise out of the moment and are not preconceived. Active listening, ongoing dialogue and discourse, creative conversation, and talking/thinking together (brainstorming) lead to appropriate activity and result in consensus-driven courses of action. In a sense, no solution is truly satisfactory until it incorporates all individual perspectives and objectives. This, again, echoes Follett who believed that no minority
opinion should be left out of a solution to a community problem.

In contrast to the business metaphorical perspective, the overarching goal of the home metaphor is not for individuals to create an ideal society, but to help each other simply focus on living in the present, engaging in the process of life, here and now. There is a strong innate desire to help people enjoy their lives and their connections to others. Again, this is done from a perspective of unlimited supply and abundance. When there is a need, we can be comfortable that it will be filled through meaningful collaborative action.

Methodology/Action

Turning to the methods that these contrasting perspectives use, we find that the business metaphor methodology is systematic, scientific, privileged, and modeled. That is, if proper steps are followed, e.g., engaging in a rigorous policy analysis, then the right solution to the concern will be found and a program to fix it can be designed. Failure to solve the problem, once proper steps are taken, is considered bad and means that something went wrong. It is believed that skilled statistical/quantitative analysis will reveal the true and accurate path or direction. As such, a search for facts by rational government experts is instrumental and leads to a rationalistic form of government, based on a positivistic science of facts and values.

From this frame of reference, action is agenda and goal driven. As such, it is mapped out, strategic, and should arrive at planned outcomes. Consequently, action from a business metaphor perspective tends to be systematic, leading to the creation of standardized, equitable programs (McSwite 1997, 46). The acceptable alternative is to use "formal participation
strategies or voting in which people are allowed to make individual choices, which are then aggregated into a collective choice" (McSwite 1997, 235).

In striking contrast, the home metaphor emphasizes that there is no one perfect method for approaching a social or public issue. Action is foremost tentative and questioning. Individuals are more comfortable with so-called failures, since they believe that tentative actions will eventually lead to a successful outcome. There is no right or wrong dichotomization. Gray areas of occasional indecision are typical, normal and to be expected. And, following a hunch or feeling is just as appropriate as, or even better than, a scientifically derived solution. From this stance, it is not unusual to reject law as a binding constraint (McSwite 1997, 134).

The home metaphor suggests that pragmatic action research will lead to answers to problems. From this perspective there is a sense that the whole must take time to dwell on solution-building, indwelling, and being quiet together. Answers arise between and because of individual interactions and are people-oriented and subjective. Moreover, the answers evolve from relationships between the players who are intimately involved in a given situation. The better they are connected, it is believed, the more likely a solution will reveal itself. Therefore, getting to know each other is purposeful for its own sake. Relationship leads to the potential for creativity, which is a key, critical component for identifying solutions. It is understood that individuals and groups of individuals contain the wisdom and answers within themselves. The goal, from this perspective, is not to create an ideal society, so much as it is simply focused on the present, engaging in the process of life, and helping others to enjoy their lives. Again, action is experimental, situational, iterative, and variegated.
Time

As noted in the earlier epistemological section, time is viewed differently from the business and home metaphorical perspectives. The business metaphorical perspective perceives time as a commodity that should be used efficiently and effectively and is, of course, measurable. As such, time should not be wasted because it is viewed as limited, and therefore of value. Taking time to dwell on an idea or problem is viewed as potentially wasteful and is not considered constructive if it is not agenda-driven. If the scientific method is followed, a solution will be discerned and will be definitive. Answers are arrived at by following a concrete set of rules and expertly derived models for action. Moreover, time spent on relationship building is wasteful, has the potential for encouraging corruption, or borders on the possibility of watering down objectivity, which is the privileged perspective. Bureaucrats must strive for objectivity that will reveal the correct action to take.

In contrast, as noted by Fox and Murray, the home metaphor perspective on time is one in which:

…life, more particularly the lives of men and women, may be more adequately captured with a sense of time that is ongoing and seamless rather than divided into intervals or stages or marked by discrete events, roles, and achievements (Fox and Murry 2000, 1162).

The home metaphor perspective privileges time and leisure to pursue collective solutions to societal problems or concerns. Since neither are commodities, it is less important how long it takes to arrive at a solution. Moreover, even after a solution is derived, additional information may yet change the direction an action takes.
If there is always enough, then there is no need or desire to consume more for the sake of consuming or ensuring that you have received your fair share. Time can be spent on leisure pursuits, such as helping to address social problems or concerns, or the pursuit of individual avocations.

Relationship building is considered a priority for the home metaphor. Individuals desire to know each other well and appreciate each other's background, experiences and perspectives, all of which might hold the key to the identification of a community solution or course of action. Intimate, shared personal knowledge among the key players involved in a situation is believed to lead to a level of comfort and trust that rarely exists as a shared value within the business metaphor. For example, members of a family have intimate knowledge and appreciation of each other's strengths, weaknesses, and stances. This information often leads to strong collaborative solutions that acknowledge and include all perspectives, no matter how minor.

Power

Turning to the exercise of power from within each of these perspectives, the business metaphor suggests that power must be held by the elite, e.g., Follett's "power-over," by vote or by virtue of expertise. Here there is an expectation that information conveys power and superiority. This viewpoint rarely, if ever, strives to incorporate minority views. Seniority and hierarchy are critical to this perspective, the extreme of which can lead to the possibility of exploitation. Government is led by McSwite's Men of Reason, who form an elite leadership and whose function is to discern proper courses of action and to ensure that they are taken. No action is possible until the Big T Truth is discovered and agreed to via democratic laws, rules, and regulations. Power is centralized, and involves "obeying legally enshrined commands issued
from central authority" (McSwite 1997, 141).

From the home metaphor perspective, power is shared. This concept was also explored in considerable detail and depth by Follett. She coined the terms "power-with" in contrast to "power-over." According to Follett's theories, solutions are discovered together through active listening. Answers bubble to the surface as a result of discourse and tend to be egalitarian and communal in nature. All viewpoints and perspectives are incorporated into the final solution. From this perspective, it stands that collaboration is possible even in disagreement (McSwite 1997, 133). Government is a process, involving individuals, groups and voluntary action associations (141). Moreover, power is decentralized (89). As noted earlier, the function of elites, or bureaucrats, is to be facilitative, "arranging, representing, and protecting the centrally important process of public dialogue" (166). Normative agreements are, therefore, foundational.

**Decision making**

Looking to the ways in which decision making occurs from each metaphorical viewpoint, we are familiar with the traditional business metaphorical viewpoint that decision making is a product of hierarchical expertise and control. Those who serve in the highest ranking positions and hold authority are responsible for decisions that are based on expert knowledge. The business metaphor gives the responsibility for governmental decision making primarily to elected leaders, and then secondarily to bureaucratic experts and lobbyists (McSwite 1997, 48). The populace votes for elected officials and then defers to and agrees to the rule of law and imposed regulation. Decision making is at once conclusive and finite and decidedly hierarchical. Someone or individual is responsible for every decision. Elites are expected to utilize rational knowledge to make decisions for which they are then held responsible. Policymakers are viewed as the
decision makers (Congress and political appointees) and the primary role of the bureaucrat is to carry out the decisions of the policymakers.

From the home metaphorical viewpoint, decision making is based on creative synergy (faith in relationship, process, community, and trust in each other). Decision making is self-governing and a constant, incremental, and ongoing process. It is non-hierarchical and web-like, in which groups of individuals make decisions together (Helgesen 1995).

**Budgeting**

Moving to the way in which these metaphors play out on the subject of budgeting, money and resources are seen as limited and finite from within the business metaphorical perspective. If they are managed well by the elites, then there will be enough to support and carry out policy objectives. This perspective is undoubtedly budget-focused and budget driven. For instance, it is not uncommon for the legislative appropriations process to drive policymaking, rather than the legislative authorization process doing so. Moreover, the annual budget process drives executive branch activities and programming. Programs and policies are designed based on budget availability, rather than on actual need or circumstance. It is common practice for policymakers and bureaucrats to request more resources, that is to pad or inflate their budgets, in order to ensure that enough funding will be allocated to their program or project. As such, it would not be uncommon for the budgeting process to actually waste government resources because agency officials get caught up in the request and justification process and the hiding of so-called scarce resources.
As noted earlier, it stands to reason then that from this perspective, organizations are created to lobby for their "piece of the pie." Hiring the most well-connected and savvy lobbyists enhances the ability to get a more than fair share of the pie. This perspective assumes that there will be winners and losers in each cycle of the budget and appropriations processes. Individual stakeholders, or alliances of stakeholders, are most concerned with getting more resources for their pet cause(s) and stretching them to suit their needs, without consideration for or at the expense of others' needs.

Last, as noted earlier, money and consumption are privileged over time and leisure by the business metaphor. Consequently, the amount of funding spent on a particularly intransigent social issue is often the bell weather for assessing how important an issue is to policymakers. In contrast, the formation of diverse community study groups to consider new courses of action to address pressing social concerns might demonstrate a level of importance from the perspective of the home metaphor.

In contrast, the home metaphor views budgeting from a sense of there always being sufficiently abundant resources. For instance, in the home a family might be fond of saying, "somehow we always manage to find a way." Good is viewed to be unlimited and individuals are participants in creating that good. It is believed that if you take what is instinctively the right course of action, then the means (money) will appear to accomplish it. Concepts of lack, limitation, or stake holding are not generally perceived or assumed.

Budgeting and financial concerns do not drive discussions and solutions about issues, but are
instead a response to them. If one is not happy, then all cannot possibly be happy -- we are all somehow intrinsically part of each other and no one should suffer so that others might live well. All should and can live well simultaneously. Giving is not at the sacrifice of getting, meaning that if someone else gets something then you do not. Once policy is collectively determined, all interested parties work together to identify the financial resources necessary to carry out the policy and all of the actions derivative from it.

The home perspective avoids thinking in terms of "piece of the pie" limited good, and focuses on everyone collectively arriving at solutions that can serve all individual and collective needs simultaneously. From this stance, pieces add up to more than the whole, which eliminates the need for stakeholders who are always competing for a larger share of a shrinking pie. From the home perspective, the need for lobbyists and their methodologies is greatly diminished if not wholly eliminated. This perspective encourages policymakers and bureaucrats to look at the needs of others, as well as the needs of themselves or their pet programs/projects. As in nature, there is a symbiotic relationship between all. Again, there can be no winners and losers, only winners.

**Justice**

The carrying out of societal justice is viewed quite differently by these two metaphorical attitudes, and thus the activities that carry it out also contrast significantly. From the business metaphor attitude, collectively thinking about justice plays havoc with the philosophy of life. The primary aim of this attitude is to place experts, i.e., lawyers, police, judges, and others in positions of judgment to impartially, objectively and fairly view the circumstances of an injustice
in order to arrive at a solution that punishes the guilty individual(s). Officials must not have conflicts of interest when involved in a particular case because such a conflict of interest would render the official incapable of arriving at an impartial judgment.

Once a verdict is decided, the responsible parties receive a sentence that is judged to be commensurate with the crime. Elaborate sentencing guidelines exist to instruct judges and juries on how to dispense fair and impartial justice. Similar crimes are categorized and receive similar treatment, regardless of individual or extenuating circumstances. "Three strikes, you're out" policies and regulations are increasingly believed to be fair, regardless of the individual circumstances of the alleged criminal or victim. They are viewed as objective outcomes of the rule of law, which is designed to be fair and equitable at all costs.

Consequently, victims of an injustice are not directly engaged in the process of determining how a perpetrator will be treated. While they may be increasingly permitted the opportunity to offer remarks on how they feel about the circumstances of the case after the case has been decided, they are not consulted or engaged in the actual sentencing process. Punishment is viewed as the way in which to restore an individual to proper communion with society.

From this orientation to justice, outward motivation (what I will or will not get) drives the actions of the criminal (Williamson 2000, 33-36). People are treated as isolated and innately bad once they have been convicted of a crime. Consequently, there is little or no value or social gain to designing programs that would educate prisoners, because such programs are not generally viewed as cost effective, efficient, or a wise use of limited resources. Recidivism rates tend to be
very high, as individuals are viewed as a danger to society and therefore incapable of successfully reentering it. Society must be protected from offenders at all costs.

Viewed from the home metaphorical attitude, there is a sense that collectively thinking about justice deepens our philosophy of life and that true justice depends on inward guidance (Williamson 2000, 33-36). Everyone affected by an injustice must be part of a collaborative process of responding to it. Such a perspective realizes that consensus is critical to community healing and that a demonstration of compassion for all involved will lead to a restoration of harmony and community, not to mention significantly reduced or eliminated rates of recidivism.

As no situation is exactly the same as another, there is a willingness to consider, find and apply new and unique solutions to each situation. In order to arrive at a proper response to an injustice -- note that this does not involve "solving a case" -- the individuals who caused the injustice are treated as members of one's family who can and should be restored to harmony with other members of society, based on an appeal to their innate goodness. Society is asked to see through the current circumstance(s) of an injustice to a condition of wholeness and to restore wholeness to the community that has suffered. Society must look at the individual as a critical part of the whole and examine such questions as: How did this come to happen? What are the responsibilities of the community to make this person and the situation whole again? As a result, this perspective stresses the use of positive reinforcement and rehabilitation rather than punishment.
In today's society, we see nascent modern evidence of the uses of a restorative justice system. Such a system is, in large part, enacting from the home metaphorical perspective, the primary aim of which is to harmonize, heal, and transform. Concepts such as forgiveness, engaging in deeply personal interaction, and relationship building and restoration are utilized to arrive at a sense of communal justice. Symbols of power, such as a judge sitting on an elevated bench using a hammer to dispense justice, are not used. Instead, a compassionate atmosphere is created, in contrast to the traditional courtroom setting, that demonstrates a collaborative decision making process.

The Media

As seen in great evidence today, the business metaphor-based media is a commerce-driven institution that is focused on what will best sell the news. Such a point of view lends itself to being, by its very nature, voyeuristic and therefore focused on extremism and "spin." News is selected and placed in various segments, time slots or sections in order to make the greatest commercial impact. In response, an entire public affairs industry has evolved, one that is filled with public affairs experts or so-called "spin doctors." These experts are hired specifically to create and/or respond to any potential news with a counterassault and efforts to impact the way in which news is brought to the public. Journalists are educated to be objective above all and to disassociate themselves from the events they are covering. They believe that they can be dissociated from the creation of news, if they follow certain rules of objectivity that they highly value.

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8 See websites such as: http://www.restorativejustice.org/; http://www.sfu.ca/crj/about.html; http://www.suffolk.edu/cas/crj/r_justice.html; and http://www.voma.org/docs/connect21.pdf#search='restorative%20justice%20movement' that provide information on this movement.
In contrast, the role of the media plays out quite differently from a home metaphor point of view. From this perspective, the media has a community-oriented role in which it becomes "the matchmakers, the conveners, the community salon-keepers" (McSwite 1997, 80-81), e.g., the media takes the role of introducing constituents and constituencies to each other. Media, from this stance, plays a highly subjective and involved role and is understood as intimately active in helping to create news and events simply by being present. Members of the media recognize that they are not separate from news creation. From the ultimate extreme, were media institutions to shift from their news selling orientation, their underlying point of view could change to one of active community building and civic engagement. We will see some evidence of this perspective described in the community policing case studies to follow.
The Ethical Dimension

The following table illustrates the main features of the ethical dimension of the business and home typologies.

**Ethical Dimension**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHICAL DIMENSION</th>
<th>BUSINESS</th>
<th>HOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rights</td>
<td>• Responsibility and caring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Principles of &quot;Blind Justice&quot; and Impartiality regulate behavior -- Abstract laws and universal principles must be followed</td>
<td>• Relationship and mutual understanding regulate behavior -- context is definitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fairness -- everyone must be treated equally and identically.</td>
<td>• Fairness -- everyone is unique and deserves special treatment. Each person is as important as the next.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Win/lose -- what is best for the individual's survival</td>
<td>• Win/win -- what is best for the whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Everyone is treated the same by standards and regulations - &quot;one size fits all&quot;</td>
<td>• Individual needs and unique circumstances are taken into account</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Belenky has done a tremendous amount of research around issues of morality and how women and men frame these issues differently. These moral frames of reference greatly inform and help to flesh out the dimension of the ethical framework of the home and business metaphors. As such, it is worth examining Belenky’s review of Carol Gilligan's succinct description of the general differences between these moral frames of reference:
By listening to girls and women resolve serious moral dilemmas in their lives, Gilligan has traced the development of a morality organized around notions of responsibility and caring. This conception of morality contrasts sharply with the morality of rights described by Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg (1981, 1984), which is based on the study of the evolution of moral reasoning in boys and men. People operating within a rights morality – more commonly men – evoke the metaphor of 'blind justice' and rely on abstract laws and universal principles to adjudicate disputes and conflicts between conflicting claims impersonally, impartially, and fairly. Those operating within a morality of responsibility and care – primarily women – reject the strategy of blindness and impartiality. Instead, they argue for an understanding of the context for moral choice, claiming that the needs of individuals cannot always be deduced from rules and principles and that moral choice must also be determined inductively from the particular experiences each participant brings to the situation. They believe that dialogue and the exchange of views allow each individual to be understood in his or her own terms. They believe that mutual understanding is most likely to lead to a creative consensus about how everyone's needs may be met in resolving disputes (Belenky 1997, 8).

When we asked women what they 'should' do in a moment of moral choice, they usually told us that it depended on the situation ... they tended to respond with further questions. ...In contrast, men ... invoke a general principle. ...Women's question posing when faced with moral conflict indicates a sensitivity to situation and context. Constructivist women resist premature generalization about what they would do or what should be done, particularly about matters of right and wrong. They insist on a respectful consideration of the particulars of everyone's needs and frailties, even if that means delaying making decisions or taking action. They do not want to neglect the 'practicalities of everyday life' for the sake of abstract justice or for the illusory search for 'some kind of end all, be all, cure all.' ...In the responsibility orientation to morality, women resolve conflicts not by invoking a logical hierarchy of abstract principles but through trying to understand the conflict in the context of each person's perspective, needs, goals – and doing the best possible for everyone that is involved (Belenky 1997, 149).

We see from above that business metaphor ethical framework decisions are based on abstract principles applied to a given situation. Concepts such as "blind justice" and impartiality are privileged from this perspective. Again, this ensures that individuals are treated equally, and without individual favor, which would be considered unfair.

In contrast, the home metaphor tends to be contextually and situationally based, requiring participants to recognize that the perspectives of the involved individuals and the circumstances
of an event influence the moral choices and decisions that can be made available. This is sometimes referred to as the difference between equality, treating all the same, and equity, treating individuals according to their special circumstances. Many scholars have discussed that treating all the same when it comes to consequences -- although all certainly don’t start with the same talents or advantages -- may follow a concept of equality, but it does not follow a concept of fairness or equity. In other words, asking everyone to run the same race when some are handicapped by heavier loads may treat all equally, but not equitably.

From the home metaphor perspective, the business metaphor's insistence on treating people as equals denies the unique circumstances of a situation. Treating people as equals feels like colorblindness from a home metaphor stance, as it denies the uniqueness of the person(s) and their subjective experience(s). Therefore, it is a fundamentally cold, detached, and an objective perspective to be avoided. Because there is no feeling involved in applying the rule of law, it fundamentally denies people their humanity, which is anathema to this dimensional perspective. Therefore, public policy or decisionmaking must value relationship and feeling over other considerations in order to ensure a morally satisfactory outcome.

From the home metaphor stance, civil servants can and should tailor public responses to individual needs or circumstances. If one response is ineffectual, alternative solutions are tried until one works. Different solutions are the norm, since one answer cannot possibly be expected to fit all situations. As such, individual needs and unique circumstances are taken into account when designing public programs. In fact, what works today may not work tomorrow. If the process does not work for as few as one single individual, then it may no longer be suitable and
may need to be reevaluated or adjusted.

In an agency, from the business metaphor stance, everyone is treated the same by standardized rules and regulations. This way, no one gets special treatment that another is not offered. Equality is the overriding value, as is a sense of color-blindness. As noted earlier, there is an assumption that the fairest means for arriving at solutions, programs and policies is to identify the one best way and then apply it equally to all involved. This leads to a sense that a fairly designed program will accommodate the majority of needs, which is sufficient for success. This perspective will not generally change policies or programs without a majority in agreement on engaging in regulatory or legislative review, analysis or change. Again, feelings are not viewed as relevant to considering an issue or taking action with regard to it.

The business metaphor finds itself concerned with customer satisfaction. We find out what the customer wants or needs and ensure that it is provided efficiently and effectively. From the home metaphor perspective, we deal with people in relationship from a more concrete or whole perspective. In an academic setting, we wouldn't just give them a set of courses that will lead to a diploma, but instead we find out who they are, what they want to accomplish and then not only help them to define how to achieve that, but identify additional resources to assist them.

The business metaphor views fairness, a key concept of the ethical framework, as ensuring that everyone is treated equally by the same standards and regulations, regardless of individual circumstances. Equality is highly valued, and is often associated with the ability to be color blind, that is to treat people identically without regard to their individual characteristics. Such
treatment results in "one size fits all" programs and policies, which are very difficult to change once they are in place without engaging in major regulatory or legislative processes.

From the home metaphor outlook, the concept of fairness disappears and is replaced by a concept of designing special treatment according to individual needs, based on an established and entrenched series of relationships. In the home, families respond to the needs of family members and are rarely concerned with fairness. Life simply is not fair, nor is the concept privileged from this stance. Not surprisingly, the home metaphor does not expect one solution to fit all situations. It is assumed that a wide variety of solutions may be attempted before the right solution is found. Again, what works today may simply no longer work tomorrow and that is acceptable.

**Conclusion**

Throughout this chapter, based on the commonalities that exist in the broad review of relevant literature, I have synthesized strands of thought that describe four primary dimensions of the business and home metaphor typologies and contrasted them with each other. Again, it is important to note that these are primarily ideal characteristics that serve to shed light on the differences between the two divergent metaphorical lenses. The purpose of this process was to build toward a better conception of an alternative approach to public administration based on a feminist worldview and grounded in the metaphor of the home, a metaphor developed in public administration by Camilla Stivers.

In the next chapter, I describe the community policing movement and its seeming adherence, in
its ideal state, to the home metaphor typology described in this chapter. Then I will examine two U.S. Department of Justice case studies of cities that have enacted community policing programs and then, via content analysis, have tested the typology and the degree to which the cities have successfully moved to embrace the home metaphor typology in their policing practices. Last, I will demonstrate how the nonconventional typology can serve to suggest alternative strategies for the cases reviewed as an example of the potentiality of the theoretical frame.
Chapter 4. Community Policing

Introduction to Community Policing

In seeking to find an administrative practice that could best illustrate the potential power of the home metaphor typology, I identified the concept of community policing. Upon delving into the community policing research literature, I discovered that community policing is not only enacting from the home metaphor typology, it has a strong historical basis for returning the practice of policing to these concepts. Paralleling the insights of Camilla Stivers in her descriptions of the early history of public administration, policing researchers identify a similar series of events that led policing away from its roots in the community and toward the professionalization of the role of the police. These discoveries will be explored in some depth over the course of this chapter.

Following an exploration of community policing, its history and definitive features, I will examine two case studies that illustrate the challenges and successes of implementing community policing concepts in two U.S. cities.

A Short History of Community Policing

When Sir Robert Peel established the London Metropolitan Police, he set forth a number of principles, one of which could be considered the seed of community policing: ‘...the police are the public and the public are the police.’ For a number of reasons, the police lost sight of this relationship as the central organizing concept for police service. Researchers have suggested that the reform era in government, which began in the early 1900's, coupled with a nationwide movement toward professionalization, resulted in the separation of the police from the community. Police managers assigned officers to rotating shifts and moved them frequently from one geographical location to another to eliminate corruption. Management also instituted a policy of centralized control, designed to ensure compliance with standard operating procedures and to encourage a
professional aura of impartiality. This social distancing was also reinforced by technological developments (Consortium 1994). 5).  

The height of police isolation came in an era of growing professionalization, when the prevailing ideology was that the professional knew best and when community involvement in crime control was seen by almost everyone as unnecessary (6).  

As noted in the brief historical abstract above, the result of a strict emphasis on professionalizing policing led to a separation of the police from the very public they were meant to serve and protect. And, the resulting pendulum swing away from community interaction led to a number of administrative practices that had little if anything to do with solving community problems, such as a focus on collecting statistics and ensuring "rapid response which became an end in itself" (6). At its worst, the lack of relationship between police and the communities they were meant to serve resulted in the all too familiar "us vs. them" attitude (6) with which we are all too well aware.  

Over the course of the past 30 years however, there has been a rising awareness that something was not quite right in policing and national attention was placed on the need for changes. As a result of the civil unrest of the 1960's, and the related attention placed on improving administrative practices based on social science research, a plethora of policing research indicated that there might be alternatives to what had become traditional policing methodologies. Policing researchers sought out ways to "improve their image and to interact more effectively with the communities they served" (7).  

A recent article entitled, "The Organizational Determinants of Police Arrest Decisions" (Chappell 2006), reviews policing research that describes class typologies of policing
organizations. This article discusses and builds on J.Q. Wilson's seminal work, *Varieties of Police Behavior* (Wilson 1968), in which he studied "police organizational styles and officer behavior suggesting that individual police behavior and ideas about the police role are a function of departmental goals, which occur within the broader political climate of a community" (Chappell, 289). It is useful to describe Wilson's typology in some detail:

... Wilson (1968) suggested that agencies could be classified into three typologies: the watchman style, the legalistic style, and the service style. According to Wilson's typology, order maintenance is the operating philosophy of departments exhibiting the watchman style. Officers in these departments are encouraged to ignore certain types of criminal behavior, such as minor traffic violations and juvenile indiscretions, and to invoke laws only deemed important by citizens and local politicians. Not surprisingly, officers in these departments are subject to corruption and allegations of excessive force by minorities. Because of a lack of emphasis on professionalism, officers in watchman-style agencies tend to be working class, locally recruited, and low paid. They are poorly trained and seldom rewarded for seeking further education. These departments have flat bureaucratic structures, low budgets, little specialization (e.g., they are generalists), and few rules. The penal law is but a device that empowers police to maintain order and protect citizens.

In contrast to watchman-style departments, legalistic-style and service-style agencies are highly professional but vary in their level of administrative complexity. Enforcing the law is the main strategy in legalistic organizations. ... They act as if there is a single standard of acceptable behavior based on the law. Officers operate autonomously from the communities they serve, and all citizens are treated equally and impersonally. Legalistic departments are highly complex bureaucratic agencies that rely on central administrative authority and extensive rules and procedures. Administrators in legalistic departments see discretion as the opportunity for corruption and see high arrest rates as evidence that officers are doing their job. These police organizations have stiff entrance requirements and incentives for continuing education and training. Officers are encouraged to compete vigorously for the many opportunities for promotions and advancement. Tasks and roles are specialized (e.g., there are often separate gang units and vice units), and there are strict evaluation processes.

In contrast, service-style agencies are highly professional but have less hierarchical structure and control. Service organizations are decentralized in command structure with many station houses or precincts presiding over individual beats. They are specialized, formalized, and professional. They employ civilians and embrace diversity. The emphasis on community relations is reflected in officer training and evaluations. The main goal of service-style
agencies is to protect the common definition of public order. Service departments usually … are concerned with public relations, problem solving, and deferral to community needs (289-290).

Wilson's typology is instructive in that it draws on similar themes to those identified in this dissertation's theory chapter. As will be more thoroughly explored in this chapter, Wilson's watchman and legalistic-style typologies can be seen to inform the business metaphor, while the service-style typology is clearly a reflection of the home metaphor typology.

This and other research support the concept of community policing, whose two primary components are community partnership and problem solving (Consortium 1994, 13). As I explored the literature on community policing, I discovered an uncanny similarity between it and Stivers' home metaphor. The history of public administration clearly encompasses that which happened in policing over the decades between the Progressive Era and the 1960's when traditional policing methodologies began to be called into question. In the following section, I will draw out the distinctive features of community policing, as identified in the literature, and then show how these are strikingly similar, if not identical to, what has been described as representative elements of the home metaphor typology.

While community policing advocates view their work along the veins of reinventing government, I posit that they are actually enacting from the home metaphor typology, an entirely different frame of reference and one with which we are all intimately familiar, but whose primary features and dimensions have been as yet scattered and unidentified until now in public administration literature. Looking at community policing from this new metaphorical lens will
help to identify additional options for administrative practice that heretofore have not been as apparent from the traditional business metaphorical stance. Further, we may be able to demonstrate the power of the new typology for diagnosing and suggesting alternative remedies.

**Conceptualizing Community Policing as Exemplifying the Home Metaphor Typology: Its Distinctive Features**

In *Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action* (Consortium 1994), it is noted that:

> community policing cannot be established through a mere modification of existing policy; profound changes must occur on every level and in every area of a police agency – from patrol officer to chief executive and from training to technology. A commitment to community policing must guide every decision and every action of the department (27).

As will be noted throughout the remaining dissertation sections, I believe the reason why community policing cannot simply be the implementation of a new flavor-of-the-month management policy is precisely because pure community policing is operating from a very different ontological, epistemological, social and ethical frame of reference, that of the home metaphor typology.

The following table identifies some of the key features I have drawn from the literature as elements or primary features of community policing (home metaphor viewpoint) as contrasted with the traditional policing, or business metaphor, viewpoint. The key features of the community policing typology illustrated below have been drawn directly from U.S. Department of Justice's monograph entitled, *Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action*, (Consortium 1994).
## Community Policing Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Business Metaphor as Enacted in a Traditional Policing Context</th>
<th>Home Metaphor as Enacted in a Community Policing Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong></td>
<td>• scarcity – there are never enough resources to keep a community completely safe from criminal or other disruptive activity</td>
<td>• sufficiency – if a community works closely together, all the resources necessary will be identified and brought together to address any problems that arise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the nature of being)</td>
<td>• perception that individuals are separate and discrete – there are goods guys and bad guys and the police must control the bad guys so the good guys can live peaceably</td>
<td>• a perception that community is a coming together of all the individuals who are interconnected and created by their relationships with one another – no one is inherently bad or good and all have a place in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• police must dominate those elements in society that are disruptive and imprison those that cannot be controlled</td>
<td>• police must build relationships with everyone in their community and assume good will toward all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• relationships are instrumental – only interact with members of community in order to obtain information</td>
<td>• positive assumptions and constant beat interaction build good relationships which result in transformational and constructive interactions and community solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong></td>
<td>• the correct solution will be found be logically deducing the answer from appropriately collected data</td>
<td>• the correct solution will be found by communicating with individuals in the community who are living with the problem and tentatively trying various solutions until something works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge)</td>
<td>• specialists -- police are viewed as the experts or authority figures and are separate from the governed (citizens)</td>
<td>• generalists -- police are viewed no differently than civilians, and often take a subordinate position to the knowledge of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Business Metaphor as Enacted in a Traditional Policing Context</td>
<td>Home Metaphor as Enacted in a Community Policing Context</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>focus is on obtaining instant results to solve the particular crime (18)</td>
<td>the community and are an integral part of the community's culture; they work together to define priorities and allocate resources (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;one size fits all&quot; orientation toward policing and solutions to community problems – somewhat coercive</td>
<td>knowledge is based on a cycle of processes and requires indepth knowledge of the community (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>decisionmaking is primarily a function of organizational hierarchy; it is centralized command (top down)</td>
<td>problem solving is defined by eliminating the problem; reducing the number of incidents; reducing the degree of injury; improving problem handling; manipulating environmental factors; and understanding that solutions may be easy and cheap one time and expensive and complex the next time, depending on the context of the situation (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>managers dominate and take &quot;by the book&quot; action which is rewarded (23)</td>
<td>emphasis on the devolution of responsibility and decision-making to patrol officers who use a wide array of social and government agencies and community resources to arrive at solutions (bottom up) (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>community is viewed as a passive presence or source of limited information (17)</td>
<td>managers guide creativity and innovation is encouraged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the concept of community does not exist in the business</td>
<td>community is viewed as a key partner in addressing concerns with police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>community is a &quot;small, well-defined geographical area&quot; (11)</td>
<td>community is a &quot;small, well-defined geographical area&quot; (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimension</td>
<td>Business Metaphor as Enacted in a Traditional Policing Context</td>
<td>Home Metaphor as Enacted in a Community Policing Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Theory</strong></td>
<td>- metaphor approach to policing</td>
<td>- focus on long-term goals/proactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(how we understand the development and maintenance of the social world)</td>
<td>- focus on short-term fixes/reactive</td>
<td>- Police are members of the community and participate as active members of it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Police follow the rules and regulations closely and are judged by how well they do so – interaction with community is based solely on information and data collection</td>
<td>- Officers often live and work within the community in which they are assigned and often work after hours on community problems and solutions. They are an integral part of the community in which they live and work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Police only serve a community while assigned to that particular beat. They are not encouraged to build relationships with the members of individual communities.</td>
<td>- encourage innovation and creativity in an honest effort to solve problems; understand that mistakes will be made on the road to improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- punish experimentation outside the rules and regulations</td>
<td>- emphasis is on &quot;establishing and maintaining mutual trust&quot;(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethical Framework</strong></td>
<td>- Use of fear to control others; emphasis on power and authority</td>
<td>- values are linked directly to behavior -- &quot;The guiding values central to community policing are: trust, cooperation, communication, ingenuity, initiative, discretion, leadership, responsibility, respect, and a broadened commitment to public safety and security&quot; (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- emphasis is on rules and regulations that are supposed to guide behavior, rather than on values</td>
<td>- morality is centered on the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The next table summarizes a few of the daily practices carried out by police departments under the two opposing frames of reference. Again, most of the elements of this table were drawn from the Understanding Monograph (pp. 34-51) and when appropriate are cited as such:

### Daily Policing Practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Traditional Policing Business Metaphor</th>
<th>Community Policing Home Metaphor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Policing Orientation &amp; Organizational Structure</td>
<td>reactive to reported criminal behavior</td>
<td>proactive; problem-solving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Evaluation</td>
<td>feedback and control mechanism; behavior that is risk averse is rewarded; based on quantities of activities (e.g., tickets issued, #s of incidents, etc.);</td>
<td>tool to facilitate the process of change; risk taking is valued and rewarded; based on quality, e.g., how well you know your beat; initiative, creativity, relationships and partnerships with community organizations; honest mistakes are valued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>for select few or elite; emphasis on learning rules and regulations, quantification and the collecting and analyzing of data</td>
<td>initially intensive training to implement community policing; encourages participation of community; emphasis on teambuilding, problem-solving; motivating; and developing initiative and discretionary ability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Traditional Policing Business Metaphor</td>
<td>Community Policing Home Metaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision</td>
<td>boss knows all; reprimands for inappropriate behavior</td>
<td>mentor, motivator, facilitator, coach, coordinator, liaison role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Assessment</td>
<td>measure crime fighting tactics -- occasional assessment employed, often external and viewed as hostile (e.g., GAO), study a narrow set of criteria, quantitative</td>
<td>measure crime prevention, i.e., the reduction of crime and fear; enhance quality of life and service provision; qualitative use of personnel surveys and community customer service evaluations; constant orientation toward assessment of progress formally and informally to improve program; nothing to hide orientation of &quot;ongoing monitoring&quot; (44); measure how well problems have been solved (effectiveness)(45);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgeting</td>
<td>police department only – &quot;piece of the pie&quot; mentality</td>
<td>may include community resources as available; nonprofit contributions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisionmaking and Information Collection</td>
<td>centralized; statistical analysis; collect static data on number of incidents; reduction in crime statistics; number of calls to 911</td>
<td>decentralized; strategic analysis; unconventional information collection methods; may need different information support and systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Orientation</td>
<td>hierarchically-enforced change; teamwork discouraged</td>
<td>broad-based implementation team necessary for achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>media hostility; media must remain unbiased and objective</td>
<td>internal and external communication and marketing plans encouraged (42); media is potential partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>equity is not a concept that is emphasized in traditional policing; community favoritism is often employed</td>
<td>strongly emphasize: equal access to police services by all citizens; equal treatment of all individuals under the U.S. Constitution; equal distribution of police services and resources among communities (50) based on need; all citizens have a say in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Michigan State University National Center for Community Policing identifies the primary features of community policing in the following "Roadmap for Change." These features further flesh out the information identified in the table above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Traditional Policing Business Metaphor</th>
<th>Community Policing Home Metaphor</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>how they are governed;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>rejection of stereotypes about</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>citizens</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Community Policing: A Road Map for Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exploratory Structure</th>
<th>Commitment Structure</th>
<th>Planning Structure</th>
<th>Implementation Structure</th>
<th>Monitoring and Revision Structure</th>
<th>Institutionalization Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concept</strong></td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Community policing</td>
<td>New knowledge &amp; implementation</td>
<td>Movement and impact data</td>
<td>Examples of best practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role and Responsibilities</td>
<td>Specialist</td>
<td>Generals</td>
<td>Blend specialist (CPD) into overall patrol unit: Define those task areas requiring specialized department wide and unit accordingly. Develop timelines utilizing a combination of specialists whenever possible. Review other best practices.</td>
<td>Identify key “universal” roles &amp; evaluate the number of personnel who participate in this role.</td>
<td>Track the efficiency of service systems likely to be affected by the new personnel role and evaluate whether improvements are made as a result of new roles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisional alignment</td>
<td>Hierarchal</td>
<td>Vertical and horizontal</td>
<td>Geographic subdivisions developed, with internal and external input for assignment of personnel. Reporting line utilized in activity and geographic area of accountability, rather than function. Review other best practices.</td>
<td>Assign areas of geographic responsibility to all personnel. Study feasibility of organization for better accountability.</td>
<td>Evaluate departmental effectiveness in key geographical areas and note improvements as well as areas of weakness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational accountability to community</td>
<td>“Crime Fighter Model”</td>
<td>Expanded role to include crime prevention and social disorder</td>
<td>Expand outcome beyond crime statistics and response times to include citizen perceptions of utility and security. Review other best practices.</td>
<td>Create atmosphere soliciting public input</td>
<td>Survey community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Survey crimes perception of utility and security of life in neighborhood</td>
<td>Develop systems for community input, suggestions, and feedback. (e.g., 1-800 lines, web page, surveys, suggestion boxes)</td>
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</table>

**Tracy Smith Hall**

Rediscovering a Fundamentally New and Practical Administrative Alternative
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>EXPLORATION</strong></th>
<th><strong>ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONCEPT</strong></td>
<td><strong>Traditionally</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Approach</td>
<td>Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMITMENT</strong></td>
<td><strong>Traditionally</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Model</td>
<td>Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMUNITY POLICY</strong></td>
<td><strong>Traditionally</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Model</td>
<td>Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PLANNING</strong></td>
<td><strong>Traditionally</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Items</td>
<td>Benchmarking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IMPLEMENTATION</strong></td>
<td><strong>Traditionally</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Knowledge &amp; Implementation</td>
<td>Benchmarking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MONITORING AND REVISIONS</strong></td>
<td><strong>Traditionally</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement &amp; Impact Data</td>
<td>Benchmarking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INSTITUTIONALIZATION</strong></td>
<td><strong>Traditionally</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples of Best Practices</td>
<td>Benchmarking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tracy Smith Hall**

Rediscovering a Fundamentally New and Practical Administrative Alternative
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNITY POLICING: A ROAD MAP FOR CHANGE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIME LINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNITY POLICING</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADITIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMITMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCEPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPLORATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATING SYSTEMS</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONITORING AND REVISION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPLEMENTATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE AND PERFORMANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTITUTIONALIZATION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Time Line**
   - Define the timeline for the project, including milestones and deadlines.
2. **Planning**
   - Assess the current state of community policing and identify areas for improvement.
3. **Community Policing**
   - Develop a community policing strategy that includes engagement with the community.
4. **Traditional**
   - Implement traditional policing methods and practices.
5. **Commitment**
   - Establish a strong commitment to community policing from all stakeholders.
6. **Concept**
   - Define the concept and goals of community policing.
7. **Explain**
   - Explain the rationale and benefits of community policing.
8. **Operational Systems**
   - Develop and implement operational systems for community policing.
9. **Monitoring and Revision**
   - Continuously monitor the effectiveness of community policing and make revisions as necessary.
10. **Implementation**
    - Implement the community policing plan with support from all stakeholders.

The diagram illustrates the stages of community policing, from planning to operational systems, with key steps and considerations at each stage. This approach aims to foster a collaborative and effective community policing strategy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME LINE</th>
<th>COMMUNITY POLICING: A ROAD MAP FOR CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PLANNING</strong></td>
<td><strong>ACTION ITEMS &amp; RECOMMENDATIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Work group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploration</td>
<td>Community policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human resource management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and revision</td>
<td>New knowledge and implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement and impact data</td>
<td>Examples of best practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization</td>
<td>Community policing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Example: Tracy Smith Hall Rediscovering a Fundamentally New and Practical Administrative Alternative*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and Revision</td>
<td>- Ensure compliance with new regulations.</td>
<td>- Track performance and progress.</td>
<td>- Review and update policies regularly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>- Launch new training programs.</td>
<td>- Roll out new technology.</td>
<td>- Communicate changes to employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>- Set clear goals for the next fiscal year.</td>
<td>- Develop a strategic plan.</td>
<td>- Allocate resources for new initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Items &amp; Recommendations</td>
<td>- Identify key performance indicators.</td>
<td>- Develop a risk management plan.</td>
<td>- Establish a feedback mechanism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Engagement</td>
<td>- Increase participation in community events.</td>
<td>- Collaborate with local organizations.</td>
<td>- Foster a culture of inclusivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>- Maintain office hours.</td>
<td>- Hold regular meetings.</td>
<td>- Conduct annual performance reviews.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>- Develop a new program.</td>
<td>- Pilot new strategies.</td>
<td>- Create a new department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptualization</td>
<td>- Brainstorm new ideas.</td>
<td>- Conduct market research.</td>
<td>- Engage stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>- Ensure buy-in from all levels.</td>
<td>- Secure necessary resources.</td>
<td>- Maintain focus on goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploration</td>
<td>- Conduct feasibility studies.</td>
<td>- Test prototypes.</td>
<td>- Explore new markets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME LINE</td>
<td>COMMUNITY POLICING: A ROAD MAP FOR CHANGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING</td>
<td>ACTION ITEMS/RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>MONITORING AND REVISI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNITY POLICING</td>
<td>INSTITUTIONALIZATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCEPT</td>
<td>EXPLORATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMITMENT</td>
<td>PROBLEM SOLVING FOCUS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPLORATION**
- Initial problem definition
- Identification of problem stakeholders
- Exploration of community attitudes and beliefs

**CONCEPT**
- Development of community policing concept
- Identification of potential strategies

**COMMUNITY POLICING**
- Implementation of community policing strategies
- Monitoring of program effectiveness

**IMPLEMENTATION**
- Planning and preparation
- Resource allocation
- Training and capacity building

**MONITORING AND REVISI**
- Regular assessment
- Feedback and adjustment

**EXPLORATION**
- Ongoing exploration
- Assessment of outcomes

**COMMUNITY POLICING**
- Routine operation
- Continuous improvement

**IMPLEMENTATION**
- Sustained resources
- Ongoing training and development

**MONITORING AND REVISI**
- Long-term evaluation
- Sustainability planning

**EXPLORATION**
- Future possibilities
- Potential areas for expansion

**COMMUNITY POLICING**
- Community engagement
- Feedback and interaction

**IMPLEMENTATION**
- Ongoing monitoring
- Adjustment and refinement

**MONITORING AND REVISI**
- Ongoing evaluation
- Continuous improvement
The preceding chart explores a number of practices that are key to administrative policing activity, e.g., partnerships, organizational structure, operating systems, human resource management and problem-solving focus, and then denotes how various concepts of these activities are carried out from the perspective of traditional versus community policing. It is instructive to note that the very terms used to describe these two perspectives are echoes of the terms used in earlier research literatures to denote the differences between the masculine and feminine, for instance specialists versus generalists and administratively mandated versus collaborative process.

I included this lengthy chart in order to illustrate that scholars in community policing have identified strikingly similar administrative and organizational activities to those identified by the resource literatures and as synthesized in the new typology as representative of the home metaphor. Moreover, they serve to strengthen the framework of this new typology by providing additional information along the lines of commitment, planning, implementation, monitoring and revision, as well as identifying strong examples of institutionalization from cities from across the country that have attempted to implement community policing practices.

I am personally struck by the use of the metaphor "road map for change," and the words "time line" with an arrow along the top of the chart with arrowheads on either end, all of which imply a continuum, rather than a static either/or set of choices. The authors of this chart clearly recognize that administrative practices may fluctuate back and forth along such a continuum, depending on a wide variety of potential variables.
And, last but not least, according to the U.S. Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) website, community policing is the following:

A central goal of the COPS Office is to help law enforcement agencies implement and enhance community policing. We have previously defined community policing as ‘a policing philosophy that promotes and supports organizational strategies to address the causes and reduce the fear of crime and social disorder through problem-solving tactics and police-community partnerships.’ In an effort to help discern what community policing is, what interactions between the police and citizens are central to this philosophy, and how the field should measure movement towards community policing, COPS has attempted to further outline the elements that are central to the philosophy of community policing.

This document is considered living, just like community policing itself, and it is meant to inform current practice and the discussion surrounding the advancement of community policing. It is not intended to be a prescriptive listing of central elements, but is meant to stimulate discussion in what is an ever-expanding body of experience and knowledge about the practice of community policing.

Community policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police services that includes aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as prevention, problem-solving, community engagement, and partnerships. The community policing model balances reactive responses to calls for service with proactive problem-solving centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Community policing requires police and citizens to join together as partners in the course of both identifying and effectively addressing these issues.

The core elements of community policing are described below:

### Core Elements of Community Policing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Elements:</th>
<th>Tactical Elements:</th>
<th>External Elements:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Philosophy Adopted Organization-Wide</td>
<td>1. Enforcement of Laws</td>
<td>1. Public Involvement in Community Partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Fixed Geographic Accountability and Generalist Responsibilities</td>
<td>3. Problem-solving</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Utilization of Volunteer Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Enhancers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Again, it is impressive the degree to which the academically described concept of community policing follows the parameters and dimensions of the home metaphor perspective. I found little to no deviations between my identification of key community policing techniques, the dimensions of community policing as identified by policing researchers, and their alignment with the dimensions of the home metaphor typology.

To reveal how the home metaphor may help us understand managerial situations, in the next section of the dissertation I examine two case studies conducted by the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, as part of its *Case Studies of the Transformation of Police Departments: A Cross-Site Analysis* (March 1999).
Chapter 5. Case Studies

Introduction
The purpose of examining case studies on community policing is to provide material that illustrates how the home metaphor typology plays out when it is applied in a real world public administration setting. When a typology is followed in its most ideal form, we are provided an opportunity to see the robust, as well as familiar, nature of the typology in practice. Case illustrations provide examples of how a practice such as community policing, which attempts to follow the home metaphor, but without the benefit of a comprehensive typology, is implemented. Without a theoretical typology, managers may revert to previous administrative practices or may inadvertently adopt practices that compromise or even completely contradict the typology.

Methodology
As noted previously, the Harvard University Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at the John F. Kennedy School of Government (hereinafter referred to as the "Kennedy School") conducted a series of case studies as part of a national evaluation of the U.S. Department of Justice's Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program. The original purpose of these case studies was to assess the degree to which federal funds were successfully being used to:

change the predominant strategy and operations of American policing: from a strategy that emphasized reactive law enforcement, to one that emphasized proactive community problem-solving (Moore 1999, 1).

The compilation of individual case studies was an effort to "describe how a particular police department changed over the period in which it applied for, received, and then implemented one
or more COPS grants" (1). Importantly, it was felt that the creation of these studies could result in a demonstration of the "concrete nature of the changes that had occurred" (2) in police departments, as well as present "a contextualized, narrative account" (2) of those changes. It is precisely this orientation to providing contextualized, narrative accounts that provides a basis for choosing this work as the data for analysis in this dissertation. As would be expected, the case study research was based on "indepth interviews, direct observation, and primary documents to create a detailed portrait of how certain events transpired and what effects they had" (16).

I chose to use this case material because of its adherence to rigorous empirical case study methodology and the rich amount of publicly available data it provided for this dissertation. Moreover, in following more recent theoretical understandings of the benefits of utilizing rigorous case study methodology, I have leaned toward an interest in achieving and establishing explanatory richness, a trade-off inherent in case study methods, rather than strict statistical representation (George 2005, 31).

For practical reasons, the Kennedy School case study evaluators decided to look at medium-sized cities that had received COPS funding from the federal government and those that had implemented community policing strategies "in the recent but not-too-recent past (those where change commenced between 1992 and 1994)" (12). Of the approximately 1,600 cities that had received these funds, they selected a sample size of 10 medium-sized cities to evaluate. The evaluators designed the study as:

a comparative analysis, one that, in the words of Theda Skocpol, 'tries to establish valid associations of potential causes with the given phenomenon one is trying to explain' (12).
To facilitate the comparison, the evaluators chose "8 departments that seemed to have changed a great deal, but that varied in many ways – often in ways that might seem to make change impossible" (12-13). They note that Skocpol:

explains the second type of comparison as follows: 'One can contrast the cases in which the phenomenon to be explained and the hypothesized causes are present to other cases in which the phenomenon and the causes are both absent, but which are otherwise as similar as possible to the positive cases.' Taken literally, this description calls for a comparison of success vs. failure; but it is also possible simply to compare various degrees of success, which is the strategy we have chosen (13).

Consequently, in addition to the 8 high achieving cases that represent the most "progressive police agencies in the nation" (13), the evaluators identified:

two departments that would be representative of community policing in most mid-sized American police departments. These departments provide fit comparisons to the eight high-achievers (13).

For purposes of this dissertation, I reviewed the case studies and determined that the most benefit could be gained from analyzing one so called high-achieving case study that demonstrates strong adherence to generally accepted community policing practices, i.e., the home metaphor typology, and one that shows weak adherence to these concepts, i.e., one that had difficulty moving away from the tenets of traditional policing (the business metaphor) to that of community policing (the home metaphor) despite the benefit of receiving federal funding to do so. As such, this type of analysis engages in a "least similar" research design (George 2005, 82-83). That is, I believe this contrast best illustrates the differences between the two metaphorical lenses and provides the reader with a practical and revealing guide to implementing the alternative administrative practice.

In regard to adequately ensuring that my research avoids the obvious pitfalls of selection bias,
George and Bennett, the authors of the recently published, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (2005), suggest that:

> Selection with some preliminary knowledge of cases, however, allows much stronger research designs; cases can be selected with a view toward whether they are most-likely, least-likely, or crucial for a theory, making the process-tracing test of a theory more severe. … In addition, researchers selecting cases can benefit from knowledge of the findings of existing studies, and be guided by estimations of whether the theories of interest are strongly and previously tested or new and relatively weak (24).

In this regard, the selection of the cases has been done to demonstrate and most easily reveal the inherent difficulty in adhering to community policing without the benefit of grounding it in an established and well-understood administrative typology, one involving the home metaphor.

As further noted by George and Bennett:

> In comparative case studies, structure and focus are easier to achieve if a single investigator not only plans the study, but also conducts all of the case studies. Structured, focused comparison is more difficult to carry out in collaborative research when each case study is undertaken by a different scholar (71).

Accordingly, I chose case studies to review that were, indeed, conducted by the same individual, David Thacher, a Research Associate, at the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management.

In the following sections, I employ content analysis to reveal illustrative material that demonstrates how a strong commitment to the home metaphor typology, as demonstrated by the Lowell, Massachusetts case study, shows the reader a wide range of alternative administrative choices inherent in the home metaphor. The high achieving Lowell case study is contrasted with a case study about Albany, New York, where, despite federal funding having been awarded to support a new commitment to community policing, the police force was found to have
considerably greater difficulty taking on and demonstrating these new concepts in their daily policing activities.

**Content Analysis**

Content analysis is generally understood to be a research technique designed to:

- determine the presence of certain words or concepts within texts or sets of texts. Researchers quantify and analyze the presence, meanings and relationships of such words and concepts, then make inferences about the messages within the texts, the writer(s), the audience, and even the culture and time of which these are a part.\(^\text{10}\)

This methodology was selected because of its capacity to reveal adherence to the theoretical typology, as well as to reveal dissonance with the typology.

According to Krippendorff (1980)(as quoted by Stemler, 2001, 1), six questions must be addressed in every content analysis:

1) Which data are analyzed?
2) How are they defined?
3) What is the population from which they are drawn?
4) What is the context relative to which the data are analyzed?
5) What are the boundaries of the analysis?
6) What is the target of the inferences?

I have chosen to use the Kennedy School case studies as the basis of data to be analyzed. They have been described above. Each of Krippendorff’s questions will be answered in the following pages. Stemler, a more contemporary author on content analysis methodology, further explains:

Content analysis has been defined as a systematic, replicable technique for

\(^{10}\) See Colorado State University's website: [http://writing.colostate.edu/references/research/content/index.cfm](http://writing.colostate.edu/references/research/content/index.cfm)
compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding (Berelson, 1952; GAO, 1996; Krippendorff, 1980; and Weber, 1990). Holsti (1969) offers a broad definition of content analysis as, 'any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages' (14).11

What makes the technique particularly rich and meaningful is its reliance on coding and categorizing of the data. The basics of categorizing can be summed up in these quotes: 'A category is a group of words with similar meaning or connotations' (Weber, 1990, 37). 'Categories must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive' (GAO, 1996, 20). Mutually exclusive categories exist when no unit falls between two data points, and each unit is represented by only one data point. The requirement of exhaustive categories is met when the data language represents all recording units without exception (15).

Based on Stemler's overview, I adopted the practice of a priori coding, wherein:

the categories are established prior to the analysis based upon some theory. Professional colleagues agree on the categories, and the coding is applied to the data. Revisions are made as necessary, and the categories are tightened up to the point that maximizes mutual exclusivity and exhaustiveness (Weber, 1990) (Stemler, 3).

In this case, the categories are based on the theoretical framework of the business and home metaphors and will be outlined in the case study dictionary below. By using and refining the aforementioned descriptions of traditional (business metaphor) and community (home metaphor) policing, the following "case study dictionary" was constructed to carry out the content analysis of the case studies. This resulted from an iterative process of reviewing individual paragraphs in the case studies and refining the dictionary concepts accordingly until there was little to no difficulty in identifying an appropriate code or codes in a systematic fashion for each paragraph.

