CHAPTER 2
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

We should do well to remember that that Christianity, Islam, the Protestant
Reformation, and the subsequent sectarianism began life as the organizing frames for
specific social movements.¹

Introduction

This chapter outlines the interaction between the culture of a society, movement
ideologies and movement frames. The dominant social structures of a society, such as the
*mosque* and the *bazaar* in Iranian society, are identifying features of a broader Iranian-
Moslem culture. Likewise, the dominant narratives and symbols that help maintain these
institutions—and which enable people to identify as members of these institutions—are
important features of Iranian culture. These social structures and the availability of unifying
narratives and symbols in a society contribute to how, and why, social movement
mobilization occurs. Still, these institutions and dominant cultural narratives are amended,
updated, rejected, and revived during periods of social protest.

Social movement research that focuses on social structure is organized on the basis of
two broad themes: 1) *mobilizing structures*, and 2) *political opportunities*  (McAdam
McCarthy and Zald 1996). For example, in the case of Iran, traditional merchants (*bazaaris*)
were often clustered together in the major cities and formerly organized through craft guilds
and merchant networks. Likewise, the religious elite often used the mosque and seminaries
(*madrasas*) to mobilize movement adherents. These are examples of possible *mobilizing
structures* in Iranian society. These two groups sometimes formed coalitions with one
another, and the formation of elite coalitions is often considered part of the *political
opportunity* structure.

Exploring the interaction between social structure and the creation of movement
messages has been a primary project among those who study social movements. Researchers
interested in the narratives and symbols used to establish a movement identity concentrate on framing processes. Frames are: “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion a shared understanding of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.” (McAdam, McArthy and Zald 1996:6; Snow et al 1986:464). One purpose of this work is to demonstrate how cultural narratives in Iran were used to frame collective action during times of protest. Nonetheless, social organizations in Iran, such as the mosque and the bazaar, structured social debate.

**Structural and Social Psychological Considerations in Social Movement Theory**

*Resource Mobilization Theory*

Resource mobilization (RM) theory was the dominant perspective employed in social movement research during the 1970s. RM theory assumed that individual grievances in a society were constant. As such, participation in collective action occurred when a social movement structure offered an opportunity to change a negative condition in society. RM theory regarded movement adherents as rational actors engaged in a systematic process designed to achieve their movement goals (Olsen 1965). This perspective was adopted to counter theories that posited collective behavior was an inherently irrational and mob-driven process. Because RM theory focuses on structural elements of movement activity, such as building elite coalitions, it often neglected the role that social identity played in the formation of movement groups (see Morris and Meuller 1992).

*Social Movement Frames*

Researchers interested in how social movement actors—both leaders and followers—use symbols and language to identify social problems have increasingly used the concept of social movement frames (Snow et al 1986). Movement frames provide a context for
collective social action and can increase movement legitimacy. Also, the development of a compelling movement narrative is important when movement leaders attempt to recruit movement supporters. The development of movement frames also contributes to the creation of collective identity. In effect, a change in self-identity—or establishing the collective identity of a movement group—is an important part of why people participate in a social movement. So, self-identification as a union member, African-American, environmentalist, human rights activist, a democrat, a communist etc… is usually considered an important factor in social movement mobilization (Larana, Johnston and Gusfield 1994).

Another function of framing is that it helps identify grievances. Moreover, how a grievance is framed affects movement tactics (Snow and Benford 1992). For example, McAdam (1996) has outlined how movement tactics employed by the American Civil Rights movement were also resonant frames of protest. Some examples of innovative tactics that employed “strategic dramaturgy” include the marches and sit-ins that symbolically demonstrated social inequality in America (see Morris 1984). This action was resonant because social movement leaders, organizations and followers created a unifying reference frame of “civil rights” that identified injustice and then offered a program of action to ameliorate this condition.

Individuals help shape interpretive frames so that they are aligned with their own perception of a social problem (Goffman 1974; Gamson 1992; Snow et al. 1986). Obviously, the construction of a “civil rights” frame that emphasized the goal of equality, and then framed racial equality as an ideal of American governance—combined with movement tactics that symbolically demonstrated that equality did not exist for black Americans—were all-important factors in the success of the Civil Rights movement. At the same time, a change in self-identity also helps ignite social movement activity (Ferree and Miller 1985; Gamson
Iranian movement groups, over time, also worked to fashion collective identities. For instance, Moslem reformist actively fashioned Islam into an activist revolutionary doctrine in order to make self-identification as a “Moslem” an appealing identity for activist Iranian students. Iranian movement groups also employed wide repertoire of symbolic action during protests. For instance, the symbolic use of *bast*—seeking sanctuary—was employed during the early protests that are covered in this study.

