
This chapter will explore the aborted process of democratization during 1979-1980. The sudden death of President Park Chung-Hee provided the Korean people with an opportunity to make the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one in 1979-80. Although opposition groups attempted to organize themselves and push the regime toward democracy, their efforts failed, and another authoritarian regime was established. The questions examined will be how the democratization movement failed at this period, what the major actors’ strategies were during this process, and what were the conditions under which the major actors made decisions.

Historical Legacies and Political Context

The historical failure of the leftist national movement in establishing an autonomous republic under the U.S. military government, and the loss of organizations such as workers, farmers, and students in the political arena after the Korean War (1950-53) provided the state with omnipotent power in South Korea. According to Jang Jip Choi, the experience of war and anti-communism between 1948 and 1953 became “the most important and useful tools for penetrating civil society and consolidating the state’s legitimacy among the people.” Exploiting these experiences, the state articulated and re-articulated anti-communist propaganda to legitimize its lack of broad support whenever it faced an eruption of people’s protest. Any demand for democracy could be sacrificed under the excuse of national security and economic prosperity, as long as North Korea existed. The relationship between the state and civil society was greatly skewed toward the state after the war, and this trend was maximized when Park Chung Hee led a coup in 1961 and adopted an export-oriented development strategy during his rule.

Moreover, as many studies on economic development in Korea demonstrate, the power of the state was strong enough to overwhelm civil society. The state and its institutions were the main force of initiation and accomplishment of rapid economic growth during the 1960s and the 1970s. By adopting export-oriented development strategies based on cheap labor, the state, instead of the bourgeoisie, was the main force of capitalist development. The bourgeoisie did not have enough initiative in the performance of economic policies during the 1970s. By maintaining a powerful military, other oppressive forces, and very harsh laws, the state also repressed its potential political opponents, especially laborers, students, and opposition parties. This meant that the state was free from the bourgeoisie, laborers, farmers, and other civil groups to impose its will on society.

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3 For how the Korean state succeeded in penetrating itself through society and maintaining autonomy in the relationship with all these social groups, see Hyun-Jin Im and Byung-Guk Kim, “Nodongui jwajol, baebandoi
In this situation, the conservative opposition party was the main and formal channel with which people could represent their interests. Every other major social interest group was prevented from participating in politics and from organizing, except for a few co-opted pro-government organizations such as the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI). This situation made party politics play an important role in political change in Korea. Especially through elections, the opposition party challenged and threatened the authority of the state.

Although there were long authoritarian regimes, these regimes did not completely ignore the structure of liberal democracy, which was used as an alternative to communism and planted by the U.S. during its military government. Actually, Korean people experienced a democratic regime, although it only lasted a short period of time. When student demonstrations toppled the Rhee regime in 1960, the Second Republic was established by democratic election and people experienced their first democratic regime. However, the Jang Myon government was overthrown by Park Chung Hee’s coup in 1961. Even under Park’s regime, there were relatively free and competitive presidential elections until 1971, although the regime violated election laws. By the establishment of the Yushin regime in 1972 President Park abolished direct presidential election and controlled the opposition groups more tightly.4

The general elections were maintained regularly after 1948. The authoritarian regime always faced the contradiction of the necessity of the elections for acting as a champion of liberal democracy, and the fear of the danger of losing in the elections. After the Park regime lost its popularity and barely survived the presidential election in 1971, it established the more authoritarian Yushin regime.5 Under this Yushin regime Park maintained stability by using super-oppressive measures against the opposition party and against civil society. However, these measures did not last long when the Park regime’s economic performance faced serious difficulties in the second oil shock and in the aftermath of the heavy and chemistry industry policies. Reflecting this regime’s lack of support the opposition party obtained support over the DRP in the general election in 1978. The NDP obtained 32.8% of whole votes, and the DRP obtained 31.7% of total vote. Although the NDP failed to be a majority party in the National Assembly due to the multi-district system and the Yushin constitution which allows the president to appoint one-third of the assemblymen, this event was a critical blow to the

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5 There are different interpretations of the causes of the establishment of the Yushin regime. Im Hyug Baeg used the Bureaucratic Authoritarianism theory to explain the sources of the Yushin regime, and he argued that the attempt to overcome economic difficulties which the Park regime faced was the main sources of the establishment of the Yushin regime. In contrast, Choi Jang Jip argued that the economic reason was not a major reason, but a political reason was; that was to secure Park’s life-long power holding and to avoid any challenges from the opposition groups. See Hyug Baeg Im, “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” *World Politics*, 39. no. 2, 1985:231-57.; and Jang Jip Choi, “Political Cleavages in South Korea.”
regime. After this election, the NDP leadership changed from the acquiescent Lee Chul Sung to a hardliner, Kim Young Sam, in 1978. Dealing with the Pusan and Masan riots in October 1979, which were caused by the expulsion of Kim Young Sam from the National Assembly, the authoritarian regime experienced internal conflicts. Eventually, the internal conflicts led to the assassination of President Park and created a political vacuum, which provided civil society with the political opportunity to organize itself.

In summary, Korean politics carried many legacies from the experiences of the U.S. military government and the Korean War: the defeat of the leftist movement; no choice of ideological options except liberal democracy; the destruction of social groups and organizations; and the dominance of anti-communism in politics. These factors led to state superiority over civil society. In this situation, the conservative opposition party was the only legitimate channel to express the interests of various groups. Thus, the opposition party’s reaction to the regime could be a possible threat to the regime. Although they were limited there were intermittent efforts to obtain procedural democracy by opposition parties through elections and sporadic eruptions of anti-regime social movements.

Political Opening and Preparation for Transition

Having overthrown a democratic government (the Second Republic, 1960-1961) through a coup in 1961, Park Chung Hee rose to power. Although several political crises occurred during his time in office, Park maintained his power mainly due to successful economic development and effective oppression of the opposition for 18 years. However, this long dictatorship ended suddenly when his close associate, Kim Jae-kyu, Chief of Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), assassinated him on October 26, 1979. With this blow a sudden power vacuum was created. Since President Park concentrated all power within his own control, there was confusion within the ruling bloc.

With this event, martial law was enacted and the military became an important player in politics. The prime minister under the Park regime, Choi Kyu Hwa, became acting president for six weeks and then was elected president by the National Conference For Unification (NCFU) under the Yushin constitution on December 9, 1979. He promised to reform the Yushin constitution which was written under President Park, that guaranteed Park’s permanent holding of power by indirect presidential election. In addition, Choi took several actions to create a relaxed political atmosphere. He abolished Emergency Decree No. 9, which was used to oppress people’s general freedom during the Park regime. Also, in December 1979, he released political prisoners and freed opposition politicians who were under restriction by the decree. As a result, many dissident politicians, students, and religious leaders won back their civil rights on February 29, 1980. Among them was included Kim Dae Jung who was a well known opposition politician and was under house arrest during the Park regime. Although President Choi promised a “political evolution” by revising the constitution by the end of 1980 and promised free elections would be held within six months, he made sure both
would be done gradually to secure political stability.⁶

Since President Choi spent most of his career as a bureaucrat and did not have his own autonomous base in the regime he could not act like Park Chung Hee, who managed all decision-making himself because of his strong power base. Instead, Choi spent a significant amount of time making each decision by consulting with former or incumbent bureaucrats. In addition, he did not have a solid independent power base within the military and his administration. Under martial law, an army chief-of-staff, Chung Sung-Hwa, participated in the decision-making process. However, Chung agreed to revise the Yushin constitution and to keep the military out of politics in the future.⁷

In a secret meeting, the key military generals split into two different groups over the necessity of the Yushin constitution. The “mainstream group”, led by Chung, expressed a “moderate” political view favoring civilian rule based on a moderate constitution in place of the Yushin constitution. In contrast, young generals, led by Chun Doo Hwan (47), opposed the civilian rule and transition to a liberal democracy. This secret meeting ended without the military reaching any specific agreement on the future course of the country.⁸ Since Chung Sung-Hwa still maintained his control over the military, the moderate military’s cooperation with the Choi government was not endangered until the coup on December 12, 1979.

