

CHAPTER FOUR -- A TOOLBOX FOR MEANING

"One of the damn things is enough" -- "Rebecca West's irritated response to the 'mind as the mirror of nature' model that it is hard to see why one would want a copy of the universe" (quoted in Brandom, 1994, 74).

Loose Ends and New Knots

My overall argument now stands at a juncture. I promised in the introductory chapter that I would be giving an account of intentional representations. The first stage, that of showing how an account of meaning must take into account the intentionality of interpretation, has been completed. The second stage is more difficult. It will require an argument that an adequate conception of the problem of meaning must account for the logical space between non-epistemic activities and epistemic activities, for somewhere there is the key to a proper way of talking about meaning.

During the search to find that key, I will show that the gap between epistemic and non-epistemic activities can be bridged. It is in the context of a search for a proper language of meaning that the thesis regarding Kant's notion of the productive imagination is introduced to fill the logical space between non-epistemic and epistemic activities. Once Peirce's phenomenological analysis of experience is introduced, the picture presented needs but little modification to provide a skeleton account of pragmatist meaning. Meaning is then taken as the phenomenal content of representations which are necessary for beings which have only sensible forms of intuition to conceive of anything at all. Because we are such beings (i.e., incomplete beings), for objectivity to be considered possible at all, an account of meaning applicable to our experience requires showing that non-epistemic activities are really connected to epistemic activities. Meaning is then construed as the intentional mediation of conceptions and unified experiential structures which precede conceptualization. Elaboration of what it is to be an incomplete being, which will be done in chapter five is required to make perspicuous the problems that arise in arguing objectivity in that context, however.

Phenomenalistic concerns

It is clear that in accepting those of Sellars' arguments which effect a refutation of the myth of the given, we need not worry about committing ourselves to the view that there really are particular physical objects. Sellars would not have wanted us to think that he thought his arguments implied such a commitment. It is not clear, though, that he would reject the notion that his arguments implied something else: that, because we presently conceive of ourselves within a world of physical objects, our accounts of non-epistemic activities, as well as epistemic activities, should be made in language about certain such objects.

My concern in this regard is phenomenalist: I want to maintain a seed of phenomenism such that talk about sensings and *even full-blooded perceivings* need not have anything to do with particular objects of our world whether that world be the one of ordinary believing and acting or that of our scientific theories. This concern arises from the belief that objectivity of experience is not an essential matter for treatment of the problem of meaning. Rather, I think that accounts of meaning have neglected object-directedness (as opposed to objectivity), which cannot be separated from questions about experience as a finished process.

The last chapter demonstrated that a phenomenalist approach committed to the notion of the given is a dead end: conceptions of meaning must involve intentionality. My purpose in this chapter and the next is to indicate certain epistemological and ontological issues which arise in consideration of intentionality. In doing so, I will argue for deemphasizing the ontological issues. Also, I will argue that the resolution of such issues should also resolve any complications with respect to the notion of intentionality corresponding to the resulting metaphysics. I offer a tentative resolution of those issues, which, in turn, is also a theory about the conceptual form of "meaning". The form of "meaning" I propose involves a notion of intentionality characterized by persons' incomplete conception of self, a reaching-out toward objects not yet conceptualized, and an inclination to engage in inquiry.

The proposed sketch involves a two-framework system, where one of the frameworks does not include any objects at all. It is simply a framework of reachings-out toward objects, where the objects of that object-directedness are to be found in the other framework. Once this picture is developed, it becomes clear that to talk about propositional thought in language derivative of talk about physical or other objects is to suggest that we can understand intentionality only in terms of objects. Since I will be arguing that all of our objects are products of intentionality, this would be to put the cart before the horse. However, what I have in mind cannot be presented convincingly until a great deal more work has been done.

Whither individual capacities?