---

# Case Study Dictionary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Traditional Policing Business Metaphor</th>
<th>Community Policing Home Metaphor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Policing Orientation &amp; Organizational Structure (DPO&amp;OS)</td>
<td>reactive to reported criminal behavior (more serious crimes are more important); bound by regulation and formal authority; hierarchical</td>
<td>proactive; problem-solving; (less serious crimes are significant); tactical; informal authority; pragmatic; encourage community building, crime prevention; patrol has most knowledge; nonhierarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager/Employee Interaction (MEI)</td>
<td>impersonal; hierarchically enforced change; boss knows all; reprimands for inappropriate behavior; feedback and control mechanism; behavior that is risk averse is rewarded; performance evaluations based on quantities of activities (e.g., tickets issued, #s of incidents, etc.); teamwork discouraged</td>
<td>collegial; mentor, motivator, facilitator, coach, coordinator, liaison role tool to facilitate process of change; participatory decisionmaking; risk taking valued and rewarded; based on quality, e.g., how well you know your beat); initiative, creativity, relationships and partnerships with community orgs; honest mistakes valued; broad-based implementation team necessary for achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training (T)</td>
<td>for select few or elite; emphasis on learning rules and regulations; quantification and the collecting and analyzing of data</td>
<td>intensive training to implement community policing; encourages community participation; emphasis on teambuilding and problem-solving; motivating; and developing initiative and discretionary ability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Assessment (PA)</td>
<td>measure crime fighting tactics -- occasional assessment employed; often external and viewed as hostile (e.g., GAO); study a narrow set of criteria; quantitative</td>
<td>measure crime prevention, i.e., reduction of crime and fear; enhance quality of life and service provision; qualitative use of personnel surveys/community customer service evaluations; constant orientation toward assessment of progress formally/informally to improve program; nothing to hide orientation of ongoing monitoring; measure how well problems have been solved (effectiveness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgeting/Resources (BR)</td>
<td>never enough resources; insular; defensive; police department only – &quot;piece of the pie&quot; mentality</td>
<td>creative; may include community resources as available; nonprofit contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisionmaking &amp; Info. Collection</td>
<td>centralized; statistical analysis; collect static data on</td>
<td>decentralized; strategic analysis; unconventional information collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Traditional Policing</td>
<td>Community Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business Metaphor</td>
<td>Home Metaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DIC)</td>
<td>number of incidents; reduction in crime statistics; number of calls to 911; criminal informants</td>
<td>methods; may need different information support and systems; community informants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications &amp; Relationships (C&amp;R)</td>
<td>silo mentality; interdepartmental isolation; one-way information flow; media hostility; media must remain unbiased and objective</td>
<td>interdepartmental cooperation and collaboration; two-way information flow; internal and external communication and marketing plans encouraged; media and community as potential partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity (E)</td>
<td>equity is not a concept that is emphasized in traditional policing; community favoritism is often employed</td>
<td>strongly emphasize: equal access to police services by all citizens; equal treatment of all individuals under the U.S. Constitution; distribution of police services and resources among communities based on need; all citizens have a say in how they are governed; rejection of stereotypes about citizens and police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**M** = mixed orientation, reflecting a sense of both the business metaphorical perspective and the home metaphorical perspective  
**NR** = not relevant (a paragraph that does not deal with the 8 dictionary elements listed above)

Stemler then defines the units by which the coding can occur:

There are several different ways of defining coding units. The first way is to define them physically in terms of their natural or intuitive borders. For instance, newspaper articles, letters, or poems all have natural boundaries. The second way to define the recording units is syntactically, that is, to use the separations created by the author, such as words, sentences, or paragraphs. A third way to define them is to use referential units. … Referential units are useful when we are interested in making inferences about attitudes, values, or preferences. A fourth method of defining coding units is by using propositional units. Propositional units are perhaps the most complex method of defining coding units because they work by breaking down the text in order to examine underlying assumptions (Krippendorff, 1980)(3).

For purposes of this dissertation, I have chosen to identify each individual paragraph of each case study as the coding unit. Each of the case studies was reviewed paragraph by paragraph. Each
paragraph was then assigned one or more of the eight primary element codes from the case study dictionary based on an analysis of its content. For instance, if a paragraph described the daily policing orientation and organizational structure of the police department, it received a code of DPO&OS, followed by a forward slash and then either a B, an H or an M, indicating whether the paragraph reflected a business, home or mixed metaphorical orientation (one in which neither orientation dominated, but in fact reflected confusion between the two). These codes were placed immediately at the end of each paragraph and highlighted in yellow, as the following example illustrates: Coding = DPO&OS/B. As noted above, in some cases paragraphs were decidedly about only one activity, while others were clearly about more than one, in which case they were coded for multiple elements, e.g., Coding = DPO&OS/B; BR/M. A relatively few paragraphs in each case study were not about any of the 8 elements, but instead provided historical or other context placing narrative by the case study author. These paragraphs were coded as NR, or not relevant, and were highlighted in red, e.g., Coding = NR.

**Intercoder Reliability**

Issues concerning intercoder reliability will now be explored. Stemler states:

Reliability. Weber (1990) notes: 'To make valid inferences from the text, it is important that the classification procedure be reliable in the sense of being consistent: Different people should code the same text in the same way' (p. 12). As Weber further notes, 'reliability problems usually grow out of the ambiguity of word meanings, category definitions, or other coding rules' (p. 15). Yet, it is important to recognize that the people who have developed the coding scheme have often been working so closely on the project that they have established shared and hidden meanings of the coding. The obvious result is that the reliability coefficient they report is artificially inflated (Krippendorff, 1980). In order to avoid this, one of the most critical steps in content analysis involves developing a set of explicit recording instructions. These instructions then allow outside coders to be trained until reliability requirements are met. Reliability may be discussed in the following terms:
• **Stability**, or intra-rater reliability. Can the same coder get the same results try after try?
• **Reproducibility**, or inter-rater reliability. Do coding schemes lead to the same text being coded in the same category by different people?

One way to measure reliability is to measure the percent of agreement between raters (3-4).

Neuendorf states it another way:

Achieving an acceptable level of intercoder reliability is important for two reasons: 1) To provide basic validation of a coding scheme: That is, it must be established that more than one individual can use the coding scheme as a measurement tool, with similar results. Put a different way, it must be confirmed that the coding scheme is not limited to use by only one individual. (That would be more along the lines of expert analysis and not a true content analysis; Carletta, 1996; Krippendorff, 1980). As Tinsley and Weiss (1975) note, it is important to demonstrate that the 'obtained ratings are not the idiosyncratic results of one rater's subjective judgment' (359). This means that even if the principal investigator does all of the coding, a reliability check with a second coder is needed (Evans, 1996)(142).

Neuendorf goes on to state:

What constitutes an acceptable level of intercoder reliability for each is open to debate … Various rules of thumb have been proposed … It’s clear from a review of the work on reliability that reliability coefficients of .90 or greater would be acceptable to all, .80 or greater would be acceptable in most situations, and below that, there exists great disagreement (143).

Therefore, in order to ensure that this dissertation research does not reflect the potential biases of the principal investigator, an associate, Allan Jones, Ph.D., agreed to serve as a second coder in order to provide a reliability check, as recommended by Neuendorf (142). Given the recommended levels of acceptability noted immediately above, my research goal was to achieve an intercoder reliability level of greater than or equal to 80%, as deemed necessary and appropriate for generally accepted rigorous and statistically reliable content analysis.

A clean copy of the Lowell, Massachusetts case study was forwarded to Dr. Jones by e-mail and
he was provided with the following instructions:

1) Review and become familiar with the Case Study Dictionary elements and metaphorical dimensions.

2) Review each paragraph of the case study and assign it one or more of the eight primary element codes. For instance, if a paragraph describes the daily policing orientation and organizational structure of the police department, you will write a code of DPO&OS next to it, followed by a forward slash and then either a B, H or M, indicating whether the paragraph reflects a business, home or mixed metaphorical orientation (one in which neither orientation dominated, but in fact reflected confusion between the two).

3) In some cases, a paragraph may reflect more than one element or activity – in these cases you may code for multiple elements, e.g., Coding = DPO&OS/B; BR/M; etc.

4) A relatively few paragraphs in each case study are not about any of the eight elements, but instead provided historical or other context placing narrative by the case study author. These paragraphs may be coded as not relevant, or NR.

5) Select no fewer than 50 paragraphs from the case study and assign them codes according to the Case Study Dictionary.

6) If you find difficulty in accomplishing any of the above instructions, please call and let me know so that we can review them together and determine appropriate remedies.

A comparison was then conducted between my coded paragraphs and those of my associate's to determine if there was sufficient (≥ 80%) intercoder reliability. A total of 201 case study paragraphs were coded by Dr. Jones. Each paragraph's coding was compared to the coding conclusions I had drawn from each paragraph. A total of 156 paragraphs were coded identically
for both their element(s) and whether each element was reflective of the business, home or mixed metaphorical perspectives. As such, the raw intercoder reliability score was 78%. Because this score was slightly less than the target of ≥ 80%, I conducted an analysis to determine whether this could be considered an acceptable level of reliability, or whether I needed to revise the dictionary or coding instructions in order to achieve a higher degree of intercoder reliability.

A deeper analysis revealed that of the 45 paragraphs that were not coded identically, 30 (67%) of them were coded for at least one element and its perspective identically, but one or the other coder coded for an additional element or elements. In 10 of the cases (22%), the element(s) was identical, but the coding for business, home, or a mixture of the two perspectives was not the same. In all of those cases, the differences were between the business metaphor and a mixed perspective or between the home metaphor and a mixed perspective. None of them were between the opposites of the business and home metaphors. As such, the differences related to the coder’s sense of the degree to which the paragraph reflected a pure sense of either the business metaphor or the home metaphor and a mixed orientation, but in no instance was there a complete disagreement between whether a paragraph reflected the business or home metaphor viewpoint. In the remaining 5 paragraphs (11%), the differences in coding related to both the specific elements being coded, as well as the coding for the perspective being reflected.

Because of the nuanced complexity of the choices inherent in coding a paragraph for up to 8 separate elements ranging across 3 different perspectives, and because only 11% of the paragraphs reflected a combined difference of both element and degree of perspective, I believe a sufficient level of intercoder reliability has been achieved for purposes of this dissertation.
analysis.

The following section will describe the conclusions of the content analysis exercises for each case study and provide specific case study examples of how the power of understanding the dimensions of the business and home metaphor typology might lead to a heightened ability to diagnose and suggest new administrative practices and remedies.

The Lowell, Massachusetts and Albany, New York Case Studies Analyzed

As noted earlier, the Lowell, Massachusetts Case Study was selected for review because of its strong adherence to so-called community policing practices as defined by the U.S. Justice Department in its analysis of the 10 cities. The initial purpose of my analysis was to first, see if the home metaphor could be applied to two concrete cases; second, to see what insights such application could reveal; and third to see whether the lack of a theoretical typology identifying the fundamental dimensions of community policing as enacting from the home metaphor makes it more difficult for public administrators to make the philosophical commitments necessary to enact from that perspective (see the appendix to review the coded case studies).

The following table shows the number of occurrences each element appeared in each paragraph of the Lowell Case Study. As discussed in the intercoder reliability section noted earlier, some paragraphs reflected only a single element, and others reflected between two and five elements. Moreover, in some cases the paragraph clearly reflected a business metaphorical perspective for one element in a paragraph, while simultaneously reflecting a home metaphorical perspective for another element.
Lowell, Massachusetts Case Study
Tabulation of Occurrences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Metaphor (B)</th>
<th>Mixed Orientation (M)</th>
<th>Home Metaphor (H)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPO&amp;OS</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEI</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B&amp;R</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D&amp;IC</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;R</td>
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NR = 38 (includes footnotes at end of case study)

Despite being a so-called strong adherent to community policing, and therefore to home metaphorical practices, my analysis shows that while the overall tenor is strongly in favor of home metaphorical practices, there were instances in which these practices were strongly influenced or corrupted by the dominant business metaphorical perspective. For instance, only one element, decision and information collection, had more business metaphor paragraphs than home metaphor paragraphs. Five of the elements had more home metaphor paragraphs than business metaphor paragraphs and two of the elements, training and program assessment, had the same number of home and business metaphor paragraphs. Not surprisingly, the number of mixed metaphor paragraphs was significant for most elements. Only one element, program assessment, had no occurrences of mixed metaphor usage.

The following table shows the number of occurrences each element appeared in each paragraph of the Albany Case Study, the so called weak adherent to community policing, or home
metaphor perspective. Similar to the Lowell Case Study, some paragraphs of this case study reflected only a single element, and others reflected multiple elements.

### Albany, New York Case Study

#### Tabulation of Occurrences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Business Metaphor (B)</th>
<th>Mixed Orientation (M)</th>
<th>Home Metaphor (H)</th>
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<tr>
<td>DPO&amp;OS</td>
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<td><strong>72</strong></td>
<td><strong>131</strong></td>
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</tbody>
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NR = 86 (includes footnotes at end of case study)

Interestingly, despite this case study being labeled a weak adherent to community policing, a paragraph-by-paragraph coding revealed that more paragraphs were coded with the home metaphor perspectives than might have been expected for a weak adherent. The three elements that showed greater numbers of business metaphor paragraphs than home metaphor paragraphs were the Daily Policing Orientation & Organizational Structure element, the Manager/Employee Interaction element and the Budgeting/Resources element. In many respects these are the elements that were the least subtle for coding purposes. They were elements that were discussed often in each case study and gave the overall sense of adherence to community policing practices. The other elements, while important to the overall understanding of community policing theory, were less evident in these two case studies.
It is important to remember that these case studies were drawn from work that was conducted with the purpose of demonstrating how well federal monies influenced the extent to which a city police department was able to change the overall orientation of the police department to one of community policing. I believe the Daily Policing Orientation & Organizational Structure and Budgeting/Resources elements are ones that may be more critical to making the shift from a business metaphor stance to a home metaphor stance. Once the top leadership in a police department has made the intellectual commitment to the home metaphor perspective, as well as committed budget and resources to it, I would not be surprised that additional research would reveal that the other elements can more quickly follow their lead and assume a home metaphor stance. Underlying much of administrative practice is the factor of human interaction and influence. If my boss shows her commitment and enthusiasm by utilizing and drawing from a new set of administrative practices, I am far more likely to go along with her and become captivated by the newly revealed choices, than if she simply told me about them without any concrete evidence of enacting from them.

More notably, perhaps, there was considerable evidence of a mixed model in both case studies. Lowell, as well as Albany, exhibited evidence of mixed metaphorical stances. I believe this is a strong indication that it is difficult to move from one end of the spectrum to the other. In other words, moving from a traditional policing orientation to one in which community policing is the primary orientation is not an easy task. Even though the private and public spheres of American life are dominated by the orientation of the business metaphor, we still see evidence of the home metaphor. For instance, practices such as teamwork, active listening and flattened hierarchical structures are popular in today's management literature and belong on the home metaphor side of
this typology. It should not be surprising, therefore, that a pure community policing orientation is just as difficult to achieve, if not more so, given the home metaphor's scarcity in public agency life.

I urge readers to view the business and home metaphor stances as polar opposites along a continuum of choices. Upon completing the analysis of these two case studies, perhaps what we are seeing is evidence that there really is no basis for an either/or set of choices. If what we are seeing is truly a continuum, then a mixed result should not be unexpected and may be evidence that it is difficult, if not impossible, to enact purely or ideally from one stance versus another. As suggested by the Michigan State University *Roadmap for Change*, movement between one set of administrative choices in the typology and another may be more common. If the value of this new typology is that it allows us to truly reveal an opposing set of coherent administrative practice choices to the traditional realm of choices that have informed and dominated public administrative life for the last 80 years or so, then it provides us the possibility of drawing on that set of choices when appropriate, and not to the necessary exclusion of the more dominant set of choices.

**Examples of Each Element as Drawn from the Case Studies**

What follows is an analysis of paragraphs drawn directly from the case studies that reflect each element and their various commitments to the business, home or mixed metaphor orientations. This analysis will provide the reader with a practical understanding of how the philosophical commitments to the home metaphor typology play out in the real world of public administration policing.
Daily Policing Orientation & Organizational Structure (DPO&OS):

Drawing from the Lowell Case Study, a typically strong business metaphorical perspective paragraph, albeit prescient, reads as follows:

I remember standing on Union Street one day, and hitting this first floor apartment with the SWAT Team. I was right there with them. And these guys were dressed up – it was a military operation for all intents and purposes – they were dressed up in military gear and with machine guns, and they smashed the windows in and they threw these flash hand grenades into the apartment and blew the windows out of the apartment. And I remember the windows blowing out onto the street, and I remember looking around and the people in the neighborhood were absolutely horrified. And I said to myself, 'Wow, there's something wrong here. This isn't the way this is supposed to go.' We had gotten into an arms race with the drug dealers and it was getting ridiculous. It was really getting ridiculous (Lowell Case Study, 16).

It is easy to see the degree to which this early case study paragraph exemplifies the business metaphor perspective of the daily policing orientation and organizational structure element. Overall orientation is directed toward carrying out the rule of law at all costs and has little to no concern with reaching out to community, let alone interacting with community members to problem-solve. This paragraph reveals an orientation of "go get the bad guys," regardless of the negative impact on the members of community who are witnessing the policing activities. Contrast the above paragraph with a decidedly mixed metaphorical orientation toward daily policing orientation in the following paragraph:

Juvenile did get some work in different ways: In the course of their jobs, the division's detectives developed relationships with some school principals, and one reports that the principals would call them occasionally about 'ongoing things … gang-related problems, ethnic problems [i.e., ethnic conflict],,' and so on: 'We would stay around for a couple of days and guide them through if it was a real hot time or something like that. We would be there after school for dismissals to try to give them some extra assistance, do some car stops after school if they were having a lot of problems with non-students.' But as this detective remembers the period, 90% of his time was spent on investigations of juvenile-related crime reports (8).
As this paragraph indicates, the Lowell police are drawing from both metaphorical lenses. While they are trying to reach out to interact with and assist school principals with gang-related problem-solving (evidence of the home metaphor), they are simultaneously pulled in the direction of juvenile-related crime reports (evidence of the business metaphor). A pure alignment with the home metaphorical perspective for this element would have led the police to develop a long term relationship with the principals to problem-solve around the gang issues. They might have gotten to know the young adults involved in the suspect activities and worked to engage them in alternative activities unrelated to gangs, perhaps in after school programs.

Later in the case study, when Lowell has truly begun embracing the home metaphorical perspective from the top down, we see much stronger evidence of community policing in the element of daily policing orientation and organizational structure. A rich example of this follows:

I changed the mission. I changed it to: Our ultimate goal is responding to what the community needs. To fix a problem that they've identified. They have clearly identified a problem, they call us every day and they say the man who's living at sixteen Third Street is dealing drugs. Our response to that complaint was to arrest him. But he would literally be out on the street before we finished our paperwork. And he'd be back selling because he had to make his bail money back. I recognized that what we were doing wasn't what the people wanted us to do. They didn't care if we arrested them, they just wanted us to stop the drug dealing.

Moreover, where in the past detectives had tried to focus their attention on the top of the drug distribution pyramid, Davis ordered his officers to focus first and foremost on the street-level dealers who were the immediate cause of neighborhood disruption.

With the change in goals came a change in means as well. Davis did not expect the six officers to 'stop the drug dealing' alone. They would have help not only from the rest of the department, but from the rest of the city. 'I told these guys
that they were now in charge of that street, that the decisions that they made would be followed up on.’ As he told his officers:

I want you to tow cars, I want you to call the DPW and clean up buildings. I want buildings boarded up that aren't habitable. I want you to go into the yards and take the mattresses out of the yards and the garbage out of the yards. Call the DPW right down there and do that … And I'm going to tell you that this small section of the city is the focus of the Police Department. So if you need the SWAT team, they'll be there. If you need the Narcotics Bureau, they'll be there. If you want a search warrant done on a place, they will direct all their attention to your operation.

Organizationally, this was possibly the most radical of Davis's proposals, for it meant that this new, ostensibly isolated unit of the LPD would actually have a great impact on the day-to-day functioning of the rest of the department and even the rest of city government. That was a complete break with the way things had been done. 'In the past, the Patrol was always the lowest rung in the police department,' Davis explains. 'They were subservient to detectives. They were subservient to all the bosses. They were pretty much the lowest rung.' His job was to break down this hierarchy, to put patrol on top and make the other divisions act as support services for them. 'That flipped everything upside down,' Davis maintains (Lowell Case Study, 22).

Unpacking the above reveals the home metaphor typology in action. The overall philosophy of the police department has moved to one of problem-solving within the community context and views patrol level police officers as having the most relevant knowledge about the issue(s) of concern. Recognizing that other government entities can collaboratively assist in reaching the ultimate objective of responding to the community's stated needs, results in a very different set of outcomes than simply focusing on reacting to criminal behavior. And, the pragmatic and proactive attitude reflected in the quote above shows a commitment to a new way of viewing the structure of the policing organization and the value of the patrol officer in finding solutions to problems.
Manager/Employee Interaction (MEI):

As noted in the case study dictionary, the difference between the business and home metaphorical perspectives of this element relates primarily to a change in the overall tenor of relationship between an employee and his/her boss. In the traditional policing context, the maintenance of hierarchy is critical to how police interact with one another. As modeled to by military institutions, traditional police officers do what they are told to do by their supervisors and are discouraged from initiating change. An example of this follows:

Street supervision had some influence on officers' work, but sergeants' styles differed quite a bit:

There were certain bosses that you knew if they were working you were all set, you could do whatever you want. There were guys that didn't want you to send in so many arrests because it created too much work for them, like anyone else. But then there were other guys who didn't care if you sent in 20 guys a night.

Given such variation, it seems clear that the sergeants' supervisors did not exercise much control over them. And indeed, those who were sergeants at the time report that they did not have very explicit marching orders from above. One explained that street supervision meant 'basically being available to the officers, responding to calls with them. Basically just making sure that everything was running okay out on the street;' and of course collecting reports (Lowell Case Study, 14).

In contrast, from a community policing perspective, the relationship between a patrol officer and her supervisor is more collegial and participatory. The individuals work together to identify solutions to problems and are encouraged to be creative and to take initiative. Leaders instituting this new metaphorical perspective with their police officers take on a mentoring and coaching role in order to assist the officers to think in a new way. An example of this follows:

Siopes describes her role as trying 'to get people motivated in that direction, to get people to understand what they were doing.' At the beginning, her role reflected the specialization of community policing in the precincts: She spent much of her time simply helping to get the precincts opened, playing an important role in securing a number of early grants (though as her workload swelled, two newly-
hired civilians would take over the task). And she worked particularly closely with the sergeants who were actually supposed to run the new precincts once they were opened, helping them to understand what community policing meant in practice. But the precincts, while the center of community policing, were not to be its only home. So Siopes also tried to work with the rest of the department in the same way, trying to help the Captains (then in charge of shifts) and Lieutenants put the idea of community policing into practice (Lowell Case Study, 36).

As noted above, Siopes was working to establish a collegial relationship with her peers, one in which she was coaching and mentoring them to embrace the home metaphor perspective. Had she been enacting from the business metaphor perspective, she could simply have, for example, told them that they if they did not embrace the new perspective their job would be on the line.

Training:

Training from a traditional policing perspective is described below:

The Massachusetts State Police provided training for LPD officers at five locations around the state, as it did for all but a handful of the largest Massachusetts cities that had their own academies. The academy sought to instill a strong commitment to professional ideals, organized as it was in a military style that included short haircuts, clothing inspections, and strict regulations. The substance of the training was similar to most police academies, covering accident investigation, fingerprinting, defensive tactics, and the like. Even today the state academies only devote 4-6 hours to community policing (though Lowell itself has started its own academy) (Lowell Case Study, 12).

This is a prime example of professional traditional police training. Emphasis is on inculcating individuals into a hierarchical culture where the emphasis is on learning rules and regulations, and the quantification and collection of data.

In stark contrast, once Lowell began to strongly embrace the home metaphorical perspective, it realized the necessity of creating its own training academy, because the one described above clearly would not meet its new objectives.
...the academy was the first one in Massachusetts grounded entirely in the philosophy of community policing. By cutting from specialized areas like accident investigation and fingerprinting (which Fleming argues patrol officers do not undertake alone anyhow), it expanded the amount of time dedicated solely to community policing to 44 hours. And perhaps equally important, it eliminated the old system's quasi-military atmosphere (doing away with things like marching, saluting, and the more extreme forms of uniform inspection), replacing it with what Fleming describes as 'more of a college campus atmosphere.' Some recruits, upon reading newspaper articles reporting on the 'new kind of academy,' and discussing their experience with colleagues in their home departments, began to raise concerns that the new academy was too 'soft.' In response, Fleming reshaped some aspects of the academy mid-course, notably by increasing the already-rigorous physical training program. Fleming describes this change as 'confidence-building,' and in any case it appeared to demonstrate that the academy was far from 'soft' (Lowell Case Study, 51).

The fascinating piece of this example is that the philosophical commitment to community policing was not altered in the face of some concern about the new academy appearing to be "soft." Instead, by simply increasing the amount of physical training that was included in the academy, it was possible to appear to have toughened, or masculinized it, without sacrificing commitment to the home metaphor perspective. This is a brilliant example of how leadership understood the importance of staying committed to the new philosophical perspective, while simultaneously finding a way to mollify those who had concerns about its "soft" appearance.

Program Assessment:

The Albany Case Study provides some rich comparisons of how program assessment can be viewed from the two primary administrative orientations.

The absence of any alternative way to evaluate community policing did not result from a lack of interest in the subject. For example, early on in the APD's reforms, the local newspaper called for comparisons of crime rates in foot beat areas vs. car patrol areas, saying, 'it will satisfy more than idle curiosity to record exactly how effective one officer on the beat is in comparison to one officer in a car. It will give the city a better idea how to spend its money and how to protect its citizens.' And within the department, the community policing plan itself charged the Administrative Services Bureau with 'developing and implementing an
evaluation system that will determine the effectiveness of the community policing plan and recommend changes to the plan.’ Indeed, the department did begin to identify a few novel ways to evaluate community policing, and in some cases it even drew up fairly elaborate plans to do so. But in the end, nothing apparently came of these ideas (Albany Case Study, 31).

This is a fairly typical traditional administrative practice program evaluation perspective. In other words, it is a typical quantitative approach that involves comparing crime rates in two areas, one of which is being policed from a community policing perspective and one that is being policed traditionally. What it does not address is whether the citizens of those communities feel safer, whether they are cooperating more closely with the police department to solve neighborhood problems, and so forth. Compare the above perspective with the following:

Tuffey echoes Nielsen's sentiments, explaining that he considers community reactions to be an important means for monitoring department performance and fine-tuning its programs. As an example, he describes the process whereby the boundaries of the department's foot beats have evolved. 'We always get letters or we go to community meetings and we get input from them,' Tuffey explains. 'There have been times when we had to extend one beat a different way because some of the people thought it should be extended a little bit. So, you let the guy walk a couple of extra blocks or walk on the other side of the street.' Asked if such requests don't have the potential to dilute the program that was designed, Tuffey responds:

Let's be honest: If you're on a beat and you're at one end of the beat, whether you're three blocks away or four blocks away, it's going to take you relatively the same amount of time to get back (Kerr, Miller et al.). And usually there's a car close anyway, so it's not really an issue, unless they're all tied up. Was it a big thing for us the Police Department? No. But is it a big thing for the community to have us give them better service? Yes, absolutely, that's what we're here for (Albany Case Study, 46).

In this example, the leader has a very clear understanding that his program's performance is judged successful by members of the community, and not by whether a particular statistic has gone up or down. He has moved from the business metaphor viewpoint to a robust understanding of what constitutes proper program assessment from the home metaphor
viewpoint. Neither case study provided an example of mixed orientation with regard to the program assessment element. In fact, out of the hundreds of paragraphs that were coded in the two case studies, only nine paragraphs discussed program assessment issues at all. As noted in the case study dictionary, a home metaphor perspective on program assessment would include qualitative measures, as well as quantitative measures of crime prevention and the enhancement of quality of life and service provision.

**Budgeting/Resources:**

The following Albany Case Study paragraph highlights a strong business metaphorical perspective on budgeting and resources within a policing context:

> Finally, Jennings wanted to implement community policing department-wide, expanding foot patrols and creating a special unit focused on crime hot spots in the process. Jennings estimated his plan's cost at $1 million, but he felt that the money could be raised by cuts in other areas (including reductions in overtime expenses within the police department) or, in a pinch, by raising taxes. 'It's a matter of priorities,' Jennings told the crowd assemble to hear his proposal (Albany Case Study, 10).

Note that the traditional metaphorical perspective involves funding one program at the expense of another, i.e., that funding is based on a series of priorities that pits one program's merits against those of other programs, or on increasing the size of the pie overall via the raising of taxes. Compare that perspective to the following:

> … the community response to the Lowell Police Department's new openness has been overwhelming. In the department's eyes, one of the most visible indicators of this was a successful fundraising drive led by a local businessman to raise some $200,000 to buy the department's mobile precinct (Lowell Case Study, 49).

The above paragraph illustrates how policing departments that approach budgeting and resource issues from the home metaphor perspective are not constrained to think in only a "piece of the pie" funding mentality. They can envision not only a different relationship with the community
they serve, they can also experience increased resources coming from nontraditional sources, or an enlarged pie, i.e., a community fundraiser for the department led by local businesspersons.

A mixed orientation on budgeting and resources was not uncommon in either case study. A good example is as follows:

One interesting aspect of these partnerships is how the other agencies manage the new demands the LPD is making on them. Davis reports that he has had almost no negative feedback from the agencies whose help the LPD has tried to enlist – 'surprisingly so,' he admits. One of the most heavily-used partners, the Department of Inspectional Services, seems to have compartmentalized its LPD work, assigning it to David St. Hilaire. Hilaire says that 'there is a little bit of conflict' inside Inspectional Services over his work for the LPD -- other inspectors must, after all, pick up his share of the Department's regular workload as he spends more time on LPD-driven inspections -- but it is ultimately minimal. In any case, St. Hilaire explains that the city manager has ordered his department to give top priority to police requests for inspections (Lowell Case Study, 48).

What is fascinating about the above paragraph is the fact that the movement is toward embracing the new administrative practice of the home metaphorical perspective. Agency personnel see their work success as intertwined and interdependent with other departments and are striving to collaborate. However, the alternative fact is that there is still some opposition to these activities and that the city manager has to order this activity as a top priority in order to ensure that it is accomplished. Again, this demonstrates the constant push and pull between the two metaphorical perspectives and illustrates how difficult it is to implement a purely home metaphor administrative practice stance.

Decision Making and Information Collection:

A wonderful example of the business metaphor perspective from this element is the following:

... reports were the major information resource in the LPD of this period. The department did, of course, maintain the usual information on known offenders.
But all of this information was kept in paper files (the department is only now inputting most of the information into computer databases), and the system for accessing them was cumbersome. As a consequence, some think, the information that was available was underused. Arthur Ryan, the head of MIS explains that officers often 'wouldn't bother' getting background information about people they stopped because it would require them to stick around, call into the radio room, the radio room would then make the inquiry. And then, when they got around to it, get back to them (Lowell Case Study, 13).

Contrast this perspective with the following home metaphor perspective on decisionmaking and information collection:

Finally, one Albany officer argues that by citing people on minor violations, police effectively alert the courts to a potential pattern: If police fail to write these citations, a first offense for robbery may look like a forgivable aberration, when in fact it is the culmination of years of unrecorded petty crime (Albany Case Study, 36).

Where you find police officers preferring to avoid the collection of information in the business metaphor example above, from the contrasting perspective you find an officer being zealous about citing individuals on minor violations because of his understanding that even minor violations may be an indication of a more serious problem. Here we can see that the metaphors present us with opposite perspectives and consequently, contrasting attitudes on what is important and necessary for conducting successful policing activities with regard to decisionmaking and information collection on even the most mundane of levels.

The Lowell Case Study offers a good example of how the decisionmaking and information collection element can be experienced from a mixed metaphorical perspective:

But on a day-to-day basis, the main source of authority the LPD looks to is the community – notably organized community and business groups, but also individual citizens. Christine Cole, the department's civilian 'community liaison,' constantly updates an extensive list of groups and a calendar of their meetings (the latest revision listed 35 organizations), and she and the sworn force (especially sergeants) attend these meetings regularly – as the command structure expects them to. The department has institutionalized community input through
its new COMPSTAT process, where Cole reports on recent neighborhood concerns and announces upcoming meetings – all under the watching eyes of Chief Davis (who is himself extraordinarily visible in the community). In directing the LPD’s problem-solving, community input has begun to lose some ground to proactive computer analysis of crime trends, but it still plays a large role. The department also tries to gauge the views of the unorganized citizenry, especially through citizen surveys and ad hoc focus groups (one recent focus group solicited the views of downtown businesses and patrons); moreover, the precinct stations themselves, located throughout the city and staffed by citizen volunteers, are also intended to make the police more accessible to the community (Lowell Case Study, 54).

Here the case study author notes the success of collecting information from the citizenry through extensive outreach meetings and related activities, but also acknowledges that the new proactive computer analysis activities are competing with this problem-solving orientation.

Communications and Relationships:

As seen from the business metaphorical point of view, building strong communications skills and relationships are not valued highly, as seen in the following example:

But the entryway itself was not very welcoming. That became particularly clear in the early days of community policing when the department began to listen closely to community groups’ concerns. After addressing some basic problems like response time and on-scene behavior, problems in the calls-for-service system came to the fore: ‘It wasn’t concerns that the police weren’t getting there quick enough or that they didn’t arrest somebody for stabbing somebody,’ the LPD’s community liaison remembers. It was, ‘We don’t like the way we’re being treated when we phone.’ Many blame the problem on personnel. At best, officers got assignments as dispatchers because they were injured; at worst, they got them as punishment for their misdeeds on the street. (For many years every dispatcher was a sworn officer, though as call volume increased the department began adding civilians as well.) One Lieutenant explains that officers ‘were not going into the radio room because we said, this person’s going to be a good person in the radio room; it was because he’s not good somewhere else.’ The current head of communications describes the results:

You would have complaints filed left and right about the way people were handling the call. They had somebody treating them rudely or hung up on them or yelling at them on the telephone . . . We actually had a city councilman walk in there one night to go
nose-to-nose with somebody during the middle of the night because he called down about a drug dealer on the street. All they needed to see was a cruiser driving by. And got into a little bit of a shouting match with the dispatcher.

The department tried to channel public demands through the calls-for-service system, but it seemed that the system itself was flawed (Lowell Case Study, 5).

Not only are communications and relationships not privileged as important by the business metaphor point of view in this example, it is almost as if they are aligned with some sort of tough guy imagery that prevents them from showing any sort of basic politeness in their interactions with the public. A good example of a mixed communications and relationships element perspective follows:

In any case, he and others insist that most outreach officers took to their jobs with enthusiasm, and that most of those who did not were eventually 'weeded out' through the disciplinary process: Thus the result, after some fine-tuning at the start of the program, was a good group of officers who the department has been satisfied with. Many community members were also happy with the outreach program, feeling that the officers had markedly improved APD visibility and begun to tackle longstanding problems in their areas. A few neighborhoods complained that their officers were not visible and that they tended to keep banker's hours, but for the most part the outreach program received strong praise from Albany residents (Albany Case Study, 24).

The mixed orientation coding for this paragraph stems from the fact that the officers were not always visible and were seen as tending to keep banker's hours. A pure home metaphorical perspective example would have noted that the police lived within the community, for example, and were available to fellow community members no matter whether they were on duty or not. For instance:

More generally, the LPD has simply paid growing attention to contact with citizens. Sergeants direct their officers to interact with the community (for example housing officers act as a 'welcome wagon' in Lowell's public housing, knocking on doors to introduce themselves to new residents); and many officers have pagers to provide a direct link with residents. Moreover, the department has hired minority officers to help build ties with Lowell's increasingly diverse population – particularly its growing Southeast Asian community (Lowell Case
This paragraph shows a strong commitment to interacting with the community and building strong ties and partnerships with all of its members.

**Equity:**

The concept of equity is one that is more difficult to identify and illustrate from the perspective of the business metaphor. Simply put, equity is a concept that finds its definition in the home metaphor perspective and can only best be defined from the business perspective as community favoritism. From the home metaphor perspective however, the meaning of equity encompasses a much richer sense that everyone is entitled to equal access to police services, and that citizens have a say in how they are governed. Last but not least, the use of stereotypes about citizens, as well as about police, are strongly discouraged. The best example of this element is one in which the business metaphor perspective initially dominated a situation, but ultimately evolved into a home metaphor perspective result:

In some cases Davis tried to win back partial control of the agenda not by disengaging from the community-initiated dialogue, but by engaging it proactively. One often-told story in this vein concerns the siting of the Highlands precinct, which became a focus of conflict between the department and a nearby neighborhood group. The problem was simple: The LPD wanted to locate the precinct in the largely Cambodian Lower Highlands neighborhood, and the local Boy's Club had offered the department space in a location that lay at the center of many of the area's problems. But the community group representing the predominantly-white Cupples Square neighborhood, argued that the new precinct should be located in their neighborhood. Well-connected in local politics, the group brought their concerns to a number of city councilors, and Davis began to feel pressure to change his mind about the location of the site.

Davis felt he was in the right in this case: "This was clearly just a small segment of the community," he maintains, "and it was the Cambodian people who really needed the services. That's where people were actually dying." Davis turned to Hart for advice:
So she said, 'Okay, well, it sounds to me like you have to put together a really good presentation that examines that data. So we'll go out and we'll take photos of the two locations and try to sell it to the group. And in addition to that, I think that you have to bring a different constituency to the meeting.' So she went out and actively recruited the Cambodian community to appear at this meeting. So here you have this group of two hundred or so white lower-middle class individuals who are pretty politically-savvy. And all of a sudden, fifty or a hundred Cambodian people come in and sit down at the meeting. They don't know what to do. The people at the meeting didn't know how to handle this. And then we walked in and we put on a really good presentation with data and photos of what the two locations looked like.

Going in to the meeting, Davis had taken a hand vote to gauge support for the two sites, and he estimated that three-quarters of those voting preferred the Cupples Square location. But after the presentation – when the department presented crime statistics and other basic information about the two areas -- sentiment had switched, and the group overwhelmingly voted to go with the Boy's Club site. City manager Johnson, who attended the meeting with Davis, still remembers the event with astonishment:

I don't think I've ever seen a neighborhood group where you expect to go in and get the shit kicked out of you and people throwing rocks at you -- and he went in there with such a positive approach, with statistics, and facts and figures, that the people basically said, 'He's our expert. He's the leader of this thing. We've got to give him the support.' And they did. And that doesn't happen often, when people have a predetermined position. And they definitely had a predetermined position going in, no question about it.

Davis insists that he would have sited the precinct where the group wanted (and given the growing political pressure, he might have had no choice): 'This wasn't an ego thing. I mean, if the community really wants something, even against my better judgment, I'll do it, because I'm here to serve the community.' But by engaging in a serious deliberation, and recruiting an underpresented constituency (thankfully, Davis reports that no one complained that the department had 'stacked the vote'), he was able to come to a mutual agreement with the community (Lowell Case Study, 37-38).

This is a particularly strong example of how the concept of equity plays out in communities every day. Often, the business metaphor perspective dominates and the loudest and most organized part of the community is the one that receives a particular service, often at the expense
of a part of the community that is not well organized and has greater need, such as immigrant and minority populations. In this particular case, the police department leadership understood its role as convenor, and brought representatives of all members of the community together to deliberate collaboratively about what was in the entire community's best interests. What should not surprise us, but does, is the fact that the more politically saavy group, once presented with critical information, saw that it was part of a broader community that was in need of services. In many respects, this is an excellent example of a home metaphor "win-win" situation. While it may have taken more time to develop the information and additional time to alert and galvanize the immigrant community members, the end result was worth the extra effort. In addition, the leader learned that enacting from a home metaphor perspective means accepting that you do not know how things will turn out and a willingness to go where things organically lead you. He was willing, in this case, to defer to the community's sense of what it needed, and did not need to force his bureaucratic expertise on them. This is key to enacting from the home metaphor perspective. In the next section, I will explore the extent to which these case studies have exemplified the home metaphor model.

**To What Extent Do These Case Studies Exemplify the Typology**

In conducting the content analysis on these case studies and by drawing out the precise ways in which the business, home and mixed metaphor orientations play out in community policing, I have been able to elaborate the specifics of the theoretical typology and make the case that the specific practices of community policing are in fact consistent with these.

Not unexpectedly, in doing the case study research, I found evidence in each of the elements where so-called community policing practices violated the home metaphor typology. From a
purist point of view, such violations prevent these policing organizations from operating completely successfully from the home metaphor alternative administrative practice perspective - in the new way that if you have a Total Quality Management (TQM) program and do not get rid of performance evaluation, it is going to ultimately fail to make things completely better.

However, the evidence of these case studies, again, leans toward an understanding that these metaphorical stances are polar opposites along a continuum. By using the typology, one can easily identify and suggest alternative strategies for the cases, as was illustrated in the preceding pages.

Because the public administration field of policing provides such a dramatically polar example of the rediscovered typology playing out along the continuum between traditional and community policing, it is fairly easy to find illustrations of the purist business and home metaphorical perspectives. What became clear to me was the degree to which leadership plays a critical role in determining the extent to which traditionalists are able to understand, synthesize and then enact from an opposing perspective, that of the home metaphor. While police officers can go to training and learn about community policing techniques and the value of enacting from a new perspective, the new perspective has no value if it isn't actively played out in the daily lives of police officers across a variety of activities, e.g., manager/employee interaction and decisionmaking and information collection. If my boss rewards me for making choices that reveal a community policing orientation, you can be sure that I will continue to practice those choices. If, on the other hand, my supervisor ridicules my attempts to draw from those new choices, I will immediately revert to what is familiar and safe.
Given the extremely hierarchical system found in a traditional policing administration, it appears that only the complete buy-in of senior leadership and on down through the managerial ranks will make it possible for there to be any degree of success in enacting home metaphor principles. A lack of such strong commitment appears to doom the degree of success in implementing community policing, and therefore home metaphor, practices. Again, it also appears that the ability to provide sufficient budget resources to support home metaphor-based activities, such as inserting new sub-stations within neighborhoods, also heavily influences the degree to which such choices can be enacted. If there aren't sufficient resources to meet with constituents more often to engage them in problem-solving, for example, it becomes much too easy to fall back on traditional policing practices which are so familiar because of their dominance.

**A Reconceptualized Community Policing Leads to What?**

What can we learn from community policing? On a simplified level, we can learn such things as planning and implementation can occur simultaneously with great success (Understanding, pp. 29-30). On a grander scale, we can see that there is an alternative public administrative practice based on the home metaphor typology that is being carried out in many of our communities, complete with a set of guidelines for experimentation, implementation and daily activity. And, this alternative public administrative typology is now available to guide us in identifying new means by which to carry out the work of the public sector.

As noted by renowned community policing scholar, George L. Kelling:

> Pushing harder and more stridently with current control mechanisms that exert little real control over substantive work will not lead the way out of this quandary.

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12 George L. Kelling is Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Research Fellow, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute and is respected as one of the leading authorities on the community policing movement.
Such specious thinking has been in place since the 1950s (e.g., just a little more inservice training, a slightly tighter span of control, a few more general orders or rules, more militant internal affairs units, improved rewards and punishments, improved or more representative recruitment, greater militarization of recruit training). Instead, police officials need to focus on the substantive content of police work; find and delineate the means to conduct police work morally, legally, skillfully, and effectively; then structure and administer departments on the basis of this literal work and not a fictionalized view of police work. In other words, a clear definition and description of quality policing is needed around which appropriate organizations and administrations can be developed (Kelling 1999, 2).

Further:

We now understand that telling officers only what they cannot do, which is so typical of police manuals and rules and regulations, has not improved the quality of policing. We know as well that the work world of police is too complex to tell officers exactly what they should do in every circumstance. The only alternative left for the management of most police work is to teach officers how to think about what they should do, do it, and then talk about it, so that they improve their practice over time and share their emerging values, knowledge, and skills with their colleagues and the profession (v).

As we see these shifts away from traditional policing to a system in which policing "reflects a neighborhood's values and sense of justice and that understands residents' concerns" we may end up with a system that actually "is more likely to do justice than policing that strictly follows a rule book" (iii). Moreover, "for the police it is an entirely different way of life … The task facing the police chief is nothing less than to change the fundamental culture of the organization" (Monograph, 1999, 31).

Throughout the community policing literature I found almost apologetic notations that community policing, up until this point, is just a set of commonly held, or shared, principles, but that there is wide variation in theory and practice, depending on the needs of the individual community (Understanding Community Policing: Framework; 1994, 1). Moreover, there were complaints that there were few overviews of community policing that would provide
practitioners with guidance on how to "learn to use this wide-ranging approach to address the problems of crime and disorder" in communities (Understanding, 1). I cannot help but wonder if it isn't the overriding sense of the business metaphor that is pushing practitioners and academics to attempt to quantify the benefits of the home metaphor as exemplified by the community policing movement.

Indeed, fuzziness and the unknown are more at home in the home metaphor than the emphasis on "an effort to bring community policing into focus" (1), which is clearly a sentiment that is more at home in the business metaphor. In fact as noted earlier, Belenky noted a metaphorical preference for words that related to vision, e.g., the word focus noted above, when talking to men and women about the basis for their moral orientations. Women more often talked about auditory metaphors related to an emphasis on hearing and listening.

Researchers within the community policing movement have begun to allude to its broader applicability and "how community policing can act as a catalyst for mobilizing resources to address problems on a local, state and national level" (Understanding, 28). I am further encouraged by comments expressed in the community policing literature suggesting that this movement could be used to move toward a "community-oriented government." (BJA, Monograph 1994, 28). Clearly, members of this academic community recognize the inherent value of the community policing movement and its potential applicability to other areas of public administration. And, I believe they are right. This is just the tip of the iceberg.

However, I do not think that the richness of community policing can truly be appreciated without
a deeper, broader and more systemic understanding of precisely why community policing is so important. I believe it is a deep rooted counter reaction to the extremism of the dominant business typology which has, heretofore, been acknowledged as having failed the world of traditional policing, as well as, to some extent, the larger world of public administration. The value of community policing is that it is truly enacting from a new metaphorical perspective, one with which we have been all too familiar, but one that has been practically forgotten and relegated to the private realm. Until now, it has not had the benefit of more widely accepted and broader practical and intellectual research, rigor, acceptance or recognition.

With the tremendous contribution of those who had begun mapping out the terrain before me, as evidenced in the earlier literature review and resource literature discussions, a typology that reveals the home metaphor and its dimensional commitments is now mapped out in its entirety. The community policing movement is a rich, and heretofore, unrecognized salute to this typology. Now we have the ability to learn from its successes and failures, as noted in the previously described case studies. The community policing movement, as exemplifying the home metaphor, provides an entirely new and actionable means to reorient governance in an even more democratic way. Its potential, grounded in Stivers' home metaphor, is unlimited and without boundary. Others may now reap the benefit of this rich treasure trove of pragmatic administrative activity and utilize this to guide them in illucidating alternatives to their traditional administrative practices, ones that may enrich and expand the possibilities for community interaction and social problem solving.
Chapter 6. Summary and Implications

It is my deeply held personal belief that there is a place for both the home and business metaphors in administrative practice. They are two sides of one metaphorical coin; both provide invaluable insight and guidance for carrying out public administrative practices. And, neither can truly exist without its opposite. Without a clear and defined understanding of the richness of its opposite, however, the business metaphor has become the dominant and only perspective from which contemporary administrative practice has drawn. The revelations of this dissertation provide a new, albeit rediscovered, set of choices for informing our administrative practices in the future.

Summary of Findings

This dissertation began with the purpose of examining four research questions. Each of these will be revisited along with a summary of pertinent findings. They are as follows:

1) Is there a clear typology distinguishing an alternative organizational viewpoint built on feminist principles in the public administration literature from other more dominant premises?
   a) Do the major feminist theories distinguish clearly the premises of an organization built on feminist ontology and epistemology?
   b) Are there conceptions of such an organizational framework in related social science fields?

As discussed in Chapter 1, the two primary types of feminist literature identified in the field of
public administration, equity feminism and other voice feminism, do not reveal a clear typology that practically outlines the characteristics of an alternative organizational viewpoint from that of the dominant viewpoint. While the major feminist theories do reveal aspects of their ontological and epistemological assumptions, they are not well developed in the public administration literature, nor are they well developed in the feminist organization literature. However, there are considerable elements of the feminist viewpoint revealed in at least nine other resource literatures. These are reviewed and discussed in Chapter 2.

2) If such a typology does not exist, what premises would be the basis for an alternative theoretical typology for public administration based on the worldview of the feminine and grounded in the metaphor of the “home,” a metaphor developed in public administration by Camilla Stivers?

Given that a typology grounded in the feminine does not exist in the examined literature, I looked to Camilla Stivers' exemplary and revealing historical analysis of the founding of the field of public administration that identified two primary frames of reference in administration practice, that of the bureau men and that of the settlement women. The settlement women enacted from a practice that Stivers described as a metaphor of the home; while the men enacted from the more familiar metaphor of business. As discussed in Chapter 2, Stivers' metaphor of the home provides us with a basis for constructing a typology for public administration that opposes the home metaphor with the dominant business metaphor.

Building on Stivers' metaphor of the home, and drawing on nine other strands of literature, a typology was constructed that opposed the two metaphorical perspectives along four primary
dimensions: epistemology; ontology; social theory; and ethics. The resource literature provided rich examples of how these four dimensions play out in various academic fields. As such, the other resource literatures made it possible to flesh out the dimensions of such a typology for the field of public administration, although the implication is that such a typology may well be useful in other fields of research.

As previously noted, the home metaphor provides a framework for implementing the rediscovered typology in other public agency settings. Highlighted below are a few high-level abstractions of the two metaphors and their orientations.

### High-level Metaphorical Abstractions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business Metaphor Overview</th>
<th>Home Metaphor Overview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>instrumental</td>
<td>interpretive/critical thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rationality/objectivity</td>
<td>arationality/subjectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>federal</td>
<td>anti-federal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>science defines, explains and categorizes</td>
<td>human experience and inner knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moral authority is codified in the law and applied</td>
<td>moral authority is a product of context and discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus on steadily improving the way in which life is lived</td>
<td>engage in a process orientation to life; comfortable with here and now orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>action is methodological, scientific, privileged, expert</td>
<td>action is tentative, pragmatic, practical, experimental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positivist science</td>
<td>pragmatic action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reinvent government</td>
<td>reconceptualize government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) Can the home metaphor be revealed in actual case studies through a content analysis of two cases of community policing used as an illustration?

After constructing a case study dictionary of key business and home metaphorical practices as exhibited by both traditional and community policing, I engaged in a detailed and rigorous content analysis of two existing community policing case studies. The analysis of these case
studies revealed the apparent difficulty of moving from the dominant business metaphorical perspective to the less familiar home metaphorical perspective. Despite this apparent difficulty, the case studies revealed rich examples of how the home metaphor plays out in cities that are striving to utilize community policing practices.

4) What implications does the home metaphor have for public administration research and practice?
   a. Can the use of the premises behind the home metaphor point to alternative understandings?
   b. Can alternative recommendations for actions be demonstrated in the analysis of two case studies?

Researchers who are seeking to identify alternative perspectives for analysis can now use this typology to do just that. In fact, by applying the typology to particular cases that seem stuck, so to speak, the typology can help to make clear where the business metaphorical lens is so dominant that it veils any alternative view of a situation. Understanding the premises and dimensions that are behind the home metaphor allow us to now truly hear, rather than see, alternative points of view and the alternative perspectives and values that they bring to situations. As such, it is now possible to take the home metaphorical lens and review other areas of public administrative activity to identify alternative understandings, as well as nonconventional courses of action.

By using content analysis to examine specific paragraphs of the respective case studies, it was possible to use the typology to reveal alternative courses of action that the administrators might
have chosen. The value of analyzing these particular policing case studies is that they demonstrate the practical application of home metaphorical principles and provide academics with a typology for enacting in other agential settings.

The case studies, beyond any doubt, demonstrate that a critical aspect of public administration, that of policing, which permeates public life and affects all citizens, has begun to strongly value this alternative metaphorical perspective and the positive gains that it brings to strengthening the relationship between public administrators and citizens. Not only that, this alternative perspective has demonstrated the viability of identifying potential alternatives in all aspects of policing activity, e.g., decisionmaking, personnel management, budgeting and resources, etc., suggesting that the application of this typology in other agency settings will be just as rich and revealing.

In constructing a typology that was then applied to community policing, it became possible to specifically demonstrate where the individuals in the case studies failed to enact from a purely home metaphorical stance, as required by a community policing perspective. A number of instances were described that revealed how the alternative perspective could have been followed. As a result, it has become evident to me that there are a number of critical factors that must be understood in order to maintain the integrity of the home metaphor in practice. These factors are important since they assist individuals in understanding how to innovate coherently from this fundamentally new metaphorical perspective.

For example, it is imperative to recognize that all individuals involved in a situation have
knowledge that is important to the solution. In other words, an attitude of arrogant expertise held by the public administrators involved in a circumstance will surely create an atmosphere that is not in alignment with the home metaphorical perspective. It must be clearly understood and embraced that all individuals, whether citizen or bureaucrat, have knowledge that is important and necessary when addressing a public concern. This relationship to knowledge and its creation permeates many aspects of the home metaphor.

On a related front, it is worth grappling with all perspectives to ensure that all are incorporated into a final solution. And, the sometimes messy process of grappling itself has value, since it leads to better relationships and consequently, solutions that address larger numbers of individuals and their concerns. Majority rule, at the expense of minority opinion, is not acceptable nor encouraged. One can easily recognize that the integrity of the home metaphor perspective has been breached when a decision to engage in a particular activity is determined by a leadership that prevents interested parties from participating in the decision making. As soon as information is hierarchically controlled and distribution of information is privileged, the home metaphor is no longer in practice.

It is also clear that a leader who conceptually grasps the home metaphorical perspective in its entirety has a much greater chance of adhering to the integrity of the typology than someone who simply wants to find a solution to a single dimension problem. Leader understanding and metaphorical perspective buy-in was clearly critical to the success of community policing and enactment of the home metaphor because such a leader could see the links and relationships between the metaphor's four primary dimensional aspects and subsequently enact from all of
them simultaneously and creatively.

I believe that the community policing movement is evidence of a much wider yearning for the alternative perspective that all of us know and experience in various aspects of our lives – a perspective that is more holistic, hopeful, inclusive, and returns us to an understanding of our innate interconnectedness. Moreover, I suggest that this is a yearning for both perspectives to exist along a continuum that offers up fruitful solutions to problems that we are faced with in public administration and elsewhere.

**Final Reflections**

At this juncture, it is important to point out that my purpose in this dissertation has been to create an ideal type and I am well aware that the way in which the home metaphor has been presented is most certainly from an ideal perspective. Clearly, as intimated to earlier, many homes are not perfect and this must be openly acknowledged. Many homes harbor negativity, pain, confusion, separation, and far less in terms of relationship building than many business environments. As such, it is apparent that a shadow or darker side does exist within the home metaphor, just as in the business metaphor. Moreover, issues of self-interest most certainly exist within homes, which are not simply bastions of selflessness. However, because of the structure of home life, these forces are often managed in a way that leads to the creation of collective wisdom and are not allowed to spin out of control or dominate at the expense of the family whole. Whereas, issues of self-interest are so privileged and encouraged in the business metaphor that they lead to exaggerated forms of competition and are not generally handled as well. Yet, a further
examination also may reveal that more effective ideals are left out of the business metaphor.

Given all of the preceding, I believe that the home and business metaphorical typologies require more thoughtful consideration and explication. At this juncture, they are truly idealizations.

In conclusion, we now have an alternative from which to practically and pragmatically draw insight, that of the home metaphor. As Ramsey and Calvert note:

> It is unrealistic, of course, to believe that we can move immediately from hierarchical to nonhierarchical organizational structures, but if we begin to realize that what has always been does not always have to be – if we begin to experiment with dropping assumptions of hierarchy as a permanent state of affairs, it becomes possible to begin envisioning new and different (and perhaps more life-affirming) ways of doing things. … The issue is not to seek a utopia, but to be more inclusive of all people and to establish a new balance between human needs and organizational goals.

> We believe, however, that instead of simply reacting to …pressures, organizations need a more radical way of thinking about things, a reframing both of the questions to ask and of their answers. Feminist frameworks offer a different angle of vision through which to see characteristics of organizations, and ask us to rethink the relationships between organizations and individuals.

> What we offer here are not solutions, but a new set of lenses that allows us to ask new questions, to see organizational problems from a totally different perspective, to step outside the old models (1994, 96).

With this in mind, it is hoped that researchers will identify and explore additional areas of public administrative practice, such as the restorative justice movement and various areas of the environmental movement, where I believe there is strong evidence of the home metaphor being at least partially enacted. Such analysis will provide further support for the value and usefulness of this typology.

Moreover, my professional experiences in the nonprofit sector lead me to a strong research interest in exploring evidence of the home metaphor playing out in areas of civil society. I
believe additional research might reveal that some nonprofit activity is more firmly entrenched at the end of the continuum closer to a pure home metaphor perspective. In fact, it may even be possible to document a nascent nonprofit sector pendulum swing back toward the business metaphorical perspective, evidenced by the more recent push to apply business practices in nonprofit settings, heretofore known for its "ready, fire, aim" attitude to approaching social problems.

My hope is that other researchers will explore evidence and applications of the home metaphor in other areas of public administration and alternative academic fields. Given the related work of researchers in such wide ranging fields as business entrepreneurial enterprise creation, the cognitive sciences, and psychology, as noted in the earlier resource literature review, I believe this to be a greatly expanding area of research, to which I hope to be contributing for decades to come.