Meanwhile, the opposition party [the New Democratic Party (NDP)] leader Kim Young Sam demanded a quick replacement of the Yushin constitution with a democratic one by March 1980 and direct elections of the new president, as well as the entire National Assembly members by April 1980. In addition, Kim Young Sam criticized the Choi government’s unilateral-decision making and the presidential election by the NCFU as deliberate moves by the government to guarantee the election of Choi, who had been a loyal supporter of the Yushin regime.⁹ On the one hand, the NDP blamed the Choi government for the delay of political reform and for its inability to further reform. On the other hand, the NDP started to cooperate with the Democratic Republic Party (DRP), which was a ruling party under the Yushin regime and played a rubber stamp role, for establishing a democratic regime. Together they set up the “Special Committee on Constitutional Revision” within the National Assembly in December 1979. In addition, they agreed that the National Assembly should be the major body to revise the constitution. At the same time both parties started to prepare for the next election since they believed that constitutional revision is necessary and transition to a new democratic regime is unavoidable at that time.

Although the DRP was in a confusion and depressed due to sudden loss of its leader, Park Chung Hee, it started to gain strength when Kim Chong-Pil became a new president of the DRP. Since the Choi government was a transitory government and it tried not to give the wrong impression to the people that it was favorable to the DRP, the DRP could not coordinate with the government. To clean up and improve his tarnished image as a loyal follower of the authoritarian Yushin regime,

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⁷Sung-Hwa Chung, Chung Sung Hwanun mal handa [Chung Sung Hwa speaks] (Seoul: Kkachi, 1987), 87, 90-91, and 95-97.
Kim Chong-Pil needed time. In an atmosphere under which the majority of the people wanted to change the Yushin constitution he could not win if the presidential election was held early. Thus, he wanted to delay the process of revision of the constitution as much as possible. Although Kim Chong-Pil agreed to revise the Yushin constitution, he stated on December 20, 1979 that it would take more than a year to establish a new constitution and hold elections.\textsuperscript{10} This view was significantly different from the NDP’s which demanded that all transition to a new government should be completed by August 1980.

In this period, according to various opinion polls conducted during the six months after the assassination of Park, the majority of the people (about 72\% of interviewers) favored major political reforms toward democratization. Specifically, people wanted a presidential system and direct presidential elections. However, they wanted to reduce the power of president, to increase the independence of the legislature and judiciary, and to gain local autonomy.\textsuperscript{11} In this atmosphere the NDP felt confident about winning in the coming election. However, the leadership of Kim Young Sam was not solid enough to make him be a standard-bearer for the presidential election. Owing to his narrow win in the election for party president in May 1979 Kim Young Sam’s control of the NDP needed to be solidified.

The social movements did not show significant mobilization during this period (October - December 12, 1979) except in a few cases. The National Coalition for Democracy and Unification—an umbrella organization formed by Kim Dae Jung and other dissidents in March 1979 to struggle against the Yushin regime—presented a manifesto on November 12, 1979 criticizing Choi’s November 10th television address about the future political plan. They demanded an immediate establishment of democracy, the abolition of martial law, and the adoption of a democratic constitution, all within three months. On November 24, 1979, a group of dissidents organized a rally at the Seoul Y.W.C.A. building in the Myeongdong district of Seoul. It was the first major challenge to the authority under martial law. The goal of this rally was to support the manifesto of the NCDU. However, this rally was repressed by the police within half an hour and 96 participants were arrested.\textsuperscript{12} There were also some attempts to organize rallies for demanding a rapid transition to democracy in Seoul and in Kwangju after the first rally. Other than these events, there were no substantial protests or rallies against the government. Other social movement sectors were still hesitating to organize collective actions in a situation under which the major political parties and the government promised changes.

The United States was very cautious about the development of the situation in Korea. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, stated in October 1979 right after the assassination of Park, that the U.S. would support a peaceful transition to democracy. To monitor the Korean situation and to coordinate between Ambassador William Gleysteen and Washington, the U.S. established a secret cable. The main interest of the U.S. in the Korean peninsula was to maintain “peace and stability,” for several reasons. First, it was necessary to maintain the stability which would guarantee “the

\textsuperscript{10}Dong-A Ilbo, December 25, 1979.
\textsuperscript{11}Song-Jae Kang, “80 nyon bom gukhoe gaehun tukwuiui jwajul”[The frustration of the 1980 Spring National Assembly Special Committee on Constitutional Revision], Sindonga (July 1986): 265, 269-70, and 281.
\textsuperscript{12}Dong-A Ilbo, November 26, 1979.
maximum U.S. share of economic benefits from economic relationships with increasingly prosperous South Korea.” Second, peace and stability would contribute to “the improvement of the human rights environment through evolution of a liberal, democratic, political process.” Third, peace and stability would contribute to preventing North Korea from attempting any military actions give rise to any political unrest in South Korea. This last reason was an important issue, in that about 30,000 U.S. troops were stationed in Korea in 1979. The U.S. and Korean armies formed a unitary command system in 1978, the U.S.-Korean Combined Forces Command (CFC), to improve operation ability for emergencies. Under this system which still operates today, the commanding officer of the CFC, who is a U.S. general, has the authority to approve any movement of the Korean troops. It was necessary for the Korean army to report any movement of troops to the U.S. chief commander before it mobilized any division of the army. Thus, the attitude of the U.S. was important, in that it could prevent the mobilization of the military by using the CFC structure.

Before Park was assassinated, there were conflicts between the Carter administration and the Park regime, due to the Carter administration’s emphasis on human rights issues as well as the policy of withdrawal of U.S. ground troops during 1978-1979. However, these conflicts were healed when the Carter administration shifted its policy on the two issues. To demonstrate the change of policy of the Carter administration and the recovery of the relationship between the U.S. and Korea, President Carter visited Korea in the summer of 1979.

Facing the dilemma of choosing between protecting human rights and pursuing U.S. national security interests, the Carter administration put its priority on pursuing national security interests in Korea as previous administrations did. This policy shift was clear during the period between 1979-1980 in Korea. There were two critical events which facilitated the shift of policy; the Iranian revolution in October 1979 and the Soviet Union’s Afghanistan invasion. Ten days before the assassination of Park, Iranian revolutionary students occupied the U.S. embassy and took Americans hostage. Several days later the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. These two events made the Carter administration panic on the threat of communism. The Carter administration maintained its security first policy throughout 1979 and 1980 in Korea. The U.S. realized that the military was the critical player in this transitional period, and paid close attention to its movements. Since the U.S. wanted gradual progress toward a procedural democracy, it preferred a conservative group to be in power, which could manage this process. By taking a critical stance against Christian leaders and other dissidents in Korea, the Carter administration implicitly supported the moderate groups, the Choi government and the DRP, in the ruling bloc.

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16Ibid.
A Coup on December 12, 1979

The military hardliners who enjoyed their privileges of rapid promotion under Park’s authoritarian regime staged a coup and arrested Chung Sung Hwa, then the Chief Commander of the Army as well as the commander of the martial law, on December 12, 1979. Representing the young generals was Chun Doo Hwan, a Defense Security Commander (DSC). The younger officers were called “Shingunbu” (the new military) in contrast with the older generations. The core members of the new military came from the same class (the 11th class) of the Korean Military Academy (KMA). They were the first graduates of the regular four-year education system and competently trained KMA class. Most of them came from Kyungsang Province, which was also the home province of Park, who personally had promoted all senior military officers. Owing to their high privilege, the young generals wanted to maintain the authoritarian regime. Since they believed that the Yushin regime was not as bad as the opposition groups argued, they opposed the revision of the Yushin constitution. Moreover, they believed that the civilian leaders, especially the opposition party leaders, could not save the country from the threat of North Korea and from the worsening economy. Thus, they were dissatisfied with the moderate military leaders’ cooperation with the Choi government and their intention to support the civilian regime.17

The young generals justified their coup as an effort to expedite the investigation of President Park’s assassination.18 They argued that Chung and other officers, who supported the transition to civilian rule and democracy, were involved in the conspiracy of the assassination of Park. By removing Chung Sung Wha and his followers, the hardline Chun group became an important political actor. After this coup, the new military strengthened its political power by winning three core cabinet positions within the Choi government; the ministries of Defense, Home, and Justice.19 With this event, the Choi government was surrounded by the hardline military (the new military) and the new military was able to influence the decision-making of the government.