The notion of the given, as presented and refuted in the last chapter, seems to arise from an attitude of denial directed at the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic activities.¹ Yet, we have seen that there are good reasons for distinguishing between the two kinds of activities. The result is recognition that individual capacities, i.e., essentially (as opposed to merely accidentally) autobiographical facts about individual perceivers, should play a diminished role in accounts of language-learning (see Sellars, 1963, 81-4). That is, if the having of a linguistic ability requires being a member of a community which shares a conceptual framework, individual capacities can play only a causal role. Though causally necessary, such a role is far more trivial than we would have expected prior to borrowing Sellars' spectacles. The surprise is almost enough to make us try to deny that the distinctions are clearly drawn; for surely the individual is not only responsible for what she says, but also for being able to say what she says, and she is responsible for *that* because of her own experience and capacities, not because of the common experiences of some collection of persons and the framework that community has developed.

While someone who idolizes the given (e.g., traditional phenomenologists) will deny that the distinctions between epistemic and non-epistemic activities are drawn sharply, it is not the case that someone who denies that the distinction is clearly drawn necessarily idolizes the given. Were someone to argue that

¹ This attitude of denial might take the form of reductivism in which concepts are nothing but the firing of synapses or such-like and in which even propositionality is said to result from mere physiological changes *in individuals*.

the distinction is not a clear one, however, care must be taken in providing reasons for that position. It would be easy to give the wrong reasons and, thereby, be drawn into the cult of the given.

One wrong reason someone might give for rejection of the distinction is that it is not clear how a child could learn a language if, in a sense, the child must already have the concepts for learning it. In response, though, it should be kept in mind that the stringent condition for an appropriate cognitive response to an experience -- that one know that the appropriate conditions are appropriate -- "does not imply that one must have concepts before one has them" (Sellars, 1963, 148). Nevertheless, it would seem to require some kind of individual capacity for making connections at the pre-conceptual levels, which connections somehow are analogous to conceptual connections developed later. I have loosely referred to this *pre-conceptual capacity* as "taking one's behavior seriously", where the different activity of *taking responsibility for one's behavior* would be an activity that takes place within a conceptual framework.

I said that one might be drawn to the cult of the given by a belief that the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic activities was not sharp. I also implied that one might have reasons for believing that the distinction is not clearly drawn which do not necessarily invoke the myth of the given. I have just such a reason in mind.

We might imagine someone who believes that there is some kind of connection between epistemic and non-epistemic activities which is not merely causal, as opposed to conceptual, yet, which cannot be associated with the notion of epistemic aboutness in that strong sense that perceivings can and should be. That person might hold the view that "there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the" cognitive and conceptual (e.g., knowing), "and on the other hand with the" non-conceptual (e.g., behavioristic dispositions).² Such a view would require that the lines between cognitive and non-cognitive activities be blurred. It would not entail, of course, the belief that non-epistemic activities like sensing are actually epistemic. It would, however, imply the view that there is

² Of course, I am paraphrasing a part of Kant's discussion of the schematism (A138/B177).

something non-conceptual, but also non-dispositional (behavioristically-speaking), which plays a role in forming knowledge. Hence, if there were such a capacity, it would be cognitive, but would not have a place coordinate to our conceptual framework. Its place, rather, would be subordinate to our conceptual framework.

The Productive Imagination

The role of the present discussion

This view is not original and I am not pretending to be bringing it out into the light for the first time. It was, in fact, introduced by Kant. He referred to the process in which unified structures, i.e., schemata, are produced as the "schematism" (A140/B179),³ but it has been generally discussed relative to the capacity responsible for the activity: the productive imagination (*loc. cit.*). Conveniently, Sellars has discussed Kant's notion of the productive imagination. However, before I represent his discussion, I want to clarify the role the notion of the productive imagination has within the construct I am building.

The underlying point of my current line of argument is that an account of language learning which itself entails the existence and effective use of individual capacities need not entail or presuppose either an ostensive tie to the world or foundational non-inferential knowledge. Put generally, I have in mind an individual capacity which involves an object-directedness, but is *not a capacity* for the individual *to find* objects of perception or thought. Rather, it is a predisposition which, given that the finding of objects by individuals requires that they be embedded in a social framework, can be characterized as a mere preparedness, though not the ability, to find objects.

³ References to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* are made to Norman Kemp Smith's translation and are given according to the first ("A") and/or second ("B") editions.