So much of public administration governance has been an attempt to make processes "semi-automatic," when, in fact, most of life is far more complex and requires judgment, values, thoughtful consideration, and so forth. Something has been missing for a long time. An overt emphasis on rules and Big T Truths, leaves much less space for the interpersonal engagement between human beings, which is the place where our feelings, thoughts, and emotions are contained. What is the purpose of life anyway? – to make rules or to forge new ways for assisting people to live whole and complete lives to the best of their abilities? I believe that the field of public administration has a rather important role to play at the intersection between individuals and collectivities – the ways in which we organize life. It is the place where we can
collectively create ways to engage each other on the social issues of the day and attempt to find solutions to the most pressing problems. I believe the home metaphorical stance provides public administration with a counterbalance to the business metaphorical tendency to automate our administrative practices. The home metaphor provides us with a space within which to spend time together grappling with difficult social issues and come to tentative solutions, without the pressure to design entirely new systems of practice. We need to become comfortable, again, with the unknown and confident that grappling with it will lead us to uncharted waters that are rich with possibility for administrative action.

My dissertation project has stemmed from a desire to more fully appreciate alternative perspectives and the tools they bring to the construction of complex collective human activities. As such, my aim is to contribute to the academic literature in this regard, as well as to practically harness a wider variety of potential approaches and solutions, to expand from the way it is and to dream and create how it can be, by utilizing the gifts and perspectives of all human beings. As a sentient and gendered human being, I stand somewhere between the opposing metaphorical perspectives described in the preceding chapters. I value both points of view, am frustrated by the dominance of one view over the other, and strive daily to enact from multiple stances along the continuum of administrative practices that range between the opposing sets of ideas presented in this dissertation.
Appendix
Lowell, Massachusetts Case Study

NATIONAL COPS EVALUATION
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE CASE STUDY:
Lowell, Massachusetts

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Case Study Prepared for the Urban Institute

Introduction

The Lowell Police Department has undergone rapid changes over the past four years. Throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the department was organized largely on the “professional model” of policing: Patrol work focused on emergency calls, management was fairly hierarchical, and relations with the outside world were formalistic. But by 1997, the LPD operated much more in the image of community policing, emphasizing community problem-solving, team-based management, and an open dialogue with the public. Pockets of the professional model still remain, just as pockets of the community policing model existed in the old LPD. But on balance the changes appear to be dramatic.\footnote{Coding = NR}

The LPD was pushed from the outside by state and federal policy, which influenced the department through the grants it began to need when the city’s largely industrial economy faltered; it was also pushed by local government itself, which pressured all Lowell agencies to work in a more neighborhood-oriented fashion. But most important, the LPD was driven from the inside by two forces. First, and most visibly, by a talented and articulate chief with a clear vision and effective management style; and second, by many committed staff whose innovations were allowed to prosper (some of these actually emerged well before the department officially tried to “transform itself,” but they were not supported by the previous administration).\footnote{Coding = NR}

This paper will describe and explain the changes that have taken place in Lowell. Descriptively, I will try to reconstruct the LPD of the 1980s and early 1990s (section I)\footnote{Coding = NR} and to describe how the department operates today (section III).\footnote{Coding = NR} Those descriptions revolve around four major elements of the organization: Its relationship with its environment, its operations, its support services, and its management.\footnote{Coding = NR} In section II, I will try to explain why and how the LPD changed. That discussion will focus on the role of leadership and the COPS grants in effecting the LPD’s changes, but it will also consider other environmental influences, as well as the way in which the existing organizational structure and culture impeded or accelerated change.\footnote{Coding = NR}

I. THE LOWELL POLICE DEPARTMENT, 1980-1993
1. Relating to the Environment

Observers typically describe so-called “professional” police departments as “autonomous,” and that description does fit the LPD of the 1980s and early 1990s in many ways. The department apparently tried hard to remove itself from the more obvious forms of political and community life, minimizing its relationships with elected officials, other government agencies, community groups, the press, and even (in some ways) the general public. But elements of the LPD seem always to have maintained relationships with these groups, at times against explicit department policy. And even where formal policy is concerned, the LPD has never been able to be completely autonomous. Coding = DPO&OS/B

The Authorizing Environment

Public agencies must inevitably submit to some public controls; the question is what forms those controls will take. The Lowell Police Department of the 1980s and early 1990s apparently followed the dominant strategy of twentieth century policing, one reminiscent of the ideal political theorists call “juristic democracy.” In this ideal, the public does not influence police operations directly: The agency tries as much as possible to keep politicians and community groups at bay, and it does not pay particular heed to public opinion. It answers instead to clearly-stated policies that elected officials have set out in advance—like the laws the police are directed to uphold, the budget that authorizes their expenditures, or the employment regulations that govern their staffing decisions. But before considering the ways in which the public did have influence over Lowell’s police, consider first the relationships that the department downplayed. Coding = DPO&OS/B

City Government

By all accounts, the LPD did not maintain a high profile in city hall. An employee of the DA’s office during the period described the department’s reputation in city government as “aloof,” “separate,” or even “untouchable.” The department did not, for example, produce an annual report—the exemplar of government oversight. A previous city manager remembers relations with the police during this period in terms of occasional civil suits brought against the department, together with the ever-present budget issues. Coding = C&R/B

To be sure, city government had some formal authority over important police issues. The council ultimately controlled budgeting, giving it great control over staffing and equipment purchases. This element of government control over the police became important in the early 1990s, as Lowell’s declining tax base forced the city to cut services. But during the relatively prosperous 1980s, a period when police staffing stayed fairly constant, these issues were not nearly so salient as they would become. In any case, city hall technically had input on other personnel matters, such as promotions. But in practice these decisions were governed by civil service rules. Even the superintendent was traditionally chosen through a competitive civil service exam, putting Lowell in the minority of cities that removed its police so dramatically from “politics.” Coding = DPO&OS/B

Community Organizations
The LPD also minimized its relationships with organized community and business groups. Like many police departments since the 1960s, Lowell did have “community relations” officers whose job it was to air community groups’ concerns and provide safety-related information and training. Jeff Davidson, the chief community relations officer in Lowell, still works for the LPD, and he is highly esteemed by many both inside and outside the department. In fact, early participants in Lowell’s community policing efforts credit Davidson with preparing the way by establishing links with many community organizations and even organizing some neighborhood watch groups on his own. **Coding =C&R/M**

But the community relations position apparently absolved the rest of the department from such responsibilities. Community groups report that other police personnel seldom attended their meetings, and officers confirm this account; one who considered himself outside the mainstream, in that he did do something like what we now call “problem-solving,” recalled: “I was never involved with any type of neighborhood groups or working with community groups to [do problem-solving]. That was unheard of.” Isolated exceptions existed; for example, in the early 1990s the Deputy Superintendent began attending monthly meetings with the Downtown Businessman’s association. But these were decidedly exceptions. **Coding =C&R/B**

Moreover, the community relations position itself was limited by its mandate and by its position within the department. Through Davidson the department could give information to the community—he does safety training that community groups still value highly. But it could not get information back as easily. As Chief Ed Davis explains it, a community relations officer “would never come to the chief and say, ‘Hey Chief, you know, there’s a problem over there.’ Because he’s in the chain of command and has a boss to answer to and they just don’t do that.” In the end, with the LPD’s community relations specialized in an institutionally-constrained position, community groups had little access to the department. **Coding =C&R/B**

**The Press and Public Opinion**

More diffuse embodiments of “the public” did not fare much better. Take, for example, the media. During the 1980s, the chief and others inside the department viewed the media with suspicion, “as people who are always questioning us, people who don’t know what they’re talking about, have the audacity to come in and ask you hard questions,” as one described the dominant sentiment. That attitude led the department to keep the media at bay. In part this was just a matter of culture. The LPD did not proactively offer up stories, and it discouraged officers even from responding to the inevitable requests reporters made. But at times things became more serious, and some officers received written reprimands or even suspensions for talking with reporters. **Coding =C&R/B**

From the perspective of Patrick Cook, a reporter for the Lowell *Sun* through much of the period, the result was that the department “was a really, really tough place to cover.” Cook recalls being thrown out of police headquarters on several occasions, and simply denied access on many more. But like most reporters he maintained a set of informal contacts with individual officers, bypassing more formal channels that the department had shut off. So by formally discouraging media communications, the department did not eliminate them completely. It simply drove them underground and lost control over their form. Cook reports that the inevitable quotations of
“unnamed sources” would send the department into a “frenzy” of internal investigations as it tried to identify its leaks. Coding =C&R/B

In August of 1989 the administration yielded somewhat, releasing a general order that announced a policy for dealing with the news media. Cook reports that

It was finally at the point at which specific members of the command staff were allowed to speak on behalf of a function of their division. So if you had a captain that was in charge of detectives, he would handle the press for that. Or the accident investigator could handle those things . . . But still the rank and file of the police department was clearly discouraged from talking with the media. And it was well known that it was not something that you did. Coding =C&R/B

So in the end the department did develop some formal channels for dealing with the press. But it did so reluctantly, and only after much internal strife over the “leaks” that had sprung. The practice that emerged was one in which the department maintained strong centralized controls over media communications, discouraging their overuse. There were exceptions, notably then-Lieutenant Edward Davis, who as head of Special Investigations consciously maintained close ties with the press; Cook remembers that Davis was, “clearly, more than anyone in the department, very press savvy at the time, much to the consternation of some of the people who were here.” But overall, Cook remembers his job as a frustrating one:

It was difficult. A very difficult place to cover because you couldn't get people to realize that we weren't just looking for bad news or the sensational stuff that they thought would have been on page one. We were just looking for news, period. Even when it came time for features or some type of new police program, it was a tough sell to get it out of the place. Coding =C&R/B

Cook himself believes that the department’s isolation actually exacerbated its poor image in the media. Coding =C&R/B

The story is important because it echoes in many of the LPD’s relationships. True to the “professional” model, the department tried to strike an autonomous posture. But at the same time, it maintained some formal connection with these groups out of necessity. And informally, in pockets throughout the department, it often maintained fairly strong relations with outside groups. Because of their informality, there was no way to monitor them, and favoritism was always a possibility. But ultimately these pockets became important as the LPD made the transition to community policing. Coding =C&R/M

The department did not emphasize other forms of public relations either—for example, the extensive youth programs the department maintains today were essentially absent during the 1980s and early 1990s. To be sure, individual officers report performing acts of charity and community service in this period. One tried to project a positive image of the police by buying Christmas gifts for children on his beat, which was located in a poor area of the city. He and other officers played sports with local youth on Sundays. But such officers remember little support or encouragement from the department: “There was no incentive. Like, you weren't
being asked by the administration, you weren't being supported.” Another who coached sports teams in his private life echoed the sentiment: “If, at any point, I felt I could have started a sports program, with my background I would have done that. Because I enjoy that. . . . But it was never brought up, ‘geez, why don’t you try this or why don’t you try that.’” The LPD simply did not privilege community relations and public opinion. **Coding =C&R/M**

**Juridical Policing**

In sum, the department did not directly negotiate relationships with city government, organized groups, and the public at large. Instead, public controls followed the model of professional policing, in which the department was governed primarily by three kinds of law: The criminal law that constrains the police response to crime, the civil law that governs police liability (citizens brought a number of civil suits against the department for brutality), and the administrative law that governs any public agency (notably Massachusetts’s strong civil service laws governing hiring and promotion). **Coding = DPO&OS/B**

But the core way in which the LPD responded to public demands—the “front door” to the police department—was the calls-for-service system, a rationalized and egalitarian screen for public requests.³ We will see below that emergency calls commanded great deference in the LPD. **Coding = C&R/B**

But the entryway itself was not very welcoming. That became particularly clear in the early days of community policing when the department began to listen closely to community groups’ concerns. After addressing some basic problems like response time and on-scene behavior, problems in the calls-for-service system came to the fore: “It wasn't concerns that the police weren't getting there quick enough or that they didn't arrest somebody for stabbing somebody,” the LPD’s community liaison remembers. “It was, ‘We don't like the way we're being treated when we phone.’” Many blame the problem on personnel. At best, officers got assignments as dispatchers because they were injured; at worst, they got them as punishment for their misdeeds on the street. (For many years every dispatcher was a sworn officer, though as call volume increased the department began adding civilians as well.) One Lieutenant explains that officers “were not going into the radio room because we said, this person's going to be a good person in the radio room; it was because he's not good somewhere else.” The current head of communications describes the results:

> You would have complaints filed left and right about the way people were handling the call. They had somebody treating them rudely or hung up on them or yelling at them on the telephone . . . We actually had a city councilman walk in there one night to go nose-to-nose with somebody during the middle of the night because he called down about a drug dealer on the street. All they needed to see was a cruiser driving by. And [he] got into a little bit of a shouting match with the dispatcher. **Coding =C&R/B**

The department tried to channel public demands through the calls-for-service system, but it seemed that the system itself was flawed. **Coding =C&R/B; DPO&OS/B**
The more literal “front door” to the police station was the front desk at headquarters, and it suffered similar problems; in fact, would eventually serve as a cause célèbre for Superintendent Davis’s early changes. In his words,

There had been a window at the front desk. Years ago the glass had been broken out during a fight. So somebody had reinstalled Plexiglas there, it was pretty bad looking. It was all marked up and scraped and dirty, people had spit on it and nobody cleaned it off, it was a terrible looking front entrance. There was a hole, it was a slot where you would slide things back and forth; there also was a hole drilled in the Plexiglas about three inches in diameter. If someone came into the station to report a crime, there’d be a Captain sitting at the front desk and a Lieutenant sitting next to him and a Patrol Officer sitting next to him. There were three people there. A person would come to the front desk and they’d talk to the Officers. The only problem was the officers couldn't hear what they were saying. The only way you could hear is if someone came up and actually put their face right up to the hole, put their mouth right on the hole and spoke into the office. They'd normally get a pretty surly response. As a matter of fact, there was one Sergeant who was there and was well known for his demeaning attitude and corrosive comments to the people who came in there. It was great fun, actually, people liked to sit there with him because it was like sitting with Don Rickles. Someone would come up to the window and he would abuse them as a joke. Which, if this was an old boy's club, can be pretty humorous, but in reality, it presented a pretty negative view of the Police Department.

It is hard to convey the sincerity with which officers, even today, defend the integrity and good intentions of the Lowell Police department during this period. But the LPD, like many other police departments, was committed to a dominant ideal of policing that viewed public relations dimly, as a superficial and expendable frill.

The Task Environment

Leaving the question of public control aside, police departments face a more practical need to forge external ties. Like any organization, a police department’s ability to do its job depends or potentially depends on the actions of outside groups (like city agencies and property owners). But with a few exceptions, the “professional” ideal of autonomy governed this domain as well.

A twelve-year veteran of the Department of Inspectional Services (which enforces building and sanitary codes and is now one of the LPD’s most prominent partners) maintains that in his early years, “there was no cooperation (Reid, Miller et al.). You know, they did their thing, and we did our thing.” Several other agencies did interact with the LPD in some ways: Public Works, the Department of Social Services, the public schools, and the Housing Authority all apparently had some connections with the LPD. But these relationships were often informal, in that the administration did not particularly encourage, recognize, or control them; and they were not nearly as strong as they are today.
As one might expect of a police department operating in the professional mode, its most common partners came not from these agencies of local government, but from the criminal justice system and its offshoots. Lowell had the usual team of detectives that worked closely with the District Attorney’s office, and officers and detectives had the usual daily interaction with the courts and other police agencies. The department also had ties to police professional organizations like the IACP and the FBI (for example, Chief Jack Sheehan sometimes sent staff to these organizations’ training programs).

Still, conflict riddled some of these relationships. Most notably, the criminal bureau and the DA’s office were at loggerheads into the 1990s, and mending the break became a major task for Ed Davis when he took office as chief. And other criminal justice relationships were strangely absent. In the early 1980s, the LPD had little contact with federal and state law enforcement agencies, despite Lowell’s status as a major center of interstate drug trafficking. It did maintain a good working relationship with the federal Drug Enforcement Administration, but the department had very little contact with agencies like the FBI, ATF, INS, and the Massachusetts State Police—all agencies with which it works closely today. According to Davis, the department “was pretty parochial about enforcement and they looked at another agency that came in to assist, or to be involved in an investigation, as people who were intruding on their territory.” As he rose to the head of Vice and Narcotics, Davis began to change this attitude in his unit, working with every applicable federal and state law enforcement agency.

Finally, though we do not normally think of them as “partners,” it is worth noting that criminal offenders played the same role in the LPD that they do in almost every police department (even those oriented to community policing). Perhaps in part because little information flowed in from the community, the department tended to rely heavily on informants to solve many types of crime (though the LPD still relies heavily on informants today). This relationship is important to take note of because it created some minor problems in implementing community policing.

Perceptions of the LPD

Whether or not as a result of the LPD’s aspirations to autonomy, the department suffered in the forum of public opinion. Officers themselves remember that “ten, twelve years ago it was almost like we were just like an occupying army in the city . . . and there was, I think, very little support for the police department.” A management consultant who guided officers through a strategic planning process (which in part took stock of the department’s current state) reports that even those who tended to glorify the past admitted that the community viewed Lowell police “dismally.”

Outsiders confirm these judgments of public opinion of the time. Perceptions of the police were reportedly especially poor in Lowell’s minority community—particularly in its rapidly growing Southeast Asian community, as the department had no Asian officers who could speak Khmer or other important languages. Finally, the business community gave the department a serious no-confidence vote in the early 1990s, when an association of downtown businesses voted to hire private security to patrol Lowell’s rapidly-deteriorating commercial district.
2. Operations

The Lowell Police Department grew gradually during the 1980s, from 174 sworn officers in 1982, to 195 in 1991. But as Lowell’s economic fortunes declined, department staffing did too. By 1993, on the cusp of the LPD’s transformation, the department had only 159 officers left. Throughout the period, the department also employed about 20-30 civilians. Coding = B&R/B

Until Davis’s reforms in 1994, the organization of the Lowell Police department had remained essentially constant since 1975. Operations were spread across six separate divisions in the department. One was the radio room, which employed the department’s dispatchers, located in the computer division of the technical services bureau. The previous section described dispatch and its problems; here we turn our attention to the other five divisions—vice/narcotics, patrol, criminal investigations, traffic, and juvenile. Each of these divisions was headed up by a captain reporting directly to the deputy superintendent. (See Figure 1) Specifically, we will focus here on patrol and the three investigative divisions. Coding = DPO&OS/B

**Patrol**

Patrol was organized in three shifts (the LPD calls them “platoons”). Most officers were assigned to two-man cars, though when manpower allowed, two officers would patrol the downtown area on foot. In the late 1980s, about eight cars patrolled the city on a typical evening shift, supervised by one or two sergeants. Coding = DPO&OS/B

These cars have been assigned to essentially the same beats since at least the late 1980s, and a large proportion of officers had relatively permanent assignments to their cars. But beyond the beat level, no geographic logic underlay the patrol division’s structure. Officers were grouped by the time they reported for duty—shifts were staggered slightly to avoid emptying out the city during shift changes—and beats scattered all across the city would attend the same roll call and be supervised by the same sergeant. Coding = DPO&OS/B

Officers remember their main duty as taking calls quickly. One remembers: “My main responsibility when I worked the cruiser was, if I get a call, to answer that call in a timely manner, handle the call, clear the call, . . . and get ready for my next call.” In part this was simply an impersonal norm, something that “they” expected. But the norm had a personal face as well, as this officer explains:

> You have to take your calls on your route and you have to get in and get out of there and get ready for your next one because you don’t want another guy coming on your route and taking your call. That is your responsibility. . . . [If you didn’t] you would get the attitude from the other guy, the guy that would come over to your route, the officer in the car. They would send a guy from a route next to yours, the next area, and he would be like, ‘Oh I had to take five calls on your route tonight, what are you doing? Where are you? What are you sleeping somewhere?’ That was the attitude. Coding = DPO&OS/B; D&IC/B
Taking time out to do what is now called “problem-solving”—or for that matter personal business or anything else—created a reaction from one’s fellow officers. **Coding = DPO&OS/B**

Officers attribute this way of working to two things. Some point to an older (and depending on the officer, a mistaken) ideology of policing. Others blame the department’s chronic shortage of officers, which became acute to the point of crisis in the early 1990s. One remembers that around 1993, “we were probably down to 130 men [sic] and this route in particular down here was drug-infested. We would get 30-40 calls a night and we would just go boom, boom, boom, boom. It was nutty. It was like write the report and get out. It was total chaos.” Another maintains that unassigned time was scarce because “we just couldn’t react to the basic calls.” **Coding =DPO&OS/B: D&IC/B**

Some officers apparently did work against the mainstream, doing something like what we might now call “problem-solving” or “community policing.” One exclaimed: “When the community policing concepts became popular in the last few years, my opinion at the time was what’s new.” These officers do not claim they were doing anything innovative; one gives an example in which officers would try to close down drug houses without trying to make arrests: “A lot of us, just by us shaking people down that would go in and out of drug houses, we would force the people to pack their stuff up and move somewhere else.” Others made a special effort to get to know the residents and businesses on their beat, and to lay down rules of behavior that would govern it. But the department and their fellow officers did not particularly encourage, support, or direct any of these activities. And officers often simply lacked the necessary time—as staffing dwindled, “downtime” available for anything like problem-solving grew scarce. **Coding =DPO&OS/M**

**Investigations**

During much of this period the LPD delegated investigations to three separate units—juvenile, criminal investigations, vice/narcotics—, each usually headed by a captain (except for juvenile) and reporting directly to the deputy chief. **Coding =DPO&OS/B**

Criminal investigations was the largest of these divisions, employing about 20 detectives over three shifts for much of the period. The detectives were mostly generalists, though a few specialized in specific crimes like rape or bad checks and credit fraud. The detective bureau was primarily reactive in the sense that its priorities were set by reports that came in from patrol. The division’s commanding officer would assign priorities to the reports that came in according to how serious the crime was, and how much there was to go on. “Less serious crimes, if there was absolutely nothing to go on, then we would pretty much file it,” one detective from the period explains. For example, burglaries would often go uninvestigated, since evidence was usually slim. Specialized cases were parcelled out to the other three investigative divisions: Vice/Narcotics (though its workload evolved somewhat differently, as described below), traffic (which employed officers specially-trained in serious and fatal accident investigation and reconstruction), and juvenile (a three-man unit that investigated cases in which a juvenile was a suspect or victim). **Coding =DPO&OS/B; D&IC/B**
Juvenile did get some work in different ways: In the course of their jobs, the division’s detectives developed relationships with some school principals, and one reports that the principals would call them occasionally about “ongoing things . . . gang-related problems, ethnic problems [i.e., ethnic conflict],” and so on: “We would stay around for a couple of days and guide them through if it was a real hot time or something like that. We would be there after school for dismissals to try to give them some extra assistance, do some car stops after school if they were having a lot of problems with non-students.” But as this detective remembers the period, 90% of his time was spent on investigations of juvenile-related crime reports.  

Investigations in all divisions were typically retrospective: The assigned detective tried to identify a perpetrator, based on interviews with witnesses and the responding officer’s report (or occasionally, though not usually, direct communication with the officer). Sometimes surveillance tactics were used—for example, detectives might stake out a shopping area that had reported a rash of robberies or vandalism. But none of the detectives from this era whom I spoke with reported any truly proactive investigations, in the sense that all these investigations were triggered by complaints from outsiders about specific incidents. For example, according to the captain who took over the detective bureau during Chief Davis’s tenure, even organized gangs were investigated only in response to specific crimes.

Towards the end of this period, as the city’s budget crisis grew, the detective bureau suffered. Staffing reached a low of eight detectives concentrated on one shift. Equipment suffered too; the division did have funds for equipment during the period, but it apparently did not spend much of it because it was too busy dealing with an unmanageable workload. Finally, as described in the previous section, the division’s relationship with the DA’s office deteriorated to the point where the DA sometimes refused to work with it.

**Vice and Narcotics**

The vice and narcotics division was consolidated out of its two constituent parts in the early 1980s, and it handled the cases its name implies (though Lowell’s thriving drug market seems to have generated most of its workload). Vice worked differently from the other investigative divisions because of the nature of its target crimes. Its workload came less from patrol officer reports than from informants and citizen complaints, both of which typically came directly to the vice division itself. Vice gave top priority to cases that involved dealers further up the drug distribution pyramid.

Detectives from the division remember investigations as focused on surveillance and informants. One sums up the typical memory of drug house investigations: “You know, we’d typically watch a house, get an informant, get a buy out of a drug house, and go in there and make a couple of arrests.” Areas with heavy street-level dealing, like the regionally-renowned “triangle” in Lowell’s Acre neighborhood, made easy targets, as Lieutenant Billy Taylor explains: “It would not be uncommon to go in there and conduct an operation and make twenty-five arrests in a single day. Sometimes you are only limited—and I am not being facetious about this—we were sometimes limited by the number of handcuffs we had. It was tough.” Finally, particularly when high-level dealers were concerned, investigations often became quite elaborate, as Davis began
involving federal and state law enforcement agencies in major drug investigations. **Coding = D&IC/B**

Vice was clearly a well-respected and exciting place to work at the time, and in some ways it got considerable organizational support (as described below). But many that worked in the division remember frustrations as well. Ed Davis, who headed the unit for most of this period, recalls:

> We had put together an excellent Narcotics Enforcement Unit. We worked with all the Federal Agencies and the State Agencies. We did high level cases. We were probably the only Police Department, outside of Boston, from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, that was frequently in Federal District Court. . . . But no matter what we did, the city still got worse every year. No matter how many drug dealers we put away, no matter how many organizations we took out, no matter how far up the chain that we went in the distribution of drugs, . . . the neighborhoods got worse and worse every year and the local narcotics were increasing. We changed tactics to try to better arrest these guys and nothing worked. **Coding =DPO&OS/B; PA/B**

Many blamed the failure on problems in the criminal justice system—especially the courts’ perceived leniency—and this diagnosis spurred the unit on in new directions. **Coding =PA/B**

Indeed, those who worked under Davis in the vice unit remember their commander as an innovative man. One recalls:

> He came up with this idea that he dubbed “The Welcome Wagon.” And what we used to do is put on our raid jackets, and we'd all pile into one of the vans or all the cars in the morning, 9:00, 10:00 in the morning. We'd go out, but we wouldn't have any search warrants with us. We'd go out and we'd have a list of drug houses that we were going to go to. We'd go knock on the doors of the drug dealers and invite ourselves in. And we'd talk to them. And we'd run checks on them and find out who the hell they are and let them know that this is the opportunity that they're going to get to move out of the neighborhood, or else next time we're going to come back, we're going to be back with a bag of handcuffs and a search warrant and they're going to go to jail. And some of the officers thought it was kind of—I don't know, kind of a crazy way to do police work. But, believe it or not, it worked. Not everybody moved out, but a lot of them did move out. **Coding =DPO&OS/M; D&IC/M**

The Welcome Wagon also began to work with outside agencies. With the blessing and help of assistant city manager Brian Martin, Davis began bringing building code inspectors from the Department of Inspectional Services along on raids. The inspectors could often close down apartments that hosted drug-dealing on the grounds that they were uninhabitable (particularly since dealers would modify them extensively), and they did so more and more after some early experiments. Property managers were also brought along to determine whether or not those in the building were actually tenants. Overall, the Welcome Wagon was an early approach that
bypassed the criminal justice system altogether. Its officers were not concerned with arrests but with shutting down drug houses. 

One other non-traditional approach was emerging on the fringes of the organization. A young sergeant, Debbie Friedl, was assigned to the Vice squad in the late 1980s, mainly investigating sexual assault. Through a chance event, Friedl wound up getting involved with a local battered women’s agency:

It was a female victim one day that needed some services and the two male officers that were dealing with her figured, “Let’s call Debbie. She’s a woman, she’ll know what to do” . . . I didn’t know but I knew where there was a phone number to call. And one thing sort of led to another. The battered women's program . . . had had an interest in having a police officer serve on their board to get that law enforcement perspective, but they weren't really certain. They didn't have any contact or they didn't know anyone. When it was a female officer that they suddenly interacted with, it seemed like, “Oh, this makes a lot of sense. Let's approach her and see if she's interested.” And I was.

Friedl joined the agency’s board of directors, and in the process began to learn more about domestic violence and issues facing victims—an education she began to supplement by taking classes on her own initiative. At the time, the LPD was like many police agencies, in that it did not give domestic violence much attention. According to Friedl, “if it was a domestic violence incident short of a homicide, there was no investigation.” There was some discussion with then-Superintendent John Sheehan in the early 1990s about creating a domestic violence unit, and Sheehan reportedly agreed that the department needed such a unit. But staffing was extremely low at the time, and the administration decided that it simply did not have the officers to create the unit. Absent organizational support, Friedl’s growing interest in the issue had no outlet at work; she speaks of her involvement with domestic violence during this period as part of her “civilian life.” But it positioned her well for developments that were soon to come.

Coordination and the Division of Labor

These two major operational branches—investigations and patrol—worked under a fairly stark division of labor. The CO of criminal investigations describes the bureau he inherited as “very territorial,” in that it frowned upon any activity resembling investigations by the patrol force. The patrol officer’s responsibility for a problem ended with the report he took. One officer explains that “it was your responsibility to go to the call, get the person’s information or whatever it was that he was complaining about, and get out. Write a report and pass it in, and hopefully somebody else would take care of it.” Indeed, the report was the lifeline between the two branches. As one Captain remembers, “The flow of information [between investigations and patrol] decreased to where it was almost nil.”

3. Organizational Support
The department’s support services partly confirm and partly qualify the description of the LPD as operating under the “professional model.” Training clearly favored professional ideals. But support services seemed to hark back to an even earlier era, in which the crucial ingredient of policing was an alert and resourceful individual officer. With a few exceptions, analyzing records, elaborate equipment, and other forms of organizational support played a fairly limited role. Coding = DPO&OS/B

Training

The Massachusetts State Police provided training for LPD officers at five locations around the state, as it did for all but a handful of the largest Massachusetts cities that had their own academies. The academy sought to instill a strong commitment to professional ideals, organized as it was in a military style that included short haircuts, clothing inspections, and strict regulations. The substance of the training was similar to most police academies, covering accident investigation, fingerprinting, defensive tactics, and the like. Even today the state academies only devotes 4-6 hours to community policing (though Lowell itself has started its own academy). Coding = T/B

The state also mandated 40 hours of in-service training per year, which since 1983 had been offered at the Northeast Regional Police Institute in neighboring Tewksbury. But the department provided its own in-service training as well, at least to the circle of command staff close to Superintendent Sheehan. The department sent these officers to a variety of professional development courses, seminars, and the prestigious FBI training academy. One narcotics investigator recalls, “when I was in the narcotics unit for that long stretch of time as a detective, we were well taken care of in the department.” Sheehan’s substantial commitment to professional development had an important benefit for Ed Davis, whom Sheehan sent to the Police Executive Research Forum’s Strategic Management Institute for Police (SMIP) seminar—a seminar that would be Davis’s first exposure to community policing. Coding = T/B

Information

The LPD of this period did not value the same sort of information it values today. Superintendent Sheehan distrusted crime data to the extent that the department did not submit Uniform Crime Reports for nearly a decade. Others say that the department lacked resources to devote to technology, and that the administration was not particularly interested in the new information technologies, believing that officers should get their information on the street. Crime analysis as it is known today would have been difficult, as the department lacked a computerized dispatch system, and most records were on paper; in any case the department did not do it. Coding = D&IC/B

As suggested in the previous section, reports were the major information resource in the LPD of this period. The department did, of course, maintain the usual information on known offenders. But all of this information was kept in paper files (the department is only now inputting most of the information into computer databases), and the system for accessing them was cumbersome. As a consequence, some think, the information that was available was underused. Arthur Ryan, the head of MIS explains that officers often “wouldn’t bother” getting background information
about people they stopped “because it would require them to stick around, call into the radio room, the radio room would then make the inquiry. And then, when they got around to it, get back to them.” **Coding = D&IC/B**

At the time Ryan worked under Davis in the Vice Squad, which was a bit ahead of the game with respect to information, as it was in operations. For a time the Vice Squad was the only part of the department to use computers substantially, and one of Ryan’s duties was to oversee them. He explains that the division mostly used the computers for word processing, but it also began to use them for “a little bit of data . . . and kind of crude record-keeping.” But gradually the computers spread throughout the department—the city sponsored a computerization initiative, in partnership with Lowell-based Wang laboratories, in the late 1980s—and Ryan began to spend more and more of his time on the issue. But the department did not become fully involved in the city’s program until just before Davis became Acting Superintendent. **Coding = D&IC/B**

**Equipment**

The officers I spoke with remember equipment during this period as inadequate. One union official recalls that equipment was one of the major issues that rose repeatedly in negotiations with the administration (the other two were safety and pay). Things became particularly acute in the early 1990s, as then-city manager Richard Johnson recalls that because of the revenue shortfalls “we weren't replacing the cruisers, we weren't providing any equipment at this facility, which was not close to meeting the needs of the modern-day police department.” The cell block was too small to the point that the department was worried about civil liability, and the dispatch system was plainly outdated, according to Davis:

> There was literally a $300 phone system that was installed up here and that was being utilized to run a city. And it would break down and the phones would go out and they'd have to get in new supplies from a company in Tewksbury. It wasn't a 911 company, it was just a regular telephone company. It was a little place that we buy our phones. It was almost like us going to Radio Shack and buying a phone system for the police department. **Coding = B&R/B**

Again, much of the problem stemmed from the city’s growing budget crisis. But not all of it did. Billy Taylor, who took over the detective unit under chief Davis, recalls that when he took over:

> One of the immediate things that I realized was that they had kind of shitty equipment. They had cameras that were fifteen years old, they really were not keeping up to pace with technology in terms of computer programs. They were using a sketching system to sketch suspects that was back from literally the 40's and 50's where now there was much more sophisticated computer aided graphics available. **Coding = B&R/B**

Nevertheless, Taylor found that the division had unspent equipment funds from previous years. **Coding = B&R/B**

**Other Support Services**
One other support service is interesting to note because of its role in the department’s evolution. Throughout this period the department did not formally maintain an employee assistance program the way it does today, but an officer by the name of Thomas Fleming had begun to play that role informally:

People knew that, I guess, if they had some problems and things of that nature that they could contact me and I could get them out to a good source somewhere and get them to someone. . . . In graduate school I had done a paper on police stress, stress in law enforcement, so I had an interest in that whole topic of stress in law enforcement . . . And then, I had been involved in some stabbings, my partner was stabbed badly and I had gone to counseling myself and I saw the benefit of it. So, as a result of that, I had an interest in working with officers and I had just done it informally through the grapevine.Coding = MEI/M

Fleming helped other officers out not only with his growing list of referrals, but also with what he describes as “peer counseling” and “critical incident debriefing.” Coding = MEI/M

4. Organizational Management

Then as now, the LPD’s management consisted of a Superintendent of Police, a Deputy Superintendent, and a number of Captains, Lieutenants, and Sergeants. The Superintendent had primary control over department policies, while the Captains (reporting to the Deputy Superintendent) oversaw the department’s major subdivisions (the investigative divisions and patrol, as well as the administrative services and technical support bureaus). Lieutenants either headed smaller departmental units or oversaw a shift of patrol officers (with responsibility for day-to-day issues like juggling assignments when an officer called in sick), while sergeants typically supervised three to five patrol officers on the street. In addition, two unions—a patrol officers’ union and a superior officers’ union—had input into many important LPD decisions. Coding = DPO&OS/B

Decisionmaking and Control in the LPD

Some of the department’s management was highly centralized. Most major decisions—making policies and procedures, assigning staff to important positions, allocating department funding, and so on—were made by the LPD’s appointed Superintendent. The full management staff rarely met in one place, with the exception of monthly meetings that were held during one two-year period. And the organization’s hierarchy permeated even those events. One who attended recalls: “The Chief would still sit there and say, I want you to do this, I want you to do this, does anybody have anything to say to me? And everybody would say, ‘No, we need more people, we need more money.’ That was the meeting.” Coding = D&IC/B; MEI/B; B&R/B

The Superintendent did not make all decisions alone, however. Many in the department report the perception that there was a core of command staff and others who were friendly with chief Sheehan. This cadre seems to have had influence on important policy decisions, and many think that they also got privileged treatment in assignments. Similar perceptions surround Superintendent Davis today, as they must surround most police chiefs (and for that matter, most
heads of organizations). But for a while in the 1980s the split between “ins” and “outs” became severe. One observer explains that at one point “you were either viewed [as] being in administration or you were one of the malcontents.” In any case, high-level decisionmaking was mostly centralized, whether in the hands of the Superintendent or in a more extended group that included some of his command staff.

The same pattern characterized discipline in the LPD, with an important qualification. One manager from the period remembers:

Before, the chief would deal with complaints from outside and the bosses weren't a part of it. They wouldn't . . . know an internal affairs investigation was going on of one of their people. And afterwards, there would be a suspension that would come down or some kind of disciplinary action and the bosses weren't held responsible for that activity. They were just sort of onlookers and joked about it, actually.

But this was only true of the internal affairs complaints that reached the chief—which turned out to be a very small fraction. Many complaints were turned away at the desk on the grounds that the officer’s supervisor had to take the complaint personally, while complainants might come in when the supervisor was off-duty. (This process reportedly became a problem on several occasions, as citizens who had been rebuffed at the front desk took their complaints to city hall or the press.) Other complaints were simply handled informally at the desk, never entering the formal internal affairs system at all. Thus although the chief did exercise centralized control over the disciplinary cases that came to his attention, the organization beneath him kept many of these cases for itself.

A similar pattern governed many operational decisions: the department’s hierarchy ostensibly controlled them, but in fact that hierarchy was something of a paper tiger. One story out of department lore, here told by chief Davis, illustrates:

If I was a Patrol Officer on the street and I made an arrest, I would call for the patrol wagon . . . and they would call back and say the wagon’s tied up right now at the booking window. . . . If the situation was very violent and there were a lot of people gathering around, I would call my Sergeant and I’d say, “Car four to Sergeant so and so.” Sergeant would say, “Go ahead.” And I’d say, “I’d like to transport the suspect by cruiser.” The Sergeant would say, “Standby car four.” Then the Sergeant would say, “Sergeant so and so to Captain at the main desk, the commanding officer.” And the Commanding Officer would say, “Go ahead”—there’d be this big voice—“Go ahead.” And the Sergeant would say, “Captain, car four is asking permission to transport a suspect from the location to the station.” And the response was inevitably these words; “Tell car four it’s okay to transport if it’s safe to do so.” So basically what was happening was the guy who actually knew what the circumstances were has made a decision to transport the prisoner. But to do it, he has to call a Sergeant who has to call a Captain who has absolutely no idea what’s going on out there in the street, who sends back a
response that says, “Yes, if the guy thinks it’s a good idea, he should do that.”

Coding = MEI/B; D&IC/B

So although the command staff formally had control over this decision, this control was ultimately superficial.  Coding = D&IC/B

Indeed, when one looks closely, the hierarchy did not extend its reach very far into many low-level decisions at all—other forces dominated those areas. Take the generation of the workload for the LPD’s operational divisions, discussed above. Most of this work could ultimately be traced to calls-for-service. Patrol work was dominated by emergency calls, particularly as staffing dwindled, and calls also triggered most investigations (though they passed through a priority-setting filter that considered the incident’s seriousness together with the likelihood that it could be solved). One Lieutenant recalls: “The work kind of ran the department.” Coding = DPO&OS/B; D&IC/B

Three sorts of work did not stem from the calls: “Proactive” investigations, patrol between calls, and problem-solving or investigations stemming from community complaints (like the juvenile division’s work for school superintendents). The last two sorts of activity were nearly invisible to the department, so pursuing them was up to the officers involved. And as described above, for most of this period the Vice division’s investigations were not truly “proactive” (as Davis himself, then the unit’s head, admits); they were instead typically driven by disgruntled informants.  Coding = D&IC/B

Street supervision had some influence on officers’ work, but sergeants’ styles differed quite a bit:

There were certain bosses that you knew if they were working you were all set, you could do whatever you want. There were guys that didn’t want you to send in so many arrests because it created too much work for them, like anyone else. But then there were other guys who didn’t care if you sent in 20 guys a night.Coding = MEI/B

Given such variation, it seems clear that the sergeants’ supervisors did not exercise much control over them. And indeed, those who were sergeants at the time report that they did not have very explicit marching orders from above. One explained that street supervision meant “basically being available to the officers, responding to calls with them. Basically just making sure that everything was running okay out on the street”; and of course collecting reports. Coding = DIC/TP; MEI/B

Indeed, it would have been difficult for centralized control to influence street-level work much, because accountability was ill-defined. For example, the head of Criminal Investigations explained that before geographic organization of his unit it was hard to fix responsibility for problems—anyone with citywide command simply could not keep tabs on his entire domain:

If a particular section of the city really started to get out of control, or a couple of streets were experiencing problems that would really impact the neighborhood there, whose fault was it? Or who does the Chief hold responsible to say “Hey we
have got to do something over there, this situation can not be tolerated.” Well he called me, but I cannot watch the city, it is too big.  Coding = DPO&OS/B; MEI/B; D&IC/M

So in the end, although the LPD centralized important policymaking decisions—like internal budgeting and general orders—in the hands of the Chief and his associates, street-level work was driven by other forces: Mostly 911, informants, and—within the limits imposed by the previous two—the impulses of the occasional patrolman, detective, or sergeant. Coding = DPO&OS/B; MEI/B; D&IC/M

All of this was enforced by a definite sense of mission, which the department does appear to have had throughout this period. This mission came from the professional ideal (most officers use the term “traditional law enforcement”)—specifically, an interpretation of that ideal that placed the highest value on rapid response to calls.  Coding = DPO&OS/B; MEI/B; D&IC/M

**The Union’s Role**

The one way in which patrol officers could influence department policy (primarily around contracts and discipline) was through their union. The most important decision the union became involved in came as Lowell’s economic crisis mounted and the department had to absorb its share of budget cuts. The relevant decisions were made jointly by the chief and some from the command staff, the unions, and city hall (though after running a $13 million deficit the city lost some discretion to a state-initiated control board, which had veto power over budgeting until the city returned to the black). At the beginning of the 1990s, the department decided to freeze hiring and offer some two dozen officers early retirement—the number of sworn officers dropped from 195 to 159 from 1991 to 1993— and it saved money in other ways, like making promotions without pay raises. But in 1993 the city (apparently egged-on by press stories about the officers’ “excessive” benefits) demanded further cuts from the police: The officers would have to give up their holiday pay—some $3-$4,000 per officer—or the department would have to lay off staff to reduce the budget by the same amount (which worked out to 32 officers).  Coding = B&R/B

The city left little time after its ultimatum, and when it came time to make the final decision the union—whose approval was needed to suspend the holiday pay—had not voted on the issue. The city decided to suspend the officers, but Tom Meehan, the president of the patrol officer’s union, wanted time to get a vote from his body. Jerry Flynn, who was the union’s treasurer at the time, remembers that Ed Davis was instrumental to the negotiation, and the episode earned the Superintendent-to-be enormous credibility in the department:

[Davis] is somebody who took a department that had 127 patrolmen at time and we were in the midst of laying off 32 more. . . . I think he was a captain at the time, but it was him and I who sat at the table, and at the time everybody else got up from the negotiating table. And we stood there and requested the addendum of city manager Dick Johnson to give us another seven days to post this [union rules demanded this much advance notice for a vote], and for the union to go as a body and say, “Look, we need to reduce this holiday pay in order to save these 32 police officers.”  Coding = B&R/B; DPO&OS/M
Meehan and Davis got their extension, and the union ultimately voted to suspend the benefits. Many officers believed that to cut staffing from its already bare-bones levels would have put them in danger on the streets. Others simply felt sympathy for the large number of officers—some on the force for years—which would be laid off. \textit{Coding = B&R/B}

\section*{II. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE}

I have tried to suggest that some of the seeds of change already existed in the Lowell Police Department during the 1980s and early 1990s—Debbie Friedl developing contacts and expertise dealing with domestic violence, individual officers doing something like “problem-solving” before the idea was in good currency, and so on. But the immediate force for major changes in the department came from two converging strands. \textit{Coding = NR}

\section*{1. Development of a Vision}

Ed Davis had clearly been an innovative force in the LPD throughout his tenure in the vice squad. He developed a solid working partnership with federal and state law enforcement in an agency that had previously been suspicious of these outsiders. He developed a strong relationship with the press in a department that treated the media with distrust. And he encouraged many tactical innovations in fighting drugs in the city, including the “welcome wagon” and the use of building code enforcement to deal with drug houses, in a department focused on arrest and prosecution. \textit{Coding = C&R/M}

Davis himself does not emphasize this aspect of his work during this period: “I was a reactive cop,” he remembers. “I was out there to take names and lock people up. That’s what I did. I prosecuted people, that was my mission.” But two things conspired to change his philosophy. \textit{Coding = DPO&OS/B}

The first was a growing frustration with the ineffectiveness of traditional methods. This frustration had, of course, led Davis and his vice squad to a number of innovations. But Davis remembers the innovations he did try as dead-ends:

\begin{quote}
I mean, it was always—it wasn’t strategy, it was tactics. It was always, they'd barricade the door, we'd get a bigger hammer to knock the door down. They started to barricade the windows because for a while we were breaking the windows and going in through the windows. So then they put plywood over the windows and screwed the plywood in so we couldn't, we'd break the windows and hit plywood. So we wouldn’t be able to get in that way. So then we brought the SWAT Team in and we started to use the SWAT Team on every entry that we did. And they would bring in these hand grenades that they'd throw into the apartment and blow the place up. \textit{Coding = DPO&OS/B}
\end{quote}

By early in 1993, the frustration had boiled over, and Davis remembers one particular incident with the force of an epiphany:
I remember standing on Union Street one day, and hitting this first floor apartment with the SWAT Team, I was right there with them. And these guys were dressed up—it was a military operation for all intents and purposes—they were dressed up in military gear and with machine guns, and they smashed the window in and they threw these flash hand grenades into the apartment and blew the windows out of the apartment. And I remember the windows blowing out onto the street, and I remember looking around and the people in the neighborhood were absolutely horrified. And I said to myself, “Wow, there's something wrong here. This isn't the way this is supposed to go.” We had got into an arms race with the drug dealers and it was getting ridiculous. It was really getting ridiculous.

At about the same time, Superintendent Sheehan sent Davis to a PERF-sponsored leadership training seminar called the Senior Management Institute for Police (SMIP); a firm believer in training, Sheehan would occasionally send the captains he was close with to similar management programs. Davis recalls being reluctant about SMIP: “I didn’t want to go,” he explains. “I was very busy doing drug cases. And I thought I knew what all the answers were so I said to him, ‘Look, I don’t want to go to this school. I'm too busy, I can't really afford that time right now.’” But the chief insisted—Davis believes Sheehan was grooming him at this point to take over the department sometime in the future—, and Davis ultimately attended the seminar.

According to Davis himself, the experience was fundamental to the vision he has today. As it turned out, SMIP—taught primarily by faculty from Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government—was a seminar in community policing, though Davis doubts that Sheehan knew that when he chose the program: “He knew it was a management school. I don't think he knew that it would be heavily oriented to community policing because he was adamantly opposed to that form of policing,” Davis recalls. In any case, the Superintendent-to-be took from the experience a changed understanding of the police role. “By taking some time out, I was able to get off the dance floor, so to speak, and take a look at what was going on. And I realized that the tactics we were employing, as effective as we thought they were, were not making any difference in the city.” Instead Davis became a convert to the idea of prevention:

Prevention was always something that—my eyes would glaze over when I heard the word . . . But after I went to SMIP, I got a new perspective on what prevention meant. Prevention, in that sense of the word, is allowing police officers to do more than just arrest people. It's a real nuts and bolts approach to crime fighting. The theory behind it is, it's more preferable to prevent a crime than it is to effectively prosecute it. In a phrase, that's what we're attempting to do here. That's what I said since day one to all my bosses and to all the police officers I come in contact with. I want them to prevent the crime. Now if preventing the crime requires locking someone up, then great, do that, that's perfect, that's exactly what I want you to do. But if preventing a crime means removing those conditions that lead to a feeling of disorder in the neighborhood, then do that too.
We will examine Davis’s emerging vision in greater detail below. Here it is enough to note that after years of innovations on the margin in the vice squad, and growing frustration with his failure to make a dent in the city’s drug problems, this self-described “reactive cop” had refocused his attention completely. Coding = NR

2. Development of an Opportunity

During this time, Superintendent Sheehan found himself increasingly out-of-phase with events around him. The first harbinger of this problem traveled down the road of economics. The city, of course, was in no position to hire more officers; it had just narrowly avoided firing 32 of them. So with help from the offices of the state and federal representatives, the city began looking for outside funding. Coding = B&R/B

Community Policing in State and National Policy

Lowell’s growing crisis of public safety—drive-by shootings, prostitution, and drugs were all making headlines—had attracted the attention of a newly-elected city councilor named Bernie Lemoine, who had formerly worked as a Lowell police officer. Lemoine called a meeting with Superintendent Sheehan (who invited Davis along), City Manager Richard Johnson, and representatives from both the State and Federal legislatures to discuss what could be done about the problem. As Davis remembers the meeting, “they all sat down . . . and Bernie basically said, ‘Look, we’ve got to do something about this, what’s going on here?’ And the Chief said, ‘We don’t have enough people.’” The city, of course, was in no position to hire more officers; it had just narrowly avoided firing 32 of them. So with help from the offices of the state and federal representatives, the city began looking for outside funding. Coding = B&R/B

The team identified two major funding opportunities at the time: A state-administered grant known as the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program, and the federal Police Hiring Supplement Program (precursor to the COPS hiring programs). Sheehan immediately assigned Davis to write applications for the two grants. Coding = B&R/B

What Davis quickly found, however, was that the grants were not simply for more officers—they were specifically for more officers doing community policing. Thinking in particular of the Byrne grant, Davis recalls: “It was very specific. It talked about a new philosophy. It talked about problem solving. It talked about empowering officers and teams of officers.” This suited Davis personally just fine; by this time he had attended the SMIP seminar and been “converted” to the cause of community policing. But chief Sheehan thought differently, so Davis brought the grant requirements to the Superintendent’s attention. Davis recalls Sheehan’s response: “I remember one conversation he had with me at his desk. . . . he said to me, ‘I’m going to tell you something. You can write all these grants you want. There will never be community policing in this police department as long as I’m the Chief.’” But Sheehan clearly faced a dilemma: He had made a commitment to the elected officials that he would go after every funding option available, but all of those options seemed to require a style of policing that he rejected. Coding = B&R/M

When the LPD received the state’s Byrne grant, the conflict of philosophies arose in a meeting between Davis, Sheehan, and city manager Richard Johnson, as the three discussed what the city would do with the $75,000 it had received. Sheehan formally accepted the need to follow the
grant requirements and use the money for community policing, but it was clearly not what he wanted to be doing. Johnson remembers, “I’m not saying that Chief Sheehan fought [community policing], but he didn’t accept it readily.” And Davis recalls: “As I was leaving the meeting, he agreed to do that [follow the grant’s requirements]. But he started to talk a little bit about filling portable fifteen and portable thirteen and portable twelve,” which were the cruiser routes in Lowell. “He was stuck in the old kind of idea of, ‘Well, if we have more men, then we have to put them in the old routes.’” Concerned, Davis raised the issue with Johnson on his way out:

So, as I was leaving the meeting, the Chief kind of got ahead of me and I said to the Manager—it was really the only time that I had a private conversation with the Manager—and I said to him, “The grant says we have to do things a certain way. And if we just fill the old routes, we're not going to get done what we want to get done. Make sure you kind of talk to the Chief about that.” I was concerned that the Chief was just going to override what was going on and he said, “No, don't worry about that, we're not going to make any—we're going to do it exactly by the numbers.” So I felt a little empowered at that point in time, even though I was very open with the chief about this, too. I said to him, “The Manager wants to do it this way, I've talked to him about this.” Coding = B&R/M

Throughout this period Davis felt torn: “I felt a lot of allegiance to Jack,” he explains, and I didn't want to do anything that would upset Jack. But at the same time, I recognized that something had to be done in the city. I had been given a job to do and I felt that I knew what I was doing with it and it was a difficult situation to be in. It wouldn't have been difficult if I wasn't friendly with the guy. But he was my friend for a long time, so it was a difficult situation. There were competing interests, loyalties. Coding = DPO&OS/M

Indeed, Davis found himself in the middle of a major rift in the philosophy of American policing. He was pulled in different directions—on the one hand by a man who had been a personal friend and his superior officer for over a decade, and on the other by the crystallizing ideal of community policing, which was becoming a matter of state and federal policy. In any case, this was clearly a turning point for Sheehan: His uneasiness with the grant requirements made clear just how distant he had become from the new trends in policing. Coding = DPO&OS/M

**Neighborhood Power in City Government**

But state and federal policy were not the only forces pushing for community policing in Lowell: The LPD’s practices were increasingly mismatched to the way the rest of local government operated. Specifically, the city of Lowell had begun to work more closely with neighborhood organizations, most notably by assigning a liaison to community and business groups who worked out of the city’s Community Development Department. Johnson explains:
We really were doing an extensive amount of neighborhood work. The administration and the council and the mayor and everybody was really encouraging the development of neighborhood organizations, so that you had and you have today very strong neighborhood groups who are organized, who meet on a regular basis. And a lot of them initially started because of the crime issues, because of the drug houses, the prostitution, the prostitutes in the neighborhoods and crime. . . Most of those neighborhood meetings, when I first attended, were all crime. People were talking more about crime incidents than anything else.

Given the neighborhoods’ concern with crime, Johnson quickly tried to get the LPD involved. And the LPD did oblige the Manager as he went to the neighborhood meetings: “The Chief would come with me. He would bring his personnel with him that were working those neighborhoods.” Still, the collaboration was not all it might have been: “Chief Sheehan was working with it happening, wasn't overly excited about it, but at the same time, I think he recognized that it had to happen.” But as he had told Davis, it wasn’t going to happen under his leadership.

So at least two forces were making work difficult for Jack Sheehan: First, the only money available to his rapidly-shrinking police department was explicitly targeted for community policing; and second, the city he worked in was moving in a neighborhood-oriented direction that he was not particularly in tune with.

Superintendent Davis

Given a growing realization that Sheehan was not comfortable with the direction the LPD needed to move, Johnson apparently began looking for a replacement. Sheehan himself was skeptical at first: “When I talked to the Chief initially about retirement, he wasn't convinced that there was anybody that was ready to take his place that he felt solid about,” Johnson remembers.

Davis himself believes that he became a candidate during the meeting he, Sheehan, and Johnson had when the state awarded them its Byrne grant. The position was hardly in his sights at the time, but the vice squad Captain thinks his aside to Johnson (when he conveyed Sheehan’s discomfort with the grant requirements) was significant: “That was the only conversation that I had with Johnson that might give him an indication that I disagreed with the Chief. It was literally a couple of sentences, but I think he may have started to think that I might be a candidate for the job after that conversation.”

From Johnson’s perspective, Davis’s reputation had preceded him: “Davis . . . really was a leader prior becoming Acting Chief . . . [He] recognized the importance of neighborhood police stations, community policing, reaching out to the public, the neighborhood groups, and everything that came along with that,” he explains. Patrick Cook, then a reporter for the Lowell Sun, remembers that as the city’s neighborhood initiatives took root, Davis was a strong participant, and his visibility in the city swelled:
He always showed up at the meetings. So if the resident on the street was considering a minor complaint about the drug dealer next door, they got the head of the vice squad there to talk about it. If he couldn't be there, he made sure he had somebody there from his unit. . . . So through that his notoriety increased. And the city councilmen were also attending these meetings. So they were sitting there and watching his reputation. So he became very much a recognized figure—plus the fact that he is six foot eight or whatever. Everybody knew who he was.