After watching the coup on December 12, 1979, the U.S. ambassador in Korea, William J. Gleysteen and Chief Commander of the U.S. Army in Korea, John Wickham, originally voiced their strong complaints about the fact that Chun Doo Hwan’s group violated the Combined Forces Command (CFC) system by mobilizing troops for their coup20. As time went on, however, Gleysteen

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17Koon Woo Nam, South Korean Politics: The Search for political Consensus and Stability (Maryland: University Press of America, 1989), 186-87. The new military based on the clique “Hanahoe (one circle)”, which composed of the 11th class and other officers, mainly came from Kyungsang province. They included most high officers in the government of the Fifth Republic (1981-87). Roh Tae Woo contributed to the coup by moving his troops from the DMZ front to control Seoul city during the coup in 1979.


19Koon Woo Nam, South Korean Politics, 186-7. President Choi originally had planned to pick other figures for these positions. However, he had to change his plan. Chu Yong-Bok, Kim Chong-Hwan, and Paek Sang-Ki were appointed as the Minister of Defense, Home, and Justice respectively.

20According to declassified U.S. government documents, Gleysteen and Wickham met with Chun Doo Hwan after the coup and to convey their “concern over the danger of insubordination, particularly, in light of the
accepted the reality that the military hardliners had become a critical player in politics. Although if Wickham had tried to organize a counter-coup he could have succeeded, he did not attempt to do so. He argued that the U.S. could not interfere with the coup because the coup leaders were supported by most Korean army leaders. However, this was a very weak excuse. According to Chung Sung-Hwa, the military mainstream, except a few politically oriented high officers led by Chun Doo Hwan, opposed the intervention of the military in politics. Since the U.S. concern was maintaining “stability and peace” in Korea the U.S. did not want to take the risk of organizing a counter-action that would cause serious unrest in Korea, which would endanger the most critical foreign interest of the U.S. With the U.S.’s implicit approval of the coup, the new military became a critical player in politics.

Political Stagnation

With the coup, the Choi government, under the pressure of the new military, changed its agreement with both parties about the process of constitutional revision. As a result, the government tried to avoid rewriting of the Yushin constitution, and started to delay the process of the constitutional revision. The government suggested a different political schedule, and proposed to prepare the administration’s own draft constitution in January 1980. In addition, the Choi government set up a working panel consisting of professors and lawyers for this purpose. As time

North Korean threat.” However, at the same time, Gleysteen suggested that the U.S. should not treat “the new military hierarchy as so bad that we decide to risk seriously alienating them.” In later reports Gleysteen suggested that although the new military’s coup was not acceptable, the U.S. would not strongly oppose the new military group’s intervention in politics as long as it could manage the situation with moderation. Moreover, he opposed any sanctions against Korea as well as do nothing. With this attitude, the U.S. did not take any practical action against the new military groups, which helped the new military’s eventual decision to intervene in politics.


Sung-Hwa Chung, Chung Sung Hwanun mal handa, 98-99. and 239. He argued that the Chun group did not get support from the majority of the military high officers. If President Choi aggressively attempted to prevent the coup it was possible to prohibit the Chun group’s coup

Donald Clark N, ed., The Kwangju Uprising,(Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1988) 56-57. General John A. Wickham explained that he did not organize a counter-coup, since he believed that the Chun group obtained solid support from the high-ranking officers. With this evaluation of the situation, Wickham preferred warning the new military to organizing a counter-coup action in order to maintain stability in Korea.

I think there is another reason that the U.S. did not take an aggressive action on the coup, which is Chun Doo Hwan’s doubt on the role of the U.S. in the assassination of Park. In the meeting with Gleysteen, Chun Doo Hwan expressed his doubts about the U.S. involvement in the conspiracy of Kim Jae-kyu. Troubled with this reaction, the U.S. was very cautious in expressing its opposition to the new military group, who justified its action to perform an investigation of the assassination. For the discussion between Chun and Gleysteen, see Shorrock. “The U.S. Role in Korea in 1979 and 1980,” 12-13. Eventually Gleysteen changed this negative evaluation and accepted the Chun group’s coup as a mere power struggle within the military. With this change of attitude, Gleysteen did not push the Chun group to go back to the barracks. Instead, he accepted the group as an alternative power and implicitly acknowledged that as long as the Chun group maintained political stability, the U.S. would not demand the group to stop intervening in politics. Ibid., 14.
went by, the government clearly revealed its purpose to delay the process of transition, and even to revise the Yushin constitution only minimally. The government announced that the parties could not initiate the constitutional revision, but the government should do so. Now the government, the proxy of the “new military,” and the parties started to battle for political transition.

The main issue was what type of governmental system should be adopted for the next regime. The choice was between a presidential system and a parliamentary system. Also it had to be decided whether the elections would be direct or indirect. Since the majority of people preferred a presidential system and direct presidential elections at this time, both the DRP and the NDP agreed to adopt a presidential system. On February 9, 1980 both parties presented tentative drafts of the new constitution, which included a presidential system based on direct elections.\(^24\) They also agreed that the constitution should be revised as soon as possible and that the National Assembly should be a legitimate representative to initiate the constitutional revision.

The government’s plan was revealed on March 14, 1980, when President Choi delivered a speech at the opening ceremony of the Government’s Committee of Constitutional Revision. The government suggested a form of a dual executive government system, under which the president is in charge of national security and foreign policy, and the prime minister, elected by the National Assembly, assumes responsibility for internal affairs. Moreover, the government proposed a multi-district system for the National Assembly election, under which the ruling party can benefit. The reason that the government opposed direct presidential elections was that a strong presidential system would create a dictatorship, and the direct election system would result in dogged struggles between the parties. This over-heated political situation would be a significant threat to political stability and national security.\(^25\) Since the new military wanted to participate in politics, they pressured the Choi government to prepare the dual government system under which the military or a military backed candidate could still hold power through indirect election system. Right after this announcement both parties criticized the Choi government’s plan to secure the interests of the military.\(^26\) As the government clearly revealed its intention for the direction and content of the constitutional revision, the battle between the ruling bloc and both parties became intense.

For both parties it was necessary to prepare for this situation with cohesive strategy and coordination with their constituents or the social movements in order to maintain power. In contrast, both parties did not focus on their criticism of the military. Also they failed to maintain the cohesiveness within each party.

The DRP faced internal dissensions. The intra-party conflicts started on December 24, 1979, when the young party members who wanted to improve the party image and to win in the coming election demanded that those who were involved in the abuse of political position and in amassing wealth by using their position be purged. The major targets were the leading members in the DRP,

\(^{24}\)Sung-Jae Kang, “80nyon bom gukhoe gaehuntukwuiui jwajol,” 270.
\(^{25}\)Ibid., 268 and 274 - 75. The newspapers had already reported the plan of the government in January. However, up until March, the government tried to hide its intentions.
\(^{26}\)One of the NDP member criticized the military as a “masked knight,” who operates the government behind the scenes, in his meeting for denouncing the government plan. Ibid., 175.
including Kim Chong Pil. However, the leaders ignored this demand and argued the necessity of maintaining unity to win in the elections. These “purification” conflicts lasted until the spring of 1980. Moreover, the rumor that the new military and technocrats were trying to organize a new party gave a serious blow to the DRP. Due to all these internal and external factors, the DRP was reduced to ruling party in name only. As the hardline military basically abandoned the DRP and tried to create a new party, many supporters of the Yushin regime, mostly bourgeoisie and bureaucrats, deserted the DRP. Owing to the emergence of the military hardliners as an alternative power group within the ruling bloc, the DRP lost its supporters. Thus, the DRP could not be a relevant counterpart for the NDP in the negotiation for the transition to democracy.

At the same time, the NDP was caught in a similar problem. The return of ousted politicians, including Kim Dae Jung, to the party threatened the leadership of Kim Young Sam in the NDP. Although both leaders shared the same political goals to establish a democratic regime by peaceful elections, they represented different ideological positions.

The internal power struggle for a presidential candidate in the NDP became intense when Kim Dae Jung declared in February 1980 that he would run for president. Although Kim Young Sam came back and became a leader in the NDP, Kim Dae Jung’s struggle against the Park regime and his suffering caused by the Park dictatorship gave him a symbolic popularity. Kim Dae Jung’s intention to run for president caused strong internal conflicts in the NDP, because Kim Young Sam opposed Kim Dae Jung’s initiative in the party.