Kant's productive imagination

In taking this approach, we find that there already is a candidate for a model on which to found a theory of intentionality on top of the framework of inquiry.⁴ Kant gave us an account of how the raw material provided by our sensory equipment is processed into a form that allows subjects to conceptualize that material content. Of course, that "processing" requires something that shares characteristics of both non-epistemic and epistemic activities (A138/B177). Kant's concepts are altogether empty without a material content (A139/B178) and require the bridging of the gap between sensing and knowing by some capacity which unifies the matter given in sensibility (A145-6/B185). Similarly, in the account presently being given, epistemic activities are altogether empty without the unified structures which are the product of an *a priori* imagination. In my account, those unified structures are the pieces which are used to make moves within the conceptual framework. Following Kant, it is the productive imagination that generates those unified structures.

Of the "productive imagination", Kant wrote that "[t]he two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of imagination" (A124). What Kant meant was that there is something, i.e., the productive imagination, which relates the capacity for non-epistemic activities to the capacity for epistemic activities. Without that connection, sensing, for example, could not play the role of causally mediating between perception and the sensible world. Insofar as the productive imagination is able to mediate between sensing states, and the like, and perceiving events, and the like, it does so independently of, and prior to, reception of sense impingements, which is what Kant meant when he spoke of a *transcendental* function.

Sellars' discussion of the productive imagination

Sellars commented on Kant's notion in a paper entitled "The Role of the Imagination in Kant's Theory of Experience" (1978). There, Sellars wrote that the productive imagination played the role, with

⁴ Though it may not be apparent at this point, by using Kant's model, the notion of representation that will be used to give the form to a pragmatist conception of meaning will become inseparable from intentionality. It will turn out that the representational aspect of intentional representations will be found in the mediation of positions in a conceptual framework and certain structures generated by the productive imagination. The intentional aspect of intentional representations will be found in both the reaching-out and the epistemic aboutness already mentioned and to be given a context below.

respect to children, of "an innate conceptual framework -- a proto-theory, so to speak, of spatio-temporal physical objects capable of interacting with each other" (1978, §32). Apparently, Sellars saw in Kant's notion of the productive imagination exactly the same pre-conceptual capacity I indicated was needed. Also, he saw the productive imagination as very much tied to Kant's forms of intuition, i.e., space and time. In addition, Sellars seems to have indicated that "though the child does not yet have the conceptual framework" required to have knowledge which is within the logical space of reasons, the child does have a general framework for encountering "others", by which I do not mean other people, but other spatio-temporal things (1978, §32). Thus, when the child does develop the capacity for epistemic activities, she can then form propositional attitudes with respect to impressions she had before she was able to make sense of (i.e., to cognize) the encountering of others.

Sellars used the notion in further developing his theory of the non-epistemic and epistemic activities of sensing and perceiving. He distinguished between *what the object is perceived as* and *what is perceived of some object* (1978). "Perceiving as" is the mode of perception in which what is perceived is not actually "of" an object in the non-epistemic, causal sense, though it appears to be. That mode of perceiving involves both imaging -- that is, production of "a unified structure containing as aspects" qualities that can be instantiated according to spatio-temporal forms of intuition -- as well as conceptualizing -- that is, being aware of the position of some fact within a logical space of reasons. The result of this form of perceiving is, for example, one's shivering while looking at a snow-covered peak from a warm observation point. The coolness is not sensed, but one's productive imagination produces a unified structure which can have real consequences, such as, in that example, an epidermal reaction much like one would have if one were actually exposed to cold temperatures. In contrast, "perceiving of" is the mode of perceiving in which what is perceived are qualities which are actually sensed. In addition to that which *perceiving as* consisted of, *perceiving of* also involves not just conceptualization and the forms of intuition (i.e., space and time), but also an actual sense content.

