A Comparative Analysis of Islamist Movements in the Neoliberalization Process: Jama’at-e- Islami in Pakistan and the Fethullah Gulen Movement in Turkey – Reactions to Capitalism, Modernity and Secularism

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ABSTRACT

In my research, I will attempt to examine the way in which Neoliberal Capitalist Globalization and economic conditions in the marketplace have shaped and continue to shape the assessment by Islamic groups of modernity, secularism and their place within it as a mutually constitutive process. I will conduct this analysis utilizing two country case studies: that of Turkey and Pakistan, each within the context of the theoretical frameworks of Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim and their study of the impact of religious ideas upon economic structures.

In the last 30 years, from the start of market Neoliberalism, the political economy has shaped religious ideas in Muslim-populated regions as a result of privatization, deregulation of the market and urbanization. I found this process similar to that of the industrialization and emergence of modern capitalism in the beginning of 19th century Europe, which produced rapid urbanization. This, in turn, created a different lifestyle, family structure and (most importantly) produced a unique and secularized individual that was and is a product of modernity. The process can also be described as a departure from tradition and God. Economic transformations of this period restructured the concept of social and politics. The politics of God have been replaced by the politics of economy.
On the other side, neoliberal economic policies have instigated a desecularization process within Muslim-populated countries.

In Turkey, privatization and deregulation of the market have actually helped Muslims and Political Islam to move upward in the social stratification ladder and the result is the emergence of an Islamic-oriented middle class. The Gulen movement in Turkey is one of the best examples of this process.

In Pakistan, the Jama’at-e-Islami has been a key player in the political and social sphere and has been supported by the middle class since the country was established in 1947. However, the polarization of Pakistani politics has weakened Jama’at and has consequently led to the formation of even more religious groups and movements. Both countries have in common similar social, political and economic characteristics and the desecularization process is taking place rapidly.

In my research, I will compare the Fethullah Gulen Movement and the Jama’at in the context of the strengthening Neoliberalist economic process, and will look at how and why economic policies have created and led to a desecularization of the social and political spheres, unlike the case of 19th century Europe. According to this research, desecularization in Muslim populated societies is a temporal process, which represents the larger social and political patterns of transformation that have been fueled by the market economy. Although we do witness an increasing trend of Islamization in Pakistan and Turkey, these movements will in time become weakened and absorbed by new market conditions. In the Turkish case, the Gulen Movement has already been integrated into the market economy and should be understood as a market
oriented movement rather than an Islamic-based Nurcu movement. This is because in the Gulen Movement, establishing an Islamic order is not the primary objective, but the movement instead seeks political power as well as economic prosperity. I therefore describe the Gulen Movement as an ‘Islamic movement without Islam.’ On the other hand, The Jama’at in Pakistan represents a persisting form of classical Islam, which conflicts with and directly opposes the market conditions. However, powerful economic forces have transformed the Jama’at-e-Islami of Pakistan from a classical form of Islam to a more reactionary form of Islam. I argue that both the Gulen Movement in Turkey and the Jama’at in Pakistan will be domesticated by powerful market forces; however, this change will occur over the longer term. In this global era, there will continue to be less space for traditional community, and instead, market-based-individualism will play a dominant role in social relations. I contend that Islam will not be able to escape from this domestication process.
Dedication

I am dedicating this research to the children who have been killed and murdered by the military machine in Afghanistan and Iraq. My belief is expressed best within the well-known verse “Call not those who are slain in the way of Allah ‘dead.’ Nay, they are living, only ye perceive not.” (154) Al-Baqara, The Qur’an.
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The rule of man over man is exploitation; submission to Allah the creator is the only way to emancipation.
A slogan by Islami Jamiat-i Tulabah

Those who do not rule in accordance with God’s revelations are the disbelievers.
Al-Maeda (44) The Qur’an

The chief characteristic of the Islamic Concept of Life is that it does not admit a conflict, nay, not even a significant separation between life-spiritual and life-mundane. It does not confine itself merely in purifying the spiritual and the moral life of man in the limited sense of the word. Its domain extends to the entire gamut of life. It wants to mould individual life as well as the social order in healthy patterns, so that the Kingdom of God may really be established on the earth and so that peace, contentment and well-being may fill the world as waters fill the oceans. The Islamic Way of Life is based on this unique approach to life and a peculiar concept of man’s place in the Universe.

~ Mawdudi, The Islamic Way of Life

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

~ Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Today, we witness rapid changes in society, politics and the economy as a result of technological innovations, urbanization, and the increased growth of education and the media as an overall trend. However, all of these changes have occurred within a different framework than the changes that took place a century ago in the industrialization era. This is because the scale of changes now taking place are at the global level; therefore, there is no escape from it, as described by Weber (Weber 1963). It is not accurately described as an iron cage either. These changes are best characterized as a revolution in human history, because they intend to create a new individual who is very different than those living in the pre-capitalist period. Today’s new individual is more work oriented, consumes more, produces more, is more educated, reads more and lives in the city. I will refer to this as a new stage in capitalism based on mass production and mass consumption.

In this new era, we also observe the emergence of some social and political concepts that have swept the globe, such as modernity, secularism, democracy, human rights, and freedom. According to pro-capitalist scholars such as Milton Friedman, Friedrich von Hayek, and Karl Popper, all of these concepts are related to or products of the capitalist system. I tend to agree with their observations; however, the system of capitalism also leads to unintended negative consequences for society, such as inequality, growth of the military machine, the atomic bomb, standardization and destruction of diversity, disciplinization, and rules and regulations in the name of the common good.

Today we have more bureaucratic political structures, we at least tend to be more rational, and society is more secular and modern than ever. We have departed from the
social space, or a mechanic solidarity where religion used to be a dominant institution, and are moving more towards an emphasis on an economically driven society. In this new society, mass-production and mass consumption dominates every aspect of human life including relations between people. Unlike Peter Berger’s argument, I believe that we are now less religious and more economicus. In this context, Islam is the last world religion that has not been disciplined and secularized; therefore, I have analyzed the domestication of Islam through the neoliberal economic process.

1. Sociology of Islam and Muslim Societies

The historical transformation of Modernity in Muslim Societies reminds me of the very complex story of the Hagia Sophia, a church that was built between the years 532 and 537 in Istanbul, Turkey. For almost a thousand years, the Hagia Sophia had the largest church dome in the world. Until the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet conquered Istanbul in 1453 in the name of Allah and Islam, Hagia Sophia stood as a sacred place of worship for the Christian “World.” After Sultan Mehmet conquered Istanbul, he was named the Fatih, a title that was given to describe a conqueror by the religious Ulama in the Ottoman Empire. Fatih Sultan Mehmet transformed the Hagia Sophia from a church into a mosque, and Muslims used the Hagia Sophia as a mosque for almost 500 years. However, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the new Turkey, the first president, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, transformed the building into a museum.

In the modern world, what does this museum represent? Are museums related with an archaic and mystical past, or are they a product of modernity and an attempt by the modern world to capture and examine the past? What was the purpose of
transforming the building into a museum, which has been a touristic attraction in modern societies for over 70 years? Does religion belong to a museum, and should it be expected to become obsolete one day? These questions are all pertinent to the present study regarding the role of religion and its relationship with the capitalist economic system in a modern society.

In this research, the process by which a society becomes either more or less religious is examined in the context of two distinct but related concepts. The first concept is that of secularism and the secularism thesis, and the second is the concept of the domestication of religion. The premise of this dual focus is that the turn towards or away from religious observance in a society depends on whether the process of neoliberal and economic modernization was driven internally and organically from within a society, or imposed on a society from the outside. In cases where the driving force of modernity and neoliberal capitalism have been imposed on a traditional society by an external force or presence, the path to secularism may not be a direct one.

In order to understand the true role of religion in modern society, one must understand the impact of the economic system in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the modern world, the forces of the capitalist economic system have restructured the collective identity of religion, and confined religion to a place that exists as a direct link between the individual and God. This is referred to as the privatization of religion (Berger 1999). However, Islam, Christianity and Judaism should each be viewed as a way of life that enables individuals to regulate every aspect their daily lives, in the same way that capitalism does. This dynamic demonstrates a clash between two powerful actors, and both work to regulate a person’s daily life.
In this clash or competition, capitalism operates according to powerful elements, such as the division of labor, market conditions, bureaucracy, rationality, media, education, and urbanization. Each of these elements is an output or condition of modernity. Capitalism is able to gradually domesticate Islam and become the more powerful force, through increased interaction of individuals with the marketplace. Karl Polanyi describes the move towards a market society as “the great transformation” (Polanyi 2001).

In the Neoliberal era, capitalism shapes and encroaches on the daily lives of individuals, from their eating habits to prayers. Consequently, God is no longer in the church or mosque, but exists instead in the public and social space. Religion, or “God,” has stepped into and claimed its place in the market and is now regulated according to the norms of the marketplace. This has marked the beginning of the commodification of religion. In this context, the new interpretation of religion was a result of the clash between capitalism and religion. The original meaning and message of religion has been lost in the hands of the neoliberal individual, who now attempts to interpret it as it fits neatly within his daily life.

Modern forces of capitalism have created an individual who is a worker and works at least 8 to 10 hours a day, lives in a secular city (Cox 1965), has a nuclear family, and operates within a consumer society that – because of the Industrial Revolution – encourages excessive consumption that extends beyond the basic needs of citizens. This is what it means to live according to a modern way of life. Likewise, in this process, religion becomes a commodity. The modern individual has little time for praying or
attending church or mosque; therefore, his new religion is capitalism, which can be understood as a form of religion without a God.

My research examines the mutual impact of the economic model of neoliberalism on the trend of Islamic revivalism in two Muslim-populated nations, each within the context of modernity and secularism. This analysis covers the beginning of the 1980s to the present. Its objective is to review the way that global forces shape local conditions, and how this relationship is maintained. I seek to understand how local forces, such as Islamic parties or movements, become active players within the larger field of global neoliberal capitalism.

This study will apply the historical-comparative research approach to the examination of pro- versus anti-globalist responses to modernity in order to compare forms of secularism in social and political movements in Turkey and Pakistan. The historical-comparative perspective is able to facilitate the comparison of two very distinct social systems, and is also useful in providing an in-depth examination of long-term societal change – specifically, the rise of desecularization and pro- versus anti-globalist attitudes across different historical and cultural contexts.

In this research, secularism and modernity are treated as concepts that inevitably do interact with each other and cannot be separated from the major characteristics of societal development and the capitalist economic context in which they arise. If modernity is defined within the context of urbanization, individualization, education, rationalization, and industrialization, then one must understand its role in the minimization of traditional ways of life. In this sense, modernity is a product of the
economic conditions that characterize 19th century capitalism and global capitalism in the late 20th century.

This research is not based on an anthropological understanding of two geographically different societies, but instead attempts to examine the way that economic conditions shape and restructure the role of religion within society. This dynamic is examined through the lens of the sociological imagination and within two case studies; more specifically, within two social movements in their unique country context to illustrate. Therefore, the contribution of this research is very different than the focus provided within Clifford Geertz’s anthropological work *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (Geertz 1968). Furthermore, this study will incorporate a cultural understanding of Islam in two different societies, and the cultural perceptions of Islam embedded in their socio-political and economic conditions. The approach taken by this study seeks to avoid using an orientalist approach (Said 1994) to its understanding of Islam and Muslim-populated countries.

This research has greatly benefited from Ernest Gellner’s work (Gellner 1981) on Muslim Society. In his book, Gellner questions the collective Muslim identity, which is understood to be embedded within the framework of Islam. According to Gellner, there is no clear definition of the collective Muslim identity. Therefore, a single Muslim society does not actually exist; instead there are multiple identities among Muslims based on their interaction with and understanding of Islam (Zubaida 1995).

According to many Islamists in the twentieth century, however, the Muslim collective identity and Islamic political tradition are being threatened by economic globalization. Therefore, the Muslim collective identity, or the Ummah, must be re-
established in the mind of the Muslims. Many political Islamists view Islam as an alternative to Western Capitalism and modernity. However, in her well-known works on Islam and Capitalism, and Islam and Marxism, (Rodinson 2007) Rodinson explores the compatibility between Islam and the capitalist and Marxist economic systems and disagrees with this perspective. According to Rodinson, Islam is inherently compatible with capitalism. In relation to Rodinson’s work, this study also looks at the place of religion within Muslim societies.

David Harvey’s book *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Harvey 2005), is relevant and has also been explored within this research, regarding the ability to understand how Islamist movements have reacted to market conditions. Islam has been understood as the sword of Allah, which means that Islam is understood to bring social justice for all to a society, whereas neoliberalism, or new market conditions, should be viewed as a mechanism of the domestication of religion within the global age. Harvey’s historical explanation of neoliberalism shows us that this domestication and disciplinization takes place globally and is not limited to one specific geographic location. Neoliberal Capitalism does not leave any space for other economic, social and political systems (including religion) to co-exist. This powerful phenomenon demonstrates the invisible hand of new market conditions.

In addition to these important scholarly works and concepts, I have also drawn on my previous experience as a journalist in Washington, D.C. to provide context and understanding of the complex relationship that exists between the economy and politics. The IMF and the World Bank, for instance, should not be considered independent from the Beltway Politics of Washington. These institutions and their economic policies breed
social, political and economic problems in developing countries, such as inequality, the exploitation of labor, corruption, environmental damage, and chaotic urbanization. These powerful institutions and their neocolonialist interests impose on and shape the economic structure of the developing countries. In Muslim-populated societies in particular, we see the rise of Islamic activism as one of the most important responses to the problems created by Neoliberalism.

2. The Market: The Engine of Transformation

The expansion of globalization and global capitalism shapes and restructures the position of Islam in Turkey and Pakistan today. While in this context, the Islamization of society and desecularization in these countries is a consequence of the new economic conditions in the marketplace. This is not always the case. For example, although in 19th century Europe, industrialization and the emergence of capitalism triggered the process of secularization and led to the formation of the “secular urban individual,” the reverse is sometimes true in Muslim-populated societies. Although global capitalism may ultimately promote secularism in these societies, their adaptation of neoliberal economic policies tends to result initially in the formation of more intense Islamic devotion, not less – a basis of collective identity with which to resist Western neoliberal intrusions – particularly in the case of new urban migrants in Turkey and Pakistan. This research shows how economic processes shape and restructure the role of religion in contemporary Muslim societies, similar to what happened in 18th, 19th and 20th century Europe.

After the 1950s, the capitalist economy began to shift to a more globalized economic structure, which has also created its own social and political hegemony. This stage of capitalism is significantly different than (and more complex and multifaceted
than) the Weberian, Marxist and Durkheimian understanding of early capitalism. This new stage is called Neoliberalism and has its own social and political dynamics.

Neoliberalism is not just an economic-based hegemonic mechanism of control; it also exists as a social and political order, and its policies are carried out and imposed on the developing world by states acting in the interests of a capitalist class. This is what I will refer to as a new form of capitalist globalization. This globalization causes deregulation, privatization and the withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision. These are the central themes of the neoliberalization period.

According to David Harvey, a revolutionary turning-point in the world’s social and economic history took place during the period 1978-80 (Harvey 2005). This new economic transformation was called Neoliberal Capitalist Globalization and has resulted in the new international division of labor. This division of labor, rapid urbanization, and the increase in the level of education, has also led to the creation of more market-oriented democracies in developing nations and countries, specifically in Muslim-populated societies.

Market oriented democracy has a different meaning and certainly different characteristics and dynamics than the original meaning of democracy. The concept of democracy in its original form should refer to the ability of a state to provide social and economic equality among classes and citizens.

The secularization thesis, first proposed by theorists such as Peter Berger, suggests that secularism is the inevitable end result of a society’s process of modernization. It is the idea that modernization, bureaucracy, rationalization and urbanization are expected to contribute to directly diminishing the role of religion in the
social and political spaces. However, contrary to this expectation, over the last thirty years, religion has returned to a prominent position in social and public life, particularly within Muslim-populated countries. According to classical theorists such as Marx, Weber and Durkheim, as societies and neoliberal economics advance, religion is expected to be confined to the private lives of individuals, or what Jose Casanova has referred to as the “privatization of religion” (Casanova 1994). The theory of secularization suggests that the secular would inevitably replace the sacred society. According to Norris and Inglehart, “during the last decade, however, this thesis of the slow and steady death of religion has come under growing criticism; indeed, secularization theory is currently experiencing the most sustained challenge in its long history” (Inglehart 2004). The present study examines some of the factors that are leading to a temporal process of the resurgence of religious observance, in contrast to the theory of secularization and the idea that religion would inevitably decline.

3. Modernity and its Challenges

Modernity has brought with it a chain reaction of events within different socio-political settings worldwide. In Europe, it led to the secularization of society. The response within Muslim-populated societies, however, has been different and therefore to many theorists, unexpected. Modernity in this context has led to a widespread trend of religious revivalism. This has taken place as a direct reaction to modernity, which has been imposed on traditional societies by external actors and influences, and in reaction to Western Capitalism and its destructive impacts as experienced by local and traditional communities. Today, as a result of the trend of religious revivalism, particularly in Muslim-populated societies, secularization theory needs to be updated to respond to
evidence that suggests that there is no one direct path to secularism. Along this line of inquiry, this research explores the root causes of religious revivalism and how this trend fits or does not fit in relation to existing theories of secularization.

If the theory of secularization is accurate, then why are we faced with religious revivalism today? In the 19th century, economic transformation had the effect of readjusting the role of religion within social and political spaces. We know that neoliberal economic globalization today is the main proponent of political and social change, and that the role of religion in Muslim-populated societies is modified by the neoliberal economic transformation. It is important to understand both the patterns and characteristics of this new trend, as well as some of the potential ramifications within Muslim-populated countries. The ultimate condition of a society that has become modernized may still be secularism; however, the path to reach the secular society may not be direct or immediate and includes many mediating factors and influences.

When the economic transformation brought about by the emergence of capitalism in the 19th century took place, the dynamics and relationship of society and politics was readjusted by this new mode of production, and the sacred and the secular became involved in a constant struggle. According to the earlier works of Peter Berger (Berger 1999), modern societies in general are more religious today than in the past. This idea does not support the premise that the secularization of modern societies is inevitable. It is important to understand how this religious revivalism or return to God has been influenced by new market conditions. However, this is only one side of the equation, and religious thought in turn also shapes economic activities, an example being the emergence of the Islamic financial system and non-interest banking. This system of non-
interest banking shows that Islam, and by extension social movements more broadly, are also adapting to and re-shaping economic structures according to their own terms as an ongoing, constitutive process.

Secularism is an important component of modernity and a by-product of capitalism and neoliberalism, the newest stage of modern capitalism. These concepts are inextricably connected to one another. Modernity is facilitated by new modes of production, and this has resulted in new lifestyles in cities, mass-consumption and production, the emergence of selfish-individualism above social solidarity, routinization and discipline, and (most importantly for the purpose of this paper) has transformed political power structures from religion-based empires into secular states in which God does not play any role.

Today these new forms of social life and organization have also produced by-products in countries such as Pakistan and Turkey. Both countries are faced with an unexpected process of de-secularization, with Islam playing a growing role in the political and social arena. In part this can be understood from the statement by Samuel Huntington that, “while Asians became increasingly assertive as a result of economic development, Muslims in massive numbers were simultaneously turning toward Islam as a source of identity, meaning, stability, legitimacy, development, power, and hope, hope epitomized in the slogan ‘Islam is the solution’” (Huntington 1993). It appears that the more Pakistan and Turkey have adopted and continue to adapt to neoliberal economic policies, the more they have experienced a parallel trend of Islamic revivalism and a pattern of de-secularization predominates.
As we are beginning to understand, unlike the case of European modernization and the trend toward the secularized and modern man, the neoliberal economy in Muslim-populated countries has instead led to the rise of more religious social structures. These conditions influence each other, specifically from the period marking the beginning of Neoliberal Capitalist Globalization within two Muslim-populated countries. The relatively modern and secular Turkey is used in juxtaposition with more traditional and less secular Pakistan. In this context, the differences and similarities in the patterns of desecularization are examined with reference to popular and powerful social movements in Turkey and Pakistan.

In particular, two social movement case studies will be used: the Jama’at-e-Islami in Pakistan and the Fethullah Gulen Movement in Turkey. The two countries have important similarities in their state structure, the economy, society, urbanization, and the role of the military. However, they also have important differences with regards to the role of religion and the secular orientation of the state and society, in addition to very different historical experiences with colonialism. The two countries are also significantly different with regards to national and local-tribal identities. These differences and similarities have impacted the character of the social movements that have arisen in these two countries in the neoliberal era.

Although the Fethullah Gulen movement and Jama’at have responded to and benefited from neoliberal market conditions differently; the process of Islamization in these nations is similar. This differences and similarities in the positions of these two social movements towards modernity and secularism is examined in this research, as well
as the relationship between global forces of capitalism and the response by regional local social movements.

In summary, this study examines the response of the Jama’at and the Gulen movements to the process of Neoliberalism, and seeks to develop an understanding of the historical trajectories of these movements within their historical and socio-political context. There is no single source of existing research that compares these two countries and movements in terms of new market conditions; however, this research will build on earlier studies that cover salient components of each of these issues, such as the work of Max Weber (Weber 1996), Maxime Rodinson (Rodinson 2007), Owen Chadwick (Chadwick 2000), Jack Goody (Goody 2004), Peter Berger (Berger 1967), Ernest Gellner (Gellner 1981), Jose Casanova (Casanova 1994), Bryan Turner (Turner 1974) and Vali Nasr (Nasr 1994).

The unique contribution of this work is to explain the relationship between religion and capitalism as it has played out among Turkey’s Fethullah Gulen and Pakistan’s Jama’at-e Islami, and to examine the relationship between religion and capitalism more realistically than the simplistic predominant theories of secularization. This study thus fulfills two objectives. It re-evaluates theories of secularization and modernity in Muslim societies in the neoliberal era, and secondly, provides a comparative analysis of the transformation of the Fethullah Gulen Movement and Jama’at-e Islami over the last 30 years in the context of capitalist neoliberal market forces. In the next section, I will review the Jama’at and Fethullah Gulen movements as case studies in their unique historical context, each in relation to the concept of modernity and secularism.

Fethullah Gulen, the founder and a leader (Hocaefendi) of the Gulen movement (Cemaat-Community), is one of the most controversial Islamic figures in Modern Turkish history. Although the ideology of the movement used to be a direct continuation of Said-i Nursi and Islam, the success of the Gulen community is a direct consequence of the impact of neoliberalism and privatization in Turkey. Consequently, the Gulen movement has transformed from its original status as a small and strict community based on Said-i Nursi’s understanding of Islam into a global brotherhood and network based on common social, political and economic interests among the socially conservative and newly urbanized masses.

Islam was the central focus and framework of the Gulen movement; however, the movement’s actions of engaging with the neoliberal economy after the mid-1980s (by opening financial institutions, schools, TV stations, newspapers, magazines, and export and import trading companies) pushed the Cemaat towards the market. However, through this engagement with the market, the movement’s slogans, symbols, characteristics and structure began to change, and caused it to adapt to and use concepts related with the neoliberal economy, such as democracy, freedom of speech, human rights, and pluralism. According to Hakan Yavuz, the Cemaat has also become more intolerant towards other political, religious and social groups and now seeks economic power and a greater share of the market (Tavernisa 2008). This transformation can be described as a neoliberal version of Islam without the underlying principles of Islam. As the movement began to invest and operate within the market, it also began to adapt its principles and actions to
the imperatives of the market economy, and in so doing, became less religious and more political.

Today, the Cemaat operates within a complex and multifaceted structure. Yavuz describes the movement as possessing three layers: the businessmen, journalists and teachers and students (Yavuz 2003). The movement has a hierarchical structure, and aside from the Gulen leadership (Hocaefendi), only a small group of decision makers of the Gulen community have played an important role in its development after Fethullah Gulen himself moved to the U.S. in 1997. Even after leaving Turkey, however, Fethullah Gulen maintained control of the movement and its operations, and does so to the present day.

The community has established schools globally in locations from Kenya to Kazakhstan and businesses from the U.S. to China, and has organized Christian and Muslim dialogue forums from London to Washington. It has also arranged conferences and panels from Cambridge University in the UK and Rice University and Georgetown University in the United States. Over the last two decades, the community has gained more financial power than any other single religious, social, political or economic group in Turkey. However, it is important to understand what the movement actually wants. It is unclear how they have become so powerful that they are able to operate in more than 40 countries. For instance, is the Cemaat really a religious group or is it a network community that exists in order to facilitate additional benefits for its members from the marketplace? It is also unclear whether the Gulen community is a modernity friendly movement or whether it is instead seeking power, authority and legitimacy within Turkish society.
Whether the Fethullah Gulen movement supports modern science and education or not, the Cemaat’s contribution to the educational system is undeniable. However, the movement has not been studied objectively in an academic context as much as it should be. The Cemaat is a unique and controversial Islamic movement because of its unusual engagement with the economy and ability to benefit from the capitalist economic system, despite its otherwise traditional Islamic underpinning and perspective. As such, the Gulen movement was able to revolutionize the relationship between Islam and the economy in Turkey and this should be of particular interest within the context of social movement theory, social theory and the political economy. This study attempts to address this gap.

5. Islamization of the State and Market: Jama’at

Jama’at-e-Islami of Pakistan is one of the most important and the first Islamic revivalist movements of the 20th century (Nasr 1994). Unlike the Gulen Movement, the Jama’at is a legitimate political party that challenges Western capitalism and modernity, and is a product of Political Islam in the Indian-subcontinent. The Jama’at should be understood within the framework of Islamic revivalism because the goal of the movement is to build a Muslim Ummah and to establish a globalized Muslim nation of believers devoid of any specific territoriality by promoting Pan-Islamic ideas. According to Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, one of the main founders of the Jama’at movement, Islam and politics cannot be separated, because Islam is a way of life. Moten defines the Jama’at as an ideological movement based on a Muslim brotherhood and the global network of Muslims (Moten 2002).

Mawdudi established the Jama’at in 1941 in Lahore; however, the history of the movement actually dates back to the late 19th century Islamic revivalism against British
colonialism in India. Later in the 20th century, Mawdudi’s understanding of Islam and the political ideology of Jama’at have played an important role in the politics of Islamic movements, from thinkers and activists in Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Algeria, Indonesia, Palestine and Malaysia. Nasr argues that religion without political action has no meaning and does not hold any direct consequences within Islam (Nasr 1994). It was this belief that had inspired Mawdudi to create and to use the Jama’at in order to pursue Pan-Islamic political objectives, thus creating alternative forms of politics for the Muslim Ummah.

The Jama’at’s organizational structure is more democratic than most political parties and movements. The leader of Jama’at is called the Ameer, or “leader” and the upper levels of its organizational structure consist of members of the middle and upper-middle class strata of society. By contrast, supporters of the Jama’at are usually from the lowest levels of the social stratification system in Pakistan. This has had important consequences in Pakistani politics in terms of the widening gap between the social classes as result of socio-economic inequality. The base of support of the Jama’at is so large due to the very large population of the poor in Pakistan.

6. Emergence of Class Structure in Muslim Societies

Neoliberal economic processes shape, influence, and restructure the opportunities and motivations of Islamic movements and parties. In this context we see the polarization of Islam, resulting from the mutually constitutive process that takes place between new economic conditions and religious groups. Under these new economic conditions, the understanding of modernity by Islamic movements has undergone a shift, from more traditional views to a set of market-based perspectives on Islam. However, in this process, Islam has also restructured and acted upon the market, as in the case of the
system of non-interest banking. In order to take this analysis to a greater level of detail, two divergent conceptions of Islam must be explored.