Eventually Kim Dae Jung declared in April 1980 that he would organize a separate party and run for president in the coming election. The source of the division of the opposition leaders was their ambition to become president. Kim Young Sam believed that he was in a more favorable position than Kim Dae Jung because he was a president of the NDP and had already solidified his support within the NDP. In contrast, Kim Dae Jung was a councilor of the NDP and did not have a large political base, because his political activity was seriously restrained under the Yushin regime. Kim Dae Jung wanted to bring more people in from outside the party. Those people are called the

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28 Prime Minister Shin Hyun Hwak denied the possibility of creating a new party in an interview with *Dong-A Ilbo* on April 25, 1980. However, there were many speculations that the new military tried to organize new party. See the discussion of this possibility among journalists who covered politics in major newspapers. “Angaesokui jungchi kisangdo” [The forecast map of politics in the fog], *Sindonga* (April 1980): 96-117.


30 The rival competition between the two Kims originated from the beginning of their political careers. Kim Dae Jung won over Kim Young Sam and became a presidential nominee of the NDP with narrow margin in 1971. Although Kim Dae Jung was defeated by Park Jung Hee the election was considered as a critical threat for the Park regime. Park established the Yushin regime, which guaranteed life-long power without direct presidential election after the 1971 election. Under the Yushin regime, Kim Dae Jung suffered severe political oppressions and was usually kept under house arrest during this period. He became a symbolic champion figure of democracy. For a discussion of their rival competition, see Yon-ho Oh and Sang-hwi Han, *Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam: Kyungjaengkwa kongjonui yoksada* [Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam: A history of competition and co-existence] (Seoul: Uiam Chulpan, 1992).
“Jaeya,” which is a term used to represent a group of people who fought against the Yushin regime. It was composed of a variety of social classes, such as expelled professors, politicians, reporters, and other intellectuals. To expand his support within the NDP Kim Dae Jung demanded that Kim Young Sam accept more of the “Jaeya” people. However, Kim Young Sam opposed this because he did not want to lose his power within the NDP by allowing the Jaeya people to become members of the Standard Committee which would decide the presidential candidate of the party. The division of the opposition party leaders and their conflicts provided the military with an opportunity to prepare another coup and an excuse to blame political unrest as the cause.

Although there were some differences between Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung about the prospect of democratization during this period, neither realized the intentions of the new military. Kim Dae Jung was more cautious about the moves of the military and paid attention not to provoking the military to intervene in politics. However, these two leaders did not have a more fundamental vision of obtaining democracy in front of the military. Both leaders believed that the Choi government had real power, even after the December 12, 1979 coup by the new military. In addition, they tried to negotiate with the DRP, which had no practical capacity as a ruling party. With this optimism, the opposition party did not depend on mass mobilizations. Instead they firmly opposed resorting to mass mobilizations to enforce the military to go back to the barracks. That is why they did not prepare to form a coalition with other social movements or citizens. Both leaders worried that the mass mobilizations would provide the military with an excuse to intervene in politics. Thus, they adopted a strategy to make the transition to democracy by a pact between parties. They ignored the fact that the military was the major factor in deciding the fate of this transition period, and it already planned to grasp power by force.

The Radicalization of the Social Movements

While the institutional politics were in an uncertain situation in the spring of 1980, civil society was resurrected by exploiting this loosened political opening. As O’Donnell points out, the opening

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31 There was a physical fight between the followers of the two Kims. Sung-jae Kang, “80nyon bom gukhoe gaehuntukwiui gwajol” [The abortion of the Special Committee for the Revision of Constitution in the National Assembly in Spring of 1980], Shindonga (July 1986): 262-85. The author suggests that these conflicts may have been planned by the new military to undermine both leaders. If so, the military succeeded. With this event, the two Kims’ political trust was seriously damaged.

32 Kim Young Sam still assumed in his speech on May 9, 1980 that the Choi government was the major power to handle the situation. He misjudged the situation. Sam-Ung, Kim, ed., Seoului bom: minju sonun [The Spring of Seoul: Declarations of Democracy] (Seoul: Ilwol Sogak, 1987). 161-166.

33 Im, “Politics of Transition,” 150.

34 The U.S. already knew that the military would be the major factor in deciding the situation of this period, but as we have noted the U.S. did not attempt to prevent the new military’s intervention, because the U.S. would support the authoritarian regime as long as the regime can guarantee peace and stability in Korea. See Shorrock, “The U.S. Role in Korea in 1979 and 1980,” 13.

35 Here I used the concept of civil society proposed by O’Donnell and Schmitter. Their concept of civil society means “network of groups and associations between families and face-to-face groups on one side, and outright state
of the authoritarian regime provided civil society with an opportunity to express its interests, and the society experienced an unprecedented eruption of mass mobilizations during this period. The main sectors of the social movements will be examined in the following section: the student movements, labor movements, and the Jaeya group.

The Student Movements

The student movement was the first group to make an impact on the ruling bloc during this period. During the 1970s the student movement fought against the Yushin regime to obtain democratization based on liberal democracy. Students had few theoretical debates on their strategy or tactics because they believed that liberal democracy could be accomplished by their struggle.

The struggle of the student movement against the Park regime was intermittent and reactive on certain issues. Under the severe oppression of the Yushin regime, its struggles could not last long after the Emergency Decree No 9 was established in 1975. Moreover, after Emergency Decree No 9, the Yushin regime prevented autonomous student organizations and set up a pro-government military-like organization, Hakdo Hokuktan (Student Defense Corps) in 1975. In this situation, student movements occurred temporarily under small groups’ leadership. Mass demonstration was practically impossible except in a few cases. Although the student movements could not bring down the regime, they were a primary group for organizing political struggle against the regime. Toward the end of the regime, the student movements played an important role in triggering mass demonstrations in Pusan and Masan, which led to riots in October 1979.

The student movements’ attempts to form a nationwide network were suppressed by the regime. Since the regime used the National Security law to suppress these organizations and the

organizations on the other, mediating between individual and state, private and public.” Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 48. According to Schmitter, civil society is different from clan, clique, cabal, and clientele, in that these groups “obtain a recognized right to exist often though lengthy struggle as well as they can openly deliberate about their common affairs and publicly act in defense of justifiable interests.” Philippe Schmitter, “An Introduction to Southern European Transitions,” in, The Transition from Authoritarian Regime to Democracy vol 1, eds. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence White (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 6-7. The civil society includes different layers of groups such as intellectuals, middle class organizations, professional associations, workers, etc. O’Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, in, The Transition from Authoritarian Regime to Democracy vol 4, eds. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whit (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 49.

36 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, 26 and 48-56.
37 This Emergency Decree prohibited any kind of anti-government activity and punished harshly for those actions. For specific contents of these punishment, see Hak-Kyu Sohn, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea (London: Routledge, 1989), 83.
38 There were several attempts to organize nationwide groups and more advanced organizations, but these efforts were frustrated by KCIA. The representative efforts were ‘Chunkook minju chungryun haksaeng chongryunmaeng [The National Democratic Youth and Student Alliances ]’ in April, 1974, and ‘Namchosun minjokminju chunsun [The National and Democratic Front in South Korea]’ in October, 1979. Some leaders of the latter organization were executed in April, 1980, during the transitory process. For details of the latter event, see Koon
level of oppression was serious, students tried not to become involved in these types of organizations during 1979-80. Under strict surveillance and suppression an attempt to form a network across the campuses nationwide was almost impossible. After several failures, no attempts were made to form this type of organization until 1980. Eventually the student movements faced the open political opportunity without any well-organized organizations or preparations. At this transition period, students in Seoul were the main force of the student movements. The students in the other major cities such as Pusan, Taegu, Kwangju, and Chonju were mobilized but their actions were not coordinated under a unitary organization. The capacity of the students’ mobilization depended on each campus’ student leaders and organizations.