Coding = DPO&OS/M

In any case, Davis also had the good word of a number of people who had Johnson’s ear, notably Middlesex District Attorney Tom Reilly, who had worked with Davis in his capacity as head of the Vice squad. Coding = NR

Whatever the reason, Johnson soon asked Davis to meet him away from the police department, at the office of State Representative John Cox. It was at this meeting that Johnson made Davis the offer, explaining that he had some problems with chief Sheehan, and that he wanted to make Davis the Police Commissioner. But Johnson wanted to bypass the city’s usual procedure—recall that even the chief’s position was a civil service appointment at the LPD; instead he would appoint Davis directly. Davis felt that this simply would not do:

So I said to him, “I can't take the job.” He was flabbergasted by that. John Cox said, “I've talked to Dick (Duerst-Lahti and Johnson), I told Dick you'd be the best guy for the job.” I said, “John, what Dick wants me to do in the Police Department is going to require a tremendous amount of in-fighting, it's going to require a tremendous amount of change, it's going to create an incredible number of problems. And if I go in there as a political appointment, I will lose a lot of credibility with the people I have to supervise, first of all. And second of all, I'll last a year and I'll be gone. It—this is a very difficult thing that you're asking me to do.” So, they were kind of taken aback by that. They were shocked that I would say no. And I said, “Jack's the Chief, Jack wants to—he's looking at stepping down, you can put a package together to have Jack retire. If he retires, I'll take the Civil Service test and I'll be a Civil Service Chief. But that's the only way I'll take the job.” I wouldn't take it any other way. Coding = DPO&OS/M

Johnson and Cox ultimately gave in to Davis’s position, but it meant that they had to pass special legislation to give Sheehan his full retirement benefits, which he was not entitled to for several years. That done, Davis still had to take and top the civil service test (which Johnson organized under the newer “assessment center” model, which provided more flexibility than a strict written test), and he eventually did so. But in the interim, as part of the deal with Sheehan, the chief took an extended leave of absence, and Davis became Lowell’s Acting Superintendent of Police on February 11, 1994—a position he would hold for over a year before becoming Superintendent the following April 7th. Coding = DPO&OS/M

But before taking either office, Davis had one more important piece of business to perform as Captain: Opening the LPD’s first community policing precinct. That experiment was to set the
course for many of the most important operational changes Davis would make when he finally became chief. **Coding = DPO&OS/H**

### 3. The Centralville Precinct

The grant proposal Davis had submitted to the state of Massachusetts called for the LPD to open up a new police substation in Centralville, an area of Lowell that was cut off from the rest of the city by the Merrimack River. Centralville’s 15,000 residents hailed from many backgrounds. The neighborhood had traditionally been home mostly to Irish and Polish immigrants, but these groups were joined in the 1970s by immigrants from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico, and somewhat later by a number of Southeast Asian groups. Centralville had historically been stable and relatively safe, but in recent years many sections had been overrun by drug traffickers and warring gangs, and it now generated more emergency calls than any other neighborhood in the city. Indeed, the main reason Davis chose Centralville as the pilot site was that its decline was fairly recent, and because the areas around it (mostly in neighboring Dracut) were still stable—the fight appeared to be a winnable one. But Davis also candidly admits being aware of the fact that the city manager lived in Centralville: “He lived right up the street. So he had to drive through there, and I was cognizant of that. He had to drive through there on his way to work and he had mentioned it a couple of times.” **Coding = DPO&OS/H; E/H**

In any case, the decision to place the first precinct in Centralville did not end up being very controversial. Part of the reason, Davis explains, was that “nobody knew what it meant”—the LPD had never done anything like this before. But there was also consensus that Centralville needed the help: “There was no outcry from anybody that Centralville was going to get more resources because Centralville was clearly a problem area.” So the city rented a brand new office in a small commercial building on Bridge Street (one of the neighborhood’s main roads) after rejecting an old fire station on a side street; Davis was able to convince Johnson that the Bridge Street site was worth its $600 per month pricetag, because it was much more visible and closer to the neighborhood’s most serious problems. **Coding = B&R/H**

Because Davis had written the grant, Sheehan put him in charge of its implementation, appointing him as head of the department’s new Community Policing Program (though he also retained his responsibilities as head of Vice and Narcotics). Davis got underway with a commitment for six officers and one sergeant: Two officers funded by the grant, two funded by the city through Community Development Block Grant moneys, and two officers and the sergeant provided by the department.

Davis had complete freedom in assembling his team, which was organized entirely outside of the regular patrol force, and he used his freedom carefully. To head up the operation on a day-to-day basis, he appointed Bobby DeMoura, a young sergeant who had worked with Davis in the Vice squad. “I knew his work ethic,” Davis explains. “I knew how motivated he was, how aggressive he was, and I needed someone like that. I knew he could also put a team together.” Davis and DeMoura then selected the six officers by posting a notice that requested volunteers—though Davis also specifically asked Jerry Flynn, the President of the Patrol Officer’s Union, to join the new precinct. “I felt that it was important to have the union involved in the planning of this,” Davis explains. “I had an idea of where I wanted it to go, but I left a lot of latitude in other day-
to-day business. And I involved Jerry right in the beginning of it, because I felt that having support of the Patrol Officers would be critical in this.” DeMoura had a major hand in picking the remaining five out of the pool of volunteers, and he tried to select aggressive officers who would not be afraid to try non-traditional techniques. He also purposefully picked a female officer and a Latino officer.  

**A Vision for the New Precinct**

Davis did not have a specific agenda for the team to carry out, but he did have an overall vision to guide them in creating one. That vision was shaped extensively by his experience at SMIP and by extensive reading he did afterwards (much of it funneled to him by a management professor at U Mass Lowell named Linda Hart, who he had begun to work closely with when he had applied for the grant): “I read all the management books,” Davis remembers. “For a six month period, I don't think I came out of my room. I just sucked down everything I could on teams and team based management and TQM and all that stuff that was out there.”

The vision that would guide Centralville began with a simple goal: Dealing with the problems that concerned the community. As simple as that sounds, Davis believes it represented a radical departure from the department’s previously-dominant goal—which he describes as “arrest and prosecution.” In his words:

I changed the mission. I changed it to: Our ultimate goal is responding to what the community needs. To fix a problem that they've identified. They have clearly identified a problem, they call us every day and they say the man who's living at sixteen Third Street is dealing drugs. Our response to that complaint was to arrest them. But he would literally be out on the street before we finished our paperwork. And he'd be back selling because he had to make his bail money back. So that, I recognized that what we were doing wasn't what the people wanted us to do. They didn't care if we arrested them, they just wanted us to stop the drug dealing.

Moreover, where in the past detectives had tried to focus their attention on the top of the drug distribution pyramid, Davis ordered his officers to focus first and foremost on the street-level dealers who were the immediate cause of neighborhood disruption.

With the change in goals came a change in means as well. Davis did not expect the six officers to “stop the drug dealing” alone. They would have help not only from the rest of the department, but from the rest of the city. “I told these guys that they were now in charge of that street, that the decisions that they made would be followed up on.” As he told his officers:

I want you to tow cars, I want you to call the DPW and clean up buildings. I want buildings boarded up that aren't habitable. I want you to go into the yards and take the mattresses out of the yards and the garbage out of the yards. Call the DPW right down there and do that . . . And I'm going to tell you that this small section of the city is the focus of the Police Department. So if you need the SWAT team,
they'll be there. If you need the Narcotics Bureau, they'll be there. If you want a search warrant done on a place, they will direct all their attention to your operation. Coding = DPO&OS/H; C&R/H

Organizationally, this was possibly the most radical of Davis’s proposals, for it meant that this new, ostensibly isolated unit of the LPD would actually have a great impact on the day-to-day functioning of the rest of the department and even the rest of city government. That was a complete break with the way things had been done. “In the past, the Patrol was always the lowest rung in the police department,” Davis explains. “They were subservient to detectives. They were subservient to all the bosses. They were pretty much the lowest rung.” His job was to break down this hierarchy, to put patrol on top and make the other divisions act as support services for them. “That flipped everything upside down,” Davis maintains. Coding = DPO&OS/H

Securing the Resources

According to Davis, getting the LPD to go along with his plan was not actually very difficult, partly because of the position he himself held. As head of Vice and Narcotics, he had direct control over perhaps the most important support service the department could offer the Centralville officers. And over the years that role had given him a lot of indirect influence as well. He was the contact officer for the SWAT team, since his unit had worked so closely with them over the years. And though the criminal bureau was organizationally separate from Vice at the time, its commanding officer had been Davis’s partner many years ago. “There was probably some grumbling,” Davis recalls. “But we just did it. We sort of had a mission going on.” Of course, Superintendent Sheehan had expressed his opposition to community policing quite strongly, and he might have been expected to interfere with all this activity focused on the new precinct. But by this time Sheehan was already distancing himself from the department’s business: “There were a lot of problems going on at the time and he was not actively involved in a lot of this stuff that went on,” Davis explains. “He’d get involved in the major decisions, like assignments. He was very concerned about who worked where so he’d get involved in that. But he had walked away from a lot of the day-to-day management of the police department.” Coding = DPO&OS/M; C&R/M

Davis describes the process of getting outside resources as somewhat more complicated. But he already had the cooperation of one important agency, the Department of Inspectional Services, which had already begun to work with Davis’s Vice squad to close down drug houses (as described in the previous section). “We had done that prior to the Centralville experiment,” Davis explains, “so we knew that that worked. But we had never done it to the degree that we did it in Centralville.”). Here the continued cooperation of Assistant City Manager Brian Martin was crucial, as Martin was ultimately in charge of inspections. Coding = B/CP

But Centralville soon got the cooperation from other city departments as well. At the meeting with Bernie Lemoine some months ago, Johnson had given the department a mandate to do whatever was necessary to clean up the drug problem, so Davis reports feeling empowered: “I
knew that I had the support of the City Manager's office, so I kind of ran with the ball.” And in the event, the Manager did deliver, as DeMoura explains:

    We had the ability, through the City Manager's office at the time, to contact various agencies. And those agencies were instructed to follow-up immediately with the concerns of that precinct because that was the first one . . . . And that determined if we were to get additional grant money. So everybody in the city got together and said, “You know something, if we don't stick together and take care of these problems as they come in, we're not going to get any more money and this city won't be a safer city to live in. And it could be a potential other city that's declining really bad.”

DeMoura remembers this sense of collaboration as crucial, not just for Centralville but for the future of community policing in Lowell: “I can't downplay that position because that was the catalyst of everything that's occurred since then, that togetherness.”

One final way in which Davis paved the way for Centralville was with the press. In his years running Vice and Narcotics, Davis had developed the strongest relationship with the press of anyone in the LPD at the time, and he used that relationship on the eve of the new precinct’s opening. “I recognized that we had something here that we had to tell the people about,” Davis explains, “and the best way to do that was through the newspaper.” Davis mostly spoke about Centralville with Patrick Cook, the Lowell Sun reporter he had worked with over the years. Cook was able to run a number of articles about the new precinct, and public attention was stirred.

Cook remembers:

    When they opened, the Centralville precinct couldn't make a move without the media covering it because it was under quite the microscope. . . . They got tremendous coverage about just routine issues. They had a fire and some victims were burned out, they had the toys for tots type thing and that ran for a couple of days on the front page. They opened up a basketball school for the kids. Got that right on the front page.

Cook remembers the period as a transitional one; a lifelong resident of the city, he recalls: “Literally for the first time that I had ever seen, the tide turned toward positive publicity” about the police department.

**Carrying out the Plan**

With a guiding vision and the necessary resources and publicity in place, the new precinct hit the ground running. True to its vision, the precinct began by holding a community meeting, which was organized through and held in the local St. Michael’s Church, and advertised in the news media. Residents were furious about the neighborhood’s growing problems, and a huge number—most of them not associated with any organized group at the time—turned out to air their grievances. DeMoura recalls: “I'll never forget the first meeting that we had. There were approximately 500 residents there. And they were up in arms. . . . People were sick and tired of
being propositioned for either drugs or sex in that area. . . . And they wanted immediate action.”

DeMoura promised that they would get it, but he also asked for their help. “I told them that it was very important that we continue the meetings on a bimonthly schedule so we could keep abreast of [the] problems out there, not problems that we perceived as problems as the police, but you perceived as a neighborhood.” It was in those meetings that the team identified particular buildings or other targets to focus on week-by-week, even day-by-day. It was not that the team itself did not quickly learn where the problem areas were on its own. “They knew,” DeMoura explains. “They knew the areas. They knew most of the drug houses from rats and informants. So it wasn't a thing that we didn't know where the serious problems were. We did.”

But identifying problems jointly with the community became a matter of philosophy:

> You know, when we got into this, I said we want it to become a thing where you tell us where your problems are. I knew where problems were, but I wanted the public to tell us where the problems were. That's the big change. And that was one of the dramatic changes that the community now has input in the police department. Never, ever did anybody listen to the community. Never. It just never happened. “Yeah, all right. Get out of here before I lock you up,” that kind of attitude. Following Davis’s model, the officers would then bring the concerns that had been raised back to their precinct and talk strategy about specific houses. “I wasn't there barking orders out as a Captain,” Davis maintains. “I was asking the people who were actually doing the job, what they needed to stop the problem from occurring.” What emerged was a toolkit of ways to deal with the problems that were identified: The officers would put a narcotics case together against a particular apartment; try to condemn the apartment with help from the Building, Fire, or Health inspectors; carry out traditional sting operations against prostitutes; or try techniques reminiscent of Davis’s old “welcome wagon” to frighten away drug dealers, as DeMoura recalls:

> They would knock on the door and say “Hi, Mr. Jones. We've got information that you're dealing drugs here. We've had numerous calls that people are coming and going, which is consistent with drug traffic. We just want to let you know we know that it's happening and we're going to stay outside your door until it stops.” And 90 percent of them moved out because they knew we weren't kidding around.

The dealers in particular did not always give up easily. “You know, we had some fights,” DeMoura admits. “This wasn't easy. There were some times when officers got on foot chases. We arrested tons of people on drugs and prostitution charges . . . The officers were out there full-time, doing it constantly.” Indeed, DeMoura and Davis both put great emphasis on consistency and follow through; according to DeMoura, that was precisely what differentiated Centralville from Davis’s Vice squad, which had used similar tactics: “Once they did a warrant they left. The Drug Unit left. We stayed. See, that was the difference.”
By all accounts, the results were staggering and quick. DeMoura remembers of the unit:

> It cleaned up the area in a real, real short time. People were astonished with the time. It took two weeks, that you could actually walk down the streets again... The calls came from stabbings, fires, drugs, prostitution, to dog complaints and kids playing in the street. That's how drastic the change in calls were. It was really hard for the officers to realize, “Hey, wait a minute, Jesus Christ, we just took care of the serious problem and now you're complaining kids are playing basketball in the street.”

Residents were thrilled as well. One explains, “This was a neighborhood that was like a war zone. Now it is quiet.” Davis vividly recalls one example of gratitude, in this instance from a woman living in southern New Hampshire who, like many commuters, used Bridge Street to reach the major freeways that passed through Lowell:

> I remember sitting there and a woman walked up with a plant and put it on the precinct desk. I said, “Hi,” and she said, “Hi, I'm from Pelham, and I just want to thank you guys for cleaning up the street. I'm not afraid to drive down here anymore.” I was bowled over when that happened. I had no inkling—that was my first indication that we had hit on something that was really helping.

In less time than anyone had expected, the new precinct emerged as a success.

When the most glaring problems with drugs and prostitution had been solved, the officers began to pay more attention to other concerns. For example, the unit would call in the Public Works Department to clean up deteriorated areas that it had cleared of drugs or prostitution: “They sent over guys with trucks to clean up the garbage, hallways, alleyways, and everything,” DeMoura recalls. “You know, abandoned houses, we cleaned up abandoned houses just to make the facade look a little better. Our sign department went over there and put up signs.” And the officers spent time simply getting to know the community, starting after-school activities with neighborhood youth and the like.

Soon the community itself took over many neighborhood improvement projects. Out of the bimonthly meetings DeMoura had called, a number of residents—spurred on by the police department’s work to clean up the area—banded together to form organized groups. One resident’s group became very active not only in neighborhood watch, but also in physically improving the neighborhood—receiving state grants to landscape some streets, working with various agencies to get lights installed, and so on. Other organizations pitched in as well, like a number of Bridge Street merchants who formed a group and began to decorate their street.

*Centralville’s Impact*
The fledgling precinct became a model for how the LPD would operate its future precincts, but its legacy was broader than the tools it field-tested. The ways in which it cemented ties between the police department and several other city agencies were clearly important, as DeMoura testified. The experiment had a similar effect on others, primarily by demonstrating what might be accomplished.  

Perhaps most important, Centralville’s quick and dramatic success seemed to give community policing legitimacy within the department—even among many skeptics. As Davis explains, “Centralville was such an incredible success that nobody could argue with it,” echoing the sentiments of many in the department when asked about the early reception of community policing in the LPD. The Centralville officers did not take a “soft” approach to fighting crime—they attacked it with at least as much vigor, and more success, than the many more traditional officers who had preceded them.  

Centralville had a similar effect on the citizenry of Lowell, though here the effect was sometimes more than anyone wanted. Johnson remembers that after Centralville, “getting a precinct” became a hot political issue in many neighborhoods:

> When that station opened, it was a matter of weeks—not months or years—I’m talking about a matter of weeks, when you knew of the positive effect and response from the people and from the business community and from the neighborhood groups. So now you get more money, and you can do one more. Who's going to get it? . . . It does become a political problem. And then when you decide who’s going to get it, where does it go? Everyone wants it as close to them as they possibly can.

Gone were the halcyon days when Davis had more or less free reign in siting Centralville because “nobody knew what it meant.” But for him and for others invested in community policing, there was a silver lining to this sometimes unwanted pressure: The approach had developed a constituency that would push mightily to expand it throughout the LPD. As one Lieutenant remembers, “When the city at large saw how good Centralville was working, then there was no stopping. . . . It just went through the city like wildfire.”  

The final, and probably most surprising “demonstration effect” that Centralville seemed to have was on Lowell’s drug dealers. That effect became apparent when the next precinct opened in the Acre—arguably an even more troubled area than Centralville. Lieutenant Billy Taylor, who took charge of the Acre precinct when it opened in May of 1994, explains that the Acre—especially the portion around the new precinct—“was really a no-man's land. It was very tough. It was open street level dealing that happened in several different spots, really bad.” As a result Taylor was pessimistic:

> I was admittedly apprehensive about the likelihood of success for this operation. . . . It seemed to work fine in Centralville, [but] I thought that Centralville was much more amenable to this type of police initiative, the community policing. I was not sure it would be a success for the Acre, quite honestly, for a variety of reasons. I thought the magnitude of the problem was much larger than it was in...
Centralville at that point. I thought the resistance that we would meet would be more significant. More importantly, I was not sure that the community would be responsive and back us because it was a very transient community. Coding = E/H

Taylor tried to set his team an obtainable objective, focusing on a small park in the Triangle that had been overrun by drug dealers and junkies. “I felt as though if we could be successful in something like that,” Taylor explains, “then maybe we could branch out.” But when the precinct opened, Taylor was astonished:

We won without firing a shot. They all left. I guess they just anticipated that we were coming and they figured, “Well we will just go somewhere else.” . . . . It was almost as if they decided, “Hey you know what? They are not fooling around, they are going to take over, and we will just leave it.” So the drug dealers to a great extent in that initial phase of the operation just left. It was amazing. I was really amazed because I expected trouble. I expected that they would be shooting at us and all kinds of stuff, but it just did not transpire. Coding = DPO&OS/H

Taylor attributes the dealers’ quick surrender to the earlier success of Centralville together with intense media coverage just before the Acre’s opening: “I think a big part was the media blitz and obviously the success that they had generated in Centralville—which we also used as a public relations tactic to let them know that we have done it there, we are coming over here, you are next, and this is what you can expect.” But although he and Davis spoke with the media several times before the new precinct opened, Taylor does not take credit for a conscious strategy. “I did not realize this [the effect of the media] until afterwards . . . . [But] over the course of the next year or so in trying to analyze this and talking to different people about it, I have come to that conclusion.” Coding = C&R/H

Beyond Centralville

Centralville was the first official step Davis would take in transforming the Lowell Police Department. Sheehan had given him free reign over six officers, a sergeant, and a storefront substation; and the chief had not interfered with the use of other resources in the department and in the city. Davis was able to test his vision in microcosm, and it is hard to find anyone who was not taken with the results—the experiment won allies both inside and outside the LPD. Coding = B&R/H; DPO&OS/H

There were some, however, who thought (like Taylor before he opened the Acre) that Centralville was unique. Union President Flynn, one of the first Centralville officers and usually a strong supporter of community policing, nevertheless says:

But I think the big thing about that program was . . . the six of us wanted to be there, and it was a small, regulated area that you could literally walk the whole route in a day or two. You could basically meet every person on that route. I also think that the people there wanted you there, because it was overridden with drug dealers, it was overridden with prostitution, literally on the corners in the middle of the day. There was a business area in the main drag that obviously because of
that activity the businesses had suffered. I think that everybody in that area wanted us there, and we wanted to be there. Coding = DPO&OS/H

But, Flynn continues, as the program expanded to other areas, there was a danger of moving into areas that would not support community policing as strongly as Centralville had, and which would be more difficult—simply because of their size—to police as intimately as he and his colleagues could police Centralville. Finally, there was an even greater danger, by trying to expand the program department-wide, of running into resistance or simply apathy within the LPD: Flynn and his partners “wanted to be there,” but would the rest of the Lowell Police Department? Coding = DPO&OS/H

Over the next three years, and continuing on even today, Davis would try precisely to expand the Centralville experiment department-wide. Using massive outside funding, mostly from state and federal sources but matched at every step by the city, the LPD would open up six more precincts (plus one “mobile precinct” funded by voluntary contributions) organized on the Centralville model. Davis would try to transform other areas of the department as well: The detective bureaus, the “traditional” patrol force (which for a time was separate from the emerging “precinct structure”), departmental support services, special divisions like internal affairs, and the overall management of the LPD; and each would be integrated as thoroughly as possible into the new, precinct-based community policing program. The final section of this paper will describe the results of these reforms in detail. The following one turns to an examination of how, in broad detail, Davis and his staff tried to carry the reforms out. Coding = DPO&OS/H; B&R/H

4. Expanding, Communicating, and Building Support for the Vision

The vision Davis had developed to guide Centralville seemed to have worked in that context, but something grander was clearly needed to guide the LPD as a whole. Consequently, one of Davis’’s first crucial tasks when he took over the LPD was to begin to elaborate and disseminate a coherent vision for the department. The guiding ideals and plans would change as time progressed, but for the sake of exposition, I will describe the process of developing and communicating them at the outset, only afterwards turning to the way in which the LPD carried them out. Coding = DPO&OS/H; C&R/H

Strategic Planning and Beyond

When Davis took over as Acting Superintendent, he immediately called a meeting with three trusted friends (only one from within the LPD) to ask for advice about how to proceed. At that stage the discussion was quite basic: As Acting Superintendent, Davis needed to decide how quickly to move, given the incomplete mandate his title implied. But as or more important than the substance of these meetings was their process. As Davis explains, “I liked the process of sitting down and kind of planning out how we were going to move forward with this.” So with some prodding from Linda Hart (his newfound-ally from U Mass Lowell’s school of management), Davis decided to institutionalize that process, starting a series of strategic planning meetings with the upper ranks of the LPD. Coding = DPO&OS/H
Davis enlisted Hart’s help to run the early meetings, believing that an outside perspective was exactly what the department needed. “Right at the beginning I recognized that Police Administrators could be very myopic,” he explains. “They only see things through the eyes of a Police Administrator. And I thought it was critical to bring in civilians, bring in people from business, bring in people from different disciplines, to talk a little bit about how things are done in different places.” Thankfully, the university was willing to donate some of Hart’s time; \textsuperscript{17} to support later sessions, the LPD wrote a small line item for organizational development into some state grant proposals. \textsuperscript{18} Coding = C&R/H

The sessions consisted of brainstorming among the department’s command staff (ranks of Lieutenant through Superintendent), supplemented by surveys of others in the LPD. The goal of the sessions was to define a mission for the department, and to elaborate a set of conditions that needed to be established if the LPD was to achieve that mission. Their ultimate product was a prioritized set of reforms that the department needed to undertake over the coming years in order to realize its missions. Coding = DPO&OS/H; MEI/H

The sessions were to be truly participatory, so that the final plan would reflect a consensus among everyone present at them (and informed by suggestions made by the rest of the department). But as Hart remembers it, creating a truly participatory atmosphere in the early meetings was difficult because of the culture of the department:

We said, “Well Ed will be here to give you points of clarification if need be on something and he'll be engaged, but he's not going to be the one who's primarily coming up with the ideas, and you're deciding to agree or disagree with him.” And they were so uncomfortable. I mean, they did it and they did a great job. And Ed was really just really impressed by the plan they ended up coming up with. But they were so frustrated with the fact that they couldn't hear what Ed would have said first, and that they were going into territory where they didn't actually know what he thought in that area. So one time one of them said to somebody else, “You've known him for a long time, what do you think he's thinking?” Coding = DPO&OS/M; MEI/M

Though she has begun to get very positive feedback from participants in recent strategic planning sessions, Hart remembers the early meetings as difficult ones: “A lot of them didn't like it. You know, a lot of them really didn't like it. . . . It was very hard for them to see that anything good was really going to come out of it.” Eventually, Hart was apparently able to overcome the hierarchical style of decisionmaking that was ingrained in the LPD’s past. Davis recalls: “She knew the process; I didn't know how to do a team-based meeting. And she'd break them out into groups, I mean, I'm aware of it now, but back then, it was really foreign to me.” Coding = DPO&OS/M; MEI/M

There was some tension around the major decision of which direction to take the department. Lieutenant Susan Siopes, whose job it would be to coordinate the LPD’s fledgling community policing program, recalls: “You know, you got a variety of responses, all levels. Some were kind of interested. A lot were on the fence. And there were a few adamantly opposed to any kind of change whatsoever, who feel it’s just constitutionally wrong to change.” But ultimately the early
sessions came to a consensus about the most important goals for the department.”

Most notably, they decided that the LPD as a whole had to embrace community policing—it should not be restricted to the Centralville precinct or some larger “special unit.” The department would be completely organized along geographic lines, dividing the city of Lowell into three sectors associated with one, or sometimes two, precincts. The head of each sector would act like a police chief for his or her area, with 24-hour responsibility for the problems that arose in it. Davis’s job would have less and less to do with the day-to-day operations of the police department, and more to do with interfacing with the outside world. Most of these ideas did not originate with Davis. Hart recalls, “What was really striking to me was that it wasn't Ed, it was that group that came up with the idea that community policing needed not to be something that happened in a little pocket here and there.”

When the first sessions had ended, two members of the command staff were assigned to pull out the crucial ideas and write up the results as a strategic plan for the Lowell Police Department. The resulting document identified a number of crucial priorities, like reform of internal affairs, creation of a new domestic violence unit, and improvement of training in the LPD. But the centerpiece was clearly the structural reform of the department: The LPD was to designate an overall coordinator of its community policing program; restructure the department geographically, with mid-level management at the head of the new sectors; and create a mentoring system that stretched from the Superintendent to the Patrol Officer. The final document would serve as not only as an internal five-year plan, but also as a document in which the LPD accounted for its intentions to the outside world: The plan served as the basis for a number of grant applications, and it was ultimately delivered to city manager Richard Johnson as a statement of the LPD’s goals and objectives (see Figure 2).

**Demonstrating a Commitment to Change**

Before the strategic planning process had been completed, Davis faced the immediate decision described above: How quickly should he act, given his nebulous position as Acting Superintendent? Indeed, if the legislation to secure Sheehan’s retirement benefits did not go through, the Superintendent might not retire at all. Davis remembers his dilemma vividly:

It was a difficult transition time. Jack [Sheehan] was very upset with Johnson at the time. He hadn't removed anything out of his office. Even the bathroom there, he had all his shaving stuff right there in the bathroom. So I was working off the table in the office for over a year, where I didn't sit at his desk, it was his desk. . . . I didn't wear a Superintendent's badge, I didn't come in uniform, in a Superintendent's uniform. I stayed pretty much in plain clothes and there was an old Chief's badge I wore as opposed to the Superintendent. I didn't want to—I was an acting Chief, I wasn't a Superintendent. So I tried to walk very softly on that, but at the same time, I recognized that it was a critical period in the development of the Police Department.
In the end, the latter consideration outweighed the former: Davis would hold back somewhat, trying to pay Sheehan respect in the symbolic ways he described above. But especially given the momentum that Centralville had established, he and the close friends with whom he had called that first meeting determined that the time was ripe for change. Coding = DPO&OS/M

Davis began with a number of high-visibility gestures intended to show that change was in the air. “I did a bunch of things that were critical to making clear that there was a new game plan,” he explains.

I changed the colors of the cruisers. Jack was very upset about that. I didn't ask for his permission, I just did it….I cleaned the place up. The place was really nasty looking. I started walking to the main desk and throwing books out. And they were very upset at me when I did that. There were books that had been there for years that nobody ever looked at; they were just there. I felt it was important for me, every time I was someplace where there was a bunch of offices, to do something outrageous to make it clear that we were going to change things. So I took the 1986 City Directory that had been sitting around for six years and I threw it away. And somebody says to me, “That's the 1986 City Directory.” I said, “I know, and it's gone. And so are the 1942 and '43 phone books.” And I threw those away. I mean, the place was just littered with all this old stuff that nobody would throw away. . . . I also recognized that the front desk was a horror show and I changed the front desk. And that really kind of upset the apple cart. . . . I took that window out [the Plexiglas window described in the previous section], and I moved the front desk where it is now . . . I eventually civilianized the desk, but the first thing I did was make sure that there was a standard of conduct there that was acceptable. Coding = DPO&OS/H; B&R/H; C&R/H

Davis feels that these demonstrations had the intended effect: “They knew something, either something bad or something good was happening that day,” he explains. Coding = DPO&OS/H

This level of activity ultimately became a matter of philosophy. “Some people have an attitude of do one thing at a time and do it very well,” Davis observes. “My attitude was to do everything all at once. . . . So I jumped in with both feet and changed the whole place, a couple times.” In some ways, Davis did not have much choice in the matter, as the growing clamor from the community for more precincts had an important effect on the pace of change. In any case, the turbulence associated with rapid change—together with the staffing crisis the LPD still faced—seems to have disoriented many in the LPD, who found that the pace of change made it difficult to keep track of. “I think that we tried to do too many things too fast,” one of Davis’s supporters maintains. Later sections will return to this idea; here it is enough to note that Davis had put the LPD on notice: Business would not be as usual. Coding = DPO&OS/H

**Gaining Commitment within the LPD**

Davis intended these dramatic acts to raise the department’s attention. Now he had to use that attention to broadcast his message. Coding = C&R/H

**Police Chief as Teacher**
As a matter of philosophy, Davis feels that this aspect of his job as Superintendent is crucial: “You have to be 90% teacher when you have this job,” he explains. “And that's what I try to do.” Consequently, one of his first actions as Acting Superintendent was to assemble the entire LPD command staff in one room and spend eight hours on community policing “training.” In this session Davis tried to cover the high points of the SMIP training he had attended, assigning his staff some literature he had read at SMIP (buying 50 copies each of Beyond 911 and Problem-Oriented Policing). “So I tried to enlist their cooperation and I tried to do some training with them at first,” Davis explains.

More than simply communicating some of the principles of the new policing, Davis tried to convey the new management style he intended to bring to the department. I asked them all for their input. I asked them all for some information on how they felt that this would work. And I really wanted to make them managers—not Superior Officers, but managers of the Police Department. I wanted to know what they thought and they had never been asked that before. So there was some cultural shock. This was an organization where all the orders came from the Chief, and he was some all-knowing human that sent down through the chain of command these directives that were to be followed at the cost of losing [your] job. But I didn't operate like that, I don't like to operate like that.

This particular lesson would be ongoing, something that Davis tries to develop to this day in the department’s recently-established COMPSTAT meetings (modeled on the NYPD’s command staff meetings of the same name). “In teaching them what I want from them,” Davis explains, “sometimes the best way to do that is to have them actually involved in it. So [in the COMPSTAT meetings] I ask them exactly what they're working on and how they've come to this conclusion. And I try to do that in front of people, so that eventually they'll get the idea of it, that it's their responsibility.”

Police Chief as Negotiator

Ultimately, of course, the vision of how things would be done needed to trickle down to the ranks. Davis would try to communicate directly with officers and to get their take on the department’s changes (for example, he developed a close rapport with one young officer, using him as a sounding board for new ideas). But in the end, a Superintendent could not do everything himself—other managers in the department would eventually have to help spread the new philosophy. Still, Davis could build support with the department-at-large, especially the patrol force, in at least two ways.

The first was by dealing with bread-and-butter issues. Davis himself does not describe a conscious strategy for this, but many officers explain their high regard for him and his mission for the department in terms of the lengths he will go to in order to look out for their interests. For example, many LPD officers credit Davis with using grant money to expand a grossly-understaffed department—the number of sworn officers has skyrocketed from 159 to over 240 in little more than three years. This effort extended the credibility Davis had already established as Lieutenant, when he stepped-up to the plate after the city threatened to lay off 32 officers at the
depths of its crisis. More generally, many officers (including both the president and vice president of the patrol officers’ union) credit Davis with helping to improve pay, safety, and equipment dramatically over the past few years. Officers credit Davis with other improvements in working conditions as well, like a more judicious approach to discipline. One aspect of that is the department’s new employee assistance program, which can help officers with problems like alcoholism; union president Jerry Flynn maintains about the program: “Scores of officers have gone through this program and returned to be productive members of this department who maybe 10 or 15 years ago would have been fired.”

The other way in which Davis has earned respect from the department is through what most perceive to be an authentically participatory style to management. In practice, this means that the Superintendent is willing to give as well as take in negotiations over change. The strategic planning sessions provide one example, and there Davis was apparently quite conscious of the idea that giving management a voice might encourage buy-in. Siopes explains that “we thought we needed a strategic planning, getting together with all of the upper level managers anyway, lieutenants and captains, because we knew if they didn't buy in and get on board that they would probably deep six the whole thing somewhere along the way and not too far down the line.”

But the most concrete examples of this decisionmaking style come from Davis’s work with the patrol officers’ union throughout the process of change. As he summarized the matter, “I've given in to some of the demands that they've made against my better judgment, just to maintain consensus and to make sure that I had them working for me.” The most dramatic example is Davis’s concession to the union’s demands for a seniority-based system of personnel assignment, according to which every eighteen months, officers in the patrol force bid for their own assignments. Davis opposed this provision strongly: “It's very difficult for me to deal with because I can't put a Cambodian Officer into a Cambodian neighborhood. I can't take two really reactive cops and put them with two really proactive community policing officers so that there will be some kind of a balance there. They get to pick their own locations.” But as one of his last acts before taking leave of the LPD, Sheehan had promised the seniority system to the union. And while Davis tried to win the provision back, he ultimately gave in:

I had them amend a little bit so it was easier for me to work with. But I had to sacrifice my principles on this particular issue for the larger mission which was to make sure the patrol force keeps working. And I think that that's paramount to what I'm trying to accomplish. The union participation in what we do is critical, it's critical to making sure that these guys continue to work.

Flynn views the incident in essentially the same terms, explaining that even after the union vote against Davis’s counterproposal, “He could have bumped heads with us. He could have said, ‘Well, to hell with the pay raise’ [which was included in the same contract] What he said was, ‘I'm not going to let this issue hold up the rest of the contract,” something for which Flynn, at least, gives Davis great credit.

Gaining Commitment Outside the LPD
So by acting the parts of teacher and negotiator, Davis tried to build support for the changes to come within the LPD. But the new Acting Superintendent focused considerable attention to building a coalition of support in the outside world as well. Coding = C&R/H

Most simply, Davis began to open up the department’s decisionmaking to outside eyes. He explains that he “opened the doors up for the Police Department for the first time, and I talked frankly about staffing issues, and I talked frankly about budget issues. I talked frankly about the internal affairs function which is always a matter of great concern to the community groups.” He and the LPD internalized many of these concerns—for example, we will see that the department completely revamped its internal affairs function, in part in response to concerns raised by community groups, and in part because of pressure from city government, which was facing growing civil liability suits against the department. Coding = C&R/H

But Davis became increasingly uneasy with the essentially reactive stance that this type of interaction with the community implied. In particular, after Centralville the precinct issue became overwhelming, as practically every neighborhood in Lowell demanded something similar. Davis summarizes the feeling with an aphorism: “There’s a saying in community policing, ‘You can teach the bear to dance, but you can't necessarily tell it when to stop.’ That was what happened with these community groups.” For Davis, the problem was that the department lost any control over the agenda—the dialogue with the community focused exclusively on issues that the groups themselves raised. “We were always reactive. We were always going to a community group to answer for a particular injustice or a particular problem that was observed by that group.” Coding = C&R/H; E/H

In some cases Davis tried to win back partial control of the agenda not by disengaging from the community-initiated dialogue, but by engaging it proactively. One often-told story in this vein concerns the siting of the Highlands precinct, which became a focus of conflict between the department and a nearby neighborhood group. The problem was simple: The LPD wanted to locate the precinct in the largely Cambodian Lower Highlands neighborhood, and the local Boy’s Club had offered the department space in a location that lay at the center of many of the area’s problems. But the community group, representing the predominantly-white Cupples Square neighborhood, argued that the new precinct should be located in their neighborhood. Well-connected in local politics, the group brought their concerns to a number of city councilors, and Davis began to feel pressure to change his mind about the location of the site. Coding = C&R/H; E/B

Davis felt he was in the right in this case: “This was clearly just a small segment of the community,” he maintains, “and it wasn't the Cambodian people who really needed the services. That's where people were actually dying” Davis turned to Hart for advice:

So she said, “Okay, well, it sounds to me like you have to put together a really good presentation that examines that data. So we'll go out and we'll take photos of the two locations and try to sell it to the group. And in addition to that, I think that you have to bring a different constituency to the meeting.” So she went out and actively recruited the Cambodian community to appear at this meeting. So here you have this group of two hundred or so white lower-middle class individuals
who are pretty politically-savvy. And all of a sudden, fifty or a hundred Cambodian people come in and sit down at the meeting. They don't know what to do. The people at the meeting didn't know how to handle this. And then we walked in and we put on a really good presentation with data and photos of what the two locations looked like.  

Coding = D&IC/M; E/H; C&R/H

Going in to the meeting, Davis had taken a hand vote to gauge support for the two sites, and he estimates that three-quarters of those voting preferred the Cupples Square location. But after the presentation—when the department presented crime statistics and other basic information about the two areas—, sentiment had switched, and the group overwhelmingly voted to go with the Boy’s Club site. City manager Johnson, who attended the meeting with Davis, still remembers the event with astonishment:

I don't think I've ever seen a neighborhood group where you expect to go in and get the shit kicked out of you and people throwing rocks at you—and he went in there with such a positive approach, with statistics, and facts and figures, that the people basically said, “He's our expert. He's the leader of this thing. We've got to give him the support.” And they did. And that doesn't happen often, when people have a predetermined position. And they definitely had predetermined position going in, no question about it.  

Coding = C&R/H; E/H

Davis insists that he would have sited the precinct where the group wanted (and given the growing political pressure, he might have had no choice): “This wasn't an ego thing. I mean, if the community really wants something, even against my better judgment, I'll do it, because I'm here to serve the community.” But by engaging in a serious deliberation, and recruiting an under-represented constituency (thankfully, Davis reports that no one complained that the department had “stacked the vote”), he was able to come to a mutual agreement with the community.  

Coding = C&R/H; E/H; D&IC/H

With his growing frustration over losing control of the agenda, Davis took the proactive approach even further by sponsoring the department’s own massive community meeting, which focused on Lowell’s declining downtown. He remembers,

I had a meeting that was sponsored by the Police Department. The downtown business district had been decimated by businesses leaving because of the crime problem. And I invited everybody in the city that was left—I sent police officers in uniform with invitations—, and I held a meeting at the Sheraton. And I brought the whole Command Staff of the Police Department there and sat them in front of all the business people in the downtown area. And I said to them, “Look, we're going to make a difference here. If you have a problem here, you call this person. This is Captain so and so, this is Lieutenant so and so, they're in charge of this, they're in charge of that. We're going to have a sheet of paper before you leave that will show you how your police department works.”  

Coding = C&R/H

The meeting was a huge success, completely filling the ballroom at Lowell’s Sheraton hotel. As Davis sees it, the event provided a dual opportunity: “I indicated not only to the people in the
city, but to the Command Staff, that things were going to be a little different.” Davis has maintained a strong relationship with the downtown business community ever since. Coding = C&R/H

But with this proactive gesture Davis did not mean to foreclose any dialogue initiated by the community. Indeed, he implicitly encouraged this sort of dialogue to such a degree that the burden became unmanageable (especially given his need, during this time of great change, to focus so much attention internally). At about this time Davis was at a going-away party for an old friend and ran into a young woman named Christine Cole, who had been a victim/witness advocate and worked closely with Davis on child abuse cases. Cole was finishing up a degree in psychology at U Mass Lowell, and as the two began talking, Davis recognized that someone like Cole could help him manage growing demands from the community. Coding = C&R/H

As part of her coursework, Cole had recently been at a community group where the police became a topic of discussion. “There was no police representation at the meeting,” Cole remembers, “and they were clearly frustrated, angry, felt that they had been patronized by the police department, and so on and so forth.” When Davis relayed his frustration about dealing with community groups to Cole, she told him about this meeting:

And I said, “Well, it's interesting because I have the perfect example for you. There was nobody there. And had there been somebody there, somebody could have rushed to your defense, somebody could have explained things. They had misinformation, they misunderstood, and because of that were displacing anger on the police department and really holding them responsible for things that weren't their responsibility.” Jokingly, I said, “What a great job that would be to do that kind of stuff.” Coding = C&R/M

Davis seized on the idea, seeing in Cole someone who could help manage the day-to-day demands he had been facing—but also someone who, as a civilian outside the chain of command, would be forthcoming in bringing community concerns to his attention. Cole’s new position as community liaison (which she started in July of 1994) was not to absolve the rest of the department from responsibility for working with the community; in part her job would be to help the patrol force develop ties with the community. But she would hopefully help tame the increasingly out-of-control bear. Coding = C&R/H

Davis attended to the outside world in many other ways. He worked closely with city government throughout this period, and also sought advice and support from Senator Paul Tsongas (whose permanent residence was in Lowell) on occasion (for example, Tsongas helped Davis come up with a mission statement for the department, which was to create “the safest city of its size in the nation”). Davis worked closely with many other elements of the community as well, notably the schools department and the local University. We will examine other ways in which the environment pushed, facilitated, or hindered the LPD’s coming changes below; here note only that Davis went to great lengths to develop a supporting coalition not only inside the LPD, but also outside of it. Coding = C&R/H

5. Putting the Plan into Action
So throughout these busy years, a vision and plan for the LPD was evolving from Davis’s original epiphany, and Davis was using the leadership opportunity he had been given in the department to develop several coalitions for change. In parallel with these developments, the department began to put the plans into action. **Coding = DPO&OS/H**

The emerging substance of the vision that the LPD would try to implement can be described in terms of two elements. First, there would be a fundamental change in the style of management of the department, towards a team-based system that made patrol officers the central focus of work. Second, the department would develop or transform a number of specialized services in order to support this new approach to management, and also to support the more specific goals identified in the strategic planning systems—things like management information systems, internal affairs, and accreditation. **Coding = DPO&OS/H**

Here we will examine how the LPD implemented one example from each of these two categories. First, we will examine how the LPD tried to refocus attention on patrol—probably the most central aspect of its transformation. Second, we will examine the transformation of the department’s internal affairs function. This story demonstrates the way in which the LPD managed one of the most potentially explosive elements of its emerging plan—particularly the importance and limits of consensus-building, and the flexibility and learning that the department’s new management style afforded. (A later section on the COPS grants will examine two more examples from this category: The development of a domestic violence program, and the transformation of MIS.) **Coding = DPO&OS/H**

Delegation of authority emerges as a central theme in both stories: Davis did little direct implementation work himself, as a matter of philosophy (something he claims to have learned from William Bratton, from whom he sought advice after taking over the LPD). In Davis’s word, “to delegate, and to hold people responsible after you've delegated the responsibility to them . . . [is] the only way you can get done what we've been able to get done in such a short period of time.” For example, speaking of one assignment he made to a bureau that needed reform, Davis explains that he chose a talented individual but otherwise did not have much to do with the process: “I let him make those decisions. I didn't try to interfere, but I made it clear to the boss that the boss is of value to the organization and, in large part, his professional reputation was staked upon how well the bureau ran. So, it was necessary for him to make changes and it made the bureau run properly.” The stories that follow illustrate what the idea of delegation means in practice, and how the LPD’s transformation was aided by the talented staff Davis inherited or brought on. **Coding = MEI/H**

**The Transformation of the Patrol Force**

The strategic planning sessions initially envisioned a geographically-basic patrol force. Foot patrol officers with no 911 responsibilities at all would make up part of this force, operating out of the developing precinct system. The other part of the force consisted of cruiser officers with 911 responsibility, who would be assigned to three sectors that encompassed from one to three precincts. **Coding = DPO&OS/M; D&IC/M**
In its early years the community policing program clearly focused on the precincts, which the department was opening one-by-one as grant money was awarded (after Centralville, the LPD opened four more precincts in 1994, one in 1995, and one in 1997). So implementing the new philosophy essentially meant getting the precincts up and running—a task delegated to the sergeants who commanded them. Most of the precincts developed in ways very similar to Centralville, which throughout this period served as a prototype: Sergeants were directed to develop a team approach to policing, to build partnerships with the community, and to build skills in problem-solving. But the sergeants did have discretion to change the way the precincts operated (Taylor, for example, started bicycle patrols and basketball leagues in the Acre precinct after he opened it), and the department developed new support services to help the precincts do their work (like the community surveys it began to conduct with the assistance of U Mass Lowell).

The Community Policing Coordinators

The first strategic planning meetings had envisioned the position of community policing coordinator to guide the emerging program, and Davis chose a young Lieutenant named Susan Siopes for the job. Siopes had studied community policing in college, and her first assignment in the LPD (back in 1978) had been with a group of officers who were informally doing something like what we would call “community policing” today. Because of this experience, she felt that community policing might have real potential: “I knew it wasn’t just pie in the sky,” Siopes explains, so she expressed a strong interest in the new position. “I was kind of excited to think that we might be going in that direction, and [I] told [Davis] that I’d like to work with him to see if we couldn't get community policing going here.”

Siopes describes her role as trying “to get people motivated in that direction, to get people to understand what they were doing.” At the beginning, her role reflected the specialization of community policing in the precincts: She spent much of her time simply helping to get the precincts opened, playing an important role in securing a number of early grants (though as her workload swelled, two newly-hired civilians would take over the task). And she worked particularly closely with the sergeants who were actually supposed to run the new precincts once they were opened, helping them to understand what community policing meant in practice. But the precincts, while the center of community policing, were not to be its only home. So Siopes also tried to work with the rest of the department in the same way, trying to help the Captains (then in charge of shifts) and Lieutenants put the ideas of community policing into practice.

Siopes was soon joined by Captain Chauncey Normandin, who took over the Patrol Operations Bureau (later renamed Neighborhood Services). Normandin explains that much of the pair’s work focused on training. In meetings that ranged from bimonthly to monthly, they tried to help sector Lieutenants (and sometimes their sergeants) learn management techniques like team-building and how to run meetings, as well as the philosophy and practice of problem-solving (mainly accomplished through hands-on help with actual projects). Normandin and Siopes were themselves well-trained in these aspects of community policing; Normandin, for example, explains: “I probably spend three months a year away from the city just going to conferences and stuff like that,” something the department supported heavily. Those in attendance at these in-
house training sessions were expected to carry the word back to their own sergeants and officers, creating a trickle-down system of training. As Normandin explains it, “sergeants would supervise and mentor patrol officers, lieutenants should supervise and mentor sergeants, and the captains would supervise and mentor lieutenants.” He and Siopes were to serve as the prime movers in this process.  

These in-housing meetings were supplemented by stepped-up in-service training, and two more global training programs. First, in 1995 the department sponsored a department-wide training in problem-oriented policing (recently followed-up by another in the Spring of 1997). Organized through PERF, this session spent three days with command staff and two with patrol officers, trying to instill the ideas and practice of problem-solving. Second, the department changed the way it trained new recruits. The training academy itself increased the time it spent on community policing tenfold (a change we will explore further below). But the department also instituted a new apprenticeship system, whereby new recruits would be assigned to specially-trained field training officers (FTOs) who would help them learn how policing was done in the LPD. While common in the South and West, the FTO system has been less prevalent in the Northeast, and it had never been used before in the LPD.

Siopes and Normandin did have a number of responsibilities for day-to-day operations, as well. As community policing coordinators they were empowered to reshuffle departmental resources and otherwise direct LPD operations in ways that would support community policing. For example, the two were empowered to pull officers for special projects where necessary, or to direct Lieutenants’ attention towards emerging problems in their sectors. But the bulk of their job, like Davis’s, was to play the role of teacher.

Finally, Siopes and Normandin were hardly alone in changing the way the managers and patrol force thought about their jobs. Most notably, Christine Cole, the new community liaison, tried to act as a catalyst in making the sworn officers more closely connected with community groups. In part this meant exhortation: She describes trying “to constantly push, ‘What does the community think about that? . . . . Have we talked to them about that? Have we asked them about it?’” And in part it meant literally hands-on mentoring: “I remember going to a couple of meetings where I remember taking [a patrol officer] by the hand and going, ‘Come on, we're going to go integrate.’” Cole feels that the process is working, offering this anecdote as evidence:

Thinking about what Wayne said to me one day. Wayne Hayes is a real active leader in one of the community groups. . . . He'll call every couple of days. “You got anything to tell me?” “This is what I have to tell you.” About three or four months ago, he said, “I don't think we need you anymore. The sergeant's doing this. Patrolman's doing this.” . . . Which is exactly how we envisioned things. We facilitate and teach and model, but ultimately it's the people, the men and women in uniform, that are going to have to do it. Because as much as we can say, “I'm Christine Cole from the police department,” when it comes down to it, I'm not the police.

Where necessary, Cole has Davis’s ear—she works outside the command structure——, and she can apprise him of community relations stumbling-blocks.
**Challenges**

A number of problems quickly emerged. Most fundamentally, support for community policing—though ostensibly unanimous in the strategic planning meetings—was uneven in the department. The captain in charge of the early night shift was a particularly clear case, as Siopes explains:

> He was ready for retirement, you know, getting quite close to it, and made it pretty clear that he really didn't want to change his stripes this late in the game and wasn't going to get in the way, but really wasn't going to stand out there and carry the flag for community policing either. . . . . Mainly it was just an attitude of, “This stuff doesn't work, cops don't want to be doing that, cops want to be out catching the bad guys, that's what they're supposed to be doing out there.” That kind of talk over and over and over . . . It just made officers wary about being too openly in favor of doing community policing—some officers. And then of course there were some that said, “I'm going to do it,” and they did it. But most of your guys want to hear that their boss is supporting what they're doing out there.

Coding = DPO&OS/M

Siopes brought the problem to Davis’s attention, but even the chief’s coaxing did not seem to have any effect on the recalcitrant shift commander. Coding = DPO&OS/B

This specific problem seemed to raise a more general one. By putting high-ranking (and often traditionally-minded) Captains in charge of shifts, the department seemed to be sending the wrong message: That the old temporal organization took priority over the new geographic one (the newly-created sectors were headed by Lieutenants, as was the entire community policing program). Coding = DPO&OS/B

The department reacted to the problem in two ways: First, it brought in Normandin to head up the patrol bureau, with a clear mandate to assist Siopes in her overall coordination of community policing. “A captain was brought on board in the hopes that we could deal with captains in that way,” Siopes explains. “A captain could talk to captains.” Second, and later on, the department began to reallocate the command positions so that Captains would be in charge of the geographic sectors, with responsibility for long-term planning for the area, while Lieutenants would be in charge of the shifts and be responsible for implementing the sector plans. This replacement was accomplished by a process of attrition, as Captains retired or left their positions for extended training or even personal problems. (In fact, Siopes believes that the initial idea that Lieutenants might take over the shifts may have emerged serendipitously: One captain was forced to leave his shift for personal reasons, but his Lieutenant was able to take over the job without difficulty.) Eventually, Siopes and Normandin’s positions were abolished, and the job of coordinating community policing became fragmented into the three sector captain positions. For example, the “in-house training” that they provided is now provided by the sector captains. Coding = DPO&OS/M; MEI/M

A separate problem emerged concerning the division of the patrol force into cruisers and precincts. Within a year it became clear that that system was not working: “It was becoming very nasty in here,” Davis explains. “The patrol officers on the street looked at this special unit as sort
of another detective bureau. They were in uniform, though, and they were getting all the resources of the police department, and the regular cops didn't get anything." To manage this emerging conflict, the department tried to merge the two halves of patrol somewhat. Normandin explains this as a process of training in which they “try to get them the idea of sector mentality as opposed to, ‘Well I am assigned to a cruiser, and I am assigned to a walking route, and I am assigned to the precinct.’ You are always assigned to the same sector.” Moreover, the department has tried to involve patrol officers more closely in the precincts’ problem-solving. **Coding = DPO&OS/M**

Finally, the department’s chronic staffing shortage made Siopes and Normandin’s jobs difficult. Although the number of officers grew enormously in a very short period of time, this growth actually exacerbated staffing problems in the short run, because of the demands that training the new recruits (and training their FTOs) imposed. Normandin explains:

> It was a problem getting the information out to the people that needed it, the patrol officers and the sergeants, because there was no consistency in it as far as having them all available at the same time . . . Right now, I will go in and have a meeting in my sector. I would bet that 80 percent of the people in my sector will be at that meeting. A year ago, I would have been lucky to get 30 percent because they would have to be pulled for other assignments—they would not be accessible to have them at the meeting to tie them up for an hour or so. **Coding = T/M; B&R/B**

With department staffing so taut, it was difficult to justify widespread attendance at training sessions. For example, the initial problem-oriented policing in early 1995 was not followed up for over two years, though Normandin had wanted to do so within a matter of months. As a result, the community policing message did not get out as evenly as some hoped. One sergeant explains,

> Initial training is real important, and consistent follow through afterwards in making it known, not make it secret that [we are doing] community policing. We went through this. We went through it with a guy who would go to roll call and he would not hear a thing. I probably was a little guilty of it myself because as a supervisor you would not hear anything about community policing. And there were times when you would hear patrolmen and supervisors say, “Hey are we still into the community policing stuff?” **Coding = DPO&OS/M; T/M; B&R/B**

Despite these challenges, as the final section will demonstrate, the department was able to make some fundamental changes in the way its patrol force operated. There are still problems, to be sure: Sergeants who simply do not run their shifts according to community policing principles; and Lieutenants who undermine sector plans by reshuffling personnel to deal with short-term issues. But many of the emerging problems have come quickly to Davis’s attention in strategic planning sessions, surveys of patrol officers, the new COMPSTAT procedure (which Davis tried to use to keep tabs on what was happening throughout the department), or directly from the personnel involved (Davis maintains an open-door policy and has tried to encourage subordinates to bring problems to his attention). So through a process of constant vigilance and
error-correction, and through constant reiteration of the basic message, the department gradually
shifted the way its patrol force performed its job. 

**Coding = DPO&OS/M; B&R/B; MEI/B; C&R/H**

**Internal Affairs**

The first strategic planning sessions identified reform of internal affairs (called “Professional
Standards” in the LPD) as a top priority. As described above, community groups often raised
concerns about the process, and city government had been pressuring the department to make
changes because of civil liability suits it was facing. And more fundamentally, Davis explains his
feelings on the matter bluntly: “The IAD process was not legitimate.” 

**Coding = DPO&OS/M; E/B**

Davis selected Chauncey Normandin to head up the transformation of IAD and some of his most
talented investigators to work under him. To make sure they got off on the right track, Davis sent
the team out of state to be trained on the topic by the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (IACP). But other than this he delegated the responsibility completely; as Normandin
remembers it: “The chief charged me with putting a policy together and he allowed me free reign
to do whatever I felt was right.” 

**Coding = MEI/H; T/H**

The first thing Normandin noticed upon taking over the unit was how few complaints were on
file: “I was amazed that ten years of records were in one file cabinet drawer for a department of
this size,” he remembers. “And I just knew right off the bat that that wasn’t right.” The problem,
of course, was the system described in the first section of this report, in which complainants were
routinely turned away on the grounds that the supervisor for officer in question was off-duty; and
in which other complaints were routinely handled informally by the supervisor. Normandin felt
that this system—which typically left complainants angry or even suspicious of a cover-up—was
“contrary to everything that we are trying to do in the community police effort.”