*Political Opportunity and Frames*

Political opportunity is conceived as a structural change that makes the probability of movement mobilization greater. For example, an economic crisis could make longstanding complaints against a government more salient and cause greater support for a challenging social movement. Shifting elite coalitions, access to political systems, creative movement structures, possible allies and the level of oppression were all considerations of RM theorists concerned with political opportunities (Tarrow 1998). The assumption was that political opportunity acted as an independent variable that affected movement mobilization (Gamson and Meyer 1996). Figure 2.1 represents this relationship.

![Figure 2.1: Political Opportunity as an Independent Variable](image)

But social movements also “make” their own opportunities and “create” change to a system by challenging it. In effect, movements work to change people’s perceptions of a problem and this creates opportunities to change social institutions. So the causal relationship
between social structure and political opportunity can be regarded as bi-directional (Gamson and Meyer 1996). This allows movements to “make” their own opportunities, but can account for the affects that structural change has regarding political opportunity. Figure 2.2 represents a conception of how social movement frames interact in the relationship with political opportunity and social structure.

**Figure 2.2 The Interaction of Framing, Structural Change and Political Opportunity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Movement Framing</th>
<th>Structural Change</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Creation of a master frame. The development of frames to describe social conditions etc…)</td>
<td>(The creation of new allies, access to the political system, repression of movement etc…)</td>
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For example, the adoption of a provocative frame can cause structural change, such as increased repression. In Iran, throughout 1963 Ayatollah Khomeini gave several provocative speeches that directly challenged the Shah’s authority. He anchored his speeches to the symbolic content of a religious event, the *Moharram* processonals, which celebrate the martyrdom of religious figures. And he used traditional narratives of past religious oppression to give his attack on the Shah more resonance. This was innovative movement frame and the Shah quickly responded by repressing the movement and then exiling Khomeini to Iraq. This repression affected the subsequent movement frames adopted by leaders. Khomeini, now in exile, became much more provocative. Most religious leaders inside Iran became more circumspect. Furthermore, the event itself—the repression by the Shah and Khomeini’s response during the *Moharram* ceremonies—was later used as a frame that demonstrated Khomeini’s heroic resistance to the Shah. This account was then used to attract movement
supporters during the Iranian Revolution. It is also a reason why Khomeini later became, for many, the symbolic leader of the Iranian revolution.

**The Relationship Between Legitimacy and Social Movement Framing**

Social movement leaders want to increase movement legitimacy (Oberschall 1996). That is, they are trying to create a framework that makes their movement positions appear the most legitimate in terms of affecting social change. Resonant protest frames—those analogies that are more popular—are often considered more legitimate (Snow and Benford 1992). Of course, movement leaders are constantly responding to feedback that they receive from movement adherents, and leaders change movement messages in order to maintain, or increase, movement support. Figure 2.3 represents the relationship between framing activity and legitimacy.

**Figure 2.3 Symbolic Interaction Between Framing and Movement Legitimacy**

I regard the relationship between framing and legitimacy as bi-directional, with each having effects on the other. For example, as a frame is assigned increasing legitimacy by movement supporters, it would allow movement leaders increasing latitude in using the same frame to identify other social problems.
Any serious social movement is attempting to gain legitimacy through framing activities. Still, the legitimacy assigned to governance or a challenging movement is also affected by activities other than framing. For instance, some who have investigated the Iranian revolution have concentrated on the affects that rising expectations and an economic downturn had on government legitimacy (see Keddie 1995). While this structural change—affected primarily by global economic conditions—was not an event precipitated by a social movement it still provides an “opportunity” for leaders to frame the event’s meaning (Gamson and Meyer 1996). In Iran, decreased legitimacy assigned to the government offered “opportunities” for movement leaders to gain legitimacy by tapping into societal discord. Figure 2.4 is a simple, hypothetical example as to how structural changes in the global economy might have interacted with framing opportunities in Iran.

**Figure 2.4 Relationship Between Frames, Legitimacy and Structural Change**

- **Movement Frames**: Our oil economy makes us dependent on the West. (+++++ for social movements)
- **Structural Changes**: Global economic shifts. (- for existing government or counter-movement)
- **Assignment of legitimacy by people**: (+ for social movements; - for existing government or counter-movement)

**The Master Frame of Sovereignty in Iran**

Social movement activity tends to rise, and fall—sometimes across different social systems—at the same periods in time. Turner (1994) states: “a few basic themes tend to shape the goals and worldviews of the most significant social movements, even when the specific movements are quite disparate” (79). Of course, structural changes to the global economy, and nation state interaction, can be contributing factors to the cyclical increases in social movement activity (see Goldstone 1991). Snow and Benford (1992) have developed the
concept of a *master frame* to describe why movement activity tends to cluster together and becomes focused toward eradicating the same social problem. A *master frame* is “the big picture”—the primary problem that movements largely agree upon—which organizes their worldview. McAdam describes a master frame as, “ideological accounts legitimating protest activity that come to be shared by a variety of social movements” (49). Importantly, the adoption of a master frame helps legitimate protest activity among divergent movement groups.