The first describes Muhammad as a “merchant,” represented within the Fethullah Gulen movement. From the beginning of Neoliberalism, the Gulen movement has been a beneficiary of this process through its ability to adapt to and find its place within changing economic conditions, and has therefore played the role of the pro-globalist movement. The “Merchant Muhammed” concept is modernity and market-friendly, and has arisen in response to Neoliberalism.

By contrast, the second conception of Muhammad is that of the “Meccan Muhammad,” or the idea that Muhammed can be described as a proponent of the social welfare state and is by definition opposed to Neoliberalism. The Jama’at movement in Pakistan more closely resembles this understanding of Islam. The Jama’at has opposed Neoliberalism and represents an expression of anti-globalist solidarity in the Islamic context; therefore, the movement symbolizes Islam as a social welfare state. Followers of the Gulen Movement are involved in and are able to benefit from the economic spoils of neoliberalist globalization, whereas the Jama’at represents the interests of more traditional elements of society and classical Islam within Pakistan. In both cases, religion is one manifestation of either opposition to or beneficiary from Neoliberalist Globalization.

Islam is currently undergoing a process of transformation in response to its interaction with neoliberalism, sometimes giving way to secularization much like Christianity did in Europe. In addition, although the Enlightenment and French Revolution played an important role in the transformation of Christianity, one of the
major components of this transformation emerged from the Industrial Revolution and the development of capitalism in the nineteenth century. However, we must understand why it is that neoliberalism in Muslim-populated countries has often resulted in an increase rather than a decrease in religious social and political activity and organization in Turkey and Pakistan, while the trajectory in Europe has been exactly the opposite.

The difference between Europe and the case studies of Turkey and Pakistan is that Europe experienced a significantly different path to economic development than did many Muslim-populated societies. The European path to economic development took place as part of an organic process, which was based on technology and mechanical inventions such as the steam engine and the use of colonialism to obtain scarce resources. In addition, while both the Gulen movement and the Jama’at are proponents of de-secularization, they both approach globalism and neoliberal economics differently. The Gulen movement benefits from the process and works within the system to promote its interests, while the Jama’at in Pakistan work in opposition to forces of globalization to promote its interests. Here again, this research seeks to understand the historical elements that have caused either a pro- or anti-globalist orientation over the last 30 years.

7. Research Question: Secularism and the Domestication of Islam

This study applies a historical-comparative research approach to the examination of pro-globalist and anti-globalist responses to modernity. This approach is used in order to compare forms of secularism within social and political movements in Turkey and Pakistan from the early 1980s to the present. This period marks the beginning of market Neoliberalism in the two countries. In using this approach, I examine why social arrangements have taken a certain trajectory in some societies but not in others. The
historical-comparative perspective is used as an effective means to compare two distinct social systems and to examine the elements that are common across societies and those that are unique. The approach also facilitates an in-depth examination of long-term societal change – specifically, the rise of de-secularization and pro-versus anti-globalist attitudes across different historical and cultural contexts.

Beyond the purely theological understanding, religion is also a form of tradition, which has been embedded in social, political and economic structures. Therefore, it challenges modernity and represents a more traditional way of life and a pre-modern and pre-capitalist time-period. According to Max Weber, religion, and more specifically Protestant Christianity, played an important role in shaping the spirit of capitalism and the work ethic (Weber 1996); however, the powerful economic structure of capitalism has cultivated and crystallized Protestantism and confined religion to the sphere of private life in Europe. In this context, the economy has been the engine of the modernization process, which has led to the decline of religion in public life. In his book *Public Religions in the Modern World*, secularization scholar and sociologist Jose Casanova refers to this process of the decline of religion in public life as the domestication or “privatization of religion” (Casanova 1994).

According to scholars of the secularization thesis, as a result of capitalist economic tendencies, the inevitable trajectory was that, “with the diffusion of modern life forms, including urbanization, industrialization, rationalization, and pluralization, the social relevance of religion and church would decrease, and religious worldviews would gradually be replaced by a scientific, rationalized, and secular interpretation of the world”
(Pollack and Olson 2008). For the last two decades, this assumption that secularization was inevitable has been under the critique of pro-religious and conservative scholars.

More recently, a prominent scholar and proponent of secularization theory, sociologist Peter Berger has changed his perspectives regarding the decline of religious belief and the privatization of religion in the modern world (Berger 1967). In his more recent book The Desecularization of the World, he confesses that, “my point is that the assumption that we live in a secularized world is false” (Berger 1999). Pollack and Olson also claim that “religion is back on the political agenda of western societies” (Pollack and Olson 2008). As such, Berger proposes that there may be a more complex path towards secularism or de-secularism than the more simplistic secularization thesis, and this path may include more factors that are able to shift an outcome in either direction.

Today, unlike the Weberian understanding of the relationship between religion and the economy, the neoliberal economy has fueled a trend of religious revivalism, specifically in Muslim-populated societies. Within his theory, Weber attempted to understand the way that religious ideas shape economic structures and vice versa. Similar to secularization theorists, he believed that the neoliberal economy would inevitably lead to an increasingly religious society. However, especially from the early 1980s, we have witnessed a trend of desecularization in the Islamic World.

Capitalism is an economic concept and ideology that first developed in the era of industrialization (Tucker 1978) and within the context of the expansion of Colonialism. It was developed and conceived not just as a hegemonic ideology but as a part of human development, and in opposition to religious hegemony in the late 18th and early 19th century Europe. New forms of economic transformation have become so powerful, not
just in the sense of restructuring the economic environment, but also in their ability to influence social and political ideals of the society and state. The transformation of economic, social and political aspects of Europe led to a new transformation in the process of the separation between the church and state. Religious structures had previously ruled and controlled the society, and state, but not in the modern sense, because the modern state is a product of capitalism in the context of complex bureaucracies (Gorski 2003).

Religion and the European Context

By way of overview of the economic, political and social transformation of European societies; this change began with mercantilism, a system that was based upon state control of trade and the economy between the 16th and 18th centuries. This took place within the embryonic stages of modern capitalism or Neoliberal Capitalist Globalization that we see today (which facilitates privatization, deregulation of the market, and promotion of polyarchy in the political sense), and the emergence of a global bourgeoisie. The economic revolution of mercantilism also created social and political ramifications in Europe, which led the way to modernization, industrialization and finally the system of modern capitalism based on mass production and mass consumption. One of the most complex processes within this emerging trend was the modernization of European societies and the economy as the main engine of change from traditional to modern social structures.

As an important turning point, in the year 1789 (when the French Revolution started), and partly as a result of mercantilism; critical thinking emerged towards and in opposition to the ruling class and the predominant religious structure. The French
Revolution was a political transformation that produced more rapid political change in these societies than ever before. A modern state appeared in the European political arena as a result of the French Revolution, and the Church began to lose its power over society and the newly emerging institution – the State. This transformation reconstructed and reshaped the social and political order within Europe; and the separation between Church and State and modern capitalist democracy was emerging. In this context, Secularism was born as a necessity of the new state order against the Church-dominated society, or what has been referred to as an empire. In regards to this new process, the State should have then become separate from the religious institutions, because the core ideas of this new and emerging power structure were based upon the economy and the class structure.

Another important stage in the development of capitalism in this era was the invention of the Watt steam engine in England at the same time as the French Revolution. However, this invention did not actually result in significant economic change until the early 19th century. It revolutionized the economy and a modern, secular, urban individual was formed in these new circumstances.

The division of labor also materialized within this economic transformation. In parallel, new actors appeared on the political scene in Europe that represented the beginning stages of the modern Nation-State, bureaucracy, rationalization (Gorski 2003) and secularism (Chadwick 2000). These actors played a crucial role in the development of the modern capitalist market. Traditional actors (such as the Church, clergy, peasants, serfs, lords and kings) had been replaced by new emerging actors of capitalist development (Kumar 1995). The process of rapid accumulation of wealth had eliminated or weakened many of the old structures of power, because the engine of this change was
this economic transformation, which was the emergent system of capitalism (Tucker 1978). There no longer existed a belief in the traditional religious dogma regarding the “absolute truth” of God. The departure from traditional societies and move toward assembly-based capitalist societies occurred in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. According to author Barrington Moore, this transformation was the revolutionary origin of capitalist democracy (Moore 1993).

The economic-based Industrial Revolution led European societies in a different direction. Rapid urbanization (Cox 1965; Simmel 1971), the emergence of the modern capitalist class structure, the increased disciplinization of labor (or the idea that capitalism tightly structures and disciplines the worker), individualization, and education were all at the center of these new changes. Unlike Weber’s argument regarding the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, in reality, the economy served to reshape the role of the Church and clergy in Europe; not the reverse. In this way, religion was effectively removed from public life and confined to the private lives of individuals as a result of the economic transformation. This process can be understood as the privatization of religion, and as a specific phase of modernity. As I will also argue, this process can also be described as the “domestication of religion” by capitalism.

In the pre-Capitalist period, the clergy were the representatives of religion, and due to the status ascribed to religion at this time, they were one of the most powerful actors. By contrast, in the Capitalist period, the bourgeoisie were the new representatives of the Capitalist class and its interests, and the new most powerful actors. In Muslim societies, with Neoliberalism and privatization, we have witnessed the emergence of a new class structure, which is more religious and conservative. Generally, this includes
representatives of the lower class strata of society in addition to the upwardly mobile lower and the middle classes. This stratum of society uses religion for the purpose of creating and maintaining social solidarity and networks. These networks, in turn, are used in order to obtain a greater share in the marketplace. However, once those in this social class or strata gains a foothold in the marketplace through the use of its religious and traditional networks, they begin to lose the religious foundation that brought them there. This is what I will refer to as the “domestication of religion.”

Without a doubt, the 19th century saw the creation of more rapid and chaotic transformation in Europe as a result of the Capitalist Revolution. In Europe, old style agrarian societies, multi-ethnic empires, and Church-dominated social structures were transformed into more industrialized and secular nation-states (Goody 2004). The 18th and 19th centuries witnessed the emergence of early capitalism mostly based on industrialization; however, no one can argue that Colonization did not play a role in this economic transformation. In his well-known book Social Origins of Dictatorships and Democracy, Barrington Moore argues that this process of industrialization in England culminated in the establishment of a relatively free society. The Church was eliminated from public and political life because the economy had become the main controlling mechanism within state transformation (Moore 1993). Economic life had taken the place of religious life in Europe as result of this new trend, and religion was confined to private life. Privatization, in the modern sense, began with the privatization of religion, or what is now called secularism.

With the establishment of the international financial organizations and the United Nations after World War II, another stage of capitalism began to emerge. This new phase
of capitalism appeared to be more global than ever, and it was then that the seeds of global capitalism of early 1980s Neoliberalism were sown.

8. Methodology

According to Larry Isaac (Isaac 1997) in his study *Transforming Localities: Reflections on Time, Causality and Narrative in Contemporary Historical Sociology*, the historical method is useful because “patterned social relations are produced, maintained and changed by social action deeply grounded in processes that are always historically based.” In order to understand the evolution of social processes, there first needs to be an understanding of the context in which they arose in terms of time, causality, and narrative; this is because social processes are dependent on the local time and place. Described by Sewell as “eventful time,” mutually constitutive processes create dynamics of social action and social structure that are “continuously occurring in and through time.” As part of this process, local events shape and are shaped by human processes and result in cycles of reproduction or change. Ronald Aminzade (Aminzade 1992) further expands on this idea with reference to the role of the temporal concepts of duration, pace, cycles, and the trajectory of events as important concepts within long-term historical studies. Pace and duration refer to the number of events in a period of time and the length of each event, and each factor contributes to the influence of the event. An event that takes place more frequently or for longer duration is likely to have greater impact.

For example, the fast pace of migration from rural villages in Turkey to urban centers is considered to be a contributing factor to the strength of social movements and their pro versus anti-globalist orientation. The concept of trajectory refers to the impact of a sequence of initial events and the related decisions to support these events create and
help determine future options and events. The focus is on the mechanisms that sustain movement along an existing trajectory versus those that lead to reversal or movement to alternative trajectories of events (Aminzade 1992). This relates closely to the concept of path dependence and the sensitivity to initial conditions in constraining available options for later events. Finally, this study examines historical cycles of social action and change within the context of social movement theory. For example, within a social movement, the temporal location or timing of an event within a cycle of protest will determine its likely consequences (Aminzade 1992). The related concepts of cycle, trajectory, pace and duration are also each be examined within the present historical-comparative analysis.

The issues examined herein include the political economy, privatization, deregulation of the market and urbanization, and the influence of these factors on differing outcomes of social and political organization within Muslim-populated countries. This approach has been selected in order to highlight the multiple historical and cultural contexts that have led to a change in social consciousness, and will avoid both economic determinism and structural functionalism. In order to effectively understand the factors that shape social and political organization and movements, the case study approach has been used; in particular the case of Pakistan and Turkey. In so doing, historical context, process and concrete historical details are examined, while simultaneously applying theoretical generalization.

The two country case-studies are based on a narrative analysis of qualitative data; both primary and secondary resources are used to this end. Comparative analysis is useful in its ability to facilitate a comparison of context across the two case studies, and qualitative data is applied in order to explore the conditions that have given rise to
differing forms of social organization. Secondary sources include articles and books about the Fethullah Gulen and the Jama’at movements, secondary websites and newspapers, in addition to primary resources such as interviews, the movements’ websites, speeches, newspapers, and magazines. Interviews and field research with members of the Fethullah Gulen and the Jama’at were conducted with approximately twenty-five people in Turkish and English, and historical records were collected with the assistance of academicians, politicians, political activists, and members of the movements. Interviews were also taken with journalists based in Turkey, Pakistan, and the United States. The narrative method of analysis organizes material chronologically, providing content within a coherent story and relational whole. This approach assumes that a relationship exists between time and events, and provides a focus on the sequential nature of events. The approach also assumes that past events and actions limit the menu of available future events and actions (Griffin 1993).

The independent variables include the extent of neoliberalism, privatization, and deregulation of the market by the IMF and the World Bank, the diminishing power of labor unions, and levels of economic development, industrialization and urbanization within the two country cases. The dependent variables are the reaction to modernity and secularism by the Fethullah Gulen and Jama’at movements. These variables are examined without the use of a fixed hypothesis and with non-linear contingent narrative style description and explanation of historical process, rather than with the use of causal reasoning (Isaac 1997). In his article From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism, Andrew Abbott describes this approach as the “merging the determinant and
contingent explanations in a fully historicized social science,” and as a move from conventional causality to process, events, and narrative (Abbot 1992).

An important aspect of this approach is that history and theory are applied simultaneously – specifically, the theories of Marx, Weber and Durkheim whose research also lie within the framework of historical-comparative analysis. Theory is thus presented as an outgrowth of historical analysis, and modernity, secularization, and social change theories are used as critical components of the analysis. Modernity theories are particularly useful because they arise within a specific context, as historically situated phenomena that shape events.

This study applies the methodology of path dependence to the Fetullah Gulen and Jama’at movements with respect to their assessment of and relationship to modernity and secularism. The approach, as described by James Mahoney (Mahoney 2000), is used to highlight the historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion specific chains of events with deterministic properties. For example, specific contingent and unpredictable events in Turkey have led to social movements that are relatively more open to secularization and modernity than comparable social movements in other countries. We witnessed the re-emergence of Islam with the democratization process in Turkey because of the forced modernization that had occurred within the early 1950s political transformation, between 1923 and 1946. This set in motion the series of events that followed. However, this has taken place not as a sequential process, but as a more reactive chain of events. In Pakistan, what has emerged is a reaction to contingent events that have produced self-reinforcing mechanisms of path dependence. Early contingent events determine the nature and structure of later events and this trend has been self-
reinforcing, creating a social structure that is more adverse to modernization and secularism. There are important differences between the two countries in their respective response structure to early events, and this dynamic has re-created and reinforced patterns that can be observed within the dynamics played out within their social movements.

Path dependence also fits within the overall framework of this analysis because contingent rather than causal reasoning is already the central mechanism of analysis. This is not by mistake; it is due to the author’s conviction that events in these two countries cannot be described as “event A led to event B, which led to event C.” Instead, very formative early events led to the formation of historical response-patterns to an initial event, and this can lead to the establishment of very different social structures. One component of the analysis of path dependence for Pakistan, for example, places critical importance in its early experience with colonialism and the patterns of reaction that were produced by this contingency. By contrast, in Turkey we see an early emphasis on secularism and modernity, which has set in place reactive historical sequences that have at times supported the trend towards secularism and at other times opposed it.

The central characteristics of path dependence apply to both case studies – early contingent events in Turkey and Pakistan, which set in motion institutional event chains, lead to path-dependent historical patterns. Furthermore, early events frequently matter much more than later events and their timing or sequence is therefore very important (Mahoney 2000). This principal is referred to by Quadagno and Knapp (Knapp 1992) as the principle of “sequentiality,” which is understood to mean that the timing of an event within a sequence of events determines how the event will occur. Secondly, early events are contingent and cannot be explained or predicted as anything more than a random or
happenstance occurrence with important consequences; for example, a natural disaster such as an earthquake or an unexpected invasion by another country. Thirdly, both case studies exhibit evidence that once a given historical process is set in motion, it produces reinforcing patterns of either reaction or replication, and therefore, a chain of events possesses inherent logic. In other words, a sequence of events will create mechanisms that reinforce and reproduce, or create reactive sequences to the initial institutional pattern. Other characteristics of the historical approach used herein are “choice points,” or the way that outcomes at a specific point are able to constrain or influence the available options at subsequent points in time (Deflem 2000; Skocpol 1984; Stinchcombe 1978). The use of choice points assumes a non-linear approach that allows us to explain turning points that are contingent upon and influenced by local events.

In summary, the three analytical approaches used in this study include path dependence, field research methods, and narrative analysis. Neither approach yields a single set of objective facts, but each accounts for the subjectivity of the researcher and examines a diverse set of data in order to provide an empathic understanding of events and people, and the history and cultural contexts in which they exist. Each approach uses grounded theory, in the sense that neither proposes a fixed hypothesis to either prove or disprove an idea, and concepts are defined and not proven at the start of the research. Instead, theory emerges and changes as part of the process of data collection and through its interaction with that data. Historical narrative and theory are constructed simultaneously and one does not exist independently of the other. As such, data collection and organization, theoretical organization and analysis of the data, and
historical construction are all inter-dependent elements of this analysis. Neither one of these approaches is mutually exclusive.

**Field Research Methods**

The Field Research interview method was selected because of the compatibility and symbiosis of this approach with historical-comparative analysis. Both the historical comparative analysis and the field research approach focus on action, process, and sequence, and see time and process. Field research is also used because both this and the historical-comparative approach combine generalization with theory and neither relies on fixed laws (Neuman 2003).

The investigator interviewed approximately 25 people based in the U.S., Turkey and Pakistan, over e-mail, Skype Internet connection and telephone, and face to face, in addition to several interviews that were conducted in-country in Turkey. The interviews were conducted in both the English and Turkish languages. The interview population included academicians, politicians, political activists, and members of the Fethullah Gulen, and the Jama’at movements. Specifically, the interviews were conducted with academicians including Deniz Tansi from Yeditepe University, Berna Turam from Northeastern University, Hakan Yavuz from University of Utah, Kemal Silay from Indiana University, and Husnul Amin from Institute of Social Studies in Netherlands. Interviews have been conducted with Nurettin Veren, a member of the Fetullah Gulen movement for over 30 years, and journalists and activists in Turkey, including Rusen Cakir, Adnan Akfirat, Mustafa Yildirim, Mehmet Pacaci, Hakan Tasci, and Ali Hasan Yurtsever.
Narrative Analysis

The narrative analysis approach is used in order to chronologically sequence events and describe the impact of past events on perceptions of present events and vice versa. As chronology is an important focus of this approach, it is also a lens through which the study attempts to understand the impact of present events on the future and the historical transformation that takes place. Narrative inquiry methods are used in order to obtain an understanding of subjects in their current historical context, and both structured and unstructured interviews are used to this end.

Path Dependence

The path-dependence approach is used due to the assumption of this study that events that have taken place in the past do play a role in influencing the menu of available options that take place in the present and future. For example, a specific set of events surrounding the beginning of neoliberalism in a given country will trigger the next set of events around the country’s and society’s ability to adapt to the new economic conditions. The model of path dependence is examined in conjunction with theories of modernity, secularization and social change because the existence of contingency cannot be established independent of theory (Isaac 1997). Furthermore, the author will examine path-dependence using both Power and Functional explanations of institutional reproduction.
CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN TURKEY

With its predominantly Muslim population, Turkey has travelled an interesting path towards modernization and secularism, and the Turkish State has certainly played an important and unique role in this process. The early republican elite perceived religion as something related with the past and tradition, and consequently attempted to eliminate or at least to minimize the role of Islam by controlling the state bureaucratic institutions. The objective of the elite has been for religion to play less of a role and to be privatized; however, the forced modernization partly failed when the Justice Development Party came to power by popular election in 2002. The Gulen movement stepped in at this stage, and became a more powerful actor by using the market economy. In this chapter, I will attempt to show how the interaction between religion, the state and society has been formed and sustained in modern Turkish history.

1. Emergence of a New State or the Continuation of an Empire?

In order to understand the current and likely future trends within Turkish society that influence the desecularization process, it is important to look at the historical transformation of social, political and economic structures following the establishment of the original Turkish Republic. Turkey was established through the ashes of the Ottoman Empire and was an inherently multi-ethnic society with a melting pot of religious identities that coexisted peacefully. However, in time, the Western-oriented republican elite had rejected the multi-ethnic and religious identity of the Ottoman Empire and attempted to build a new nation state and identity that rejected all of the traditional and religious values of the Ottoman Empire.
The identity of the new Turkish Republic was constructed based on a process of modernization and secularization, a process that followed the same trajectory as so many nation-states. Territoriality and citizenship played a critical role in the formation of the new state and its identity. On the other hand, the empire also naturally formed part of its identity based on a feeling of Islamic identity, or the Ummah, rather than based solely on national identity defined only in the context of the nation’s borders (Zurcher 2005). (“Ummah” is the Arabic word for the nation of Islam, and the Ummah extends to the Muslim population worldwide.)

At the time of the Ottoman Empire, Turks were the dominant ethnic group; however, other ethnic groups also expressed their identity within the religious structure of the Ummah. In the new era, however, the republican elite tried to eliminate other ethnic identities within a newly created and enforced notion of Turkishness based on territoriality and citizenship. The new Turkish national identity did not cover Christian minorities, even though identity was based first on territoriality and citizenship. This was because religion played an important role, parallel to that of nationality and citizenship. Consequently, the population of ethnic Christian minorities was a threat to the newly formed Turkish identity.

One of the weakest points, and what I will refer to as the “fabricated Turk identity,” was to be found in the interaction between Turkishness and the Christian minorities within the nation’s borders and the dilemma that it presented. For example, the Armenians in Turkey were not originally considered to possess a Turkish identity, because Turkishness was based on religious structures in addition to citizenship and territoriality. In fact, the Armenians in Turkey were described as the “others” and were
given no place within the new Turkish identity unless they agreed to convert to Islam. Therefore, these marginalized groups were ignored and rejected by society and by the elite, based on the fear that they would create too much instability for the new and fragile Turkish identity.

The Turkish Nationalist and Panturkist, Huseyin Nihal Atsiz, criticized the Turkish identity and the role of the elite in its formation in his famous once-banned books, *Night of The Sycophants* (Atsiz 1997), and in the book *Vitamin Z* (Atsiz 1992). Atsiz was a primordialist, and believed that “Turkishness” is inherited and so it cannot be constructed. This is the viewpoint that describes Turkishness as an organic identity. Accordingly, the Kurds are considered to be Kurds, Armenians are Armenians and Turks are Turks. According to Atsiz, you can be a citizen of Turkey but that does not itself make you a Turk. Kurdish nationalists hold a similar view regarding the formation of identity and believe strongly in the inherent ethnic underpinning of their Kurdish identity. Actually, the Kurdish and Atsiz’s viewpoints are similar to each other, both perceiving the process of identity formation to be anti-democratic and unscientific. Therefore, they harshly disapproved of the ideology of fabricated Turkishness, and the elite of Turkey punished them severely as a consequence.

According to newer conceptions of Turkish identity, “Turkishness” is based on citizenship and is territorially defined, rather than being based on any inherent identity. A similar process can be found in Iraq and Iran regarding assigned identities. The elite in Turkey have tried to eliminate non-Turkish ethnic groups, including the Kurds, in order to facilitate Turkish National Unity. According to one of the most important ideologues and a member of the Turkish elite, Bozkurt Guvenc, a professor at Hacettepe University,
the Turks are a mixed ethnic group of Anatolian descent without any intrinsic Turkishness (Guvenc 1995); and therefore, Turkishness is based on territorially and citizenship. In the context of this research, this is in fact understood to be the true nature of the Turkish nation-state and its elite.

The first challenge to the formation of the Turkish identity came from the Kurds and Islamists. The Kurds have reacted overwhelmingly and have asked to be recognized as Kurds and not as Turks, even though the new Turkish identity is based partly on citizenship. As a consequence, several Kurdish riots took place in the South East of Turkey between the years 1924 and 1938. Some of these riots had religious elements, more specifically during the Sheikh Said rebellion of 1924. According to Ugur Mumcu (Mumcu 1995), the Said Rebellion was motivated by a mixture of motivations ranging from religion to Kurdishness. Therefore, opposition to the Turkish identity complicated and created conflict within the social structure of the new republic, and political and social lines were drawn by this very polarizing issue.

The Turkish Republic was the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire, and it has a highly complex and diverse social structure. However, three major components of identity formation in the more recent history of the Republican era of the modern Turkish State have both perpetuated and reshaped Turkish society. These include first state-imposed Turkishness, secondly the official ideology of Kemalism and its link with elitism and laicism, and thirdly the creation of a bourgeoisie, a ruling class with a declining sense of national identity due to the emergence of capitalism and urbanization and people’s allegiance with economic rather than national boundaries and principles. In the first part of this chapter, these two major social and political issues are discussed, as
they relate to trends within Turkish society and as they have bearing on Turkey’s response to its European Union (EU) candidacy, and the impact of the impasse on its bid for membership on social and political attitudes within Turkey (The PEW Global Project and Attitudes 2007).

A theoretical premise that is tied closely to each of these three factors is the concept of political opportunity structures (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Throughout the time period in which the Turkish identity was born and shaped, the successes and failures of Islamic groups and movements were intricately connected to what was taking place politically within Turkish society. As one example, early in its history, the interests of the ruling Democratic Party were tied to those of the Islamists. This is because the Democrats were willing and able to harness the interests of the Islamists, to their mutual benefit, and this dynamic describes what Hakan M. Yavuz has referred to as “political opportunity spaces” (Yavuz 2003). However, political opportunity space can also be described as a political opportunity structure or free space as conceptualized within Social Movement Theory (Wiktorowicz 2004). In the context of the Islamic revivalism that has taken place after the 1980s, these opportunity spaces have played an important role in Turkish politics.

Due to specific economic, political and cultural factors that this study will explore in some detail, activities in the political sphere served to either open up and enhance, or prevent the entry of Islamists and Islamic ideology into Turkish society. An example of this is the struggle for power that takes place over the presidential election. The recent Presidential election is a clear example of a struggle that took place between Islamists
and secularists in Turkey, and is a political conflict that has polarized Turkish society and led to the empowerment of Islamists due to the new leadership.