**Coding = C&R/B; E/B**

At the same time, Normandin also recognized that this would be an extremely touchy area to
reform. He was committed to ensuring that officers were protected: “A city of this size with this
many police officers will get complaints,” he explains. “But we also can show that of these
complaints, not all of them are founded. . . . [So I] also wanted to make sure that the officers
were protected, and afford them no fewer rights than any other person would be afforded.” But
he knew that his word alone would not reassure the officers, particularly since he was a member
of the command staff. 

**Coding = E/M**

To help deal with this problem, Normandin enlisted the help of officer Brian McMahon, who
was at the time the vice-president of the patrol officer’s union, and by all accounts a trusted
member of the department. Normandin did not simply hope that patrol officers would be
reassured by the fact that one of their own had a voice in forging the new policy. He also hoped
that McMahon could serve as an ambassador to the patrol force: “Brian could present it to his
union and say, ‘Look, this is what we are doing, this is why we are doing it.’ Relieve all of their
fears.” And Normandin himself was president of the Superior Officers’ Union (representing
sergeants and above), so that he could do the same for his union. Finally, Normandin also
worked closely with Garrett Sheehan, then head of criminal investigations. Sheehan was also a trusted member of the department, and he was the brother of the recently-retired chief—so he would hopefully have clout with precisely the officers who might feel somewhat alienated by Davis’s reforms. **Coding = C&R/H**

For the substance of the policy, the team looked primarily to other departments. “I figured we are eventually going for accreditation,” Normandin remembers, referring to another strategic planning goal. “Maybe the best way to start would be to find a couple of accredited departments.” So he sent away for information from a number of accredited departments and from the accreditation commission itself. But he also talked extensively with officers from the Miami police department, which had become well-known for its policies on the use of force, and he reviewed information from PERF and other agencies as well as the IACP model policy. **Coding = DPO&OS/M; C&R/M**

With all this information, Normandin sat down and drafted a section at a time, giving each one to Bryan McMahon to review. “And he would mark it up in red and do different things. And I would make the changes. Or if I had a conflict with something he had, a change he would want to make, we would sit down and we would talk about it.” When the team reached the issue of criminal charges against officers, they enlisted Sheehan’s advice. “He didn't want to be in the business of investigating Lowell cops,” Normandin remembers, and he knew that the public would have little faith in such an investigation anyway. So the team developed a very specific set of guidelines about when cases would be turned over to the District Attorney’s office. **Coding = DPO&OS/B**

Normandin describes the policy that emerged as specific and comprehensive: “It didn't leave a lot of discretion as to how things would react when an officer faces a problem or a potential problem.” All complaints would be forwarded directly to the internal affairs office as soon as they were received (the general order announcing the policy stated in boldface: “No person should be directed to return at a later time or to call back later”). All complaints would be investigated fairly, and both the complainant and the officer would be notified in writing about the outcome of the case. And so the team submitted the new policy to Davis, who found it somewhat lengthy but ultimately signed off on it. **Coding = DPO&OS/B; MEI/B; E/H**

The policy would have its first test shortly when an LPD officer was accused of pistol-whipping two people when he was off duty. “I was called from home by the criminal bureau,” Normandin remembers. “I went over what they had for information up to that point, and I realized that if what these citizens had alleged was 50 percent true, we were looking at an officer with criminal charges—potentially felony charges.” In accordance with the policy on criminal charges he, Sheehan, and McMahon had agreed upon, Normandin turned the case over to the DA. The DA’s office initially balked: “Their investigator was a state trooper and he didn't want to come out,” Normandin remembers. “And I said, ‘Well you have to come out.’ They didn't want to get involved in investigating cops either. But that is their job.” **Coding = DPO&OS/B**

As Normandin tells it, the case went off well. “Everyone in the department was cool because officers were afforded certain rights. . . You have the option of not only having an attorney there, but having a union representative of your choosing, plus a representative of the department
there”—rights this particular officer exercised, as the union ultimately assigned him an attorney when the case went to trial. Moreover, Professional Standards itself kept apprised of the case, and Normandin announced an open-door policy that he hoped would dispel rumors (and officers did indeed visit him to find out what was happening); he also made sure the LPD’s two unions kept officers informed about the procedures that were being followed. Coding = C&R/H; E/H

In the end, the officer was acquitted, and Normandin believes the case gave the new policy credibility: “This case did more to solidify the fact that we want to do this the right way, to protect everybody involved, than anything else we could have said or done. . . I think that this case showed that the chief meant what he said when he said he wanted things to be fair and equitable.” Coding = E/H

On the other hand, more recently two officers were found guilty of charges against them—many believe unfairly. “These were two guys who did their job and have always done a good job,” union President Flynn maintains. “And ultimately because of what's happening in policing today with the O.J. Simpson thing and the L.A. incident, you're going to have jurors who are going be against the police.” The union has raised concerns about the policy with Davis, and Flynn intends to try to make changes. But in the end he does not seem to fundamentally oppose it: “We understand where his concern with this is,” he explains. Coding = DPO&OS/H

Not long after the initial policy had taken effect, Kenneth Lavallee—one of Davis’s closest advisors and a main architect of the emerging community policing program—took over the department’s Support Services Bureau, under which Professional Standards fell. Lavallee brought with him an idea from his extensive reading and training, the idea of an “early warning system” that would flag officers who received multiple complaints against them, even if each one ended up unfounded. (Of course, such a system was not even possible before Normandin’s reforms, since few complaints made it into Professional Standards’ records to begin with.) Lavallee raised the idea with Davis by bringing him a list of the officers who had received more than three complaints during the new system’s first year in effect. The two decided to send out letters of alert to the officers in question, so they asked Lieutenant Patrick Burns, who had taken over Professional Standards (Davis rotates the position yearly), to let them know which officers had more than three complaints. Coding = MEI/M; C&R/M

When Davis sent out the first batch of letters to the targeted officers and their sergeants, there was a moderate uproar in the department. Officers had not been warned that the letters might be coming, they were not told what the letters’ implications would be (for example, that they would not go in their personnel folders). Moreover, the letters themselves did not distinguish founded complaints from unfounded, something the officers considered inexcusable. One sergeant remembers that one of his officers (who he considered “one of my best”) received one of the letters and was devastated: “I mean, it really took the wind out of this guy. He was kind of devastated, he was losing sleep over this,” particularly because he thought it might affect his chances for promotion. Coding = MEI/M; C&R/M

Burns admits to these problems readily: “I don't think the officers really understood what we were doing . . . . It definitely did cause a reaction and there was a misunderstanding. They thought these letters were going in their personnel file and they're not.” Burns tried to control the
damage by opening his door to anyone with questions, and he was able to reassure individual officers. But the argument that potentially “bogus complaints” were being kept in the system remained.  \textit{Coding = MEI/M; C&R/M}

Lavallee takes responsibility for the flare-up, explaining that after he proposed the idea to Davis, “what I should have done was [said], ‘Okay, Chief. Let’s have a meeting with the command staff and explain what we’re going to do so they’ll understand, and then they can explain to [the officers].’” So in the following year they did just that, and according to Lavallee and others, the process seems to have gone more smoothly the following year. The union is still not entirely satisfied with the process, but the system has not become a major issue.  \textit{Coding = MEI/H; C&R/H}

Despite the flare-up, Lavallee maintains that the process had value. He points especially to the fact that few of the officers flagged in the first year showed up on the following year’s list. And he refers specifically to an officer he describes as “headed down the path of oblivion” who apparently (according to his supervisors) shaped up after being put on notice that he was being watched.  \textit{Coding = MEI/M}

The unit is still a work in progress. Lieutenant Jonathan Webb is refining the “early warning system” further, and the division is developing a brochure for the community explaining the complaint process—as well as announcing a procedure whereby officers can be commended. But Professional Standards today is a completely different place than it was three years ago. Not everyone is happy with the change—again, this is perhaps the most sensitive area in which reforms can be made—, but most seem to agree with the changes in principle and understand the importance of an effective internal affairs procedure to the maintenance of departmental legitimacy. In any case, changes in internal affairs have not fundamentally soured relations between the officers and the administration: Those who do disapprove of it seem to see the issue as an isolated one.  \textit{Coding = MEI/M; E/M}

6. COPS

In the course of this story the COPS grants do not appear to play a pivotal role in catalyzing change in the LPD or explicitly changing its shape. While early grants may have been crucial in pushing the department towards community policing, the most important in this respect appears to have been the state-administered Byrne grant (which was ironically fairly small, amounting to approximately $75,000), together with COPS’s precursor, the Police Hiring Supplement grants. Indeed, by the time the 1994 Crime Bill was passed, the department’s vision had solidified, so the grants did not influence its basic philosophy.  \textit{Coding = DPO&OS/M}

\textit{COPS-Funded Changes}

But the COPS grants did play a role—possibly a substantial one—in a number of less dramatic ways. The first and most obvious of these was by providing resources for the department to carry out elements of its plan that it simply could not afford at the time. One obvious case is simply
providing the manpower to open the LPD’s precincts (the city had told the department that the only way it would get more officers would be to apply for grants—though it would happily meet any matching requirements). But three others deserve extended discussion: Reform of the department’s Management Information Systems division and its dispatch operations, and the expansion of its domestic violence unit. Each of these stories also gives further insight into the process of change in the LPD. Coding = B&R/H

**COPS MORE**

The strategic planning meetings had identified reform of Management Information Systems as a crucial task for the LPD, and while much of this transformation began earlier, COPS MORE grants sped the process along. In particular, grant money helped the department decentralize its information systems as it decentralized its operations. The LPD used some of the money to outfit its precincts with up-to-date computer hardware and software (many of its systems were still the old Wang systems installed as part of the citywide computerization program), and to install telephone lines that allow some precincts to connect to the department’s developing e-mail system. Officers can use these systems to write reports and correspondence at the precinct stations (some cruiser officers regularly stop by the precincts to use them for these purposes), and some also use them to develop databases. MIS has also begun to install a local area network (LAN) connected to a central server, both of which are funded by COPS MORE. Lieutenant Arthur Ryan, head of MIS, expects that in the “not too distant future” the precincts will be able to use the LAN to get the same information they would be able to get at headquarters. Coding = B&R/H

On the management side, COPS MORE also enabled MIS to hire a civilian crime analyst named Steve Di Noto, a recent graduate from U Mass Lowell’s Criminal Justice program. Di Noto is charged with preparing maps, crime statistics, and other pertinent information about crime trends and patterns in the city. This information plays a central role in the department’s COMPSTAT meetings, where Di Noto presents and hands out packets of information about crime trends. Davis sees this information as perhaps the most important way in which he can monitor trends in the city, proactively deal with community problems, and hold his managers accountable: Speaking of COMPSTAT, he explains that “the bottom line is we’re using Steve Di Noto’s talents to direct the activities of the police department.” Coding = D&IC/B

The civilianization element of COPS MORE also fed into the department’s reform of the radio room and front desk. Davis and Patrick Cook, who as communications director oversees these two areas, explain that the department initially tried to bring their problems under control through stronger supervision, discipline, and gradual civilianization through attrition. But the grants enabled them to finish the job quickly, and during a crucial period of the department’s evolution. Coding = B&R/H; MEI/B

**Domestic Violence**

Another high-priority strategic planning goal was the development of a domestic violence unit in the department. Debbie Friedl, who had been developing an interest and some experience in the area (mostly in her civilian life), immediately volunteered for the position. In July of 1994, Davis
gave her part-time responsibility for coordinating the department’s response to domestic violence, but the job did not begin in earnest until the following January, when Friedl got the task full-time and Davis assigned an investigator to her. Friedl and her detective reviewed officers’ reports for accuracy and completeness, investigated cases of abuse and tried to establish contact with the victims, fielded officers’ questions about the rapidly-evolving laws on the subject, and built a relationship with the local battered women’s program (named Alternative House) and other relevant initiatives. Coding = DPO&OS/H; C&R/H; D&IC/H

Tipped-off about the opportunity by Brenda Bond, a civilian in the LPD who had spearheaded many of the department’s grant applications, Friedl (joined by Alternative House) soon applied for and received a COPS Domestic Violence grant for some $160,000. The grant immediately allowed Friedl to hire three more investigators and a part-time community outreach coordinator, and the unit began to take off (for example, the number of victims it has made contact with monthly has jumped from 90 to 220). And it also funded a series of summits (still in the planning stages) that will bring diverse agencies and businesses together to discuss domestic violence and the system for dealing with it. Friedl sees this initiative as crucial, as she has found that while she can make inroads into the way the LPD deals with domestic violence, many of the weak links lie elsewhere. Coding = DPO&OS/H; C&R/H; D&IC/H

Both of these special-purpose grants funded ideas the department had already planned to undertake. But it enabled the LPD to expand them beyond what would have probably been feasible without them. And equally important, it accelerated their implementation during a crucial period of the department’s evolution, when it had enormous momentum for change. Coding = DPO&OS/H; B&R/H

**Indirect Impacts**

But perhaps most interesting, the COPS hiring grants apparently had a number of extremely important indirect effects. Here the important aspect is numbers: AHEAD and UHP grants funded 25 officers for the department, MORE grants purportedly freed up 31 more, and PHS grants hired 12 new officers and helped open up two precincts. In all, the COPS grants, a number of state grants, and matching money from the city have helped the LPD rebound from its low point of 159 officers little over three years ago to 245 today. (Today’s sworn force is joined by 64 civilians, up from 31 in 1993). The grants were crucial to this growth, as Johnson had told the department that the only way it would get more officers was through outside funding. Coding = B&R/H

First, the additional slack these officers provided appears to have been crucial in smoothing over many potential obstacles to community policing. We saw in the first section of this report that one constraint early “problem-solvers” felt was complaints from colleagues who had to take their calls when they insisted on staying “out-of-service” too long. Asked about this pressure today, one cruiser officer responds: “That’s one of the big pluses in having so many people on the street. Is that your individual calls go down, you have time for other things now, that you didn’t have before.” And another explains: “You are still going to have your accidents and stuff that you have got to fly to. But if you are tied up trying to do something, trying to take care of something, they are going to give it to somebody else because there are so many officers out
there now in the city. There is no reason why you have to go to these calls and rush.”

More directly, we have seen that LPD has—in part because of the grants—created a whole contingent of officers working for the precincts and the community response team (which includes the mobile precinct) who are completely protected from the 911 system. Currently, this force amounts to 45 officers—43% of the department’s patrol force, not counting supervisors and managers—and they represent a substantial capacity for uninterrupted problem-solving work.

The New Training Academy

But the hiring programs had a final, more unexpected impact as well. The process of hiring so many officers at once (one UHP grant alone funded 20 officers) created enormous problems for the department. First, it was simply a huge logistical challenge to interview and run background checks on so many officers—Sergeant Thomas Fleming, in charge of recruitment for the LPD, estimates that to fill one batch of 27 hires he had to review 90 applicants on the state’s civil service list. And the department’s recent improvement’s to its hiring process (which made the screening process much more thorough) reportedly made the task much more difficult.

Moreover, at one point the department was hiring so rapidly that it nearly had to postpone filling some positions because the state’s civil service list—from which the LPD must hire its recruits—had become so picked over that few attractive candidates were left (though in the end, Captain Lavallee reports being “very happy” with the recruits the department did end up with).

More important, the state’s training system simply could not handle the huge number of officers that not only Lowell, but many other Massachusetts police departments were hiring, largely as a result of the enormous COPS program. Even in the early years of smaller grants, the LPD had to scatter its hires across the state in several different training academies, since no single academy had enough room. (This was hardly the most efficient means of training the officers, many of whom had to drive three hours a day to get to and from their academies).

But the situation had a silver lining, as it ultimately forced the LPD to do something it had wanted to do anyway: Open its own training facility. In addition to its inconvenience for local recruits (the nearest academies were well over an hour’s drive each way), the existing system simply did not reflect the LPD’s emerging philosophy. State academies were run in a very military style and spent only four to six hours on community policing.

The Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Council, who ran the state system, agreed that it could not meet the skyrocketing demand for training, and it approved Davis’s plan to have the LPD start its own. Davis chose Sergeant Thomas Fleming to design the new academy, as Fleming had taught in the state system for ten years and was a firm supporter of community policing. He also enlisted the support of U Mass Lowell, which provided space for classes and athletics even when the final enrollment turned out to be well over twice the department’s initial estimates (Lowell took recruits from many nearby cities, and it ended up running two sessions in parallel, educating a total of 96 new officers). But the University’s help did not end there, as its
Vice President took an active role in setting up the program—“everything right down to the parking and lunch and all the things that make the academy work and run smoothly,” Fleming remembers. Coding = B&R/H; T/H

Most important, the academy was the first one in Massachusetts grounded entirely in the philosophy of community policing. By cutting from specialized areas like accident investigation and fingerprinting (which Fleming argues patrol officers do not undertake alone anyhow), it expanded the amount of time dedicated solely to community policing to 44 hours. And perhaps equally important, it eliminated the old system’s quasi-military atmosphere (doing away with things like marching, saluting, and the more extreme forms of uniform inspection), replacing it with what Fleming describes as “more of a college campus atmosphere.” Some recruits, upon reading newspaper articles reporting on the “new kind of academy,” and discussing their experience with colleagues in their home departments, began to raise concerns that the new academy was too “soft.” In response, Fleming reshaped some aspects of the academy mid-course, notably by increasing the already-rigorous physical training program. Fleming describes this change as “confidence-building,” and in any case it appeared to demonstrate that the academy was far from “soft.” Coding = T/H

The academy was apparently a huge success, as Fleming reports hearing nothing but positive feedback from the recruits, the many Chiefs who sent them there, and the Training Council. Indeed, the Council has recently begun work with PERF on a $300,000 contract to revise its own curriculum, and it has been greatly influenced and encouraged by Lowell’s experience. This may end up being one of the most significant impacts of COPS in Lowell: A rapid acceleration of changes in the way policing is taught not only in the LPD and the cities who have directly used its academy, but potentially throughout Massachusetts. Coding = T/H; B&R/H

III. THE LPD TODAY

1. Relationship with the Environment

The old LPD had a relatively impersonal relationship with its environment—one concentrated in the calls-for-service system and laws like the civil service system. But the department has transformed that relationship considerably. It has created a much more active dialogue with the community, city government, the press, and others, and it has tried to reduce juridical constraints like civil service laws. Coding = C&R/M

The Authorizing Environment

Civil service laws still weigh heavily on the department, to be sure—for example, we saw that civil service rules affected the department’s COPS-related hiring. But the LPD has clearly begun to strain against this agency’s fetters. For example, civil service testing normally governs promotions, but two years ago the department bypassed the high scorer to fill two captain positions—something that had apparently never been done before in Lowell. Davis explains that he made this decision for two reasons: First, because the skipped Lieutenant was not fully invested in community policing, and that investment was indispensable in this crucial period of change, and second, because the other two candidates had proven themselves through their
excellent work habits—"they had worked their tails off," Davis explains. Then-city manager Richard Johnson was a staunch ally in this process, taking the chief’s advice on the matter of whom to promote after the chief had explained his reasoning to him (promotion decisions are in the immediate instance the city manager’s), and testifying on the department’s behalf when the skipped lieutenant demanded a civil service hearing on the decision. Coding = MEI/M

The department has sought to reduce civil service constraints in other ways as well. It increasingly tries to bypass promotion-by-testing in favor of the civil service commission’s “assessment center” approach,22 which recaptures some discretion by relying less on fixed examinations and more on the department’s own interviews with and judgments of candidates; the new city manager, Brian Martin, has supported the LPD on this issue. And it has tried to change civil service regulations themselves. Davis has been working with a number of other chiefs in his region to try to convince the civil service commission to make a college degree a requirement for police hiring. The commission has so far balked at the request, but the effort nevertheless suggests that the department no longer takes civil service testing as immutable. Coding = MEI/M

These examples reflect a gradual shift in decisionmaking authority. Civil service regulations still lay the foundations for the agency’s decisions, but the LPD has tried to find some flexibility in them. Of course, the discretion that emerges is not absolute: It is constrained by the need to get public approval from people like the city manager. In any case, the department does exercise it in the context of a more negotiated relationship with government and with the community. Coding = MEI/M

The Relationship with City Hall

Indeed, the greater role of city government is obvious in many areas. For one, as the department undertakes new initiatives outside of its routine business, it simply has more occasion to approach the city. For example, as part of its reform of the radio room, it needed about $300,000 to physically refit the facilities, and also city approval to raise the dispatchers’ salaries, which were not competitive with neighboring cities. Many other instances could be cited, from another $300,000 to refurbish the LPD’s cell-block, to $5,000 in CDBG funding for an anti-graffiti program initiated by a patrol officer, to additional funding for training. Some of these sorts of requests were no doubt made in years past. But in previous years the department seemed less likely to try to negotiate actively with the city to develop a set of spending priorities that met its perceived needs. Coding = DPO&OS/M; C&R/M; B&R/M

The new system obviously demands a closer working relationship with the city than in years past, and the LPD has tried hard to develop one. Most plainly, the somewhat dormant oversight relationship we saw in the first section has become more active: The department has started preparing the long-absent annual reports, and since early 1996 it has delivered quarterly reports to city hall that summarize precinct activities, crime statistics, financial information, and the like. Coding = DPO&OS/M; C&R/M; B&R/M

On a more personal level, today the LPD seems to pay much greater attention to networking. Christine Cole explains:
I joke about it sometimes. Where you going? I'm going to schmooz. I don't mean that in its bad way. It's so important. And sometimes it's tough. I have to [exert myself]. I haven't been over to city hall in a while, so I'll pick up that stuff today, instead of sending somebody else to do it. Because I think it's important to be visible. Coding = C&R/H

Indeed, staff like Cole are crucial in maintaining these relationships, as they have the time and expertise others in the department lack to deal with day-to-day issues that city hall raises for the department. For example, the department’s grantwriters—notably Brenda Bond and Cole herself—recently helped the city prepare its successful Enterprise Community proposal. That collaboration reflected a complete role reversal from a few years ago, when the department (actually then-Captain Davis) came to the city asking for help writing its own grant applications. But other elements of the department help forge ties with the city as well. For example, during the recent funeral for Senator Paul Tsongas (a native of Lowell), the LPD provided diverse forms of assistance, from press relations (overseen by Patrick Cook, the department’s communications director) to the preparation of maps and other graphical aids the city needed. Through collaborations like these, the LPD has become an integral part of the day-to-day business of city government. Coding = C&R/H

Disagreements still arise between the city and the department, of course. One city councilman invariably opposes LPD proposals to expand its command staff, believing that the department has “too many Chiefs and not enough Indians”; but his colleagues just as invariably overrule him. And when the Federal Government approved the LPD’s $1.5 million COPS Universal Hiring Program grant, one councilor balked at the $375,000 matching requirement. But the objections were overruled in this case as well, as the mayor stood up to the podium and fought for the department’s achievements in securing needed grant money. In any case, the point is that close relationship with city hall does not mean collusion. It means public consultation with elected officials on major policy issues, rather than resignation to existing juridical controls. Coding = C&R/H; B&R/H

Community Groups, The Press, and the General Public

But on a day-to-day basis, the main source of authority the LPD looks to is the community—notably organized community and business groups, but also individual citizens. Christine Cole, the department’s civilian “community liaison”, constantly updates an extensive list of groups and a calendar of their meetings (the latest revision listed 35 organizations), and she and the sworn force (especially sergeants) attend these meetings regularly—as the command structure expects them to. The department has institutionalized community input through its new COMPSTAT process, where Cole reports on recent neighborhood concerns and announces upcoming meetings—all under the watching eyes of chief Davis (who is himself extraordinarily visible in the community). In directing the LPD’s problem-solving, community input has begun to lose some ground to proactive computer analysis of crime trends, but it still plays a large role. The department also tries to gauge the views of the unorganized citizenry, especially through citizen surveys and ad hoc focus groups (one recent focus group solicited the views of downtown businesses and patrons); moreover, the precinct stations themselves, located throughout the city...
and staffed by citizen volunteers, are also intended to make the police more accessible to the community. **Coding = DPO&OS/H; C&R/H; D&IC/M**

More generally, the LPD has simply paid growing attention to contact with citizens. Sergeants direct their officers to interact with the community (for example, housing officers act as a “welcome wagon” in Lowell’s public housing, knocking on doors to introduce themselves to new residents); and many officers have pagers to provide a direct link with residents. Moreover, the department has hired minority officers to help build ties with Lowell’s increasingly diverse population—particularly its growing Southeast Asian community. **Coding = C&R/H**

The LPD has also created a number of positions that essentially specialize in forging ties with citizens (particularly youth). For example, officer Sergio Maldonado (like 8 other LPD officers) spends part of his time as a school liaison, sitting in on classes with students at the local middle school. The department’s DARE unit is even more single-minded in this respect, employing officers who work essentially full-time on DARE and other youth programs. Finally, even outside these formal roles, the department encourages community relations work. Officer Mike Miles, Vice President of the Patrolman’s Union, is a departmental star in this respect, taking the initiative to start a number of youth programs (including an art contest, a career day for young women, and a homework study program). Though Miles does much of this work on his own time, the department clearly values and provides help for these initiatives, freeing up work time or providing comp time where possible, providing administrative support, and simply putting the organization behind his efforts (for example, Chief Davis presented awards for the art contest). Miles has undertaken similar activities throughout his career at the LPD, but he maintains that he only recently got support for them. **Coding = MEL/H; C&R/H**

Finally, the department has radically reoriented its once-anemic relationship with the media. Officers have become more empowered to speak directly with the press, and the department has sent a few of its members to various training sessions on dealing with the press. Davis also hired Patrick Cook, a reporter for the Lowell Sun, to oversee the LPD’s media relations. Cook has taken a proactive stance towards the media, trying to use it as a way to communicate the department’s achievements to city residents. The relationship is not pure P.R., however: Cook and Davis both recognize, in the words of the former, “when we have the bad news, we . . . have that accessible to them as well. It can't be just a one way street. We can't expect them to do all our features for us and then when they are looking for something, and it sounds like trouble for the city, [clam up]. You still have to give it to them.” **Coding = T/H; C&R/H**

**The Task Environment**

The LPD has also looked more extensively to the outside world in actually *doing* its work. The Centralville story illustrates that change, showing how the department turned to a number of city agencies to close down drug houses and make physical improvements to neighborhoods; and how it catalyzed and worked with citizens’ groups that took on other neighborhood projects once serious drug dealing had been brought under control. But the department has carried this working style beyond its first precinct, and it now touches many elements of LPD operations. **Coding = B&R/H; C&R/H**
Inspectional Services and the Department of Public Works are now widely-used in the same ways they were in Centralville, in both the precincts and in many of the investigative branches. On the private side, many problem-solving projects seem to involve property owners and managers, as well as business owners (for example, one problem-solving project focused on grocery cart theft, and the precinct team involved worked closely with a local supermarket to revise its security measures and policies); and in at least one instance precinct officers worked closely with a community group to close down a drug house by simply standing on the street to frighten customers away. Many other examples could be cited: Friedl’s domestic violence unit, for example, has developed a close working relationship with many social service agencies; the department has worked extensively with U Mass Lowell on innumerable fronts; and on the law-enforcement side, the LPD has recently become an active participant in the Cross-Border Initiative, a Lowell-based multi-jurisdictional task force (including agencies like the FBI and the DEA) that focuses on regional drug trafficking. And finally, informants are still a crucial part of the LPD’s work.  Coding = DPO&OS/H; D&IC/H; C&R/H

One interesting aspect of these partnerships is how the other agencies manage the new demands the LPD is making on them. Davis reports that he has had almost no negative feedback from the agencies whose help the LPD has tried to enlist—“surprisingly so,” he admits. One of the most heavily-used partners, the Department of Inspectional Services, seems to have compartmentalized its LPD work, assigning it to David St. Hilaire. Hilaire says that “there is a little bit of conflict” inside Inspectional Services over his work for the LPD—other inspectors must, after all, pick up his share of the Department’s regular workload as he spends more time on LPD-driven inspections—, but it is ultimately minimal. In any case, St. Hilaire explains that the city manager has ordered his department to give top priority to police requests for inspections. Coding = B&R/M; C&R/M

Relationships like these are almost uniformly welcomed, but it is worth mentioning one exception. Some community groups apparently thought that the LPD took its collaboration with Inspectional Services to extremes—notably in its use of so-called “emergency condemnation” procedures that close down substandard housing on extremely short notice. As in many other cities that have used code enforcement to close down drug houses, some allege that the tactic made innocent families homeless because of their neighbors’ misdeeds (entire apartment complexes are often closed down). Inspectional Services, of course, maintains that it only closes down housing in clear violation of code, whether or not police notify them of the problem. But such complaints have reportedly led the two departments to use the tactic somewhat less frequently.  Coding = DPO&OS/M; C&R/M; E/M

The Community’s Reaction

Despite pitfalls like these, the community response to the LPD’s new openness has been overwhelming. In the department’s eyes, one of the most visible indicators of this was a successful fundraising drive led by a local businessman to raise some $200,000 to buy the department’s mobile precinct. But more objective citizen surveys reveal this support as well: For example, the highest proportion of residents who thought that the LPD was providing protection “not well” or “not well at all” in three recently-surveyed neighborhoods was only 18%. Coding = PA/H; B&R/H; C&R/H
Some concerns still exist, to be sure. Lee Winkelman, the organizing director for Coalition for a Better Acre (a nationally-known community development corporation that focuses its attention on Lowell’s Acre neighborhood), reports a number of them: He believes that the police relationship with CBA has weakened a bit since the Acre precinct first opened; that dispatchers lack sufficient language skills, and that precinct personnel change too often (possibly as a result of the LPD’s bid system, which lets officers switch jobs every 18 months if they so desire). But in the end, the LPD has won over even Winkelman, a committed activist who has always believed that crime ultimately stems from poverty, not inadequate policing: “It's the best in any place I've worked... I often joke around that if the other community organizers heard me saying such good things about the police, I'd lose my community organizer's license.” He points particularly to the department’s active hiring of Cambodian and Latino officers, the very visible impact the LPD has had on street drug dealing in the Acre, and the department’s openness—particularly chief Davis’s—to community concerns.

2. Operations

The LPD’s operational personnel are now housed in three areas: The Investigative Services Bureau, the department’s three geographic sectors, and Management Information Systems (which oversees dispatch). Dispatch reforms have been described elsewhere: The department maintains a completely civilian staff, it has physically revamped the radio room, and it has (with the city’s help) installed a 911 emergency line (so that now LPD dispatchers also field fire and emergency medical service calls). This section will focus on Investigative services and the patrol force.

**Patrol**

The LPD’s patrol force is organized in three major pieces: First, precinct and cruiser officers are assigned to each of three geographic sectors. Second, 12 officers are assigned to the Community Response Team, which encompasses the mobile precinct, the LPD’s new boat patrol for the Merrimack River, and the mounted unit that patrols Lowell’s downtown. Under the direction of Sergeant Jim Trudel, these officers respond to community problems that require a sustained presence, often in areas remote from the precincts; and they offer the city of Lowell many specialized services (for example, maintaining a presence at parades or using the technically-sophisticated mobile precinct to manage emergencies). Third, the LPD maintains a separate traffic division (though cruiser officers, and sometimes even precinct officers, also enforce traffic laws).
The Precincts

The department’s 45 precinct officers (including the mobile precinct) do not usually respond to 911 calls, though they occasionally accompany cruiser officers on calls that require more than one officer. Instead they spend their time on patrol and problem-solving projects. Coding = DPO&OS/H; MEI/H

Patrol emphasizes community relations: Officers are expected to interact with area businesses and residents, and many report doing so extensively (talking with youth seems to be a favorite activity). One precinct officer explains the patrol part of his job this way: “We’re just walking the beat. . . . We try to get to know our neighborhood, who lives where, and who owns what, and where the problem mostly started, you know. We try to get to know all the people.” This sort of activity has gotten institutionalized to some degree, as officers help administer community surveys, and some sergeants have directed their officers to go door-to-door soliciting community concerns. Coding = C&R/H; PA/H; MEI/H

Problem-solving is the other major precinct activity. All levels of the organization can nominate problems for precinct officers—from the officers themselves, to their sergeants, to sector captains, and occasionally to the chief. But across all of these levels, three major sources of information seem to drive the identification of problems: Meetings with neighborhood groups, repeat calls-for-service, and officer knowledge (with repeat calls for service apparently becoming the dominant method in recent months). Coding = DPO&OS/H; D&IC/H; MEI/H; C&R/H; B&R/H

Projects vary in their scope: Examples include the archetypal “problem apartment complex,” purse-snatching problems in a mall, a rash of shopping cart thefts at a local grocery store, and of course the ever-present (but greatly diminished) prostitution and street drug market areas. But some LPD problem-solving projects have extended beyond small geographic areas: For example, as the use of dogs by gang members grew as a problem in one sector, the sector captain assigned one officer to work with the city to develop an animal control ordinance. Coding = DPO&OS/H; D&IC/H; MEI/H; C&R/H; B&R/H

Beginning with Centralville, the LPD has developed a large tool kit for dealing with these problems. Officers often work with business and property owners to make changes in their facilities, policies, or operations; and they regularly work with code departments to deal with problem buildings. But police-based initiatives play a large role in problem-solving as well: Precinct officers have undertaken low-level investigations or sting operations (one sergeant directed his officers to drive around an area of heavy prostitution in plain clothes and an unmarked car); and of course stepped-up patrol plays a central role in many projects. Coding = DPO&OS/H; MEI/M

To be sure, much of this varies by precinct and even by officer. Police departments commonly find that even when community policing works well in small units like Centralville, it runs into apathy when extended department-wide. Union President Flynn suggests that this problem arose in the LPD to some extent: “What happened was instead of getting officers who truly wanted to be involved and truly wanted to do that type of policing, they were being kind of, you know—
not forced, but it was like nobody in the beginning wanted community policing. So that the people who would pick it—you’d pick all the other jobs, the only ones left were community policing jobs.” Today young officers disproportionately fill the precincts, suggesting that this dynamic may still exist to some degree (recall that the bid system gives veteran officers first pick of assignments). But those who work in the precincts simply do not report that commitment among the officers is a serious problem. Some teams do have officers who do not participate vigorously in precinct activities. But these officers seem to be a decided minority, and teams can work around the occasional skeptic. The more serious problem seems to be uneven commitment to community policing among sergeants. Unenthusiastic street bosses obviously affect officer morale and motivation, and because sergeants play such a central role in identifying problems and acting as community liaisons, their commitment is crucial to precinct operations. Davis has reported particular frustration with some precincts run by “traditional-minded” sergeants. Coding = DPO&OS/H; MEI/M

Finally, precinct officers have recently gotten involved in some investigations. As part of his reform of Criminal Investigations, Lieutenant Billy Taylor decided to develop a system whereby patrol officers would investigate many burglary reports, which otherwise went uninvestigated. A protocol for these investigations was developed by Sergeant David Tousignant and is now used in the department. Patrol officers have also been involved in other investigations, notably during a recent homicide case in which the criminal bureau enlisted the help of the patrol force as well as recruits in training to help gather evidence. And Sergeant Trudel’s community response team recently collaborated with a detective assigned by the criminal bureau to investigate a rash of larcenies at the local community college. In all of these ways, investigative work is being dispersed throughout the LPD’s operational units (and collaboration between the two main operational units has increased, as described below). Detectives have reportedly welcomed the change—particularly the new system for investigating burglaries—since their work has in the past overwhelmed them (and probably also because the changes have concerned less prestigious cases). Coding = DPO&OS/H; MEI/H

**Cruisers**

Cruiser officers respond to 911 calls, and in this way they behave like the LPD patrol force of a few years ago. The norms of 911 response itself seem to have changed a bit. One officer explains that he feels the administration expects him to spend more time on individual calls: “There are more men to handle your calls so they want you to spend time on it,” a sentiment many other officers echo. Another important norm of 911 response seems to be the way in which officers interact with callers, as the department has paid increasing attention to good public relations skills (particularly in its recruit academy and its disciplinary system). Coding = D&IC/H; C&R/H; MEI/H

But beyond 911, the department has increasingly tried to get cruiser officers involved in the sector teams: One officer reports: “I’ve noticed lately in the past 6 months, even in the cruisers if you are getting a certain call or problem over and over and over again, like the kids in the park causing problems or B&Es in a certain spot and you are getting them all the time, they want you to spend time on that.” The same sergeants now oversee both precinct officers and cruiser officers in their sectors, and they may assign specific jobs to cruiser officers in connection with
an ongoing problem-solving project—which usually means extra patrol attention in areas that
carless precinct officers cannot easily reach. At the very least, many sergeants now include
cruiser officers in sector meetings during which current problems are discussed. And some
cruiser officers see themselves as part of problem-solving teams in the sense that they help
accomplish the “scanning” element of the SARA model (which outlines four steps of problem-
solving: “Scanning,” “Analysis,” “Response,” and “Assessment”). Moreover, cruiser officers
increasingly use the precincts to write reports and use the phone, so they come into regular
contact with the precinct officers in this way. Coding = DPO&OS/H; MEI/H; D&IC/H

Finally, even outside formal problem-solving work, cruiser officers seem simply to have more
free time when they are on patrol. Above and beyond the brand-new precinct force, the
department has many more cars on the street as 5 years ago during the evening shift (33 versus
16-20), and the call volume seems to have declined somewhat as well (hard data on this are not
available, since the LPD did not keep good records in the past. But department data do show that
part I crimes dropped by almost half from 1993 to 1996, from 9,981 to 5,166.) Conscientious
officers, at least, use some of this time to patrol and maintain order in known trouble-spots,
check on large buildings like the schools when they have closed, and other traditional patrol
functions. Coding = B&R/M; D&IC/M; MEI/M

As with the precinct officers, all of this varies by sector and by officer. Cruiser positions seem to
be particularly attractive to those officers less in tune with community policing (several
estimated that 20-25% of officers fall into this category). In any case, several officers reported
that the cruiser positions in the day shift—often bid for by older officers with seniority—have a
particularly high concentration of traditionally-minded patrolmen. Many of these officers are
described as conscientious and hard workers; but they are less likely to be involved in problem-
solving and community relations work (which may be of particular concern given the importance
of the day shift in developing relations with the community). Coding = DPO&OS/H; MEI/M;
C&R/M

Detectives and their Coordination with Patrol

Reforms of the criminal bureau initially focused on what might be called issues of
professionalism—establishing standards of conduct, improving technology and equipment, and
improving the once-dysfunctional relationship the bureau once had with the courts—, though
there has also been some reshuffling of units (notably Friedl’s new domestic violence unit, a new
unit focused on gang violence, and revamped juvenile bureau located at the Eliot Center, which
includes a new holding facility). Formally, detective operations today work much like they did a
few years ago. Much work is still driven by patrol officers’ reports or (in the case of vice) by
informants, with a few potentially significant exceptions. First, given the department’s stronger
ties to community groups, it seems reasonable to believe that more investigations are nominated
by community groups—particularly since philosophically, the LPD has focused its attention less
on high-level dealers and more on disruptive street-level activity (as Davis explained above).
Second, Debbie Friedl’s domestic violence unit increasingly gets cases directly from victims
with whom it has begun developing strong ties. Finally, Dennis Cormier, the head of Criminal
Investigations, asserts that his unit has become more proactive. He gives the example of a recent
investigation of the Latin Kings (which had begun to develop a presence in Lowell) in which his
detectives borrowed an ATF informant to infiltrate the regional gang, ultimately arresting six of its leaders. Cormier maintains that a few years ago, “that would have been looked upon as just non-traditional policing and wouldn't have been acceptable [because] we didn't wait for a crime to occur, we went after them.”

Recently the department has tried to integrate detectives more closely with the new sector system and with the patrol force. Davis describes a conscious strategy of rotating officers through the detective units that will hopefully break down the wall between the two segments of the department. More immediately, both Vice (now called Special Investigations) and Criminal Investigations have tried to assign detectives to specific geographic areas. Billy Taylor, who had a major hand in both reforms, explains the scope and limits of this idea:

For example, if one detective is assigned to Centralville in the narcotics department, which does not mean that he is only going to work in Centralville. He potentially is going to have cases going in different areas. But what I want him to do is focus on Centralville, and I want him to be familiar with the officers. I want him to go to the precinct, meet with them, find out what their problems are that he can assist them with, especially in the narcotics area. And when I have a problem in Centralville, I am coming to him and holding him accountable.

Many detectives do not yet seem to understand their work in this way. In part this may simply reflect the newness of the reforms. But some explicitly argue against it: Many explain that staffing is insufficient to cover separate areas of the city every shift of the day, and a few argue that they have to follow the cases their informants bring them—cases that may or may not lie in their assigned area. Taylor and Cormier both recognize these points and expect flexibility in the system (as Taylor explains above). Only time will tell whether or not the new system takes root.

3. Support Services

The section on organizational change described the changes in support services extensively: Training and information systems were reformed dramatically (and expenditures increased) in order to support the LPD’s new mission. Information, for example, now plays a central role in the department’s operations. Officers have mobile data terminals in their cruisers through which they can quickly access departmental records (as well as communicate with one another), and precincts are outfitted with rapidly-evolving computer systems. Today the LPD records information more regularly than in the past, and in ways that make it easier-to-access—enabling management to use crime information to set priorities and identify problems, as it does in department-wide COMPSTAT meetings.

Equipment has become equally advanced. For example, criminal investigations has been brought up to date technologically, with a computerized sketching system, equipment for tape recording confessions (the department had not done even this in years past), and equipment for developing photographs (previously the department sent photos out at a cost of approximately $1,200 per homicide case). Some computer-shy officers apparently avoid some of the technology, but most
use it heavily (as attested to by the late-night calls MIS head Arthur Ryan receives when the computerized mug shots system, for example, goes down). \textit{Coding = B&R/M; D&IC/M}

Finally, the LPD has expanded less technical support services as well. Reference has been made to the department’s new employee assistance program, which Davis allowed Sergeant Thomas Fleming free reign in designing (Fleming had served a similar role informally in the past and had many contacts and much knowledge of the area). The program provides services like critical incident stress debriefing, peer counseling, and referrals to outside agencies when necessary. Some of these services become mandatory in lieu of discipline when personal problems begin to interfere with an officer’s work. Moreover, the department’s growing administrative staff supports many operational activities. Bond and Cole in particular are cited by many officers as invaluable aids for projects they have been engaged in (for example, officer Mike Miles relied on them heavily in developing his many youth programs). And perhaps most important given the importance of outside funding in the LPD story, through them the department has developed a strong capacity to secure and maintain its grants—to the point that city government has actually turned to LPD staff in preparing its own grant applications. \textit{Coding = MEI/H; B&R/H}

Each of these transformations reflects a dramatic shift in the way the LPD organizes policing. While it has put a new emphasis on the patrol officer on the beat, it has also put great emphasis on the idea that the rest of the department must support these front-line workers. It does so in part through support services like information, equipment, and administrative assistance. These services were much less strongly-valued under the old philosophy that relied mainly on the alertness of individual officers. \textit{Coding = DPO&OS/H}

4. Management

The LPD’s organizational structure lays out management responsibilities in the department (see Figure 3). Having changed four times in fewer years, the current structure breaks the department into two major pieces: The Operational Services Bureau (headed by the Deputy Chief, though that position is currently vacant) and the Support Services Bureau (headed by a captain). \textit{Coding = DPO&OS/M}

But behind the new structure, a new management philosophy also animates the LPD. Some have described similar styles of police management as “decentralized,” and that description is accurate to a point. But in some ways the new style is less decentralized than the old one. That is no criticism of the new LPD, of course; the point is simply to characterize its achievement accurately. The next section examines the elements of centralization in the new system; and with this qualification in mind, the following one describes the real sense in which the LPD is decentralized. \textit{Coding = D&IC/M}

\textbf{Centralization}

We saw that in years past, most patrol officer time \textit{not} dedicated to 911, and many other aspects of operations, were almost totally decentralized: The department did not seem to direct patrol time in any significant way. It is not that no one did problem-solving. It is rather that those who did acted almost as free agents. \textit{Coding = DPO&OS/M}
Today, the LPD has reached into this “free” time and given it structure. All levels in the hierarchy can nominate problems for officers to deal with: At the extreme, many problems are nominated in COMPSTAT meetings and assigned to sector captains, who then delegate the problems to the appropriate shift lieutenants and sergeants; the sergeants then direct their officers accordingly. Moreover, after assigning the problem, each level of the hierarchy keeps an interest in its solution and holds lower levels accountable. Ultimately, this means that high levels of the organization, sometimes including the chief, may pay specific attention to what officers do with their once-invisible “free” time. Coding = DPO&OS/B; MEI/B

Of course, the chain of command breaks down at times. In particular, the department has in some cases had problems getting shift Lieutenants and sector Captains to coordinate their work. In theory, the captains do long-term planning and set priorities for their sectors on a 24-hour basis, while the lieutenants—with 8-hour responsibility for the entire city—are supposed to use their control over day-to-day matters (like personnel assignments) to carry out those plans. But some Lieutenants do not follow sector plans religiously, and they sometimes pull officers across sectors to deal with short-term hotspots (i.e., issues arising on their shift). The issue is ongoing, and Davis—alerted to the problem by comments from patrol officers who felt caught in the middle—recently called a meeting with shift Lieutenants and sector captains urging them not to work at cross-purposes. Coding = DPO&OS/B; MEI/M

**Decentralization**

Despite this new element of centralization, the LPD *has* decentralized in an important sense—a sense that is captured by the idea of delegating authority. We have seen what Davis meant by the idea of delegation in the story of the department’s transformation. But the idea is not restricted to the chief himself: As a philosophy, it seems authentically to have permeated the ranks of the LPD. Coding = MEI/H

For example, Captain Dennis Cormier, head of criminal investigations, describes how his detectives might handle a neighborhood prostitution problem, and in the process gives insight into how he thinks about management:

There may be a number of ways that the officer may want to handle this. The detective may want to do a sting and arrest the Johns and have all their names published in the paper, that they went to court for picking up hookers, which is very effective. The punishment is not very stringent, but the social stigma is very effective. Or he may choose to use undercover officers to pick up these prostitutes and get them to make some kind of offer in the car, or whatever, and arrest them there for him, because it’s arrestable. Or he may choose to use the Code Department, if they're living on the street and the house is in disrepair—to go in there and work with the Code Department to see if he can solve the problem that way, by boarding up the house and throwing them out. I'm not going to tell him which one of those to use. If he asks me, . . . I'll let him run with it, if it sounds like a good idea. Coding = MEI/H
Cormier goes on to explain that “I keep an eye on what's going on . . . [and] they come in for advice on a daily basis.” But he delegates much of the responsibility to the detectives themselves. Coding = MEI/M

Cormier admits that this style works more easily for him than for patrol supervisors because the detectives he oversees are typically very experienced. But most patrol supervisors—for example, Davis and DeMoura when they ran Centralville—express their management philosophies in terms almost identical to those that Cormier uses. Each level of the hierarchy typically discusses proposed projects with their superiors—one sergeant describes this as a matter of “respect”. But given a reasonable proposal that fits with broader plans, all levels typically allow discretion. One officer maintains: “There isn’t a supervisor on the street that if you said, ‘Look, this is what I’ve got to do, do you mind if I do this?’ [who wouldn’t let you do it]. Even if it’s like, ‘I’m going to park the cruiser for a couple of hours and watch this house or something.’ They’ll let you do it, as long as the coverage is out there for somebody to take your calls if you have any.” Coding = MEI/M

This management system obviously requires that the department decentralize important decisions. For example, sergeants can decide to have their officers go undercover to deal with low-level drug problems—there is no need to clear the decision downtown (at least one sergeant has used this power extensively). As another example, there is no citywide policy on the use of vehicles in the precincts, and different sector captains have different attitudes towards the use of cars, motorcycles and bicycles (indeed, we saw that the use of bicycles was a precinct-level innovation introduced by Billy Taylor in the Acre). And as a good metaphor for the LPD’s decentralization of decisionmaking, it is worth mentioning that the old mock-bureaucratic system by which officers got authorization to transport prisoners has been abolished. Officers are now only required to notify dispatch (who must know that the car cannot take calls). Coding = MEI/H

In the management philosophy that dominates the LPD today, supervisors mostly control their subordinates using outcome measures. Referring to the prostitution example, Cormier explained:

I’d let [the detective] take the ball and say, ‘I want you to get rid of the prostitutes on this street . . . As long as they’re doing it legally, right, and they’re not violating any rules or regulations of the police department or the city, then I’m happy with that. . . . I mean, eventually, in a very short time, if I’m doing my job, I’m going to find out whether they’re doing theirs or not. Coding = MEI/H

Many supervisors indicated that they use something like “management by walking around” to monitor the success of their problem-solving projects and the performance of their subordinates. Davis, for example, describes how he discovered that one precinct was “slipping back badly”:

I was over there on Saturday and Sunday. On Saturday I was there during a citizen survey and I just drove around the neighborhood and sat in the parking lot and watched what was going on. And I was, “Bullshit!” I have a sergeant over there who has no idea what he's doing. He’s not supervising his people properly. He doesn't know how to identify problems. He's an old-time guy who's going to
stand up for his men no matter what they do, and that's not acceptable anymore. So, on Sunday, I went over again and saw the problems again. I called him directly and I tried to tell him what I wanted. Now, I also talked to his supervisor, who's a lieutenant. I made it clear that I'm not happy with his performance and that we need to do something about that. I think the most effective way of finding out how a police department is operating is by getting in your car and taking a drive through the neighborhoods, see what's not happening or what is happening. 