In the developing world, at roughly the turn of the century, a master frame for most movements was clearly directed toward ending Western imperialism. Likewise, for Iranian movements surveyed in this work, ending Western and Russian imperialism was an anchoring theme for Iranian movements during the past century. But the frame of “imperialism,” who the imperial powers where, and what should be done about imperialism, varied from movement to movement. For example, both religious movements and Marxist movements in Iran framed their movement goals as *ending Western domination of Iran*, but religious groups and Marxist groups in Iran differed on the reasons why Western domination occurred. They had dramatically different programs as to how this condition should be ameliorated.

The master frame of movements in Iran throughout the 20th century was centered on the need to end Western in influence in Iran. I have labeled this frame *Iranian sovereignty*. This frame was debated at two levels: 1) Frames of *national sovereignty* addressed how the Iranian state (or the larger Islamic community) could achieve national independence from the influence of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, and 2) Frames of *individual sovereignty* addressed how individual Iranians respond to Western ideas and Western materialism. Figure 2.5 represents the interaction of this frame with movement legitimacy.
Definitions of National and Individual Sovereignty

In this work frames of national sovereignty are arguments articulated by movement leaders, used to mobilize movement supporters, related to the Iranian government’s relationship with the East and West. In Iran, both religious and nationalist movement leaders argued that it was a necessity for Iran to be independent from the influence of the West. Inevitably, all movement leaders in Iran had to establish their doctrinal relationship with the West in order to attract supporters. They framed this position in a manner calculated to resonate with movement supporters, but were constrained by other movement positions. For example, current reform movement leaders in Iran are trying to establish a frame that will allow for the reestablishment of Iranian diplomatic relations with the United States, but they are constrained by the previously negotiated frames, debated during the revolution, regarding this relationship. Recently, a popular reformer associated with the 2nd of Khordad movement, Abdollah Nouri, was not allowed to run for the Parliament in 1999 by the Guardian Council—a twelve-member panel that oversees the election process—because he discussed
renewing relations with the United States (Lyons 1999). In this case, the Guardian Council was engaging in framing activity designed to de-legitimize a leader of the 2nd of Khordad by claiming he would compromise Iranian national sovereignty.

*Frames of individual sovereignty* are different from the frames of national sovereignty in that they are the requirements, as articulated by leaders, that individuals should fulfill in order to participate in governance. As a practical matter, *individual sovereignty* are requirements concerning religious piety, ethnicity, gender, age etc… that individuals must fulfill in order to participate in governance. For instance, the current Guardian Councils dismissal of candidates—particularly women who have petitioned to run for President—has often been debated in the Iranian press (see Hemming 2001; IRNA 2001). A rationale for dismissing women—or religious minorities—from running for public office is the Guardian Council’s frame regarding *individual sovereignty*. Likewise, the Guardian Council often dismisses candidates from running for the Assembly of Experts because they lack religious training. In effect, the Guardians often define *sovereign rights* related to political participation. Of course, many regard the Guardians as illegitimate because of the frames they employ regarding the sovereign rights of individuals. *Individual sovereignty* can also vary in degree. For instance, many religious minorities in Iran now have sovereign rights as it relates to voting, and can run for most political offices, but are denied the right to run for the office of the presidency.

The current debate over *individual sovereignty* in Iran is comparable to that which occurred in 17th century Europe. During that period, citizens of a nation were assumed to have “free-will” which enabled the expanded political participation of “citizens” who were afforded “sovereign” rights. Previous to the assumption of these rights, sovereignty was often invested in the authority of a single individual, often a monarch (or the “sovereign”) who embodied the political authority of a state. Likewise, there has been considerable debate in
the Middle East as to whether Moslems have “free-will” and can therefore assume the rights as citizens who can “make” law. Much like the debate in Europe, many claim that only “God” is sovereign and deny that individual Moslems can exercise “free-will.” Other Moslem thinkers grant that individual Moslems have “free-will” when they act as God’s vice-regents on earth. In this instance, the argument supports an expansion of political rights for Moslems. It is common in Iran for some individuals to refuse to accept the idea that they have “free-will”—only God is sovereign—but to nonetheless claim to have an extraordinary ability to interpret God’s will. For the religious elite, this might include training that enables them to see, and interpret, God’s signs. This debate concerning individual “free-will,” given the belief in the absolute sovereignty of God, is a common feature of movements surveyed in this work. In particular, whether “men” exercised “free-will” became an important theoretical discussion during the Iranian Constitutional Movement. It remains an important part of the discourse in revolutionary Iran, and is still debated among current social movement factions (see Soroush 2000:136).