There were two different approaches to dealing with the labor movements within the student movements in the mid-1970s. One group of students argued that the goal of the student movements was to prepare for future political struggle and discipline its members for the future. After they finished school they would need to go to factories to organize workers and pursue more long-term struggles. This group preferred to preserve the student organizations. Thus, this group emphasized the movement of students into factories and accepted the role of the labor movement as the major force of the social movements. Another group of students argued that the immediate political struggle in the streets or on the campuses was necessary, and through these struggles the student movement could grow. Since the student movements were the major forces fighting against the Yushin regime it was necessary for the social movements to organize their political struggle. This group emphasized immediate political struggle and demonstrations in the streets.39

These different approaches emerged again when there were abrupt political openings during 1979 and 1980. Using these opportunities, the student movement leaders, who were in school at that moment and agreed to preserving the student movements’ viability, tried to reorganize autonomous student organizations to create a substitute for Hakdo Hokukdan. Until the spring of 1980, they focused on on-campus issues, such as organizing autonomous student organizations, removing collaborative professors under the Yushin regime, and cleaning up corruption related to school administrations.40 Although the students who were released by the government in November, 1979 went back to the campuses, their demands for more aggressive political struggle did not get support until April, 1980. After the student movements solved most of on-campus issues they began paying attention to the political issues in the spring of 1980.

Despite the differences in the student movements they organized mass demonstrations during May, 1980, in major cities in Korea. They demanded an immediate abolishment of martial law, opposed the government’s initiative of the revision of the constitution, and insisted upon the

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39These two different approaches on tactics developed into major theoretical debates after the Kwangju Uprising in 1980. For the development of the different theoretical debates, see Ilsongjong Editorial Staff, ed., *Haksaeng undong nonjaengsa* [A History of Disputes of Student Movement](Seoul: Ilsongjong, 1988).

withdrawal of the new military from politics. At the peak of the student demonstrations in major cities, the NDP leaders discouraged the student leaders from provoking the military. Faced with this reaction from the opposition party, the student leaders agreed to moderate their approach in dealing with political issues and decided to stop their mass demonstrations in the streets. They negotiated with the government which guaranteed safe return of the students who participated in the demonstration on May 16, 1980, if the students would stop the demonstration. However, this decision did not help to prevent the military from intervening in politics. The night before the student leaders decided to cancel their street demonstrations, the military arrested most of the student leaders and expanded martial law to encompass the whole country on May 17, 1980. The student leaders misjudged the situation at that time. Regardless of the students’ retreat from the planned mass demonstrations, the military already had a plan to intervene in politics. The student movements’ political misjudgment was a main source of critical review about their strategy in dealing with the regime. Only the militant student leaders judged the movement of the new military correctly by arguing that it was necessary for the student movements to focus on the movements of the hardline military and to stage a mass mobilization nationwide, however, their capacity to lead students was low compared to the moderate student leaders.

The capability of mobilization of student movements depended on each campus’ leaders, and the student movements in Kwangju, in Southwest Korea, reacted differently to the military’s expansion of martial law and prohibition on the demonstration. Although student movements in other regions remained silent after the military’s arrest of the leaders in Seoul, Chunam National University students maintained their struggle against the military. Eventually this struggle caused a serious retaliation from paratroopers, which triggered the Kwangju democratization movements. However, as the protests evolved into armed struggles most students, except a few leaders, escaped from the movement. The citizens from lower social classes were the main forces of the struggle. Thus, the spontaneous mass mobilization took place of the student movements.

During this time there were no efforts by the students to form coalitions with other movement

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42Ki-Sok Ahn, “80nyondae haksaeng undong leaderdului kyebowa hyunjuso” [The Genealogy and Current Situation of the Student Movement Leaders in the 1980s], Shindonga (April 1989): 436-37. One of the leaders of the Seoul National University, the strongest organization of the student movements at that time confessed that their decision to retreat from mass demonstration in front of Seoul Train Square was a critical mistake.
43Yonsei University Struggle Committee for Lifting Martial Law, “Bisang gyeom haejerul wihae ssaujia” [Let’s Fight to Lift Martial Law], in Seoulul Bom, ed. Sam-Ung Kim. 328-333. This group of students was a member of the “immediate struggle” faction within the student movement, but its capability to lead a mass mobilization was limited because it did not have an organizational base in schools. The group was mostly released from prison, and used to acting in the small group level under the oppressive Yushin regime. Although their diagnosis of the situation was right, they failed to lead student movements at that time. They criticized themselves about this point later.
44The remaining student movement leaders played an important role in maintaining newspapers within the city and in mobilizing people. Chang-Jin Kim and Kwang-II Lee, “Kwangju minjung hangjaeng” [The People’s Uprising in Kwangju], in Chungnyonul wihan hanguk hyundaesa [A Contemporary History of Korea for Youth], ed. Hyun-chae Park (Seoul: Sonamu, 1992), 327.
sectors such as labor movements, farmers, or church groups. In addition, the relationship between the opposition party and the student movement was not close either. The student movement leaders were sympathetic to the opposition party leaders, but they did not try to build systematic relationships with the opposition party. As time went by, the militant student leaders criticized Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, and demanded them to fight against the new military and against the Choi government.\footnote{It is important to notice that even the militant student leaders did not mention the U.S. role in the democratization process. Up to this point they did not raise anti-Americanism and even the militant students’ leaflets showed that they expected some positive role of the U.S. in creating democracy in Korea. They argued that the U.S. pressure on the Korean military could be a favorable condition. See Yonsei University Struggle Committee for Lifting Martial Law, “Bisang gyeom haejerul wihae ssauja” [Let’s Fight to Lift Martial Law].}

In general, the level of organization of the student movement was low, and the student leaders did not have a long term strategy for democratization. Facing suddenly opened political opportunity and backed by students, the student leaders went out to the streets in the spring of 1980. However, these leaders, who faced the new military’s reaction, retreated from the streets and hesitated at the critical moment due to lack of correct judgment of the intention of the military, a nationwide network, and coordination with other social movement sectors. The hesitation and weakness of the student movements allowed the new military to take action first and the students lost their opportunity to organize themselves.\footnote{It was impossible for the student movement to block the new military’s intervention in politics at that time. The major point is that student leaders should have not retreated on May 15, 1980. Even though the result was clearly defeat in that struggle, they should have fought at Seoul in considering the political impact. Instead of Seoul, Kwangju was chosen as a battleground between the new military and the citizens. Geographically Kwangju was far from Seoul and it was easy to isolate its struggle from other regions. For an evaluation of the May 1980 struggles, see Ilsongjong Editorial Staff, ed., \textit{Haksaeng undong nonjaengsa} [A History of Disputes of Student Movement], 26-28.}

Since the student movement was the main force of the struggle for democracy, their lack of organizational capacity, theory for alternative goals, attempts to form a coalition with other movement sectors, and information about the military indicates that other social movements with even fewer capabilities than the student movements also were weak at this time.

The Labor Movements

Although the Yushin regime tightly controlled workers and prohibited them from acting collectively by using oppressive labor laws and the police, a rapidly growing Korean economy created favorable conditions for workers’ collective actions. While the Park regime accomplished high economic growth “by moving from cheap labor-based light industries to heavy and chemical industry the workers in small-and medium-size industries continued to suffer from low wages, poor working conditions, and despotic labor relations in the working place.”\footnote{Hagen Koo, “The State, Minjung, and the Working Class in South Korea,” in \textit{State and Society in Contemporary Korea}, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 139.}

In addition to the deteriorating economic situation of the workers, other factors contributed to the growth of the labor movement. The number of workers rapidly increased and concentrated
The ratio of workers among the whole population increased 31% in 1961, 39% in 1970, and 51% in 1980. As Koo Hagen pointed out, “the new urban working class began to reproduce itself in cities.” These factors contributed to improving workers’ collective identity. However, these structural conditions required conscious efforts to organize workers. Church organizations and students played important roles in raising workers’ consciousness by educating the workers during the 1970s.

Church organizations, especially Catholic youth groups (JOC) and the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) played an important role in teaching workers about their rights and in providing networks and resources which the church had already used to organize democratic unions. Since the regime used a co-opted pro-management union (Oyong), and had blocked the creation of a union to control the labor movement, the workers needed either to create a new democratic union or to change those co-opted unions to democratic ones to protect their rights. The JOC- and UIM-assisted female workers created independent grass-roots unions in the textile and electronics industries. These activities were significant in helping to organize several democratic unions.