The mass migration of people from small rural communities to urban centers also opened up political opportunity spaces, and the interests of the more traditional and religious rural populations had to be represented and mediated in the large cities. At the end of the Cold War, the ideological vacuum left by the failure of communism also left behind a large opportunity space. If communism was not the solution to poverty, inequality and the domination of society by its elites, then what was? In this case too, Islam was able to enter Turkish society at an opportune moment, providing the solution and answers to many questions, where old ideologies had been left behind. Other opportunity spaces were opened up within Turkish society by the cultural effects of globalism.

In part, this dynamic emerged from the ordinary Turkish citizens who were alienated by increased contact with the outside world and unable to relate to images of the West that they viewed on television. They needed to believe in something new that would represent their perceived interests. Religion provided a solution, an alternative identity that they could cling to and claim as their own. According to Ali Carkoglu and Ersin Kalaycioglu, “traditional and conservative standards, norms and values were dominating Turkish society just as Turkey was transforming from an agricultural society into an industrial one and simultaneously becoming increasingly integrated into the global markets of the post Cold War era” (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu 2009). Islamist groups have thus been able to successfully capture political opportunity spaces from the 1980s to today.
2. Reform of Turkish Socio-Political Structures

In order to provide additional background for the current rise in religious social movements in Turkey, it is critical to begin with an overview of the historical role of religion in Turkish society and to review the concept of secularism. The reform of religious structures in Turkey did not actually start with the Turkish Republic or Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s rigid secularist policies. The modernization of Ottoman society began with the Tanzimat Reforms in the 18th century. The core of these reforms was restructuring of the Ottoman government and the acceptance of new technologies from Europe. Administrative and technological reforms had a strong influence on the social structure of Ottoman society. The Ottoman state was not at the time a secular government in any sense of the term because religious Shari’a law was the ruling law. However, there were other very powerful external influences. Many scholars, government officials, and military people, for example, were sent to Europe to obtain a much sought-after European education. While being educated in engineering and technology, the Ottoman Turks in Europe were influenced in their thinking towards the modernization of society, and also in their perspective towards the relationship of government to religion. After graduating, most of these Ottoman citizens returned to Istanbul and would play a vital role in implementing reforms at home (Zurcher 2005).

The context of this set of events was Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, a time when Positivism was the dominant ideology. European states and societies had become secularized, and the role of religion was minimized. A prominent scholar on Islamic activism, Richard Tapper asserts that, “the secularization introduced under the Ottomans largely involved the separation of religion from politics by the creation of parallel state
institutions” (Tapper 1991). Secularization in Europe began in the 17th and 18th century in direct parallel to the secularization process in Turkey that occurred during the same time.

After World War I, the Treaty of Serves was signed by the Ottoman Empire and what was then a 600 year-old Empire was divided up among the colonial powers. The new Turkish state was established in 1923 under the founder of the new republic, Kemal Ataturk. This new republic and its elite continued with the secularist policies that began under the Ottoman legacy. Policies created under Ataturk were undertaken in the fields of education, justice, women’s rights, and administrative reorganization. Tapper argues that Turkey in its early years had policies that were far more rigid regarding the role that the state would play and its separation from religion (Tapper 1991). Religion was placed outside of the public sphere at this time, and in parallel, the new state wanted to have the ability to control all religious activities, a policy which it pursued under the Religious Affairs Agency (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi). Another prominent scholar of Ottoman and Turkish studies, Serif Mardin, argues that these Kemalist reforms, then also called the Republican Revolution, primarily represented a change of values (Mardin 2006). The reforms by the new regime under Ataturk were far more radical than any pursued in the earlier Ottoman State.

In terms of reforms, the core difference between those pursued by the Ottoman State and those of the new republic of Turkey was that the intention of the reforms initiated by the Ottoman State was to adopt new technologies from Europe. By contrast, the reforms undertaken in the republic of Turkey included cultural and value elements of change within society. As Hakan Yavuz writes, “The Republican elite has aimed at
Westernizing every aspect of social, cultural, and political life to create a secular and national republican space with a Westernized identity” (Yavuz 2003). In this way, the Turkish state from its beginning was able to adapt important cultural and social aspects of Western culture. According to Metin Heper, there are more similarities than differences between European and Ottoman Turkish attitudes and values. Citing an early Ottoman intellectual, Abdullah Cevdet, Heper refers to the saying that “There is no second civilization. Civilization means European civilization” (Heper 2002) It must be imported with both its roses and thorns. Heper’s perspectives on civilization symbolize the view of the Republican elite, and impose the identity of European civilization on Turkey. This view is very much unlike the Islamic and Nationalist parties in Turkey who see Turkey as part of Islamic civilization. Of course, more than one valid civilization exists, and it is unlikely that any civilization can be “imported,” as by definition any civilization grows organically.

3. **Bureaucracy and Islam’s Continuing Evolution**

The conservative Republican elite in Turkey held rigid policies regarding the role of religion within society, and began religious reforms as a type of “Westernization project” in the context of the modernization of society. The Caliphate – the Islamic equivalent to the Pope to all Islamic countries – was abolished for this reason and the educational system was secularized in 1927. Furthermore, the Arabic alphabet was replaced with Western letters, and Islamic orders (Tarikats) and organizations were banned. According to Tapper, the Tarikats had never died, but had gone underground (Tapper 1991). Tarikats are a unique type of Islamic grouping deep-rooted in Muslim societies, and the role of the Tarikats in Muslim societies trace back to the ninth and tenth centuries and is
distinct from other Islamic orders and branches. During this time period, the Tarikats used rituals, methods and codes in order to keep their collective identity strong.

In Ihsan Dagi’s research on Islamic Movements and the relationship of these movements to the Westernization project in Turkey, he asks, is a “clash of civilizations” inevitable between Islam and the West? This question is addressed in light of developments concerning the attitudes of the Islamists in Turkey towards the West, westernization, western values and institutions, the EU integration and globalization (Dagi 2001-2002). His approach is similar to Huntington’s approach; however, it is more interesting because he comes to similar conclusions as Huntington – but from an Eastern perspective. Whereas Huntington claims that Islam is not compatible with Western values, Ihsan Dagi’s conclusion is that political Islam is not compatible with democracy, particularly the Islamic politics reflected in Islamic movements in Turkey (Huntington 1993).

Religion and the politics of religion have always played a key role in Turkish society. Islamic movements and communities have been at the center of Turkish politics and culture, although the predominance of Islamic ideology has been prevented by the government, and enforced by the military. Between 1923 and 1946, Turkey had a single party system of democracy. In this era, known as the Reconstruction Era, the role of Islam in Turkish society and government was limited. Despite the government’s secular policies, Islamic sects and groups were able to organize underground (Yavuz 2009a). Islamic movements did not have any confrontation with the Kemalist regime, but they also did not support it either. According to Yavuz, the Kemalist regime viewed Islamists as a threat to their intention to Westernize Turkey. However, the ruling elite, military,
bureaucrats and businessman association TUSIAD, considered most groups not directly aligned with their interests. Other groups, such as the nationalists, Kurds, Islamists and leftists, have also been perceived as a threat to the Turkish State and persecuted accordingly (Yavuz 1996).

More recently in Turkish history, the transition of Turkish politics to a moderate and reform-oriented version of Islamist and moderate secularism, and actors such as Erdogan, are viewed with suspicion by Kemalists. This is because Kemalists are only interested in maintaining the State’s control over Islam and society, and view the current pro-Islamist changes as a defeat of secularism. However, as this study argues, this is not entirely the case (Turam 2007). There have been many varied theories on the possible outcomes of this competition or conflict between secularism and Islamic movements and which side would dominate or prevail. Some theories propose that the State would necessarily destroy the Islamic Movements, and others propose that Islamists would inevitably conquer the secular institutions (Turam 2007). Although these two sides of the argument continue to be hotly debated, it is indisputable that presently a group of once traditional Islamists have captured State power. However, in doing so, they have also modified their positions in this process, and their traditional Islamic ideology has become more subdued and has moved closer to the Neoliberal ideals and the Weberian understanding of Islam. Therefore, the two approaches may not be entirely the correct understanding of this interaction between Islamist and Secular forces. A more accurate understanding would be the that the confrontation between Islam and the Secular creates processes of Democratization (Turam 2007). This occurs because the State is forced to confront “the other” that has been previously excluded from social, political and
economic processes. As a consequence of this confrontation, there is negotiation between the powerful actors on both sides of the spectrum.

There has been an ongoing conflict within the military and the state bureaucratic groups, because not all military officials support the ideology of what we will refer to as “artificial Kemalism.” This ideology is based on what author Hakan Yavuz (1996) has called “imagined enemies.” Imagined enemies were created by the official ideology referred to as Kemalism in order to protect upper class interests in the popular ruler’s name. In reality however, the ruling class ideology of Kemalism has no direct relationship with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s ideas regarding the state. The ruling elite created the official Kemalist ideology after Ataturk’s death in 1938 and bastardized the ideology that he had left as his legacy. Ataturk himself did not come from the elite but came from the lower class of Ottoman society. Despite holding views that are internally consistent, the military has arguably been the group that supports the Kemalist ideology the least. The military is also against imperialist and neo-colonialist policies.

The second most important institution that plays a critical role is the Foreign Ministry, which is based on and indeed supports Kemalism and the Westernization project in Turkey. The Foreign Ministry and its ideology are mostly alienated from the cultural roots of Turkey.

The third group, the Businessman Association (TUSIAD), has been the most influential group within the ruling elite. TUSIAD is a class-based interest group that represents and protects the transnational capitalist class interests in Turkey (TUSIAD 2009).

4. Colonized without Colonization
One of the most important social and political transformations was in the 1950s, when democratic changes were taking place within Turkish society and the more traditional and religious Democrat Party had won the election. Many Islamic sects and movements supported the new party (Cakir 2006). With this party, Islamic movements tried to rebuild their organizational structure and to influence the government. For example, the Nurcu movement, Naqshibandis, Kadirs, Suleymancis, and other small Islamic groups had become more powerful within this era from the support they were able to obtain from the Democrat Party and its officials. This was the first Islamic revivalism following the establishment of the Republic. These Islamic groups pursued many forms of social activism and started to publicly criticize the Kemalist regime through the forums of Islamic and traditional newspapers, journals and magazines. They were then able to reorganize within small religious endowment organizations. As the smaller groupings became more powerful, they began to harness and use the resources of their members in order to form larger groups and further influence public and political life in Turkey (Balbay 2007).

An important sociological concept that we should apply to the Democrat Party era is demonstrated by the collective identity that strengthened among Islamic groups and sects at the time. Islamic movements became more organized, and importantly, more politicized. They established cultural codes and distinguished themselves in opposition to the Secularists and other political and social movements. The message of the Islamic groups at this time was clear and open: that Islam is the law. Because Islamic groups had maintained strong relations with the Democrat Party, they were also able to benefit economically from this relationship, because the Democrat Party’s administration
provided benefits to members of Islamic groups. This period was best characterized by a legitimization of Islam in the public and political spheres, and had important long-term consequences. A precedent was established, from this time on, that all Islamist and traditional parties in Turkish politics have been able to use the Democrat Party’s policies for their own purposes, even after the Democrat party was closed down by the military coup of 1960 (Zurcher 2005).

Between the years 1970 and 1980, Islamic groups were less successful in their attempts to influence the politics of the day. The public and political spheres were occupied by ten years of continuous conflict between the leftists and nationalists. Therefore, Islamic movements and groups did not have much chance to promote their views throughout society. The political arena of this time period was under attack by terrorism and civil war, but after the coup of 1980, Islamic movements again rapidly began to flourish in the big cities, especially the suburban areas called “Gecekondu” or “shanty towns.” The military coup created a new economic, political and social environment and new opportunities in the big cities, which attracted people from the rural side of Turkey (Bulac 2007).

5. Domestic Migration and Patterns of Religiosity
At this time, people from the rural areas migrated to the more developed parts of the country. Domestic migration has continued over the last twenty years, changing the demographic make-up of the country. People from rural regions have historically held more traditional religious values, so when they arrived en masse in the big cities, this changed the social and religious structure of the cities. The big cities had in the past been more secular than rural communities; however, this was changing rapidly. Migration’s
other important effect was that traditional people were becoming more religious after they moved to the cities, when they encountered the secular “others.” The more traditional religious sectors of society established their identities in opposition to the secularists. The result was an overall increase in religious identification and social movements throughout the country (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu 2009).

Prior to 1980, Turkey had strong social movements on both the left and right spectrum of political ideology. The leftist and rightist movements were the outcome of Cold War politics between the USSR and USA. These movements struggled violently with each other, falling just short of civil war. The September 12, 1980 military coup ended this conflict.

The second factor in the increase in social movements in Turkey is primarily political. Turkey was a “playground” of the Cold War era, as leftists (Marxists) and rightists (Nationalists) fought with each other over Turkey’s political future. The USSR, China and other communist countries supported mainly the leftist movements, whereas the rightist movements were supported by the USA (Akfirat 2007). Religious movements in particular received more financial and ideological support from the West. This support took place not just in Turkey but also in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. The military coup of September 12, 1980 ended this political civil war by putting leftists and rightists alike into jail, leaving little in the way of political ideology for the people to follow other than that of the new ruling class. The military regime in turn worked to prevent the growth of religious and political movements. This environment, combined with the end of the Cold War, left a severe political and ideological gap within Turkey. However, following the end of the military regime in 1983, religious social movements began to
rise again and these religious movements replaced leftist political ideologies (Yavuz 2003; Yesilada 2002).

6. New Market Conditions, Migration, and Social Movement Theory

The rise of Islamic social movements from the 1960s onwards can be attributed to tension created by neo-liberal economic policies. Yavuz describes the politicization of this era as a rise of network communities in reaction to the modern urban conditions of fragmentation and anomie (Yavuz 2003). As the secular nation state created systems of control and standardization, an ideological vacuum was left within the society, but the strong traditional underpinnings remained. Muslims sought to carve out Islamic niches in the public sphere, free from secular state control. Traditional religious groups have used Islam to make identity claims and to justify their entry into political and economic spheres as a result of the politicization of Islamic identity.

A second cause of the rise of the Islamic social movement in Turkey that Yavuz discusses is migration. The policies of Kemalism had mainly succeeded in transforming the ideology held by dwellers in urban centers, but not the ideology of those in the rural areas of Turkey. When the rural populations began to migrate to urban centers, they brought with them old ideological orientations towards religious Islam, and created what Yavuz terms “opportunity spaces” for religious ideology. Social institutions such as the neighborhood, community, and family were able to preserve traditional identities within a state that was opposed to religion. Of this, Yavuz says that the “household became the center of a sacred arena” (Yavuz 2003).

The informal networks that were created in the big cities after the migration of more religious populations from rural areas were a type of mobilizing structure
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Yavuz 2003), and have constituted political “opportunity spaces” (Yavuz 2003) that arose as a forum through which people worked to reinvigorate Islam. According to the political process model, grassroots settings such as the neighborhood, family, and workplace played a key role in facilitating these social movements. This had been the case also in post-Kemalist Turkey, at a time when grassroots religious groups had emerged to fill the ideological vacuum left by the primarily non-ideological state.

Finally, the concept of “framing” from Social Movement Theory clarifies how actors create shared meanings and definitions in a national, political or social context (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980). The framing process is related to Turkey regarding the way that political groups contend for prominence in their ability to define the social environment. The frame of reference of Turkish Islamist movements includes a shared language, and the use of symbols such as the headscarf. According to scholars such as Yavuz, “frame of reference” describes the identity within which the social and political situations are recognizable, and in this case, the Islamic political identity (Yavuz 2003). A major gap in the literature at the end of the 1990s and beginning of 2000 was the lack of research into the way that political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and the framing process each interacted with each other to shape social movements.

7. Impact of European and U.S. Actions

Turkey has been strongly influenced by its possible rejection of membership to the European Union. Its “Pseudo Rejection” (as this has been called) has had important negative social and political implications within Turkey, and has contributed to the radicalization of parts of Turkish society. This radicalization can be seen from two
different perspectives: the increasing trend of Nationalism/Islamism and the rejection of so-called European values such as democratization and human rights.

Turkish politics and society have become increasingly radicalized in response to Turkey’s perception of its own identity, and at the same time, in opposition to external values imposed on it by the EU. Secondly, this radicalization has emerged as an anti-European and an anti-American phenomenon, as demonstrated in earlier PEW reports. According to the 2007 PEW research report, *Global Unease with Major World Powers*, the EU approval rate had dramatically decreased, and anti-Americanism had increased in Turkey. In addition, according to the report, only 9% of Turkish society approved of U.S. foreign policy; this number is less than in Pakistan (15%) and Egypt (21%). Additionally, 27% of the Turkish public supported the EU, whereas, this number was 58% in 2004 (The PEW Global Project and Attitudes 2007). These numbers show that Turkish society is in the process of radicalization, which benefits the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and Islamist groups. Also in the report, Iran and the Ahmedinejad government have a more favorable view towards Turkey than does the EU, or the U.S. and G.W. Bush, and 28% of Turkish society has a growing and more favorable view towards Iran, while only 5% favor Israel.

Another element that has helped to shape the social and political structure of Turkey is the American occupation of Iraq. Ali Carkoglu and Ersin Kalaycioglu view the occupation of Iraq as an event that fostered fear and suspicion of the United States and caused an increase in conservatism in Turkey. This rising trend of conservatism and religiosity has continued to reinforce Turkey’s changing opinion of the United States (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu 2009). At the same time, Turkey’s unclear status with respect
to the EU is another factor that contributes to conservatism and religiosity in the country (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu 2009). The anti-European and anti-American environment that has developed within Turkey has served to benefit political and social groups such as the Nationalist and Islamist groups.

8. The Weberianization of Islamists: Islam without Islam

Neoliberalism began in Turkey with privatization, which has been the major element of capitalism. The legal preparation for privatization in Turkey was made according to Law 2983 in March of 1984 (Tecer 1992), and this marked the beginning of state withdrawal from the market. In this era, the state-owned sectors were privatized according to IMF and the World Bank structural adjustment policies. At the same time, global financial institutions began to play an important role in the Turkish economy as well as in Turkish politics. As a result of the structural adjustment and privatization policies adopted by the government, the economy has been restructured and the gap between the economic classes has widened. Turkey started to face challenges such as high unemployment, and the destruction of the agricultural sector caused by the financial policies. However, conservatives and traditionalists have gained momentum in the Ozal era. This is because they have supported Ozal’s Motherland Party.

These Neoliberal policies generated new political conditions in Turkey after the 1980s. This created political opportunities that benefitted groups and movements, which had previously been excluded from the social, political and economic processes in Turkey. This represented the birth of a new Turkey, which now included democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech. However, these concepts can be described differently, depending on the condition of the society in which they are applied. The
Islamists have used these concepts in order to occupy and capture the social and public spaces. While pursuing this objective, the Islamists also stepped into and pursued activities within the market. This interaction with the market in turn shaped the understanding of globalization by the Islamist movements and parties. This was a mutually constitutive process: the Islamists and conservatives occupied the market at the same time as it educated and influenced them.

Two important movements emerged from this process. One is the Fethullah Gulen Movement, and the other is the Justice and Development party. In the Neoliberal era, I will describe the transformation of the Islamists from their original religion-based ideology to a more market-based one as the “Weberianization of Islam”.

Some political background on Turkey is needed to clearly explain these developments. The Turkish political system is quite similar to the European parliamentary system, and parties run for election every four years. There is a majority control in the Turkish parliament, and the Prime Minister is always elected from among the winners of the Party. This has been the case throughout the period under study. The most notable political changes that have taken place in modern Turkey include the 1946 inception of the multi-party Parliamentary system, the military coup in 1960 that resulted in the passing of a new Turkish constitution, and the military coup in 1980 when the military came to power for a second time and again passed a new constitution in 1982. In 1983, Turkish politics and democracy entered a new era. Turgut Ozal, who was the President of the Motherland Party, won the election that year and became the first conservative-oriented Prime Minister’s of Turkey.
Under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, Turkey welcomed the neoliberal economy and due to Ozal’s conservative background and policies, he was able to bring the Islamists into the market. The current Prime Minister has very similar ideological beliefs as Ozal. They both support a free market economy and believe the free market will provide opportunities for conservatives and Islamists in Turkey. This process can be understood as the Weberianization of Islamists.

The Justice and Development Party, also known as the JDP, or the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi in Turkish, came to power through election in November of 2002 as a result of the economic and political frustrations of the time. The JDP’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, claims that the JDP is the continuation of the Motherland Party’s socio-political and economic policies. The former President Turgut Ozal (1989-93) attempted to implement neoliberal economic policies in Turkey because, besides holding strongly Islamist sentiments, he also believed in neoliberal and Friedrich Hayek-style economic policies; therefore he supported and pursued the use of IMF and World Bank economic programs in Turkey. On the other hand, Islam is not entirely open to economic liberalism, because it is a religion that is closely characterized by or affiliated with a more socially-based economic structure (Mawdudi 1950).

In this context, not Islam, but Islamists in Turkey have departed from the more social base of Islam and its original values. They have moved towards a Weberian understanding or neoliberal Islam rooted in its adaptation to the marketplace, or the assumption that Islam is compatible with the Market. According to Weber, the main engine of the capitalist economic transformation in Europe is Protestantism, and is embedded in the Protestant ethic. There are proponents of a similar thesis regarding
Islam. These proponents are traditional Islamists who entered the market, became successful within it, and therefore argue that the market is compatible with Islam. Examples include the MUSIAD (Muslim Businessmen Association) or the Fethullah Gulen Movement. Groups such as these that enter the market are referred to within this research, as “Neoliberal Islamists” and are interested in capturing a share of the market. To this end, they do not support State involvement in the economy, society or politics. However, when those of the old Turkish elite were being removed from the political structure, it was unclear who would replace them. However, the more entrenched these actors have become in the marketplace, the more diluted their traditional identity has become, and in the process, they have lost much of their traditionalism and the original meaning of the religion (Yavuz 2009b).

Neoliberal Islamists’ entry to the market and the transformation that takes place at the hands of the economy have overlapping characteristics with Hayek’s neoliberal economic model (Rodinson 2007). According to Hayek’s model, state should not be involved in regulation of the market, politics and society, because the new neoliberal market is self-sufficient. Hayek also claims that economic Neoliberalism brings political freedom to society, and without Neoliberalism, democracy does not exist.

The lower and middle classes in Turkey generally voted for leftist parties prior to 1980; however, factors such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the increase in globalization after the 1990s, and mass migration from rural areas to cities in Turkey reshaped the political spectrum. After the 1980 coup, Turgut Ozal and the Motherland Party benefited from this trend and used neoconservative politics to maneuver and pursue their interests within the Turkish political system. Ozal stayed in power for more than a
decade, and during this period, privatization took place and EU membership was considered a goal for the new conservatives. So-called democratization was imposed on the state and society through EU policies and the willingness of the Turkish government to fulfill related eligibility criteria (Yesilada and Wood 2007).

Recent domestic migrants from rural towns to urban centers in Turkey benefited from the neoliberal policies of Turgut Ozal. Ozal was religious and was a member of the Naqshibandis order and the Iskenderpasha Cemaati, whose leader was Mehmet Zaid Kotku. This is something Ozal had in common with Erdogan. Erdogan was also a frequent visitor to Iskenderpasha Cemaati. These two political leaders in later Turkish political history have contributed to the growth of neoliberal economic policies and have facilitated the socio-political transformation of the country. This transformation has been more difficult than the economic transformation. However, every social and political revolution creates its own forces of opposition, and Ozal and Erdogan’s main opponents have been within the military (Yavuz 2006).

The Turkish elite includes the military, the Foreign Ministry and bureaucracy and the Turkish Businessmen Association (TUSIAD); however, these groups have divergent interests that conflict with each other. For instance, the Foreign Ministry and bureaucracy and TUSIAD have supported the economic and foreign policies of Ozal and Erdogan against the military. A good example of this division can clearly be seen within the Cyprus conflict and the Kofi Annan Plan. One can argue that as long as the Kurdish question continues to play a vital role within politics, the military will remain the most powerful player. In the short term (not just within Turkey, but throughout the region), the Kurdish issue will be the most important question to shape regional politics. The EU has
harshly criticized the role of the military in Turkish politics. But one thing is clear: the military derives its role from society as a result of perspectives regarding the socio-political threat that would arise from the country’s potential division. Once this threat is over or is proved to be either unfounded or unlikely, the military’s role will be minimized naturally (Yildirim 2007).

9. The Presidential Crisis in Turkish Politics

One of the most important challenges in recent years has taken place in the context of the presidential election under the Justice and Development Party. Following the presidential crisis of July 22, 2007, the national election changed the entire political landscape in Turkey when the JDP received 47% of the votes. This election can be compared to the 1950 election when the Democratic Party won the victory under the leadership of Adnan Menderes. The 1950 election was the first political milestone toward democratization that was reached, and initiated the departure from single party rule. It redefined the political, economic and social landscape in Turkey. In this context, the JDP has many similarities with Menderes’s Democrat Party. Both parties consist of conservative social and political perspectives and promote liberal economic policies.

The Democratic Party can be understood as the predecessor to Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party (MP), which emerged after the September 12th Military Regime. In the continuation of the democratization process in Turkish politics, Ozal’s MP can also be understood as the forerunner to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s JDP. All three of these parties have tried to redefine the Turkish political, social and economic structure in opposition to the state elite and bureaucrats; therefore, these parties, including the JDP in the July 22nd election, received popular support from the new conservative migrants to the cities, and
have been very successful at promoting conservative politics. The JDP has benefited from social, political and economic changes more than its predecessors because of the increased globalization and the integration with the global market.
CHAPTER 3: SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN PAKISTAN

Colonization has created unintended consequences in the Global South. Some of these consequences include the emergence of a colonial elite, forced modernization, and dependency. However, I believe that one of the most important problems colonization created is the emergence of the nation-state in Muslim societies. For any given society, certain economic preconditions should be in place before the creation of a nation-state. These economic preconditions feed into the social and political conditions that will generate a stable social and political environment for a nation-state and a national identity that is based on a territoriality.

Pakistan certainly is not an example of this type of nation-state and has lacked a modern class structure, bureaucracy, rationality, urbanization, and modern educational system. Pakistan also has a very complex and multifaceted social, political and economic structure, and it cannot be understood without examining Indian and Bangladeshi history and the history of colonization in the Indian Subcontinent; therefore, in this chapter I will examine the history of colonization in the region, and will link colonization with the current socio-political problems in modern Pakistan.

1. Introduction

Within Muslim populated societies, the emergence of the nation-state did not occur as an organic process, whereas in Europe, the prevailing internal economic conditions of industrialization helped fuel social and political transformation and resulted in the emergence of the nation-state. On the other hand, the Western-educated colonial elite in Muslim societies had created most of the nation-states (Amin 2009). Unlike the case of
18th and 19th century Europe, there were no pre-existing conditions of modernity in
Muslim societies; a capitalist bourgeoisie did not exist, there was no modern
urbanization, and education and mechanical solidarity was the dominant structure.
Pakistan is the one of the best examples of this case.

The “founding fathers” of Pakistan came from the middle and middle-upper classes;
for example, Western-educated intellectuals and political activists such as Muhammad
Ali Jinnah and Muhammad Iqbal fit this description (Abbas 2005). However, the dream
of creating a modern Muslim state had partly failed when the Taliban came to power next
door in Afghanistan in 1996. In the region, countries, societies, ethnic groups and
religious groups are intricately connected to each other and political, social and economic
changes in one country are able to modify power structures in neighboring countries.

In this chapter, I examine the emergence and the historical transformation of Pakistan
in the context of the capitalist mode of production, and Pakistan’s relationship to
modernity in Muslim societies. One must understand that without first exploring the
historical formation of social and political institutions in the pre-capitalist period in
Pakistan, it is impossible to analyze current conditions and to most accurately foresee
future trajectories. Therefore, the question is not whether Muslims can face the
challenges posed by modernity or not, but rather to understand the maturity of economic
conditions that exist in a given society, that will lead to either a simple or a more labored
process of transformation within a specific Muslim society.