**Summary of Individual and State Sovereignty as a Master Frame in Iran**

Social movements surveyed in this work had to confront two primary questions: 1) How should the Iranian state achieve independence in the world? And, 2) What rights should individual Iranians enjoy in their political and social system? All movement groups in Iran had to address these two questions if they wanted to gain legitimacy among possible movement supporters. As such, the issues of individual and national sovereignty were the *master frames* that movement groups had to negotiate in 20th century Iran. These issues of sovereignty were tied to the state making process (see Tarrow 1983). In this respect, the modern nation-state, largely imposed on the people of the Middle East during the 20th century, was a structural condition that helped precipitate the debate over individual and
national sovereignty. This work demonstrates how concepts of Iranian sovereignty changed over time as a result of social movement activity in Iran during the late 19th and 20th centuries.

*The Study of Culture in Social Movement Theory*

Discussions of culture have become more common in recent social movement literature. In general, *New Social Movement* (NSM) perspectives are more inclined to discuss cultural identity (McAdam 1994). NSM theorists are often interested in movements that cut across racial, ethnic and class differences in terms of the composition of movement adherents. In this respect, appeals based on the commonality of a culture are useful in mobilizing movement participants who have a broad range of social backgrounds. McAdam (1994) states that social movement frames are acts of *cultural appropriation* with “movement leaders seeking to tap highly resonant ideational strains in mainstream society (or in a particular subculture) as a way of galvanizing activism” (37). Likewise, Zald (1996) states, “movement frames and ideologies grow out of existing cultural definitions” (273).

There has been a tendency to conflate social movement frames with both ideology and culture (Benford 1998). Zald (1996), addressing this problem, has provided definitions of culture, ideology and collective action frames that treat them as distinct concepts (262). The most important distinction is that a “frame” is a movement specific narrative, and culture is the broader “life-organizing” principles such as shared religion and language. Table 2.1 provides Zald’s definitions of culture, ideology and frames.
Table 2.1 Definitions of Culture, Ideology and Frames

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<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
<td>the shared beliefs and understandings, mediated by and constituted by symbols and language, of a group or society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>the set of beliefs that are used to justify or challenge a given social-political order and are used to interpret the political world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frames</strong></td>
<td>the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and suggest alternative modes of action.</td>
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(Zald 1996 Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.)

Culture and the Islamic Revival

Snow and Marshall (1984) have stated that Islamic revival movements use the concept of *cultural imperialism* to organize social movement activity. The expansion of the West—through colonialism, the export of Western consumer goods and Western control of resources—has often been regarded as an assault on Islamic cultural norms that threatened Moslem identities. They observe that:

One possible reaction to such an assault on the cultural basis of a people’s being is the emergence of movements which have as one of their aims the restoration and maintenance of the cultural identity and self-esteem of a challenged population (136).

As a result, “third world religion often provides both the mobilizing ideology and the organizational basis for collective action in response to cultural imperialism” (138). Snow and Marshall’s review of Islamic revival is cursory, but they conclude that the rhetoric and ideology of Muslim leaders is an attempt to re-establish the “uniqueness of national identity and the uniqueness of Islam” (135).
While Snow and Marshall make a sound theoretical argument for the consideration of

While Snow and Marshall make a sound theoretical argument for the consideration of cultural identity in social movement research, this premise was simply taken for granted by many Middle East area specialist. For instance, Nikki Keddie (1995b) states:

> Long cultural identities do not of themselves encourage revolution, but they can do so when they are combined with a heavy western imperialist presence, which is seen as an attack on the strongly held identity (62).

Likewise, Tibi (1991) has an excellent account of Islamic cultural systems and their adaptability to change. He generally argues that Islamic movements are a “defensive” response to Western domination and that Moslem movements are “reactions” to changed situations (193). I differ from Tibi in that do not label Moslem movements as either entirely “defensive” or “pro-active” in their response to the West. While cultural systems “react,” they are also a proactive assertion of cultural values. Movements that attempt to reestablish cultural values should be characterized as having degrees of both of these qualities. In effect, Moslem movements can be both progressive and reactionary.

Most observers of Iran agree that Moslem movements in the 20th century were preoccupied with the reestablishment of cultural values in response to Western imperialism. This fits with McAdam (1994) and Zald’s (1996) assertion that movement frames are often conceived of as acts of cultural appropriation. Likewise, Snow and Marshall state (1984):

> In sum, our basic argument is that Islamic Revivals are shaped both by governmental responses to popular demands for a rejection of foreign encroachment and a reassertion of indigenous cultural pride as well as elites’ own need for external sources of legitimation (145).