It can be seen from the fact that there are three elemental modes of activities -- sensing, imaging, conceptualizing -- that there are the following important possible modes of "experience", construed broadly: sensing, sensing and imaging, imagining (i.e., perceiving as, which consists of imaging and conceptualizing), and perceiving of (i.e., sensing, imaging, and conceptualizing). Since imaging is but the production of unified structures, we do not become aware of these unified structures as such, but we can recognize them as such upon reflection (Sellars, 1978, §27). Thus, we can really speak of imaging only in virtue of the combination of imaging and conceptualizing (and, thus, only with respect either to imagining or to perceiving of). Hence, a pre-conceptual child would be able to sense things and to imagine things, but would not be able to cognize them as facts having a propositional content. One way of putting that is to say that, for the child, the sensings and imagings could not be put into relation with other "experiences", but would rather, fade in and out. Notice that there would still be sensations, though no true experience of "otherness".

Also, conceptualizing independently of imaging would not seem possible since conceptualizing simply is a conceptual response to a unified structure as some potential object of experience. Thus, it requires the work of the imagination, and thus, requires imaging for it to be about anything. The importance of this fact is that imaging does not play a merely causal role -- it also plays the role of providing the unified structure which is to be conceptualized. That is, imaging provides the pieces in virtue of which it is possible for there to be moves made (within a conceptual framework), rather than a mere arrangement of conceptual positions. Inasmuch as it is a structure, there is a material which -- while not given in sense reception, but produced by the imagination -- if not for that material, conceptualizing would not only be empty, but could hardly be said to be the occurrence of conceptualizing. While sensing, for example, causally mediates between the physical world and the conceptual, inner world, imaging both causally and cognitively mediates between sensing and perceiving.

The role of the productive imagination in Kant's system

Kant's move "to show how pure concepts can be applicable to appearances" (A138/B177) is exactly the one we would need to try to bridge the gap between what can be given in propositional form only indirectly or derivatively (i.e., any instance of non-epistemic activities) and what has propositional form

of itself (i.e., any instance of epistemic activities). At the beginning of this chapter, I was arguing that, though the distinction between non-epistemic and epistemic episodes be sharp, it must be bridged. Obviously, Kant saw the same difficulty for his concepts and intuitions as I was indicating with respect to perceiving and sensing, long before I did. The productive imagination can be used to fill the gap between the two, i.e., connect the conceptual realm to that of sense impressions.

According to Kant, beings whose forms of intuition are sensible come into immediate contact with things in themselves only through the senses, as opposed to through the intellect (A19/B33, A51/B75, and B146-7). The productive imagination is necessary for such beings to have knowledge of objects, in Kant's system. If that objective knowledge is knowledge resulting from immediate contact, the image produced from a manifold of those sense impressions (i.e., sensible intuitions) must be conformed to concepts (B146). Likewise, if the knowledge of objects does not result from immediate contact, but is *merely mediately* related to objects in thought through some far removed intuition, the image of the senses (generated by the *reproductive* imagination) still must be conformed to the concepts involved in thinking about the object (see B150-52 and A140-2/B179-81). That conforming requires a unified structure, which is generated by the productive imagination. It is in that way that "[t]he two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding" come to "stand in necessary connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of imagination" (A124). Of course, conceptualization is still required for any object to be known, i.e., for one to have any concepts regarding objects.

As Kant also pointed out, the productive imagination would not be needed for beings who apprehend objects by intellectual forms of intuition (B138-9, B145, and B151-2). Nevertheless, the result of beings like ourselves' having merely sensible forms of intuition is that unified structures are necessary for knowledge of objects. Below, I will refer to this necessity in terms of an incomplete intentionality. It accounts for the "reaching-out" introduced at the end of the preceding section and to be discussed below and for the incompleteness of personhood, also to be discussed in the next chapter.⁵ The need

⁵ With regard to the latter, "incomplete personhood" is the name I give to conceptual beings whose conceptual frameworks are incomplete. Question and doubt emerge when the instabilities of conceptual schemes become important in some personal decision, purposeful action, or thought.

for unified structures for there to be knowledge for persons implies a need for sense impressions to be conformed to concepts and, hence, a need for concepts. If concepts are taken as cultural/linguistic, as Sellars seems to do, the existence of a conceptual scheme implies a community. Hence, the necessity for the activity of the productive imagination accounts for incompleteness in terms of both object-directedness, i.e., reaching-out for objects, and the incompleteness of one's account of one's world.