Students also provided a great deal of help in educating workers into having a “worker’s collective consciousness.” When Chun Tai Il immolated himself on November 13, 1970 as a protest to demand improvement of inhumane working conditions in garment factories, it had a serious impact on students and intellectuals. Realizing workers’ working and living conditions, students started to build links with workers. Initially, students tried to provide workers with chances to educate themselves with regular school texts at night school (Yahak). However, as time went on, students shifted their focus of teaching to raise workers’ class consciousness. Eventually, some students joined the labor movement after they graduated from college, and became an important part of the labor movement during the 1970’s.

Toward the end of the 1970’s the Korean economy suffered serious problems “arising from several coincident[al] events: the second oil shock and subsequent world recession, overinvestment in heavy chemical industries, the adverse balance of payments, runaway inflation, competition from low-wage Third World countries in export market, ....” Due to these difficulties, many companies laid off workers and closed factories. The unemployment rate was 3.8% in 1979, and 5.2% in 1980. In this situation, about 200 female workers who were employed at a wig factory, YH company,
staged a demonstration against the plant closure in August 1979. The police expelled the workers from the plant by force. In order to get help from the New Democratic Party, these workers staged a sit-in in front of the headquarter of the NDP. In reaction to this, the NDP tried to assist the workers but the regime cracked down on the sit-in. In the process of this crackdown a worker was killed by the police and several of the members of the NDP were injured. The reaction of the regime caused a series of protests, and led into the Park regime’s collapse. Utilizing this political opening, workers waged collective action to demand wage increases, improvements in working conditions, and democratization of co-opted unions in the spring of 1980. The number of labor disputes increased from 105 in 1979 to 407 in 1980.52

One important collective action of the workers occurred at a coal mine in Sabuk in the Kangwon Province, located east of Seoul, on April 20, 1980. These coal miners initially demanded wage increases and the abolition of the co-opted union. In reaction to their collective action, the police again tried to quell this demonstration by force and the confrontation escalated to violent riots. The miners occupied the town for four days. Eventually they obtained the wage increase. This violent collective action showed how the workers, who were under repression during the Yushin regime, participated in collective action spontaneously by using the political opening. Other workers launched collective actions and demanded wage increases and democratization of unions. These collective actions were spontaneous mass mobilizations that exploited the sudden political opening.

However, since the labor movement was tightly controlled by the state, its level of organization, ideology, and relationship with the other social movement sectors was low, limiting its capacity to participate in political struggle. The attitude of the labor union leaders during the 1980 transition period clearly demonstrates the limitations of the labor movement. When students launched mass demonstrations demanding political democratization, the workers who organized a sit-in on May 13, 1980 in the KFTU building to demand a guarantee of basic labor rights ignored the students’ appeal to participate in the demonstration.53 Instead, the labor union leaders remained at the sit-in and refused to participate in the demonstration because they did not realize that their struggle for wage increases and democratic unions was closely related to democratization. The workers’ class consciousness was limited to economic struggle. This event was representative of the status of the labor movement in the democratization process in 1980. Eventually, workers’ spontaneous strikes and violent confrontations, which were exploiting the loosened political situation, provided the new military with an excuse to blame the workers’ collective action as the source of social unrest. In addition, the workers’ demands for wage increases was used by the new military to threaten the middle class and business people by arguing that if the military did not interfere, this social unrest would lead to a breakdown of the economy, which was already showing symptoms of crisis. As a result, the workers’ collective actions, which were not led by coordinated leadership and organizations, provided the military with an excuse to intervene in politics.

The main weakness of the labor movement during this transition period was a lack of core

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52 Ibid., 149.
leadership which had long-term goals, could lead organized political struggles beyond the economic struggle, and could make a coalition with other sectors of social movements. Although there were objective conditions such as the increase of the number of workers and their concentration in certain areas which could facilitate political organization and collective action in the process of democratization, the labor movement, under the tight control of the state, could not mobilize for political goals. The objective condition itself does not help to organize people without a self-conscious effort to form an organization and pursue political goals. The defeat of the labor movement before the Korean War (1950-53) and the aftermath of the war, left significant limitations on the development of the labor movement in Korean politics. In addition, the state’s adoption of an authoritarian development strategy forced workers to endure very oppressive labor law which controlled most of the collective actions of workers. These factors contributed to the weakness of the labor movement in Korean politics. The labor movement’s nascent status was one important reason for the weak reaction of the opposition groups in this transition period, in that the labor movement failed to coordinate its struggle against the new military with those groups. The opposition group had no bases from which to launch a coordinated struggle against the military.

The Jaeya (Extra-Institutional Opposition Groups)

Since the Yushin regime suppressed the NDP and it became a semi-loyal opposition party until 1979, there were no formal institutions to represent the interests of opposition groups within the institutional political arena. In this situation, various people organized themselves to perform their struggle against the regime. The term Jaeya means extra-institutional opposition groups who are pursuing democracy and fighting against the regime outside of institutional politics. The Jaeya is different from student movements and labor movements in that the members of the Jaeya were mostly intellectuals and ousted politicians, but they were politically oriented and fought against the regime for a procedural democracy. The Jaeya is composed of people with a variety of different occupations, former dissident students, religious leaders, professors, writers, ousted politicians, and journalists. Many organizations were formed to struggle against the regime, and dissolved themselves when the limited time for action was over. Or sometimes those organizations were dissolved through the regime’s oppression. The National Coalition for Democracy and Unification pushed for more organized democratization movements on March 1, 1979. Their tactics of struggle were mainly

56Keun-Sung, Lee “Yushin jungkwenkwa jaeyaseryukui dungjang” [The Yushin Regime and the Emergence of the Jaeya Forces], in Yushin chejewa minjuhwa undong[The Yushin Regime and Democratization Movement], ed. Seung-Hun Han (Seoul: Samminsia, 1984), 25.
57Before the NCDU there were several organizations formed by the Jaeya: the National Council for the Guard of Democracy as an election watchdog to prevent election rigging in April 1971; the National Council for Recovery of Democracy for a signature campaign for the constitution revision on December 25, 1974; and the National Coalition
peaceful. These were written declarations criticizing the Park regime, the organization of a campaign for constitutional revision, and the launching of peaceful demonstrations. Under the Yushin regime all these activities were illegal. The regime oppressed these activities using Emergency Decrees which prohibited general freedoms of speech, press, and association. By November 1979, Emergency Decree No. 9 was enacted to prevent any possible critiques of Park. But relentless oppression by the regime could not stop the successive organizations and struggles of the Jaeya. 

A major contribution of the Jaeya to the democratic movement was to reveal the regime’s brutality and abuse of human rights by sacrificing themselves. The repeated arrest and oppression of the leaders of Jaeya organizations brought attention not only internally but also internationally to the situation in Korea. The regime’s stern oppression showed how the regime violated human rights. These violations of human rights became a main source of conflicts between the Carter administration and the Park regime. Mainly, the struggle of the Jaeya played a symbolic role in undermining Park’s regime, by showing there was incessant resistance. Without these struggles, Park could have legitimized his life-long dictatorship. In addition, the Jaeya assisted the NDP party in playing the role of a more “clearcut opposition party,” which could fight against the Yushin regime in 1979.58

However, the movement of the Jaeya showed some limitations. Since the members of the Jaeya came from a variety of different social classes, it was very difficult to have well-organized long-term goals. Instead, the various organizations started by the Jaeya were maintained for short periods of time, and dissolved after certain short-term goals were either attained or not attained. With the lack of either a coherent ideology or long-term goals the organizations could not last long. In terms of mobilization capability, the Jaeya did not base itself on mass populations and other social groups such as workers, farmers, students, or urban poor. Due to the lack of broad support of the Jaeya their struggle could not undermine the Yushin regime significantly.

After the assassination of Park, the NCDU organized a secret rally, demanding that the presidential election by the National Conference for Unification, at Myungdong YWCA in Seoul on November 24, 1979, be stopped. The military, which was under the leadership of the moderate Chung Sung Hwa, arrested dozens of the participants for violating the martial law.59 This event showed how the military viewed the Jaeya movement. Except for this event, there were no significant attempts at demonstrating by the Jaeya during the transition period.

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58 Among the Jaeya leaders, Kim Dae Jung, who was a rival of Kim Young Sam in the presidential candidate race in the NDP in 1971 gave support to Kim Young Sam to gain power in the NDP. For a detailed story of the race, see Yon-Ho Oh and Sang-Hwi Han, *Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam: Kyungjaenggwa kongjonui yoksa*, 117-120.