Importantly, movement leaders in Iran were specifically calling for the reestablishment of an Iranian-Moslem culture in response to Western imperialism. In effect, a
primary diagnostic frame of the Iranian revolution became that Western culture was a pervasive and insidious force that was an affront to the cultural norms of Iranians. The primary prognostic frame--the movement plan for change that specified “what should be done by whom” (Hunt et al. 1994)--included re-establishing Iranian-Moslem culture and strengthening religious institutions to combat Western ideals. Of course, there was considerable variation among groups who adopted this general framework.

Figure 2.6 is a model that appears throughout this work. It is an elemental representation of how culture, ideology and framing interact with one another that helps conceptualize the definitions Zald (1996).
**Figure 2.6 The Interaction of Culture, Ideology and Frames**

**Culture in Iran**
The shared beliefs and understandings, mediated and constituted by symbols and language, of a group or society.

**Ideology**
The sets of beliefs that are used to justify or challenge a given social-political order and are used to interpret the political world. (e.g. Marxist-Leninism, Socialism, “Islamology,” Religious-Socialism)

**Master Frames of Sovereignty**

*National Sovereignty*: How Iranians can achieve an independent state in the world system.

*Individual Sovereignty*: The rights Iranians possess with respect to political participation.

**Movement Specific Frames**

Arrows represent the interaction between culture, ideologies, and specific movement frames. Culture shapes ideology and frames. Resonant frames affect the development of ideologies and change cultural practices.
Utopia and Ideology in Movements

Utopian ideas often drive social movement protest. Gusfield (1994) states: “Imaging an alternative to the present is the utopian element in all social movements. Social movements become issues about change or the repelling of change in ways broader than individual, idiosyncratic choices” (62). If a movement ideal was not compelling, if it did not describe a way to “make the world a better place,” people would not support a movement, particularly when this activity puts them at risk. Utopian rhetoric is a means by which social movement leaders help mobilize support for a movement. This is particularly true for religious leaders, even when their movement goals are not specifically oriented toward the establishment of a new religious system. In the West, Martin Luther King is a well-known example of a religious leader who used utopian rhetoric to ground a social movement ideal. For example, his allegorical use of the “promised land,” a place of complete racial harmony, has strength because it draws on utopian Christian imagery. At the other end of the spectrum, Karl Marx, while not enamored of religious rhetoric, nonetheless insisted the dialectic-material process ended with a worker’s paradise. Both of these visions have proven effective at uniting movement adherents, and putting people into the streets, although the outcome of movements motivated by these ideals was often something less than what many hoped for.

Karl Mannheim (1936) conceived of the relationship between utopian ideas and political ideology as two dialectically opposed concepts:

The relationship between utopia and the existing order turns out to be a “dialectical” one. By this is meant that every age allows to arise (in differently located social groups) those ideas and values in which are contained in condensed form the unrealized and unfulfilled tendencies which represents the needs of each age. These intellectual elements then become the explosive material for bursting the limits of the existing order. The existing order gives
birth to utopias that in turn break the bonds of the existing order, leaving it free to develop in the direction of the next order of existence (179).

Figure 2.7 is a graphic representation of the interaction between ideology and the utopian ideal that Mannheim described.

Figure 2.7 Mannheim’s Dialectic of Ideology and Utopia

Ralph Turner (1994) argues that despite the decline of socialist ideologies—the most recent “utopian ideal” that underpinned much movement activity worldwide—that “new left” utopianism still permeates recent social movements. Moreover, if utopianism remains a strong impulse for joining a social movement, than religious ideals are bound to be a part of new movement activity. Recently, there has been a trend toward increased support for new evangelical movements while membership to established faiths are in decline (Beckford
1986). One reason for this trend may be that the “new faiths” offer a more egalitarian vision than the orthodox Christian faiths. This may also be a reason why some Moslems reject “state” Islam, and are instead drawn to movements that they feel embody more of the radical egalitarianism of the “original” Moslem ideal.

Some Iranian movement activity supports aspects of Mannheim’s argument in that many movement supporters were inspired by the utopian rhetoric common in the discourses of religious laymen and activist members of the Iranian clergy. Moreover, some movement groups attempted to combine a Moslem ideal with Marxist egalitarianism (Abrahamian 1989). These would appear to be divergent traditions, but this combination is not unique, with the most recent example being the “liberation theology” doctrines popular in South and Latin America movements during the 1970s-1980s. In Iran, some movement adherents believed the primary goal of the Iranian revolution was to establish a society based on radically egalitarian ideas. Some (the orthodox communist party) continued to anchor movement ideas solely to Marxism. And others (the activist clergy) anchored their ideas only to Islamic egalitarianism.