Coding = MEI/B

Many supervisors also use various types of data and input from community groups to monitor performance. The COMPSTAT meetings, for example, use both, allowing Davis to keep tabs on the entire department. Reliance on these techniques is, of course, intimately connected to the increased attention the LPD pays to data collection—not only crime data, but also internal affairs data (Professional Standards briefs the COMPSTAT team on citizen complaints, just as Steve Di Noto does on crime data; and the division’s “early warning system” briefs supervisors, as described above). The new supervisory techniques are also connected to the department’s strengthened relationships with community groups. Davis describes hiring Cole in precisely in these terms, explaining that she helps provide an unfiltered line to the community so that he can monitor neighborhood problems. Coding = D&IC/M; C&R/H

The LPD has decentralized in other ways that today’s management does not particularly like. The bid system is of course the main example here, a major change in management of the department’s personnel that originated with Sheehan and the union, not Davis. The system leaves some control to the administration: Davis can override self-selections under a “just cause” clause to the contract (a right he has exercised a few times), and he can fill positions that open up between cycles. Moreover, the system only applies to patrol—Davis has free reign in assigning detectives and superior officers, and he exercises this power in consultation with other command staff. But the bid system clearly stripped considerable power away from the Superintendent. Coding = DPO&OS/M

In any event, management, like the rest of the LPD, looks very different than it did even five years ago. The department has developed a new supervisory structure based on the idea of problem-solving that has allowed it to exercise more oversight over the “free” time patrol officers have between calls; the precincts, which lack calls entirely, would be inconceivable under the old system. But at the same time, it has relaxed its control over many operational decisions, notably by giving officers and detectives more flexibility in choosing the means by which they will accomplish the tasks assigned them. Accountability is based on outcomes rather than process. Coding = DPO&OS/H

1 With one exception, this paper will not try to evaluate the impact of these organizational changes, though most believe that public safety (especially visible street drug dealing) has improved markedly in Lowell over the past four years: (index crimes dropped 48% from 1993 to 1996, while violent crime dropped 45%; the drops in Massachusetts as a whole were 11% and 15%, respectively). The exception is that I will comment on changes in public perception of the department—an important outcome measure in community policing. Coding = NR
2 The case draws principally on recent interviews (though I have also examined older documents and newspaper clippings), so this account is limited by my informants’ memory and emotion (most LPD personnel favor the changes that have been made—although they invariably express respect for the previous administration). I have tried to control these problems—particularly the latter—by pushing my respondents to be concrete and soliciting a wide cross-section of opinion. Coding = NR

3 This account is based on 35 interviews (seven outside the department), extensive documentation, and observation of both patrol operations and management. Coding = NR

4 These categories were informed by, but are not identical to, those developed in Henry Mintzberg. The Structuring of Organizations. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979). Coding = NR


6 Cook has since become the LPD’s director of communications. Coding = NR

7 The relevant General Order (G.O. 89-06, August 2, 1989) actually empowers all officers to “respond to legitimate inquiries for routine information from the news media if the time, place, and circumstances permit.” But the order qualified this statement of policy immediately: “If there is any doubt as to whether such information should be divulged, these inquiries shall be referred to the Superintendent of Police, the Deputy Superintendent, or the particular Platoon/Bureau commander” [emphasis added]. In practice, the qualification apparently carried more weight than the policy Coding = NR

8 Normally one would say “the 911 system,” but until 1995 Lowell did not have a 911 system. Coding = NR

9 We will discuss an early example (ca. 1990) of collaboration between Inspectional Services and the police in the section on change. Coding = NR

10 Census data show a 117% increase in foreign-born residents of the city from 1980 to 1990, and an increase of over 2,000% in the number of Southeast Asians (though local officials believe that Census undercounts were a serious problem in the city); many of these immigrants were attracted to Lowell in the 1980s by the city’s growing economy. Other minority groups grew as well: Lowell’s Latino population rose 130% in the 1980s, and its African-American population grew 110%. Census data are taken from Lowell Police Department. Community Policing: Lower Highlands/Acre Neighborhood. Grant Application: Drug Control & System Improvement Discretionary Program, Department of Justice Police Hiring Supplemental Program, p. 6. Coding = NR
11 The way in which detectives dealt with victims is worth noting, as it highlights a crucial difference between the professional model and community policing. One sergeant remembers: “One of the things that we always heard about is people usually get a little frustrated, they never knew what was going on with their case. Then all of a sudden, we would make an arrest, and all of a sudden a victim would get a subpoena to go to court and they would have no idea what it was about. They would end up calling you and you say ‘You remember me, I was at your housebreak three months ago, well we have got the guy and a whole bunch of them and we just want you to show up.’ They say ‘Oh I did not know that, did you get any of the property back?’,” which if you found property you would have notified them. Coding = NR

12 Drug investigations are often considered proactive in the sense that they target “victimless” crimes that lack a specific complainant. But Chief Davis, who headed Vice from 1983 to the time he became chief, describes the division he ran as “very reactive . . . Because you wouldn’t target someone who you didn’t get a lot of complaints on, who wasn’t already out there causing a lot of trouble. So, in that respect, it was still reactive.” He goes on to explain that the complaints came from citizens especially disgruntled informants: “They talk about vice enforcement and narcotics enforcement as enforcement of victimless crimes. But there really are victims. There really are people who, even though they may be part of the conspiracy, end up becoming victims. So those are the people that complained a lot.” Coding = NR

13 According to Building Inspector David St. Hilaire, who has done almost all of the city’s LPD-initiated code inspections, the first time he used code enforcement in response to drug problems was at the request of the FDIC, which had just foreclosed on a drug house in the city. Coding = NR

14 Several years saw considerable activity on these fronts. For example, the LPD issued 17 general orders in 1987, covering such areas as standards for dress and grooming, policy and procedures to be followed for D.W.I. roadblocks, and procedure for the reporting and investigation of missing persons. Coding = NR

15 Outsiders like the state Governor also helped focus attention on Centralville by delivering an oversized check, representing Lowell’s first state aid for community policing, directly to the new precinct. Coding = NR

16 Taylor had been particularly concerned that bringing the area under control would demand forceful tactics that might alienate the community he wanted to work with. But the dealers’ unexpected surrender sidestepped the problem: “Because we did not have to get into this almost military mentality of fighting these drug dealers off because that happened almost without a fight, it facilitated us very quickly [moving] into the next phase of the operation, which was more of the community outreach, working with the neighbors and the Parks Department. I am very thankful for that because I was not sure how long a period we were going to have to be in the trenches at first, because it really was a bad area.” Coding = NR
17 An important aside is warranted here. Davis had recently developed a close relationship with the University, which apparently believed it was losing students because of safety concerns—particularly along the drug-infested Fletcher Street entrance to the campus. Davis remembers that because of this, “The Chancellor made it clear that the University was at my disposal on the other side of the house, on the administrative side of the house. So we started to work very closely together. I have a very good relationship with Chancellor Hogan and Vice Chancellor Fred (Speronis).” The University was generous not only with Hart’s time, but also in other ways like providing technical support when the LPD revamped its finance office. And it was through Hart that Davis hired Brenda Bond, who became instrumental in securing and managing the department’s grants (among other things). We will see other ways in which the University relationship became important below. **Coding = NR**

18 Hart, who now runs a private consulting business to support organizational change in the private sector, reports that funding is often a stumbling block for police departments—which is why the LPD is the only police department she has had a chance to work with. A few departments have contacted her, but none have been able to come up with funding to support consultant’s fees; Hart believes the problem is that there are too few grants specifically designed to support the process aspects of organizational change, and that city governments are loath to spend money on such “frills.” The funding the LPD was able to get was entirely a result of their own inventiveness: “We were just very creative,” she explains. “We just wrote it in but the grants weren’t specifically set aside for organizational change. I think the proposals were strong enough that they allowed it to stay in the proposal. And it was still a relatively small amount [relative to the rest of] the proposal.” **Coding = NR**

19 According to Normandin, the FTO system emerged out of work he had recently done reforming internal affairs, when he found that the department was not making sufficient use of the one-year “probationary” period that civil service laws allowed (the department could fire officers more easily during this period than afterwards). Normandin raised the problem at early strategic planning sessions, and the group decided to develop the FTO system as a way of monitoring new hires more closely. But the system also allowed additional training in the LPD’s rapidly-changing vision of policing—both for the recruits and for the FTOs themselves (as they would undergo their own training to qualify for the program). **Coding = NR**

20 UHP also funded two officers for the Lowell Housing Authority, now a seven-person force directly under the LPD’s command. **Coding = NR**

21 There is always some question about the number of officers the technology portion of MORE grants free up, since the calculation rests difficult-to-establish assumptions (Lowell’s grantwriters themselves describe the calculations as “a nightmare”). But at least 16.5 of these 31 positions are real, as they represent the civilianization piece of COPS MORE. **Coding = NR**

22 The civil service system authorizes the assessment center approach (though it does not exactly encourage it), but a private contractor actually runs the process. **Coding = NR**

24 He remembers that time very fondly, however: “We had the beeper number of the person in charge, and you could beep him any time of the day or night. I swear to God these guys never slept. You could beep them any time of the day or night, and they'd call you back like two minutes later. I always felt guilty. But they were great. They were really responsive.” Coding = NR

25 On the other hand, one officer interprets the same observation in a positive light: “They’ve got young, energetic officers [in the precincts] that are going to do something.” Coding = NR

26 The investigation is also notable for the close relations it implies between the LPD and federal law enforcement, as loaning an informant implies an extraordinary degree of trust. See James Q. Wilson. *The Investigators*. (New York: Basic, 1978), p. 78. Coding = NR

### A. Tabulation of Occurrences

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NR = 38
Albany, New York Case Study

NATIONAL COPS EVALUATION
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE CASE STUDY:
Albany, New York

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Case Study Prepared for the Urban Institute

Introduction

Albany, New York is a city of just over 100,000 residents and a rich political history. Though it has been the state capital since 1797, it is Albany’s local politics that have truly distinguished the city: Albany hosted the most enduring political machine in modern American history, one that kept a strong hold over most city affairs well into the 1970s and even the early 1980s. But towards the end of this period the party’s hold on civic affairs began to weaken: Although Democratic voters still outnumber Republicans better than 10-to-1 in Albany, the Democratic organization no longer holds the iron grip on power that it once held, and today party leaders share power with employee unions, neighborhood groups, civil service boards, and independent administrators. Coding = NR

The Albany Police Department has evolved over the past two decades in response to these changes, and recent reforms labeled “community policing” have played a part in that evolution. In some ways, community policing has meant a return to the past in Albany: Well into the 1980s, local police maintained a neighborhood-oriented force that emphasized foot patrol, and it was not until reform Mayor Thomas Whalen cut department staffing radically—from a patronage-swollen 415 in the 1970s to 300 by 1993—that the APD shut down its popular neighborhood substations. In part, community policing simply reversed these recent reforms by re-instituting foot patrol and by promising to re-open neighborhood substations. But it also promised the city something different: Whereas in the past local police had taken guidance mostly from the formal political system, under community policing they pledged to listen to Albany’s newly-powerful neighborhood and business groups, and also to unorganized residents. Coding = NR

This case study chronicles the history of the APD community policing efforts in three stages. Section I sets the context for change by reviewing the recent history of Albany’s police and its government more generally. Section two, the heart of the study, then chronicles the reforms of the past four years in some detail, focusing on the strategies APD administrators and others used to put community policing in place. Section three then sums up the consequences of change by briefly reviewing how the APD operates today. Coding = NR
I. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT THROUGH 1994

1. Relationship to the Environment
All public agencies submit to some form of public oversight, often distributed among elected officials, public-minded professionals, community groups, and administrative law. But in the decades leading up to community policing, what was distinctive about the Albany Police Department was the degree to which this oversight was informally centralized in the hands of local politicians. The near monopoly of control that elected officials held over city agencies began to weaken in the 1980s, but many observers maintain that up until the 1970s, Albany government was firmly in the hands of a unified Democratic machine. Coding = NR

The Albany County Democratic Committee is the stuff of legends. Presided over for some five decades by party leader Dan O’Connell, Albany Democrats held tight control over everything from elections, to taxes, to the criminal justice system, using their influence over those spheres to earn loyalty and maintain their hold on power. Though a few veteran city officials downplay the influence of the machine, most report that as late as the early 1980s, the party’s appointed ward leaders held sway over many important decisions—including where code inspections would be made, whether or not the city would collect on a parking ticket, and who the police department would hire and promote (civil service tests were widely considered toothless in Albany, one of the few large cities in New York to administer the test locally, and the state repeatedly admonished city officials for lax administration of hiring regulations). Indeed, the special role of jobs in the patronage system led to an enlarged police department of some 415 officers in the 1970s, when LEAA funds boosted APD staffing considerably. Coding = DPO&OS&OS/TP; E/B

Ward leaders, of course, did not exercise their influence independently. O’Connell and Albany Mayor Erastus Corning—whose 42-year tenure made him the longest-serving mayor in America—exercised strong discipline over party members: Well into the 1970s, it was highly unusual for any political position to be contested within the Democratic party, and to win the Democrats’ endorsement meant certain victory in open elections. (Even in 1985, after the machine’s inexorable decline had taken root, Democrats outnumbered Republicans by 16 to 1 in Albany.) Indeed, “loyalty” has long been the watchword of Albany politics, and observers both credit it with making the system work and blame it for making it unbearable. On the one hand, loyal party members—even those of the most modest means—could often expect immediate responses when they brought neighborhood or personal problems to the attention of their ward leaders, who gave Albany government a strong neighborhood focus that so-called “professional” city halls around the country could rarely match. On the other hand, dissent was not welcome in Albany, and those who sought to organize their own power bases met with stiff resistance. One example of this dynamic comes from repeated attempts by police to unionize, which did not succeed until the mid-1970s after a bitter fight with the Corning administration. Another example emerged during the same period as neighborhood associations began to form in the city: Many observers report that Corning fought the groups and their proposals every step of the way, seeing them as an affront to the consolidated power of the political machine. Finally, Corning also resisted organizing attempts in Albany’s black community, which was scantily represented in the Democratic Committee. Indeed, Albany blacks have long had a contentious relationship with city
hall—particularly the police department, which faced widespread accusations of brutality towards African-Americans. Coding = DPO&OS&OS/TP; E/B

These various organizing attempts presaged the machine’s gradual unraveling, which was punctuated by the deaths of O’Connell in 1977 and Corning in 1983. Corning was succeeded by Thomas Whalen, who at the time was the president of the city’s Common Council and had been hand-picked by Corning himself as his successor. Initially viewed as a Democratic loyalist who would simply continue with the status quo, Whalen turned out to be something of a reformer. Even before taking charge of the city, he had felt that voters simply would not accept the “bare-knuckles” strategies of the past, and two structural problems apparently encouraged his reformist bent. First of all, the tight link between the mayoralty and the County Democratic Committee died along with Corning, who left the mayor’s job to Whalen but the chairmanship of the Committee to a longtime party member named Leo O’Brien—a division that broke the machine lifeline connecting voters to city services. Second, years of patronage had swollen the city’s budget, to the point that Corning had allegedly begun borrowing to finance regular operating expenses (an illegal practice supported, again allegedly, by questionable accounting). As Whalen quickly recognized, the already-decaying city simply could not afford the old strategies of patronage. Coding = NR

Whatever the reasons, Whalen gradually extricated city government from the Democratic Committee and its offshoots, selling the water system to an autonomous agency, ending most no-bid contracts, and embarking on a massive enterprise to rationalize the city’s finances. At the same time, Whalen cultivated a relationship with the growing movement of neighborhood associations, which gradually began to displace ward leaders as shareholders in some city decisionmaking. The new Mayor’s supporters trumpeted his efforts as a professionalization of city government that had started to undo the damage done by decades of backwards politics—which, they argued, had left the city’s downtown in disarray, undermined effective service delivery, and destroyed city hall’s legitimacy. But opponents accused the new mayor of elitism and of catering to the wealthy and business interests, and many party loyalists treated him as a traitor. Moreover, some in the police department argue that political influence over policing actually increased under Whalen, who they say took a more direct interest in staffing decisions that Corning ever had, perhaps in order to advance his reforms there. Coding = NR

Whatever their objective merits, Whalen’s reform efforts touched the police department directly: Believing that patronage had swollen the APD’s ranks, the mayor stopped hiring completely for eight years, closing the department’s two neighborhood substations in the process. The effort put a serious strain into relationships between city hall and the police—particularly with the increasingly-vocal Police Officer’s Union, which fought Whalen on staffing and other issues for years. The result was that the Mayor found it difficult to push more substantive reforms: For example, despite four years of efforts to implement community policing towards the end of his tenure, Whalen was only able to establish a marginal special unit, leaving the rest of the department untouched. Other Whalen-led reforms to areas like internal affairs and minority hiring also led to serious dissent and were never completely implemented (one Chief resigned over disagreements with the Mayor about discipline). Coding = NR
Whalen did influence policing indirectly by encouraging active neighborhood associations (NAs), which began gradually to play more of a role in the APD and other city agencies. But while police were not exactly antagonistic to these groups (special units like the anti-burglary team and community services reportedly had close relationships with some NAs), they apparently never fully accepted the idea that they should look to the community for guidance about police priorities. Community activist Harold Rubin recalls an incident that illustrates this idea:

Years and years ago, there was a motorcycle parked on the sidewalk. Now, a motorcycle in the vehicle and traffic law is listed as a motor vehicle: It’s not supposed to be parked on the sidewalk. And so I told the cop about this and said, “There’s a motorcycle over here.” He turned to me and said, “Are you trying to tell me how to do my job?” . . . He didn’t want to write the ticket for the damn thing. So instead of going after the motorcycle, which is illegal, he goes after me.

Rubin, whose Center Square neighborhood was the only one with foot patrol in the city after the Arbor Hill and South End substations closed, had perhaps the closest thing to “community policing” that the APD was offering at the time. Nevertheless, Rubin reports that even the foot patrol officer only occasionally attended association meetings, and that while he was an effective and welcome police presence, “he was not community-oriented.”

The Task Environment

Until the 1980s, the Democratic organization also influenced the APD’s dealings with other city and county agencies. In fact, interagency cooperation in this period was apparently reasonably good, as employees of both the police department and their agency partners remember making regular referrals to one another, particularly with regards to problem properties: Since public servants worked as much for ward leaders as they did for their respective agencies, the “barriers” between different agencies were not especially salient.

On the criminal justice side, the APD apparently enjoyed a good relationship with other nearby police agencies and with the County court system, which never faced the crisis of jail space that began to pressure many other U.S. cities. Some local officials feel that the APD had too little contact with State and Federal law enforcement agencies (both of which participated in investigations against the County Democratic Committee—ranging from the one led by presidential aspirant and New York State Governor Thomas Dewey in the 1940s, to a more recent FBI probe into fundraising practices in the early 1990s). But within the county, at least, some allege that the APD was enmeshed only too well into the machine-controlled criminal justice system, which elected its judges, its county attorneys, and (until 1968) its DA with the blessing of the Democratic Committee.

2. Operations

Writing thirty years ago, James Q. Wilson described the Albany Police Department as a “watchman” style department that emphasized serious crimes and the maintenance of public order, paying less attention to minor violations like traffic offenses, gambling, and other misdemeanors. Many department veterans today insist that this policing style dominated the
department well into the 1980s. For example, one officer who moved to Albany relatively late in life remembers that the department frowned on him when he did make arrests for minor infractions: “A lot of the older guys would look down their nose at that,” he explains. “I can remember my Lieutenant yelling at me for bringing in a drunken driver, or different things that were [about] quality of life.” Tolerance for vice and gambling declined somewhat under the glare of negative publicity (including an early-1970s investigation by the state into allegations that Albany police took payoffs from local prostitution rings), but the underlying watchman ethos remained. Coding = DPO&OS/B

The organization of the patrol force underwent more dramatic fluctuations. Several decades ago, the APD was divided into six precincts that assigned officers to relatively small areas of the city. But this decentralized structure eventually gave way to two relatively large patrol divisions within which officers did not have permanent beat assignments. Coding = DPO&OS/B

In the early 1970s, the department moved back towards decentralization again by using federal LEAA money to open up two neighborhood substations, located in the predominantly black neighborhoods of Arbor Hill and the South End. Tensions with police were high in these areas, largely because of accusations about police brutality, but also because of concerns that police were ignoring these neighborhoods’ serious crime problems. In response, the department assigned several non-uniformed officers to patrol these neighborhoods mostly on foot, charging them with delivering essentially all police services—from patrol, to call response, to investigation—and thereby creating what amounted to a new and separate police department dedicated solely to these two areas. One substation officer remembers:

The neighborhood units, as they were called, were dressed in brown pants [and] either yellow or green blazers, and your cars were yellow. So it was like having two different police departments. And the people in the neighborhood would often say, “We don’t want the blue coats in here.” And the uniformed officers in blue would resent [the neighborhood units]. There was a lot of divisiveness. Coding = DPO&OS/M

This divisiveness may have contributed to the substations’ closing in the mid 1980s, and some former unit officers argue that growing union activism also undermined them (among other demands, the new union insisted that the administration fill jobs in the neighborhood units through the seniority-based bid system that began to govern most other APD assignments). But when Mayor Whalen eliminated the two units on the advice of an outside study, he presented the action as part of his more general downsizing of the police department, arguing that Albany simply would not have enough manpower to run these special substations any longer. Coding = DPO&OS/M; B&R/B

In closing the Arbor Hill and South End substations, Whalen returned the APD’s patrol force to the relatively centralized model it had used in the 1960s, which consisted of two divisions plus a traffic unit, with little focus placed on neighborhoods. The basic grouping during this period was the squad, and the Lieutenants who commanded them were charged with overseeing the entire patrol force during their hours on duty. It was not that there was no incentive at all to deal with neighborhood problems in this system: One department manager recalls, “I know when I was a
Sergeant, if I had groups that were constantly congregating in one area between certain times, causing an uproar in the neighborhood, I didn’t want to have to go to the Lieutenant three times and tell him I couldn’t fix it. I’d fix it.” But the difficulty was that accountability for these problems was often fragmented or ill-defined. The manager continues:

Who did you go to? Because if you were the Lieutenant on days and I came to you and said, “Hey listen, you need to straighten this out.” And you said, “Yeah, yeah I do. But you know what, a lot of that happens after five, six o’clock at night, and that’s not my shift.” Or I went to you on four to twelve, and you said, “Well, you know, we have some problems with it—but man, after midnight when we go off, it’s [worse].” So you never had that one person that you could go to and say, “Fix this,” or, “Why is this happening?”

As a result, some department veterans argue, chronic neighborhood problems never received the attention they deserved.

Outside of patrol, the relatively unspecialized APD of the 1960s (when operations divided into traffic, investigations, patrol, and communications) gradually added a number of dedicated units, including a juvenile unit, a community services unit, a drug unit, and an anti-burglary unit. Like the neighborhood substations, most of these special units operated autonomously, having little coordination with the rest of the APD. The drug unit, for example, worked flexible shifts and had little managerial oversight—to the point that by the early 1990s, some city officials felt it was getting out of control, as drug officers provoked a number of civil suits for excessive force and wrongful searches. Community services, which met with neighborhood groups, provided crime prevention services, and took care of other community relations functions, obviously did not create the same types of concerns. But many department members felt that it too was overly isolated, as the rest of the patrol force rarely attended community meetings with community services officers, who were expected to take care of such duties on their own.

3. Administrative Systems

These problems with organizational structure apparently reflected more general administrative weaknesses in the APD. In part, the department’s relative lack of emphasis on things like policy, procedure, and coordination reflected the strong influence of politics on Albany policing. For example, hiring and recruitment were directed less by internal needs assessments and standardized testing than they were by the political machine. (Even today, it is not hard to find department veterans who remember a time when the surest way to gain a police job in Albany was to contact one’s ward leader.) This particular form of strong political influence subsided when Corning died in 1983, but at that point a new form of political influence began to dominate personnel decisions, namely, the massive downsizing of the Whalen administration, which saw hiring stop cold for eight years, promotions slow to a crawl, and total staffing drop by one-third. In any case, other administrative systems also seemed to suffer due to political influence, as functions like planning, internal budgeting, and policymaking had little place in an environment where political leaders had final say in most important decisions. The party’s opposition to unionization also had the effect of maintaining informal administration, as evidenced by the fact
that formal rules governing things like assignments and discipline proliferated in the APD after the union did gain power in the late 1970s.  Coding = DPO&OS/B

Further back in time, the internal affairs system also received little attention in Albany. In particular, complaints against police were widely viewed as unwelcome, and the entire criminal justice system seemed to mobilize against those who made them. “Twenty, thirty years ago, especially in this city, you didn’t make complaints,” one department veteran explains. Mayor Whalen sought to revamp internal affairs in 1985 when he replaced its commanding officer in response to a high-profile case that he felt had not been investigated properly, and some department veterans argue that the complaint process became much more sophisticated around that time. But others maintain that low-level complaints still tended to be deflected, since the small internal affairs unit simply did not have the time to investigate every minor incident. Coding = DPO&OS/B; D&IC/B

4. Management
The lack of structure and coordination that came with the APD’s informal administrative systems were something of a double-edged sword to department managers. On the one hand, the lack of emphasis on strict rules and procedures meant that the personal authority of a manager or supervisor carried considerable weight, and it is perhaps for this reason that many department members remember their organization as a fairly hierarchical one. “Back then,” one department member remembers, referring to the 1970s, “a Sergeant was a Sergeant and you did what he said. You didn’t question him, and you didn’t make suggestions.” Indeed, supervisors tried to keep close watch over their subordinates: For example, officers were not supposed to contact outside agencies like code enforcement without first clearing it with their Sergeant. And until forces like unionization and civil service began to erode upper management’s power in the 1980s, APD managers (working closely with elected officials) had essentially unilateral authority to make assignments, decide policies, and choose promotions. In this sense, authority was fairly centralized in the APD during much of this period. Coding = MEI/B

On the other hand, the department’s informal, craft-like flexibility made for something of an unruly organization that management occasionally had trouble controlling. For example, many department managers felt that as attrition thinned out upper management ranks, individual units tended to go their separate ways, independent of oversight, coordination, and any overarching departmental strategy. One department manager explains:

There was head butting going on within the department about who’s in charge, who’s running this, who’s doing that. That was one of the problems they’d run into. The other problem was that there were people doing things and not telling anybody about them. And then [someone] would find out two to three days later that they had decided to send somebody to Timbuktu to go investigate something without clearing that through any of the proper channels. . . . And the other thing was that the Chief was caught up trying to find out what was going on, and nobody had answers—they’d have stuff on the news, but nobody could tell him what happened. Coding = DPO&OS/B; C&R/B
These problems were particularly acute during the night shift, when the highest-ranking officers on duty would typically be the various division Lieutenants, who sometimes had trouble agreeing who should take charge of crime scenes and other situations. Finally, beyond these questions of oversight, some department veterans argue there was simply too little mentoring by upper management. “What was frustrating is when as a new supervisor . . . . you were just constantly bombarded with decisions and you weren’t necessarily sure what to do,” one department member remembers, going on to explain that the lack of upper management presence exacerbated the problem by leaving supervisors to their own devices. Thus in this sense, management was fairly decentralized in this period, leaving officers, first-line supervisors, or at least division Lieutenants with important decisions—to the point that some of them felt that they were overburdened with authority.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN ALBANY

The growing national discourse about community policing began to touch Albany in 1991, when Mayor Thomas Whalen attended a U.S. Conference of Mayors meeting on the topic and was prompted to direct then-Police Chief John Dale to implement it in the APD. Dale’s staff spent three months studying community policing efforts in other cities, and the Chief then announced plans to start up an outreach unit that would partly re-create the popular foot patrols that Whalen had abolished a few years earlier (residents in those neighborhoods had repeatedly complained that they wanted their stations back after Whalen closed them in 1986). This time, however, the effort would not involve physically opening up new police stations to which a large number of officers reported: Instead, the APD would assign eight officers total to four relatively small “quarters” in each of the Arbor Hill and South End neighborhoods, with a mandate to broaden their role beyond traditional police work. “I want the officers to be able to get on the telephone and call an individual to take action, not go through the red tape,” Dale explained to a newspaper reporter at the time. “[An officer might say] ‘I have a house that needs to be boarded up, I have a mother here who doesn’t have any food, you’ve got to help her.’” Dale especially hoped that that the officers would build rapport with residents in these neighborhoods and thereby reduce the historic mistrust that had existed in Albany’s African-American community, telling a newspaper reporter, “My internal affairs department shouldn’t have much work if this works.”

The foot patrols were apparently popular in the city, and some residents insisted that their community policing officers had helped clear out the most egregious drug markets in their neighborhoods. But many in the APD felt that the program represented a superficial commitment to community policing. One explains:

Essentially what they did was take about eight guys from neighborhoods in the upper end of the city, moved them down into the Old Arbor Hill and the South End . . . and said, “OK, you are community policing.” No training. . . . They didn’t even consult what was then the command staff at the police department. Just the Mayor said, “Community policing sounds good: Here’s what we’re going to do.” And then, as was typical at that time, they didn’t take these guys and plug
them into the organizational chart. They just said, “You report directly to the Chief of Police.” So when the Chief of Police went home, these guys were on their own. **Coding = DPO&OS/M**

Others concur that in this incarnation, the outreach unit was even more isolated from the rest of the department than the APD’s other special units. The problem was not just that this version of “community policing” left most Albany officers untouched, but also that the unit itself sometimes did not get needed support. Then-Sergeant Arthur Phinney, who commanded the outreach officers for a year, reports that his team made some significant accomplishments but that at times he felt constrained by wider organizational issues:

The community policing philosophy was just kind of taking hold and I, for one, really did not feel at that point that I had as free hand as I have now to position my people and to apply the manpower that I have. A couple of times I would suggest that maybe we ought to put them in plain clothes to do a certain thing, and I felt that there was resistance to that amongst my immediate supervision at the time. So we didn’t do a lot of that stuff. **Coding = DPO&OS/B; C&R/B**

The problem, perhaps, was that longstanding disagreements with Whalen made police less than enthusiastic about carrying his newest program forward: Patrol officers opposed the effort through their union, and when Dale advertised the position for a Sergeant who would head up the new outreach unit, no one applied for the job, forcing the Chief to fill it by inverse seniority. Some observers suggested that the union was politically-motivated, in that it was geared to oppose anything proposed by Whalen. But union leaders argued that they had serious substantive disagreements with this particular proposal, maintaining that too few officers were being committed, that the target areas needed to be “cleared out” with sweeps before foot officers took to the beat, and that a heavy load of traditional police work was diverting the officers from the job they were supposed to be doing. **Coding = DPO&OS/B; B&R/B**

1. A New Mayor and a New Push for Community Policing

Community policing thereby sputtered along slowly in Albany for about three years until 1994, when a new Mayor brought not only a broader vision for the effort, but also, and perhaps more important, greater credibility with the rank-and-file. That Mayor was a man named Jerry Jennings, an Albany alderman for thirteen years who had long stood up for police interests against Whalen’s budget cuts. Community policing had a direct connection to at least one of these battles, as Jennings joined one other alderman to oppose the Mayor when he shut down the Arbor Hill and South End substations. Jennings did not represent either ward at the time, but he explains that as a school administrator (a position he had held since the 1970s), he “understood the importance” of these units, which he felt did an excellent job of holding the line against growing crime problems. Moreover, when Whalen began pushing his new version of the outreach unit in 1991, Jennings felt that the efforts left much room for improvement. “The community was crying for more,” he maintains. **Coding = DPO&OS/B**

Public safety was not the only area in which Jennings clashed with Whalen: Long something of a dissident who had insisted on the Common Council’s independence, Jennings alienated the party mainstream and became a pariah to many Democratic stalwarts. For example, when he sought to
This history poised Jennings as a maverick candidate for mayor, and he found himself running against a well-financed candidate named Harold Joyce, who had the Democratic party’s endorsement and had only recently been the party’s chairman. The contest was a highly unusual one for Albany: No one had upset the party pick for mayor since World War I, and even lesser races were still rarely contested. But Jennings gradually assembled a diverse coalition of supporters who helped him win a close Democratic primary and then an easy victory in the general election. Part of this coalition came from those who disapproved of Whalen’s reforms, including a number of Corning loyalists who felt Whalen had betrayed their patron’s legacy, as well as a few dissident ward leaders who lamented their declining clout in city decisions. But Jennings also had strong support from organized labor, receiving endorsements from the Albany Permanent Professional Firefighters Association, its statewide parent organization, and the New York state police union. The local Albany Police Officers’ Union declined to endorse either candidate, citing potential conflicts of interest if someone in a campaign became the target of an investigation. But most Albany police officers clearly supported Jennings, who they were grateful to for his opposition to Whalen, and who was close friends with then-union president James Tuffey.

Substantively, Jennings ran on a mixture of issues, but public safety was among his most prominent themes. “Crime was a major concern as I walked the neighborhoods, talked to people, and tried to become Mayor of the city,” Jennings explains. “And it’s something that we quickly focused on.” Jennings saw public safety as part of the larger issue of quality of life, which he considered indispensable for further economic development in the city. At the same time, Jennings sought to build “community trust” in the police, primarily by increasing their visibility. “You only do that [build trust] by maximizing the exposure of the men and women in the department,” Jennings explains.

In contrast with his opponent, who intended to commission a professional management study to make recommendations about the APD because he felt “it’s not the mayor’s job to run the police department,” Jennings laid out a fairly specific plan, arguing that a management study would be a waste of money that could better be spent on manpower. Three proposals stood out in Jennings’s plan: First, he intended to add 25 officers as a way to increase patrols in the city. Second, he intended to restructure the department’s management team by adding two new Assistant Chief positions and dividing accountability among them, by filling the long-vacant Deputy Chief slot, and by adding two “non-union” commanders who would ensure loyal, 24-hour supervision. (At the time, the highest rank working nights was a Lieutenant, and the most important supervisors during days were Captains. Both ranks belonged to the same union, and Jennings and others felt this situation created a conflict. “That doesn’t work,” Jennings told an audience at the time. “Where’s the allegiance?”) Finally, Jennings wanted to implement community policing department-wide, expanding foot patrols and creating a special unit focused on crime hot spots in the process. Jennings estimated his plan’s cost at $1 Million, but he felt that the money could be raised by cuts in other areas (including reductions in overtime expenses...
within the police department) or, in a pinch, by raising taxes. “It’s a matter of priorities,”
Jennings told the crowd assembled to hear his proposal.15  Coding = DPO&OS/M; B&R/B

Robert Grebert and the Vision for Community Policing
Jennings wasted no time carrying out his proposals for the police department, filling the vacant
Deputy Chief’s position in his first week on the job. The man he appointed was a 42-year-old
Lieutenant named Robert Grebert, who had started as a patrolman in the APD 20 years before
and had served in the old neighborhood outreach units in the 1970s. In fact, Jennings cited that
experience, together with Grebert’s strong educational background, in his decision to appoint the
Albany Lieutenant to the APD’s number 2 slot.16 In any event, department insiders had for some
time suspected that Jennings would appoint Grebert to the position, as he had been friendly with
the mayoral candidate for a while and, together with union president Tuffey, he had apparently
helped Jennings develop his strategy for the police department.  Coding = NR

Grebert received a broad mandate for reform from Jennings, including scattered administrative
issues like bringing overtime under control and reining in the APD’s special investigations unit.
But Grebert’s central charge was clearly to work with Chief Dale to expand the APD’s
community policing program. Indeed, Grebert remembers that if anything, Jennings’s initial
resolve to put community policing in place struck him as too ambitious:

I get promoted to the Deputy Chief position and the first thing that happens is the
Mayor says, “I want community policing and I want it next month.” So [I said],
“Whoa, wait, you can’t do this. This is really a major change in how we look at
the organization and how the organization looks at itself, and this is not something
we can do overnight. This really takes a generation of police officers to bring it
about completely.  Coding = DPO&OS/M

Grebert also felt that the department simply was not ready to embark on the effort immediately:
He himself was among those most knowledgeable about community policing in the department,
but he had only been exposed to it tangentially. (His first exposure came during a session at the
FBI Academy in 1989, a period when many in the law enforcement community were beginning
to question the so-called “professional model” of policing and looking for alternatives. He had
since followed its development in the literature and learned about it from colleagues in his role as
an adjunct faculty member at two local colleges.) As a result, he received support to spend some
time at Michigan State University’s Center for Community Policing, where he was joined by
another APD member; and a number of high-level APD administrators attended further training
locally and through the Department of Justice’s Community Policing Consortium.  Coding = T/B

Grebert took away from this experience a better sense of what community policing entailed. “I
[was] at least beginning to get my own handle on some of the concepts,” he remembers. Grebert
particularly became convinced about the importance of giving officers a sense of responsibility
for the areas they patrolled—something he felt the current assignment system did not
accomplish.

[One of the] things that I think are incredibly important is the sense of ownership
on the part of police officers: This is my neighborhood; this is where I work. How
dare you commit a burglary? How dare you commit a robbery out here? So this was really the first thing that we tried to work on is the sense of ownership or identification with a particular neighborhood. The city used to be divided into eighteen patrol zones and two divisions. You could come in to work on any given night and you could be in any one of those cars, you could be in any area in the city. There was really no opportunity to develop the sense of ownership with a neighborhood. Coding = DPO&OS/H

Equally important, however, was convincing officers to pay attention to the full range of problems that arose in their beats—not just serious crime. Grebert explains the importance of this idea with a reference to the New York City Police Department, which at the time was beginning to carry out its now-famous focus on quality of life issues.

I’m a big fan of NYPD. I think they really made tremendous gains down there, and certainly what they’ve done with the broken windows idea . . . is a part of the proper message. 17 If the boys can hang around on the corner and smoke a joint, then it’s just a short step to stepping in and shoplifting a carton of cigarettes, and another little step to sticking the place up. So when you send a message that there are consequences for your actions regardless of how unserious people might consider those actions—I think that’s an important part of the message. Coding = DPO&OS/H

Grebert’s early forays into the community, which served to announce the department’s plans, confirmed that this focus made sense:

You’re in law enforcement for twenty years and you go and say, “OK, folks, what’s the problem in your neighborhood?” In law enforcement, what do you expect to hear? Burglary, robbery, rape, murder. That’s not what we were hearing. What we were hearing was, “The kids are out with the boom box all night,” and “The dope dealers are on the corner”—and those are essentially quality of life issues. Coding = DPO&OS/H; C&R/H

This focus would grow even stronger over time as it dovetailed with a citywide effort led by Jennings to improve quality of life in the city. Coding = DPO&OS/H; C&R/H

The First Plan
Grebert sought to flesh out this vision by crafting a long-range plan, one that would lay out the specific reforms needed to make this version of community policing a reality. To be sure, the newly-minted Deputy Chief was realistic enough to recognize that Albany politics could easily overwhelm a naïve and overly ambitious plan; he explains:

Given the way the city worked, you could never run a strategic plan—a three year plan, a five year plan. It would be futile because you couldn’t stick to it. . . . This is such a political environment that the minute some stakeholder group began to yip about something, we’d be modifying that strategic plan, and then somebody
else would begin their yipping and you’d have to modify it again to where itecame the point that you didn’t have a plan.  

Nevertheless, Grebert apparently felt that it was possible and helpful to lay out some sense of the
direction that community policing would entail, even if it were not a detailed “five year plan”
that programmed every element of reform.  

To that end, Grebert put together a “transition team” made up of fifteen officers from different
parts of the department, asking each to outline necessary changes that would orient their unit
towards community policing. (At the time, some criticized the planning effort for failing to
involve the community, but Grebert insists that the group met with Neighborhood Associations,
and in any case he was happy with the results.) Some of the team members came with Grebert to
local seminars on the subject, and all reviewed the literature collected from these events and
Michigan State.  

The document that emerged in the fall of 1994 laid out an ambitious plan to restructure the entire
Albany Police Department. Patrol would undergo the biggest changes: The department’s two
divisions would give way to six geographic sectors, and officers would have constant
assignments to a particular sector until they bid into a new one. This arrangement, the planners
hoped, would not only provide the sense of ownership that Grebert viewed as crucial, but it
would also create teams of officers who could meet regularly to discuss troublespots in their
areas.  

The sector cars would be supplemented by 20 zones of foot patrol officers that were drawn,
according to Grebert, according to “unofficial neighborhood boundaries” in those areas where
foot patrol seemed appropriate (Grebert explained this decision to a newspaper reporter by
saying, “In areas where the social life is in the family room or the backyard pool, foot patrol
doesn’t work. In areas where the social life happens on the street corner and the porch, foot
patrol is the ticket.”) In his eyes, foot patrol had always been a valuable tool, and he looked
forward to bringing it back to Albany. “I’ve always been a believer in foot patrol,” he explains.

I don’t think there’s anything more reassuring to a citizen who’s looking out her
front window than seeing a cop walk down the street. Can he answer as many
calls? No. Can he make as many arrests? No. But it’s an information-gathering
tool, [and] it’s a tool that makes people perceive themselves as being safer when
they see that.  

Each zone was to be staffed with a single officer who would serve as “an ombudsman of positive
change in the neighborhoods he patrols.” With flexible schedules and minimal 911
responsibilities, these officers would have ample opportunity to get to know their assigned
communities and the conditions that most concerned them. The plan made a special effort to
clarify the scope of concerns that these officers might encounter:

The Foot Patrol Officer should be attentive to all types of community problems
and concerns ranging from criminality to parking violations and including such
things as vacant buildings in need of stabilization, pavement in disrepair, speeding
on neighborhood streets, debris strewn lots, abandoned cars, elderly persons in need of assistance, etc. (p. 4) Coding = DPO&OS/H; D&IC/H

Finally, the plan particularly encouraged foot patrol officers to access other city agencies for help dealing with these problems, calling for the department to authorize them to make the necessary contacts. The foot patrol officers would be managed by a Lieutenant (who would in turn report directly to “a person above the rank of Captain who has the responsibility of overseeing Community Policing”), but he would act more as their support staff than their supervisor, helping the officers by following up on their requests to other agencies and departmental units, bringing serious crimes on their beats to their attention, and maintaining files on neighborhood and business groups. Coding = C&R/H; MEI/H

Other units would undergo less dramatic transformations, but all were affected in some way. Detectives, for example, would for the most part begin assigning cases by sector rather than by incident type, allowing them to get a better overall picture of crime patterns in individual neighborhoods. (The main exceptions were illegalities like white collar crime, which was felt to have a citywide rather than a neighborhood character—for example, these criminals often committed crimes at banks far away from their own neighborhoods.) The Administrative Services Bureau, charged with jobs like evaluation of the entire effort, would be expanded by three positions, including two in the training division, which would see its duties grow exponentially: Not only would the community policing effort demand significant training for all staff at its inception, but the department would also have to revise its curriculum for recruits, and it would need to train volunteers to perform outreach duties. Finally, the plan gave all units a mandate for improved coordination, calling, for example, for SIU to include foot patrol officers in drug raids. Coding = D&IC/H; PA/H; T/H; C&R/H

In the deliberations that underlay the report and the reactions to it when it was released, a few areas of controversy turned up. First of all, while the report proposed that the foot patrol officers would walk one-man beats, officers themselves insisted that many areas were too dangerous for that; as a compromise, the plan allowed some officers in adjacent zones to walk together. Second and more important were disagreements about how to fill new assignments like the foot beats: Management wanted to use the so-called review board process, which governed special assignments like detectives or the traffic unit and gave the Chief significant say in who got particular jobs. The union, however, insisted that the positions should be filled through the seniority-based bid system. Despite its misgivings, management conceded to officer demands on this issue, and in return the union agreed to the proposed flexibility in the foot patrol officers’ hours.20 (The existing union contract required fixed schedules for officers, but the union agreed to make an exception for the foot patrol officers, who would be allowed to flex their own schedules with supervisory approval, and who would sometimes be ordered to work different hours when the need arose.) Coding = DPO&OS/M

2. A New Chief for Albany
Before the new effort could make much headway, dissent broke out in the department after Chief Dale’s February, 1995 announcement that he would retire, explaining only that he was “in the 37th year in my profession, and when it’s time to go, you know it.”21 The problem was Jennings’s
choice for a replacement—State Police Sergeant Kevin Tuffey, brother of the department’s recently-departed union president, and a long-time friend of the Mayor’s. Coding = NR

Union leaders were up in arms about the choice even before Jennings formally announced it (like Dale’s retirement, the appointment of Tuffey had been rumored for months). Albany had not made an outsider Police Chief in over a hundred years, and the Civil Service Commission—prompted by Jennings and opposed by the police union—had only made it possible to do so a few months earlier, adding language to the position’s job requirements that would allow candidates to have “equivalent experience in a municipal or State Police unit within the state of New York.” In any case, union leaders accused Jennings of cronyism for appointing his long-time friend, and they insisted that Deputy Chief Grebert was the most qualified man for the position. “I don’t think Kevin Tuffey is up to the job,” then-union president and APD Detective James Galante told a Times-Union reporter at the time. “He has no urban policing experience, [and] I don’t feel that [he] has a real feel for the goings-on in the city of Albany. I believe the people we have are more qualified and experienced and educated.” Regardless of Tuffey’s qualifications, union leaders and others (including two Common Council members) criticized the fact that there would be no formal search process at all for the important post. Coding = DPO&OS/B

When Jennings finally made the appointment official in a March, 1995 press release, he defended his choice of Tuffey as someone who would bring “loyal, progressive leadership” to the APD, insisting that he selected Tuffey “not because I am his friend or because I do not recognize the talent that exists within the Albany Police Department, but because he shares my vision for the future of the department and he has the experience, energy, and qualifications to implement it.” “As an elected official, you go with your gut, and I went with my gut,” Jennings explains of the appointment today. “I was confident that he would be forthcoming and up front with me, and tell me, ‘You’re wrong. You’re right.’ . . . . I went with someone that I was confident in, that would be someone that would work with the present police structure and change it if appropriate.” Jennings also points to Tuffey’s experience with the State Police, which had given him experience in its own fledgling community policing program, and which had helped him to develop strong connections in regional law enforcement circles. Coding = NR

Local media at the time made much of the fact that Tuffey and Jennings were close friends, and some commentators suggested that Jennings appointed him for that reason—a suggestion that Jennings rejects. But while the media interpreted the friendship through the lens of “cronyism,” Tuffey argues that his close association with the Mayor meant that the two shared a view about the challenges facing law enforcement. “The Mayor and I have been friends for a long time,” Tuffey explains. “So we would always sit and talk about visions, and about where we thought the Police Department should go, and what I thought. And we would sit and talk for hours.” Tuffey remembers several recurrent themes in these discussions, including the importance of training in police work and what he saw as problems with the APD’s command structure. But at the broadest level, he simply tried to convey his underlying convictions about policing:

The problem with police work is it changes but it’s the same. Faces, names, and places change, but basically it’s the same. I mean, a robbery is a robbery, a burglary is a burglary, and a homicide is a homicide. You investigate them all the
same way, basically—there are certain steps you take. And every homicide is
different, every robbery has a little different quirk to it or whatever you want to
call it. But basically, you investigate them the same. Coding = D&IC/B

This idea was particularly important for his conception of community policing, which he and
Jennings also discussed in their conversations. “Community policing is—again, I mean call it
community policing, call it what you want: All it is just doing regular, honest, basic police
work,” Tuffey explains. For example, for Tuffey, foot patrol is “getting back in touch with the
community.”

The basic principle of a beat cop is, you walk up and down your certain area. You
get to know who the people are. You help them. They trust you. You build a bond
with them, and when they have a problem, you take care of it. Whether the
problem is loud music in this day and age, whether it be litter, whether it be a
code enforcement problem for your neighbor. It hasn’t changed. The only thing
that has changed is the way the police agencies have handled it, based on different
factors. . . . If you have higher manpower you can do more: You can put more
beat officers out; you can put more police cars out . . . [But] the basic principle of
taking care of the people and doing some things never changes . . . . You arrest
people when you have to. If Mrs. Jones cat is up a tree, try to get the cat out of
there. If she has a burglary, investigate it and try to arrest the perpetrator. If Mrs.
Jones has fallen down in her house, you go in and try to get her out and get her
whatever help she needs. If Mrs. Jones or Mr. Jones is senile and nobody is taking
care of them, you get a hold of the proper social service agency to take care of
them. That’s all police work is. You know, people always see . . . TV shows and
they say all you do is run around every day and arrest people and all that stuff.
That’s not really what it is. Coding = D&IC/H

Thus over the course of years of conversations like these—including discussions about
Jennings’s plans to run for mayor— the two men came to share important aspects of their vision
for the APD. Moreover, beyond the question of personal loyalty came from a long-time
friendship, Tuffey recognized that it was his job to carry out the Mayor’s vision: “If I’m not
following his philosophy, you know what? I’m not going to be here,” Tuffey explains. “Whether
he and I were personal friends, or whether he just hired me, I will tell you the exact same
thing.”24 Coding = NR

Dealing with the Backlash
Nevertheless, many APD officers still resented the choice of Tuffey for police Chief, and it
began to sour the once-amiable relationship between police and the Mayor. That relationship had
already begun to deteriorate a few weeks before Dale’s retirement because of continued tensions
around staffing issues: Union leaders argued that Jennings had been dragging his feet on filling
promotions, and they were become impatient about the pace at which he was fulfilling his
campaign promise to put 25 new officers on the street (Jennings attributed the delay to
unanticipated budgetary problems; the new hires had been chosen in 1994, but some had not yet
entered training because of concerns about funding them). The Tuffey appointment only
exacerbated the situation, leading the union to pull its ads from Jennings’s weekly radio show
and causing its president to threaten that he would withdraw support from the Mayor in his 1997 re-election bid.  Coding = B&R/B

Tuffey himself pointedly stayed out of the fray, telling a reporter he didn’t “have any problem” with the criticisms being levelled against him by the union and explaining, “they have to do what they have to do, and I’ll do what I have to do.” Perhaps because of this attitude, union leaders increasingly qualified their attacks in kind, saying that they were not so much personally opposed to Tuffey as they were upset with Jennings for his methods. Still, sentiment regarding the new Chief was guarded at best: Many police officers refused to attend Tuffey’s swearing-in ceremony, and a wishful group of detectives hosted a “retirement party” for the Chief one month into his tenure. Thus as he entered the APD in the middle of an organizational change effort, Tuffey faced a clear need to build support for his leadership. Coding = DPO&OS/B

The new Chief was able to capitalize on the fact that he was not entirely the “outsider” that union officials had pegged him as. His brother, a long-time union leader and a 19-year veteran of the force, was the most obvious example of Tuffey’s ties to Albany. Indeed, the Tuffey family had a history with the department, as the two brothers’ uncle had been Albany’s Police Chief from 1953 to 1968, and both of their grandfathers had worked for the APD. (As Chief, Tuffey keeps photographs of these relatives on his office wall and an old service record for the department in his desk, as if to remind department members how his genealogy connects him to Albany.) Finally, outside of his family ties, since Tuffey had grown up in the city and associated with law enforcement circles, he had a few friends and colleagues in the department (for example, he and Grebert had occasionally run together before Tuffey came to the APD). All of these ties together meant that Tuffey was not without influential allies in the APD, and at the very least he was able to get a sense of the department’s goings-on more quickly than a complete outsider would have. Coding = DPO&OS/B

More substantively, officers got some reassurance about their new Chief when he made a few long-sought staffing decisions that filled six vacant promotional slots and brought twelve new hires onto the force. In part these moves helped simply by addressing what had been the burning issue with the police union, which simply wanted to see these opportunities for its members made real. But Tuffey argues more generally that this wave of promotions and those that followed over the years helped him to gradually build a core of loyal supporters. “I think by everybody knowing that they have their position because I recommend them to the Mayor, it helps a lot,” Tuffey explains. “That’s how you develop your loyalty and trust.” Indeed, many department members—particularly those at high levels—openly acknowledge an obligation to follow Tuffey’s lead that stems from the positions they have been given in the department. Coding = MEI/B

But some department members insist that the most important factor in neutralizing the “Chief Tuffey” issue was a perception that Grebert was still making most of the APD’s important decisions at first. Tuffey himself hardly discouraged this view: When a newspaper reporter asked him about his inexperience in urban policing (the implication being that he did not understand Albany), Tuffey answered: “The architect of that plan [the department’s community policing plan described above], or one of the architects, was Deputy Chief Grebert. Deputy Chief Grebert’s still going to be there. So as for my lack of knowledge of the inner workings of the city
of Albany Police Department and urban policing, he’ll be there to assist me.” In any case, Tuffey had no plans to upend the plans the department had recently put together, except that he wanted to beef up departmental training even more, and unlike Grebert, he wanted to physically open up at least one new substation to advance community policing. \textit{Coding = DPO&OS/B}

In any case, while many officers still see Tuffey’s appointment as evidence of cronyism in the city of Albany, outright opposition to the Chief died down over time to the point that he became at least as well-accepted as his predecessor. Jennings’s reputation, too, rebounded from its low point at the time when he appointed Tuffey—largely, union members explained, because promotions and staffing did begin to increase under the new Chief, even if the total force never reached the promised 345. In any case, Jennings never became a \textit{bête noire} for the police union, which eventually endorsed him in his bid for re-election in 1997. \textit{Coding = DPO&OS/B}

3. Reforming the APD

The Tuffey appointment and the Grebert plan laid the two central foundations of the reforms that would follow. On the one hand, the plan Grebert spearheaded set the basic course for organizational change in the Albany Police Department—and indeed it had already begun to do so by the time Tuffey took over the Chief’s job. On the other hand, Tuffey brought a strong commitment to the Mayor and his vision for Albany, and these forces would elaborate, modify, or strengthen some elements of the initial plans. \textit{Coding = NR}

\textit{Consolidating Authority}

Tuffey’s first elaboration of the community policing plan came barely three months after he took office, when the new Chief called a group of high-level department members together to develop a plan to reorganize department management. This second plan was not an attempt to revise the community policing blueprint that Grebert had spearheaded: Instead it helped complete unfinished elements of that blueprint, notably its vague but significant exhortation to establish “a command structure . . . that clearly defines duties and outlines the chain of command” (p. 15). \textit{Coding = DPO&OS/B}

The team that examined these issues consisted of a half-dozen APD managers who would eventually become Tuffey’s command staff. As one of the participants remembers their meetings, the group tried to understand and improve upon the department’s organizational structure.

[We wanted] to look at the department, how it was presently, what the structure and the sub-structure were. You know, you have a division, and then you have units and sub-units, and who was in charge of those? And was the workload distributed evenly? Or how accurately was it being represented on paper? And you know, a lot of times you can look at an organizational chart which really is not a true representation of how the department is organized. So that was part of what we did, and he wanted to look at how we were going to deliver service at that time, which was 1995, and where we were going to be within one year, two years. So we almost wanted to look at like a five-year projection, if you will, as to what we were going to be doing. \textit{Coding = DPO&OS/B}
The main conclusion that emerged from these sessions was that the department needed to restructure upper management essentially along the lines that Jennings had laid out in his campaign platform: First, the APD would add two assistant Chief positions to bring the total to four, dividing responsibility among them for patrol, investigations, administration, and special operations (which included things like the K-9 unit and the mounted patrols). Second, the department would create three new appointed positions with the rank of Commander. Two of these non-unionized positions would oversee all department operations after 5 P.M., and the third would oversee the communications unit.  Coding = DPO&OS/B

A number of goals underlay the new command staff positions. One was simply to provide more high-level management, which many felt had declined too far in recent years: During the Whalen era of little hiring and few promotions, the number of APD Captains had fallen from 10 in the late 1970s to 2 by 1995, and many blamed the problems of coordination and oversight—particularly during the night shift and in the narcotics unit—on the lack of high-level management. “There was lack of hierarchy to give those mid-managers their direction,” one participant in the planning sessions explains. “You need the pyramid effect, [where] the Chief is at the top and then it gets wider as it goes down. What we found was there was really no upper pyramid—it kind of flattened off.” Jennings too agreed with this diagnosis, and he argues that the lack of upper management was particularly inappropriate in Albany because of its retirement system: “When you have twenty year retirement,” he explains, referring to the number of years officers must work in Albany before they are eligible for their full pension, “you end up having a very young police department [that] necessitates a lot of supervision, or good strong supervision.”  Coding = DPO&OS/B

But beyond this somewhat abstract desire for “more management,” there was a more specific intention to shore up the authority of the Chief’s office compared to the union. Union power was a comparatively recent force in Albany, where city hall and the Democratic party had long resisted organized labor. But after the initial unionization of police officers in the mid-1970s, other ranks in the department quickly followed suit, and by 1994, the only non-union positions left were the Chief’s job, two Assistant Chiefs, and a vacant Deputy Chief position. Just as Jennings had argued during his 1993 campaign, the planning group felt that this situation undermined effective management. “There were situations where decisions were made by the ranking officer on duty that clearly benefited the union position rather than the department’s agenda,” one APD manager explains. Another argues that union presence on the command staff was undermining the authority of the Chief’s office, pointing out that a Captain who also worked as a union official was essentially “wearing two hats” (an idea department managers and city officials use often when justifying the changes they made).28 He gives this hypothetical example of the problems that arrangement led to:

One guy is the chairman of the Captain’s unit for the union, but he’s also on the command staff. So now on Monday, he goes to the command staff meeting, and you talk about all of these things that you want to do to make it better for the department, but you’ve got to kind of supersede the contract a little bit. “Hopefully we can get this through, or we can get that through”—that’s what you talk about at a command staff meeting. Then the next day, he takes his command staff hat off and he puts on his union hat. He sits at an executive board meeting
with the union, and he says, “Well, you know what? I was at the command staff meeting yesterday, and they want to try to do this, and they want to try to do that.”

Participants in the planning sessions hoped that new command positions would help solve this problem for them. “That’s the reason for these [new] ranks,” one explains. “He [Tuffey] wanted them on board with the command staff, not on board with the union.”

Finally, Grebert agreed with the need for more non-union command staff positions, but he also saw the reorganization as an opportunity to rationalize department management. “When I was in grad school,” Grebert explains, “one of [my professor’s] things was that what makes police organizations so complex—and it always stuck with me—is that they have to be organized on three separate dimensions: Task, geography, and the time of the day.” Community policing had already begun to entrench geography as an organizing principle, and the reorganization offered a chance to firm up organization by task and time:

[In the new plan], Assistant Chiefs were task oriented: One for patrol, one for investigation, one for special operations, . . . and one for administration. Then the rank of Commander, which was the shift boss, who would be the ultimate [person to] answer [to] on each shift around the clock. So we did that restructuring to provide some accountability for both task and for the time of the day.

Grebert concedes that these goals came somewhat at the expense of geographic focus: For example, by putting shift-based commanders on duty during the night and evening shifts, the department essentially re-centralized authority not just from the six recently-created “sectors,” but even from the two divisions that had existed for years.

Does that fly in the face of decentralization? Yes, a little bit. However we were in a situation where very frequently we would have a Sergeant—a unionized Sergeant—being the highest ranking guy on the street in the whole city. In terms of transferring the message down to the troops, that doesn’t work—because that Sergeant is much closer to being one of the boys, one of the troops, than he is to what the command staff is trying to accomplish. So I felt it was important that there be one identified non-union command post on each shift.

In any case, the six sectors were still intended to have some degree of autonomy, and in the near future the department would take further steps towards decentralization.

*Putting the Plan in Place*
At the time, the most controversial aspect of the plan had nothing to do with decentralization and everything to do with the question of union power. “It’s classic union busting at its best,” union president Leonard Crouch said of the plan to a *Times-Union* reporter. Crouch went on to lambaste the administration’s tactics in putting the plan through, insisting that the Chief’s office shut the union out of decisionmaking about the reorganization and that it even tried to hide the
reforms it was making—to the point that he himself did not learn of the new positions until he ran across an entry in the newspaper’s legal notices that advertised the required public hearing for the new positions, which the Civil Service Commission had to approve. “I don’t like reading it in the newspaper first,” Crouch explained. “This is back to where we were”—an apparent reference to the poor relationship the police union had with Mayor Whalen. Charges of “union busting” aside, many in the APD simply disliked having so many appointed positions, and they expressed concerns about what one calls “politicization of our upper ranks.” When the plan was first announced this was simply an abstract concern about the potential for political influence over high-level promotions. But as Tuffey filled the new jobs with people who some viewed, rightly or wrongly, as part of Jennings’s “inner circle,” some of the old sentiments about cronyism re-emerged. These objections from the union and some of the rank-and-file did not, however, derail the reorganization proposal. “They resisted,” one department manager remembers. “[But] we kind of did it by the books, according to New York State civil service law . . . So, although the unions griped about it, ultimately there was really nothing they could do about it.” The Civil Service Commission’s cooperation was obviously crucial in this process, and APD management took pains to present a clear rationale for the new positions to them (including many of the reasons already described), and the reorganization ultimately received the Commission’s endorsement.

Different concerns arose in the political world, where some city leaders decried a plan that proposed “too many Chiefs and not enough Indians.” But here too one key ally was all that was needed: Jennings clearly approved of the proposal, which essentially reproduced a significant element of his campaign platform (which in turn apparently emerged out of discussions Jennings had had with friends and acquaintances in the policing world—including Tuffey and Grebert). In any case, the Mayor was more than willing to sign off on the roughly $100,000 price tag the plan carried.

Tuffey filled most of the new positions in January of 1996, when he appointed three Commanders and one new Assistant Chief (the second Assistant Chief would be appointed the following year). The move gave the Chief his first chance to put his own stamp on the department’s direction, and he sought to assemble a “young command staff [that was] innovative, creative, [and] that wanted to move forward,” as he puts it. The Assistant Chiefs had responsibility for reforms that (for the most part) fell under each of their assigned functional areas, and these reforms will be described below. The Commanders, however, had newer and therefore less-familiar responsibilities.

One of the first people to be appointed to this position was a 23-year veteran named David Epting, a Lieutenant at the time who had worked in patrol for most of his career. Epting remembers his charge from the Chief clearly: “He called me in and said to me, ‘I’m going to make you Commander. You’re going to run the City from five to one.’” But Epting admits that it took his subordinates some time to adjust to his new role.
It took people a while to realize that there was somebody out there that they had the answer to. Like the detective office would be sending people to God knows when to pick somebody up, and they never used to notify anybody that they did that. Now they had to notify somebody. So I would bump heads with some of the detective supervisors. The narco guys would be doing their raids. The next thing I know, I hear on our radio, “We just executed a search warrant at such and such an address.” I didn’t know anything about it. So, we bumped heads a few times until they realized that there’s now a person out there. I mean, I’m not going to tell them how to run their raid, [and] I’m not going to tell them when to do the raid. But I’ve got to know about something like that. [So] it was more getting your middle management and lower-middle management people used to knowing that they had to actually answer to somebody now, because there was somebody ultimately responsible for what they were doing.  

Over time, Epting maintains, middle managers did get used to the new Commander role, and he believes that the new position has worked out well.  

For many in the APD, this reorganization was far from a minor issue: When asked about organizational change in their department, they insist that the restructuring of upper management—not community policing or any other substantive reform—has been the most significant recent change in the Albany Police Department. Consequently, it is perhaps not surprising that the reform sparked the initial resistance it did, and that it took some time to settle in. In any case, most department members seem to have become accustomed to the new arrangement: When asked what happened to the initial concerns about creating the new positions, one department member explains, “I think it’s just an accepted fact.”  