Since there were many different groups which had different perspectives on the tactics for the transition within the Jaeya, it could not coordinate a significant struggle. During the period of the spring of 1980, the Jaeya split into two different groups to pursue its goal of obtaining procedural democracy. One group supported Kim Dae Jung and followed his line of political participation, i.e., the gradual line. Since the followers of this group were ousted politicians, they agreed with Kim Dae Jung. Mainly, they focused on the gradual transition and were not acting to give the military an excuse to intervene in politics. Therefore, they emphasized patience in dealing with the military.

After Kim Dae Jung decided not to enter the NDP, the followers tried to create a new party with him. This group was part of the Jaeya. There was no difference between the NDP and this faction in that both the NDP and this group pursued power. The difference was that the “gradual line” of the Jaeya had a more cautious perspective on the transition period, but they did not support this perspective with any specific alternatives. When this group decided to follow Kim Dae Jung, it became entangled with other institutionalized political groups.60

Another group pursued a more “activist line” of tactics. They were mostly composed of former student leaders, progressive church leaders, and radical dissident intellectuals. This group preferred popular mobilization and more direct pressure on the regime to accept their demands for a rapid transition to democracy. Their tactics thus relied on mass rallying and street demonstrations, which were later adopted by the students. After the student leaders returned from prison to schools, these leaders were the primary channels to persuade moderate student leaders toward more activists lines of tactics. The militant student activists, who were influenced by the activist-oriented group in the Jaeya, started to persuade the incumbent student leaders who were concentrating on campus democratization. Many student demonstrations during May 1980 were organized due to the pressure of the militant students. However, since they also did not have a long-term goal and did not perpetuate their leadership into the incumbent student leaders, the militant students failed to maintain the popular mobilization. In sum, the Jaeya failed to emerge as an alternative political group who could lead during the transition period and to coordinate struggles with other sectors of the social movements and the opposition party against the military. There were limitations to struggle against the new military with these heterogeneous Jaeya.61

The Kwagnju Uprising and Abortion of the Transition to Democracy

The new military, who operated the political situation behind the scenes came forward when Chun Doo Hwan, a Defense Security Commander, became the chief of the KCIA in March 1980. With this event the new military clearly revealed its purpose to intervene in politics. Both political parties failed to prepare for this situation, since they suffered internal conflicts and spent most of their time trying to occupy a better position in the coming election. They did not attempt any coordination

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61 Yong Han, 80nyondae hanguk sahoewa haksaneng undong, 9.
with the social movements to pressure the government for fear of military intervention as well as because of their disinterest in using the national assembly to lift martial law. Only when the demonstrations increased seriously to provoke the hardline military did the opposition party leaders encourage the students to be patient and agree to open the emergency session of the national assembly to lift martial law on May 17, 1980. However, this reaction was too late to prevent the military from intervening in politics. Since if martial law is lifted the military will lose power over politics, the new military enacted emergency martial law on May 17, 1980. The rationale of the coup was to protect the country from “political chaos and anarchy caused by student protests, workers’ strikes, and demagogy of the irresponsible politicians.”

With this measure, the martial law commander, Lee Hi-Sung, one of the supporters of the new military coup, took over the day-to-day administration. Martial Law Decree No. 10 dissolved the National Assembly, prohibited all political activities and assembly, imposed tight control over press and media, closed colleges, forbade labor strikes, and banned rumors, slander, and defamation of the government. The representatives of the students who gathered together to discuss the future plan at Ewa Women’s University, were arrested before the extension of the martial law on May 17, 1980. In addition, many politicians were arrested, including Kim Dae Jung and Kim Chong Pil. Kim Young Sam was not arrested, but he was forced to announce his permanent retirement from politics. As a result, the new military rose to power.

Faced with the severe repression of the military hardliners, most student movements in major cities including Seoul stopped demonstrations, except for one city, Kwangju, the capital city of Chunam Province located in southwest Korea. Unlike other group of university students, Chunam National University students gathered in front of the school and tried to get into the school on May 18, 1980, but paratroopers attacked the students indiscriminately with clubs and bayonets. This harsh oppression provoked mass protest in the city. As time went on, citizens participated in protests to protect themselves from the paratroopers’ harsh attacks and the movement grew into a mass rebellion lasting for nine days. The clash between the citizenry and the paratroopers escalated to an armed struggle, which was unexpected on both sides. Although the movement spread into the near cities of Kwangju, the military succeeded in isolating the struggle in the territory of Chunam. All communications were monitored by the military. The rest of the people in South Korea did not know what happened in Kwangju and why the citizens had struggled against the military. The movement was dubbed by the military a rebellion provoked by Kim Dae Jung and other pro-North Korean agitators. All citizens who participated in the movement were called mobs or simple followers of North Korean propaganda.

The citizens expelled the military from Kwangju city to the outskirts of the city by May 21,

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1980, when they controlled the city. They organized their own leadership to negotiate with the military and to appeal to the U.S. for assistance. They still believed the U.S. would help their struggle for democracy. To their disappointment, the negotiation with the military failed and the U.S. ignored the people’s request for assistance. Instead, the U.S allowed the military to mobilize the 21st division of the Army to regain control in Kwangju City. With this measure, the military killed the resisting armed civilians and regained control over the city on May 28, 1980.

The main reason for the Kwangju uprising was the paratroopers’ cruel overreaction to students and citizens. This indiscriminate oppression was premeditated to show that the new military would treat individuals or groups who challenged the military with maximum brutality. The new military tried to demonstrate their stern will for power because they believed this movement was an important challenge to their building of power. Although the Kwangju uprising was quelled by force, it provided an immense lessons to the student movements and to other sectors of social movements in terms of their perspective on the military, the attitude of the U.S., the strategy for obtaining democracy, and the meaning of democracy. The social movements realized the importance of ideology, strategy, and nationwide organization in struggling against the military. They also believed that revolution was the only way to bring down the military regime. Moreover, the U.S. was not a supporter of democracy but supported the military for the sake of its own interests in Korea.

The Carter administration was satisfied with the situation in Korea by April 1980. According to a secret cable, Secretary Vance expressed his “great satisfaction over the many positive developments” in Korea. Even when Chun became head of the KCIA in early April, the Carter administration “had returned to a business-as-usual stance with the Korean government.” In addition, the Carter administration allowed Chun to use the military to handle student demonstrations in March and April, 1980. On May 7, 1980, Gleysteen reported to Washington, informing that “the Korean military had informed U.S. commanders in South Korea that it was moving two Special Forces brigades to Seoul and the area of the Kimpo Airport for contingency purposes and to cope with possible student demonstrations.”

During the Kwangju uprising, the position of the Carter administration became clear. During the fight against the military, the Kwangju citizens had expectations that the U.S. would support their struggle for democracy and would save them from the military’s attack. They expected that the U.S. at least did not agree with the military’s blame for the citizen’s struggle. However, this expectation was a misunderstanding of the principles of U.S. foreign policy. Instead, the U.S. agreed to the

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66Ibid.
67This document proved the argument of the opposition about the role of the U.S. in the Kwangju uprising in 1980. Up to now the U.S. officially denied that it knew the movements of the Special Force, and it did not approve the mobilization of the troops which was responsible for the massacre. However, this secret cable showed that the U.S. already knew the movement of the Special Forces in May, 1980. Also, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) informed the Department of Defense Joints Chiefs of Staff on May 8 about the movement of all Korean Special forces brigades. This cable reported specifically about the movement of the 7th Brigade, which was sent to Kwangju universities. In addition, it stated that all Special Forces units “had been receiving extensive training in riot control.” Ibid., 9.
Gleysteen’s report to Washington showed his change of view. At first, when he had news about the Kwangju uprising, he wrote to Washington on May 19, 1980 that “rumors reaching Seoul of Kwangju rioting say special forces used fixed bayonets and inflicted many causalities on students.” However, two days later his tone had changed and he wrote “unquestionably ... a large mob has gained temporary run of the city, and the authorities face series of very different options.” Based on the U.S. conception of an “unruly mob”, the Carter administration made a decision on May 22 in Washington to send military forces to retake Kwangju. Although Gleysteen and General Wickham “have been assured by the military hierarchy” they would encourage public distribution of the official U.S. statement from the day before (May 21) urging “maximum restraint” on both sides, military action had already been approved at this point. Shorrock, “The Role of the U.S. in Korea in 1979 and 1980,” 8. This distribution was never accomplished instead the new military distributed leaflets urging the immediate surrender of Kwangju citizens. See Donald N. Clark, ed., The Kwangju Uprising, (Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1988), 61. The example of how the State Department officers had distorted information on Kwangju can be seen in the cable which Secretary of State Edmund Muskie sent on May 25 to Richard C. Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “the moderation citizens committee has lost control of the situation and the radicals appear to be in charge. People’s courts have been set up and some executions have taken place. Student demonstrators have been largely replaced by unidentified armed radicals who are talking of setting up a revolutionary government.” Although Muskie changed his tone and asked Holbrooke to be cautious about making judgments, the decision about supporting the new military using the 20th Division to quell the Kwangju movement was made in this situation. Shorrock, “The Role of the U.S. in Korea in 1979 and 1980,” 17.