The problem with Mannheim’s thesis is that it is hard to determine individual belief. Moreover, the actual support that groups with radically utopian ideas had throughout the revolution is debatable. Many have argued that Ayatollah Khomeini never enjoyed a plurality of popular support from the Iranian public with respect to his specific program for establishing Islamic governance. Many Iranians did not believe in the utopian rhetoric that they heard, and, voting with their feet, left Iran once supporters of the “Imam”7 Khomeini tried to make his particular ideal a reality. Moreover, Khomeini himself would have firmly distinguished between the “this-worldly” endeavor of establishing just governance in Iran, and the utopian ideal expressed concerning the Shi’i day of judgment. He never explicitly promised people heaven on earth. But Khomeini, and others, used the rhetoric of utopianism
and it is safe to assume that most of his followers thought their lives would be better after the revolution.

This discussion of Islamic utopianism is not meant to imply that Middle Easterners are more inclined to be motivated by religious utopianism than the very real social conditions—poverty, inequality and lack of democracy—that were an obvious concern of many movement adherents. Indeed, while utopian rhetoric inspires people, and may be used to assign meaning to an event, once people seriously contemplate the prospect of radical egalitarianism they may find they are more concerned with the practical matters needed to live in this life.\(^8\) Still, the power that egalitarian ideals have during social movement mobilization is real. For instance, using an example from the West, it seems clear that many people believed, or at very least wanted to believe, in Martin Luther King’s grand vision:

> When we let freedom ring, when we let it ring from every village and every hamlet, from every state and every city, we will be able to speed up that day when all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual, "Free at last! free at last! Thank God Almighty, we are free at last!"

Moreover, the failure to realize aspects of King’s vision—among those who followed and believed in King—is usually contemplated with remorse not because the vision was never possible, but because it was possible and not realized. Of course, there were those in the Civil Rights movement who never believed in King’s rhetoric, and dismissed his vision as too idealistic. With this example in mind, how should the effects of the utopian rhetoric of the Iranian revolution be evaluated? Turner (1994) has modified Mannheim’s grand thesis, but tries to maintain the importance of the “utopian” vision. Mannheim defined the utopian vision
as one that expressed normative “ideas and values” that people felt were “unfulfilled” at the present time. In this respect, the rhetoric of King was compelling because, given the American ideal of equality, his vision of racial equality was that “unrealized and unfulfilled tendency” of American democracy. King’s vision was powerful because it was one many Americans intuitively felt “ought to be” true. In this respect, the utopian rhetoric of many movement leaders in Iran—whether Marxist, religious socialist, or religious traditionalist—resonated with different Iranians because it articulated the promise of previous Iranian movement ideals (material wealth, state independence, rapid development, Moslem inspired advancement) that many Iranians intuitively felt “ought to be” true in the Iranian social system.

Mannheim (1936) believed ideals moderated away from utopianism as the revolutionary cycle progressed. In this regard, current reform movements in Iran are explicitly rejecting the most radical movement ideals that were articulated during the 1979 revolution. In particular, there is a rejection, on the part of moderate reformers, of arguments that “smell” of “religious ideology” (Moaveni 2000). Indeed, the rallying cry of the current reform movement centers on the need for “discourse” and explicitly states that disagreements are a part of any functioning governing system. In this respect, the current movement ideal has become the rather mundane goal of institutionalizing a system that will allow people to disagree with one another. This is certainly a commendable goal that could led to a more open Iranian society—but entirely different than the utopian ideals held by many dedicated revolutionaries during the 1979 movement.

**Social Movements and Revolution**

There are two concurrent academic traditions—one that focuses on revolution and the other on social movements—that investigate many of the same issues but have evolved
largely independent of one another. Both debate the relative importance of social structure, ideology and culture in creating collective contentious action. Recently, some have begun to integrate these fields (see McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 1997). Of course, there are some scholars (e.g. Tilly 1983) whose work is represented in both academic traditions. In particular, Nikki Keddie (1995), a specialist on Iranian history, has been an active participant in debate over “revolution.” This work investigates both “social movements” and “revolution,” and treats both as the same type of social phenomenon. For parsimony, I primarily use the language of the “social movement” literature, but I have been influenced by debates undertaken by theorists interested in “revolution.”

Revolutions can be distinguished from social movements in terms of the scale of the proposed program for societal change. Revolutions also involve a change in who controls the state, and a change in the governing ideal. Moreover, the number of movement actors is dramatically increased during revolutionary activity. Goldstone (1997) has asserted that revolution is facilitated by state repression. In effect, indiscriminate repression against all movement groups facilitates cooperation between divergent interests. These groups then broaden their narrow movement interests to include overthrowing oppressive state actors (see Tarrow 1998:158). Still, social movements and revolutions are obviously facilitated by the same social processes (McAdam, Tarrow Tilly 1997).