2. Ideological Foundations of Pakistan
The struggle between tradition and modernity should be understood within the context of
the impacts of forced modernization, especially in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
While Western modernization was developing full speed ahead in Europe (as a result of the capitalist economic modes of production, and from the emergence of the nation-state, urbanization, and advancements in education). Muslim societies were being challenged by colonization fueled by European capitalism. Consequently, the relationship between European capitalism, as expressed within its system of colonization, led to the forced modernization of Muslim societies. This produced an unhealthy social and political environment and worked against the organic development of modernity in Muslim societies.

Modernity cannot emerge without the existence of conditions that are already in place within a given society, such as urbanization, the division of labor, and increased levels of education and literacy. The emergence of new economic structures and market conditions will restructure the society and power relations, and will facilitate the development of new institutions in the society. This will in turn generate conditions of modernity, as an organic and natural process. However, forced modernization that takes place without any of these underpinning conditions of modernity is destined to fail, as we can see in the cases of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey. Without the existence of the underpinning complex economic structure and market conditions, some countries or societies will experience a forced process of modernization, and as a result, there is an inevitable struggle between tradition and modernity. On the other hand, and related, some Modernization theorists such as Alejandro Portes, believe in the role of cultural systems in creating the impetus for social change. This view has its premise in the belief that change comes primarily from within a society and that the micro level determines the macro structural level (Jafee 1998).
In this context, tradition represents the people, whereas modernity represents the elite structure within an anti-democratic society. There is a constant struggle that is set in motion from the interplay of dynamics between tradition and modernity, and this struggle itself creates unique and contradictory conditions of modernity. The actors in this process include the elites representing modernity and the people representing tradition. Interestingly enough, however, the interaction between the two sets of actors has influenced them both to modify and adapt their original views of modernity and tradition; thus the traditionalists have become more modernity-friendly, while the modernists have through this exposure become more traditional (Bulac 2007; Mardin 2006).

Neither physical nor artificial ethnic or national boundaries were clear before European colonization in Muslim societies. These boundaries have been imposed on Muslim societies by colonialist capitalism in order to further the exploitation of their lands. In his context, the nation-state can be understood as a clear example of this exploitative process, because it does not represent social institutions in these societies; therefore, the nation-state is necessarily in constant struggle with the real historical social, political and economic “boundaries” of Muslim societies.

The Nation-State is the creation of modern man, and exists as a consequence of his relationship to the capitalist market. Therefore, with its clear ethnic, religious, political and economic boundaries, the nation-state has been in service of the free market because its purpose is to build a society, which is directly contrary to the purpose of traditional societies. The nation-state in this context is a product of modernity, capitalism and industrialization. As such, its main objective is to eliminate traditional ways of life (Gellner 2006; Hobsbawm 1990). If the nation-state is treated as a part of modernity, then
the invisible hand of modernity must eliminate the pre-modern or pre-capitalist notion of social and political entities. However, this struggle between modernity and tradition has taken a longer and more difficult path in Muslim societies than in Europe. The nation-state therefore is not a political entity, but rather acts to regulate the market.

The emergence and transformation of Pakistan is a good example of the struggle between pre-capitalist entities and modern social, political and economic institutions (Zaidi 2000). Pakistan emerged within complex and unique historical circumstances, which were also embedded in the consequences of colonization; therefore, the modern history of Pakistan goes back to the Colonial Period.

The Colonial Period of the Indian subcontinent, which has been an important geographic and strategic region for European colonization, gave birth to three independent countries: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. During colonization, there were no clear ethnic and religious boundaries between Muslims and other groups, and the independence struggle against British colonialism was a unified concept for the all people who lived in the subcontinent. Furthermore, the emergence of the nation-state in Europe and the declining power of the Ottoman Empire created the idea of an independent Muslim state in the region among Muslim intellectuals. The Pakistan Movement grew from the idea that it was necessary to create a state that was separate from that of the Hindu majority in India. During the years 1857 to 1947, there were many ideological and Islamic revivalist movements also taking place at the time (Amin 2009).

Different regions of the Indian Subcontinent were controlled, ruled and colonized by colonial powers (the British, Danish, Dutch, and Portuguese) from the early 16th century to the middle of the 20th century. However, one of the most important periods of
colonization was the British Raj era from 1858-1947 (Abbas 2005). More specifically, the British East Indian Company was in control of most of the Indian subcontinent from the early 17th century to 1874. It was, however, dissolved by economic conditions created by the 1857 uprising.

The Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 was a cornerstone for British imperialism in India. The uprising began as a revolt against the Indian Colonial Army officers, called “Sepoy” or “Sipahi” in Persian. Even though there were many differences between the Muslims and Hindus, they became unified in the rebellion, through the common fight against the colonial regime. The Sepoy was the army of the British East Indian Company and protected its interests. The Sepoy Mutiny lasted two years, and although Muslims and Hindus were unified in the war, the uprising marked the beginning stages of the separation between Muslims and Hindus (Abbott 1968). After the uprising was defeated, British Imperialism created artificial ethnic boundaries and religious lines in the subcontinent, which were used in order to establish their domain over another century. Hence, the idea of an independent Muslim state began to flourish among educated Muslim intellectuals following the Sepoy Munity.

The idea of an independent Muslim state had partly arisen from the hostile and untrustworthy environment between Muslims and Hindus that had been created and cultivated by the British colonial rulers. The idea of an independent state found its origins in the population of educated Muslim intellectuals, and later this idea was to generate the Pakistan Movement led by Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the first President of Pakistan (Haqqani 2005). Muhammad Ali Jinnah certainly wasn’t Islamist; instead, he was trying to build a new nation-state based on citizenship, territoriality and the cultural
aspects of religion, similar to the objectives of Turkey’s Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Consequently, Mawdudi, the founder of the Jama’at–e Islami and one of the most important architects of political Islam in the 20th century (Cakir 2006), and other Islamists were against the separate independent state.

Each of the public figures and social and political movements reacted differently to the process of “colonized modernization,” and therefore; they each represent their own unique understanding of how Muslims should respond to the challenges of modernity. At the time, Muslim societies were characterized by mechanical solidarity, while Europe moved towards a more organic solidarity as a result of the division of labor. On the Indian subcontinent, most Muslims lived in rural areas, had no or little “modern” education, did not operate according to a complex division of labor, and most importantly, religion was a central component of their social structure and culture. However, similar to the Turkish case, some Muslims were able to experience a “modern” European education at the same time, and in so doing, attempted to adopt the more highly prized European educational system. For the modernists, a European education was essential, and empowered them to work towards developing and decolonizing the land. Most of the early modernists were directly or indirectly educated in either colonial schools or in Europe.

From the years 1857 to 1947, many important intellectual, religious, and nationalist leaders and movements among Muslims in South Asia emerged in reaction to the colonialism of the Indian subcontinent, three with particular significance. The first movement was that of Syed Ahmed Khan (Amin 2009). Ahmed Khan was one of the early modernists to use the European educational model and was the first modernist
intellectual to establish a European educational system in Pakistan. Ahmed Khan was a rationalist and modernist and believed that Muslims were still living within a system of colonization due to their lack of modern education (Abbas 2005; Khan 1985). This was the time that the Mogul Empire collapsed and it also marked the decline of the Muslim civilization. One of the most important accomplishments of Ahmed Khan was his establishment of the Anglo Oriental school, which refers to the Western education system used in the schools. The main example of this type of school was the Aligark University.

Modern education in Pakistan today is a direct continuation of Ahmed Khan’s modernist educational endeavors. In these schools, he tried to apply both European-style social sciences in addition to the natural sciences. On the other hand, Ahmed Khan translated the Qur’an and wrote a modernity-friendly Tafsir, i.e., an explanation of the Qur’an by religious scholars. He was critical towards colonial education, and also towards Hindu nationalism. Ahmed Khan was a secular nationalist and also a rationalist. Because of his criticism of Hindu nationalism, he also rejected the idea of the unification of the Muslim and Hindu peoples in the fight against British colonialism. He was an ideologue and his ideas influenced and shaped the emergence of the Muslim League, the movement that provided the ideological foundation of Pakistan (Khan 1985). The first president of Pakistan, Mohamed Jinnah, and Mohamed Iqbal, the intellectual father of Pakistan, held very similar ideas to those of Ahmed Khan, such as the goal of modernizing Muslim society in Southeast Asia.

The second movement that arose in response to colonialism was the Deoband Movement, a classical revivalist Islamist movement, which also emerged in direct opposition to British colonialism (Amin 2009). The movement opposed Western
education, modernization and secularism and started in the late 19th century in the Deoband Madrassas. (Deoband is a small village in Northern India.) The Deoband movement believed in and promoted a pure form of Islamic education and teaching among the Muslim societies and was opposed to modernity and the Westernization project. The movement became extremely powerful in the Muslim community, and is still active and highly influential among Muslims in India today. This movement was an Islamic revivalist and anti-modernist movement.

The third movement that arose in response to colonialism was the Allama Shibli Nomani, and was much more complex and multifaceted than the other movements because it was not anti- or pro-modernist per se (Amin 2009). The Allama Shibli Nomami movement can be described as modernity–friendly traditionalism, which was also not as orthodox as the Deoband movement. They established an institution, the Nadwatul Ulama (Darul Uloom), to educate Muslims according to the cultural codes of Islam while at the same time not rejecting the Western educational structure. The Darul Uloom has played an important role in the creation of modern Islamic sciences in the Indian subcontinent and is very similar to the Al-Azhar University in Egypt.

In the context of these three important movements, Colonialism did not create modernity but generated the conditions of modernity, which Muslims have faced for a century in complex and chaotic conditions. Therefore, a Muslim who lives in the Indian subcontinent should be understood within the framework of historical conditions of colonialism and their consequences. These movements played a significant role in managing the conditions of modernity that have been imposed on society by colonialism.
and the elite, and each of these factors have had a powerful and unique influence on the emergence of Pakistan.

In 1885, the Indian National Congress (the Congress Party) was established by Hindu Nationalists. After Mahatma Gandhi’s participation in the Congress, the party transformed to become the Indian Independence Movement, which was the main organization for fighting against British colonialism. The Indian National Congress was a modern form of nationalist movement in South Asia. The core elements of social solidarity within the Indian Nationalist ideology included the Hindu religious structure and the idea of an independent Hindu state. Meanwhile, Muslims did not have any comparable or unified social solidarity or organization, and had instead witnessed the collapse of Ottoman Empire and the weakening power of Muslims around the world. Under these circumstances, the Muslim League was organized in 1905. Hindu Nationalism was far more advanced than Muslim collective identity in Hindustan (Haqqani 2005).

In the context of nationalism and the nation-state, “national” identity was based on religious nationalism among Muslims rather than on a modern form of territoruality and citizenship-based nationalism. According to many prominent Islamic thinkers, such as Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shariati, and Mawdudi, the concept of nationalism and the nation-state does not belong to Muslim collective identity, and they go a step further to argue that Muslim collective identity should be based on the Ummah, or Islamic nation (Mawdudi 1950; Qutb 1991). Qutb and Mawdudi clearly describe nationalism as a disease that belongs to Jahilliye, which is a pre-Islamic social order. In the Jahilliye period, Asabiyya, (which was described by Ibn Khaldun in *Mugaddimah* as social
solidarity among groups of people based on their ethnic, racial, and tribal ties) was the dominant element in the formation of group solidarity (Khaldun 1969). However, the emergence and spread of Islam in the 7th and 8th centuries created different types of social identity based on religious belief systems.

In the context of the Muslim Ummah, ethnic, racial and tribal categories of social identities were strictly prohibited. Territoriality and citizenship does not define Islamic identity but rather it crystallizes the Muslim Ummah. Therefore, Islamists opposed the idea of an independent Muslim state in the Indian subcontinent. However, the Western educated secular elite and founding fathers of the Muslim League, such as Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Jinnah, promoted the concept of the independent Muslim state.

According to Abbas, Iqbal convinced Jinnah to establish a separate Muslim state (Abbas 2005). Mawdudi described Jinnah and Iqbal as secular politicians, and as secular elite who were going to eliminate the role of religion and weaken the social solidarity of the Muslim Ummah. In this context, Mawdudi was very much correct in his assumption, because Jinnah’s ideas regarding the nation-state were very similar to Ataturk’s ideology regarding Turkey, and were based on the modern rather than an Islamic way of life. Actually, creating a secular nation-state was one of the first collisions between modernity and tradition in the context of the political structure among Southeast Asian Muslims.

Muslim Political Institutions, organizations, and parties were not as organized as Hindus, because the clash between modernity and tradition started after the establishment of the Muslim League. The Muslim League was expected to form an independent Muslim state in the Indian subcontinent; however, the elite and intellectuals of the movement aimed to create a secular nation-state. On the other hand, traditionalists strongly opposed
the secular state. According to the traditionalists, especially Mawdudi, the secular state is as dangerous as British colonialism.

During this era, the Ottoman Empire, which was the center of the Muslim “World,” and Khilafat, which was based in Istanbul, was in decline and parts of the Empire were under occupation by British colonialism. Under these conditions, the traditionalists established and formed an organization called The Khilafat Movement.

The goal of the Khilafat Movement was to help the Ottoman Empire and Caliph to create a truly Muslim organization and party. The movement tried to design a collective identity among Muslims based on Pan-Islamic political philosophy, which can be described as beyond nationalism and the nation-state. According to Jacob Landau, Pan-Islamism is a political ideology based on the construction of a global Muslim Society, and national boundaries are the main barrier for the Muslim Ummah (Landau 1990). Therefore, Islam condemns the nation-state and nationalism as ideas injected into Muslim society from the Western educated “Muslim” elite. Mawdudi and other Muslim intellectuals also believed that nationalism is a disease that divides the Muslim Ummah. The conflict between traditionalists (Islamists) and modernists (the Western educated secular elite) generated a century long argument between the two groups.

Modernists did not examine or understand the conditions of modernity, which are embedded in the economic transformation and class structure. By comparison, the Islamists or traditionalists were not ready to face the challenges posed by the modern form of economic revolution, which generates urbanization, division of labor, organic solidarity, the emergence of new forms of education, women’s participation in the workforce, and technological innovations. In the case of Pakistan, the clash between
these two polar opposite approaches has been observed both before and after the establishment of Pakistan. The transformation of Pakistani society was truly historical, concerning the change of rural and tribal social structures within a semi-authoritarian state and the increasing trend of Religious Revivalism.

3. Islamic State or a New Nation-State? (14 August 1947)

The complex ethnic, religious and social structure within the context of colonization created a chaotic environment for Muslims as well as other ethnic and religious groups in the region. The historical trajectory of the rise of social, nationalist and religious movements in the region began to change under European colonization, and led to the formation of new social, political and economic obstacles for people who had never experienced modernity before.

One of the most important challenges for the people was the formation of awareness of ethnic and religious identities within social, political and economic spheres. Muslims began to understand and define their religious identity in comparison with the Hindus or with their British colonizers. This was what will be referred to as the “reactionary identity,” created partly by the problematic conditions of modernity.

Unlike the case of Europe, in the subcontinent, the nation-state, national identity, modern forms of economic structure, urbanization, and education did not really exist in any true form prior to colonization. However, the relocation of Europeans to the region generated a kind of “pseudo modernity,” which was the origin of the problem of Islamization.

Political Islam is thus understood to be a direct consequence of pseudo-modernity. In this context, pseudo modernity is a modernity that is imposed external to a society, and
the conditions of this modernity do not arise or develop organically. Under these circumstances, and as a result of the prevailing conditions of pseudo modernity at the time, many political and social groups and movements emerged. One of these social movements was the Jamiat Ulema-e Hindi (JUH). The Jamiat become a powerful actor in Indian politics and represented Muslim needs and interests. Significantly, Mawdudi, a founder of the Jama’at Movement, served as an editor of the Jamiat newspaper and was involved in the politics of Muslim nationalism from the beginning (Nasr 1996). The Jamiat was one of the most important Muslim revivalist movements at the time, and its political ideology was a reaction to and against British colonization, and imposed modernization.

The politics of the Jamiat were concerned with supporting a unified India and its goal was to create a socio-political movement for Muslim needs and interests in the region. However, faced with the challenges of modernity, this ideology divided Muslims into many different social and political groups. Mawdudi and the Ulama (religious clergy) began to criticize the Muslim League and described the league as a corrupt and secular movement. At the same time, Jinnah was seeking an ally for the Muslim League, and ironically, British colonialism was the only friend and supporter for his ideas regarding the movement as a means to create a Muslim state (Abbas 2005).

In 1940, Jinnah proposed the Two Nation Theory, that Muslims and Hindus should have two separate nation-states. Colonialism and its chaotic consequences helped Jinnah to organize the movement (the Muslim League) to pursue the goal of creating a secular nation-state for Muslims. However, the nation-state was not going to be based on religious ideas and traditionalism; rather, it was to be a modern secular nation-state, and
Pakistan’s national identity would be defined within the framework of territoriality. According to Husain Haqqani and Ayesha Jalal, under the difficult circumstances of the time, Jinnah knew that Islam was one of the most important components of the collective identity of Muslims in the region, rather than nationalism, or identity based on territoriality (Haqqani 2005; Jalal 2008). Jinnah argued that an independent Muslim state would be able to defend the rights of the Muslims against Hindus and the growing Hindu Nationalist movement, and against the powerful Indian National Congress. Jinnah brought together the religious groups in order to create an independent state for the Muslims, and as such, he was able to use Islam not as an ideology but as a base for social solidarity. Under these social, political and economic conditions, Pakistan emerged as a new nation-state in the region on August 14, 1947.

4. A Nation-State without a Constitution

The emergence of a new independent Muslim state in the Indian subcontinent did not solve the problems of the Muslim Ummah; rather, it has complicated the socio-political transformation in the region as well as in Pakistan. The new nation-state could at this time be characterized by its lack of industrialization, urbanization, education, and national unity; and by its over-populated areas, the large number of Muhajir groups from India, and its powerful traditional social structure embedded in tribalism. Most importantly, it lacked a strong national security and military. The combination and interplay of these factors has led Pakistan to authoritarianism and militarization.

This was a new nation-state without a constitution, and was the dominion of British Imperialism. Between the years 1947 and 1956, Pakistan was a member of the Commonwealth Nations; and in this context, independence was a meaningless concept. A
year after the independence, the founder and first president, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, died. According to Abbas, Jinnah (who was the main ideologue of partition from India) had been sick from tuberculosis for a long time and it was kept secret from the public until the partition occurred. Had the public known that he was no longer in public life at the time, without his implied leadership the partition may not have taken place, or may have been delayed (Abbas 2005).

The problematic years of Pakistani history were not past; indeed, things only became more complicated with the rise of a newborn nation-state. This era was also the beginning stage of the creation of a civil bureaucracy and state. The regime changed quickly when one president replaced another one. After Jinnah died, Liyakat Ali Khan, who was at first the finance minister of India and then the Prime Minister of Pakistan, became President. Liyakat Ali Khan was an Oxford Graduate, a member of the Muslim League, and was very close to Jinnah. Liyakat also served as Defense Minister, and built the Pakistani Military. Similar to Jinnah, his objective was to modernize Pakistan and to create national unity based on territoriality. He single-handedly ruled Pakistan until his assassination in 1951.

During Liyakat Ali Khan’s presidency, the economy was mostly dependent on primary goods and commodities, 90 percent of which were exported; there was no sign of industrialization and the economy was very traditional. Raw cotton and some agricultural products were major elements in the economic structure. Most of the exports came from East Pakistan, which is now called Bangladesh. In this era, the modern form of class structure did not exist in Pakistan, and feudalism was the predominant form of economic structure. According to Akbar Zaidi, the country was underdeveloped, predominantly
agrarian, and lacked any real infrastructure. The main goal of the new state was survival (Zaidi 2000).

In this decade, one of the major developments in the political structure of the new state was to pass the constitution and change the name of the country from the State of Pakistan to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1956. The constitution was quite different and more religious than the Jinnah’s modernization project. In the constitution, it stated that the Qur’an would be taught in the public schools, and alcohol would be banned. It was also written in the constitution that Pakistan would promote unity and dialogue among Muslim countries. However, in 1962, during Muhammad Ayub Khan’s presidency, a new constitution was passed, and the name of Islamic Republic of Pakistan was changed to the Republic of Pakistan to represent the shift away from Islam towards a state based more on economic liberalism.

In General Ayub Khan’s era, the state was the main actor in the economy at the time and industrialization had just begun. Zaidi claims that 1958-1968 was the decade of development. Economic development and modernization were taking place at full force within the hands of the state-run economy. Also in this era, bureaucrats and military officers had captured complete control of the government and the state was moving toward more authoritarian political tendencies. At this time, Mawdudi was put into jail and military officers and bureaucrats strictly controlled the Jama’at. This was the beginning stage of authoritarianism in Pakistan.

5. **Martial Law and the Militarization of Pakistan**

Aside from the economic crisis in Pakistan, a major political transformation emerged within the presidency of General Muhammad Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan was the first
“native” Commander in Chief of the Pakistani Military, and most importantly, he was able to establish a military relationship with the United States. Veena Kukreja describes this relationship and its elite power structure and actors as the bureaucratic-military axis (Kukreja 2003). These cold war politics helped the U.S. to enter Southeast Asia. The United States had been looking to find a partner in Southeast Asia for a long time, and they had a good relationship with India. However, the U.S. did not want to have a relationship just with India but wanted other partners, and this was the time when General Ayub Khan, who was willing to form a relationship with the U.S., came to power. The relationship between the two countries began as a military relationship. This was a period that shaped the region’s political landscape and this has had lasting repercussions.

Under General Ayub Khan’s Presidency, Pakistan seemed to operate as a military dictatorship. The state, under the influence of the military, created and implemented new economic development and industrialization plans every five years, which reflected primarily military interests. The military, however, had adopted a capitalist economic model, and the private sector did not play a very important role in the new nation’s development. This is because the military and the state wanted to use the capitalist model in Pakistan, but there was no clearly defined or evident “bourgeoisie.” Therefore, the state and military, essentially the same actors, acted in the role that would otherwise have been played by a bourgeoisie. At this time, and to this day, the military was the most powerful actor in Pakistani politics. Nevertheless, the state elite, which refers to the state bureaucrats and high-ranking military officials, controlled and regulated the market at the time. In this era, the interests and objectives of the green revolution were pushed, and the
emerging private sector was supported by the state actors. The main objective was the creation of the private sector in Pakistan.

Mechanization, tractorization and canalization in the agricultural sector were major themes within this green revolution. The objective was to create an agricultural revolution in rural areas and to develop Pakistan’s economy from the bottom up. The U.S. financed and supported the Pakistani military as well as the green revolution in rural areas and high yield variety seeds were received from the U.S. The Pakistan economy was developing very rapidly in this era and all sectors were growing. According to Husnul Amin, at the time, South Korea adapted a similar model of development from Pakistan (Amin 2009).

As part of the expansion of the economy, roads and infrastructure were built; however, inequality increased across the region and between classes. In addition, a new class structure emerged as a result of Ayub Khan’s development policies. The Green Revolution generated its own riches, and the feudal lords and landowners benefited from these policies. This new class invested their money in the urban centers, and urbanization was in the beginning stages of growth within Pakistan. These landowners became feudal industrialists.

The emergence of a new class, and changes in the class structure fostered and embraced social, political and economic elements of transformation in Pakistan. It was in this context that Mawdudi and his followers worked to resist Ayub Khan’s political authoritarianism, and the Jama’at became active, although the movement was being strongly oppressed by the bureaucratic-military axis. Control of the political structure, however, was moving further towards the military and bureaucratic elite within this
decade of development. The authoritarian military elite in Pakistan and the United States each promoted and supported capitalist development within Pakistan and the result was the creation of economic and social inequality and militaristic rule.

Ayub Khan began the green revolution specifically in order to develop and industrialize Pakistan’s economy and society; however, Khan and his elite did not implement their land distribution policies over the large landowners and feudal lords. Without land distribution in tribal areas, the agricultural revolution would not be successful, and this created inequality (Haqqani 2005). The feudal landowners became rich from this green revolution due to the mechanization and canalization of agriculture, and then moved to the big cities to invest their money. This was the emergence of a new powerful class or bourgeoisie in Pakistan.

Two major political developments took place in the 1970s; first was the war with India and the second was the partition of Bangladesh (East Pakistan) from Pakistan in 1971. The Pakistani military and bureaucratic elite used the Indian threat as a bargaining chip within domestic politics in order to dominate the political space, and the war with India empowered the Pakistani military in the eyes of ordinary Pakistani citizens. The second major political development, and one of the most traumatic political events in the relatively short history of Pakistan, was the partition of East Bengal or what is now called Bangladesh. The partition of Bangladesh and the 1971 War with India both served to alter the Pakistani political and social environment over the next eight years. Under General Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s economy began to boom within a decade of development; however, aside from economic development, prevailing political conditions were not as good as expected. The fast pace of economic development in Pakistan led
Ayub Khan and his government to become more powerful and authoritarian and he used this power to repress the opposition movements.

In this era, the anti-democratic political environment, or what Kukreja refers to as the “political opportunity structure,” also created a civil opposition movement, which consisted of disenfranchised members of society, such as the lower class and left leaning parts of society. Consequently, new political actors began to emerge on the political scene and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was established under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1967 (Kukreja 2003).

The Pakistan People’s Party was a leftist party, and was against the privatization policies of Ayub Khan. Bhutto was the harshest critic of Ayub Khan’s policies in the 1965 War with India; however, he was also concerned about the direction of the economic privatization policies of the time. The years between 1958 and 1968 were a decade of development for Pakistan, but it also marked the beginning stages of a widening social and economic gap and inequality between the classes. Growth rates in industrial and agricultural production were very high, particularly in the manufacturing sector, and Pakistan was considered a successful capitalist economy (Zaidi 2000). However, at the same time, as a result of economic liberalism, Pakistan started to face the challenges of capitalism, including poverty, unemployment, chaotic urbanization, and the breakdown of social ties. According to Zaidi (Zaidi 2000), Ayub Khan’s economic policies led to the birth of the proletariat in Pakistan. On the other hand, Ayub Khan’s economic policies were based on the state-regulated and sponsored market; therefore, economic development was under the control of the state. This system has been described as a bureaucratically governed and directed capitalism (Zaidi 2000). Under these
economic and political circumstances, Bhutto and the PPP emerged as a party that was able to provide hope for the disempowered and the lower classes, due to the growing economic inequality between the classes in Pakistan.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the PPP came to power by popular election in 1971. This was a new era for Pakistani society, economy and politics. Every policy of Ayub Khan was revised under the Bhutto Presidency and the politics of Pakistan moved towards left and socialist leaning policies. In the economy, there was also a shift from privatization to nationalization. Bhutto’s central economic policy was to nationalize the banking industry, education, and Pakistan’s agricultural economic structure. According to Zaidi, Bhutto’s economic policies failed due to the world oil crisis and the financial crisis of 1974. He was an unlucky politician. The Pakistani military had always been suspicious of Bhutto’s left-leaning policies and his good relationship with the Soviet Union, whereas the Pakistani military had an established relationship with the United States. Under Bhutto’s leadership, the loyalty of Pakistan had shifted from the U.S. to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.