Peirce's discussion of the schemata of the productive imagination

Sellars was not the first pragmatist to find Kant's notion of the productive imagination interesting. On the subject, Peirce wrote:

[The greatest fault of Kant's logic] lay in his sharp discrimination of the intuitive [non-epistemic] and discursive [i.e., epistemic] processes of the mind. . . he drew too hard a line between the operations of observation and ratiocination. . . His doctrine of the *schemata* can only have been an afterthought, an addition to his system after it was substantially complete. For if the *schemata* had been considered early enough, they would have overgrown his whole work. (CP 1.35, 1885)

Peirce seems to have underestimated the importance of the fact that Kant did include in his "transcendental doctrine of the elements" such a thing as the schematism. However, if one takes the schemata as what I have been (loosely) referring to as an application of the productive imagination, one sees that Peirce was indicating a need for the same pre-conceptual capacity I mentioned above. That is, if we are given the miserly choice between the barrenness of mere non-epistemic activities and the fecundity of epistemic activities, it is difficult to see how the two activities are related. Peirce (though he, of course, did not have that latter observation in mind) seems to have thought that the schemata, as elements of Kant's system, could have been used to make continuous the transition from sensing to perceiving.

That is not to say that Peirce expected, once that continuity was established, that a materialist account could be given for all those activities. Peirce was actually opposed to accounts which emphasized material accounts by excluding what could be called "conceptual" (see CP 5.77-101, 1903). His

response to distinctions, it seems, was to find the third element lurking behind any line dividing two elements. This was just as true at the epistemological level as it was at other levels. Nevertheless, it seems that Peirce did not intend to acknowledge the importance of the productive imagination and the schemata and so to propose modest modifications to Kant's project. Rather, it seems that Peirce saw the schemata as the simple notion of some connection between sensing and perceiving. Consequently, when the so-construed "simple" notion that sensing and perceiving are not wholly separate was applied by Peirce, it was applied not to a theory of some epistemological apparatus (e.g., Kant's "understanding"). Rather, it was applied in the development of Peirce's metaphysics and the result was anything but conservative or simple.⁶

Peirce's Phenomenology

Without resorting to Peirce's opulent metaphysics, one can still picture what it would mean for something like Kant's schematism to overgrow one's whole work. That is, we can imagine a philosophical system in which something modeled on the notion of the productive imagination plays a central role. From that centrality, it would follow that the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic activities would not be so clearly drawn as Peirce thought it was in Kant's first Critique, though it might still be drawn. One way of allowing the productive imagination to play that role in one's system is to develop a phenomenological approach which would toe the line between empty concepts (i.e., positions within an unused conceptual framework) and blind sensing (i.e., sensing which is a mere channel for material impressions lacking intentionality). In fact, this is what Peirce did.

⁶ It would be sufficient to comment that the extravagant metaphysics that resulted involved the notion that thought and reality are continuous such that some element is common to both in varying degrees (CP 6.476-7, 1908). The capacity we have for representational thought -- for conceptualization -- is taken by Peirce to be a result of the constitution of the physical universe having a nature interrelated with thought (CP 5.93-106, 1903). Peirce made this evident when he stated that there is no absolute boundary between thought and the physical world: "all mind is directly or indirectly connected with all matter, and acts in a more or less regular way; so that all mind more or less partakes of the nature of matter" (CP 6.268, 1892). What form Peirce thought that connection takes is not clear, though. Elsewhere, Peirce claimed that there is a "natural tendency toward an agreement between the ideas which suggest themselves to the human mind and those which are concerned in the laws of nature" (CP 1.80, c.1896). Furthermore, in Peirce's system, "[t]houghts act on the physical world and conversely" (CP 5.106, 1903). Similarly, "words produce physical effects" (CP 5.106, 1903). Hence, unlike Kant, Peirce seemed to suggest that the connection between the objects of appearances lies outside of ourselves, in the nature of reality. Thanks to the happy correspondence between the structure of our thought and the structure of the universe, according to Peirce, we can consider our sensations, actions, and thoughts within a continuous framework. That framework is similar to Kant's in some superficial respects, but is, in general, fundamentally different. To understand what is fundamentally different between Peirce's and Kant's framework requires examining what Peirce called his "universal categories" (Turrisi, 153).