I regard social movements in Iran, and the revolution(s) in Iran, as being intimately linked together, and one goal of this work is to demonstrate that a century of social movement activity helped facilitate the Iranian revolution. In particular, movements in Iran developed the resonant frames used to identify social grievances. They also developed repertoires of social action that had deep resonance during the period of revolution. Moreover, repression does appear to have played a role in converting more narrow movement grievances into a broadly supported revolution (see chapter 11). In short, the 1978-79
revolution occurred because previous movements—the Tobacco protest, the Constitutional revolution and the Nationalist movement—provided a framework for collective action that enabled revolutionary activity. The current reform movement in Iran is constrained by, but also amending, the previous revolutionary frames.

**Civilizational Clash**

Iranian movement leaders have often dichotomized their worldview into a simple accounting of ideas that were labeled “Western” or “Moslem.” Later, some movement leaders framed their movement goals as a re-establishment of Iranian-Moslem cultural norms in the face of Western cultural hegemony. Indeed, the construction of the “West” as “other” was an important frame in the Iranian revolution (Dabashi 1993; Boroujerdi 1996). As a practical matter cultures—or civilizations—are not hermetically sealed entities that can be neatly separated out from one another. This work demonstrates that there have been periods of social unrest in Iran—and periods of cultural conflict—that were a function of cultural exchanges that took place between Iran, the East, and the West. Iranian culture was fashioned at the crossroads of, and in competition with, the great Western and Eastern empires. Iranian culture was obviously affected by these interactions. For instance, many Arabic words have become integrated into the Persian languages. Still, aspects of traditional Persian culture endured during periods of cultural “clash” with a number of groups, including the Arabs, Turks, Mongols, British, Russians and Americans.

This work should not be read as an attempt to support arguments that Moslem and Western cultures will inevitably clash with one another (Huntington 1996; Lewis 2002). It is a mistake to regard the movement frames of the Iranian revolution—among them the inevitability of conflict with the West—as a social scientific fact. Frames of reference change. The last Iranian movement surveyed in this work, led by the current President of Iran,
Mohammad Khatami, supports reestablishing an Iranian relationship with the West. In particular, Khatami is the primary sponsor of a United Nations endorsed program calling for a “dialogue” among civilizations. Ironically, during this same period, prominent American scholars have asserted that civilizational clash between Moslem and Western societies is inevitable (see Huntington 1996). Moreover, concurrent with Khatami’s call for dialogue, the Presidential administration of George Bush Jr. labeled Iran as a member of the “Axis of Evil.”

One way to evaluate these positions—one an advocate for dialogue and the other for the inevitability of a clash—is as competing frames of interpretation regarding the ongoing state of relations between the West and Middle East. A primary assertion of this work is that frames affect social reality. Moreover, frames grow out of cultural traditions and reflect the ideologies of the people who accept them. For example, the American frame that underpins the “preventative” war doctrine has grown out of the antiquated, but highly popular, academic frame of “realism” (see Morgenthau [1951] 1978). This academic framework, combined with the more populist and “moralist” frames that extol the virtues of “the American way of life,” and the assertion that American values offer a template for other nations social development, are now used to support conservative American ideologies. Likewise, there are “realists” in Iran, and like their Western counterparts they also regard their values as a template for other nations in the world. And like their counterparts in the West, the rhetorical frame of civilizational clash helps support conservative ideologies.

Both of these civilizations have more moderate ideas that are also grounded in cultural traditions. There is a tradition of reconciliation in Moslem thought, and Mohammad Khatami often draws upon this tradition when making arguments concerning the adoption of a dialogue among civilizations. There is a liberal Wilsonian tradition in American political culture that envisions cooperation among nation states. In the West, both civilizational clash
and global harmony (through the spread of capitalism)\textsuperscript{17} have been dressed up as social science, or as a social fact, with different groups of people claiming one, or the other, is inevitable. I regard both as interpretive frames that help support, and modify, the competing ideologies of conservatives and moderates in both the West and the Middle East. As such, cultural clash is not inevitable, but it is likely in the interest of some groups, in both the East and the West, to make people think this is so.

\textsuperscript{1} Doug McAdam (1994:49)

\textsuperscript{2} Khomeini was not the first to use this type of analogy, it had been employed in previous movements, but his use was an innovative mix of previous movement frames.

\textsuperscript{3} See Snow and Benford 1992. These theorists do not tie “resonance” to legitimacy, and it might be possible that a “resonant” frame could also be illegitimate. For example, a message could draw on traditional messages, be very clear to movement adherents, but also be considered illegitimate. But it is hard to imagine movement leaders making a “resonant” argument designed to make their movement appear illegitimate.