Although Bhutto had socialist tendencies, he altered the constitution, included additional Islamic elements within it, changed the name of the nation to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1973, and organized the first Conference of Islamic Countries in Lahore in the year 1974. However, leaders from the Jama’at movement were repressed and jailed during his presidency. Mawdudi and the leadership of the Jama’at was not happy with Bhutto’s political authoritarianism, because Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did not tolerate opposition movements, in the same way as Ayub Khan had been authoritarian and heavy handed towards opposition movements.
6. The Emergence of Madrassas and the Islamization of Pakistan

During the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Pakistan served as a social and political bridge for the United States to Central Asia, and consequently the United States stopped it from sliding towards the Soviet Bloc. Although Bhutto had tried to change Pakistani politics and move Pakistan closer to the Soviet Bloc, he was not successful in this effort and was removed from power by the military and state bureaucrats before much progress had been made. It was for this reason that the Pakistani army officers (encouraged and materially supported by the U.S. government) overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by a bloodless coup d'état led by General Zia Ul-Haq, who was the closest ally of the U.S. within Pakistani politics. The coup took place in 1977, and Bhutto was executed. Unlike Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s anti capitalist and anti-feudalist policies, Zia Ul-Haq promoted and supported economic neoliberalism.

After General Zia Ul-Haq came to power, the entire political, social and economic environment in Pakistan had changed. Ul-Haq began to implement Islamization policies. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan – a political opportunity for Islamist groups and movements who had been repressed in the Bhutto era. Islamization occurred rapidly in the education, economy, and law sectors and within society in general. Radical Madrassas emerged under the Islamization project, supported by Zia Ul-Haq. Islamization of Pakistan’s legal and educational system occurred under General Zia ul-Haq and according to Haqqani (2005), this Islamization was an extension or continuation of the state ideology.

In 1980, Zia Ul-Haq formed and established an advisory board to the government called the Majlis-i Shura, which included intellectuals, religious clergy, writers,
academicians, and prominent leaders of Pakistani society. Majlis-i Shura can be simply defined as an Islamic Assembly, i.e., an association of Islamic intelligentsia. The President appointed its members.

The Jama’at’s leadership was very happy with Ul-Haq’s policies and the two groups collaborated in the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets and the Mohammad Najibullah Government in Afghanistan, with support from the U.S. Zia Ul-Haq’s Islamization policies had objectives compatible with those of the Afghan Jihad and the Mujahideen, and the Muslims who fought in the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union were trained and educated in Pakistan by the Pakistan military with financial support from the U.S.

The Jama’at organized the groups and provided the logistics for the Mujahideen in Pakistan. Mawdudi’s famous Qur’an translation into Urdu, the Takfir-ul Quran, had been distributed to the Mujahideen and to the Pakistani military officials, because Islam was the center of this war, and the Jama’at and government of Pakistan wanted to Islamicize the war against the Soviets. In this era, the Jama’at was very active in the state institutions, in the education sector, and the overall economy. The members of the Jama’at opened small and middle-sized businesses and stores in the border towns with Afghanistan, and sold electronic equipment and export products. During this period, class structure in the border towns had also changed as a result of the new business and economic neoliberalization. Most of the newly middle class population supported the Jama’at.

The Afghan Jihad brought together the Jama’at and the State, and both worked together for the same cause in support of the Afghan war. The war in Afghanistan
became an ideological fight or Jihad against the Soviet Union for Zia Ul-Haq and the Jama’at. In this context, the Jama’at created and pursued an ideological movement against the Soviets. This war was financially, socially and politically mutually beneficial for the Jama’at and Zia Ul-Haq because the Jama’at’s supporters were experiencing upward mobility to the middle and upper middle classes.

Zia Ul-Haq’s brand of economic neoliberalism produced an increase of construction in oil rich Gulf States. This led to many Jama’at supporters visiting and working in countries such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, where the Pakistani Muslims encountered and cooperated with Arab Muslims. In this period, according to Zaidi, the civilian-military bureaucracy controlled the economy and the entire economic process (Zaidi 2000).

There has been a long history and tradition of Madrassa education in Southeast Asia coming from the eleventh and twelfth centuries; however, the traditional structure of Madrassa education had changed during the period of Afghan Jihad in Pakistan and in the Kashmir War with India. In the Afghan War, many Muslims from all over the world waged the war against Soviets in Afghanistan. Most of them went to Afghanistan after receiving military and political (Islamic) training in the Madrassas in Pakistan.

The old Madrassas represented a traditional religious education with a focus on the Qur’anic sciences, such as Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), Tafsir (interpretation of the Qur’an), Kalam (Philosophical Understanding of Revelation), and Hadith (the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad). When the Afghan Jihad began, however, most of the Madrassas became mere promoters of ideology – a place only to train Jihadists, not to
educate and enlighten students of Islam. The Madrassas had become an ideological breeding ground for Political Islam.

7. Globalization and Democracy

Zia Ul-Haq died in a plane crash in 1988, just before the Soviets left Afghanistan. Ul-Haq’s sudden death generated political opportunities for the opposition movements, which had been struggling with the Ul-Haq dictatorship. In 1988, Benazir Bhutto came to the power by popular election in Pakistan, the first time that Pakistan had had a pseudo-“democratic” form of government in its 41 years of history because it was the first time there was a real popular election. The IMF and World Bank-supported Neoliberal structural adjustment was just beginning in Pakistan. During this time, under Benazir Bhutto’s government, a relationship emerged between the Bhutto government and the Pakistani elite. The Pakistani elite welcomed the World Bank and IMF policies because they were beneficial to them. This external influence and the negative effects of neoliberal globalization generated obstacles for the society, such as unemployment, inequality and poverty. In this era, the IMF and World Bank played an important role in the privatization of the economy; in exchange for loans to Pakistan, they imposed structural adjustment programs on the weak Bhutto government.

Nawaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League, defeated Bhutto in the 1990 election. Both Bhutto and Sharif had poor relationships with Jama’at, because they both supported the development of a neoliberal economy (Zaidi 2000). Both also had poor relationships with the military. Large landowners supported neither of them, though they opposed Sharif less than Bhutto. Benazir Bhuto, a center-to-left politician unlike her socialist father, was supported mainly by the middle class and educated, younger
population. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif was a businessman and a purely capitalist politician, and he defeated Bhutto because of her government’s failed economic policies and corruption. Nonetheless, they held very similar economic views.

According to the Bhutto and the Sharif governments, liberalization, privatization and globalization were the three dominant economic principles globally; therefore, they believed that Pakistan must adopt these policies in order to develop and compete in the global economy. In this era, Pakistan’s economy also became dependent on the IMF and World Bank’s financial support; therefore, the international financial institutions became involved in the economic decisions of the country. The government was unable to appoint the Finance Minister without permission from the IMF and World Bank.

During the 1980s and 1990s, another important development in Pakistan was the emergence of powerful military businesses. The military has always protected two main interests: corporate interests and the interests of the bureaucratic-military axis. According to Ayesha Siddiqi, the military had transformed into a military incorporated entity (Siddiqa 2007). This was due to the belief that the military served not just military and defense needs, but also possessed strong economic motivations and interests. At this time, the military was not just working on military issues, but was also handling all aspects of foreign policy, securing the territorial integrity of Pakistan, safeguarding Pakistan from India, and was in charge of relations with the U.S. and Israel. On the economic side, 70% of big property businesses were controlled by the military (Siddiqa 2007), and the defense housing project was being implemented all across Pakistan. The military also entered the food, banking, and education sectors, and the construction and
gas/petrol business. This process was the corporatization of the Pakistani military with the neoliberal economy.

8. Talibanization of a Nation-State

In 1996, when the Taliban came to power, there was an explosion of Islamic Radicalism in Southeast Asia and this is what I will refer to as the “Talibanization” of the region. In Southeast Asia, the Taliban did not come to power suddenly. Rather, social and political indicators described by the social scientists from the time that Zia Ul-Haq had overthrown Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – political chaos, poverty, social and economic inequality, authoritarianism, military dictatorship, and most importantly imperialism – perpetuated an environment that the region’s Muslims have faced for more than a century. The ideological education of the Taliban in the Madrassas is one of the many consequences of this transformation.
The struggle between Islam and the State over social and political spaces in modern Turkish history demonstrates a unique conflict. This conflict turned into a power struggle after the 1980s, with the emergence of the Neoliberal economic process in Turkey. New economic conditions have intensified this conflict in the era of globalization, and Islamic movements have discovered the power of the market. The Fethullah Gulen movement, also known popularly as the Cemaat, became one of the most important Islamic movements during this period. The Gulen movement has benefitted from the market economy and has been able to obtain more power and advantage within the struggle. However, the market economy is a powerful phenomenon with its own conditions, dynamics and rules. In this process of interaction between the market economy and the Gulen movement, the Cemaat has transformed from an Islamic-based movement to a market oriented network. More engagement with the market economy has pushed the movement towards a more secular space. In this chapter, I will examine the origins of the movement and its transformation within the market economy. I describe the Cemaat’s transformation as the “Weberianization of Islam,” or Jihad in the market.

1. The Movement Origins: The Legacy of Said-i Nursi

There are currently two schools of thought regarding the Gulen movement. One is that the movement and its ideology are transparent and epitomize a liberal and moderate interpretation of Islam that does not conflict with the market or the global economy. Within this school of thought, the Gulen movement represents a form of leadership that many believe will assist Turkey in its development because it proposes a balance between
secular ideology and Islamic belief that is compatible with neoliberal modernity. This may be the only movement of its kind that does not polarize the two ideologies but brings them together by proposing and demonstrating that religious doctrine can be practiced within the private lives of Turkish citizens while they publicly engage in modern economic activity. This ideology has been referred to as the “Islamization of Turkish nationalist ideology” or the “Turkification of Islam.”

The Cemaat’s ideology attempts to bring together religion and the state, within the context of a democratic, free and secular society that is integrated within the modern world and the international political system. It is the only ideology of its kind in Turkey that has been able to gather a popular following and manages to embrace Islam while at the same time not openly stating that the role of religion is to regulate society. The Gulen movement does not openly or publicly condone the state applying Islamic law, or Shari’a, and Gulen has strongly denounced traditional and radical Islamist groups and ideologies, such as the Refah Party and other Islamists (Aras 1998).

The Gulen movement has set itself apart from other ideologies and Islamic groups and movements by stressing Turkish nationalism, the free market and the role of education. Within this ideology, Islam is a religion that is understood to enhance the national character of Turkey, and fits both within the new market economy and the Ottoman legacy. The Gulen movement took this approach because its leadership was aware of the influence of Islam on the lives of people in Turkey and the objective was to “bring this excluded identity to the public sphere and to give legitimacy to it” (Yavuz and Esposito 2003). Gulen thus offers an ideology that is compatible with religion, moderation and the neoliberal market economy, and encompasses and embraces all
elements of the Turkish identity (Turam 2007). As such, the movement seeks to redefine modernity, not as Westernization, but rather as a set of new economic, technological, and legal opportunities that are able to facilitate authentic social transformation (Turam 2007).

Regarding the movement and its history, the Gulen movement is also referred to as the Neo-Nur movement (Yavuz 2003), which can be associated with the Nurcu movement, and was inspired by Said’i Nursi’s writings and teachings. Said’i Nursi was a well-known religious leader and public figure who lived between the years 1878 and 1960. One of Said’i Nursi’s followers, Fethullah Gulen, took a step further than Nursi. Gulen took a movement with a solely religious-based structure and facilitated its transformation into a multi-dimensional social organization with a strong collective identity. The Gulen movement therefore has a unique place among other Turkish religious movements and political organizations, and cannot be understood without a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the economy, society and secularism in Turkey (Bulac 2007).

Fethullah Gulen’s movement and its ideas originated ideologically from the Nurcu movement. Said-i Nursi was born in 1878 in Bitlis, Southeast Turkey, and was educated in the traditional Madrassas. He was a controversial figure, both before and after the establishment of the republic of Turkey. Nursi did not seek or pursue political power within his career, but rather was interested foremost in spreading his interpretation of Islam, which is based on a vision of Modernity that is compatible with Pan Islamism. Therefore, Nursi tried to codify Islam within the framework of the politics of his day. Although he criticized the “authoritarian politics,” of the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid,
his ideas were not materially different from those of the Sultan, who was also a Pan Islamism (Vahide 2005). However, they held very different ideas regarding the correct path to take to reach the ideal of Pan Islamism. Both men believed that in order to prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Muslims would need to adopt the technological changes and industrialization of Europe. Said-i Nursi understood the power of the newly emerging technological advances, and had the foresight to understand the way in which these advances would eventually alter the social and political structure of Muslim societies. Therefore, he was able to bring together elements of science and religion, and in so doing, was able to use science to advance the objectives of Islam.

Nursi wrote more than 130 booklets called “Risales” in his lifetime, and travelled from the Caucuses to the Balkans in order to prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Vahide 2005). However, with the establishment of the new secular republic, Nursi could not find a place for his work and ideas within a society that was part of a newly emerging nation-state. According to many scholars, such as Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm (Gellner 2006; Hobsbawm 1990), the nation-state is a product of capitalism, which facilitates modernity and secularism. These forces of capitalism are produced by industrialization, bureaucracy, the division of labor, urbanization, and education.

In the Ottoman Empire, there was no complex division of labor; most of the population lived in rural areas, and there was no clear bureaucracy, according to the Weberian understanding of the process of rationalization. However, with the new secular republic, the political elite sought to create a modern and secular nation-state. As mentioned previously, this was a clear example of forced modernization and secularization, because capitalism and industrialization did not yet exist in Turkey.
The Gulen movement originated in the 1960s as a branch of the Nur community and began to form following the death of Said-i Nursi (Tansi 2009). The Gulen movement differs from the latter in the way that it places more emphasis on social activism, with the aim of changing society from the grassroots or bottom-up. Indeed, while in private, the members of the Gulen movement still adhere to conventional Islamic practices (namaz/praying, oruç/fasting, zekat/taxation, etc.), the key dimension regulating their life is that of hizmet. This term refers to service for the sake of God; a service that can be accomplished by continuously striving through action (aksiyon insanı) in society, with the objective to promote the movement’s ideals and spread the true ethical message of Islam. In the past two decades, due to the voluntary activism of its followers, the movement has transcended its local dimension to become a powerful transnational network of people controlling financial, economic and cultural activities worldwide; for example in Central Asia, the Balkans, Africa, and Western Europe as well as the U.S.A. Deniz Tansi argues that, “The Gulen movement uses the modern capitalist system as a tool to fulfill its goals and objectives and has developed profitable firms able to benefit from privatization and the modern economy. But even as this is the case, we cannot say that the movement has fully absorbed modernity. Instead, they have created a new community life with its own social, economic, political and cultural elements, and do not always behave according to purely rational economic rules. The Gulen movement can most appropriately be understood within Gramsci’s methods. They have developed a new form of hegemony that does not clash with the neoliberal system. It can be observed that their educational units serve the U.S. from different geographic locations across the globe. Islam is, however, the core belief system that legitimizes Neoliberalism within the
For example, in Turkey the movement runs the most read daily newspaper, called *Zaman*, in addition to many editorial houses that issue books and other reviews, and a national radio station called Burc FM, TV national broadcast stations, and Samanyolu TV. Most recently, it is also expanding its work in charitable activities (Turam 2009). Moreover, in the U.S.A, where the movement expanded after Fethullah Gulen migrated there, its members managed the Turkish Cultural center in New York, the Institute of Interfaith Dialogue in Houston, the Atlas foundation in Los Angeles, the Ebru TV channel, the Rumi Forum in Washington, D.C. and *Today’s Zaman* newspaper. The Gulen movement is thus one of the most complex and multi-faceted Islamic movements in the world, both in terms of its structure and in the breadth of its activities over the past twenty years. This is a result of the neoliberalist process, and due to important changes in market conditions, such as the widespread privatization and deregulation of the Turkish economy after January 24, 1980 (Yildirim 2007).

After the military came to power on September 12, 1980, they imposed a new constitution, ratified in 1982, which consisted of articles directly related to nationalization and privatization. The Turkish state thus became one of the few countries in the world whose constitution included articles on privatization. This is similar to Chile’s self-imposed neoliberal structural adjustment led by the “Chicago Boys” following the 1973 coup, and a process similar to this was also to take place later in Turkey, in the year 1982. Many neoliberal Turkish economists who studied and worked in the United States or in neoliberal institutions such as the IMF and World Bank became a part of the newly elected Turkish “ANAP Party” on November 6 1983, following the
election. Turgut Ozal, who was the President of the ANAP at the time and served as Prime Minister of Turkey and as a former World Bank employee, believed that the neoliberal market and privatization was the solution to Turkish under-development (Yildirim 2007). Unlike many other bureaucrats and party leaders, Turgut Ozal was a very conservative politician, with strong Islamic roots based on the "Naqshbandi order," which is also referred to as the Iskenderpasha community. The leader of the community was Mehmet Zait Kotku. This Islamic order was also called “Tarikat,” and had its roots in the 12th century Sufi order. However, members of the Iskenderpasha community based in Fatih, Istanbul were urbanized and business-oriented people; for example, they were the owners of small and medium-sized companies.

Turgut Ozal was a member of this community and Islamic order. As a socially conservative Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal implemented most of the privatization of economic activities in Turkey and this was the cornerstone of the privatization of the Turkish economy, which has helped the growth of the more community-oriented Gulen movement (Yildirim 2007).

2. **Movement Emergence: Founding Leader Fethullah Gulen**

Fethullah Gulen, the founder and leader of the Gulen community, was born in the rural and conservative city of Erzurum, Turkey in 1938 (Mercan 2008). He had three brothers and one sister. Although some claim that he was a student of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, in fact, Gulen had never met Said-i Nursi. Nursi was a member of the Naqshbandi order, and studied Islam in traditional Madrassas in the Southeast of Turkey, in Bitlis. Nursi attempted to bring science and Islam together and to demonstrate in his writing that Science was not against Islam and that the two are compatible (Vahide 2005). Nursi
created an Islamic cult called the “Nurcu,” and members of this group usually met in secret houses or apartments called “Dersane,” translated as, “study centers.” Between the years 1923 and 1960, “Nur Talebeleri,” or students of Nurcu, held meetings in Dersanes and read the Risales. This marked the emergence of the Nur Cemaati (Community).

Fethullah Gulen was not a member of this group until age 16 or 17. In Erzurum, when he was visiting a friend in a tailor store, he met with the Nur Talebeleri and started attending the Dersanes. When Gulen was eighteen years old, he took a public exam in order to become an Imam, and when he passed the exam, was assigned to Kirklareli, which was a remote place far from his hometown. Two years later, he entered military service in Iskenderun, and after completing his military service, went to serve in a mosque in Edirne. A few years later, in 1966, Fethullah Gulen was assigned to work as the Director of a Qur’an course in Kestanepazari, Izmir. Prior to 1966, Fethullah Gulen was a young preacher and Imam, however in Izmir he began to reach intellectual maturity. This period marked the beginning of a new intellectual stage in his religious and social life. Before this point, he had not become involved in politics. Indeed, Gulen and his movement did not become involved in political activities until the late 1980s.

The Kestanepazari Qur’an School was a government run and managed institution, and therefore, Gulen did not have any flexibility to select his own students. These types of religious schools were controlled by the government; in particular the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi). Consequently, Gulen decided to open his own Dersane, similar to the Nurcu Dersanes. The Dersane was in Guzelyali, Izmir, and was a three-level home financed and supported by local businessmen. This was the first
school in the Gulen movement, and signified the emergence of Gulen’s Hizmet activities. While he was in Izmir, he also preached in the city of Manisa and in the town of Edremit.

He slowly started to build a community and following between the years of 1966 and 1976 (Yurtsever 2009). In 1976, Gulen and his followers opened their first Nurcu dormitory, in Bozyaka, Izmir. Approximately two hundred and fifty students were invited, and these students were mostly from middle school and high school. These students were staying in the dormitory reading the Qur’an and Risales, and learning about the Islamic ethic, and Islamic sciences, in addition to studying physics, chemistry, the natural sciences, and philosophy. This marked the beginning stages of the “gold generation,” called ”Altin Nesil,” which describes the period in which students prepared to attend the best universities in order to get good jobs in the government bureaucracy(Yurtsever 2009).

Gulen believed that there was a gap between “din” or religion, and society. He believed that din and society should be brought together through education for the younger generation(Gulen 2004). According to Gulen, this generation was a product of the Republican elite’s secularist policies because it had become de-Islamicized. Therefore, high school and university students should be re-Islamicized and Gulen started to open many Dersane’s across Izmir, which were financed by conservative businessmen who followed Gulen. Significantly, most of the poor people’s children who are from rural and more traditional parts of Turkey were accepted to the Dersane’s.

Meanwhile, Gulen also preached in mosques during this time, and became very popular with the masses across Anatolia. Gulen instructed his followers in Anatolia to open new Dersanes, and these new Dersanes were established in Manisa, Turgutlu,
Balikesir, and Antalya. After the Bozyaka Dormitory/Dersane, a second dormitory in Izmir was opened in Ayrancilar, followed by one in Yenikoy. For followers from distant locations who were unable to attend his sermons, Gulen had the sermons recorded on cassettes and they were sold in many parts of Anatolia. They were immediately recorded after each sermon and sold in a well-known bookstore owned by the Gulen community, called the “Safa Zemzem” bookstore. This was the first bookstore owned by the hizmet or service (Yurtsever 2009).

In the Bozyaka Dersane in the year 1977, Fethullah Gulen started to open and publish his first magazine, called Sizinti. In this magazine, the main argument was that science does not conflict with but instead supports the existence of religion and God. Sizinti was published with the help of Fethullah Gulen’s brothers, who owned a small printing company in Erzurum, and later, the brothers moved its printing operation to Izmir. The Islamic education of Fethullah Gulen was also becoming very popular among the middle class and more conservative masses. Gulen retired from being an Imam in 1980, and shortly after, during the coup d’état in 1980, the military came to power and banned all political activities and many religious activities in Turkey. These events also led to over 100,000 people being placed in jail, and to the execution of more than 30 people (Yildirim 2007).

Movement Opportunities and Growth

In this new military era, the social, political and economic landscape of Turkey had changed greatly. In fact, during the first few years of the military regime, Fethullah Gulen was wanted for capture by the military for a reason that is still unknown. Meanwhile, he was traveling and preaching across Anatolia in the Dersanes and in 1983, at the end of
the military regime, an election was held and an acquaintance of Fethullah Gulen named Turgut Ozal came to power in Turkey. The two had known each other from Izmir from the time of the election of 1977. At the time, Turgut Ozal was running for Turkish parliament with the Milli Selamet Party (the National Salvation Party) and he and Fethullah Gulen met in Izmir. Turgut Ozal asked Fethullah Gulen for his support in the election.

In 1986, when Fethullah Gulen was captured, Turgut Ozal was Prime Minister of Turkey, and was able to arrange to have him released. At this time, they met again and discussed education, the new conservatism (yeni muhafazakarlık), and political activism. At this meeting between a religious community leader, Fethullah Gulen and political leader, Turgut Ozal demonstrated the importance of emerging political and economic dynamics in Turkey. Ozal was a state bureaucrat who always held aspirations to change Turkey’s economic and political environment into one that was more conservative religiously but still operating within the neoliberal economy. Ozal believes that a neoliberal democracy would create a democratic environment, and this would help religiously conservative movements to integrate within society.

On the other hand, Fethullah Gulen, was trying to spread his religious views inside as well as outside of Turkey. Fethullah Gulen had always emphasized education’s importance, especially the education of the younger generation(Bulac 2007). However, he was always suspicious of the education provided within foreign private schools in Turkey, such as Robert College, St. Joseph’s, and the German High School. The language of education in these schools was German, English, French, and Italian, and they had extremely strict entry requirements for people coming from small towns and cities in
Anatolia and thus made it more difficult for those with a conservative and Islamic background to enter the schools. This dynamic demonstrated the class structure of the time. People who attended these schools came from very elite and bourgeois backgrounds and these schools created a new generation of elite for the state.

Consequently, in 1982, Fethullah Gulen and his followers opened schools with similar characteristics, and an educational system that was similar to that of the foreign private schools. The first one was opened in Izmir and was called “Yamanlar.” Two new schools were opened next, including Fatih College in Istanbul and Samanyolu High School in Ankara. The language in each of these schools was English. However, people attending them did not come from the state elite bureaucrats or from the bourgeoisie (Yurtsever 2009).

In the meantime, Fethullah Gulen and the Cemaat (Community) found an important opportunity in Turgut Ozal’s era, due to the privatization and deregulation policies in the market. Turgut Ozal, as he was a former World Bank employee, attempted to minimize the role of the State in the Turkish economy, and attempted to give this economic space created by neoliberalism and privatization to the small business owners that were migrating from small towns and cities in Anatolia. This marked the creation of the small business network for people with a more conservative and Islamic background. The new economic conditions in the cities attracted more migrants from Anatolia, and led to a significant demographic shift within Turkey and the mass migration of people from rural locations to the urban centers. Unlike the case of European industrialization, according to Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu, these demographic changes and the conditions of
market liberalization have produced an environment that promotes traditional standards, norms, and values within Turkish society (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu 2009).

These demographic changes in Turkey have shaped and restructured social, political and economic paradigms, and this has resulted in the emergence of a new class structure with a more conservative and Islamic orientation. This is in contrast to the secular and more Western-oriented bourgeoisie. Fethullah Gulen and Cemaat benefited strongly from this trend. Fethullah Gulen stopped preaching in the year 1992, and this marked the beginning stages of politicization of the movement. By this time, the Gulen movement had been strongly established in communities across Turkey.

At the same time as these social and political changes were occurring in Turkey, important transformations were also taking place globally. One of the most important of these changes was the collapse of the Soviet system and the unification of East and West Germany. The changes presented in this new era generated more opportunities for groups such as Fethullah Gulen, because the era was based on the existence of network communities and were characterized by a combination of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft values and societal orientation, rather than on any inherently conflicting interests of society versus the community (Bulac 2007).

According to Ferdinand Tonnies, Gemeinschaft involves a more traditional and rural social structure, which can be referred to as a community; whereas, Gesellschaft corresponds to a society that possesses the characteristics of a more urbanized and individualized social structure (Tönnies 1963). The Fethullah Gulen movement is still undergoing a process of crystallization, and continues to be transformed into a network community. Within the framework of Tonnies’ argument, the Gulen movement is neither
a community nor a society, but is actually a combination of both, and is in the process of evolution from a community-based social movement to a more individualized network community based on religious and social solidarity.

Also in this era, at the end of the 1980s and beginning in the 1990s in particular, Fethullah Gulen and Cemaat, or what I will refer to after this point as “Hizmet” (service) moved more towards economically oriented activities. They began to open hospitals, newspapers, financial corporations, insurance companies, and other types of companies. At the beginning of the 1990s, for example, the first hospital was opened, called the Sifa Hospital. Non-interest based Islamic banking was also established at this time, within a well-established bank called Asya Finance, and within an insurance firm called Isik Insurance(Yildirim 2007).

Beyond just pursuing economic activities in Turkey, the Cemaat also began to establish schools in the former soviet republics and newly independent states in Eurasian countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Turgut Ozal pursued this objective and wrote letters to the presidents of these newly independent states, asking them to assist the schools (Yurtsever 2009).

The Gulen movement’s activities are not limited to education or finance alone, but have also actively sought political power through social organization and mobilization, in particular through the Journalist and Writers Foundation(JWF 2009). The Cemaat’s strategy was truly displayed when the movement provided a critical perspective toward the Secularist Regime and its power holders. The JWF Foundation was established on June 29 1994, shortly after the death of then-former President, Turgut Ozal who had held close relations with the movement. According to Ali Hasan
Yurtsever (Yurtsever 2009) who is President of the Rumi Forum, the Journalist and Writers Foundation was established in order to provide social, cultural and political dialogue with others who have been excluded from the social, political and economic process in Turkey. The president of the Journalist and Writers Foundation is Huseyin Gulerce, who also writes for the Zaman Daily Newspaper, which has unofficially represented Cemaat in the Turkish media. The foundation facilitates its activities in three different levels or stages, as follows: the Abant Platform, the Intercultural Dialogue Platform and the Dialogue Eurasia Platform.