The logical form of phenomena

As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, Peirce wanted "to formulate with mathematical precision, definiteness, and simplicity, the general facts of experience which logic has to take into account" (CP 3.618, 1911). Peirce understood experience to correspond to the three forms of predication: monadic (e.g., " x is bald"), dyadic (e.g., " x is higher than y "), and triadic (e.g., " z is in between x and y "). While the forms of predication are ordinary logical notions, Peirce associated each of them with phenomenological notions to yield something more meaningful.

Since monadic predicates cannot be relational, it would seem that only simple qualities could be associated with monadic predicates. The simple phenomenological qualities associated with monadic predication, as simples, can be considered neither as reacting with other things or in isolation, since even isolation requires a logical space within which something is in isolation.

Similarly, it would not make sense to associate simple phenomenological qualities with dyadic predicates, though one might use properties that would involve paired relations, such as would be involved in predicating "heavier than" of something. The phenomenological notion associated with dyadicity is that of otherness. That is, since dyadic predication involves paired relations, the fact of there being some thing and another thing can be expressed phenomenologically as resistance or reaction of one thing to another thing such that the two things are not reducible to one of those things.

Triadic predicates involve properties which apply to three things at one time and such that these properties cannot be expressed as paired relations. Hence, as an extralogical notion, triadic relations consist in a kind of "generation" of something (a) as a result of the relation holding between two things (b and c), such that each of the latter two things stands in a relation to the first thing (e.g., b in relation to a) which is different from that other relation of either of the two things to the first thing (i.e., is different from, e.g., c in relation to a), as well as different from the relation holding between the two things (i.e., b in relation to c). According to Peirce, "[e]very triadic relationship involves three dyadic relationships and three monadic characters; just as every dyadic action involves two monadic

characters" which resist each other (CP 6.331, *c.*1909).

While the logical notions of monadic, dyadic, and triadic predicates do not have any relation to metaphysical things, Peirce nevertheless took these three notions to constitute the basis on which all phenomena can be analyzed. That entails that discourse regarding the forms of phenomena lies on a higher plane than that regarding forms of predication. That is, while logic only yields the form of phenomena, phenomenology has to do with both form and content of phenomena (CP 1.452, *c.*1896). Peirce called the phenomenological forms "universal categories".

Phenomenology and pre-conceptual capacities

I mentioned above that Peirce's phenomenology allows for the productive imagination to play a role in one's philosophy. That story will not be told yet, but a brief statement can be made here. In effect, Peirce's monadic qualities correspond loosely to Kant's pure concepts, Peirce's dyadic phenomenological category corresponds to the objects of possible experience which we run up against, and his triadic universal category corresponds to the mediation of the manifold of the sensible intuitions and the pure concepts under which objects of possible experience are subsumed.

In Kant's framework, the mediation role is played by the productive imagination. However, since Sellars' system is constructed around the conceptual framework of persons, there are two mediating roles to be played. Inasmuch as sense reception plays a part in the intellectual life of persons, the productive imagination must play the role of mediating between sensing and perceiving. However, with respect to the mediation of the private (though non-experiential) inner world which the productive imagination makes possible in my account (as we will see shortly) and the conceptual inner world made possible by our having a logical space of reasons, conceptualization is that mediation.