\textsuperscript{4} For example, see Fazlollah Nuri’s tracts in the chapter eight of this work. Likewise, several excerpts of Moslem theorists in Donahue and Esposito (1982) edited volume, \textit{Islam in Translation}, debate the “free-will” of Moslems.

\textsuperscript{5} Often labeled “Westoxification.” This term was coined by Al-e Ahmad (1962) in \textit{Gharbzadegi (Westoxification)} that critiqued Iranian nationalists who mimicked the ideas of the West. It has a very specific social-psychological context in that Al-e Ahmad describes these individuals as “entranced” by Western modernism. See chapter 11 for further discussion.

\textsuperscript{6} Foran (1993:358-364) has a good overview of this debate.

\textsuperscript{7} Khomeini’s supporters often gave him the attribution of “Imam.” In this respect, Khomeini never claimed to be a member of the line of sacred Imams that are the closest living male descendents of Ali, but the attribution clearly connects him, symbolically, to the other infallibles.

\textsuperscript{8} This is essentially the revolutionary ebb and flow chronicled by Crane Brinton (1965). Brinton’s overarching “anatomy” of revolution has debated and criticized. Still, to date, the Iranian revolution exhibits many of the “classic” characteristics as it relates to Brinton’s stages of revolution.

\textsuperscript{9} For an example look at Moaveni (2000). In this article, titled “The smell of ideology” (for \textit{Time Magazine, Europe edition}) Moaveni interviewed a 23-year-old journalist, Mohammed Qouchani, who was the star of the student reform paper “Asr-e Azadegan” (Age of Liberty). Qouchani returns repeatedly to the idea that the courts, controlled by the hardliners, are “ideological” and not enforcing law impartially. Indeed, the primary charge that the moderate reformers use, in effect their primary diagnostic frame at the present time, is that the conservative clergy are “ideological.” Moreover, this movement frame has resonance, and has generally put the conservative clergy on the defensive.

\textsuperscript{10} See Brinton 1965; Foran 1997; Goldstone 1991; Keddie 1995; Moore 1978; Skocpol 1979

\textsuperscript{11} See McAdam, McArthy and Zald 1996; Morris and Mueller 1992; Larana, Johnston and Gusfield 1994)
12 Historians such as Abrahamian (1982); Arjomand (1984) and Keddie 1995 have generally followed this line of reasoning.

13 Huntington calls his approach a “paradigm” for understanding the world.

14 Huntington’s treatment of civilizational clash is more sophisticated than he is often given credit for. And, as an academic endeavor, he never intended his arguments related to civilizational clash to be adopted by conservative ideologues. Nonetheless, most people who publicly discuss “the clash of civilizations”—in both the East in the West—distill his ideas down to a simplistic rhetorical frame that is used to support conservative ideology. In general, I like aspects of Huntington’s argument primarily because he is a political scientist who takes culture seriously, although his specific characterizations of both Moslem and Western civilization is often critiqued (see Foreign Affairs exchanges between Huntington and “his critiques” throughout 1993). In particular, I like Huntington’s refutation of a “world” civilizational models, and that he regards a return to “culture” as a response to modernization (1996:57-78). But Huntington regards “multiculturalism”—or any perspective that argues for a social system that recognizes cultural difference—as inherently unstable. Moreover, he regards multiculturalism (as a political and educational orientation) in the United States as an indication that the West is in decline (see chapter 12). Like his other critics (see above) I find his accounting of “civilizations” to be definitionally problematic. Most importantly, I disagree with the idea that cultural clash—in the modern age—is inevitable. I do not regard a multi-cultural orientation as problematic, but as a possible solution to past grievances related to cultural differences. I think the example of Iran—in terms of most recent movement activities—reinforces this position.

15 Most modern political science no longer regards older realist theory as a particularly useful perspective for describing the modern world. But its simplicity has always made it easy to translate into compelling political rhetoric. See Nye (2002) for a critique of older realist theory. Realism has been updated by the current administration, which has, ironically, tapped into a tradition of American “morality.” Morgenthau was not a sentimentalist as it relates to why the United States should pursue power, so this “update” runs counter to many of Morgenthau’s original ideas. See Leeman (2002a; 2002b) for an introduction to the foreign policy debates in the Bush administration.

16 Simplified versions of Huntington’s thesis appear regularly in the Iranian press, and conservatives generally support the idea of civilizational clash because it make authoritarian policies, in the context of the “battle with the West, appear reasonable. President Khatami comments on the concept frequently—usually arguing that cultural “clash” is occurring—but he does not see this as an inevitable event that can not be changed through dialogue.

17 See Fukuyama (1992) for an example.