The Abant Platform

The Abant Platforms are conferences that take place yearly, and have been organized by the Journalist and Writers Association, which is closely linked with the Fethullah Gulen movement. The Abant Platforms have been organized in many different places; for example the 12th meeting took place in Cairo, Egypt on February 25 to 26th of 2008. Because the first meeting occurred in Abant, Bolu, the conferences are now known as the Abant Platform. The purpose of these conferences is to achieve the objective of the Gulen movement to occupy the public sphere (Yildirim 2007). This is in line with the attempt by the movement to capture the political opportunity structure in order to market its interpretation of Islam. In terms of democracy, secularism, dialogue and the relationship of these elements with Islam, the Gulen movement has claimed that they do not pursue political objectives; however, the Abant Platform itself facilitates political discussion (Yavuz 2009a) and objectives, and attempts to occupy political opportunity spaces (Polletta 1999) in Turkish society.
On the other hand, the Gulen movement embodies a significantly different social, economic and political structure than many other Islamist movements. In contrast to the framework of the Islamist movements, the Gulen movement seeks to work within the political establishment in Turkey, rather than outside the prevailing capitalist economic and political boundaries. This type of economic and political orientation resembles the Weberian understanding of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. However, the Gulen movement uses Islam instead of Protestantism.

In terms of the Gulen movement’s contribution to democracy and civil society, the movement has transformed from its original religious-based objectives to a new set of objectives that are more reflective of a multidimensional socio-economic approach and political power. The Abant Platform is a good example of this new approach (Akfirat 2007). The Gulen movement’s base of support has also undergone a shift in this process, and it is now supported by less religious followers. In the Abant meetings, leftists, nationalists, Islamists, secularists and many other political groups are invited to participate in the meetings of the so-called context of dialogue. Participants in these meetings include scholars, journalists, writers, intellectuals and politicians; all of these participants are critical toward the Kemalist and secularist regime in Turkey.

The objectives of the Abant Platform are limited to the domestic social and political spheres. According to the official homepage of the foundation, the Abant Platform is a working group that meets once a year in Abant, Turkey. Nineteen meetings have been held since the year 1994. The meeting’s theme changes every year, but it is important to note that critical or controversial topics are selected, such as issues relevant to the Kurdish question, secularism, Islam and democracy, pluralism and
democratization. For purposes of the present analysis, a particularly significant feature of these meetings is the critical perspective that emerges, and how this platform and its discourse dominate public discussion on complex and controversial issues in Turkey. However, it is not very clear why the Islamic oriented movement is trying to use a platform such as this one to lead public discussions.

The Journalist and Writers Foundation clearly show that the Gulen movement has been seeking political power, rather than looking for simple religious attachment (Silay 2009). Many scholars argue that the Gulen movement’s leadership hides its real motivations – motivations that are somehow part of the movement’s political strategy. For example, Hakan Yavuz claims that the purpose here is very much power (Tavernisa 2008). However, Yavuz does not identify or describe what type of power or the goal the movement has been trying to achieve. The Abant Platform can be seen to exist as a form of politicization of the movement and as a means to obtain power. At this point, the success of the movement depends on the politicization of the Cemaat, because without this politicization, the movement would not be nearly as successful as it is today. On the other hand, this politicization can be understood as another factor that will domesticate the movement within the capitalist mode of production.

**The Intercultural Dialogue Platform**

The second important activity of the Journalist and Writers Foundation focuses on the more transnational aspect of the Gulen movement: the Intercultural Dialogue Platform. This Platform facilitates inter-religious activities outside as well as inside Turkey. Interestingly, Fethullah Gulen met with Pope John Paul II in 1998 in the Vatican, as part of the Intercultural Dialogue Platform. In addition, the movement is positioning these
intercultural and inter-religious activities to be more tolerant towards other identities and religions than they actually are (Veren 2007).

The Dialogue Eurasia Platform

The Dialogue Eurasia Platform is a third key activity of the Journalist and Writers Foundation (JWF). Following the collapse of the Soviet system, new independent states emerged in Eurasia, a region which geographically extends across Bulgaria and Romania to the Central Asian Turkic states. The collapse presented a wonderful opportunity for the Gulen movement, and immediately following the collapse, the movement established schools, businesses, and cultural centers in urban centers within Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Veren 2007).

Nevertheless, the Gulen movement claims that they do not hold any political objectives (Fethullah Gulen 2009); although evidence of its activities clearly shows that the JWF is part of the Gulen movement and embodies the movement’s political goals and activities. The movement has also pursued more complex and multifaceted activities as a result of its politicization. In addition, the hierarchical structure of the movement has also become more complex in response to greater politicization and globalization. For example, the movement has a base of support on every continent, in addition to associations and foundations in more than fifty countries. In the United States, some of the movement’s many foundations include the Rumi Forum in Washington, D.C., the Turkish Cultural Center in New York, the Atlas Interfaith Foundation in California, the American Turkish Friendship Association in Virginia, the Amity Turkish Cultural Center in Florida, and the Lighthouse Foundation in New Jersey (Turam 2009).

The Gulen movement’s Economic Perspective
In Turkey, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD) represent the classical Capitalist bourgeoisie. TUSIAD has played an important role in Turkish politics and in the economy after the Neoliberalization policies were imposed. However, with the rise of the neoliberal economy after the 1980s, two new actors had emerged among the bourgeoisie. These actors also played an important role in the social and political sphere in Turkey. The first actor that has emerged is the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association (MUSIAD), the conservative and traditional bourgeoisie with Islamic roots and a background of political activism. The other actor is a group within the Gulen movement, which is called the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON)(Tasci 2009).

According to Hakan Tasci, who is a Washington, D.C. representative of TUSKON, this Businessman Association began to develop as an association in the early 1990s for and among the sympathizers of the Fethullah Gulen(Tasci 2009). Today, TUSKON has become one of the most important businessmen’s associations in Turkey, and provides business opportunities to members and sympathizers from China to Africa and from Europe to Central Asia. TUSKON has offices in Beijing, Moscow, Brussels, and Washington, D.C. Today, one hundred and fifty business associations and fifteen thousand businessmen in Turkey are members of the organization; however, TUSKON is still not as powerful as TUSIAD. According to Mehmet Pacaci, a Professor at Ankara University and religious attaché for Directory of Religious Affairs for Turkey in Washington, D.C., as a result of the business activities of the Fethullah Gulen group, the Cemaat has also become very powerful in Turkish politics and in the economy(Pacaci 2009). This demonstrates a new set of class dynamics within Turkey; and according to
Mustafa Yildirim, a writer and public intellectual, the bourgeoisie has become more Islamicized in this new environment (Yildirim 2007). However, these dynamics are also changing the structure of the movement, and businessmen who are not affiliated with it see the economic opportunities and become part of TUSCON in order to conduct business in other countries, especially in Central Asia.

3. Attracting Movement Adherents: The Dersane Study Centers

One of the most important structures established within the Gulen movement are the Dersane study centers. Dersanes in the Gulen movement resemble the Nurcu movement’s Dersanes, where the members meet once a week, usually on Friday or Saturday nights, in specific locations such as apartments or houses. Very similar to the Nurcu Dersanes, the Risales of Said-i Nursi are read and discussed in the meetings as an educational process for its followers, and people must be invited to attend. The movement focuses on bringing the young generation to the Dersanes and educating them in Islam, and in particular on Gulen’s interpretation of Islam. This long-term process facilitates social solidarity, and the creation of a network and collective identity among its followers. This is because most of the people that attend the Dersanes do so beginning in their childhood and continue attending throughout adulthood. In each Dersane, there is a preacher called “Agbi,” who is usually an older person, always male, and is charged with reading the Risales to the audience and explaining the Risales to them sentence-by-sentence. Actually, this education process is similar to the structure of the historical and traditional Madrassas.

In the context of the Gulen movement, Dersanes have two functions; one plays a religious function and the other plays an educational function. In the Dersanes, older and
university-educated followers help the children of other followers, and instruct them in natural sciences such as physics and chemistry. This is because the main purpose of the Dersane is to create an obedient individual who has less interaction with the outside world and its influences, and this also facilitates the creation of a more cohesive collective identity.

Gender relations within the Gulen movement operate within the framework of classical Islam (Yavuz 2009a). Consequently, in the Dersanes, men and women are completely separated and meet in different locations. From the outside, while the Gulen movement may represent a more “modern” interpretation of Islam, from more of an insider perspective, the movement does not operate differently than any other Islamic movement (Yildirim 2007).

4. The Weberianization of Islamists: Transplanting Jihad into the Market

Islam and collective action are inseparable terms, and Islam provides the collective identity for the Muslim community or the Ummah (the global Muslim Nation). This is because the teaching of the Qur’an educates Muslims to believe that they are part of a larger global Muslim community. Therefore, Gellner’s argument that Islam is the blueprint of social order (Gellner 1981) identifies the fundamental nature of Muslim collective consciousness. However, economic development, urbanization, and the improvement of educational structures in Muslim societies have crystallized the Ummah identity as an association of individual Muslims rather than as the more plural identity conceived of as the ideal for the global Muslim Ummah. For example, interaction with the modern neoliberal economy and its dynamics has led Muslims to think of “Muslim” as an individual’s religious characteristic, rather than thinking of themselves as part of a
collective whole. It is also useful to distinguish between the concept of Islam and Muslims; Islam is a social structure, whereas a Muslim is an agent of that structure. Islam is considered to be a fixed social, political and economic structure that is based on the Qur’an.

In order to analyze current socio-political trends within Turkish society, one must understand the relationship between three elements: Islam, secularism and the economy in Turkey. Former President, Prime Minister, and World Bank employee Turgut Ozal attempted to implement neoliberal economic policies within Turkey, beginning in January of 1980 (Yavuz 2003). Aside from holding strongly Islamist sentiments, he also believed in and pursued neoliberal and Friedrich Hayek-style economic policies. However, classical Islam is not entirely open to economic liberalism, because it is founded partly on socioeconomic principles incompatible with free markets; rather, it promotes a social welfare state. In this context, Fethullah Gulen, who was affiliated with the Islamic political sphere in Turkey, departed from a more puritanical form of Islam, and he instead adopted a neoliberal Islam, which is closely affiliated with Hayek’s neoliberal economic model. This neoliberal Islam is simultaneously a Weberian Islam, i.e., a form of modernity-friendly Islam that is compatible with the capitalist economy. The Fethullah Gulen movement has benefitted greatly from this neoliberal transformation of modern Turkey by opening small and middle scale import and export companies in Russia, Central Asia and Europe, because it has become absorbed within and has adapted to the market economy.

The majority of people in Turkey voted for leftist parties prior to 1980; however, the collapse of the Soviet Union, in addition to the increase in globalization after the 1990s
and mass migration from rural to urban areas in Turkey have reshaped the political spectrum and the menu of available options. The Gulen movement has directly benefitted from this social and economic trend, just as it has benefitted from neoliberalization. The Gulen movement can be defined as a market-oriented network because the Cemaat has supported all of the government privatization policies from the 1990s to the present time. The ideology of the movement has moved from its origins when it had just begun to engage with the market economy, towards an ideology that blends with that of neoliberal ideals such as democracy, human rights and freedom.

The increasing Islamization of Turkey, a country that was once as secular a Muslim state as the “modern” world has seen, may be fruitfully examined in the context of the core principles of the ”Weberianization of Islam.” The Weberianization of Islam can be defined as the way Islamist movements adapt free market ideology to their own goals and interests. The Weberianization of Islam can be understood as the process in which capitalism is able to transform Islam, a process that can be clearly seen within the evolution of the Fethullah Gulen movement. The Weberianization of Islam can also be seen as the adaptation of Muslims to the market economy and neoliberalism in Turkey. From this perspective, Islam is not a fixed belief system that is unable to adapt to circumstances; rather, it is a fluid belief system. Weberian Islamists therefore use market conditions and social and political dynamics such as democracy, parliamentary system and free speech to their advantage and as a mechanism to advance originally Islamist objectives. However, the Islamist agenda will be undermined when Islamic groups and movements have fully adapted to global economic conditions. Consequently, Weberian Islam describes the complex relationship between the economy and religion. Thus, a
Muslim who works in a regular industrial or service oriented job or who is a small or middle sized business owner, is educated, lives in a city, and holds conservative and religious political tendencies is considered to be a Weberian Islamist and will tend to be domesticated in the process of secularization.

These types of Muslim are likely to lose their collective identity and feeling of belonging within the larger Muslim Ummah, and will likely become more comfortable with market economy individualism. Within the market economy, religion or nationality is no longer so relevant; instead, the exchange of commodities based on mutual interest between the producer and consumer takes priority.

According to Yavuz and Esposito, “In the past two decades, the extraordinary vitality of Islam has led to a re-examination of religion and its role in Turkish society. The embrace of modernity, in fact, has proven to stimulate rather than to diminish the attraction of Islam for millions of people” (Yavuz and Esposito 2003). The Gulen movement is a product of the intersection of these new economic conditions, and exemplifies Weberian Islam’s embrace of modernity.

The Gulen movement has become integrated into Turkey’s newly neoliberal economy by opening companies, schools, newspapers, and television and radio stations(Veren 2007). The Cemaat did not create the rules and regulations of the market economy; it simply had to adapt to them, or it would fail to benefit from the economic advantages and opportunities that could propel its interests forward. According to Bryan Turner(Turner 1974), Weber did not see Islam as an anti-capitalist religion, but as a religion that could be compatible with capitalism.
Because political and economic conditions within Muslim societies were hostile to capitalism, Muslims did not develop a capitalist economic structure. However, the emergence of global capitalism in the second half of the 20th century did not leave any social or political space for puritan Islam. The collision between capitalism and Islam therefore began as a result of the integration of Muslim societies into the global economy. This process can be characterized as the Weberianization of Islam, which corresponds with the domestication of Islam, and this process is witnessed clearly within the transformation of the Gulen movement.

The Weberianism of Islam is the move from a puritan form of Islam to a more market-oriented form of Islam. In the puritan sense of Islam, Islam dominates and regulates the market, whereas in market-oriented Islam, Islam becomes a commodity in the market and is dominated by the market. In the process, market forces subjugate Islam and push it out of collective life and confine religion to the sphere of the individual. This is the domestication process.

Islam, as represented by the Gulen movement, has become an “oppositional ideology” in Turkey, in response to the state’s extensive implementation of laicism, i.e., secularization policies. The nature of Islam is to be anti-secular, anti-democratic and anti-modern; and in this context, the Gulen movement can be defined within civil society and democratic structures as a movement that is opposed to state-imposed secularization and modernization. Along the same lines, Ali Bulac, a prominent sociologist and supporter of the Gulen movement, examines the success of the movement in becoming an active participant in the market economy by harnessing conditions of urbanization, religion, and the neoliberal market (Bulac 2007).
Islam and the Turkish Republic have been in conflict since the Republic’s birth. Islamic groups and movements’ goal is to re-establish the Islamic order, but the Turkish State’s major aim is to shape civil society and to create obedient citizens. This is the nature of an authoritarian nation state. Usually, civil society demands the establishment of a democratic state. However, in the Turkish case, civil society has been undermined by the state’s elitist policies and at the same time, a transformation of the mass media, mass education, and the mass domestic migration that has been taking place. These changes do not help the state per se, in fact, exactly the opposite. Turkish society and religious communities such as the Gulen movement have redefined the state and the role of the state within the neoliberalization process. This in turn has led to the emergence of “network” or religious communities that have used and benefited from the neoliberal ideals. This is because the community-based collective identity built up that identity based on individualism. In this process, Islam did not disappear from the social and political scene, but transformed into a mechanism for social solidarity in the market, and become a core component of the network groups in the neoliberal era.

These network communities have been nourished by the liberalization of Turkey’s economy, especially the Fethullah Gulen movement, because it is not just a religious community, but also operates as a system that is both parallel to the state’s elite and rivals its power. The Gulen movement therefore has been quite successful in trying to influence the state structure by using neoliberalism to its advantage. This demonstrates the Weberianization of Islam in the Turkish context, and is also a powerful example of the use of democracy by Islamic movements to obtain power within the public and social spheres (Yildirim 2007).
As a result of neoliberal economic processes, a new Islamic bourgeoisie began to emerge in Turkey in the mid-1980s. Most members of this newly emerging economic class were members of Islamist groups, specifically the Gulen movement. The Gulen members who benefited from the economic opportunities and became upwardly mobile were the movement’s more secular members beforehand (Pacaci 2009); they succeeded because were more concerned about the market economy than with religious matters. Turkish secularism can be thought of as a product of modernization. It is clear, therefore, that the market has acted to perpetuate Islamist groups at the same time as Islam perpetuates the market. Similarly, this dynamic has created a bourgeoisie that paradoxically is increasingly Islamist and secular.

This study argues that when the Gulen movement engages with the market – by establishing financial institutions, newspapers, schools, and other economic activities based on the maximization of its economic interests as previously described – this interaction begins to transform the movement from a more traditional religious community into a more urbanized, economically-focused network community. In the long term, if this trend continues, this mutually constitutive process will secularize and depoliticize the Cemaat. The movement therefore seems more likely to depart from the community (Gemeinschaft) and to transform into something that is more accurately described as a part of society (Gesellschaft). This trajectory can be described as the crystallization of community. At this stage, the Gulen movement will have abandoned the original meaning of Islam (a Shari’a based social order) for a market-based Islam. This process is similar to the agenda that currently promotes Turkey’s secularization and modernization, and is best described as Islam without Islam. The “new Islam” is no
longer a way of life, but part of a social networking mechanism used for economic gain.
In short, the Gulen movement was established as a religious movement, but today it exists as a movement that seeks economic gain for its members as well as political power based on those gains.

5. Recent Movement Transformation: Politicization

According to some schools of thought, the political ambitions of Fethullah Gulen extend to the support of Turkey’s candidacy to the European Union and to its integration into the international political system. This matches with Gulen’s organization of schools around the world and its stated objective of having Turkey integrated with the modern world (Aras 1998). Towards this end, the movement has opened many schools globally, in Central Asia, Africa, Europe and the United States among other geographic locations.

Historically, Gulen appeared outwardly to have been relatively neutral regarding domestic politics, seeking to avoid any public perception that it sought power within Turkish politics. For example, early in the movement’s history, Gulen had avoided all connection to the Islamist Refah Party, at the same time as pursuing ongoing dialogue with secular parties. In its early days, the movement had presented its ideology as one that was in opposition to political Islam (Veren 2007). In fact, this was only an outward display of neutrality, and the Gulen movement actually sought to ally itself with these secular parties.

There have been many proponents of the thesis that Gulen and his followers do hold political ambitions that were merely hidden, because to show these aspirations would endanger the reputation of the movement (Aras 1998). Later in its history, in the 2002 election, the Gulen movement openly supported the Justice and Development Party,
and consequently from this point onwards it was more commonly held that the Gulen movement does in fact have political ambitions. From its inception, the Gulen movement has changed significantly both in terms of the scope of its activities, and its size and outreach capacity. According to many scholars, Gulen either made a shift to become a more conservative proponent of Islamist ideology, or always secretly held a conservative and religious ideology which was initially hidden until he was able to gain a sizeable following and acceptance in the society, within the more moderate facade. The Gulen movement has become very powerful in its later years and has undisputedly established a prominent place within State politics, with a strong position financially. Following this shift, the intentions of the group have been questioned by political groups and academics alike who see Gulen’s ideology as moving further towards Islamism (Sharon-Krespin 2009). There is as yet no consensus, however, regarding the true level of Islamism of the Gulen movement.

Gulen’s role in Turkish politics after the 1980s was pivotal and unique. Especially in the second part of the 1980s, Gulen was the only organized group proposing that a middle ground could be found between traditional Islamism and the modern secular state. The military government polarized this debate by threatening Islamists with repression — blocking Islamists’ political activity and driving them underground. In effect, this encouraged the Islamist movement to become more traditional and reactionary by interfering with its ability to express commitment to religious politics. This was also a time when Turkey’s government leaders began to doubt Turkey would be able to join the EU, and when cooperation with the United States seemed less attractive due to growing Turkish public opinion opposing the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Under these circumstances,
the Gulen movement offered its followers an alternative national Turkish identity that was compatible with a liberalized economy but still defined Turks as Muslim (Yavuz and Esposito 2003).

At present, the military has its own realm of control within Turkish society and the state, but the prerogatives of the military are increasingly being threatened by social movements such as the Gulen movement. This threat stems from the military and state’s inability to fulfill most Turks’ need for a Muslim identity, and the military’s failure to develop effective relationships with Turkey’s social movements or Turkey’s civil society more generally (Aras 1998).

The Gulen movement is a modernity-compatible movement because it replaced its original Islamist ideology with a Weberian-like rationality as it became more integrated within the modern, neoliberal market economy. To reach its goals and objectives for greater market share, the movement became more rational, carefully assessing costs and benefits. The Cemaat retained some of its earlier goals and objectives, but it also more openly adopted the objective to increase its political and economic power. The Cemaat’s integration with the modern market economy, in turn, prodded its members to adopt modern perspectives in other, non-market spheres. Thus, the Gulen movement is not simply Islamist, but represents the pro-market “Merchant Mohammad.” For the Cemaat, Islam is a framework for social solidarity within the market economy and in effect, Islam is their means to their ends, rather than an end in itself.
CHAPTER 5: JAMA’AT-E-ISLAMI OF PAKISTAN: ISLAMIZATION OF STATE AND MARKET

Islam is both a political religion and a way of life, which regulates every aspect of its followers’ daily lives. In the 20th century, the political aspect of Islam has been revitalized as a result of capitalism and the nation-state, and the impact they have had on Islam. The founder of the Jama’at-e Islami in Pakistan, Mawlana Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, pointed out that in order for a Muslim to reach eternal happiness and God’s kingdom as described in the Qur’an, the five pillars of Islam (Profession of Faith, prayer five times a day, pilgrimage to Mecca, fasting in Ramadan, and zakat/taxation) are not enough.

Mawdudi believed that the sixth pillar of Islam is the Islamization of the state and society, and establishing Allah’s order on the earth, which requires Jihad. Mawdudi believed that Islam must return to its origin and roots, which are embedded in Shari’a and require a society to create an Islamic order. Therefore, Mawdudi established the Jama’at-e Islami as a vanguard of Islamic Revolution. However, social and political conditions in Pakistan and the Muslim world did not allow Mawdudi to revolutionize Pakistan, but instead radicalized the Jama’at. In this chapter, I will explore Mawdudi’s idea of Islam and his influence on the Jama’at, in addition to the transformation of the Jama’at within the context of Pakistan’s Neoliberalization process.

1. Mawlana Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi and the “Islamic Way of Life”

In terms of Islamic political thought, the Jama’at has been one of the most important political parties in Muslim societies, aside from the Muslim Brotherhood and Ikhwan-al Muslimun in Egypt. Unlike other parties in Muslim societies, the Jama’at represents the
core values of Islamic resistance against Western-based capitalist hegemony, and embraces a strongly anti-globalist ideology.

In order to examine the Jama’at from an Islamic perspective, it is necessary to first understand the founder of the Jama’at, Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi (1903-1979), and his form of Islamic political thought. Mawdudi was one of the most significant, complex and articulate Islamic thinkers and political activists in the 20th century. His views have shaped, and continued to influence Islamic political thought and Islamist movements in Muslim societies to the present day (Brown 2000).

Mawlana Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi’s Islamic political thought has influenced and continues to shape the ideas of political Islam well into the 20th century. Political realities and conflicts of this time period have also shaped Mawdudi’s understanding of Islam. During his lifetime, history witnessed the revitalization of Islam both in the social and political spheres. His journalism and political activism was at the center of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi politics. According to Wilfred Cantwell Smith, “Perhaps the most significant constituent of Mawdudi’s position has been the gradual and continual elaboration of an impressive system of ideas. Mawdudi would appear to be the most systematic thinker of modern Islam” (Smith 1957).

Mawdudi’s influence has been more complex and multifaceted than that of even Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. This is because, unlike these leaders and thinkers, Mawdudi is considered to be a part of the Muslim Ulama (Religious Clergy). This is significant because he is understood to be both a political activist and at the same time a part of the religious environment. His writings and political perspectives have influenced Muslims and Islamic groups and movements that extend from Indonesia to Turkey.
Mawdudi’s approach to the Islamic State, and Shari’a in particular, is more unique and comprehensive than most other scholars, activists, and leaders because he describes Islam as a comprehensive system that regulates every aspect of human life. In addition, his theoretical framework regarding the comprehensiveness of Islam is a direct response and reaction to imperialist and capitalist domination, which is viewed as a threat to the Islamic way of life (Qutb 1991).

According to Mawdudi, Islam requires the establishment of an Islamic world order based on the Qur’an and Sunna (the latter being the deeds, acts and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). Mawdudi has a unique perspective and is one of the first Islamic political thinkers who articulated the Qur’an- and Sunna-based constitution for the Islamic State. He viewed the adherence to the strict guidelines of Shari’a as an effort that should extend to every corner of human activity and dictate every decision, so that all decisions are made in complete accordance with Islam. This belief was meant to reaffirm and establish Islam among the Muslim lands and among the people who had lost the true message of Islam and the prophet (Jan 2003).

Mawdudi re-examines the role of Muslims within the modern state and society, and proposes that their role is to re-create an Islamic State. In this context, Muslims’ main obligation is not limited just to praying to God, but to serve God by rebuilding the Islamic order. Mawdudi portrays Muslims as a political rather than just a religious people, and views Muslims as an agent of structure; more specifically, the structure of Islam. Accordingly, Muslims must comprehend Shari’a and rebuild the Islamic State and society based on the Golden Age (the first fifty years of Islam), the Qur’an and the
Sunna. Therefore, one of the basic religious obligations of Muslims is to form an Islamic State in order to understand the complete meaning of Islam (Mawdudi 1950).

The Jama’at is an Islamic revivalist movement that embodies the reaction to the “negative” influences of Western Capitalist domination of Muslim lands in the 20th century. In his work titled the “Islamic Way of Life,” Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi expresses what it is to be Islamic and defines the way of life Muslims should aspire to follow, as advocated by the Prophet Muhammad and the Qur’an (Mawdudi 1950). The overall aim of the Islamic Way of Life is to achieve peace, harmony, unity and love in all corners of the world, and among the Muslim community. Mawdudi’s social and political thought was optimistic and he espoused a form of “pantheistic globalism” with the belief that “the message of Allah is for all mankind” and that “each and everything in the world belongs to Allah” (Mawdudi 1988).

Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi came from the distinguished Ahlu’l-Bayt family, a family that directly descends from the Prophet Mohammad’s daughter Fatimah. Mawdudi was born in British-occupied India in 1903 and witnessed the occupation in his childhood. In 1918, he began his career as a journalist in the Bijnore newspaper and soon after became editor of the daily Taj, Jabalpur, Daily Muslim, and Al-Jamiat newspapers. In the year 1941, he attended the very first Jama’at-i-Islami meeting held, and was appointed Ameer of Jama’at (Badri 2003). After the partition of Pakistan from India in 1948, Mawdudi and Jama’at campaigned for an Islamic constitution and government and soon after, he was put into jail. In the year 1972, he finished one of the most important works of his lifetime, the Tafheem-ul-Qur’an. He died in 1979 in Buffalo, New York (Nasr 1996).
Mawdudi is one of the most important revivalist Islamic thinkers, political activists and theologians in the 20th century. Like Political Islam, Mawdudi himself is a product of the modern conditions of his economic, political, and social environment, which challenged the more traditional and religious structures. Mawdudi’s version of Islamic political thought was created in the context of imperialism, colonialism and occupation in India and in response to Western hegemony over Muslim land. The emergence of Western capitalism also influenced and shaped his ideas regarding the Islamic State and his understanding of the Islamic response to this domination. According to Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi’s contribution to the development of Islamic revivalism and its ideals and language is so significant that it cannot be satisfactorily understood without consideration of his life and thought” (Nasr 1996).