Peirce's universal categories

It still remains to describe Peirce's universal categories. Monadic forms of phenomena are what might be; they are what can be, but are not, as monadic forms, embodied in actual phenomena. Peirce described monadic qualities as "the qualities themselves, which in themselves, are mere may-bes, not necessarily realized. . . not even what truly appears" (CP 1.304, *c.*1894). One might say that monadic

qualities do not exist in the ordinary sense by themselves, but only when embodied. It is then that these phenomenological elements become present as phenomena. Peirce also described the nature of such phenomenological qualities as "a consciousness in which there is no comparison, no relation, no recognized multiplicity (since parts would be other than the whole), no change, no imagination of any modification of what is positively there, no reflexion -- nothing but a simple positive character" (CP 5.44, 1903). Thus, phenomenological monadic predicates will not even be something that is noticed. In a sense, they are like the descriptive content of Sellars' sensings. Such content is but a "mere may-be" until embodied and made present to a mind.

Dyadic forms of phenomena are what are actual in a pure sense, facts, independent of the *quality* found in phenomena. On this subject, Peirce said,

We are constantly bumping up against hard fact. We expected one thing, or passively took it for granted, and had the image of it in our minds, but experience forces that idea into the background, and compels us to think differently. . . . You have a sense of resistance and at the same time a sense of effort. (CP 1.324, c.1894).

It is a sense of struggle, or reaction, irrespective of context that Peirce was trying to invoke. It is that which the dyadic form of phenomena consists in, when considered alone.

The third form of phenomena involves the mediation of the monadic and dyadic forms. Peirce used such notions as baking a cake from a recipe (CP 1.341, c.1894), composition (CP 1.297, c.1905), and intellectual processes like inferences as means of conveying the essence of triadic forms of phenomena, which is to bring together merely possible qualities (monadicity) and the here-and-now-ness of the mere form of reaction (dyadicity). In Peirce's presentation of these forms of phenomena, each of the latter was segregated from the others and held in suspension. The third form is what joins them.

The triadic form is the most difficult to form a clear conception of, but it is the only one that can mediate between pure qualities of the monadic form and the brute fact of existence represented in the dyadic form. What is necessary is something that is of mind. However, even that quality does not

constitute reality, it is only an ingredient, that which combines qualities, of the first phenomenological form, and the hecceity, or otherness, of the second phenomenological form. Without the first and second forms, the third form cannot be real.

[T]he third category -- the category of thought, representation, triadic relation, mediation, genuine thirdness, thirdness as such -- is an essential ingredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute reality, since this category. . . can have no concrete being without action, as a separate object on which to work its government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of feeling on which to act (CP 5.436, 1905).

While the third form of phenomena can be real independently of the others, it has no force of otherness, no presence as something else without the second form. Likewise, without the first form, the third form of phenomena has no quality to it. It could act as a law, or as a habit, but would be empty, as empty as a mathematical theory is of all empirical content. Furthermore, joined with one, but not the other form, the third form would lack the force of law. In the case that it is joined with the first form, it would be something like one's trying to remember something, but never succeeding. In the case that it is joined with the second form of phenomena, it would be like a law that compels, but has no quality to it, something like the force of gravity.⁷

We find that Peircean phenomenology will allow us to give an analysis of "meaning" which is not far removed from logical notions. That will enable us to offer some rigor in treating "meaning". On the other hand, it will move us in the direction of practice. That means we will not be left with an overly abstract, stale notion of "meaning". The result of using Peircean phenomenological analysis in bridging the gap between non-epistemic and epistemic activities will be an analysis of representation, one which will also give us the form of the experiential wholes which are our conceptions. In the next chapter, we will see how the bridge between the non-cognitive and the conceptual provides the pieces for

⁷ Peirce's universal categories can be seen as forms of insight which are used in interpreting the laws of the universe, much like the Kantian forms of intuition "determine[s] the manifold of appearance [so] that it allows of being ordered in certain relations" (A20/B34). However, the difference here is that there is no sharp line in Peirce's system between the faculties of intuition and understanding. If Peirce's system could accommodate Kant's "forms of intuition", then they and Peirce's categories would be indistinguishable (Of course, Peirce's categories are forms of *thought*, as well.). Hence, there would be no need for a manifold of intuition or its synthesis by means of the imagination, as Kant requires. In Peirce's far simpler system, the categories act both as conditions of our possible discursive experience of reals *and* as that which so determines the manifold of the appearance such that appearances can be ordered according to certain phenomenological forms.

understanding instances of meaning as intentional representations.