In her article, Kirkpatrick argues that an authoritarian regime is bearable to people and better than a totalitarian regime. Thus, it is better to support an authoritarian regime as long as it opposed the totalitarian regime which means a communist or anti-American country. Jean Kirkpatrick, Commentary, November 1979, pp. 34-45. Cited in Tamar Jacoby, “The Reagan Turn Around on Human Rights,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1986), 1068. Although the policy came from the critique of the Carter administration, when the national security of the U.S. was threatened by several events such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua, the Carter administration adopted its national-security-first policy, like other administrations. Bruce Cumings, “The Abortive Abertura: South Korea in the Light of Latin American Experience,” New Left Review, (January/February 1989): 16 and footnote, 27.

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With the failure of the movement, the transition to democracy vanished at this time. After this bloody massacre, Chun Doo Hwan rose to power formally and paved the way for a new authoritarian regime. Kim Dae Jung, who was arrested before the Kwangju uprising by the military, was sentenced to death in August 1980 for provoking the Kwangju rebellion. In order to make a new constitution, Chun formed the National Emergency Committee in August 1980. The constitution was changed but maintained most of the framework of the Yushin constitution. There was a change made to the term of the presidency, from no limitation to one time election of seven years. But basically it provided the president with stronger powers over the National Assembly, and still maintained indirect presidential elections and the multi-district system for the general elections. Based on the new constitution, which allowed a direct presidential election by electoral college members, Chun Doo Hwan was elected as president of the Fifth Republic in December, 1980. The new military did not consider the NDP party as a counter-partner of negotiation. Instead, they believed that the NDP party and social movements were weak enemies with which they did not have to negotiate. The hope for democracy disappeared when the new military began controlling politics and reestablishing a more oppressive authoritarian regime. The social movements went underground until the regime partly liberalized its grip on civil society in 1984.

Aborted Transition to Democracy

In this section, the negotiated transition model will be applied to Korea to examine how the Korean case fits into the model and for what reasons the first attempt to make a transition to democracy failed. This transition framework suggests several conditions which should be met for the successfully negotiated transition to democracy. First of all there should be responsible representatives from each party who want to negotiate. The reformers within the ruling bloc, who are willing to change the authoritarian rule and to take a risk of opening the tight control of the regime, should exist. The reformers should maintain relatively autonomous power to control the hardliners in the regime.

The moderate opposition, which wants to make the transition to democracy through negotiation, can gain power from mass mobilization by forcing its opponents in the regime to participate in the negotiation. At the same time, the moderates have to show their ability to control the radicals in the opposition group. Without this control of the radical groups, the moderates will lose their initiative in the process of transition. In this case, the process will result in either revolution or a return to the authoritarian regime. It depends on the power of the extremists on both sides. If the hardliners in the regime maintain superior power over the radical social movements, the authoritarian regime will be restored. If the radicals overwhelm the hardliners, revolution is possible. Thus, for a successful negotiation, the reformers and moderates need to cooperate to weaken the extremists during the process of negotiation.

70Later the sentence was reduced to life-long imprisonment. Eventually he was allowed exile to the United States for treatment of his illness in 1982.
Usually, both the reformers and the moderates do not feel the need to negotiate from the beginning of the liberalization. Instead, the reformers and the moderates are confident about winning unilaterally in the physical confrontation. The reformers believe that they can contain the mobilization of the opposition. At the same time, the moderates also believe that they can succeed in mass mobilization and turn down the regime. Therefore, there often will be sequences of mass protests, demonstrations, and sit-ins, on one side, and crack-downs, martial law, and abuse of human rights on the other side. However, these clashes should not result in one-sided victory. It is necessary for both parties to realize that they cannot overthrow or completely subdue each other. Without this tug-of-war or seesawing confrontation, both sides will not confer to solve problems by negotiation.

In the case of Korea during 1979-80, there were five major actors, hardliners and reformers in the ruling bloc, moderates and radicals in the opposition bloc, and the U.S. The hardline military led by Chun Doo Hwan had the goal to maintain the authoritarian regime. The goal of the reformers was to make a transition to civilian rule and procedural democracy. The mainstream military led by Chung Sung-Hwa, the DRP, and the Choi government before the December 12 coup could be included in the reformers group within the regime. The major goal of the NDP was to obtain procedural democracy and the NDP emerged as a moderate opposition party. The social movements demanded more rapid transition to democracy and guarantee of substantive democracy. The goal of the U.S. was to maintain stability in Korea in order to guarantee its interests.

In order to make a successful transition to democracy the reformers within the regime and the moderates within the opposition bloc needed to gain power over the two extremists, the hardliners and the radicals. However, the hardline military rose to power within the regime by arresting the reformers. With this event, the power relationship within the ruling bloc changed. Moreover, when the hardliners abandoned the DRP, the DRP lost its position as a representative ruling party. At the same time the Chun group seized the Choi government and controlled the government. With these operations the hardline military became the core of the regime. In this process, the U.S., which could have prevented the military coup, did not take serious action except for a warning and shortly after the event the U.S. had changed its tone and started to support the Chun group’s decision.

Faced with the emergence of the hardliners, the moderate opposition party had two choices: pursue its goal by resorting to mass mobilization or cooperate with the hardliners and accept another authoritarian regime. To launch mass mobilization, the NDP needed to coordinate with the social movements and to control them. Since the NDP explicitly showed its interest in obtaining democracy it should have preferred mass mobilization to defensive strategy. The major failure of the NDP at this point was that it could not locate the core of power in the ruling bloc. Without knowing the actors with whom the NDP was dealing, the NDP failed to properly prepare its strategy.

Second, although the NDP realized the military was the core of power in the ruling bloc after Chun became head of the KCIA as well as the DSC in April 1980, it did not take the strategy of the mass mobilization. The leaders of the NDP failed to understand the necessity of mobilization to force the military to participate in negotiation.

Third, the NDP failed to maintain its unity due to the internal competition between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. The competition undermined the ability of the NDP since both leaders consumed their energy in solidifying their own support. This factional fight caused blame from the
military as well as the people. In addition, their lack of the attention to coordination with the social movements contributed to the radicalization of the students who complained about the process of transition as well as the military’s involvement in politics. The radicalization of the student movement provided the military with an excuse to overthrow the unstable process of transition to democracy.

According to the negotiated transition model, if the hardliners control the reformers then the transition is impossible. Moreover, if the moderates in the opposition bloc can not maintain their control over the radicals, the negotiation for democracy becomes very difficult. The Korean case between 1979-80 showed both of these situations. The hardline military rose to power and controlled the reformers. At the same time, the moderate NDP fail to be a representative of the opposition bloc due to its lack of cohesive leadership and to its failure to coordinate with the social movements.

Moreover, as Huntington pointed out, there should have been a stalemated situation between the military and the opposition bloc in order to make a negotiated transition. Since the power of the opposition bloc was weak due to its lack of unity and failure of mass mobilization, the power gap between the military and the opposition bloc was significantly large. With this situation, the negotiated transition was impossible. Instead, the hardliners, and the students and citizens who wanted to pursue their goal by force collided in Kwangju. The students and citizens in Kwangju failed to overcome the military’s physical power. At this point the U.S. played a critical role in supporting the military and quelling the Kwangju movement. Since the U.S. supported the military, the power balance between the military and the opposition bloc became more skewed toward the military. In this situation, the hardline defeated the opposition bloc and the transition to democracy failed.