**The Retirement of Robert Grebert**  
The reorganization helped consolidate support for reform among upper management by giving Tuffey the ability to appoint much of his own command staff. But that process did not come to completion until early 1998, when the APD and the city as a whole underwent a large-scale turnover of personnel.  

Tuffey made a total of four more command staff appointments during this second wave of personnel moves, but the central APD figure in the effort was Deputy Chief Grebert. More than anyone else in the department, Grebert had been inextricably associated with community policing, which to the public, at least, was the single most prominent reform in the APD. But although top management, city officials, and community leaders all credited Grebert with making that reform possible, the Deputy Chief was becoming increasingly unpopular with his immediate superiors. “The relationship went downhill from [my first day],” Grebert says of his rapport with Jennings.  

I guess I’m fairly independent. Like when you get to a hostage situation and the Mayor wants to take the phone out of the negotiator’s hands. You appreciate his support at a scene like that. But he shouldn’t be the hands-on person there. So we had four years of these sorts of things. A couple of high profile cases occurred the
last year that I really took what I thought was an appropriate position, and I would take that position again.  Coding = DPO&OS/B; MEI/T; D&IC/B

Indeed, Grebert was frequently a voice of dissent on many of Tuffey and Jennings’s initiatives, including their decision to open a substation in Arbor Hill and the Mayor’s decisions about the composition of a community advisory board. Coding = DPO&OS/B; D&IC/B

Such simmering tensions apparently boiled over in January of 1998, when Tuffey asked for his Deputy Chief’s retirement and got it. Tuffey and other local officials refused to comment on the reasons for his request, and Jennings insisted that he had nothing to do with the decision, telling a reporter, “I’m the mayor—I’m not going to micromanage the Police Department.” But the refusal to comment only fed speculation, and many local observers concluded that Grebert had been ousted because he had gone overboard responding to recent allegations of police harassment. The case in question centered on a local college basketball star’s claims that two off-duty officers had handcuffed him and beaten him after a bar fight. When the officers were suspended without pay and subjected to a thorough investigation, many APD officers attributed this zeal partly to Grebert. Unpopular with the rank-and-file, and perhaps at odds over the case with Tuffey, Grebert, this theory held, had to go.

But even on the issue of discipline, Grebert’s unpopularity extended beyond this one incident, for officers and other managers alike had long complained that the Deputy Chief favored punishments that were too strong. Even more broadly, some department members explain that Grebert simply was not on board with Jennings’s and Tuffey’s vision, pointing to disagreements like his dissent on the Arbor Hill station for evidence. In an environment where loyalty was prized highly, such independence simply did not sit well: One department member explains broadly that “Grebert had to go because he wasn’t grateful to the people who made him [i.e., promoted him];” and a local political scientist commented on Grebert’s situation by saying that although there was a fine line between legitimate political influence and unacceptable meddling, it would be well within Jennings’s right to let someone who didn’t share his vision go:

There’s probably a common amount of tension between any city hall and police department as to the way things should be done. [But] the chief executive should be commanding the strategies to implement those policies. And the Mayor is the elected chief executive, He’s the one answering to the people. A police department is a paramilitary organization. It’s not a democracy. Coding = DPO&OS/B; MEI/B

Thus although a specific incident may have catalyzed Grebert’s ouster, it seems unlikely that it alone could have caused it, particularly given these much broader disagreements over the APD’s direction. Coding = DPO&OS/B

Decentralization and Problem-Solving
In any case, well before Grebert’s star had fallen, the APD began its implementation of the community policing plan he had spearheaded, and which had been handed back to him for implementation after the group that wrote it disbanded. Manpower constraints and other considerations forced Grebert to make a few changes to the plan at that stage (for example, the
Reforms to the patrol force were the central thrust of this community policing effort, and they divided into three distinct elements: The creation of a 6-officer directed patrol unit, creation of an 18-officer community outreach unit, the and the organization of six coherent teams defined by geography that focused the APD’s attention on individual neighborhoods. Consider the latter two reforms here. Coding = DPO&OS/H

The Community Outreach Unit
Foot patrols had a long and visible history in Albany in both the old neighborhood outreach units and in the Whalen-era community policing efforts, so it is perhaps not surprising that public attention focused most intently on that element of the APD’s reforms. For example, the many newspaper articles that announced its arrival tended to mention the directed patrol unit and the reorganization by sectors only in passing, saving most of their reflections for the foot beats. Coding = DPO&OS/H

The foot patrol officers took their assignments in late November of 1994 after a week of training arranged by Grebert, in which officers learned about the resources other city agencies could offer to solve community problems. After that orientation, the officers took to their beats with a mandate to be visible in their assigned neighborhoods and get to know the people who frequented them—everyone from the block captains of local neighborhood associations, to area landlords and businesspeople, to those perceived to be troublemakers; and they were also expected to make contacts with city agencies like the Department of General Services, to which they could relay neighborhood concerns. The officers were freed up from most 911 responsibilities, giving them considerable time to take care of such business: In fact, as it turned out, some officers often found that they had too little work to occupy their shifts until their supervisors came up with ancillary duties—things like following up on domestic violence calls or trying to serve outstanding warrants in their zones. Coding = DPO&OS/M ; T/M

Indeed, the potentially light workload, as well as the flex-time options the beat officers enjoyed, initially created something of a problem for the outreach unit, which reportedly attracted some veteran officers for less than virtuous reasons. Management had little recourse to block bids from these officers, since it had agreed during the planning phase to assign the positions based on seniority; and supervision problems made it hard to motivate officers who simply wanted an easy assignment. As Grebert puts it.

The very nature of foot patrol, you’re not nearly supervised as closely as a guy in a patrol car. And because we gave them flexibility in the hours that they could work, different guys might be working from nine in the morning until two at night, and we only had one boss for them [the 18 zone officers reported to a single Community Outreach Sergeant]. At other times they’d be working without a boss and . . . there was a lot of reluctance on the part of the other uniformed supervisors to supervise these guys. Coding = MEI/B
Grebert admits that he would have preferred to have more supervision for the unit, but he explains that the department was unable to increase the number of Sergeants in the budget, so it had to make do with one outreach supervisor. In any case, he and others insist that most outreach officers took to their jobs with enthusiasm, and that most of those who did not were eventually “weeded out” through the disciplinary process: Thus the result, after some fine-tuning at the start of the program, was a good group of officers who the department has been satisfied with. Many community members were also happy with the outreach program, feeling that the officers had markedly improved APD visibility and begun to tackle longstanding problems in their areas. A few neighborhoods complained that their officers were not visible and that they tended to keep banker’s hours, but for the most part the outreach program received strong praise from Albany residents. **Coding =** DPO&OS/M; B&R/B; C&R/M

*Bringing a Neighborhood Focus to the Patrol Force*

Less widely-noticed by the public were the APD’s reforms in the rest of its patrol force, where officers were assigned to six geographically-defined “sectors” in order to create viable teams for problem-solving and instill a sense of ownership over particular neighborhoods. **Coding =** DPO&OS/H

The APD kicked off the effort with directions to its commanding officers about how to form the six sector teams and some suggestions for how to run them. At first officers received no direct training about how their jobs would change: It was simply expected that neighborhood assignments would somehow lead to ownership and problem-solving. As Grebert explains it, the main change at this stage was in holding periodic team meetings in each sector for everyone assigned to that area, including cruiser officers, the foot patrol officers, and investigators (most units within the detective division began assigning their cases by sector, and special units like SIU were directed to designate a liaison for each sector). On occasion, some sectors also invited community members, and others invited representatives from neighboring police agencies to help deal with problems crossed jurisdictional boundaries. “That sort of thing was never done before,” Grebert explains of the meetings.

You bring them all in off the street at a certain time and you say, “The crime numbers show this, but you tell us what addresses are the biggest pain in the butt because you’re going there the most times.” Or, “What person is the biggest pain in the butt?” To try and get them to concentrate on what was going on within that particular neighborhood, the addresses, the people. **Coding =** T/B; MEI/M; D&IC/M

The monthly team meetings turned out to be fairly informal events (one department member describes them as “brainstorming sessions”). For the most part they simply focused officers’ attention on the areas identified by the group as troublespots along the model of what other police agencies refer to as “directed patrol.” For example, in a Spring meeting, Sergeants might remind officers that they could expect activity to increase in a sector park as the summer approached, and that they should therefore make a particular effort to drive past it and enforce quality-of-life laws. The Sergeants who ran the meetings summarized their proceedings in an interdepartmental correspondence to the Chief, focusing on new issues raised and on the progress made in dealing with older problems. **Coding =** DPO&OS/B; MEI/B
In a few cases, sector teams went beyond the directed patrol model to craft less traditional responses to area problems. For example, a number of department members mentioned one sector’s novel attempt to deal with the problem of false robbery alarms from local convenience stores. “We were having problems with the stores that were open on the midnight to 8:00 tour, [which] were obviously like little mom and pop [stores],” explains then-Sergeant Lauren Signer of the A sector’s midnight shift. “They would hit their panic alarm for a lot of things, and we’d get there and the people would just not be able to communicate with us.” Officers were particularly concerned with a Clinton Avenue store that, as they later discovered, had generated 117 calls for service in the first five months of the year. Assembled for their monthly sector meeting in June of 1995, the A sector officers on the midnight shift identified two major problems with the store: First of all, employees were apparently treating the panic alarm as an all-purpose way to summon the police, and officers reported being called to the scene for relatively minor suspicious person calls; in police eyes, the alarm was to be reserved for serious incidents, and when they got a call from it, they assumed that a robbery was in progress. The second problem was simply that responding officers had trouble communicating with employees, for the store was owned and operated by recent immigrants from Afghanistan who did not speak English very fluently. Moreover, some APD officers felt that the store owners simply were not cooperative when they did show up to investigate incidents.  Coding = DPO&OS/H

The problem fed in to a larger team project to assign “liaisons” to various community institutions, including hotels, neighborhood bars, and convenience stores. Responsibility for the Clinton Avenue store fell to Officer Michael Romano, who had taken the assignment as convenience store liaison. After discussions within the team about how to handle the problem, Romano began meeting with the owners during his regular patrol in order to establish better communication. The APD officer used these encounters to ask the owners what safety concerns they had, to suggest possible ways to manage them (including controlling the number of people allowed in the store at one time), and to explain to them when and when not to use the panic alarm. Since Romano was also the liaison to all other area convenience stores, he began applying the same techniques in other locations, making a particular effort to educate store employees on the proper use of their panic alarms.  Coding = C&R/H

By late fall the team began to feel that the Clinton Avenue store’s problems in particular were subsiding, as officers reported fewer false alarms and better cooperation when they responded to calls. As Romano’s supervisor, Signer decided to verify the progress statistically, and with Grebert’s help she was able to get call data on this particular store over time. In the department’s eyes, the statistics showed a clear improvement: In the five months immediately before the team established its liaison, the Clinton Avenue market had made 117 calls for service, but in the next six months it made only 78; and unfounded calls fell from 15 to 8 over the same period. It was not feasible to do the same analysis for all the sector’s convenience stores, and Signer concedes that the analysis did not constitute a full-blown study of the liaison program’s impact. But it provided the department with rare statistical evidence of community policing’s success, which otherwise had been restricted to anecdotes.  Coding = C&R/H; D&IC/B

The team went on to develop its other liaison programs as well, and Signer made a special effort to document her officers’ projects, going so far as to publish a regular newsletter that reported sector activities and that printed the minutes of its meetings. All of these projects pushed the
envelope of Albany’s young community policing program at the time: The sector was the only one to turn informal pressure to “get to know the community” into a formal liaison program, and Signer paid much more attention to documentation than most teams. **Coding = PA/H; C&R/H**

In developing the A sector’s community policing program along these lines, Signer admits that high-level support was crucial, and happenstance played an important role in helping her to get it. A newly-promoted Sergeant at the time, Signer had recently completed her Master’s degree in criminal justice at SUNY Albany on a competitive scholarship for police officers. While she was away from the department attending school, her contact in the APD had been Grebert, and the two began to talk frequently about community policing. “I had that open communication with him in some organizations you shouldn’t have, because you’re violating the chain of command,” Signer explains.

But he and I both were really big on community policing and it’s something that we talked about a lot. And we would discuss [things like] “Well, this is why it will work or it won’t work.” . . . And I liked trying things and then e-mailing him, and telling him, “Well, this did go,” or “This didn’t go,” or “We’re really having a hard time.” And sometimes he would help. He would make things available or say, “Yes, go for that,” and authorize it. **Coding = MEI/H**

The convenience store liaison was itself an example of this process, as traditionally officers had been discouraged from socializing with store owners. “Sometimes people think it is an invitation to corruption because you don’t want the officers to hang around these businesses,” Signer explains. But Grebert was quick to approve of the idea:

Instead of [saying], “Hey, get back in your car and get on patrol,” it was “No, it’s okay to go in and chat with these people and establish this relationship and work out something where you’re working with them.” So it’s okay for the officer to spend some time here as opposed to, “You better have every minute in the patrol car and you better be able to account for every minute.” **Coding = DPO&OS/H; MEI/H**

Moreover, when Signer decided to evaluate the project statistically, Grebert was able to help her expedite the data request by telling the administrative services division to expect her call. (At the time, the APD did not have anyone assigned full-time to crime analysis, and its computer system did not make it particularly easy to process the sort of request Signer was making.) Indeed, on several occasions Grebert was able to help the team get needed resources, including things as simple as a file cabinet for the team’s problem-solving records, as well as larger expenses like a color printer for the sector newsletter. Signer points out that these are “things that normally take a long time [in] organizations,” but she and her officers were able to get them done quickly by showing upper management what they were trying to accomplish. **Coding = B&R/H**

Not all of Signer’s officers were enthusiastic about the many projects her team embarked upon, and some viewed her interest in their work as “micromanaging.” But she received recognition for her efforts from the department’s top management, and she was even able to get Tuffey and Grebert to attend one of her team’s 6 A.M. sector meetings. “People were totally astounded,”
Signer explains of the two Chiefs’ arrival. “The fact that they physically came and showed that they thought this was important enough to put on their sweat suits and drag their butts out of bed to come to a meeting at 6:00 o’clock in the morning was tremendous support. It legitimizes what you’re trying to do.”  Coding = MEI/H

Signer found the experience immensely rewarding, and she attributes the team’s success not just to help from Grebert, but also to the freedom she was afforded by her Lieutenant. “I had a great Lieutenant who, while not convinced that community policing was necessarily the way to go, saw that the things that we were trying as a team, did, in fact, meet with law enforcement goals,” she explains.

What I enjoyed about being a supervisor in the new community policing framework was the ability to be creative with the officers—to be able to say to the officers, “Okay, you chose to be here; you chose a sector and you chose to be here. Now, what is it you’re interested in? What do you think we need to do here?” And working as a team: I had never experienced that myself as a patrol officer: Having input, working with supervisors as opposed to being directed by the supervisor. So that, to me, was exciting and a good way to put ideas and theories into action. And some things work and some things don’t, . . . but as a supervisor, it was fun to try and tackle problems as a team and see what different officers identified as problems.  Coding = MEI/H

Some of the APD’s other teams had similar experiences, in that they were able to generate new ideas for handling problems in team meetings, and they had the flexibility they needed to carry those ideas out. But many department members also report some difficulties with the fledgling community policing effort, and it is useful to examine how the department responded to them.  Coding = DPO&OS/H

Particularly at the outset, many officers simply felt that they had not been sufficiently informed about what community policing meant for their jobs. “Community policing was a phrase that many people didn’t understand,” one APD manager concedes, going on to explain that in response, the department decided to offer a wave of in-service training for officers on community policing and related topics, such as cultural diversity. The department took particular care to give these sessions a community focus, bringing in neighborhood leaders and representatives from other community groups to one forum in order to introduce them to sector officers and to give a sense of what community concerns were. But the main message the training sessions tried to convey was that sector officers should look behind the incidents they responded to for underlying problems, and that they should feel authorized to develop solutions on their own—including making contacts with other divisions and other agencies. Indeed, describing the resources that other agencies could offer was an important part of the training sessions.  Coding = T/M

Many department members report that these training sessions and growing experience with the new style helped diffuse community policing ideas through the force, but most also maintain that there is more work to be done, and they concede that the training efforts got “mixed reviews.” As one department manager puts it:
I guess some of the older guys thought we were going to show them some new dazzling thing. And when they realized, “Well hell, I did that ten years ago,” they were disappointed I guess in the sense that they thought community policing was going to be this brand new nifty way of doing law enforcement, when in reality, it’s kind of like returning to our roots. When you had the precincts with the beat cops always walking the same areas, who knew all the same people, they worked with the community to solve those problems. So they said, “Oh, I remember doing that years ago.” The other disappointment was I think some people thought we weren’t moving fast enough, that maybe we should do more. Because we talked about that zero tolerance philosophy on those minor issues [referring especially to the “crackdowns” the APD undertook in a few areas, described below].

Still other department members reportedly rejected community policing at a more fundamental level. For example, though Grebert insists that after the first year many officers did begin to develop a sense of ownership for their areas, he admits that the department is “still a long way from [having] complete acceptance of the concept,” and he attributes this problem to some officers’ preconceived notions that community policing is “soft.” “I wish we had used any other expression rather than ‘community policing,’ because ‘community’ is a soft word,” Grebert explains. “Cops are tough guys . . . . If we called it ‘Assertive Policing’ or something they all would have jumped on board.” Other officers did not necessarily reject the message entirely, but neither did they completely assimilate it: As one department manager puts it, officers were “pretty accurate in identifying law enforcement-related problems,” but they had more difficulty coming up with solutions other than patrol and arrest. Finally, a number of officers and Sergeants report that there was uneven support for community policing at higher levels as well, as some squad Lieutenants simply did not see the need for change. “It was like, ‘Do it this way because I’m the Lieutenant. This is the way we’ve always done it,’” one department member recalls.

Management was not unprepared for such reactions, and it tried to get the message out to officers to be patient: “We tried to tell them that you don’t go from here to there without doing some transitional work in between,” one APD manager explains. In particular, upper management often reiterated the idea that it would take a generation to fully implement community policing, in order, as one puts it, “to get rid of the older guys that are used to doing it a certain way.”

In the meantime, the department continually revised its in-service training to meet the needs upper management identified. It did not, however, decide to repeat the entire community policing curriculum, despite the desires for some department members to do so. For different reasons, many APD managers explain that staffing limitations partly underlay this decision: First of all, given the vagaries of the police workload, management felt that it was difficult to schedule the entire department for training on any given week. As it was, the APD—like most police departments—found it logistically difficult to give large groups of officers their yearly in-service training, and it often needed to shift work hours and use other officers as backfill to do so. So instead of repeating the training en masse, the department opted to repeat key sections of the original community policing curriculum—like problem-solving and interagency service
referral—as part of its standard in-service training, which came to at least 40 hours a year per officer (including firearms training). Second, the training division itself had somewhat limited manpower, as even by the time of my Spring 1998 site visit, only three officers worked for the division that covered not only training, but also research and computerization. The APD’s original community policing plan called for the addition of two new full-time training specialists to Administrative Services, and for another staffer to be added to help with other administrative functions. But in an era of tight budgets, these positions did not materialize for some time. Recently the department did expand ASB, adding two officers, a Sergeant, and two civilians in June of 1998, and in comments on a draft of this paper, one department manager expressed optimism that these new positions would help improve the APD’s ability to offer training.

In any case, some department members argue that the challenges in building support for the young community policing effort had less to do with training than they did with other administrative practices. For example, one argues that department decisionmaking has been too closed, and that the result is too little sense of ownership and understanding about the reforms:

I think what was not well communicated was the interest of the command level staff and the Chief in hearing what officers wanted to contribute or do. The officers felt like, “You’re saying that, but you don’t mean it.” . . . I think community policing is very important. I’m very, very enthusiastic about it. I wish I were more in a position to help implement it. Maybe—I don’t know necessarily as part of the decision making, but part of the vision would be nice; to have more input there. [Because] I don’t know how things are done. Nobody knows how they’re done. They’re just done . . . We just don’t know where stuff comes from and that’s frustrating. . . . Why are we doing this? Why are these changes being made? How do I fit into this? . . . How am I . . . better able to serve the public this way than I was before?

Others argue that the zone meetings were and are too “unwieldy” to focus attention on problems effectively, and the lack of administrative systems to document and track problems may have contributed to this sense. Finally, important secondary reforms did not always go off as planned. For example, although the community policing plan called for a close relationship between SIU investigators and the sectors (particularly community outreach officers in the zones), many department members report that SIU still rarely notifies patrol officers when they execute search warrants in their neighborhoods—a practice that the plan explicitly encouraged. (In fact, one officer goes so far as to say that “the main problem with community policing is that this relationship with the special units isn’t there.”) On the other side, some special units maintain that sector teams sometimes fail to notify them about their team meetings even though they are supposed to attend.

**Monitoring Change**

In any case, department managers have not always been able to tell for certain whether or not community policing is “working” in the city. Arrest data for low-level offenses *did* seem to show that officers were beginning to take quality-of-life problems more seriously—as described below, that element of community policing seems to have made the most progress in Albany.
But without any type of record keeping on neighborhood problem-solving or any new forms of performance measurement, it has been difficult for department managers to tell for certain how well other aspects of community policing—such as problem-solving and the development of community trust—have taken hold in the city.\(^{36}\) Coding = PA/B

To be sure, when asked how they know whether or not community policing is both accepted and effective in the city, many APD managers are able to point to an overall decline in the city’s crime rates since 1994, when community policing began in earnest. But Grebert, at least, concedes that these aggregate trends are somewhat ambiguous: “It was happening all over the country,” he explains, referring to the decline in crime rates Albany began to experience at the time, and admitting that “people talk about demographics and there being that crack cocaine epidemic [as explanations of crime trends].” (Some historical perspective is helpful here, for the city’s recent drop in crime reversed the trend that immediately preceded it: Index crimes gradually rose from 6,800 per 100,000 residents in 1990 to 8,600 by their peak in 1994, and then they fell again to 7,700 by 1996.) But Grebert insists that community policing may have had something to do with Albany’s trends, continuing his concession to the possibility of other explanations by saying: “Other people do talk about police tactics as being part of that movement to bring the crime rates down.” In any case, he maintains that for all the problems in untangling its cause, the drop in crime rates did convince some in the city that community policing was effective: “When that happened, more and more people said ‘Gee, maybe some of this stuff is working,’” he explains. Coding = PA/B

The absence of any alternative way to evaluate community policing did not result from a lack of interest in the subject. For example, early on in the APD’s reforms, the local newspaper called for comparisons of crime rates in foot beat areas versus car patrol areas, saying, “it will satisfy more than idle curiosity to record exactly how effective one officer on the beat is in comparison to one officer in a car. It will give the city a better idea how to spend its money and how to protect its citizens.”\(^{32}\) And within the department, the community policing plan itself charged the Administrative Services Bureau with “developing and implementing an evaluation system that will determine the effectiveness of the community policing plan and recommend changes to the plan.” Indeed, the department did begin to identify a few novel ways to evaluate the community policing, and in some cases it even drew up fairly elaborate plans to do so. But in the end, nothing apparently came of these ideas. For example, Grebert explains that the department had “a fairly well-developed plan” to hire interns to administer a community survey that would measure perceptions of safety and of the police department, and that he himself supported the idea. But in the end, the department did not follow through on it. So absent more formal measures, APD managers have looked to anecdotes and other indicators to get a sense of the progress of reform. Coding = PA/B

**Modifications to the Plan**

As implementation of the original community policing plan was taking shape, some department members and city officials began talking about ways to extend and hopefully improve it. The major effort that emerged came to be known as the “four station plan.” Coding = NR

That plan emerged out of a 1996 proposal to re-open or simply replace the old Arbor Hill substation, which was championed at the highest levels of city government—including both
Tuffey and Jennings. “I always thought that was wrong,” Tuffey says of the decision to close Arbor Hill.

So I talked to Jerry [Jennings], and we talked about opening a station over here [Arbor Hill]. . . . And I also wanted to build one down in the South End area down here. I wanted to go back to the way it was. Because I think that you have to give cops an identity of where they work. . . . [When] they get to an area they like, they want to work in that area—they’re comfortable working there. They know it and they know the people there and are comfortable working with the people. . . . And if you work in Arbor Hill or you work in the South End or you work in the West End or Pine Hill, where-ever you work, if you go there every day you have part of an ownership. And I think that’s what community policing tries to make people think about. That you really own that area you work in. **Coding = DPO&OS/H**

During his campaign for Mayor, Jennings had said that he did not think the police department needed to open a new station. But after hearing “loud and clear” from neighborhood residents that they wanted one, he eventually came around to Tuffey’s view. Today, he explains his thinking on the matter in essentially the same terms as the Chief:

An outreach office with a couple of people doesn’t do the same job that a permanent, twenty-four hour a day, three shift, fully-staffed station does. Psychologically, it’s good for people to see that . . . And you know, they go to work there—they park there, the men and women in the department. They’re a constant presence. They get to know everyone that lives in each building, and what person owns what store, and who belongs and who doesn’t belong there. That’s the key to it. Identification. They build up trust with the residents in those neighborhoods because they get to see them. And believe me, it’s a very effective way, and it’s well worth the bricks and mortar that we have to put together to place them in the facility. **Coding = D&IC/H; E/H**

The two men also saw a new substation as a way to help alleviate long-standing tensions with the largely-black Arbor Hill community, which had repeatedly complained of police harassment (most recently when state correctional officers swept the neighborhood in search of an escaped convict). “In all honesty, there’s some distrust between the minority community and the police,” Tuffey explains of Arbor Hill. “And I felt that putting a station over there [would help]. We have a community room there where people come in and use it. It’s a step to build up the trust between the community and the police. Because a lot of times all they see over there is a cop . . . making an arrest. And we have to build that trust back up again.” **Coding = DPO&OS/H; C&R/H**

Jennings announced the plan to open an Arbor Hill station in March of 1996, and while his first proposal fell through over cost considerations, a second and more modest design eventually garnered support in the Common Council. Even then some Council members expressed concerns: For example, Alderwoman Sarah Curry-Cobb, whose ward encompassed some of the neighborhoods that the new station would serve, argued that a building alone was not enough to deal with tensions in Albany’s minority communities, and she proposed further reforms designed
to fill the gap. (One proposal asked the APD to offer Arbor Hill officers added training on topics like cultural sensitivity, and another asked Jennings to institute a neighborhood advisory board for the area.) Other aldermen worried that the new station would rob their own wards of police staffing, and one simply felt that the proposal was rash. “It’s not well thought out,” Alderwoman Shawn Morris told a reporter. “There isn’t a plan for this building other than to put one person on the desk. . . . Do we need a 3,500-square-foot, $400,000 building to do that?” All told, five Albany aldermen expressed opposition to the plan, and their votes alone would have been enough to derail it: In order to expedite the project, the city intended to sell the site to a quasi-public agency called the Albany Local Development Corporation, which was exempt from regulations like bidding requirements. But to do so it needed 12 votes on the 15-member Council. Nevertheless, Jennings refused to compromise on the plan, and he dismissed Curry-Cobb’s proposals as an attempt to “bog this thing down with additional legislation,” specifically rejecting the idea of a neighborhood advisory council on the grounds that his citywide Police-Community Council—then nearing completion, and described in detail below—made more sense. Ultimately, his position prevailed: The five council members who initially opposed the substation eventually backed off, and the vote for the new substation was unanimous.

### From Arbor Hill to a Four-Station Plan

Some people within the APD agreed with the dissident aldermen, arguing that Jennings and Tuffey were placing too much faith in physically opening up a station. Deputy Chief Grebert was the most prominent among them. “Albany is not that big of a city,” he argues.

If money was going to spent, I would have preferred to see one new headquarters building built that everybody would have worked out of, and then the decentralization would have taken place in the form of the outreach offices—there’s about thirty of them around the city. To use those more proactively as meeting places with community and that sort of stuff—that was the decentralization that I was looking for, in the hopes that we could get one new headquarters building out of the whole thing. Well, that wasn’t going to happen. The Mayor said he was building that building in Arbor Hill. Grebert eventually became resigned to the fact that the city was not going to build a new headquarters or even put money away for such a project, and given this reality he conceded that it “was not a bad idea” to put a station in Arbor Hill. But he and others still had concerns about the potential for the new station to fragment the patrol force, worrying that the need to reassign existing staff would wreak havoc with the existing pattern of patrol deployment. These concerns eventually led Tuffey to appoint a 5-member committee headed up by Grebert to study how the new substation would affect the APD. The group’s main conclusion was that the substation should not simply be grafted on to the existing organizational structure: Instead, the department used the opportunity it presented to reorganize the patrol force completely. Physically, Arbor Hill would allow the APD to decentralize into four separate stations: The
existing Division I and Division II buildings, Arbor Hill itself, and an old underutilized substation in the West end of the city—a station that had opened in the late 1970s with roughly 8 officers per shift but was now down to only one or two. Organizationally, the department would do away with the old divisions and give officers permanent assignments to the four stations, and it would reorganize management at the same time. **Coding = DPO&OS/H**

Lieutenants would see their roles change most dramatically, trading in their current responsibilities for squads for a new responsibility for the stations. In doing so, they would take on responsibility for handling community concerns and identifying neighborhood troublespots, thereby replacing Sergeants (who had overseen the sectors) as the department’s primary point of geographic accountability. The old temporal structure would still be superimposed over this newly-strengthened geographic logic: The night and evening Commanders would still have final say over the street during their shifts, and two of the department’s six patrol Lieutenants would take on new assignments as their assistants. But the new plan clearly sought to strengthen neighborhood focus, which it essentially pushed up in rank and therefore importance. **Coding = DPO&OS/M**

Grebert was still concerned that the Arbor Hill station would upend the department’s patrol deployment: Although his committee had broad scope to examine organizational roles and structure, it had to work within a fixed budget, and that constraint in turn affected the distribution of manpower. The result was that staffing for Arbor Hill was fixed by the capacity of the building that the Mayor had proposed there: “Rather than saying, ‘OK, how many officers do we need over there to staff this?’ it was built in terms of, ‘OK, here’s so much money that we have to spend over there, and for that amount of money, put there what you can,’” Grebert maintains. In part, Grebert simply worried that the neighborhood would be disappointed when they found out that their new station had far fewer officers than the old neighborhood unit. But more important, he felt that the lack of staffing would make it impossible to avoid violating beat integrity: “What’s going to happen when they open it [is that] cops from the other stations will constantly be called into that neighborhood, and it will really screw up this ownership idea that we were trying to create.” **Coding = B&R/B**

Despite reservations like these, many department members are optimistic about the four station plan, believing that it will improve officers’ sense of ownership and solve some of the problems that exist under the sector plan. Its implementation, originally scheduled for 1997, is still delayed as of this writing because of construction problems with the Arbor Hill station. But management is confident that the station will open shortly, and that community policing will take an important step forward when it does so. **Coding = DPO&OS/H**

4. A Focus on Quality-of-Life

If decentralization and problem-solving were one strand of the APD’s community policing efforts, a second and equally important strand centered on quality of life enforcement. This shift in priorities was a dramatic one for the APD: As noted earlier, the department has had a long tradition of what James Q. Wilson called a “watchman” style of policing, in which officers on patrol paid little attention to minor violations like traffic offenses, gambling, and other misdemeanors. As one department veteran puts it: “Twenty years ago, if you arrested somebody, say, for an open container— people would
have said, ‘Get out of here. We’re not going to book this guy on a charge like that.’” One APD manager attributes this sentiment directly to the desires of upper management, explaining: “I don’t want to throw rocks, but with the command staff that was here before, nobody cared [about quality of life offenses].” Coding = DPO&OS/B

But the advent of community policing began to change this situation markedly. As already described, early training for the community outreach unit and later for the sector officers and the directed patrol unit began to stress the importance of quality-of-life offenses. Tuffey reiterated this message with his command staff, who in turn took it to their subordinates to emphasize with patrol officers. One crucial link seems to have been with the Sergeants, who were addressed as a group by the command staff and told that what had long been considered “low-level” offenses should in fact be treated seriously. Sergeants, in turn, have repeatedly stressed that message at roll calls and sector meetings for the patrol force. “I’m trying to convey that to them, that all these things all add up to dissatisfaction,” one APD supervisor explains. “The poor man didn’t get a night’s sleep because somebody was waking him up with their boom box in the middle of the night. And then he goes outside to get his paper and he steps in a pile of dog poop. And then he comes out and his car has been vandalized.” Coding = DPO&OS/H; T/H

This message about the seriousness of “low-level” violations came directly from Albany’s political leadership—most notably Jennings’s two campaigns for mayor, when he made quality of life a major theme. “Basic policing is getting to know the community [and] dealing with issues that are quality of life,” Jennings explains. “Then hopefully the larger crimes will dissipate and diminish.” Once in office, Jennings’s very public pronouncements on the subject, his high-profile tours of some of Albany’s most deteriorated neighborhoods (sometimes accompanied by Tuffey), and his specific directions to department heads all apparently fed a growing emphasis on quality-of-life issues not just in the police department, but in many Albany agencies. Coding = DPO&OS/H

More general public sentiment also pushed the APD to re-emphasize quality-of-life problems. A few high-profile incidents, like a shooting associated with a craps game gone bad, created some public pressure to take formerly neglected categories of crime seriously, as some city residents began to believe that minor violations could escalate into serious crime. But as community policing brought police into greater contact with neighborhood groups, they simply began to hear about low-level offenses more often. “A lot of those issues,” Tuffey explains, referring to concerns about quality-of-life, “we hear from community groups, whether it be CANA, Council of Area Neighborhood Associations [a citywide umbrella organization for Albany neighborhood groups]; Beverwick, which is part of Washington Park; Park South; or Mansion Hill. That’s a big issue for them, [and] if it’s a big issue for them, then it’s our big issue.” Coding = DPO&OS/H; C&R/H

Finally, police themselves began to feel that it made sense to target these low-level offenses in order to get at their underlying goal of reducing serious crime. In this vein, many Albany officers recite something like the “Broken Windows” theory to explain how left unchecked, low-level disorder can escalate into serious crime—and indeed, department training tried to make this link explicit, both through in-service sessions with officers and through the Citizen’s Academy for
As explained by Commander William Bowen, who oversaw the department’s training division during the early months of community policing:

What we tried to do was to show the rank and file, the officers on the lowest level, that it was a partnership with the community to make life better [when we were] talking about quality of life issues. You know, many times the officer would think . . . “That bag of garbage out on the street on a night that it doesn’t belong out there, that’s not a big deal.” And we tried to show them that that was a big deal when it came to the overall philosophy of quality of life. That is, if a place looks bad, it’s going to get bad—the broken window theory and that kind of thing.

Using a somewhat different logic, many officers also argue that enforcing misdemeanor laws can have a more direct relationship to the control of serious crime, for offenders stopped on minor violations often turn out to have signs of serious criminality like drugs, concealed weapons, outstanding warrants. As Tuffey puts it:

If you go through a red light, they want to stop you and see who you are. They don’t have to give you a ticket . . . but stop and see why David Thacher is driving through that red light. . . . You’re there in the front seat and the woman is driving, [but] who’s to say that . . . you’re not holding a gun on Mrs. Jones, or you wife, or your girlfriend? . . . Maybe that’s why that woman went through [the light] there. I don’t know that until I stop the car. Maybe it’s an old person who is disoriented and lost, has Alzheimer’s or diabetes or whatever it may well be. These are all the issues that they never [checked] before—it was a no-no.

Finally, one Albany officer argues that by citing people on minor violations, police effectively alert the courts to a potential pattern: If police fail to write these citations, a first offense for robbery may look like a forgivable aberration, when in fact it is the culmination of years of unrecorded petty crime.

**Building Support for Quality-of-Life Enforcement**

Thus for all these reasons, the public and political pressures on APD officers to take low-level violations seriously did not strike all of them as unreasonable demands, and some had wanted to enforce these laws all along—they had simply felt constrained by organizational norms. But none of this is to say that APD officers took to the new style of enforcement without pause, nor that all APD officers embraced it wholeheartedly.
management directions to the contrary as naïve to the point of being dangerous. (When asked why the department did not crack down on disorderly behavior in one Albany neighborhood, one officer explained: “You would have a riot on your hands.”) Moreover, even those officers who agree with the principle of “zero tolerance” in the abstract find many exceptions in practice. For example, one officer who insisted that he would unequivocally cite people for open container violations admitted that he excluded a certain group of corner drunks from the rule, since they had useful knowledge about what was going on in the neighborhood, and “they aren’t bugging anyone” anyhow.  

Unprincipled reasons like the aversion to paperwork proved relatively straightforward to handle: If too much paperwork was getting in the way, the department could cut that paperwork down. For example, when community policing got started in Albany, existing procedure required officers to fill out as many as four different forms to make a so-called “field booking” for less serious offenses—a process that one department manager describes as “cumbersome.” In response the department sought to streamline the process down to a single short document that would reduce the officers’ workload greatly. Local courts initially resisted the change, arguing that the APD had eliminated important information with the new forms, and that in effect its zeal to “streamline” had gone too far. But with some fine-tuning, all parties wound up reasonably satisfied.

Officers who simply did not want to enforce quality-of-life offenses—however simplified the process—were more difficult to deal with. Few officers would refuse direct orders about specific problems (though that apparently happened on occasion). “If I told them, ‘I want you to tag and tow the cars at 300 Lark Street,’ they’re not going to disobey,” one department manager explains. But direct orders aside, these officers are unlikely to be proactive about quality-of-life enforcement. “What they might not do is notice it on their own,” the department manager continues. “In fact, they’ll sort of play dumb about it. You’ll say, ‘Hey, didn’t you see those cars at 300 Lark Street?’ And the guy will say ‘No, I didn’t.’” In these situations, the onus is on supervisors and managers to identify specific quality-of-life problems for officers to focus on, perhaps by reviewing citizen calls, or perhaps by listening to complaints in neighborhood meetings. Unfortunately, at least one department manager reports that fifty to eighty percent of his officers fall into this category, and he, like many APD managers, says that at least with the most recalcitrant officers, “nothing will turn these men around”; the only strategy that avails is to wait for these officers to retire, replacing them with younger and more malleable personnel.

Support for quality-of-life enforcement clearly varies considerably around the department. For example, most department members argue that the 18 APD foot patrol officers are very willing to cite people for minor offenses, while other officers who are less in tune with community sentiment are less enthusiastic. “Our outreach guys, they know a lot of people in their neighborhoods,” one department manager explains.

But the guys in the cars, they really don’t know [residents]. And I want them . . .

to go to the community meetings. And I want them to be on the hot seat like I’ve been on the hot seat: You know, “How come this hasn’t been corrected? How come they’re still dealing out of twenty-one Main Street?” And I think if the
officers go to these meetings—the regular uniform patrol officers, not just the foot patrol officers—if they start [going], they will take a little more responsibility for what’s going on in their areas: The junk cars, the refrigerators left out somewhere. All these things all add up to aggravation.  Coding = DPO&OS/M

Nevertheless, the bottom line, top management insists, is that quality-of-life enforcement has gone up (though despite repeated requests, the department was not able to provide statistics to support these claims). “We have a lot of young, new police officers here that are learning it,” Tuffey explains. “But you know what the nice part about it is? They believe in it, they really do. You can see that by a lot of the quality of life issue arrests.”  Coding = PA/B

In any case, many community members noticed and appreciated the new emphasis on these matters. To be sure, some decried stronger enforcement as harassment, arguing that police were singling out the homeless, the poor, and minorities for attention (a charge that police invariably deny). “No one is happy when their children are arrested for drugs,” one department member explains. “Nobody likes a speeding ticket. No one likes parking tickets. Nobody likes to get an open container ticket. These are unpopular things.” Another explains:

Pretty regularly [we’ll put] intensive manpower on one single corner, or one single block—sort of sweep that area for a few hours. . . . And you go to a neighborhood meeting and you tell them that you are going to do it, it’s all “Rah, rah!” until a few of them have gotten tickets for not having their seat belt on. . . . And I always tell them whenever we move from one block or one neighborhood to another, that some of the problem people are friends, maybe relatives. So be prepared. You know, justice is blind: We are going to come in and identify the problems and eliminate them. But they are likely to be closer to home than you think. So when they are, don’t blame us.  Coding = C&R/M

Such mixed messages from the community clearly create a dilemma for police, and Albany managers like this one recognize the complexity of their situation and do not take the decision to “crack down” lightly:

If a problem is a problem for a neighborhood, if it’s a problem for the majority, then it’s dealt with. If it’s the kind of situation that only arises to the elevation of problem for a few, then we try and work something out. . . . Generally speaking, those problems [where we crack down] are neighborhood wide. They are not usually small problems. . . . You may get one or two chronic pains in the neck in that respect that are constantly calling every time someone else turns their radio on in their house. But generally speaking, when problems get to that elevation, they are serious problems. And then we apply whatever is necessary to deal with them.  Coding = DPO&OS/M

In any case, the manager continues, when backlash does arise, it is necessary to “take some action.”
Especially if the perception is that it’s racial issue. Then the potential for that problem to be bigger than life, than it really is, is huge. And I think that’s my feeling, that you’ve got to step right in . . . and take some action: Either reduce enforcement, disperse enforcement, [or] get involved and get to the people who see themselves as the victims. . . . You need to get to the leaders in the community, . . . be that the clergy, or community activists, or neighborhood association activists. You need to get to them. You need to have a dialogue with them. Because they are the ones with credibility amongst the population, whatever that population is. And you now are in a position where your credibility is in question. Coding = C&R/H

Many of these situations have arisen in Albany, as vigorous enforcement has pleased some groups who called for it but alienated others—or even the same ones—who feel harassed. In a few cases, like the department’s crackdown on underage drinking, some APD members believe that the department has faced political pressure to back down entirely, both from parents of the underage youth and from well-connected tavern owners. But in other cases the department has resisted efforts to rein in quality-of-life enforcement by explaining the rationale behind it. Coding = DPO&OS/H

In any case, for most department members these concerns do arise, but the opposite message predominates. For example, asked if complaints about harassment have been common at the community meetings he attends, one department manager responds that they have not been, pointing out that “usually the people that are at these meetings are the people who want arrests made: They want enforcement of the difference ordinances. They want DGS to go after someone. They want the animal control officer to take care of the dog problem.” And when asked the same question, Jennings insists that most citizens he hears from do not complain about stepped-up enforcement: “I hear about us not enforcing it,” the Mayor explains. Coding = C&R/H

5. Building Support in Outside Agencies
Close collaboration with other local agencies was woven into the fabric of Albany’s community policing efforts, but this focus on quality-of-life offenses made it particularly important. At the very least, growing police attention to low-level offenses would create a larger workload for the local criminal justice system. At the most, this attention, as well as the growing focus on community problem-solving, would lead police to use entirely new avenues for protecting public safety: Police would call on agencies that had had little or no interaction with them in previous years to do things like board up dangerous buildings, channel the flow of traffic, and clean up neglected streetscapes. The fact that most city agencies have been responsive to these growing demands from police stems from a few structural changes in local government. Coding = C&R/H

The Criminal Justice System
Quality-of-life enforcement had a particularly strong impact on local courts and the rest of the criminal justice system, which saw its caseloads grow and change in character. Where previously Albany police handled minor violations informally if at all, around 1995 they began bringing in cases of public lewdness, open containers, and disorderly conduct in droves. The sheer growth in
the volume of cases shows up in records of the local police court, where filings shot up markedly after community policing’s debut in late 1994—a period when serious crime was actually declining in the city. (Annual filings rose from 7,500 in 1993 and 7,200 in 1994 to 9,500 in 1995, 9,000 in 1996, and 9,800 in 1997, according to records from the New York State Unified Court System.) Some department members attribute part of the increase to the county’s new 911 system, which was launched barely a month before community policing, but most believe that changing police priorities played a role as well.46 “I attribute it to our increased calls for service and more proactive, . . . more enthusiastic response from our officers for enforcing the law and making a stand,” one APD manager explains of the justice system’s growing workload.

The criminal justice system initially resisted some of the new cases patrol officers brought in—from the point of intake all the way to the judges. For example, one department member maintains that employees at the local jail complained when police first began bringing low-level violations in for processing, saying that police were “wasting their time” with petty offenses. Some judges at the local police court also reportedly chastised officers who brought minor offenders directly into their courtroom for arraignments. But when top management in the APD heard about these problems, they were apparently able to convince the judges and other justice workers that police needed their cooperation by explaining the APD’s new direction: The same department members who report early problems in the justice system maintain that for the most part, these problems have subsided. In any case, one suspects that the problem could have been worse, for Jennings had the opportunity to hand-pick the primary police court judge only a month after community policing got started, and he openly expressed his intention to choose an individual who could “deliver a strong message to the city relative to crime.”

Philosophical agreement with the new APD program did not, of course, necessarily solve the capacity problem created by heightened police enforcement. To be sure, jail space has not been an issue in Albany, where county jails are so flush with cells that they have been able to rent out space to other agencies like the Federal Government. But local courts have reportedly strained under the growing workload police brought them—to the point that in the first two years of community policing, courts disposed of a much smaller proportion of the filings brought before them than they had in previous years. (Specifically, while police court disposed of 64% of its cases in 1993 and 73% in 1994, it disposed of barely half in the next two years of increased workload—52% in 1995 and 51% in 1996.)

In response to the city’s growing caseload, state government stepped in to fund an additional judge for Albany’s city court beginning January 1, 1997. As a result, the court’s backlog apparently subsided: In 1997, the ratio of dispositions to new filings returned to 69%, even though court personnel report that the workload strain still feels severe. As part of its promise to fund the additional judge (who now works in temporary quarters), the state asked city government to foot the bill for a new courtroom, and construction for the addition is currently underway in an already-crammed police headquarters, which is where the police court is located.
City Government

Much of the push for quality-of-life enforcement lay outside the criminal justice system altogether, encompassing as it did conditions like dirty streetscapes, illegal parking, and dilapidated buildings. To deal with these problems, police needed help not from the local judiciary but from other municipal agencies. The APD began to address this need by teaching its own officers about the resources other agencies could offer. One department veteran insists that Albany officers had been savvy about these matters in the past, but that the massive downsizing of the Whalen years had undermined the informal mentoring whereby older officers passed such knowledge on to their younger colleagues:

We use the catch phrase in police work, “Notify the proper authority” that such and such needs fixing. Okay, what’s that proper authority? I mean, I know from my experience that if a sewer cover is off, I’m going to be calling the water department because they’re in charge of sewer covers. If it’s a tree that’s broken and hanging down in a precarious situation, then I know I need to call the parks department. But a lot of our younger officers didn’t know that, and I believe that was partly to blame because of that eight-year hiring gap. We have formalized training and then there is informalized training. The informalized training would be working with an older, more experienced officer so that when you went on a call and found a building that needed boarding up or needed attention, you would learn by listening to the older officer say, “Well, we need to call the fire department to do an inspection to get DGS in here to do this.” [That] was kind of lost in that eight-year hiring gap, because suddenly we started hiring at a pretty quick rate [after the hiring freeze ended]. And we had a lot of young officers . . . that had never had that ability to work with someone with five years and eight years and ten years and twelve years on the job. We might have [entire] squads made up of [officers] with three years or less. Well, where’s the experience? If they have never come upon a vacant building, how do they learn how to handle a vacant building?

In response to this perceived weakness, the department tried to pay particular attention to interagency relationships in its community policing training sessions. To prepare the partner agencies themselves, the APD began its community policing effort by meeting with all city department heads, explaining what police intended to do differently, and asking for their cooperation. In many cases they found a willing audience, for the public service in Albany has always been a tight-knit community. For example, Code Enforcement Director Mike Whelan, who worked in the Department of Public Works for many years and moved to the newly-created Department of General Services in 1996, was a long-time acquaintance of both Jennings and Tuffey (who attended high school with Whelan’s older brother). “There are a core of people here,” one APD manager says of the city. “Although we have some big city problems, it’s really kind of a small town in a lot of ways.”
Reinforcing this sense of a shared history and community was Jennings’s leadership as Mayor—particularly, once again, through his emphasis on the quality of life theme. One milestone came in 1995, when Jennings consolidated the departments of Public Works, Traffic Engineering, Parks and Recreation, and Engineering into a single Department of General Services (DGS). Though partly motivated by budgetary pressures, the move did not ultimately have much financial impact on the city, and perhaps a more important effect was to “streamline the quality of life focus by bringing all of these [jobs] under one roof,” as Whelan puts it. This was particularly true in Whelan’s own area, as the city combined the responsibilities to enforce city codes for things like lighting, curb cuts, trash, and graffiti.

Whelan and police alike report a strong relationship between the two agencies, and Whelan has become something of a catch-all “go-to” for police who notice physical disorder like trash, graffiti, or broken streetlights. According to Whelan, police demands are not at all problematic for his agency, which simply sees the officers as another set of eyes on the street to help it identify neighborhood problems: Since the agency does not do its own periodic inspections, it relies on complaints to spot relevant code violations, and it is just as happy to receive these complaints from police officers as from private citizens. In any case, since Whelan’s new position was defined precisely in terms of bringing coordination and zeal to quality-of-life enforcement in the city, it is not surprising that he and his staff responded willingly to police referrals.

Even more dramatic than the creation of DGS was Jennings’s decision to shift building and housing code enforcement over to the Fire Department, an effort that formally got underway in January of 1995. Until that time, Albany buildings had been inspected by the small Building Department, which had never had enough staff to make periodic inspections a reality. The result, as many saw it, was that city buildings were becoming deteriorated, and Jennings made stronger code enforcement one of the linchpins—along with community policing—of his quality-of-life message in his Mayoral campaign. “Let’s face it,” one city official exclaims. “Albany is an old town. You can drive around and look at the plaques on the building—eighteen hundreds, late eighteen hundreds. Most of these buildings are well over a hundred years old.”

Jennings’s plan was to certify every Albany fireman as a code inspector so that the city could—in the words of one Times-Union headline—“deploy an army to fight building code violations.” Albany’s Fire Chief immediately lent his support to the idea, arguing that “it’s just so beneficial to the department and the people in it to know what the hell they’re walking in to.” Some firefighters turned out to be less enthusiastic, and their union president eventually claimed that the new duties were reducing the department’s response time. But the AFD had long been something of an eclectic operation, having been one of the first in the state to get into Emergency Medical Services (EMS), and many firefighters apparently saw code enforcement as the latest form of job security. As Fire Captain Michael Macie puts it:

I think a lot of it has to do with local economics. . . . If you look in the surrounding cities, Schenectady, Troy, Watervliet, Green Island, Cohoes, who have paid fire departments, they’ve watched their ranks decline to almost nothing only because they weren’t providing those services. The Albany Fire Department
provides advanced life support, EMS. We provide code enforcement. We put out the fires. We go to the car accidents. We go to the chemical spills. So the taxpayers are getting a pretty good bang for their buck, as far as they’re concerned, with us. The guys out there work twenty-four hours, and from eight a.m. till seven or eight, nine o’clock in the evening. They’re busy. I’ve been here twenty-three years, and when I came on, we would just sit out in front of the fire house and you would bounce the ball, you know? It’s not that way anymore. . . . Everybody understands that if you want to be here and you want to get your salary, you just can’t sit around, because if you weren’t doing code enforcement and you weren’t doing EMS, you could cut the department size in half.

Some problems did arise as the Fire Department took on its new duties: Many residents initially complained that fire trucks were blocking their streets on inspections; historic preservationists argued that the city had taken code enforcement too far, and that it was tearing down historic buildings to make way for businesses; and landlords complained about excessive zeal and unprofessional inspections—pointing out, for example, that unlike the old building inspectors, firefighters made imprecise inspection appointments that could keep them waiting hours. In the end, the Fire Department was not able to accommodate all of these complaints, but it did make some concessions, such as leaving their fire trucks behind when they went on inspections, and making an effort to schedule specific times for inspections.

Despite the outside complaints, many Fire Department employees took to their new duties in earnest, and eventually almost every firefighter in Albany went through 88 hours of training that qualified them to inspect structures for compliance with building and housing codes. Moreover, Macie insists, firefighters who hit the streets on inspections discovered a natural alliance with police. “We’re doing the code enforcement, the police are getting into the community policing aspect, and we bump into each other on the street,” he explains.

You know, I would get a call from Timmy Toraine [a community outreach officer]. He said, “You know, we really have a problem on Hudson Avenue. What are we going to do about it?” And I said, “I don’t know. Let me come up and walk with you.” We walked in the pouring rain one night for an hour and a half just to first identify the problems, and then for me to go back and try to think, “How can I approach this?” Because obviously when you’ve got a block that’s an eighth of a mile long with a hundred houses on it—how do you go after each one of them?

Macie saw in the community outreach officers a smaller battalion of eyes and ears who could help him keep tabs on city properties. “The community officers . . . know everything that goes on in [their] neighborhood,” he insists, going on to explain that some will now jot down elaborate lists of potential code violations that fire fighters can follow up on. Over time, the relationship between the fire department and the community outreach officers on code enforcement issues has grown, a process that Macie attributes to word-of-mouth. “You know, I speak with Timmy Toraine, and later I get another call from Officer Wilcox on Second Avenue. He says, ‘I think I’ve got a problem here,’ because [Toraine] has said to him, ‘Geez, we could call Captain Macie.
Macie concedes that APD officers are not experts in city codes in the way that the newly-trained firefighters now are, and that there is the potential for police to send his men on wild goose chases. But he insists that he takes every complaint seriously, and that he has been able to educate police officers about some common misconceptions when they arise. “If [a complaint] is not founded, . . . then I will return to get back to that community police officer and say, ‘There’s nothing we can do about that because they’re well within the law,’” Macie explains. “He’s going to remember the next time when he sees that [situation]. So it’s really an educational tool for them.” In any case, Macie simply says that he is willing to check out any concerns police raise “because that’s my job. . . . If I didn’t follow up on every complaint, then the liability falls back on me: We knew about the situation and we didn’t do anything about it.” Finally, the fact that Macie now has over 250 certified inspectors relieves some pressure that the building department may have felt to ignore questionable reports of violations.

Other Institutional Partners
Though mostly restricted to the community outreach officers, these partnerships with DGS and the Fire Department have clearly taken firm root in the APD, which has found a ready outlet for the non-criminal quality-of-life issues that police often confront. Department trainers report that the collaboration has helped bring many APD officers into the community policing fold: At first, officers often expressed skepticism about a new philosophy that called on them to deal with issues like trash, lighting, and code violation—issues that they did consider to be a central part of police work. But as department trainers explained that the officers did not themselves have to solve these “non-police” problems, and that they were simply expected to channel them to the appropriate partner agency, many officers reportedly conceded that the approach made sense.

But if the Fire Department and DGS have been clear success stories for the APD, some other agencies appear to be outside of the fold. For example, a number of APD members maintain that the local power company is not always responsive to concerns about streetlights, and there has apparently been no partnership with area social service agencies on the same scale as the partnerships with Fire and DGS (though the department has stepped up cooperation with a local domestic violence agency as part of its nascent domestic violence program, described below). Indeed, some potential partners have found themselves on the defensive since the start of community policing and the Mayor’s quality-of-life campaign. Homeless shelters and advocates are one example, as these groups have decried stronger order maintenance as a violation of civil liberties, and they have resisted what they see as an effort to push the homeless and the agencies that serve them out of town. Many city landlords have taken equal umbrage at recent police and city policy changes, viewing some efforts to “clean up the neighborhood”—including the stepped-up efforts to enforce building codes and Jennings’s proposals to increase fines for violations—as direct attacks on their livelihoods.