The new capitalist economic structures forming on the Indian subcontinent transformed societies by imposing the ideology of the Western Capitalistic individual. Mawdudi believed that this encroaching individualism was a threat to the Muslim peoples and more specifically to the Muslim Ummah, and he believed that the concept of the individual should not apply at all for Muslims or within Islam. Rather, he supported the idea of the collective consciousness for the Ummah, which was to be re-established in order to develop new Islamic ways of life (Nasr 1996). Mawdudi tried to revitalize the Muslim masses, using the ideal of the Ummah and collective consciousness.

The Islamic Way of Life

In one of Mawdudi’s most important books, the *Islamic Way of Life*, he refers to the Islamic political system based on three principles: the oneness of God, Prophethood, and the Caliphate. Describing the oneness of God, he says that the sovereignty of the Islamic
kingdom exists only in Allah, and only the Creator has the authority to command or forbid obedience (Mawdudi 2005). It is also God, not the people who decides the purpose of their existence on earth and how to carry it out. The oneness of God principle is essential in determining that it is with God, not with humans, that legal and political sovereignty is decided. According to Mawdudi, Allah’s commandments provide the law of Islam through the Qur’an and the Hadiths and through the concept of Kufr, or the belief in obedience to anything other than God. According to McDonough, “The worst sin in Mawdudi’s system of thought is Kufr, failure to acknowledge the validity of the system, which he believes to be God’s plan for humanity. Kufr is both individual and social” (McDonough 1984).

In his writings, Mawdudi tried to explain how the world received the Law of God. He stated that it was through the Prophet Mohammad, hence the principle of prophethood, that the Law was received. Through the Prophet, the Divine Book was received as well as the Prophet’s interpretation of the Divine book for others to follow. The Prophet used the Divine Book or Qur’an to create a model for all Muslims to follow, and this was to be the source of a constitution for the Islamic State. The Divine Book demonstrated and painstakingly detailed the correct way of living and how to implement the law of God in addition to the law of men on earth. These two important aspects pertaining to the prophethood were known as the Shari’a. The Prophet exemplified the belief in a specific and meaningful, unique purpose for each man’s life. The only way to successfully achieve this purpose and to be a true follower of Allah was for man to fulfill his function in the world (Osman 2003). All those who did not fulfill their function failed to complete Allah’s stated purpose for man. These views represent the Caliphate
principle: the idea that man is God’s servant on earth, and not a servant of the people or the state.

The ideology of Mawdudi, the leader of the Jama’at movement, directly influenced the Islamic political theory of the Jama’at and its followers. Consequently, the views of Mawdudi will be used interchangeably with the ideas of the Jama’at movement throughout this chapter. Mawdudi, and by extension the Jama’at, believed in an Islam that is able to influence individuals, while providing concrete rules and justification for the laws of an Islamic society and its objective to build a Muslim Ummah (Moten 2003). This belief system values the gradual righting of society, which takes place through the Islamic State that leads its members on the path of a rightly guided life. Humans are seen to have failed to use the independence God has given them to recognize Him, and men are believed to have turned away from God in their pursuit of living materialistic, individualistic and capitalistic lives. Consequently, to be a Muslim, one must submit completely to God and leave no aspect of one’s life outside of the will of Allah (Mawdudi 1988). In this view, the Qur’an and the Sunna provide all the necessary direction for man to determine how God wishes him to live. Mawdudi also believed that it was the responsibility of Islam to correct the ways of man, and that this outcome would be brought about gradually.

Mawdudi held a strong belief that Islam was being diminished by the influence of Western cultural, economic and political expansion and its spreading secularism. Resistance to these forces required not only a return to a moral and Islam-centered life, but also required vigilance in erecting a structural social framework that reinforced this return. As such, an Islamic political and religious thinker should forcefully reject Western
secularism but would also, to varying degrees, inwardly enforce adherence to a moral life guided by the Qur’an and Shari’a. Mawdudi viewed the entire world as the eventual domain of Islam and believed that the world was under the control of Allah. This therefore demonstrates both an optimistic and global outlook. This global outlook gave his argument and the Jama’at ideology great force (Moten 2002). Mawdudi was considered to be an Islamic centrist.

The ideology of the Jama’at did not compromise on any issues regarding the entrenchment of the Islamic State in public life. Mawdudi does not accept any form of Western political thought and did not try to find a solution within the secular system. His objective was instead to build a parallel system of government in order to re-establish the Islamic State and revitalize the Islamic order. A unified Muslim identity could only be constructed by rejecting the current social, political and economic order and institutional structures. According to this view, there is no solution for Islam and Muslims that is compatible within the current system. Therefore, the answer is the rejection of modern conditions in favor of the sovereignty of Allah. In the year 1950, Mawdudi wrote with conviction that “The political system of Islam has been based on three principles, Tawheed [the Oneness of God], Risalat [Prophethood] and Khilafat [Caliphate]” (Mawdudi 1950). This demonstrates the inseparable nature of Islam and politics according to Mawdudi’s ideological framework.

Mawdudi and the Jama’at make a strong and convincing argument for the imposition of an Islamic moral, social and political ideology, and for strict moral adherence to Islamic law, or the Shari’a (Nasr 1996). The most important tenet of Islam is the complete and total recognition of Allah as the Supreme Being; infallible, omnipotent,
all-powerful, and able from the time of creation to instill in man free will and the power to choose right from wrong and good from evil. Belief or “Iman” represents the contract made by man to Allah to live life in accordance with the Prophet, his Sunna and the Qur’an. Islam is based on the concept of punishment and reward but is also based on the idea of spiritual and physical submission to Allah. All aspects of human society; political, cultural and religious must be in tune with the principles of Islam. Most importantly, submission to Allah is chosen and is never forced (Ansari 2003). It is the union of the men and women who perform total submission to Allah and Islam that creates the Muslim Society or Ummah, and this society is the most perfect of all societies because it is based on the foundation of equality and respect towards all people, and their union under the umbrella of love and faith, with God as the sovereign.

Like Mawdudi, Hasan Al-Banna, who is one of the founders of the Muslim Brotherhood, believes in complete and total submission to the will of Allah, in addition to the advancement of equality for mankind. Al-Banna and Mawdudi both advocate the five pillars of Islam as necessary components of the practice of Islam. However, like Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Al-Banna, Mawdudi also believes that the spiritual way of Islam is not the true path to salvation as a Muslim. Instead, complete submission is the way to reach Iman (Faith) and depart from the Jahiliyya, a term which refers to the era of ignorance in the pre-Islamic period (Mawdudi 1988; Mawdudi 2005).

It was Mawdudi who reinvigorated the concept that Muslims have been living in an ancient state of Jahiliyya until recently; and that the Muslim community had in fact become extinct and had been for many centuries. He wrote that contemporary Muslim society was in disrepair, and had fallen away from the faith of Islam and reverted back to
the ignorance of pre-Islam due to a lack of Iman (Faith) and Shari’a to govern in union with faith. To truly follow the Islamic faith, the laws of the secular world should be overthrown and Shari’a law must govern supremely. It is only in this way that a true Islamic State is achieved. Mawdudi saw Western societies as capitalistic, materialistic, greedy, lustful, sinful, lecherous, treacherous and nationalistic, possessing dark and evil symptoms of an even greater disease that now affects the Islamic State and the Ummah (Akbarzadeh and Saeed 2003).

The Islamic State and Shari’a

According to Nasr, Mawdudi “was one of the first Islamic thinkers to develop a systematic political reading of Islam and a plan for social action to realize his vision” (Nasr 1996). Indeed, this was the first Islamic response to the modern secular state articulated in the form of a social movement. As such, the Islamic State exists within the framework of Dar-ul Islam, which is a land ruled by Muslims according to Islamic principles, and Muslims as well as Islam will be marginalized in the absence of an Islamic State and Darul Islam (Mawdudi 1950). However, Mawdudi also argues that the collective consciousness of Muslims is more important than the creation of an Islamic State and implementing the Shari’a, and therefore, total submission to Allah in every aspect of life is the first stage towards creating a “purely” Islamic State (Mawdudi 1950). Mawdudi understood that in order to build an Islamic State, Muslims must possess a collective consciousness that would be able to compel them to take decisive and united action together, as one entity, under circumstances in which Muslims were otherwise quite divided politically and socially. Consequently, his objective was to implement Shari’a and establish an Islamic State as the next step in Islamic political development.
Sharia’a would create just such an impetus to act based on its ability to create a common understanding of the Muslim identity and objectives. Similarly, the Qur’an is not a constitution, but is the main source for it; therefore, a Muslim must understand the Qur’an in the context of Tafseer (Translation and Explanation of the Qur’an) in order to implement Shari’a (Rahman 1979).

In terms of the Ummah and the state, the Jama’at’s understanding of political structure is similar to the Marxist understanding of state and the classless society. The Muslim concepts of Ummah and Muslim collective consciousness also possess some similarity with the Marxist concept of class-consciousness. Within Muslim thought, the Muslim community is valued more greatly than the individual, and individualism itself is perceived as a product of the Western capitalist mode of production. Selfish-individualism is perceived as a disease that is created by modern capitalist conditions. This understanding of the economic system is similar to the perspective expressed by Western political and social thinkers such as Leo Strauss and Robert Putnam (Locke 2002; Putnam 2000). According to the Marxist perspective, social solidarity is prized above individualism, and individualism is a product of the Western capitalist mode of production. However, individualism is also based on class and class-consciousness. In one case, collective identity is based on religion, and in the other it is based on class and the unity of workers.

The Jama’at does not recognize any difference between religious and political life; therefore within this ideology, secularism does not actually exist. Nasr claims that Mawdudi believes that the “enforcement of the Din and managing state the state are ineluctably tied to one another” (Nasr 1996). Secularism is therefore an outside factor
that has been forced on the Muslim community in order to weaken Islam and Muslim society; and the Western values of secularism, nationalism and democracy are perceived as a direct threat to the values of community, and religious observance and to Muslim social and political unity. The Jama’at’s objective was to establish a unified Muslim identity in order to set the stage for Muslims to build political structures that embody Islamic ideology and following this, to establish an Islamic State (Moten 2002) through the Islamization of Muslim society.

According to Nasr, three concepts are important for Mawdudi in establishing an Islamic State. “The political order must be a clear manifestation of the sovereignty of God. The corollary of the establishment of the religion (iqamat-i din) was virtuous leadership (imamat-i salihah) and divine government (hukumat-i ilahiyah)” (Nasr 1996). The first concept is to re-establish the religion, or “din” [meaning “religion” or “Islam”]. Din must be re-established in the mind of the Muslim community and there must be a complete rejection of the secular mind. Regarding Iqamat-i din: a Muslim must understand the role of the din in his personal life; then Mumin [the Believer] can apply Islam to political life. Rightly guided leadership (imamat-i salihah) is another important aspect of creating an Islamic State. According to the Prophet Muhammad, Muslims must follow rightly guided leaders in order to situate themselves within a social, political and economic environment. Without implementing Shari’a law, Muslim society and the state cannot then be considered Islamic (Qutb 1991).

To briefly describe the nature of an Islamic State, Mawdudi is a proponent of theo-democracy, which is the idea of an Islamic democracy. According to Nasr, “Mawdudi insisted that the Islamic State would be democratic because its leadership
would be duly elected and bound by the writ of divine law” (Nasr 1996). The gist of this idea is captured within the terms “democratic caliphate” and “theo-democracy,” which Nasr coined to describe how the Islamic State would work (Nasr 1996). He also argues that the Islamic State is different from theocratic states in the history of Europe, and that the Islamic government or theo-democratic Islamic State is democratic and civil. He further elaborates on this concept by stressing that Islam goes beyond democracy, because the Western understanding of democracy implies a secular meaning; whereas Islam is the revelation of God and the sovereignty of Allah. He relates the Islamic State with Prophet Muhammad’s political structure of Medina and applies a redefined concept of democracy within the Islamic context. It is important to note that Mawdudi is Pan-Islamist and non-territorialist (Mawdudi 1950). He did not confine the Islamic State to a specific territory and viewed territorialization as the division of Islam and the Muslim Ummah. Instead, he espoused the territorial unity of Muslim lands. In this type of Pan-Islamic State, Shari’a would be the rule of law; and without this, the Muslim is not a complete Mumin (Believer) (Mawdudi 1950).

Many Islamic thinkers and political activists believe that Mawdudi is a true pioneer of Islamization (Badri 2003). Although he rejected Western secular and nationalist ideas, Mawdudi tried to understand, and was aware of, the various theoretical frameworks of social and political thought including those of Marx, Hegel and Darwin. He viewed these frameworks and Western civilization overall as a modern form of “Jahiliyya,” or ignorance (i.e., the Pre-Islamic period). He rejected the Western notion of the democratic and modern secular state, and his objective was to implement Islam within a parallel Islamic political structure (Badri 2003) that would be able to thrive in the
context of modernity. His Islamic renaissance is therefore significantly different than the apologetic beliefs of Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, because these political and religious activists tended to accept the Western notion of modernity. Abduh and Afghani attempted to apply Western political structures to Muslim societies but still called themselves Islamists. Mawdudi, on the other hand, was a purist and rejected the Western political structure entirely. Mawdudi’s understanding of modernity represents the re-Islamization of society.

Mawdudi’s contribution to Islamic Political thought helps one to understand the Islamic response to modern capitalism, secularization and individualization. Without any doubt, he is a complex and multifaceted Islamic thinker who contributed to Islamic political thought more than any other thinker and theologian in the 20th century. He represents the “Leninist” form of Islam. For example, the political and bureaucratic structure of the Jama’at–e Islami was similar to the Leninist party structure and to the politburo, whereas Sayyid Qutb embodies the resistant form of Islam. The Jama’at and Mawdudi are not trying to destroy the state and society, unlike Sayyid Qutb, but have attempted to rebuild and restructure the state and society (Qutb 1991).

Mawdudi tried to pursue an Islamic path of modernization and knew that the capitalist mode of modernization was a powerful machine able to eliminate traditional structures. Therefore, he attempted to reconfigure the role of religion in modern society and the state by applying an Islamic understanding to these challenges.

2. Movement Goals: The Islamic State and Theo-Democracy

The ideology of the Jama’at today builds on the ideological background established by its founding father, and in addition focuses on character building, improvements in
education, and healthcare. It is impossible to understand the politics of the Jama’at without first understanding Mawdudi’s ideas and the historical context of the political struggle that took place on the sub-continent until the emergence of Pakistan. In the first period of Mawdudi’s life as a scholar, he engaged with the moral issues of Islam such as character building and Islamic theology. However, the political conditions and conflict of Southeast Asia later prompted Mawdudi to pursue political activism. Specifically, when he was 24, Mawdudi wrote a book, *Al-Jihad fil Islam*, which conceptualized the role of Jihad in re-establishing the Khilafat, launching his involvement in the Khilafat movement in India, Mawdudi’s interaction with the leader of the Khilafat movement changed his views on politics and he began to elaborate on the concept of Jihad in Islam in response to this influence (Badri 2003).

In India’s provincial elections of 1936-1937, there were two distinct sets of voters, Hindus and Muslims. The Hindus and Muslims voted separately. This election marked Jinnah’s increasing political power among Muslims, and Mawdudi viewed Jinnah’s Muslim nationalism as a threat to the true Muslim identity, which was embedded in the Global Ummah. By contrast, Jinnah believed in a territorially based form of Muslim nationalism. In response to this trend of secularism and Muslim nationalism in the Muslim league, Mawdudi believed that Muslims should establish a party that would eventually be able to mobilize Muslims and Islamic politics. This was the idea behind the origin of the Jama’at. Mawdudi describes the politics of the Muslim League as “La-din’I,” a term meaning “non-religious” or “secular” (Jan 2003), and is mentioned in the Qur’an to mean the opposite of Din.

The modern political structure of Pakistan includes secular parties, organizations
and movements; however, Islamic political parties, movements or organizations such as Mawdudi’s Jama’at aim to re-establish God’s sovereignty in the political realm. Mawdudi argues that the creation of the modern nation-state establishes secular sovereignty, and according to his framework of Islamic political thought, secular sovereignty can be described as Iqamat-e Hakoomet-e Ilahiya, or “replacing God’s sovereignty.” He reasons that the secular state, like Islam, controls every aspect of human life. Mawdudi’s contribution to Islamic Political Thought begins with his assertion that establishing an Islamic social, political and economic system (Dar-ul Islam) is a religious obligation, and that in Muslim societies, the Islamic order must be re-established (Nasr 1981). In essence, Mawdudi argues that Islam and Politics cannot be separated, because Islam is essentially a political religion.

In an effort to establish an Islamic order (Dar-ul Islam), Mawdudi founded the Jama’at-e Islami in Lahore in the year 1941. The Jama’at created a very powerful base of operations in Karachi, after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. This was a period when many Indian Muslims migrated to the area. During and after this period of heightened migration, the Jama’at played an active role providing social services and healthcare to the Muhacir (migrant) population in Karachi (Amin 2009). The Jama’at adopted a cadre-based structure similar to that of the Leninist party, and built alliances with Islamic parties in other countries by recruiting members through a network of schools. Hoping to be the vanguard of an Islamic revolution, the Jama’at worked with the new state elite, trade unions, students, and professional organizations, and even built its own media outlets. Mawdudi and the Jama’at’s struggle began with the partitioning of Pakistan; however, the real conflict started during Ayub Khan’s presidency. In 1964, Mawdudi was
imprisoned, but because of overwhelming political pressure, he was released later that year (Amin 2009).

After Khan left power in the year 1971, Jinnah became the President of Pakistan. That same year, the war with India began. The Jama’at collaborated with various government forces, and mobilized several militia groups, including the Al Badr and the Al Shams (Hossain 2007). Members of the Al Badr tended to be college educated members of the Jama’at, whereas, members of the Al Shams were Madrassa graduates. Both groups played an important role in the wars with India and Bangladesh. The Jama’at’s organizational model facilitated the formation of social solidarity among Southeast Asian Muslims; the Jama’at’s leaders used this heightened solidarity to transform the party from a Pakistani-based movement to one based on regional religio-political factors. The war with India also served as a turning point for the Jama’at, helping to establish deeper relationships with the Pakistani military and intelligence. Husnul Amin, however, claims that the Jama’at did not, in fact, have a good relationship with the Bhutto government (Amin 2009). The meaning of the state varies, but often refers to state establishments including the military establishment, state bureaucracies, and intelligence agencies.

3. Mobilizing Supporters: The “Islamic” Political Party as a Social Movement
The Jama’at is a modern political movement and is a product of modern political, social and economic conditions; therefore, the organizational structure of the Jama’at resembles the organizational structure of modern political parties. The main goal of the party is to establish a religious order through Dar-ul Islam, loosely translated as a country under Islamic rule (Moten 2002). Within this order, religion and politics cannot be separated.
The president or the Ameer of the Jama’at is elected by popular vote by the Markazi Majlis-i Shura, which has sixty members selected through provincial elections. There is a regional hierarchy; beginning with the province and it can be broken down to a division, district, city, town or zone, village or circle. The election of the Ameer is a very democratic process; however, according to Nasr, the Ameer demands absolute authority over his members once he comes to power regardless of how democratic the election was. This absolute authority comes from the religion and Shari’a (Nasr 1994).

The Jama’at is a political party whose members have legal membership at one of three levels; “Arkan” who are the official members of the party; supporters or affiliates called “Mutaffiq”; and sympathizers called “Hamdard.” Arkan are the active members of the Jama’at and they usually volunteer to work and help with Jama’at activities. They organize public meetings, run for the elections, and work as election officers. Both women and men belong to the party. The Mutaffiq are the supporters or affiliates, and this group usually supports party activities and attends the public meetings, demonstrations, and votes for the party. The third group, the Hamdard, is the target of the Arkan because the Arkan seeks to recruit more sympathizers to become Hamdards. Arkan and Mutaffiq members in turn attempt to educate the Hamdard, and bring them into party politics. This organization structure resembles the Leninist party structure (Nasr 1994).

Another important bureaucratic element of the Jama’at is the party’s general secretary which is a bureaucratic organ of the party that acts as an internal mechanism to provide checks and balances. It controls the Jama’at organization structure and workers,
and organizes educational and training activities for the Jama’at’s workers and party delegates.

Unlike many other Islamist parties and movements, Jama’at-e Islami Pakistan also has a woman’s wing called the Halqa Khawateen, or the “circle of women.” This group is very active in educating and indoctrinating women members of the Jama’at in the party ideology. According to the constitution of the women’s wing of the Jama’at (Jama'at 2009), women should be educated and trained in local and global politics, and should support the Jama’at’s activities. Women’s involvement has increased since Hussain Qazi became the Ameer [President] of the party in 1987.

The Jama’at’s socio-political activities are framed in three aspects. These include Dawah (mission), Tarbiyah (Islamic education) and Tanzeem (organization) in almost all regions of Pakistan. Dawah corresponds to the concept of mission in Arabic, which means the spread of Islam through invitation. According to the meaning of this concept and in the framework of the Islamic sciences, a Muslim is obligated to educate and spread the message of Islam to non-Muslims, which can be Christians, Jews, or other religious groups. However, the Jama’at and Mawdudi believe that Muslims have been corrupted and de-Islamized by secular modernist regimes, such as the secular elite in Turkey and Pakistan. Therefore, the message should also be extended to Muslims who have been de-Islamicized in Muslim populated societies. The Jama’at considers themselves the protector or vanguard of Islam - Dawah, the “spread of Islam”(Amin 2009).

“Tarbiyah” or “education” facilitates the core of Islamic ethics and morality in the social structure of Muslim societies. According to Husnul Amin, who has been a member of the Jama’at, Tarbiyah plays an important role in educating the members and
sympathizers of the Jama’at (Amin 2009). The market economy is an amoral (neither moral nor immoral) system, whereas Islam defines morality and ethics within the framework of the Qur’an. Therefore, the objective of Islamic Tarbiyeh is to re-educate Muslims in Islamic morality.

Tanzeem (organization) is another important principle in Jama’at’s activities. As a result of new market conditions, the Jama’at has been restructured and has created sub-organizations in order to educate the masses for the Dawah. Therefore the Jama’at has labor, student, women’s, lawyers’, and doctors’ associations, each promoting the Jama’at’s ideological framework, or Dawah – the Islamic solution for the masses (Amin 2009).

4. Changing Political Opportunities

After Mawdudi resigned as Ameer of the Jama’at in 1972, Mian Muhammad Tufail was elected by Majlis-i Shura as the Ameer of the Jama’at, where he served until 1987. In this era, the Jama’at was less active in Pakistan than before, but was effective in organizing and educating groups and movements outside of Pakistan (such as in Bangladesh and Afghanistan). Tufail’s era can be divided into two parts. During the first period, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the president of Pakistan, his socialist based policies did not match with the Jama’at’s goals and objectives. Accordingly, the leadership of the Jama’at was in conflict with Bhutto’s foreign and domestic policies. Its leaders and members were jailed and repressed by the Bhutto government until Zia-Ul Haq overthrew the Bhutto government. Bhutto’s nationalization and socialist economic policies did not help the Jama’at, because both Bhutto and the Jama’at have similar perspectives on economic issues – making them political competitors in a nearly-zero-sum game. For example, both
have a critical perspective regarding the destructive consequences of capitalism but both also hold a very different social and political ideology; one is very secular and socialist, and the other very Islamist. There was only one single political space for these two actors, and both wanted to capture the bureaucratic structure of the state.

The second period began with Zia-ul Haq’s economic neoliberalism and political Islamization policies. In this neoliberal era, the Jama’at benefited more than other political parties and extended its membership and activities across borders. Additionally, the Jama’at’s middle class emerged in the early 1980s. According to Husnul Amin, Tufail was a symbol of the status quo in Zia’s presidency (Amin 2009). Whereas Mawdudi rejected cooperation with the military dictator Ayub Khan in the 1960s, Tufail was more than happy to work with the dictator Zia-ul Haq. In fact, their common opposition to Bhutto and their support for the Afghan Jihad brought the Jama’at and General Zia-ul Haq together in the early 1980s against the Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan.

Zia-Ul Haq’s Islamization slogan received welcome from the Jama’at and General Zia supported and financed the Jama’at’s activities all over Pakistan, as well as in Kashmir, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. In this era, the Jama’at opened schools and established organizations, and unions. According to many scholars (Abbas 2005; Amin 2009; Haqqani 2005), the common ground between the Jama’at and Zia-Ul Haq was Islam. For the first time in Pakistani history, the military and the intelligence establishments welcomed the Jama’at and worked together in many areas of foreign and domestic policy.

According to Deniz Tansi, who is a professor at Yeditepe University, “The Jama’at -e- Islami under Mawdudi has provided Muslims with an alternative social-political and
economic system to Western democracies, which is more culturally relevant to their lives. Mawdudi's political discourse has also influenced other Islamic movements globally. One must also take many valuable lessons from Pakistan’s Islamic movements. For instance Pakistan’s existence is attributed in part to Western support, and the country was founded according to only the religious differences, which distinguished it from India. In the longer term, Pakistan's policies also served the interests of the United States. For example, Ul Hak's administration became a background for Afghan Jihadists against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After the Cold War, Mawdudi's ideas became popular among Islamic fundamentalists. Nevertheless, Islamic movements are not outside of the Neoliberal paradigm. Islamic movements take on the class struggle and contend (openly) with modern democratic demands just as other social movements do within the neoliberal economy”(Tansi 2009).

5. New Leadership: Qazi Hussain Ahmad

The modern transformation of the Jama’at took place under Qazi Hussain Ahmad’s leadership. In 1987, Tufail stepped down from the position of Ameer of the Jama’at and Qazi Hussain Ahmad was elected the new Ameer of the party. Qazi was not supportive of Pakistan’s social and political status quo, in the sense that he was not part of the military and bureaucratic establishment and was adamant about promoting social, political and economic justice within Pakistan. The Jama’at had been transformed from a community based social movement to a more modern bureaucratic party. Before Qazi, the party’s membership was not fully open to the public; Mawdudi and Tufail required strict criteria for new members that came from outside of the Islamist circles. However, Qazi seized the opportunity to open the Jama’at to all social and political groups as a result of the
widening gap between social and economic classes. This marked the transformation of the Jama’at, and was its response to neoliberal democracy imposed by the IMF and World Bank in Pakistan.

The fact that Jama’at now pursues an open door policy, and membership is now possible for the entire Pakistani society, is evidence of the movement’s adaptation to modern politics and political processes. This is because the movement needed to open its doors to all possible supporters and sympathizers and garner support from wherever it could without being as purist regarding Islamist credentials. In short, the Party has adopted a modern political structure (Amin 2009).

Qazi’s era was also a period of major change within Pakistani politics and the economy. In this new era, the Pakistani military disappeared from the political and social scene, because they were busy adapting to neoliberal changes in the Pakistani economy and politics. According to Nasr, this was the rebirth of democracy in Pakistan(Nasr 1994).

Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir Bhutto, was elected the new President of Pakistan in the year 1987. Qazi understood that this new era would contend with different challenges and issues than the old and traditional politics, because new political and economic actors had emerged in Pakistan. Qazi Hussain established an organization called the Islamic Front and formed a youth wing of the Jama’at called Pasban. Pasban’s main objective was to support to human rights and to question social, economic and political injustices. However, after many conflicts among leaders in Pasban, Qazi Hussain established another youth organization, called the Shabab-e Milli. Today, this organization is the official youth organization of the Jama’at (Amin 2009).
During the Mawdudi and Tufail eras, supporters of the Jama’at had come from Pakistan’s urban middle class. In the 1990s, however, Qazi’s political language attracted the poor and youths in Pakistan, because the IMF and the World Bank economic liberalization policies created unhappy masses, specifically among new migrants in big cities such as Karachi, Peshawar and Lahore. This transformation created a class conflict within the Jama’at. Neoliberalism and economic transformation changed Pakistani society and politics as well as the Jama’at (Siddiqa 2007).

The IMF and World Bank’s structural adjustment policies created new economic and political conditions in Pakistan. There was a widening economic gap between the classes in Pakistan in the 1990s, and the Jama’at attempted to use this opportunity to its advantage. Some members of the Jama’at benefited from these economic policies and began to become upwardly mobile; at this point, they left the Jama’at to join other parties with more purely economic principles and objectives. This is because they perceived there to be greater economic opportunity then was available previously to them through solidarity with the Jama’at. On the other hand, there were harmful effects from these same neoliberal policies on the poor, and this generated tremendous Jama’at support within the laboring class (Amin 2009).

In the democratic era, the Jama’at was competing with two powerful political leaders and parties. Benazir Bhutto, who was the leader of the Pakistan People Party (PPP), and Nawaz Sharif, who was the President of the Muslim League, both supported the World Bank and IMF policies. In fact, both differ insignificantly from military dictator Zia-Ul Haq in terms of their economic liberalization policies (Moten 2002).

According to Bokhari, “The privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOE)
became an important instrument of economic policy for the government in late 80s” (Bokhari 1998). In 1991, with the support of the IMF and the World Bank, the Nawaz Sharif government created the Cabinet Committee on Privatisation and the Privatisation Commission of Pakistan, which played an active role in this new economic period (Privatisation Commission (Government of Pakistan) 2009). Sharif represents the capitalist class in Pakistan; however, he also understood the Islamization of Pakistan and the increasing power and support of the Jama’at. Sharif portrayed himself and the Muslim League as the true supporters of Islam and Muslim interests against the Jama’at in order to gain the vote of Islamists. In 1998, he proposed new legislation to implement Shari’a in Pakistan. However, in 1999 General Pervez Musharraf overthrew him in a bloodless military coup d’état before he could implement these objectives (Haqqani 2005).

6. The Jama’at’s Transformation

The military and bureaucratic elite in Pakistan have a very complex and multifaceted relationship with Jama’at, one that can best be described as a love-hate relationship. Both parties have benefitted from this relationship. On the other hand, Jama’at’s collaboration with the military establishment and the bureaucratic elite over the years has had negative consequences for the Jama’at. For example, the Jama’at’s support of the Zia-ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf has been criticized by other parties and movements inside and outside of Pakistan. This is because it is contradictory for the Jama’at to claim that it seeks democracy and anti-American policies at the same time as it supports military dictatorships supported by the United States. However, the current President of the Jama’at, Syed Munawar Hasan, seems likely to change and re-establish the Jama’at’s relationship with the military establishment and bureaucratic elite.
In 1987 Pakistan entered a new Democratic era, but in 1999 the Pakistani military overthrew the democratically elected president and declared military rule in Pakistan. Qazi Hussain’s Jama’at took a neutral role in the military coup d'état, and during the next two years, Musharraf ruled the country. In the 2002 election, the Jama’at and five other religious parties formed a coalition, called the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA). In 2004, Musharraf made a deal with the MMA, legitimating his military coup in the eyes of Islamists. Husnul Amin argues that the military supported the MMA in the 2002 election; however, a year later, the de facto coalition between Musharraf and the Jama’at collapsed as a result of the American invasion of Afghanistan and Musharraf’s cooperation with the United States (Amin 2009). This was a turning point for the Jama’at and for Islamists in Pakistan regarding their relations with the Musharraf dictatorship. The Jama’at and Qazi re-evaluated their relationship, because the Jama’at supported and organized the Islamic Jihad in Afghanistan and in general had held close relations with the Muslims in Afghanistan (Fuller 2004).

To understand Pakistan’s political environment following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, one must first examine the politics in Afghanistan and its relationship to Pakistani history and society. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Jihadists had won the war, and next, set out to re-establish the Islamic order in Afghanistan. This was the emergence of the Taliban, and the Talibanization of Afghanistan has very strongly influenced domestic politics in Pakistan.

After the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1996, Pakistan’s domestic politics became more radicalized. This is because the seventeen-year relationship between the Jihadists in Afghanistan and the Islamists in Pakistan provided a friendly
environment and facilitated the exchange of ideas between these groups and within the Muslim Ummah. This facilitated the development of a collective consciousness among Muslims.

However, from a Weberian perspective on modernity, at this point, Jama’at rationalized its politics and goals by using the media, Internet, public demonstrations, and its sub-organizations and associations as tools of propaganda to promote its political and social views. Jama’at was adopting the Weberian sense of modernity and had become a more rational movement in pursuit of its goals and objectives in the modern political era.

Many Western politicians are worried about the Islamization of the state and society in Pakistan(The Middle East Institute 2009). On the other hand, the Jama’at has also been apprehensive of American involvement within regional politics. A new Ameer of the Jama’at, Syed Munawar Hasan, claims that, “The idea behind raising the alarm that the Taliban are about to enter Islamabad or Karachi, is to divert attention from the real issue: the drone attacks and the American dictation [sic] and interference [in Pakistan]” (Daud 2009). The American neocolonialist political approach during the George W. Bush administration helped the Jama’at cause by further radicalizing politics, and the beneficiaries of this approach were the Islamist movements in the region.

In the 2002 election, Jama’at gained considerable political strength when its coalition won 63 seats in the National Assembly. This was the first time since 1947 that the Jama’at had received this many seats in the National Assembly(The Middle East Institute 2009). The Islamic resistance in Afghanistan also helped the Jama’at to pursue its cause outside of Pakistan. In fact, the Jama’at was working with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a leader who took an active role in organizing the Afghan Jihad against the
Soviet invasion and cooperated with the Jama’at’s leadership from the late 1970s (Jalal 2008).

The flirtatious relationship between the Jama’at and the military initially helped the party financially as well as politically in the domestic politics of Pakistan. However, in the market-oriented democratic era following the IMF and the World Bank involvement in the Pakistani economy, the military has been perceived as a barrier to democratic openness, leading Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to criticize Jama’ats for their close relationship to the military and Musharraf. According to Farhat Haq, the relationship with the military damaged the Jama’at’s position within Pakistani domestic politics due to the collaboration of the military dictatorship with the United States and the unpopularity among the Pakistani public of this approach (Haq 2009). Other movements and parties inside as well as outside of Pakistan have long criticized the Jama’at’s relationship with the military. This is particularly the case in India (Kukreja 2003).

In short, in the neoliberal era, the Jama’at began framing its politics and slogans based on anti-imperialist and social justice rhetoric. Qazi Hussain and the Jama’at sought to recruit supporters from the newly urbanized lower classes, and during the market-oriented era most of the Jama’at’s candidates were from these classes. Therefore, the Jama’at’s support base was shifting from the urban middle class to newly urbanized lower class voters (Amin 2009). By using and capturing this shifting opportunity structure, Jama’at was able to transform the traditional Islamic politics into more modern social justice-based Islamic politics.

In May of 2009, Qazi Hussain Ahmad stepped down from the leadership of the party, and Syed Munawar Hasan, a sociologist, was elected Ameer of the Jama’at. Qazi
represents the more traditional Islamic politics in Muslim societies; but with the new economic and political conditions in Pakistan, the new Ameer will be in a difficult position to control the party and the Islamization process in Pakistan. To effectively promote political Islam, he must pursue a more balanced relationship between ideology and party politics. At this time, Munawar Hasan cannot ignore either the democratic demands of the Pakistani people, or Mawdudi’s conception of political Islam, which contain popular Anti-American sentiments and a critical perspective towards neoliberal capitalism.

However, it seems that the Jama’at is moving from its traditional politics toward more radicalized politics as a result of the new market conditions. In fact, the Jama’at might not win the continued support of its current membership and followers in this new era, unless it is able to more effectively use anti-imperialist and political Islam as the central issues around which it garners its support and frames its party slogans and politics.
CHAPTER 6: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

The Gulen movement and the Jama’at share both common and unique characteristics common of Islamist or Islam-oriented movements and parties. Specifically, their reactions to modern forms of capitalism have taken a path that can be understood only within their historic and economic context. These movements and their leadership claim that modernity is not a single or unified concept; therefore, the Muslim form of modernity will look very different from the Western form of modernity. However, in this chapter, I claim and conclude that modernity and Islam are not incompatible, and modernity is a single and unified concept, which is based on economic underpinnings.

1. **New Market Conditions-Neoliberalism, Modernity and Islam**

In the beginning of this research, I questioned the concepts of modernity and secularism within Muslim-populated societies based on a comparison of two social movements in two such societies. In particular, modernity and the sweeping advances of neoliberalism have been examined in terms of their impact on Muslim-populated societies. This study has also reviewed and will now compare the historical transformation of society, politics and the economy in Turkey and Pakistan. These two unique movements are used in order to understand the collision between tradition and modernity caused by neoliberal market conditions, and its effects within the nation-state. This collision has created a set of responses within Turkish and Pakistani societies, and in particular, has facilitated the development of two distinctive examples of social movement and organization. The two movements have responded differently to the challenges posed by secular modernity, and some of the causes of these differences have also been explored.
The concepts of secularism, “political” Islam, social movements, authoritarianism, democracy, military power, and class structure have each been examined; and these concepts have been related with and understood specifically within the context of modernity embedded in the economic transformation of our time. From my observation, when traditional values (such as religion) are forced to adapt to modern economic conditions (such as the division of labor, the emergence of the class structure, and surplus value), traditional values and religion lose much of their original meaning as the economic structures and traditional values intermingle with each other. In this process, communities transform into market oriented social networks.

Some of the questions raised by this study include: Is the Muslim response to modernity unique, and if so, how? Is the process of adaptation to modernity the same across cultural and geographic contexts? Is it possible to have multiple forms of modernity? Does the form change in meaning and definition depending on geographical location and culture, or patterns of economic development? Conversely, are we actually witnessing different stages that a society must pass through to reach one final stage or condition of modernity? If neoliberalism has one single definition, then why would modernity have multiple interpretations?

According to this study, neoliberalism is a fixed term, and there is only one general form it can take. As such, and to begin answering some of these questions, neoliberalism is understood to exist as a specifically economic system, but one which has direct social and political implications. This system in its purest form is based on the free market economy, with no state involvement in the market. This resonates directly with Adam Smith’s definition of the invisible hand managing the market – not the state.
However, this invisible hand of neoliberalism also shapes and positions the social and political actors, groups, ideologies and movements.

Scholars such as S. N. Eisenstadt argue that societies are actually faced with what he refers to as “multiple modernities” as a result of globalization (Eisenstadt 2000). To my understanding, however, this alternative interpretation does not mean that there are in fact multiple modernities per se. What Eisenstadt meant is that how modernity is articulated and received differs depending on the context in which it arises. Thus, different cultural contexts can generate different forms and expressions of modernity. The thesis of this interpretation is that there exist many forms of modernity and none are exactly uniform (Smith 2006). However, I contend modernity can be understood usefully only within the context of the modern economy and the emergence of the new class structure. Modernity does not come into existence simply because a group of people prefer to be modern; rather, its roots are, in the final instance, grounded in material conditions. Therefore, the economy is the engine that propels a traditional society to transform into a modern society in which people consume more, live in a urban areas, work most of the time, and are more educated and more individualized. Without some form of modern economy, there is not enough or the right sort of surplus to permit relatively widespread high consumption levels, or to permit a modern city’s existence, or to permit teacher’s and students’ own time being invested in individuals’ years of modern education. This perspective differs from Eisenstadt’s concept of multiple modernities in that multiple modernities assumes that despite different economic stages, societies express and respond to modernity based on their unique culture and geographical
location. However, in my view, if the economic transformation and its domains are the engine of modernity, then modernity is a single phenomenon.

The concept of multiple modernities minimizes the role of the capitalist economy in dictating the expression and form of modernity. In fact, every society responds much the same to forces of capitalism. The differences actually lie in the economic stage that a society is in; this dictates the response of a society to modernity, not modernity itself. Perhaps the emergence of modernity is the creation of modern man and this process can most effectively be referred to as a continuum of modernity. Therefore, modernity is the inevitable final stage of capitalism. The path to modernity is a process of domestication and disciplinization of everyday life, and capitalism sits at the center of this process. Every concept, belief system or ideology will be domesticated in this process by the capitalist economy.

Islam is one of the few remaining social and political orders that had not been challenged by the full force of modern of capitalism up until the 1980s. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the neoliberal global economy, however, Islam and Muslim societies came face-to-face with the free market economy. Conditions of the free market from this point onwards have infiltrated Muslim-populated societies from Singapore to Turkey and from Morocco to the United Arab Emirates. These conditions (including the division of labor, the emergence of class structure, the emergence of modern forms of education and urbanization) have transformed even the more traditional Muslim societies into consumer societies.

This illustrates a continuum of modernity, in the sense that although diverse responses such as radicalization or secularization can be observed across Muslim
societies, all these societies are adapting to new economic conditions by integrating into the global economy. This is a continuum because while they are exchanging commodities, they are continually disciplined and domesticated by the rules and regulations of the free market. Muslim societies therefore have become consumers and producers within the free market. In this process of economic transformation, the modern form of class structure has begun to emerge in these societies, and social and political actors are continually shaped by these new economic conditions.

An impact of this transformation in Muslim societies is that material forces now dominate the life of the Muslim. As such, the five pillars of Islam can no longer be achieved easily in the daily life of Muslims. Praying five times a day or taxation (Zakat) cannot be the first priority for Muslims who are involved in market transactions. Departing from a daily life based on religion to one that is based on production and consumption-based economics clearly demonstrates that the Muslim community or Muslim Ummah transforms the Muslim into someone who is more concerned with the economy than with religious life. This is the creation of “homo-economicus,” or man driven by rational self-interest to make decisions based on the most feasible gain based on the least possible effort.

In this research, I have sought to understand the role of religion in modern society. Global society and its institutions are indisputably more complex than in the past. This complexity has been facilitated by a new mode of civilization, which is based on an economic structure that conflicts with the more traditional forms of social, economic and political life. New economic conditions readjust the role of religion in society and domesticate both religious institutions and the concept of religion. This domestication
process can also be referred to as the privatization of religion. On the other hand, religion resists this trend of domestication and seeks to reposition itself within the public and social spheres. This dynamic creates a conflict that is played out by social movements and groups such as the Gulen movement and the Jama’at-e Islami, which both seek to re-establish the role of religion in the social and political spheres.

Today, market conditions brought about by economic neoliberalism are more complex than the conditions of previous state-sponsored capitalism, such as the Keynesian model of economics, because new market conditions attempt to minimize the role of the state as well as religion. In this context, similar social, economic and political conditions that exist in Turkey and Pakistan have resulted in divergent outcomes and understandings of the role of religion in the two societies.

2. The Gulen and the Jama’at

This study examined the historical transformation of the Gulen movement and the Jama’at-e Islami and their relationship with the neoliberal economy. Both countries and movements have experienced similar economic challenges created by global market conditions; however, different outcomes have emerged as a result of this interaction. When the Gulen movement was forced to adapt to conditions of modernity, it became absorbed by the market economy and became a part of its economic structure. On the other hand, the Jama’at has attempted to oppose these neoliberal market conditions by exploiting political opportunities to express its religious and political interests; therefore, its structure became more radicalized, whereas the Gulen movement given the same market conditions became a modernity-friendly network community. However, this network community is somewhat different from Ferdinand Tonnies’ concept of
Gemeinschaft because this network community operates within modern society and the community is brought together based primarily on economic interests. This is a different form of community than the traditional Gemeinschaft of a family or neighborhood within a premodern society. The network community does contain elements of traditional values, such as religious social solidarity which is used as a network mechanism. But this new collective consciousness is certainly different than conventional Gemeinschaft, because a network-based collective identity represents a crystallization of the Gemeinschaft through interaction with the market. In this context, religious values lose their meaning and Islam becomes a mechanism to obtain a greater share of the market; this can be referred to as “Jihad in the market.” Thus, the Gulen network community should not be seen as the same thing as a traditional community.

The market and economic interests continuously reshape and restructure the Gulen movement. Within this movement the dichotomy between traditional and modern worldviews no longer presents a conflict, because tradition is viewed as a barrier to their success. Therefore, the Gulen movement represents the Merchant Mohammad and is more concerned with economic interests than religious objectives. More interaction with market conditions in this example drives religion towards commodification. In this regard, the Gulen movement commodifies and uses Islam for the purpose of solidarity of the social network – Islam is more a means than an end for the movement – and this is what I will refer to as the commodification of religion.

On the other hand, the Jama’at has become more radicalized, because it rejects its adaptation to conditions of modernity. The Jama’at therefore represents the Meccan Mohammad who is more concerned with religious obligations. However, the Jama’at also
redefines religion based on its interaction with capitalism. This interaction is not similar to the Gulen movement, but rather it perpetuates the movement towards revivalism. This is the case because the Jama’at views modernity as the same concept as Westernization and attempts to create a counter-argument to Western modernity by pursuing a return to the roots of Islam. This is the re-Islamization of the state and society.

This rejectionist perspective towards modernity demonstrates the incompatibility of the movement’s beliefs with conditions of modernity. Mawdudi criticizes modernity and argues that modernity is a Western production. According to this belief, the crux of the problem is that modernity is essentially not compatible with Islam because modernity is itself a Westernization project. Mawdudi and the leadership of the Jama’at have consequently redefined the traditional “five pillars of Islam” and added a sixth pillar, which is the idea that Jihad or re-Islamization of the state and society is also a necessary component of being a Muslim. Unlike the Gulen movement, the Jama’at has not been assimilated within the market economy. However, the Gulen movement’s sixth pillar is the opposite of Jama’at’s. Because the Gulen is being assimilated within the market economy, its economic success, which can be described as Jihad in the market, is instead its sixth pillar of Islam. Importantly, the Gulen movement’s belief framework is more compatible with a market-based ideology, because it places greater value on individualism, unlike the Jama’at, which values a more collective orientation. Islam is inherently opposed to individualism, so this again demonstrates the adaptation of the Gulen movement to the market.

The neo-conservative market-oriented Justice and Development Party has continued to implement neoliberal economic policies in Turkey from 2002 to 2009
In this period, the Gulen movement has become more politicized and less religious as a result of its economic success. The pro-Gulen movement associations and organizations have organized conferences and panels on Turkish domestic and foreign policy whose main focus is policy rather than religion. On the other hand, during the same period, the Jama’at became more bureaucratic and powerful in the domestic politics of Pakistan as well as in the region overall by garnering support around the issue of religion. The Jama’at has also applied more Islamic concepts and symbols within its politics, demonstrating the revitalization of political Islam. of the Gulen and Jama’at movements exemplify two very different reactions to one neoliberal economic policy.

3. Disciplinization of Society Through Class Structure

Today, as a result of the market transformation, the capitalist economic system has dominated society and politics globally and a market society has been created in this transformation. In this type of society, the market determines the role of every individual in his or her daily life through their channels of economic activity. This is because the market economy has its own dynamics, embedded within economic consumption and production. However, this new economic system also breeds social, political and economic inequality within and between nations and countries. It generates wealth and a high standard of living for certain classes, at the same time as it generates poverty for others.

The poor and disenfranchised peoples in the developing countries, specifically in predominantly Muslim countries, have moved towards political Islam, which can also be referred to as Islamic revivalism. In this era, many Islamic groups, movements and
parties have stepped into the social and political sphere in order to express their dissatisfaction with the status quo created according to new market conditions.

After the 1980s, the increasingly neoliberal economies of the core countries (e.g., the United States and Europe) replaced labor-intensive industries with service-intensive sectors. This changed the U.S. and European class structures; for instance, with the neoliberal economy, in the United States income and wealth distribution became much more unequal, with a poorer low-income sector. On the other hand, in the peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, there has been a shift from an agriculturally-based economy to a labor intensive form of industrialization. Neoliberalism and the emergence of a more modern class structure in Muslim populated societies have generated political opportunities for social and political movements due to the increase in poverty, chaotic urbanization, and unemployment over the last 30 years. This gives the movements an advantage vis-à-vis the state, because political movements are able to both address and exploit economic inequality in a way that the state cannot. For example, the state cannot or will not easily provide solutions for people who have been negatively affected by the government’s own privatization and deregulation policies, which have been imposed in conjunction with Western financial institutions.

In this period, the historical conditions of classical colonialism have been replaced with a form of neocolonialist neoliberalism, which has been imposed on the developing nations through the international financial institutions. The effects have been devastating for the developing nations, because poverty and unemployment have increased, mass migration from rural to urban areas have led to the creation of chaotic urbanization, crime has risen, inflation has continued to increase, and working conditions have worsened with
respect to indicators such as lower pay, more oppressive conditions in the workplace, and longer working hours in Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.

Scholar and activist Richard Henry Tawney (1880-1962) identified the destructive role of capitalism in the early 20th century, which has led to the disciplinization and individualization of society as we experience it today, almost 60 years before Foucault. Modern day individuals do not live communal lives as was more common in the past but rather live as relatively isolated individuals, controlled by the system for the interests of the capitalist elite. Tawney described this as “the growth of individualism” – a concept that reminds me of the Truman Show (Jim Carey, 1998) or American Beauty (Kevin Spacey, 1999), both impactful works of American cinema that demonstrate the disciplinization of life through material forces. According to Tawney, in his book *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1926), uncontrolled capitalism creates inequality, poverty, exploitation and breaks down the social structure of society into tiny cells. This process destroys the social origin of religion and finally destroys collectivism. We have witnessed a process in Muslim societies similar to what Tawney describes: the disciplinization of religion, the individual, and society by the uncontrolled spread of capitalism (Tawney 2000).

The disciplinization of society has taken place as a consequence of new economic structures, and material conditions now dominate the lives of individuals globally. In this era, religion has been replaced by material forces, and the effect on religious actors has been particularly powerful within Muslim societies. In this process, most of the Muslim societies will continue to be integrated into the market economy and Islam itself will play a weakening role within them.
4. Domestication and the Radicalization of Islam

The secularization thesis, supported by classical theorists such as Weber, Marx and Durkheim, is the claim that religion will inevitably be removed from public life as a consequence of the modernization of society and the development of a capitalist economy. The definition of secularism also, of course, is the separation of governmental practices or institutions from religion and religious belief. Related to secularization is the concept of “domestication of religion,” or the idea that as more traditional and religious actors begin to engage with the capitalist neoliberal market, through this interaction, they lose some of their original identity. The more successful and upwardly mobile they become within the marketplace, the further they move from their once traditional religious observance. This is an inevitable process in which once traditional and religiously observant actors benefit from and become more powerful within the neoliberal economic system, they become absorbed within it. The once powerful force of religion is gradually tamed in this process.

The concepts of secularism and the domestication of religion are interrelated. Rather than being a linear process, we can observe two things taking place in tandem when we look at the role of religion in a society. The first is that the population in a society on average becomes less religious in cases where the modernization and economic liberalism occur organically from within the society. Second, there is a reactive sequence of events that takes place when there is an externally imposed process of modernization. In this scenario, societies initially become more religious as the pendulum swings towards increased religious observance, but later religion loses much of its
influence over these societies. This is because gradually, over time, actors become involved in and begin to benefit from the new economic system.

The process of secularism and the domestication of religion may also be understood as one that takes place on a continuum. Theorists including Marx and Simmel propose that secularization is a direct and immediate consequence of forces of modernization, but this does not take into account the reaction of more traditional societies to externally imposed modernization, nor does it take into account the possibility that religion may be gradually domesticated.

This externally imposed modernization has important similarities to dependency theory’s emphasis that developing countries are now developing in a situation, characterized by external dominance, that the rich countries didn’t experience when they were becoming industrialized. This is particularly evident in “externally modernized” countries, which initially experience increased religious observance. Domestication does not signify complete separation between religion and the state; it does however demonstrate the re-coordination and re-adjustment of the relationship between religion and the state. Religion is not completely removed from the public space as proposed by the secularization thesis, but rather it is subdued as actors begin to benefit from new economic modes of production.

In this process, religion is gradually controlled by capitalism. Importantly, capitalism’s growing dominance over religion can follow a pattern of initially increased religious observance in reaction to modernization, succeeded by the domestication of religion by the market, followed finally by decreased levels of religious observance. The eventual result, however, is a re-secularization of society after the domestication process.
This is a predictable dynamic in certain types of societies and contexts, particularly when the forces of modernity directly challenge long-held traditional social structures and arise externally to the society. Thus, it is important that we examine the trajectory from the domestication of religion, when religion still exists in the public space but in a less powerful form, to full secularization: the removal of religion from the state. Domestication of religion is a step toward the full secularization of society.

This study proposes that one of the triggers for the transition from the domestication of religion to full secularization is upward class mobility. This is the case because once actors began to benefit from the new market economy; they become more concerned with material conditions than with religion.

5. CONCLUSION

In this study, I have attempted to examine the role that market conditions have played in the secularization of Muslim life and society. In the cases of Pakistan and Turkey, as in others, the political economy shapes both religious ideas and the understanding of modernity by social movements that use religion as their central organizing principle. In Pakistan, Jama’at-e Islami has been radicalized as a result of the interaction between Islam and neoliberalism; whereas the Gulen movement has become a modernity-friendly movement that is able to pursue its interests within the market. Both countries experienced this dynamic but at a different pace, even due to their difference in economic experiences and development and because of the impact of their different geographic locations. For instance, Pakistan is still in the reactionary phase in terms of religious observance, while Turkey is experiencing the phase of religious domestication.
My unique contribution to the study of religion and its relationship to the economic structure of a society is the idea that, particularly in cases where modernity and neoliberal capitalism have been imposed on a traditional society by an external force or presence, the path to secularism is unlikely to be a direct one – yet it is still a path to secularism. Instead, secularism is best described as a rather predictable cycle which begins first with a reactionary response to the encroaching market economy and the strengthening of traditional religious values, followed by the domestication of religion, finally concluding in the full secularization of a society.

Two nations can respond very differently to neoliberal market conditions and either adapt to the changes or take a strongly anti-globalist approach; however, the two approaches are really opposite sides of the same coin. For example, Turkey can be understood as an image of Pakistan’s future. In either case, the beneficiaries of this dynamic are not Islam itself but the Islamist movements that are able to provide a political and religious structure of meaning within the context of a society faced with political, economic and social change and uncertainty. The Gulen movement has been very successful in adapting to economic and political opportunities and promoting its agenda within it, and the Jama’at has thus far garnered its support through a more traditional, religious, and anti-globalist approach.

Neoliberalism is a powerful phenomenon that shapes and influences the daily life of individuals and has far reaching impacts, both in our work lives and belief systems. The Gulen movement seems to be forging ahead with its objectives by working actively within prevailing market conditions, and in this process, its perspective on modernity has undergone a rapid transformation; however, in response to similar economic conditions,
the Jama’at is becoming more radicalized. If the Jama’at is not able to adapt more effectively to prevailing economic forces and conditions that it cannot control, it will inevitably lose its relevance within a few decades as the response cycle reaches its inevitable conclusion of full secularization.
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