Many patrol officers seem fairly resigned about the potential for cooperation with these groups—particularly landlords, who through tactics like lease enforcement, tenant screening, and physical security have a potentially enormous influence on public safety. One potential strategy for
forcing landlords to cooperate has emerged in discussions of Pasadena’s Safe Streets Now program, which holds property owners liable for tenant behavior by imposing fines for chronic problems. A coalition of neighborhood leaders, Fire Department officials, police, and Common Council members has emerged to press city hall to adopt a similar program, and aldermen have reportedly received some encouragement from Jennings to move forward. But these discussions have not yet led to new legislation, and some in the city are skeptical that it will be possible to overcome landlord clout in the Common Council.  Coding = DPO&OS/B

The Committee on University and Community Relations
A more hopeful development in Albany has been the Committee on University and Community Relations, which predated community policing but dovetailed into its aims. The Committee had its inception early in 1990, when police and community concerns about college student parties boiled over—particularly near the large University at Albany. At that time, Mayor Whalen asked university President Vincent O’Leary to convene a task force to study souring town-gown relations and to recommend a strategy for improving them. Eventually the task force came up with a list of twelve recommendations, ranging from reforms in the way the University licensed fraternities to changes in the way the city handled code violation complaints. But perhaps most important was its creation of a standing committee that would monitor not just these specific recommendations, but also any new concerns residents had about University students.  Coding = C&R/H

Thomas Gebhardt, who as Director of Off-Campus Housing for the university became the committee’s chair, explains that the first few meetings between university officials and the community were tense: “[There were] a lot of angry people yelling and screaming,” Gebhardt remembers, conceding that some residents harbored suspicions that the effort would end up as “a smoke and mirrors committee.” In his eyes, one of the largest underlying problems was that the two sides simply did not understand each other. “There were a lot of stereotypes that both groups had about each other,” Gebhardt explains. “Many long term neighbors thought that every single university student was a party animal, didn’t care about anything. And many students felt that every long term neighbor was some old fogey that wanted it quiet twenty four hours a day, seven days a week.” Some of these perceptions broke down as the two sides began to interact with each other, and Gebhardt also made an effort to explain what the University could offer to the neighborhoods. “There were a lot of myths that needed to be cleared up when the task force was created about what the University could and couldn’t do in terms of their judicial process and things like that. So we had to clarify all of those.”  Coding = C&R/H

This issue turned out to be an important one in the Committee, for part of its strong reputation in Albany seems to stem from its ability to go beyond the University’s own authority; and that ability, in turn, stems from the diverse group of players that have gradually come to join it. Begun as an appointed body made up mostly of students, residents, and University officials, the Committee gradually evolved into a much more fluid and expansive body—one whose membership seemed instinctively driven by the need to match authority to the concerns participants were raising. For example, because many complaints about students had to do with alcohol, the committee developed a close, if initially reluctant relationship with Albany taverns; and as residents and city officials discovered that the University at Albany was not the only local
college with rowdy students, most other area college joined the committee as well.  

Police came to play a particularly important role in this effort to match authority to problems. As Gebhardt explains, the University’s own authority over unruly students off campus can be quite limited, but a close relationship with police helps to compensate.

[The University’s authority over off-campus students] is not a lot, but I think it’s enhanced by working with the police department very closely. Because it’s amazing: Once students know that . . . the police are working with the university, that are working with the neighborhood association, that might be working with code enforcement, that might working with the Albany Fire Department—that goes a long way to having an impact. So they know that all of those little fingers are connected.  

Not everyone came willingly to the committee at first: For example, Gebhardt reports that some area colleges seemed wary of joining the committee because “to join the committee would be to admit that you were part of the problem;” and he reports that fraternities have been inconsistent participants (though this may be changing as national fraternities—increasingly in the spotlight because of problems with alcohol abuse—pressure their local chapters to take more interest in their public image). But despite occasional reluctance, the Committee has had enormous success expanding its membership, and by 1998 its roster listed nearly 80 participants from a wide variety of Albany neighborhoods, agencies, and businesses.  

The Committee’s growing clout in both the community and city government made it attractive to police as they pursued their own interagency efforts. For example, asked why the department embraced the University Relations Committee so quickly, Assistant Chief Robert Wolfgang (who first represented police on the Committee) explains that the body “brought everyone together again.”  

In addition to the neighborhood residents and students, it also brought other service providers or regulatory agencies, and the fire department, code enforcement. So you had a lot of different organizations coming together, and as you identified the problems, there was a good chance someone there had a solution to that problem—or had the tools to create a solution to the problem. . . . . [And] as you’re trying to get the message out, it doesn’t appear as though it’s just the work of one person and the concerns of one person, but in fact, it’s supported by many.  

The result, many department members argue, has been extraordinary success in dealing with the problems that stem from the minority of students who have been unruly. “That’s been a home run for us,” Tuffey says of the Committee, pointing to one particular troublespot for evidence: “In three years, the complaints I get from that area has gone from maybe fifteen a year to none or one or two or three.”  

6. Building Support in the Community

If interagency collaboration has played a key role in Albany’s community policing effort,
partnerships with the community have been even more central. In part, the APD views Albany residents and the associations they have formed as a resource police can leverage to fight crime more effectively, and the department has helped facilitate activities like citizen foot patrols to increase its effectiveness. But the driving ideal behind Albany’s police-community partnerships is apparently a desire by police to better understand community priorities. “I firmly believe that we work with the people, and that’s when police departments work best,” recently-promoted Deputy Chief Jack Nielsen explains. “I always tell people that they need to go to a country where there is martial law to understand how important it is that that be the philosophy of the police department: That you work for the people.” Nielsen concedes that there need to be limits to community control over the police, but beyond those limits community sentiment becomes absolutely central to the decisions police make. “I don’t think that they should have hands on influence [on policy],” he explains. “[But] beyond the housekeeping phase, beyond the officer safety, beyond the fiduciary responsibility to the taxpayer . . . the philosophy has to be that what is most important is the perception of the part of the people of how they are policed.”

Tuffey echoes Nielsen’s sentiments, explaining that he considers community reactions to be an important means for monitoring department performance and fine-tuning its programs. As an example, he describes the process whereby the boundaries of the department’s foot beats have evolved. “We always get letters or we go to community meetings and we get input from them,” Tuffey explains. “There have been times when we had to extend one beat a different way because some of the people thought it should be extended a little bit. So, you let the guy walk a couple of extra blocks or walk on the other side of the street.” Asked if such requests don’t have the potential to dilute the program that was designed, Tuffey responds:

> Let’s be honest: If you’re on a beat and you’re at one of the beat, whether you’re three blocks away or four blocks away, it’s going to take you relatively the same amount of time to get [across]. And usually there’s a car close anyway, so it’s not really a issue, unless they’re all tied up. Was it a big thing for us the Police Department? No. But is it a big thing for the community to have us give them better service? Yes, absolutely, that’s what we’re here for.

Tuffey’s concern for providing the community the services that they seem to want is equally apparent in his refusal to consider call-diversion schemes, despite some officers’ perceptions that their workload was too heavy for them to undertake some of the new tasks the department expects of them. “That will never, ever, happen as long as I’m here,” Tuffey says of call-diversion programs like phone reporting.

The purpose of community policing is to give people what they want. And if my house is burglarized and my bike is stolen, I don’t want to see a telephone report. I want the police over there . . . One of the guys brought it up in the Commanders meeting and wanted to do that. He didn’t know my philosophy on that and everybody at the table knew it. And oh boy, he said “sorry.” I said, “Do yourself a favor, if you’re going to bring something up like that, you ought to check before you bring it up.” I don’t think that’s the proper way to do things. I really, really
People pay taxes to get service. And as far as I’m concerned, they will get the best service that I can help them get. Coding = DPO&OS/H

But if community policing aimed to “give people what they want,” the APD faced a need to learn what exactly it was that the community wanted. Of course, the APD had always kept a window open to community sentiment through the formal political system. But in the era of community policing, department managers apparently felt a need to find other ways to strike up a dialogue with the residents they served. Coding = C&R/H

Patrol officers on the beat answered this need most directly for Albany. First of all, foot patrol officers presumably had a particularly fine-grained understanding of community leadership and community concerns. But the rest of the patrol force was also encouraged to develop closer ties with the public, and while some department members feel that their sectors were too large to make this proposition a reality, there are some stories of success, like the “liaison” programs spearheaded by Signer’s team. Coding = C&R/H

**Neighborhood Associations and Community Policing**

Off the street, the APD redoubled its efforts to make contact with the city’s community organizations—especially its maturing system of Neighborhood Associations (NAs). Here too the patrol force played a central role: “Rather than this centralized community relations [unit],” Grebert explains, referring to the APD unit that had traditionally responded to NA requests to talk with police, “it was the members of the [sector] teams and their supervisors that would go to [NA] meetings.” To help jump-start this relationship, the APD included many community leaders in some of its early training sessions, including not just NA presidents, but also representatives of non-neighborhood community groups like a citywide Gay and Lesbian Association and a few business groups. Moreover, at the outset of Albany’s community policing program, Grebert and other department managers met extensively with city Neighborhood Associations to solicit their ideas about their plans. Coding = C&R/H; T/H

The APD further cultivated its ties to city neighborhood groups by creating a citizen’s advisory board called the Community Police Council that counted NA leaders prominently among its members. The Council first came up during the early discussions of community policing in 1994, when some APD members proposed creating a broadly representative body that could serve as a regular forum for airing neighborhood concerns. The idea went nowhere at first, but neighborhood leaders who remembered it eventually decided to try to put it back on the agenda. Coding = C&R/H; E/H

The first step came in the fall of 1995, when the Council of Albany Neighborhood Associations (CANA) presented a draft of its own plan for an advisory board to Jennings and the police department. Maria Parisella, who drafted and revised the original plan, explains the idea as follows:

The Council of Albany Neighborhood Associations felt that there should be some kind of permanent forum for civilians and cops to discuss community policing. There are a lot of other things that we do together, but this is devoted solely to considering [community policing], understanding the program, understanding
how it works and advising the Mayor and the Chief in how we feel it can be improved. Coding = C&R/M

While some police apparently saw the proposal more narrowly as a forum where citizens would nominate their current neighborhood problems, Parisella had broader ambitions, hoping that the new Council would serve as a way citizens could help make corrections to the APD’s evolving community policing program. “I said it to my own neighborhood association: I think we need to have a group that just keeps looking at how this is going and how we can improve it,” Parisella remembers. “We know we have to address some of the day-to-day issues, but this is not to replace the beat cop sitting down in his neighborhood.” Coding = C&R/M; E/H

Parisella’s first plan suggested that each of the city’s 28 NAs should send a single delegate to the Council, and that this group would be joined by representatives of the police department. Jennings and Tuffey, however, had a different idea. “We sent the proposal to the Mayor and he broadened it,” Parise lla explains. “He said, ‘That’s a great idea, but I would like to also have some common council people in and some community reps and some people from community organizations.’” Over the course of the next several months, CANA revised its draft, and the final proposal called for a “broadly representative” council that included police, residents, business, education, clergy, government, community organizations, and the media. Coding = C&R/M; E/H

How closely Jennings followed the CANA plan—for in the end it was the Mayor who appointed most of the Council’s membership—is a matter of interpretation. Parisella reports being fairly happy with the Council that emerged.

I know we represent what CANA had in mind because we represent various parts of the City neighborhoods, tenants and homeowners. But I think we also represent what the Mayor had in mind. The community groups don’t cover every base: [For example,] there’s no gay and lesbian [delegate], although we did propose a gay and lesbian organization member. . . . I think he chose groups that he was most comfortable with for this round. But I think . . . we represent pretty closely a broad base. Coding = C&R/M; E/H

But Deputy Chief Grebert, who had been one of the police managers to push the Council idea in its initial incarnation, was somewhat disappointed with the process that emerged. “We originally wanted to do it [with] representatives of neighborhood associations, representatives of business associations and civic associations, school district, religious community, media,” Grebert remembers. “[But] I was surprised to see many of the same faces on this as on many of the other police-related committees. We certainly appreciate people’s commitment, but we were looking for some fresh faces to work with.” The problem, Grebert explains, was not so much that some groups were under-represented: It was simply that because of their other commitments, Council members were not fully invested in the new body and its aims. “I don’t think I’ve heard, ‘Gee, we’ve been left out. What I have heard is, ‘Gee, I couldn’t make it because . . . I’m also on the community police relations board [a ten-year-old board that reviews complaints against police] and I had to go to that meeting last night.’ . . . Four or five of the people who were on that group were also put on the community police advisory council.” Coding = C&R/M; E/H
In any case, the Council began its monthly meetings in November of 1996, exactly two years after the community outreach officers hit the street. During its first year, the Council mainly sought to understand how community policing works in Albany, and it invited managers and officers from essentially every APD unit to help delegates understand how the department operated. But the group has also sought to push for a few substantive reforms, such as a comprehensive brochure that explained community policing to the community, bicycle patrols as part of the community outreach effort, and more community involvement in department ceremonies. “If anyone who we represent asks us to bring an issue to the table, we will,” Parisella explains.

We don’t take votes on these things: We just try to bring it to the table, have it discussed and if we feel strongly about something, we will just keep asking for it. Like this brochure. At first it was like, “Yes, that’s a good idea.” [But] almost every single meeting we said, “We really want this brochure.” So after a couple of months, they knew we were serious about it and they went ahead and did it. It was that kind of a give and take. We certainly don’t have any juice over the department: We’re just in an advisory capacity. But when something is important to us, the department assumes that it’s important to the people we represent.

Some of the Council’s proposals have already come to fruition, notably the bicycle patrols, which Parisella points to as a significant example of the group’s influence. “Bicycle patrols had been proposed at times and the Deputy [Chief] said, ‘This is not something that’s in our plan,’” she remembers. “[But] at the CANA meeting, . . . we had been asked in particular by an association to bring that to the table. [And] there was enough support both on the Council and in the community that the Mayor went ahead and started a bicycle patrol last summer.”

Reforms like the Community Police Council and the initiatives it has spawned would clearly not have been possible without Albany’s well-organized system of Neighborhood Associations. In fact, one of the major differences between the community policing efforts of today and the neighborhood outreach units of the 1970s is organized community involvement. “There was none of the emphasis on partnerships,” Grebert explains of the neighborhood outreach unit where he worked twenty years ago. “The community was still the bad guys.” Indeed, it is hard to see how things could have been otherwise in the earlier period, for neighborhood organization was a new and somewhat renegade force at the time: A few groups had been around for many years, notably the Center Square Association, whose 1958 birthdate makes it the oldest NA existing in Albany today. But neighborhood organization did not truly take off until the 1970s, and it is worth reviewing that history here.

At that time, Center Square residents in particular pressed the city more and more insistently to enforce zoning laws and building codes, feeling that their neighborhood was losing its historic character as landowners illegally subdivided one-family homes. The city, however, seemed to have no intention of responding to Center Square’s complaints. “Everytime we called the city, I used to hear the song and dance about how busy they were dealing with the concerns of the...
United Tenants association,” explains Harold Rubin, Center Square’s president in the early 1970s and the chairman of its zoning committee for many years before and after that time. “So I contacted the head of that Association . . . I assumed [city officials] were telling United Tenants they could not deal with their problems because Center Square was bugging the hell out of them.” 

Roger Markovics, then the head of United Tenants of Albany, was apparently somewhat wary of Rubin during their first meetings in 1974. “Center Square has a reputation of being . . . a bunch of gentrifiers over here, middle class types—not the type of people he normally dealt with,” Rubin explains. “And so [in] our early meetings, they were looking at who the hell we were.” But after discussing their respective and mutual concerns, they were able to find some common ground, and the two organizations joined up with a number of other groups—including five more neighborhood associations and interest groups like the Albany Taxpayer’s Association and the League of Women Voters—to form what would eventually become known as the Coalition for Effective Code Enforcement.

The Coalition quickly came up with an eleven-point plan that described an agenda of issues it wanted to take up with the city. “It was a very radical program,” Rubin remembers sardonically of the plan.

Such as: “Handle complaints in an orderly manner”—first-come, first-serve more-or-less. “Fine violators.” “Publicize violations.” “Have the employees take civil service exams for their positions so they can be competent.” Roger used to say that no inspection was ever done in the afternoon: They worked a half a day. At one time, five of the code inspectors were ministers. And I wondered, “What special training is it for the ministry that qualified a person to become a code enforcement inspector?” This was a political payoff.

At first the city moved slowly on the new Coalition’s sometimes elaborate proposals: For example, after researching the subject with three national code enforcement agencies, the Coalition presented the Building Department with a 43-page document—complete with sample inspection forms—that they unsuccessfully asked the city to adopt. But whatever its immediate successes, the coalition served as a starting point for Albany’s future alliance of neighborhood associations.

One milestone down this road came in 1975, when a regionally-based nonprofit called the Council of Community Services successfully petitioned the United Way to fund a new agency called the Neighborhood Resource Center (NRC). Over the years NRC provided many forms of help to struggling neighborhood groups, including secretarial services like sending out meeting notices, advice about organizing and maintaining groups, and space for holding neighborhood meetings. NRC did not try to organize neighborhood groups on its own, believing that communities should be organized from the inside rather than the outside. But by providing a focal point for neighborhood energy, the new agency effectively helped organize existing groups into a larger and more powerful coalition. That process got started in the Spring of 1976, when NRC director Tom Mayer hosted a meeting of eight neighborhood associations that was the first in what was to become a series of informal meetings for many of the city’s NAs. By 1977, the
participants (which then numbered eleven NAs) adopted a formal “Statement of Goals” that highlighted such policy concerns as housing, service delivery, and education; and by 1981, the group (then grown to eighteen members) adopted a set of by-laws and formally incorporated as the Council of Albany Neighborhood Associations.  

CANA markedly advanced the neighborhood movement by gaining significant power in city politics—particularly through its relationship with Mayor Whalen. CANA had begun cultivating that relationship in 1981, when Rubin learned that Corning intended to nominate Whalen for President of the Common Council, and by implication as his successor for the Mayor’s job. “I called him up to meet with him,” Rubin remembers of Whalen at the time.  

I wanted to meet with him with a couple people from CANA, [but] he didn’t want to meet with a group. I just went by myself. And I felt very uncomfortable speaking to him on my own, because it looks like I’m cutting a deal. And I don’t like that whole idea. But I went and spent about an hour and a half with him, telling him of our concerns. [And] he had an understanding of where we were coming from. 

Whalen agreed to speak before the emerging CANA group once he took office in 1982 as Council President, and that appearance set a precedent that has continued on to this day: Even after he became Mayor, Whalen addressed the January CANA meeting with such regularity that the event eventually became known as the Mayor’s “State of the City Address.” At times, Rubin reports, there was some tension about exactly who set the terms of these appearances: “What I would do is write a letter to the Mayor and suggest certain topics, and one time he wrote back that I was trying to give the Rubin agenda,” Rubin remembers. “I said, ‘Look, the floor is yours, [but] these are things that have come up during the past year which are of concern.’” Nevertheless, despite such minor disagreements, the January speeches helped to reshape CANA’s relationship with the city fundamentally. Not only has Mayor Jennings continued the tradition set by Whalen, but Rubin believes that at the time, Whalen’s appearances helped coax some wary heads of Albany agencies to talk directly with the neighborhoods: “At the very beginning they were very, very reluctant,” Rubin remembers of agency heads he invited to speak. “But when Tom Whalen kept coming to the meetings, he established a precedent: If the Mayor can go, it was kind of hard for them to turn us down.”  

It would, however, be an oversimplification to say that Whalen handed CANA its influence in city hall, for the neighborhoods were willing and able to be confrontational when necessary. One example centers on required public hearings for the city budget, which CANA reportedly used to great effect. Most simply, the neighborhoods made many critical comments on both the form and substance of annual city budgets, and Rubin believes this input had a real impact. But he also explains that CANA did not stop there:  

We used to use the budget hearings as a means of griping about other things, because most other issues did not have hearings. For example, at one of the meetings one of our delegates got up and said “we should eliminate the building department and save the $350,000,” which was the amount they were paying. “Because they don’t do anything anyway. Save the money.” I mean that was the
way we would use to make our views known. And since we were the only game in town . . . in terms of speaking at the public hearings on the city budget, . . . we got tremendous press coverage. And you know, the media doesn’t cover good news, they cover controversy. And when we would testify against something, that’s controversy.  Coding = B&R/B; C&R/B

In an equally confrontational spirit, Rubin describes one of the neighborhoods’ central strategies as going to court, and this was particularly true of Center Square: “We went to court lots of time,” Rubin remembers. “Some times we won, and some times we lost. But the very fact that we were ready to go to court probably stopped some of the worst abominations that would have occurred otherwise.” To be sure, navigating the machine-influenced legal system was not always easy, as attorneys had to know which judges they should try to go before, and they sometimes had to appeal cases out of the local system altogether. But Center Square in particular was usually able to get pro bono legal help either from its own residents or from other NAs, who, Rubin insists, “understood what we were trying to do, and were prepared to help out.”  Coding = C&R/B

CANA’s sometimes confrontational relationship with city hall contrasted with its hands-off attitude towards the political party. Conscious that local politicians might view Neighborhood Associations as a threat, Rubin and others constantly tried to dispel that view. “In the early years, everybody would ask me, ‘When are you running for office?’” he recalls. “They assumed that I became president of the Center Square Association and later head of CANA because I had a political agenda—that I was going to run for some office.” But Rubin overtly tried to distance himself and CANA from electoral politics, insisting that he was “not enrolled in the party” and that he was “not a spokesman who was out shopping around for a higher level job.” This philosophy became a matter of organizational policy with CANA, which asked any NA official who ran for public office to step down from the NA position first.  Coding = C&R/B

Indeed, Rubin and the rest of CANA’s board made a more general effort to focus neighborhood groups away from Democratic Committee headquarters and towards city hall. Rubin explains:

We deal with the City: We deal with the Mayor; we deal with the elected officials; we deal with the people whose salaries we pay. We don’t deal with the politics side of it. Mayor Corning, later on in his life, became chairman of the Democratic Party. When we met with him, we did not meet with him as Chairman. We met with him as a Mayor. I’m not enrolled in the [Democratic] Party. I didn’t know who our committeeman was, I wasn’t interested in knowing who he was. He did his thing or she did her thing. . . . I probably have spoken to I don’t know how many groups to help them organize Neighborhood Associations or keep them going, and what I would point out is this: You don’t go to the committeemen to ask them to do something, because you are asking for a favor. What we want are those services that the city is supposed to provide, as a right, not as a favor.  Coding = C&R/B

Rubin concedes that over time CANA may in fact have taken over aspects of the role of the committeeman, in the sense that residents often turn to him and other neighborhood leaders for
help getting better city services. But he insists that CANA did not make this goal its mission, and he suggests that its nonpartisan strategy helped it gain influence without inciting a political backlash. “If you go through the [newspaper] clips of Albany, you’ll find various articles talking [about] how we took over the role of the ward leaders,” he explains. “It may have happened, but that was not our goal. We were just doing our thing, and we weren’t concerned with what they were doing on their side.”

Finally, CANA also tended to potential fault lines inside the neighborhood movement itself. Most simply, the organization tried to build camaraderie within the group by hosting events like its citywide “conventions,” which offered speakers, awards, workshops, and even political theater. But CANA’s founders also tried to guard against the group’s potential for faction, which existed in any alliance between diverse neighborhoods. For example, Rubin explains that he tried hard to discourage CANA from tackling potentially divisive issues like parking.

I live in the downtown section of the city. We want a parking permit system. The people uptown don’t want it, and they feel if we have it, it will push people who don’t have a permit into their neighborhoods. And so when I was chairing CANA, I never brought this issue up. I stepped down as the head of CANA after 20 years in 1996. Subsequently the issue came again and CANA was discussing it. And there was some big heavy arguments in CANA about that. My policy was why bring it up and just get disunity in CANA? Because CANA can’t take a stand if it’s that divided. Just let the downtown neighborhood associations do their thing, and if the uptown wants to oppose it, fine, that’s their prerogative.

Indeed, CANA institutionalized this focus on non-controversial issues by requiring a two-thirds vote for most resolutions.

By 1998, CANA had grown to twenty-one members and played a significant part in city politics. Its rise carved out an important new space for Albany residents to influence their government, and one that has played a central role in the APD’s community policing program: Without it, police would be left to the Committee system that had held sway in the 1970s and before. To be sure, ward leaders and committeemen still help some residents articulate their views about police services. But unlike in the earlier period, the ward leaders and the committeemen do not hold a monopoly on governmental influence, and NAs have become a vehicle for demands that the committee system historically excluded. In part, the difference is simply scale, for while committeemen traditionally brought forth individual complaints, the NAs began to challenge service delivery for entire neighborhoods, and CANA actually began speaking out about citywide policies. But the neighborhood movement also brought a change to the kind of input citizens had in government, for by challenging policies and entire patterns of service delivery, residents were expressing their views at a level that the committee system had traditionally stifled. As one neighborhood leader put it in 1987: “Before there was a childlike relationship that said the party would take care of [citizens]. Now there’s a more adult relationship, that people can talk directly to their government.” It is precisely this type of relationship that underlies institutions like the Community Police Council.
8. The Title I COPS Grants in Albany
Throughout the past four years of reform, the APD has pursued several federal policing grants to help advance its community policing efforts. As a matter of philosophy, the department and the city have sought to go after any and all available funding opportunities. For example, asked if the city has considered holding back on the COPS grants given concerns about phase-outs and matching requirements, Jennings responds that it did not. “When I was at the conference of Mayors about a month and a half ago, there was a concern [in] some of these cities that had opted into this program [about] not having the monies there to continue with the police officers,” Jennings explains. “But if you’re a good manager, and you know that it’s important . . . you’ll find that extra million or two million . . . that you’ve committed as a match to pick up the other side of it.” In the same vein, Tuffey insists that he has no doubts that the city will be able to pick up the grant costs when they expire. “That’s an issue down the road, there’s no question,” he explains of the phase-outs. “But you know what? . . . I would rather hire them now and deal with them later because I’m not the budget director, so I don’t have to worry about that stuff down the road. . . . Any grants we can have, we’ll ask for, absolutely.”

Given this philosophy, the department was not at all averse to the hiring grants that dominated the COPS offerings, and in fact it received a total of 28 officers (14 of them from a Police Hiring Supplement grant) and 14 civilians through the COPS programs to help advance community policing. Grebert concedes that some might not think Albany needed any more hiring, for even at the end of Whalen’s downsizing spree the city had the highest ratio of sworn officers to city residents in the state. “Obviously when I was in the department we needed it,” the now-retired Grebert says sardonically of the calls for more hiring. “Manpower had gotten down to two hundred ninety eight, and we said, ‘Oh boy, we need more manpower to do this community policing thing.’ And at the same time COPS grants were becoming available. So we got a COPS grant and got the manpower up to about 320 and 340 for the last couple of years.”

The first round of hiring actually came from the PHS grant, which the Whalen administration had applied for but which did not arrive in city coffers until February of 1994. The grant allowed Jennings to make good on part of his campaign promise to add 25 officers to the APD and bring its total to 345, and the department itself planned to use the new officers to staff its community outreach unit (or, more precisely, to backfill the senior officers from the patrol force who eventually bid for the community outreach jobs).

Later that year, the APD applied for its first formal COPS grant from the COPS AHEAD program, through which, as local officials understood it, the city would qualify for eight officers. Jennings apparently hoped to use the money to pay for cadets he had recently hired to round out his campaign promise, telling a group of downtown businessmen that he had no plans to hire past 345. By December, that plan seemed to city officials to be on course, as the city received a letter from the Department of Justice explaining that Albany had been “authorized to hire eight officers.” But a few weeks later, Justice unequivocally told local officials that they could only spend their authorization if they used the money for new recruits, in effect telling the APD that it needed to expand its ranks even further. Already facing unexpected budget troubles, the city withdrew its application and forfeited the money. The APD hired no new officers for the next
two years, and Jennings eventually revised the department’s authorized strength back down to 320. Coding = B&R/B

The APD’s next hiring move came in December of 1996, when the city applied for a 14-officer COPS Universal Hiring grant and revisited the supplantation debate all over again. This time, according to newspaper reports, the city planned to use the grant money to effectively extend its expiring PHS grant, funding a class of recruits that was slated to enter the academy in January in order to make up for two years worth of attrition. The Justice Department, however, refused to accept this proposal, and the controversy spilled over into Albany’s Common Council, where one city Alderman exclaimed that losing the grant could put community policing in jeopardy. Eventually Jennings and Tuffey conceded to the Justice Department’s position, agreeing to hire fourteen more officers on top of the January class to bring total department strength to 334. As Tuffey explains it today, the grant was necessary for the department to keep community policing going. “I need more people to do it,” he explains. “If you want all these programs—and we didn’t have the overtime grant at the time [referring to a COPS MORE overtime grant, which had been awarded but apparently not spent]—you either pay overtime to do it or you suffer with losing patrol. We can’t afford to lose the patrol officers.” In any case, one of the new slots was pegged to fund a full-time officer at the local high school. Coding = B&R/B

On top of these straight hiring grants, Albany applied for two COPS MORE grants split between civilian hiring and overtime money. The civilian hiring came in two phases, starting with a 1995 grant that paid for 5 clerical employees, and continuing with a 1996 grant that paid salaries for 7 booking clerks. (In the 1996 grant, the department originally requested 10 positions to civilianize not just booking itself but also related jobs like fingerprinting. But the Justice department refused to fund those positions, which are still filled by sworn officers today.) In both cases, the department saw the civilianization money as a way to put more officers out on the streets and thereby increase community interaction. In any case, department members report that the civilian hiring went relatively smoothly. But they also report that it went more slowly than grant guidelines automatically allowed, and in both cases the department needed to get an extension even after taking shortcuts like designating some of the positions as non-competitive “community aides.” “What the federal government doesn’t understand,” one department member explains, “is the fact that you’re awarded a grant like this, you have to got through . . . a civil service process. . . . We had to write up the positions, we had to submit them to our civil service people. That’s why we changed [our timeline].” Coding = B&R/B

The overtime portion of the COPS MORE money came as part of the 1995 grant application, which asked for a total of $124,000 for this purpose. Initially part of the money was slated to fund officer participation in youth centers at the Albany Housing Authority, but when the AHA’s funding for the effort fell through, the APD received permission from the Department of Justice to reprogram the money for the more general overtime plan. Designed primarily by Grebert, the overtime effort sought to use flexible funding to target foot patrol officers in temporary troublespots. “It gives us so many opportunities to put people in problem areas,” Tuffey explains.

[For example,] with summer coming up we do these target patrols: We will take five police officers . . . and we’ll go down on the corner of Swan and Third. And we’ll stop cars, we’ll look for drunks, we’ll look for drugs—we’ll do all these
things. . . . Especially in the summertime with vacations—you know, everyone goes on vacation in the summer—I can’t afford to take some of the police cars 
from the patrol area just to do that. But if I can do it on overtime, fine. Coding = B&R/H

Moreover, Grebert felt that strategic use of overtime made more sense that new hiring. “You’re using veteran, trained . . . officers rather than new kids on the block,” he explains. “[Recruits] are essentially not of any value to you for two years after you hire them. It takes them that long to get up to speed. So the debate over do you want more cops or do you want to put more cops on overtime, I prefer the overtime. I think you’re getting a better product.” Coding = B&R/H

Grebert distributed the money across several projects that he identified with input from others. “We’d have meeting with the Sergeants, [and] I’d say, ‘Come on, fellows. Tell me what problems you’re having that we can throw some of this money into,’” he explains. For example, one of the MORE overtime projects put a special detail in a neighborhood that had suffered a rash of burglaries, another funded a “party car” that would take all calls about college parties on a night that University officials had heard would be especially busy, and yet another carried out a Jennings proposal for a truancy patrol (officers on this detail were assigned to patrol certain areas for school-aged youth during school hours, and they were expected to send any truants back to their high school). A few proposed projects ran into trouble: For example, some of the money was used to target alcohol sales to minors, but that effort eventually fell victim to political pressure (or so some department members report). In any case, once Grebert had selected specific projects, the department posted sheets in the division stations that allowed officers to sign themselves up for the special details. Coding = B&R/H

The APD’s final Title I COPS grant came from a 1995 application for a Domestic Violence grant, which eventually funded a two-person civilian unit charged with helping victims navigate the sometimes-complicated criminal justice and service systems. The project fed into a longstanding priority in the APD, which had adopted a mandatory arrest policy for domestic violence before many New York agencies, and in its application the department argued that the project would advance its problem-solving capabilities. Most important, department members explain, is the opportunity that the unit’s civilian staff have to talk with domestic violence victims and explain to them what their options are—including the services offered by a local nonprofit called Equinox, which offers shelter space, counseling, and court advocacy, and which served as the APD’s partner agency for the grant. Coding = DPO&OS/M; C&R/H; B&R/H

The contacts with victims mostly come from the unit’s own direct calls to victims, which it identifies by reviewing police reports. (New York State recently required all police agencies to fill out special reports for domestic violence cases, and these reports have made it easy to separate out domestic violence cases.) But the civilian staff have also gone before department roll calls to get the word out to officers about their services, and by their presence in court they hope to become known to the judges and DAs. In any case, the grant is scheduled to run out at the end of this year, and while the department does not yet have a plan for funding, city officials have begun searching for money from the state and the county. 65 Coding = B&R/ TP; C&R/H

III. THE ALBANY POLICE DEPARTMENT TODAY
Albany’s community policing reforms are still making progress today, and indeed, the department is about to turn a major corner when it reorganizes around four decentralized police stations this year. But for the sake of laying out where the Albany Police Department stands after four years of reform, it is worthwhile to briefly review and elaborate on the way it operates through the same lens we used to examine its past—focusing on its relationship to the environment, its operational and administrative systems, and its management style. Coding = NR

1. Relationship to the Environment
Since the onset of community policing, the APD’s outside relationships have changed in several ways. One of the most obvious differences is in the political system, where the once-contentious relationship with Whalen has given way to a more friendly rapport with Jennings. This is particularly true at the highest levels of management. “I have an open door with the Mayor,” Tuffey maintains. “We have a very good relationship, both personal and professional. And if I need something, he knows that when I go to him, it’s a worthwhile program and it’s going to benefit everybody.” Indeed, some department members feel that the relationship is too close—sentiments that had their peak when Tuffey was first appointed as Chief. Jennings insists that he does not micromanage the department, and Tuffey concurs that the mayor “doesn’t interfere if I let him know what’s going on.” Nevertheless, other local observers disagree, with one going so far as to put it this way: “[The Chief] is very beholden to the Mayor. If the Mayor wants the guys on this side of the city to wear green shirts today, they’re going to do it.” Indeed, many department members do believe that political leaders have great influence over the APD, and they feel that top management is more likely to respond to political interests than their own. But they do not believe that is anything new in the city, and Jennings received the police union’s endorsement for re-election amidst his opponent’s support for a civilian review board. Coding = DPO&OS/T

The one area where political leaders have lost some influence in the APD—though this change is more a long-term trend than a community policing reform—is in the ward system, for today police seem more likely to handle local problems through neighborhood associations than committeemen. Committeemen do still relay some citizen concerns to police. But a few APD managers have started asking them to have citizens contact police directly, and the ward system is no longer the only conduit between citizens and their government: At the citywide level, the Community Police Council has begun offering some policy advice to the APD (though some APD managers do not quite view its role in that way, seeing it instead as another forum for citizens to raise neighborhood problems); and at the local level, most city neighborhoods now host active neighborhood associations, while several business districts also have business associations. Both types of organization have contact at least with their community outreach officer. On the other hand, other officers do not reportedly attend NA meetings very often, and community activists rarely attend the department’s own sector meetings to discuss neighborhood problems. Moreover, a few NAs—particularly those in minority neighborhoods—are reportedly still critical of the APD, believing that officers are alternatively unresponsive and overbearing, and this position is shared by the local NAACP and a self-styled criminal justice watchdog group called the Center for Law and Justice (though both have also expressed support for the direction that the APD is going with community policing). Coding = C&R/M
Finally, interagency collaboration has made some strides in Albany, notably in the area of code enforcement, and there largely because of citywide efforts to streamline and put more resources into the process. (Most police, however, do not have a personal relationship with code enforcement employees, but they are satisfied with the paper system they use to refer potential code violations to other agencies.) These efforts, as well as the remaining opportunities for new interagency efforts, have been extensively described above.

2. Operations
As already described in detail, the APD’s community policing efforts have sought to reorganize and refocus the attention of the patrol force in several ways. Organizationally, most of the patrol force and even parts of the detective division now revolve around six-geographically defined sectors within which officers have quasi-permanent assignments. Substantively, officers have a new mandate to handle neighborhood problems proactively, and especially to enforce the low-level quality of life offenses that had previously been neglected in Albany. Many department members suggest that a large proportion of the patrol force has not fully accepted these new duties yet, and there are few examples of “problem-solving” in the city that do not focus directly on arresting or citing specific offenders. But the APD has always expected it would take at least a generation to gain complete acceptance of community policing, and in any case, special units like the 18-officer community outreach unit and the 5-officer directed patrol unit are reportedly more invested in community policing concepts—particularly the newfound emphasis on quality of life offenses.

3. Administrative Systems
The APD’s recent reforms have not involved many modifications to departmental administrative systems. There are a few exceptions: For example, the department has tried to improve its internal affairs system by making it more accessible to citizens and by creating a new system for handling less serious complaints, which are now collected centrally but handed to supervisors for investigation. (In the past these complaints were given to internal affairs, but many felt that it did not have the time to investigate them thoroughly.) But many administrative systems have remained the same over the past four years. For example, the department has made no major changes to its centralized budgeting, despite a general trend towards “decentralization”; and it has also made few changes to its recruitment, hiring, and training (though in-service training, which has always been programmed year-by-year, has evolved somewhat). Finally, although the city has begun talking with other County police agencies about sharing information, internal information systems are still fairly rudimentary—patrol officers do not have mobile data terminals in their cars, and few department members report using crime analysis to identify or monitor neighborhood problems. In this sense, administrative reform has not been a key component of community policing in Albany, which has focused most of its attention on the street.

4. Management
Management has undergone more substantial changes in Albany, especially at its upper levels. The department is still, like many police agencies, a mix of centralized and decentralized authority, and recent reforms have furthered both. On the one hand, community policing—and particularly the sector plan and the upcoming four-station plan—have put more stock in
department supervisors and Lieutenants. Under today’s sector system, Sergeants in particular have great responsibility, for it is largely through their leadership of the zone meetings that the department identifies neighborhood problems for officers to focus on; and they are increasingly expected to help officers get the problem-solving resources they need (such as contacts with other agencies or help from other units). Officers, moreover, have a new mandate to exercise discretion in choosing problems to focus on and crafting appropriate solutions—for example, they have been empowered to make contacts with other city agencies on their own. Coding = DPO&OS/M; MEI/M; C&R/M

On the other hand, the APD’s command staff reorganization has clearly consolidated authority in the highest reaches of management. The new watch Commander positions are the clearest example of growing centralization in the APD, for these managers have final say over all major decisions during their watch. But the new Assistant Chief positions, and the filling of the once-vacant Deputy Chief’s job, were also explicitly designed to consolidate authority in the Chief’s office over the various department divisions that had once had freer reign. This, of course, is not necessarily to criticize the APD, but simply to characterize its changes accurately—though it is also important to note that some APD members feel excluded from major departmental decisions. Coding = DPO&OS/B; MEI/B


2 Barely two months ago, the Albany County Democratic Committee reinforced this norm with a rebuke to erstwhile Mayoral candidate Jack McEneny (who had challenged incumbent and party favorite Jerry Jennings) by declining to endorse his re-election bid for the state assembly. “It’s no secret there’s a lot of discontent with McEneny for having run that primary against Jennings,” Committee Chairman Leonard Weiss told a reporter. “If you’re not loyal, it doesn’t matter how smart you are, or how experienced you are, or how rich you are. What good are you if you’re not loyal to a party? Party loyalty is the first requisite.” Lara Jakes. “Party Panel Declines to Endorse McEneny,” *Albany Times-Union*, May 5, 1998, p. B-1. Coding = NR

3 Deborah Gesensway. “Neighborhood Groups Carry Clout Quietly,” *Albany Times-Union*, December 6, 1987 , p. C-1. Harold Rubin, perhaps the central figure in the neighborhood association movement, suggests that Corning was not exactly antagonistic to the neighborhood associations, but he concedes that the Mayor was not enthusiastic about them. “Corning himself would address neighborhood associations,” Rubin remembers. “He didn’t oppose it or anything like that. But he didn’t view it as an asset—let’s put it that way. He viewed it like Castor Oil: You had to swallow it, but he wasn’t too supportive of it.” Coding = NR

5 Grondahl, *Mayor Erastus Corning*, p. 289. Coding = NR

6 Moreover, the APD has apparently not had a very high profile in the police professional community. To be sure, the department has for some time sent some managers and detectives to outside training and conferences (it spent $9,000 on such expenses in 1991, and by 1993 it was budgeting $15,000 for such expenses). But national practices did not necessarily take root in the city, which had a strong tradition of local control. For example, one APD supervisor reports earning a reprimand from the Deputy Chief for counseling an officer using the method he had recently learned in a state training school—through an interoffice memo addressed to the Chief. In Albany, the Deputy Chief explained to the young supervisor, things were done more informally. Coding = NR

7 There are even those who allege that the Democrats influenced jury lists, pointing to a 1960s study that found disproportionate representation of city residents, Democrats, and party workers on both trial and grand juries. See Robinson, *Machine Politics*, ch. 14. Coding = NR


12 On Jennings’s support among Corning loyalists (including a few who jokingly branded themselves as the “Corning Government in Exile”), see Carole DeMare. “Democratic Party Traditionalists Are Thrilled by Jennings’ Victory,” *Albany Times-Union*, September 19, 1993, p. C-3; Jay Jochnowitz, “Jennings Declares He’ll Run,” *Albany Times-Union*, May 27, 1993, p. B-1; and Jay Jochnowitz, “Jennings Watches His Options Flourish,” *Albany Times-Union*, March 15, 1992, p. A-1, which also discusses Jennings’s support among disaffected ward leaders, as well as early rumblings that Jennings would oppose Whalen. (Together with his confrontational stance as alderman, this early opposition likely garnered him support among those who disliked Whalen’s reforms.) Coding = NR
13 Off the record, one union member also suggested that an endorsement ran the risk of alienating the other candidate, who might ultimately end up as their boss. Jay Jochnowitz, “Police Decide against Endorsement,” Albany Times-Union, July 16, 1993, p. B-6. Coding = NR

14 The issue had also been placed on the agenda by a Whalen-initiated think tank called the Albany Civic Forum, which in late 1992 had been charged with identifying ways to improve the city’s quality of life. The Forum set up a public safety panel to focus on police, and union president James Tuffey joined then-Lieutenant Robert Grebert in discussing community policing with that panel. The panel formally endorsed community policing in December of 1993, making a few suggestions and cautions about the subject in its final report. Coding = NR


17 The reference is to James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. “Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows,” The Atlantic Monthly, March, 1982, pp. 29-38, which argues that when left unchecked, low-level “disorder” problems like aggressive panhandling can escalate to create more serious crime problems. Coding = NR


19 Sarah Metzgar. “Foot Patrol Returns to Albany,” Albany Times-Union, November 27, 1994, p. A-1. Other department members report that calls for service and past community requests were also taken into consideration in drawing the zone maps. Coding = NR

20 A later effort, in which the department sought to use Local Law Enforcement Block Grant money to start a major offender task force, collapsed because of the seniority issue: “What we were going to try to do with the block grant money [to] grab more pro-active cops and say, ‘Give us ten names of everyone who is going to cause the most trouble next summer in your neighborhood. And get on their case, see what we can do,’” Grebert explains. But the union would not approve of the proposal to select only those officers that management deemed “proactive,” insisting that the positions needed to be chosen by seniority. Without the discretion it felt it needed to make the program work, management abandoned the task force. Coding = NR

22 Mahoney, “Dale Resigns as Chief of Albany Police.” Coding = NR


24 At the time Tuffey told a reported essentially the same thing: “I am 1,000 percent loyal to the Mayor, both as a friend and as the Mayor,” Tuffey insisted. “Because when I’m sworn in, I will be working for him. In my opinion, if you work for somebody, you work for them. I will do nothing to embarrass him, nor will I let anyone else do anything to embarrass him.” Jochnowitz, “Hands-On Role Suits Tuffey.” Coding = NR


28 Jennings, for example, explained the need for non-unionized command staff positions by telling a newspaper reporter that “you can’t be answerable to two masters.” Jay Jochnowitz. “Just a Brief Fling for Jennings, Cops,” Albany Times-Union, July 21, 1995, p. B-5. Coding = NR

29 Another participant in the planning sessions simply did not believe that the reform would have this effect. “We felt that what was needed was an overall manager to manage that de-centralization. [We would still] put the proper responsibilities in those various precincts, . . . or the ownership as we talked about in community policing. But within those precincts, there are multiple functions that need to occur. And it was the functions that we were finding problems with, to have people work cohesively together. And that’s where the overall manager came in—not to detract from the de-centralization.” Coding = NR


31 Some department members also speculate that top management silenced union objections by handing out promotions to top union officials. Coding = NR

33 Jakes, “Politics and Police Don’t Mix.” Coding = NR

34 One announcement of the entire community policing effort, written by *Times-Union* reporter Sarah Metzgar, was titled simply “It’s Official: Albany Foot Cops Are Ready to Patrol City Streets,” *Albany Times-Union*, December 1, 1994, p. B-4. Coding = NR

35 The department has further plans to take advantages of new technologies for training (such as video training and computerized training) that allow for more scheduling flexibility. Coding = NR

36 Grebert does point to the importance of anecdotes and some ad hoc indicators in gauging the progress of reform. For example, he argues that one indicator of community policing’s acceptance is the presence of volunteers for the zone officer positions: “When you post an opening in one of these teams where a much busier sectors you just see tons of volunteers for it,” he explains. “A beat officer would move one and you’d fill his beat—tons of applicants for the position.” And with investigations, Grebert argues that it became clear when detectives became invested in community policing: “They’d get a big case in, and it would take them away from their team and you’d begin to hear things like, ‘Wait a minute. I’ve got these cases working in my neighborhood that I’ve got to deal with’ . . . You began to see the sense that they were buying into identifying with the neighborhoods.” Coding = NR


40 Jochnowitz, “Aldermen Hold Key to Arbor Hill Station.” Coding = NR

41 The station recently opened. Coding = NR


44 Tuffey also uses this logic to explain his resistance to call diversion schemes, explained in more detail below. He explains: “Mrs. Jones gets her bicycle stolen from her garage, and you call it in. I take a report on the phone, *click.* What’s going to happen to that report? It will get filed. The police officer working that area, are they going to know about that stolen bike? What if Harvey Smith who just committed a murder three doors away and we don’t know about the murder yet, walked down the street and stole that bicycle? He’s going to ride away on the bicycle into the sunset. I don’t even know about that murder but I do know Mrs. Jones saw a bicycle going down the street. If I never take that report, I never show up, I don’t know what’s going on in that area.”  Coding = NR

45 To be sure, some APD officers seem to see quality-of-life as an important issue in its own right, regardless of its link to serious crime. One explains: “I really believe you [should] take care of the small things: The open container on the corner; the group of kids with their boom boxes . . . ; the skateboarders, if they’re an annoyance and you’re getting calls from the community over this . . . You don’t tolerate that. You don’t tolerate people putting their trash out two days early in the summertime. Unacceptable. . . . That’s not chicken stuff. If you’re trying to go to sleep and you can’t sleep because some person is outside with a loud stereo, and it’s rattling your windows, you have the right to a night’s sleep even if you’re living in the city.”  Coding = NR

46 One statistic tends to support the police priorities explanation rather than 911: In 1995—the first full year of both 911 and the new community policing program—arrests climbed by 20%, while calls answered climbed only 3%. (Part I crimes fell by 9% over this period.) A third possible explanation is the growth in the patrol force, but filings per sworn officer rose by 20% from 1993 to 1997.  Coding = NR


49 Sarah Metzgar. “Albany to Deploy an Army to Fight Building Code Violations,” *Albany Times-Union*, December 13, 1994, p. B-1. Jennings simultaneously proposed to give police some power to enforce building and housing codes, but this proposal got a cooler reception, with some
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arguing that the work would divert police from more important duties. The proposal has recently re-emerged in the city. Coding = NR

50 Jay Jochnowitz. “Building Inspection by Firefighters Endorsed in Albany,” Albany Times-Union, July 27, 1994, p. B-3. A few city officials worried about potential ethical conflicts, since many firefighters worked as building contractors on the side. But the Fire Chief promised that he would guard against the potential for corruption, explaining that firefighters would not be allowed to solicit business. “They won’t be able to say, ‘You have an electrical problem. Here’s my card,” the Chief told a newspaper reporter at the time. See Metzgar, “Albany to Deploy an Army.” Coding = NR


53 Rubin, who became an NRC board member in 1976, explains this philosophy and the steps he and NRC did take as follows: “Other organizations like NYPIRG tried to come in and organize neighborhoods. We don’t believe in that: You don’t organize from the outside, you organize from the inside. And when we get a call from people who want to form a neighborhood association, we say, ‘Fine. We’ll give you the publication of how to organize an NA; if you want copies of bylaws, contact NRC, they have copies of the various neighborhood association bylaws. If you want a speaker, we’ll send you a speaker.’ I spoke at early meetings of forming the New Scotland Whitehall NA . . . I spoke to a whole variety of groups about how you go about forming an association, [and] how do you keep it going. And answering questions. Because people don’t know. ‘What are your boundaries?’ ‘Do you have dues?’ ‘Who can be a member? Is it the husband and wife? Do the kids become members?’ ‘How do you decide on the boundaries?’ ‘Should you be incorporated or not?’ ‘How often do you meet? Do you meet on a monthly basis? Do you have a board which runs the organization between meetings, or is every meeting a public meeting?’ ‘How do you communicate with the people?’ These are all the sorts of questions which we can talk about, because we have dealt with them over the years . . . . We don’t tell them what to do. What we do is tell them the alternatives, and they have to decide what’s best for their own area. And we still get these sorts of calls.” Coding = NR

54 Rubin offers this anecdote as an example, “to this day, I get calls from people for service. I got a call the other day from a guy who lives in a suburban community who owns a house around the block . . . for investment purposes. The house next to his has five units where they play loud music at all hours. The person who owns that building lives in Florida. There’s a manager in the building who has an apartment rent-free to run the building, but he can’t evict tenants. The suburban owner asked for my help. And what I did was speak to our community policeman. I
gave him my caller’s name and all the information I had, and he is going to follow through with it. I get these calls all the time.”  Coding = NR

55 At the beginning, at least, this disinterested posture acted very concretely as a survival tactic. Rubin remembers: “In the early days, [at] every meeting we had of the Center Square Association, we just assumed that somebody there was a mole reporting to . . . the party people. But again, the positions we took were governmental”—the implication being that they left as little as possible for the party to be concerned about. In any case, Rubin insists that he never knew of any attempt to punish him personally for his activism. “All those years, as far as I know—my name and picture appeared in the paper quite often—no one in the State [where Rubin worked] ever told me to slow down or do this or do that. Never once.” In any case, Rubin held a civil service position that made him relatively invulnerable.  Coding = NR

56 For the record, Tuffey insists that this influence is entirely proper: “I have to tell you this, I’ve never in three years here, I have never had a Ward Leader, alderperson, [or] any political person, call me up and ask me to do anything out of the ordinary—ever ask me to promote somebody, transfer somebody, hire somebody. Absolutely not, no. . . . Because you know what I’d tell them? They know what I’d tell them. . . . I mean, they’ll call you up and say, ‘Look, they have a traffic problem here.’ But that’s part of their job . . . That’s done by everybody—that’s not just done by political people. I get letters from citizens all the time, “Can you put a stop sign at the end of my street?” I might get that from an alderperson, but that’s. . . . nothing out of the ordinary. And it won’t be a demand; it will be a request: ‘Would you look into this and see if it’s possible?’ Some times it is and sometimes [it isn’t]. And if it’s not possible, then we can’t do it.”  Coding = NR

57 Deborah Gesensway. “Neighborhood Groups Carry Clout Quietly,” Albany Times-Union, December 6, 1987, p. C-1. Another community activist explains more fully what the “childlike” relationship entails: “In this town, . . . traditionally people have done what they were told. There weren’t too many voices of rebellion or even at a lower level than that—[of] dissent.”  Coding = NR

58 Jay Jochnowitz. “Crime Bill Means $8.5M for Albany, Jennings Says,” Albany Times-Union, September 15, 1994, p. B-4. In theory, the 14 PHS officers plus a net total of 11 officers hired separately on city money would bring the APD from its Whalen-era authorized strength of 320 sworn officers up to a total of 345, which is what Jennings budgeted after taking office. Attrition in both the existing force and the recruit classes, of course, meant that the total would never reach that figure, and by 1995 sworn strength was hovering around 330 officers (just as under Whalen, the actual total had hovered around 300 rather than the authorized figure of 320).  Coding = NR

60 Two years later, Grebert would comment to a newspaper reporter that the city had been particularly concerned about picking up the cost of these officers when the grant expired. See Carol DeMare. “Strings Attached to Albany’s Police Grant,” *Albany Times-Union*, June 17, 1997, p. B-1. Coding = NR

61 Jennings and budget director Chris Hearley are paraphrased to that effect in Jay Jochnowitz. “Albany May Reject $1M Grant for 14 Cops,” *Albany Times-Union*, December 19, 1996, p. B-1, in which Jenning also explains “my initial thoughts were, it wasn’t for new cops.” Coding = NR


63 Asked why the department chose to target MORE money for these uses rather than technology, Tuffey explains that the department intends to pursue its computerization efforts—notably putting laptop computers in patrol cars, which currently do not have MDTs—as part of a regionalization effort, which will allow it to share costs with other agencies. In any case, he insists that the department is not yet ready for a massive drive to computerize patrol cars because it is only now testing out the technology on a small scale. “I wouldn’t buy fifty of them right now until I make sure the technology is working properly.” the Chief explains. “I’m sure there are going to be other grants down the road for those. I would rather do that and spend the money right now on implementing the quality of life [efforts],” a reference to the overtime grants targeted for Albany troubleshoots that are described below. Coding = NR

64 Both grants also included a small amount for related equipment, such as four personal computers that the booking clerks would use. Coding = NR


66 Budgeted expenses for training and conferences have actually fallen dramatically in recent years, from $15,000 in 1993 to $5,000 in 1997. Most training, of course, is handled at no budgeted cost by the department’s own administrative services division, and that division had not added personnel for three years after community policing’s debut. But in commenting on this draft, one department member points out that since the time of my visit, the APD has beefed-up staffing not just for training but also for information systems in order to improve its administrative systems. Coding = NR
B. Tabulation of Occurrences

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References


U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice, Community


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  ▪ Northern Virginia Center Advisory Board Member 1998 - 2000
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  ▪ Co-designed and co-taught "Advanced Topics in Public Organizations: Organizing and Implementing Civil Society: Practices, Possibilities, and Theories"
  ▪ Teaching Public Administration Conference/Spring 1997: Panel Participant – "Ph.D. Student Expectations of Public Administration Teachers"
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  ▪ The George Washington University Career Development Tuition Scholarship 1993
  ▪ Bryce Harlow Foundation Scholar 1991/92 and 1992/93
  ▪ LEADER Foundation Mid-Career Scholarship 1991

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• “Building Stronger Communities – 2001/2002 Annual Report,” United Way Community Services, Detroit, MI
• Hall, T. S. (2001, July 30). Local Comment: Racial divide isn’t as big as you might think; Still, some seem invested in tension. Detroit Free Press, p. 9A.
WORKSHOPS, SEMINARS, AND SPEECHES

- Over 100 given since 1985
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  - The George Washington University
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    - Public Service Academy
    - Public Administration Alumni Advisory Council
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- Possesses over 20 years of federal, state and local legislative, executive/regulatory, nonprofit, public policy and communications experience
- Responsible for overall direction, coordination, and control of external affairs for nationally renowned nonprofit with $38M annual operating budget, including responsibility for: raising $16+million annually from government discretionary and competitive grants and contracts; marketing and communications; and volunteer and community outreach services
- 7+ years of corporate, public administration, and nonprofit managerial and organizational development consulting experience, including the design of senior management skills development certification programs for the District of Columbia, transformation management strategies, and diversity/cultural training
- Has met and exceeded high performance standards in a wide variety of progressively responsible professional and community leadership positions
- An accomplished public and motivational speaker, having created and delivered courses, lectures, seminars and workshops on subjects including public/nonprofit management and leadership, government relations, civil society, career planning and search, networking, listening skills, team building, mentoring and others
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  -- Reform Initiative Project Reviewer,
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• VaTech Center for Public Administration & Policy, Falls Church, VA 1995-1998

Capitol Associates, Inc., Legislative Director, Washington, DC  
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U.S. Dept. of Agriculture - Federal Crop Insurance Corporation  
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U.S. Agency for International Development  
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Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell  
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• Fountains Condominium Association (316 units), Board of Directors 1990-1993
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